1
EARLY RATIONALITY AND MAGICAL THINKING IN PRESCHOOLERS: SPACE AND TIME
Eugene Subbotsky
Moscow University
Department of Psychology
Send reprint requests to E. Subbotsky, Department of Psychology, University of Lancaster, Bailrigg,
Lancaster, LA1
4FY, U.K.
˙
ABSTRACT
The problem of the study was to determine the process of acquisition of some
fundamental notions (structures) of space and time in preschool children. A fundamental
structure that underlies the idea of space is the opposition between permeability and
impermeability of a physical body for another physical body. A fundamental structure on
which the concept of time is based is the opposition between reversibility and
irreversibility of complex processes. In two experiments children of 4, 5, and 6 years
were placed in situations in which they were free to reveal their beliefs in
the permeability of a solid body (a glass wall of a box) and in the reversibility of complex
processes (turning back into a little boy or girl again). The results showed that at the
beginning of the experiment almost all the children denied that permeability or
reversibility could occur in real life. However, under the influence of a fairy tale and an
adult's instruction, the majority of 4- and 5-year©olds revealed their credulity towards
such unusual properties of space and time both at the level of practical actions and at the
level of verbal judgments.
˙
2
INTRODUCTION
The problem of the study was to investigate the acquisition of some fundamental
notions (structures) of space and time in preschool age children. It is important to separate the
fundamental properties (structures), which underlie notions of space and time from the properties
traditionally investigated (metrical and topological object relations with regard to space, measurement
of time periods through movement and other simple processes with regard to time).
The fundamental structure that underlies the idea of space is the opposition between
permeability and impermeability of a physical body with respect to another and its variants
(opposition soft-solid, empty-full, etc.). This opposition of categories served as a framework for
several early concepts of structure of Universe, such as Democritus' and Epicure's concepts of atoms
and vacuum, Diodor Kron's idea of invisible particles, and so on (see Sextus Empiricus, 1976). This
opposition is also present in contemporary
metatheories of physical space: the classical "empty space" of Isaac Newton and nonclassical" space
of edges and surfaces" proposed by James Gibson are both inconceivable without the opposition of
empty and full, permeable and impermeable and the borders that separate them.
With regard to time, an equally fundamental structure is
reversibility-irreversibility of complex processes. In contrast to the world of Newton's
classical dynamics (a world of eternal and unchangeable natural laws, which exist beyond
time) modern science deals with irreversible processes (see Prigogin & Stengers,
1986). The irreversibility of being, so strongly emphasized by ancient dialectics, is an
essential feature not only of physical time, but of "psychological time" as well
According to a traditional view (e.g. Piaget) the process of acquisition
of these oppositional structures by a child is stage-based: the child initially lacks any
conception of solid (impermeable) bodies. Eventually, the infant's conceptions of subjective space and
reversible subjective time are transformed (by approximately 2 years of age) into space and time
based upon solid objects and irreversible processes (Piaget, 1937). Contrary to this view, the process
may be considered not as stage-based replacement of one fundamental structure by another but as their
permanent coexistence.
The ideas of impermeable object and irreversible process are present in the child's mind from
the very beginning. They coexist with the opposite ideas of permeable object and reversible process
for the whole life span, but their domains of influence are different. In the domain of everyday reality
notions of space and time are based on the structures of mutual impermeability of solid objects and the
irreversibility of complex processes (physical space and time). By contrast, in the domain of unusual
reality (fairy tales, dreams, fantasies) unusual properties of space and time are attributed a legitimate
status: the mutual permeability of solid objects, and the reversibility of complex processes are not
ruled out.
Once this hypothesis is accepted, it is reasonable to look for these opposing
fundamental structures in two directions. On the one hand, it is possible to look for early
forms of the child's sensitivity to the impermeability of solid objects (or its substitutes)
even in early infancy, at an age when according to the traditional view, the infant
lacks this sensitivity. On the other hand, one can also expect to find the idea of a "permeable solid
object" working in the consciousness of a preschool child (or an older child) even in the domain of
everyday reality.
