Public Opinion Pool – Summer 2002
PREVARICATING
POLITICIANS
Expert team of the CPS
Srećko Mihailović, (team manager)
Stjepan Gredelj, Sociologist
Zoran Stojiljković, Politicologist
Belgrade, July 2002
1
BASIC INFORMATION ON THE SURVEY
The field research for this public opinion survey was conducted in the first week of July, 2002.
The survey was conducted on a sample of 1,590 adult citizens of Serbia (not including Kosovo).
The sample was drawn from 82 local communities in 60 municipalities, some of which comprise
more than one local community. It is a combination random, stratified and quota sample.
Comparison of the basic information about the respondents in the sample with the characteristics
of the general population demonstrate that there are no significant differences and we thus can
have confidence in the findings of this research and, at the level of the whole sample, their
extrapolation to the entire population.
The data was collected in standardised face-to-face interviews with a questionnaire of 153
questions. On the average, interviews lasted 35 minutes (from 25 to 50 minutes). The
percentage of those refusing the interview was far lower than in similar surveys conducted
previously. Interviewers contacted an average of 24 people to obtain each 20 interviews.
The research was carried out by the research team of the Centre for Policy Studies, led by Srećko
Mihailović. The team also included Dr Stjepan Gredelj, Zoran Stojiljković M.A. and Milan
Nikolić.
The sample was half men and half women.
Twenty-five per cent of the respondents were aged under 30; 22 per cent were between 30 and 40
with another 22 per cent between 40 and 50 and the same percentage of 50 to 60-year olds, with 15
per cent aged 60 or over.
Respondents who had completed primary school or less made up 40 per cent of the sample,
another 24 per cent had trade qualifications, 21 per cent had completed secondary school and 15
per cent were graduates of technical schools or university.
By occupation, the sample included 9 per cent farmers, 18 per cent unskilled or semi-skilled
workers, 23 per cent skilled workers, 5 per cent technicians, 12 per cent civil servants, 14 per cent
professionals, 8 per cent housewives, 9 per cent students and 2 per cent other occupations. Among
these occupations, 5 per cent were self-employed (owners of shops and other businesses), 9 per
cent were pensioners and 10 per cent unemployed.
Eighty per cent of the sample were of Serb nationality and 20 per cent were members of other
ethnic groups.
2
There are numerous major social and individual problems, and no one to solve them
-- Serbia, for the umpteenth time, is fiddling while Rome burns!
The key finding of this research is that seven out of ten people believe that “politicians are diverting
us with what is described as high politics while ignoring the real problems”. What are these real
problems? The low standard of living is ranked by 71 per cent of the people among the three most
important problems. Then come 58 per cent of people including the fight against corruption and
crime among the three most important problems and 52 per cent who put the development of the
economy in this category. Thus, a low standard of living, poor economy, crime and corruption. This
triad also appears in the quartet of dominant social goals as seen by the public. More precisely, 68
per cent of people rank an improved standard of living among the first three social goals, 57 per cent
add economic progress to this, 48 per cent include the fight against crime and corruption and there
are also 33 per cent of people who include political stability among the most important goals.
And it is exactly these “real problems” which are the main cause of public dissatisfaction. As many
as 78 per cent of people are dissatisfied with the standard of living, 76 per cent with economic
development, 72 per cent with the achievements of the fight against crime and corruption, 62 per
cent with the level of political stability and, added to this, should be the dissatisfaction with the level
of social justice expressed by 64 per cent.
The wheel turns full circle with the answers to the question “Which three political parties would
make the greatest contribution to resolving the major social and individual problems identified?” A
quarter (24 per cent) of the respondents, on average, do not see any single party as being up to
this task, while two fifths (39 per cent) were unable to answer this question. Only 37 per cent
of the respondents named at least one party as being able to contribute to resolving these
issues.
