INDIVIDUAL AND ESSENCE IN AR,ISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
S. Marc Cohen
I shall beginwith a brief sketchof a theory of essences.This theory, or one
very much like it, has been traditionally, and I think correctly, attributed to
Aristotle.
Eachindividualhasan essence.An essenceis general,in that more than one
individualmay have the sameessence.An essenceis, literally, uthat a thing is;
and if this last clauseis understoodin a suitably generalway, there is no puzzle
abouthow what onething is can be the sameas what anotherthing is. If thingsare
two of a kind,then what oneis (say,a horse)is the sameas what the other is. Such
essencesare the lcindsthat thingscomein. SocratesandCalliassharean essence,
for they are of the samekind-both are men.Natural objectscomepre-sorted,as
it were, into kinds; pre-sorted,becausethe essenceof a thing is what it is by its
very nature.A thing may belongto many kinds; Callias,for example,is a man, a
biped,an animal.But the variouskinds eachthing belongsto are alwaysarranged
in a species-genus
hierarchy,so just oneof them will be the most specificnatural
kind that the thing in questioncomesin. That natural kind is the essenceof the
individualin question.
As an accountof Aristotle's metaphysics,this sketch,evenif not universally
accepted,is commonplace.
Whatever its shortcomingsas an interpretation of
Aristotle, it hasthe virtue of understandingAristotelianessencesas non-mysterious:they are simply the fundamentalkinds that natural things comein. We may
not agreethat there are such essences,but at leastwe understandwhat they are
supposedto be.
There are places in Aristotle's Metaphysfcs,however, where essences
appearto be a gooddeal more mysterious than the theory sketchedaboveallows.
In particular, in 26 Aristotle sets out to inquire "whether each thing and its
essenceare the sameor different." The path that this inquiry takes is difficult to
follow,but the upshotseemsto be that, with certain qualifications,eachthing is,
indeed,the sameas its essence.The problemsthat ensueare obvious.Socrates
may be an instance,or a member,of mankind,but he doesnot seemto be the sozrae
as mankind.
Three lines of solutionto this problem seeminitially promising: (1) Socrates
may not be id,enti.cal
to mankind,but there may be a senseof "same" accordingto
which he couldbe said to be the sameas mankind.PerhapsAristotle had such a
sensein mind. (2)The only sort of essencean individual,such as Socrates,could
be literally the same as would be an essenceas individual as he is. Thus, if
essences were individual (and, hence, non-sharable) rather than general,
Aristotle couldcoherentlyclaimthat eachthing is the sameas its essence.Socrates may not be literally the sameas mankind,but he may, perhaps,be Iiterally the
(3) Perhapsindividuals,such as Socrates,are
sameas what-it-is-to-be-Socrates.
not in view here at all. If it is only uniaersals,such as speciesand genera,that are
under consideration,then there is no problem how eachof them couldbe the same
as an essence.Socratesmay not be literally the sameas mankind,but his specics
surely is.
Thesethree lines of solution share a commonstrateg"y.Each takes two parts
of the problematic equation("eachthing is the same as its essence")as fixed in
75
I'AIDI,,'IA
accordance with the theory sketched above and then tries to bend the remaining
part into line. (l) fixes on individual "things" and general essences,and opts for a
sense of samenessother than numerical identity; (2) fixes on individual i'things"
and numerical identity, and opts for individ,ual essences; (3) fixes on gene*ral
essencesand strict identity, and opts for uniue,rsal"things". Each of thesb lines,
whatever its attractions, has severe drawbacks, not theleast of which, it seems
to me, is its partial conflict with the theory as sketched. I would prefer to work
out an understanding of the problematic equation which does not require us to
abandon any part of that theory.
In this paper I will examine the problematic equation that Aristotle considers
.
in Meto.physi'cs26 and consider various interpretitions of it. I hope to show that
the three lines of solution mentioned above are inadequate,and will propose, instead, a way of understanding the equation to be peifectly consistent with the
theory sketched above.