The first part of this hypothesis, albeit not explicitly stated, seems to inspire recent intensive
and successful efforts to find forms of behavior in young infants that can be interpreted as signs of a
3
sensitivity to the mutual impermeability of solid objects and to the irreversibility of certain processes,
or as prerequisites for such a sensitivity. Thus with regard to space these studies have shown that
infants even in their first weeks of life can distinguish contours (Powers & Dobson, 1982), certain
colors (Hamer, Alexander & Teller, 1982), and the main "canonical" figures - an arrow, a triangle and
a cross (Slater, Morison & Rose, 1982). There is also evidence of early sensitivity to intermodal
(possibly, amodal) permeability versus impermeability. Thus, Gibson and Walker (1984) have
demonstrated that 1-month-old infants can visually differentiate solid objects from elastic objects in
terms of their deformations in movement. In Bower's (1971) experiment, newborns showed signs of
surprise at being unable to touch a cube that looked visually solid. Moreover, some 3 1/2- month-old
infants are surprised when an opaque solid screen appears to pass through a solid body placed behind
it (Baillargeon, 1987).
The infant's sensitivity to the irreversibility of time has been investigated much less often.
However, there are data revealing such a sensitivity. Thus, Leslie (1986) in a series of ingenious
studies has demonstrated that 3- to 6-month-old infants attribute causality to particular successive
events, with the implication, therefore, that the events are seen as an irreversible succession of cause
and consequence.
A movement of scholars "down the age-scale" is represented by a vast range of
studies, but the counter-movement "up the age-scale" is hardly detectable. A possible
exception is studies in "anomalistic psychology" showing the presence of "magical
thinking" (in the form of the so-called "beliefs in the paranormal") in the mind of an adult
(see Zusne & Jones, 1982). As for children of preschool and school ages,
their belief in magic and animism, with a few exceptions (Harris, Brown, Mariott, Whittal & Harmer,
1991; Subbotsky, 1985) has been studied only in the Piagetian "verbal" tradition, which does not
permit an assessment of whether the fundamental oppositional structures (nonpermanent object,
magical causality, permeable solid object, reversible time) are able to control the child's behavior in a
real, practical situation.
In an attempt to partially remedy this gap, two experiments were undertaken in
order to determine a) if preschool children can attribute the fundamental oppositional
structures of space and time to different domains (everyday versus unusual reality), and b) if the
unusual properties of space and time can enter the domain of everyday reality.
EXPERIMENT 1: SPACE
METHOD
SUBJECTS
Sixteen 4-year-olds from the middle group (range: 4 years O months to 4 years and 11
months; mean, 4 years 5 months), 19 5-year- olds from the senior group (range: 5
years 0 months to 5 years 11 months; mean, 5 years 4 months) and 10 6-year-olds from
the preparatory group (range, 6 years 0 months to 6 years 11 months: mean, 6 years 7
months) of a kindergarten in Moscow took part as subjects in the three main experimental
conditions. The same number of children from the same age groups (with mean ages 4 years 4 months,
5 years 3 months and 6 years 8 months correspondingly) of another kindergarten took part in the
control condition. In each age group there was an approximately equal number of boys and girls. All
4
children were native Russian speakers and came from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds.
MATERIALS
A wooden box 27 x 40 x 22 cm. with two opposite walls made of glass was employed in the
experiment. The box had no lid or openings in it, so it was not possible to remove any of the objects,
which it contained (a fountain pen, a brooch, a ring, a cigarette lighter, a postage stamp, etc.)
˙
PROCEDURE
Subjects were tested individually. Children in the experimental group were tested in four
successive stages. In the first stage they were asked questions about the permeability of various
objects. The child was asked 1) Can you go through this wall (the wall of the room was indicated) ?
Why/Why not? Can it be done in a fairy tale? 2) If you see a toy behind the glass, can you stretch your
hand through the glass and pick up the toy? Why/Why not? Is it possible to do that in a fairy tale? 3)
If a coin is lying on the bottom of a bucket filled with water, can you pick up the coin? What is it you
have to stretch your hand through to pick up the coin? Why is it possible to stretch your hand through
water and impossible through glass? 4) Please, take my fountain pen (the experimenter held the pen
in his hand). What is it you've stretched your hand through in order to take the pen? What is it between
your hand and the pen? The aim of questions 1 and 2 was to determine whether the child was
conscious of the impermeability of solid physical objects (a wall, a glass) with respect to another solid
object (his or her arm) as well as to determine whether he or she admitted such permeability in a fairy
tale. The aim of questions 3 and 4 was to ensure that the child was aware of a substance (water, air) in
which the impermeable objects rested.