There is no one to solve the problems. Major social and individual problems exist. It is
exactly the social goals which the people list as the most important, which are intensely
irritating. These issues are also linked to the greatest dissatisfaction of the people. On the
other hand a relatively small number of people identify political parties as having any
solutions for these most important problems. In any case, the public see themselves as being
trifled with because current politics is not dealing with the issues they see as most important
-
The parties most frequently mentioned as having a solution are:
20% - Democratic Party
18% - Democratic Party of Serbia
11% - Civil Alliance of Serbia
8% - Democratic Alternative
7% - Christian Democratic Party of Serbia
6% - New Serbia
6% - Democratic Centre
5% - Serbian Radical Party
3
-
3% - SPS/Ivković
3% - Serbian Renewal Movement
3% - Social Democratic Party
2% - Coalition of parties of Serbian unity
2% - New Democracy
6% - other parties
In the resolution of the nine most important problems and the potential contribution of political
parties, the advantage goes to the Democratic Party in four cases and in three to the Democratic
Party of Serbia. In two cases, neither of these parties had any advantage over the other. In the
opinion of the people, the Democratic Party would make a greater contribution than others in
resolving problems to do with privatisation, the standard of living, economic development and the
development of democracy. The Democratic Party of Serbia would contribute the most to the
pursuit of national interests, the establishment of the rule of law and the achievement of social
justice. Neither of these parties has an advantage in fighting crime and corruption (Democratic Party
of Serbia very slightly in the lead) or the establishment of political stability (Democratic Party very
slightly in the lead). In all problems, the contribution of the Civil Alliance of Serbia comes third on
the list.
Table 1: Potential contribution of political parties to the resolution of the greatest social and
individual problems (percentage)
Political
Parties
Democratic Party
Democratic Party of Serbia
Civil Alliance of Serbia
Democratic Alternative
Christian Democratic Party of
Serbia
New Serbia
Democratic Centre
Serbian Radical Party
SPS/Ivković
Serbian Renewal Movement
Social Democratic Party
Parties of Serbian Unity
New Democracy
Other parties
Standard of
living
23
17
11
6
6
Economic
development
24
16
11
7
6
Fight against crime
and corruption
17
17
8
6
8
7
5
4
3
3
3
2
2
8
8
5
4
4
2
2
2
1
8
7
4
6
3
3
2
3
7
9
What must certainly be added to the facts in Table 1 is the finding that 28 per cent of respondents
say that they cannot identify a party which could make a contribution to resolving the problem of the
standard of living. In the case of economic development this figure is 25 per cent and for fighting
crime and corruption it is 23 per cent. These facts should also be seen in the light of the number of
respondents who are unable to answer the question about parties able to make a contribution to the
resolution of these three problems – in the case of economic development this is 43 per cent, in the
case of fighting crime and corruption it is 39 per cent and for the standard of living 34 per cent.
4
What do the people see as the reasons for what they obviously believe is the lack of efficiency of the
current authorities, in other words for the limited effectiveness of change or the “minor
achievements in reform”? The following is a list of factors which, in the opinion of the people, are
responsible “to a great extent” for the lack of effective reform.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
Rifts and conflicts within DOS
Failure of political leaders to take responsibility for what is said and done
The unresolved issue of relations between Serbia and Montenegro
The difficulty of the problems we face
The lack of competence of the new authorities
Connection between people from the old and new regimes
Lack of a clear government strategy for reforms
64%
55%
52%
51%
44%
41%
39%
Chart 1: To what extent are the rifts and conflicts within DOS responsible for the inadequate
changes?
13%
6%
17%
64%
not at all/ slightly
moderately
to a great extent
don't know
It also does no harm to mention the data on responsibility for the conflicts and clashes within DOS
(see Table 2). The public originally blamed both parties but, choosing between the Democratic
Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, slightly more people hold the Democratic Party and Zoran
Đinđić responsible. Compared to the state of affairs a year earlier, it is interesting to note that the
number of people linking responsibility for the break-up of DOS with the Democratic Party has
remained virtually unchanged, there is a small increase in the number of those who blame the
Democratic Party of Serbia, but the greatest increase, from 25 per cent to 37 per cent, is in those who
hold both parties and both leaders responsible. “DOS will not break up” is no longer an option in
this year’s survey, of course, after having been favoured by one in seven respondents in the survey
conducted a year ago. Also significant is the fact that the number of those who haven’t answered
this question has dropped from a third to a quarter.
Table 2: Responsibility for conflicts, clashes and the eventual break-up of DOS (percentage)
Who is responsible?
Democratic Party of Serbia
Democratic Party
Equally, both parties and both leaders
Something else
Don’t know who is responsible
DOS will not break up
TOTAL
August 2001
July 2002
10
19
25
2
32
12
100
5
15
20
37
3
25
*
100
Because the people do not see those problems they regard as major being resolved through the
institutions of the system, the question which logically arises is that of how they see the
consequences.