I
Why is Aristotle concernedto defendthe claim,with whateverqualifications
are required,that eachthing is the sameas its essence?Aristotle'i motivation
(howevercloudedthe detailsmay be)is clearly:rnti-Platonic.
The main questionof
Metaph.Z, "What is substance'/",is one that Plato would have answered- perhapsdid answer - in terms of the theory of Forms or Ideas.substances- the
fully real, independent
entitiesthat are the objectof Aristotle's searchin Metaph.
z - are,for Plato,the Forms or Ideasthat exist independentboth of the perceptibleobjectsthat share,or participate,in them andof the mindswhich haveaccess
to them. In Plato'stheory, as Aristotle* representsit to us, the Forms are separate,apart from their participants.Eachthing,in Plato'sview, would be distinct
from the Form (or Forms) it sharesin, and hence(Aristotle concludes)distinct
from its substance,if Plato is right about what the substancesare. Aristotle, on
the other hand,seemsto want to answer "Edsence"to the question"what is substance?",and if eachthing is not distinct from its essence,then Aristotle will be
holdinga positionthat contrastsclearly with Plato's.GivenPlato'stheory of the
separationof Form from participant,and Aristotle's claim of (let us say) identity
of a thing and its essence,PlatoandAristotle cannotboth be right aboutwhat thL
substancesare. Havingdistinguishedhis own view from Plato's,Aristotle will be
in a positionto argue for the superiority of his own view.r So much for the importance of the claim that each thing is the same as its essence.
A seeondpreliminarypoint concernsthe qualificationswith which Aristotle
bedgeshis elaim.He seemspreparedto defendthe claim at least for what he calls
kath' hautahgornena- Iiterally,"thingsspokenof with respectto themselves"but appears to withhold it from lcatasumbebekoslcgomena- literally, "things
spokenof coincidentally."The labels,literally translated,defy comprehension;
the somewhatlooserversions- "genuineunities" versus "accidentalunities" fare somewhatbetter. Aristotle's examplesare clearer still. An "accidental
unity," such as a palc man, who is so-called(lcgornenon)by way of coincidenceor
supervention(lcatasutrrbebekos),
is not coveredby the 26 equation:Aristotle is
76
"genuine
not committedto sayingthat a pale man is the sameas his essence.A
(kath'
himself
to
with respect
unity," such as am.(m,i,tro i. so-called(Ipgomenon)
his
as
same
the
indeed,
is,
o" sup""uention),
iouion, viz.,notby way of coincidence
a
make
wodld
view,
in
Aristotle's
wirat,
on
essence.Onemight profitablyreflect
prove
will
this_qualification
rate,
any
At
not.
pil"
*on
u
ion ugenuineuiity'and
we shall
to be extremely important in our interpretationof the 26 equation,and
return to it.
Let us beginwith the suppositionthat the essenceswith which the 26 equaThis
tion is concernedare generalur""n""", i.e.,sharableby morethan onething.
idento
17
and
in27,10,
goes
on
Aristotle
since
seemsa reasonablesipposition,
he seemsto assert quite unequivocallythat differert
LiIyformand essence,'and
have the
iniiuiauatsmay havethe sameform (28).So tliiferent individualsmay
general'
terminology'
our
and such an essenceis, in
same essence;'z
Now consider socrates and his essence,which we will abbreviateas
(Socrates)."According tothez6 equation,socratesis the sameas E (socrates);
we
and also Calliasis the"sameas E (Callias).But if E (Socrates)is general,as =
(socrates)
then,E
and
callias,
by
socrates
is
slzored
and
havebeensupposing,
E'(Callias).Socratei then turns out to be the sameas 'B (Callias);and' finally'
Socratesturns out to be the sameas Callias.But Socratesand Calliasare not the
same thing, so somethingseemsto have gone wrong'
(2)
We may, of course,lmmediatelyconclude'along the lines of solution
blocking
thereby
general,
not
are
inZ6
above,thatihe essencesunder discusiion
premature..For
lhe identity of .E (Socrates)with E (Callias),but that would be
(for they are both
same
the
are
and
Callias
socrates
*ti.t
in
sense
is
a
there
recognizes(cf'
men) and, what is *or", ttri. is a senseof "same" tirlt^e{i_slgtle
on "one")' one
1016b31ff
6,
a
Metaph.