In the second stage, children were told a fairy tale about a girl who was given a
"magic box" of glass as a present; the box contained a number of attractive objects (a
fountain pen, a ring, etc.). The box could not be opened in the normal way, but if one said the "magic
words" (alpha, beta, gamma), the walls of glass became "just like air" and one could stretch a hand
through and take the objects. Children were asked to retell the story and then asked 1) Why has Ol'ia
(the name of the story character) managed to get the ring? In real life, is it possible to make the glass
"just like air" by means of magic words? The aim of the questions was to determine whether the
child's conviction in the impermeability of solid objects in real life could be influenced by a fairy tale.
The third stage took place one day later. Children were given a real box similar to the box
described in the story and told: "Maybe it is a magic box as well". Children were then reminded of the
"magic words" and told "You can try if you want. If you manage to get something out of the box - you
can keep it." The child was then left alone in the room and observed secretly. Indices of the child's
belief in the permeability of a solid object ( a glass wall of the box) were judged to be those actions,
that a)occurred after the child had said the magic words, and b)included an appropriate manual posture
for grasping an object. Such “magical” actions were distinguished from “investigative” actions
(patting, touching, investigation of the box with a hand) and practical actions (attempts to uncover the
box in an ordinary way (see Figure 1).
________________
Figure 1 about here
________________
In the fourth stage, the experimenter returned and carried out a
post-experimental interview in order to determine the children's emotional attitude
towards their failure to penetrate the glass. The experimenter asked the child 1) Did you
try? 2) Did you manage to get something out of the box? 3) Do you think that this box is a magical
5
one or it is just an ordinary wooden box? If children really believed in the
permeability of the glass while making grasping actions, it was expected that they would be
disappointed with their failure and would reveal their disappointment in their answers to questions 1
and 2 : they would complain that magical words were not effective and ask the experimenter to show
them how to act on the box properly in order for the "magic words" to have an effect. If, however,
children were simply playing a game of pretend, they would not have anticipated being able to reach
the objects in the box, and therefore, could not be expected to show disappointment (i.e., they would
not complain, or request a demonstration of the proper way to penetrate the glass ). Question 3 was
asked in order to determine, whether the children's verbal behavior would be influenced by the fairy
tale despite their manipulations of the box: If so, many of the children would continue to regard the
box as "magical" despite their failed attempts to penetrate the glass.
Children in the control group were simply shown the box and left alone, having been promised
that anything that they could extract from the box would be given to them as a reward.
RESULTS
In the first stage, all subjects in the experimental groups acknowledged the impermeability of
the glass and the wall for a hand in everyday reality and
acknowledged the possibility of permeability in a fairy story (see Table 1). Most of the
children in each age group described water as a permeable substance but they were not
aware of air as a substance and said that there was "a floor" or "the walls" between their
hands and the pen. After the children had been told the fairy tale and had reproduced it in the second
stage, all of them still denied that it was possible to stretch one's hand through glass in real life.
_______________
Table 1 about here
_______________
In the third stage, most of the 4- and 5-year-olds and some of the 6-year-olds
tried to pass their hands through the glass as if it were permeable. The number of children
who tried (at least once) to say the "magic words" and to stretch their hands through the
glass was significantly lower among 6-year-olds than among 4-year-olds (z=3.02, p< .02) Most of
these children clearly expressed their disappointment with the failure in the post-experimental
interview (fourth stage). By contrast, in the control groups, only one child tried to obtain objects "in a
magical way" having made a special "magical gesture" over the box. The rest either tried to do it in a
normal way or did not tried all (see Table 1).
There were no significant differences between the experimental and control groups in the
number of children who produced investigative actions. However, the number of children who (at
least once) employed practical actions was significantly higher among 4- and 5-year-old children from
the control groups than among the children of the same ages from the experimental groups (z=2.6, p<
.05: z=3.6, p< .01 respectively). Despite the fact that not all the children tried to obtain the objects in a
magical way and all who tried failed, the majority of the subjects in each age group still
acknowledged that the box was "magical" at the end of the experiment .