Many talk about mass protests and unrest as the reality which awaits (as though the “fiery autumn”
is an ever-present issue. Twenty-four per cent of respondents believe there will be politicallymotivated mass protests, 29 per cent are sure there will not be and all the rest refrain from such
predictions. A very significant number of people, 40 per cent, expect unrest because of economic
factors, while 31 per cent of respondents say this won’t happen and the number who refrain from
stating an opinion on this is also rather smaller in this case.
Chart 2: Forecast of politically motivated mass protests
24%
47%
29%
there will be mass protests
there will not be mass protests
don't know
Chart 3: Forecast of economically-motivated protests
29%
40%
31%
there will be mass protests
there will not be mass protests
don't know
When asked the question: “Will things become so bad that it will be necessary for the government to
abolish some freedoms and use force to prevent chaos?” 45% gave an affirmative reply, 15% gave a
negative reply and 40% said they did not know.
6
Chart 4: Will things become so bad that the government will abolish freedoms and use force?
15%
40%
45%
yes
no
don't know
As opposed to these potential consequences of the non-functioning or poor functioning of the
political and public institutions, there are some consequences already existing which we have
recorded in this survey. The issue is a process which, at the outset, seemed to us the process of
depoliticisation but which was later identified as actually being a process of diminishing party
identification, or the process of de-alignment of the people.
In the survey in August of last year, respondents were asked to say who they would vote for in the
case of elections in Serbia and 38 per cent of respondents either said they would abstain, or didn’t
answer the question or simply said they didn’t know. In this year’s poll, the percentage of abstainers
and the uncommitted jumped to as high as 55 per cent. The number of abstainers and uncommitted
is high even in the case of presidential elections, between 38 and 40 per cent (depending on how the
question is phrased).
Alienation from all major political parties has also increased. There is no longer any single party to
which more people feel proximity than distance themselves from it. The Democratic Party of Serbia
has the highest score here with 33 per cent of respondents saying they feel close to it and about the
same number (31 per cent uncertain, 3 per cent don’t know) describe themselves as distant.
Compared to the status of the party last year, the proximity score is almost half and the distance
score has almost doubled. The situation is similar with other parties.
The general opinion of politicians is much lower this year than last year. The only political figure
among DOS leaders whose rating remains unchanged is Miroljub Labus. Last year, 54 per cent of
respondents had a positive opinion of him and this year 55 per cent have the same opinion.
Dragoljub Mićunović’s popularity has fallen very slightly, others have suffered a more obvious fall,
while in some cases (Perišić, Kostunica), the rating has plunged.
While these three groups of indicators point to the possible depoliticisation of the Serbian public,
questions on attitudes to politics in general show that the public are actually repulsed by the parties
and their leaders and not by politics in general.
Half the respondents (52 per cent) refuse to accept the claim “I have so many problems of my own
that I am not the least interested in the problems of the state”; 30 per cent agree with it and 18 per
cent are undecided. Thus the interest of the people in the problems of the state as opposed to only
their personal problems (52 per cent as opposed to 30 per cent) is also obvious. However this
attitude does not also imply the hegemony of state issues over personal issues. Two thirds of
7
respondents disagree with the claim “Each person should first worry about state and social issues
and only after that deal with his own problems”.
When problems are not solved where they should be solved, anything is possible! It is obvious
that people are unable to resolve the issues they see as most important through official
institutional procedures (at least that is how our respondents see things). People react to this
situation by distancing themselves more from the political parties and their leaders (the rapid
drop in popularity of parties and their leaders and of confidence in these political figures).
However they do not distance themselves from politics in general. The other possible
consequence of this situation is the potential mass riots which are predicted by a not
insignificant number of respondents.
(1) In the eyes of the people – a black vision of society
How do the people see the society in which they are living? In which direction is this society
headed? How does all this look compared to last year and in the context of expectations then held
for the year ahead? And, generally speaking, how do the people see the near future of this society?
Chart 5: What kind of situation is this society in?
1% 2%
23%
18%
56%
good
tolerable
barely tolerable
intolerable
don't know
One in every five respondents sees the situation in the society as good or at least tolerable, while all
the others see it as intolerable or barely tolerable. It is unambiguous that this is an extremely
gloomy vision of the society. It should also be added here that there is a rather larger proportion (34
per cent) of those who believe the country is headed in the wrong direction than those who see it as
in the right direction (28 per cent). However there is an extremely high percentage (38 per cent) of
those who are unable to assess the direction that has been taken.
8
Chart 6: Is this country going in the right or the wrong direction?