cf. also
, Tbp.103a6-39;
utt"en. A9, 1018a5-9
they are the
but
number,
in
sime
the
not
are
us,
tells
manand another,Aristofle
number or
.am" in species.A man and a horse, while not the same in either
on the one
sameness,
,pu"iu", are the samein genus.If we contrast numericol
our
resolve
can
we
then
other'
hand,with specifi.candginerit sameness'on the
(and'
aforti'ori,
specilic-ally
are
Callias
difficulty by noiing that Socrates and
the saire. The conclusion,that Socratesand Calliasare the same'is
gl*"i"iff'i
(callias)need
no longerunwarranled,and so the identity of .8.(socrates)with E
not be"blocked.Generalessencesare still in the running'
abanFor all its attractiveness,this first resolution of the difficulty must be
as
same
is
the
Socrates
that
doned.2The price of making palatablethe claim
is
only
it
If
interest.
of
much
be
to
weak
too
Calliasis to make lhe Z6
"qi"iion
into play in the
,p".ifi" or generic,as opposedto numerical,samenessthat comes
then the claim that eachthing is the same.asits essenceamounts to
Zb
"q""ti"ri,
than that eachthing is specificallyor genericallythe sameas its essence'
no rno""
and we
But then eachthing will beihe same,in this sense,as all sorts of things,
is
socrates
Thus,
essen_ce.
thing's
the
about
will have been told nothing special
(4)
the
(3)
Bucephalus,
genericallythe same as (1")callias, (2) the speciesmon,
his
essence'
are
these
of
all
not
and
etc.,
horse,
fpecies
is intendedto be part of an anti-Platonic
Further, recatt thaf t-trl ZO
"quution
his own theory of substance(that subesiablish
to
argument. Aristotle wishes
z6 equastanceis essence)as againstPlato's,and onestep in thisargument is the
is weakequation
tion of eachthing and iis essence.But if the samenessof the 26
77
PAIDIiIA
enedto specific/genericsameness,then the theory of substanceas essencewill
have to be similarly weakenedor it will not follow from the premises intendedto
supportit. In this case,the conclusionthat substanceis essence,which purports
to tell us what substancers, will tell us only what substanceis specificallyor
genericallythe sameas. And this doesnot tell us very much-certainly less than
what Aristotle intendsto tell us. Sowe cannotinvokea senseof "same"other than
numericalsamenessto help us out. The difficulty producedby applying LheZG
equationto generalessencespersists.
Another way of trying to keep generalessencesin the picture is, along the
lines of solution(3),to restrict the range of "each thing" in the 26 equation.In
wonderingwhether each thing (helmston)is the sameas its essence,Aristotle
may havehad in mind not such things as Socratesand Calliasbut such things as
man andhorse.If we supposethat by "eachthing" Aristotle mqanseachuniaersal
rather than eachparticulnr, then our problem about Socrates and Callias being
the samewill not arise, since neither of them will have been identifiedwith an
essenceby the 26 equation.For reasonsthat will becomeapparentbelow I will
call the interpretation which takes "each thing" to mean each universal the
abstract interpretationof the 26 equatiou the alternativeI will call the concrete
interpretation.r
The abstract interpretationhas much to recommendit. For one thing, it
blocks the unwantedinferenceto the conclusionthat Socratesand Calliasare
numericallythe same.For another,it allowsthe essencesunder discussionin 26
to be general,siircethe essenceof a universal,suchas man,will itself be universal
andhencesharable.For a third, it avoidsthe apparentcategorymistakethat the
26 equation,on the concreteinterpretation,seemsto make.After all, an essence
seemsto be an abstract entity of some kind, so how can a conereteparticular,
suchas Callias,be numericallyidenticalto his essence?