EXPERIMENT 2: TIME
METHOD
SUBJECTS
Fifteen 4-year-olds from the middle group (range 4 years 0 months to 4 years 11
6
months, with a mean age 4 years 6 months), 15 5- year-olds from the senior group (range
5 years 0 months to 5 years 11 months, mean age 5 years 6 months) and 15 6-year-olds
from the preparatory group (from 6 years 0 months to 6 years 11 months, mean
age 6 years 7 months) of a kindergarten in Moscow took part as subjects in three main
experimental conditions. In the control condition, a total of 30 children from the same age
groups (with mean ages 4 years 2 months, 5 years 4 months, and 6 years 3 months, 10
children in each group) also participated. Each group contained approximately equal
numbers of boys and girls.
MATERIALS
A small wooden box 15 x 11 x 11 cm was used. It had a special mechanism inside which
could make a new postage stamp appear to replace an old one placed in the box (for a detailed
description, see Subbotsky, 1991). In addition, there was a bottle with
pure boiled water, a small box with sugar powder, an old (torn and crumpled) postage
stamp, and an empty glass.
PROCEDURE˙
The children were tested individually. In the first stage children were asked 1) who
are you: a girl (a boy), a woman (a man) or an old woman (an old man)? 2)And who is your mother
(who is your father)? 3) Who will you be when you grow up? 4)Can your
mother (your father) become a little girl (a little boy) again? Why/Why not? Is it possible
in a fairy tale? 5)Can an old and damaged object turn into a new one? Why/Why not? Is it
possible in a fairy tale?. The aim of these questions was to assess whether children
understood the irreversibility of complex processes in real life ( in this case - the
impossibility for a human being to become much younger or for an old object to become a new one )
and whether they admitted the reversibility of such processes in a fairy tale.
In the second stage, children were told a fairy tale about a girl who had been given a bottle
with "magic water", a small portion of which could "turn you and everything around you into what it
was two years ago". At first, the story continued, the girl did not believe it, but when she tried the
water (in order to bring her beloved dog back to life) she did, in fact, become a small 3- year-old child.
Each subject was asked to recall the story and then was asked 1) Does it mean that it is possible in real
life as well, to turn time backwards? 2)But why did Lena (the name of the heroine) become a few
years younger? The aim of these questions was to determine whether the fairy tale would have any
influence on the children's belief in irreversibility of complex processes in real life.
In the third stage, the child was shown a bottle with pure boiled water, a small box
with sugar powder, an old (torn and crumpled) postage stamp, and a wooden box with a
special mechanism inside that could turn an old postage stamp into a new one. The child was told that
once the powder was dissolved in the water, it became "magic" water. Children were then shown, that
an old postage stamp "really" turned into a new one if it was touched by a drop of magic water (in
reality, because of the mechanism concealed in the box). "If you drink a little bit - you will probably
turn into a little boy (girl)" - the experimenter said, and then suggested : "Now you can try the water,
if you want. I just want to see if it works. But if you do not want to try - it is up to you". ˙
If the child refused to try, the request was repeated with the promise of a postage
stamp as a reward (stage 4). In order to determine whether the child's verbal disbelief in
the reversibility of complex processes in everyday reality was influenced by the
experimental manipulations, the child was asked the last question: "Now, what do you think, is this
7
water magic or it is just ordinary sugar-water?"
In the control groups, children were simply asked to try some "sugar water" in
order to find out if it was tasty; before the request, they talked with the experimenter on
various topics for about 20 minutes (a duration equal to the two stages of the main
experiment).
RESULTS
Among the 4-year-olds 33% acknowledged at least one of the three possible
variants of reversibility (that their mother or father or they themselves could become a
little child again, or that the old object could become a new one again) (see Table 2). The
rest of the subjects were surprisingly consistent in their emphatic denial of each possible
reversal ("Life does not go back", "Time only goes ahead", "Nothing old can become new
because many years have passed", "It is difficult, to grow downwards", etc.). Despite the fact that all
the children admitted that time reversal could occur in a fairy tale,
only three 4-year-olds and two 5-year-olds recognized the possibility
of reversal in real life after they had been told the fairy tale.