28%
38%
34%
in the right direction
in the wrong direction
don't know
Added to this gloomy vision of the society is the number of people who feel that, economically
speaking, this year is worse than the last (42 per cent). Twenty-eight per cent of the people say that
this year is better than last year and 30 per cent say that the situation is unchanged.
Chart 7: What will next year be like?
29%
45%
26%
worse
same
better
However, people see a somewhat rosier future in comparison to the gloomy present. While 29 per
cent of respondents believe that next year will be worse than this, 45 per cent expect improvements
and 26 per cent believe things will remain unchanged. This is supported by an even brighter vision
of the immediate future. Only 19 per cent believe the future will be worse, 18 per cent of
respondents do not expect things to change either for better or for worse and 53 per cent are of the
opinion that the near future will be better than the present.
People see the present in this society as black, while the future looks rather rosier. On what do
people base this social optimism?
(2) It’s a hard life!
Life is intolerable or barely tolerable for a large number of people. This is the opinion expressed by
as many as 58 per cent of the people about their lives. Only 40 per cent of respondents describe their
lives as tolerable or possibly good.
9
Chart 8: How do you and your family live?
7%
13%
6%
32%
42%
well
tolerably
barely tolerably
intolerably
don't know
These assessments were concretized with specific descriptions of the current financial situation.
Thus 15 per cent of respondents report that they do not even have sufficient money for food, 43 per
cent have money for food, but buying clothing and footwear is a problem for them. Thus we see that
almost three fifths of the people report problems in meeting their basic needs. Then follow 28 per
cent who report having enough for food, clothing and footwear, but not enough to buy more
expensive items such as a refrigerator or a television set. Ten per cent of respondents say that none
of this is a problem for them but they are unable to buy a car. Finally, 1 per cent of respondents can
afford to buy whatever they want (and 3 per cent did not answer).
Table 3: Financial situation and level of education (in %)
Financial
situation
Primary
school or
less
Not enough money even for bread
Not enough for clothing and footwear
Not enough for more expensive items
(refrigerator, television set))
Not enough to buy a car
Able to buy whatever they want
Don’t know, can’t say
TOTAL
Χ2 = 108.77;
Ck = 0.25
p = 0.000
Trade
school
20
51
18
14
42
32
8
1
2
100
8
1
3
100
Technical Ave
school or rage
university
education
9
11
15
36
35
43
39
30
28
High
school
11
1
4
100
20
2
2
100
10
1
3
100
There is no doubt that most of these assessments are based on a genuinely low standard of living,
although some may be explained by the “memory of better times”, because as many as 61 per cent of
respondents claim that life was better during the time of socialism (4 per cent say in the Milosevic
era, 10 per cent say the present day and 25 per cent are unable to say). The point is, however, that as
many as 89 per cent of respondents with children (regardless of the age of the children) say there are
concerned about the future of those children!
10
The people have a poor standard of living. On top of that they believe that the situation in the
society is even worse than it is. In all of this, in addition to the cruel reality, the “memory of
better times” during the socialist era also affects their opinion. (“May you have and then not
have” or, as Vuk Karadžić put it: “It’s easy to help the poor, but hard to help those who have had
wealth and then lost it.)
(3) The mood of the public is worse and worse; at present half way between good and bad
By their own assessment, approximately 37 per cent of respondents are concerned and even scared.
(“pretty much” and “very much”); 24 per cent of respondents feel helpless and have no hope, while
11 per cent of the people say they feel indifferent to everything. On the other hand, 28 per cent of
the respondents say they still have faith that everything will change for the better, 25 per cent have
hope and optimism, 28 per cent feel full of energy and say they are ready to take part in changes.
Compared to the situation a year ago, hope and optimism have fallen (from 31 to 25 per cent), as has
the faith that things will change for the better (from 38 to 28 per cent).
Chart 9 shows the results of asking the respondents which is their prevalent mood.