Universals,however,are
abstractentities,andthus are thingsof just the right type to identity with essences. The 26 claim as appliedto universals would, e.g., identify man with rati,onal
onirnal; so understood,the equation seems eminently reasonable.
But is the abstract interpretationevenpossiblc?How could Aristotle mean
"universal"by hekoston,the word he typicallyusesfor particulars(kath'hekasta)
as opposedto universals(ta hatholnz)?He could,becausehe sometimesdoes.In
the biologicalworks, it is individual speci.esthat are often referred to as a ka.th'
helcasta,
and speciesare, if not the only universalsin Aristotle's purview, certainly the onesto which theZ6 equationwould most of all be intendedto apply.aSo
Aristotle couldhavemeant"eachuniversal";the questionremains,however:Did
he? I believe that there are compellingreasons for concludingthat he did not.
For onething, our effort to makeroom for generalessencesin 26 has thus far
ignoredthe various passagesin which Aristotle seemsto be talking about.individwe meet
For example,at 1032a8we find E (Socrates);at 1029b14-15
ual essences.
E'(you);later, in 215 (1039b25),
we discover.B (this house);in anotherbookof the
Metaphysirs,A18 (l02an), there is .E (Callias).It is not certain that thesereferencesare all to individualessences;but ifthere rs sucha thing as E (Socrates),as
opposedto E (man),it is difficult to seehow Aristotle could fail to be raising a
questionabout Socratesand .8,(Socrates)in wondering whether the Z6 equation
holds.
A more telling objectionto the abstract interpretation is this. Aristotle finds
78
Thus, Aristotle
it necessaryto restrict the2;6equationto kath'hauta Legomena.
must supposethat the equationdoes nol hold for a kata sumbebekoslcgomenon
such as palc man. But if we consider the abstract interpretation of the equation
Pale man = ,E (Paleman)
we will seethat Aristotle can no more find fault with it than he can with any instanceof the equationappliedto leath'hauta lcgomena.Aristotle would have had
no reasonto qualify the ZGequationas he did if the abstract interpretation were
right.
Consideran instanceof the 26 equationthat Aristotle accepts:
Man = E(Man).
On the abstract interpretation, this claim identifies the universal mon with the
universal rat'ionalonimal (say),which is what it is to be a man. This equation,on
the abstract interpretation, would be quite acceptableto Aristotle. But on the
abstract interpretation, the equation
Pale man = ,E (Paleman)
identifiesthe universalpalnmon with the universal ratinnal qn'imalu.rithsuch-and'
such a surfoce (say),and this equationis as acceptableas the earlier one. On the
abstract interpretation, the 26 equationseemsequallyvalid for kata sumbebeleos
as well as kath' hauta lngomena.
One might object that, for Aristotle, there is no such thing as .E (pale man)'
andthat is what is wrong with the applicationof the 26 equationto kata sumbebekoslngomennBut given the abstract interpretation's understandingof essences,
it is not at all clear that Aristotle would deny that there is such a thing as .8 (pale
man);and,what is more, Aristotle's worry is not just that the 26 equation,applied
lo kata sunbebekos lcgomenn,fails to hold, but that, e.g', palc mon and .E (pale
man) are d,ifferent\hoion lnukos anthropos heteron kat to leukoi onthropoi e'inui:
It would be perverse for Aristotle to maintainthat two things are
1031a20-21).
(merely) different from one another if he were in a position to make the stronger
claim that one of them does not exist. More to the point, non-existenceof, e.g', E
(paleman)is never given as a reasonfor rejecting this instanceof the 26 equation.