_________________
Table 2 about here
_________________
In a real situation (third stage), all the children acknowledged that the old postage
stamp "became newer" under the influence of the "magic" water; most subjects in all age
groups refused to try the water following the experimenter's initial request. Most of them
justified their refusal by saying that they didn't want to become a little child again ("I will
become a little child again, and then...there is no "special" water that can make you older"), some
simply said "I do not want to drink it". When the children were promised a reward (fourth stage), the
majority of 4- and 5-year-olds still refused the experimenter's
request, but almost half of the 6-year-olds agreed. Among the 6-year- olds the total
number of the children refusing to try the water was significantly lower than among the 4- and 5-yearold children combined (z=2.8, p< .025). All children with the exception of three 6-year-olds answered
the last question in the positive, acknowledging the water to be magic. None of the control children
refused to taste some sugar water.
DISCUSSION
As shown in previous studies (Subbotsky, 1985, 1990), preschool- age children
are able to differentiate verbally between what can happen in everyday reality versus
unusual realities (dreams, fairy tales, fantasy). They attribute impermeability of solid
objects and irreversibility of complex processes to the domain of everyday reality while
admitting the opposite properties (permeability of solid objects and reversibility of
complex processes) to be possible through magic in a fairy tale. This differentiation
between what is possible in everyday reality and what can be achieved by magic has also
been noted by Chandler and Lalonde (this volume) and Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling and
Gelman (this volume). In each of these studies, young children expected impermeability and
irreversibility to obtain in everyday life (as reflected in their emotional reactions and
8
judgements). At the same time, they described an apparent demonstration of permeability as magic,
and they judged hypothetic examples of reversibility as possible for a magician.
However, this differentiation between what is possible in everyday reality and what can be achieved
through magic is not yet firm enough either on the level of verbal judgments or on the level of
practical behavior: it can be attenuated under the influence of a fairy tale and an adult's instruction.
The majority of 4- and 5-year-olds and some 6-year-olds tried to pass their hand through a glass wall
(in order to obtain an attractive object) and refused to drink "magic" water (fearing to become a
toddler again), thereby revealing their belief in the potentially unusual properties of space and time
even in everyday reality.
As shown by the results, the differentiation between the dominant properties of space and time
in everyday reality as compared with unusual realities at a verbal level was not influenced
significantly by the fairy tale alone (an influence that was detected with respect to children's
judgments about causality in our previous study, Subbotsky, 1985). Thus, even after listening to the
fairy tale, children still asserted their belief in impermeability and irreversibility within the domain of
everyday reality. However, the experimenter's subsequent instruction and manipulations with the box
and water did influence the children's verbal convictions: at the end of the experiment most of the
children acknowledged that the box and the water were "magic". This suggests that the experimenter's
credulity towards unusual phenomena may play a crucial role in changing the children's beliefs. To
check whether or not it did play a crucial role two experimenters could give similar instructions, with
one expressing credulity and the other skepticism.
The non-directive character of the experimenter’s instruction ensured the fact that these
changes, at least at the level of practical behavior, were not due to simple compliance with the
experimenter. Indeed, in Experiment 1 the child was left alone in the room during the testing
procedure and was therefore free to decide whether or not to try to pass his or her hand through the
glass; in Experiment 2, the child's autonomy was shown by the fact that the majority of the children
refused the experimenter's request to try the water, thereby revealing their belief in the water's magic
power. The initial reluctance of 6-year-olds to engage in a magical practice and their readiness to try
the water for the reward may be interpreted as a sign of their growing conviction that in everyday
reality "normal" physical space and time predominate.
The role of social influence in experiments designed to test children's beliefs in
physical causality , object permanence or the fundamental properties of space and time is
very important from a theoretical point of view. The main issue is whether fundamental
beliefs (e.g. the belief in object permanence or physical causality, in the impermeability of solid
objects and the irreversibility of time) have certain "natural" origins in the child's
mind or they are socially conditioned. If they are socially conditioned and social influences are
supposed to play a leading role in the acquisition of both the belief in physical causality and the belief
in magical causality, then experiments on the problem must establish the degree of social influence
(or social reinforcement) that can increase children's credulity in the existence of real magic and
reduce their conviction that only physical causality may obtain in everyday life.