Chart 9: Rating or the people`s mood
indifference
7
energy and readiness to
take part in the changes
8
helplessness and no
hope
14
hope and optimism
20
faith that things will soon
change for the better
21
concern and fear
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
The fall in faith that things will change for the better, as well as the decrease in hope and
optimism, indicate the loss of energy for change. The situation become politically dangerous
when the mood of negative energy prevails over that of positive energy. The ratio is now fiftyfifty, which still appears encouraging. However, unless the deteriorating trend is halted…
(4) Positive about privatization after all
Two thirds of respondents are of the opinion that the authorities paid no attention to the interests of
workers, unions and people in general (“Not in the least”, 19 per cent, or “A little”, 31 per cent)
when adopting legislation on privatisation, employment and adoption of social programs. Only 16
11
per cent of respondents believe the opposite (“To a great extent”, 2 per cent, or “Moderately”, 14 per
cent, while 19 per cent had no answer to this question. The response to this question reveals the
people’s vision of the government perhaps even more precisely than other visions of the
government. The poor image of the government is unambiguous and is worse than the results
themselves. And while the authorities usually manage to present even their poor results as good, this
government is even failing to present the its successes as good!
In response to its obviously poor image, the government has opted for making allegations against
workers and employees. However, despite the fact that their patience is running out (21 per cent had
already run out of patience last year and this percentage now reaches 31), we should point out that at
least some kind of majority of the public supports privatisation and that component of reform with
which experts most often take issue – the rate of the process.
Chart 10: Opinion on privatisation
14%
8%
40%
38%
too fast
the right pace
too slow
does not know
Basically it may be inferred that 44 per cent of respondents back privatisation, while noting some of
its negative consequences (the widening class gap, the short-term fall in the standard of living),
while 39 per cent of respondents focus on the negative consequences of privatisation, primarily the
reduction of employee rights and mass redundancies). A considerable number of respondents failed
to answer the question (15 per cent). In all of this we should note that privatisation itself is not a
priority of the people. They are primarily interested in the positive results of this process, and not
the process itself. Thus the issue of privatisation is neither among the most important problems, as
the people see them, nor among the most important social goals. On the other hand, the people
believe privatisation is proceeding slowly and are dissatisfied with this (as many as 55 per cent of
respondents). However, if it results in a better stand of living…
It would be insane to expect those dramatically affected by the consequences of privatisation to
also accept it. Therefore it is quite logical that 60 per cent (as opposed to 14 per cent) of
respondents do not support privatisation if it leads to a reduction in their wages, that 52 per cent
(as opposed to 14 per cent) don’t support privatisation because it means they would lose their jobs
(regardless of the severance pay) and that 45 per cent (as opposed to 29 per cent) do not support
privatisation because it means more work for the same money as they are getting now. However,
privatisation is somewhat more acceptable if retraining is set as one of the conditions: in this
case 38 per cent accept privatisation and 33 per cent do not.
12
(5) Catastrophic consequences of the conflicts in Serbian politics
As many as 85 per cent of respondents believe that what is happening on Serbia’s political scene,
particularly the conflict between the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, has a
“very bad” or “bad” effect on the public. The percentage of people (84 per cent) who believe this
has a negative influence on the inflow of foreign capital and the percentage of those who believe this
negatively affects Serbia’s international image (86 per cent) is almost the same. And the assessment
of the negative impact of these events on the election ratings of the Democratic Party and the
Democratic Party of Serbia is exactly the same – 71 per cent in the case of each party (while 10 per
cent each believe that these skirmishes will actually have a positive influence on the election results).
(6) Labus for president
To the simplest possible question, “Who would you prefer as Serbian president?”, 38 per cent of
respondents did not reply or said they would abstain from the vote, while 62 per cent of respondents
expressed a preference.
Chart 11: Who would you prefer as Serbian president?
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Labus
Koštunica
Ilić
Đinđić
Šešelj
Čović
Drašković
others
Of those mentioned (see Chart 11), Miroljub Labus got the most “votes”, 20 per cent, followed by
Vojislav Kostunica with 18 per cent, while all others scored far lower (Veljo Ilić, 5 per cent; Đinđić,
4 per cent and so on). It is interesting to note that the balance of power remains almost the same,
even in the case of a closed choice, that is to say when only four DOS leaders are listed as candidates
(although, as of the week this was written, two of these no longer belong to DOS): Labus, Koštunica,
Čović and Veljo Ilić). In this case, 30 per cent would vote for Labus, 27 per cent for Koštunica, 3
per cent for Čović and 33 per cent wouldn’t vote for anyone, would abstain, or don’t know who they
would choose.
The data on the popularity of presidential candidates should, I am convinced, be observed in the
trend on of their standing in public opinion.
13
Table 4: The people’s opinion of Labus and Koštunica in August 2001 and July 2002
(percentage)
Opinion
Very bad or mainly bad
No particular opinion
Mainly good or completely good
Don’t know or no response
TOTAL
Opinion of Miroljub
Labus
August 01
July 02
9
16
25
25
54
55
12
4
100
100
Opinion of Vojislav
Koštunica
August 01
July 02
12
24
14
25
73
49
1
2
100
100
Labus and Koštunica have socially and politically different supporters. For one of these the
problem will be how to retain his own popularity and for the other how to seize some of someone
else’s. But the key issue for both is how to win the votes of the losers in the transition process!
Table 5: Positive opinion of politicians 2000-2002 (percentage)
Politician
Vojislav Koštunica
Mlađan Dinkić
Miroljub Labus
Nebojša Čović
Veljo Ilić
Zoran Đinđić
Goran Svilanović
Dragoljub Mićunović
Vladan Batić
Momčilo Perišić
Žarko Korać
Dušan Mihajlović
Branislav Pelević
Nenad Čanak
Slobodan Milošević
Vuk Drašković
Vojislav Šešelj
October 2000
85
64
57
50
50
43
45
51
38
44
35
26
35
14
11
12
June 2001
77
54
52
50
35
43
48
40
28
22
24
25
13
12
9
12
10
14
August 2001
73
58
54
52
48
47
44
39
23
21
19
16
16
14
11
10
10
July 2002
49
46
55
34
27
34
36
36
15
5
14
10
13
12
12
10
12
(8) DS and DSS – A barrel in a glass of heavy water
The post-October 2000 authorities in Serbia and that part of Yugoslavia they believe they’re in
charge of (and who still affectionately refer to themselves as “new”) are rather like the Belgrade-Bar
railway line. They run through a scandalous tunnel only to emerge onto a critical bridge and so on
indefinitely. The tunnels are preparation for the bridges and vice versa. When passing through each
tunnel there not even a hint of light at the end and the bridges arch over ever deeper and steeper
canyons in ever more earthquake-prone terrain. The public finds it more and more difficult to
understand and follow the careering of the train around curves which were neither predicted nor
planned for. And what was Bar again? The open sea at the western end of the journey.
The leg of the journey preceding this survey was, as usual, stuffed with scandals, the hot spots of the
permanent crisis which has characterised the entire reign of the Opposition in Power. If we take the
analogy of a medical crisis, the point in a disease of the body which will be followed either by
recovery or death, the “patient”, in this case the society and the state, is closer to the latter. It has
already been in coma three times: when the head sorcerer’s formerly favourite protégé, General
Nebojsa Pavkovic, was pensioned off, an event entirely trivial in itself but which prised open the
gates of the Augean Stables. The thinly disguised ambitions of Leader Without a Country and Co,
wrapped in a tissue of underworld “legalism” broke out of laager in an curtailed plan for a night raid
by commandos on the institutions of one member of the Entity Without a Name. Fortunately, the
strike struck out. We are left to contemplate what had provoked such a flurry. Was it the devil
finding work for the idle hands of the Leader Without a Country, there at his workplace with no
work to do. (The European Union, in the shape of Javier Solana, does all his work for him anyway)?
Was it the feverish preparations for the new workplace now being planned? Or was it simply the
insatiable lust for power of the Ne’er-do-well advisors in their obscure surroundings as they jostle
for the future distribution of sinecures?
Whatever the reason, the public reacted to the pensioning off of Pavkovic with twice as much
support as opposition, (40 per cent to 22 per cent), while almost two fifths of the sample either don’t
care (22 per cent) or don’t know what to think (16 per cent).
The next coma came when a number of DOS MPs were expelled from the Parliament of the
Republic of Serbia (by coincidence, the greater number of them from the Coalition’s internal
opposition, the Leader Without a Country’s Democratic Party of Serbia. DDOS (Diminished DOS)
struck back with the “legal” justification that the dumped deputies had been neglecting their duties,
obstructing the Parliament and hindering the reform process. This “political blow to legitimacy and
the electoral will of the people” (pregnant definition courtesy of the Democratic Party of Serbia)
triggered equivalent divisions in public opinion: a third of the respondents (33 per cent) approves
and another third 32 per cent disapproves of the DOS decision while the largest part of the sample
either doesn’t care (20 per cent) or doesn’t have an opinion (14 per cent).
The Democratic Party of Serbia, by way of response, decided to throw the Government of the
Republic of Serbia into a coma by forming a shadow cabinet. The public appear to have seen
through this move: three times more respondents disapprove than agree with this gesture of fanatical
partisanship in the face of Rome burning. (37 to 12 per cent). It appears that the most adequate
assessment of this move is the reaction of the half of the sample who are either indifferent to it (27
per cent) or have no opinion about it (23 per cent).