It was just this premise that this study was based on. The study, therefore, was not
designed to eliminate all social influences since social influence of a certain type was viewed as a
necessary condition for the belief in magical (as well as in physical) properties of space and time to
occur. It did, however, aim to eliminate any direct pressure that could create a social conflict between
the child and the experimenter and turn the child's behavior into mere compliance with the
experimenter's expectations. The indirect social influences (the fairy tale, the experimenter's hint that
magic can occur) cannot therefore be viewed as a fault in an experimental procedure that had not been
9
completely stripped of all possible social influences. Just the opposite, the influences were a legitimate
and necessary way to test the firmness and permanence of children's beliefs in the impossibility of
certain events, such as the permeability of solid bodies or the reversibility of time.
If, however, these social influences are viewed as a sort of "compulsory reeducation" that
overrides "true" beliefs (or "true" disbeliefs) then the premise of the purely "natural"origins of
fundamental physical beliefs is implicitly taken for granted. The trouble with this premise lies not in
the theoretical controversy between "innate" and "acquired" nature of fundamental beliefs, to which
the problem is so often reduced. It lies instead in the methodological impossibility of revealing
something that has no relation to "social interaction" in an experiment that involves people, i.e.
reflecting and interpreting individuals. Of course, some "understanding" of magical and physical
causality may be found even in infants, but there it exists not as “beliefs” but as “behavioural patterns”
that require experimenter's interpretation.
As for the preschoolers' beliefs, they are, of course, the product of social influence. Even
seemingly spontaneous judgments about magic (see, for instance, Johnson and Harris's paper in this
journal) reflect cultural influences that children are permanently subject to (fairy tales, collective
representations, superstitions, etc.). Even more obviously "social" are children's beliefs in physical
causality and object permanence. Young infants' "understanding" of the strangeness of certain events
(Baillargeon's study) can only be perceived as genuine understanding after it is interpreted by us,
contemporary adults, and presented to older children in the form of "true" and "false" beliefs.
One more problem relevant to this study is the distinction between "magical events"
and "magical practice". Clearly, magical events (magical causality, magical properties of space and
time, etc.) can be easily defined merely as the violation of familiar physical
principles (see Piaget, 1937; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling & Gelman, this volume; Johnson & Harris,
this volume). However, magical practice (or, in ordinary language, just "magic") involves something
else: it includes certain culturally conventional actions aimed "to make magical events possible"(such
as "magical words", "magical actions", etc.). It may also rest upon a cultural context normally linked
with magic (i.e., images taken from fairy tales: fairies, ghosts, rejuvenating potion, etc.). The presence
of these "active attributes" distinguishes the practice of magic from mere conjuring. Although
conjuring may enhance behaviors testifying to the presence of magical beliefs in children, it does this
to a much lesser extent than does magical practice. This may account in part for children's greater
credulity toward the magical events revealed in this study as compared with studies in which
conjuring was employed (see, for instance, Woolley & Phelps, this volume).
Did children simply assimilate the magical practice to a type of pretend play in the course of
the experiment? Special precautions were taken to check whether children really practiced magic or
just played "magical games". The children's disappointment in Study 1 and the refusal of most 4© and
5©year©olds to taste the rejuvenating potion in Study 2 strongly suggest that children's real beliefs
(and not just their pretend beliefs) in the unusual properties of space and time were observed in this
study.
The last issue to consider is the "status” of preschool children's beliefs in the
reversibility of complex processes and the permeability of solid objects: are children
revealing a latent (and suppressed) credulity toward unusual properties of space
and time (irrespective of whether this credulity was "socially induced" or "spontaneously
acquired" as discussed above), or is this credulity simply induced and inspired by the
experimenter who is acting in a credulous fashion at the time of the experiment? This
problem touches on the general question of "revelation versus inspiration" of various
capacities in the child in the course of experimentation. The question is speculative because there are
10
no adequate methods to reveal the child's "latent" capacities that do not run the risk of inspiring those
same capacities at the very moment of a testing. However, it is much more reasonable to view the
recurrence of capacities and beliefs that dominated the child's mind at an earlier point in time, as their
"reactivation" rather than their "inspiration". This is especially true of the child's beliefs in
nonphysical properties of object, causality, space and time, as they can be detected even in very young
infants (Piaget, 1937).