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Chart 12.
60
57
50
40
33
30
29
29
25
20
13
10
5
9
0
Partition of Kosovo
into Serbian and
Albanian parts
Establishment of an
independent state of
Kosovo
expected
Long-term UN
administration
Third member of the
union of Serbia and
Montenegro
desired
One controversial decision (“reformist” of course, for which read “extortionate”) of the Serbian
Government, the drastic increase in the price of electricity, had the predictable effect of
homogenising public opinion: four out of five respondents complained about this decision, only one
in every seventeen agreed with it (79 to 6 per cent). Every tenth respondent was indifferent, one in
twenty did not know what to think.
The internal malice between the parties and the series of knockout blows have pushed two ongoing
international crises out of the public attention. These are cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and
the unravelling of the Kosovo knot.
The long-running Hague soap opera has an unknown number of episodes to go, with our antihero
playing the lead role. The people divide roughly into thirds on this issue: a somewhat larger third
(35 per cent) support cooperation with the International War crimes Tribunal, a somewhat smaller
third oppose it (probably not so much because of the current antihero but because of the potential
ones not protected by the Yugoslav Army. T-shirts with their photographs along with books and
other merchandise are the current best-sellers at provincial fairs throughout Serbia). Every fifth
respondent is indifferent to the issue of cooperation with The Hague and one in ten respondents
doesn’t think about it.
The Kosovo story unfolds, and then it folds back up a little. We offered the respondents a chance to
declare themselves on the possible “realistic” denouements and then on those they see as the most
desirable. More than a fifth of the respondents have no vision either of a “realistic” scenario or of
their own preferred outcome. Once we eliminated the undecided and those in favour of some other
solution, we presented a choice of the most dominant options, shown in Chart 12.
When viewed through the prism of realpolitik, what becomes obvious is the discrepancy between the
“real” and the “possible” (desired). In the concern about the expected but undesirable solutions
(independence, or a long-term international protectorate in Kosovo), the respondents opt for
narrowed sovereignty (“whatever you can spare”, in other words a desperate divide and conquer), or
the “impossible possibility” – a virtual member in an artificial (wishful thinking) union which has no
real identity and which no one really wants.
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(9) Legitimacy of institutions and organisations.
The irresponsible trifling with, first of all, state institutions at all levels inevitably leads to the further
erosion of their credibility in the people’s perception. In this survey we examined the legitimacy of
the institutions of executive, judicial and administrative power. The main trends noted in previous
surveys have not globally changed, but they have changed in relation to one another.
Chart 13:
61
Justice system
27
12
Yugoslav Government
47
37
16
56
Police
18
Serbian Government
26
25
Army leadership
47
28
27
42
31
33
34
32
President of Serbia
28
Army
0
10
20
31
30
41
40
50
60
70
has confidence in
undecided
has no confidence in
No state institution (apart from the Yugoslav Army) manages to attract the confidence of one third of
the sample.
The president of the federal state, that charismatic and previously unassailable monarch, has
experienced a negative inversion of confidence: for the first time, the pendulum of his credibility has
swung slightly to the side of lack of confidence. (33 to 32 per cent), with a not insignificant number
(34 per cent) undecided. Hic transit gloria mundi.
The judiciary and the police persistently maintain their strongly negative positions, possibly more
because of the inertia of the accumulated negative experience of the public than because of any
minor (and so far unnoticed) positive steps in their activity which are, after all, happening.
The proverbial mistrust in the Federal and Serbian Governments is shared equally by them (both
close to half the sample. However the latter (despite unpopular measures and infinitesimal
achievements unnoticed by the majority) still enjoys the support of a quarter of the sample, unlike
the Federal Government which is supported by 9 per cent less respondents.
The state institution which still retains the most respect, the Yugoslav Army, is to some extent in a
schizophrenic situation. While two fifths of respondents report confidence in the body (the rank and
file), the same number don’t trust the head (the military leadership). From the other direction, the
number of respondents (slightly more than a quarter) who do not trust the Yugoslav Army is the
same as the number of those who don’t trust the military leadership.