Two more reasons (one - theoretical, and the other - empirical) testify in favor of the
"revelation" or "reactivation" hypothesis and against the "inspiration" hypothesis.
First, it is theoretically impossible to accept that only one of two opposite structures (for
example, the concept of physical impermeability or the irreversibility of time) can be
present in the child's mind without its being complemented in some way by its counterpart (the
concept of physical permeability or the reversibility of time). Second, the very facility with which the
children accepted the experimenter's suggestion that the box and the water were "magical" reveal a
kind of "readiness" in the child's mind to accept such an interpretation (compare, for example, the
time and effort needed in order to teach children genuinely "inspired" concepts, such as additionsubtraction principles). However, it is widely assumed that the preschool child adopts the "rational"
stance with respect to fundamental properties of space and time such as the impermeability of solid
bodies and the irreversibility of complex processes. In this study, an attempt was made to call this
widespread assumption into question.
REFERENCES
Baillargeon,R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2- and 4 1/2-month-old infants.
Developmental Psychology, 23, 655-664
Bower, T.G.R. (1971). The object in the world of infant. Scientific American, 225, 4,
30-38
Glass, G.V. & Stanley, J.C. (1970). statistical methods in education and psychology. New Jersey:
Englewood Cliff.
Hamer, R.D., Alexander, K.R. & Teller, D.J. (1982). Reyleigh discriminations in young
human infants. Vision Research, 22ï, 5, 575-587
Harris, P.L., Brown, E., Mariott, C., Whittal, S., & Harmer, S. (1991). Monsters, ghosts
and witches: Testing the limits of the fantasy-reality distinction in young children.
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 105-123.
Leslie, A. (1986). Getting development of the ground. Modularity and infants perception
of causality. In P.L.C.van Geert (Ed.), Theory Building in Developmental Psychology (pp.405437). North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers.
Piaget, J. (1937). La construction du reel chez l'enfant. Neuchatel- Paris: Delachaux
&Niestle.
Powers, M.K. & Dobson, V. (1982). Effect of focus on visual acuity of human infants.
Vision Research, 22, 5, 521-528
Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I. (1986) (Order from chaos. New Dialogue of Man and
Nature). Moscow: Progress Publ.
Sextus Empiricus. (1976) (Works, Book 1). Moscow: Mysl publ.
11
Slater, A., Morison, V. & Rose, D. (1982). Visual memory at birth. British Journal of
Psychology, 73ï, 519-525
Subbotsky, E.V. (1985). Preschool children's perception of unusual phenomena. Soviet
Psychology, 23, 91-114
Subbotsky, E.V. (1990). The preschooler's conception of the permanence of an object.
(Verbal and actual behaviour). Soviet Psychology, 28, 3, 42-63.
Subbotsky, E.V. Existence as a psychological problem: Object permanence in adults and
preschool children. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 14, 1, 67-82
Zusne, L. & Jones, W.H. (1982). Anomalistic psychology. A study of extraordinary
phenomena and experience. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
12
Table 1. Percentage of children in experimental and control groups showing various reactions
in stages I-IV (Space)
Stage________________________________________
III
IY
N of Age
children
Exper.groups
16
4
19
5
10
6
I,II
Acknowledge
Permeability____ _________________________________ ____________
In everyday In a
Try to pass
Investigative Practical Disappointment
reality
Fairy tale hand through action
action
at failure
the glass wall
0
0
0
Control groups
16
4
-19
5
-10
6
--
100
100
100
82
58
20
12
26
50
44
53
30
44
53
20
----
0
0
10
33
42
20
87
100
40
----
13
Table 2. Percentage of children in experimental and control groups showing various reactions
in stages I-IV (Time)
N of Age
children
Exper.groups
16
4
19
5
10
6
Stage________________________________________
I,II
III
IY
Acknowledge
reversibility
of complex processes __________________ _____________
In everyday In a
Refuse to drink
Refused to drink Acknowledge
reality
fairy tale following experimenter’s when promised at the end
initial request
a reward
that the water
was still magic
0
0
0
Control groups
16
4
-19
5
-10
6
--
100
100
100
82
58
20
12
26
50
44
53
30
44
53
20
----
0
0
10
33
42
20
87
100
40
----
14