Does the relatively high credibility of the Yugoslav Army mean that the public would like to see this
institution take over the establishment and management of “order, work and discipline” in the
society and the state in the future? That they are asking for the introduction of a military junta as a
shortcut through the “chaos of immature democracy”? Certainly not. A far greater number of
people oppose the Black Hand model than support this option (3:1 or, more precisely, 69.23 per
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cent). That will be a lesson for the faint-hearted night walkers. Nevertheless, this weak quarter is
not insufficient support for their dreams, by day and by night. One solid barrier here would be true
civilian control of the Yugoslav Army, but this raises the question of who the people would trust
with this function. Once we have stripped the conglomerate of federal institutions which three fifths
(62 per cent) of the people see as controlling the most power instrument of repression, and once the
pseudo-institutions with no real political role or power have fallen away when we separate the wheat
from the chaff (Federal Parliament, 18 per cent; Federal Government, 8 per cent; Supreme Defence
Council, 23 per cent) what remains is Koštunica (13 per cent). So the wolf is set to watch the sheep!
Bad sheep and the shepherd is even worse! For we don’t need good people (hmm!) as much as we
need good institutions. (Karl Poper)
It seems that the other good news is the convincingly expressed supremacy of the non-authoritarian
political culture over the authoritarian (the “firm hand”). In both social projections (general
positions = 40 per cent) and in the auto-projections (personal positions = 51 per cent), what prevails
is the opposition to the authoritarian model of managing the state and the society.
What do the people propose as an alternative, as a democratic, participative culture? A dominant
majority of two thirds (65 per cent) advocate “an election system in which the candidates are elected
directly and not from a party ticket of candidates”. Together with this, more than half (53 per cent)
of the respondents are in favour of a government “in which, instead of politicians, we have experts
who would be managing the state”. That’ll teach the self proclaimed REFORMISTS of the cabinet!
The attitude to the non-state institutions is quite different: confidence in their work surpasses doubts
by a wide margin.
Chart 13:
40
28
Otpor
32
34
CeSid
30
30
24
G17 Plus
36
46
22
22
Church
56
0
10
20
has confidence in
30
undecided
40
50
60
has no confidence in
The other important characteristic is that, in terms of public confidence, two secular and explicitly
modern-oriented organisations, G17 Plus and CeSID, are now snapping at the heels of the previously
unassailable Church. Could this be a hint of the differentiation of the civil sector and a turnaround in
public interest from the imposed predominance of celestial and spiritual issues to the mundane
values of day-to-day life?
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(10) Assessments of the executive bodies in Serbia
It has already been noted that the Serbian Government may be relatively satisfied with the
confidence which it still enjoys with every fourth respondent to our survey. Especially given the
relatively unsophisticated combination of laying about the heads of the inhabitants with a gnarled
stick and dispensing the dry essence of last year’s shrivelled carrot through an eye-dropper.
However confidence is one thing (to some extent we have that even in a strict teacher who beats us
“for our own good in the future”), but the satisfaction we derive from it is quite another. So while
the number of respondents who have no confidence in the government and those who are dissatisfied
with it is the same (47 per cent in each case), the number of those who are satisfied (14 per cent) is
little more than half the number of those who have confidence in it (25 per cent). It seems that this is
exactly what Prime Minister Đinđić had in mind when he issued a statement saying (and I
paraphrase) that aim of his government was not to be popular but to be efficient. And since
efficiency is an even more measurable quality than popularity, let us see how the people evaluate
some of its parameters. We divided these, in larger groups, into parameters of satisfaction with
“macropolitical” and with “socio-economic” efficiency.
The parameters of macropolitical efficiency include control of State Security and the police, the fight
against crime and corruption, the pursuit of national interests, efforts aimed at establishing a legal
state and development of democracy and stabilization of the political situation in Serbia. The
satisfaction of the people with the achievement of these parameters is shown in Chart 15.
Chart 15: Satisfaction with the macropolitical efficiency of the Serbian Government
11%
25%
64%
satisfied
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
dissatisfied
The parameters of socio-economic efficiency include: privatisation, the economic situation in the
country, the establishment of social justice, the standard of living and employment. The level of
public satisfaction with the achievements within these parameters is shown in chart 16.
Chart 16: Satisfaction with the socio-economic efficiency of the Serbian Govenment
5%
19%
76%
satisfied
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
dissatisfied
All in all, it appears that Prime Minister Đinđić will have think of a new mantra...
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centar za proučavanje alternativa
center for policy studies
Braće Jugovića 21/II
11000 Beograd
Tel./Fax: (+381 11) 3220 253, 3220 458, 3343 250
E-mail: [email protected]
www.cpa-cps.org.yu
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