Perhaps the point can be clarified as follows. On the abstract interpretation,
for any universal,4 the essencewith which it is identified,.E [F], providesneeessary and sufficient conditionsfor something'sbeing F. Thus, being a rational
animal is necessaryand sufficient for being a man. Now it is easy to see that the
situation does not changewhen we go on to such universalsas pale man. Being a
a surface is necessaryand sufficient for being
rational animalwith such-and-such
a paleman.Whatever argument there may be, on the abstract interpretation, for
identifyingF with .O[F]seemsto apply equallywell whether F is a kath' hautoor a
lnta sumbebekoslcgomenon.We must therefore return to solution (2) and the
concrete interpretation.
The concrebeinterpretation seems to push us into the camp of individual
essences.s
Such essencesare problematic,however. For although they seem to
79
PAIDIiI,I
offer a neat solutionto our problemswith the 26 equation,they run into troubles
of their own when confronted with Aristotle's thesis of the indefinability of inhis equationof definitionandessence.T
dividuals6and
Individuals,of which there is
no definition,wouidhaveto havenon-sharable
essences,which,by virtue of their
not beingshared,wouldindeedserve to definethoseindividuals.Defendersof individual essencesmust extricate Aristotle from this self-contradictoryposition.
It is not my purposein this paper to show that Aristotle did not countenance
individualessences(althoughI suspectthat he did not).I wish only to defuseone
line of argumentin favor of individualessencesby showingthat the 26 equation
does not require them. What we have seenso far, in effect,is that two ways of
trying to show this - by appealto a weakersenseof "sameness"than numerical
identity, and by appealto the abstract interpretation of the equation - do not
succeed.If our only remainingway of resolvingour puzzleaboutthe 26 equation
is to followsolution(2),then we must concedethat Aristotle did, indeed,embrace
individualessences.Our project, then, will be to producea viablealternativeto
solution (2).
II
As noted above,solution (2), with its individualessences,seemsthe inevilable outcomeof (a) treating the left-hand-side
of the 26 equationas ineluding
referenceto inCividuals,
such as Socratesand Callias,while at the sametime (b)
understandingthe sort of samenessinvolvedto be numericalidenlity. But a solution whichadheresto (a)and (b)without individualessencesmay still be possible.
At any rate, MichaelWoods,E
followingsomesuggestionsof G. E. L. Owen,ehas
offeredan interpretationof Aristotle's doctrineof essencein the central booksof
the Metaphysrcs,and in particular in 24-6,which seemscapableof providingjust
such as solution.Thus, a brief look at this interpretation will be in order.
The Owen-Woodsline of interpretation is that the 26 equation,in effect, is to
be understoodin terms of a theory of predicationthat treats, e.9.,"Socratesis a
man" as an identity-statement.
In a "strong" (i.e.,essential)predication,such as
"Socratesis a man,"there is referenceto only oneindividual,viz., Socrates.The
predicateexpressionpicksout, not an individual,but a species-form-theessence
of the individualin question.And yet, accordingLo the Owen-Woodsline, Aristotle's doctrine was the "extremely paradoxical"one that "Socrates is a man" is a
statement of identity and that since Socratesand Calliasare both men they are
both identical to the form man.
Woodsand Owentake this doctrine, paradoxicalas it seems,to be a plausibly
Aristotelian reaction to Platonic worries of the Third Man variety. In a "weak"
(i.e.,accidental)predication,suchas "Socratesis pale,"the subjectand predicate
expressionsintroducetwo distinct itemsr0andthe predicateis not predicatedof
itself.rrln a strong predication,such as "Socratesis a man,"where the predicate
ls self-predicable,the subject and predicateexpressionsintroduce only one item,
for Socratesis identicalto his essence,and essenceis what is introduced by the
predicate of a strong predication. Thus, Aristotle blocks the Third Man Argument by maintainingthat of the argument's two crucial assumptions,viz., NonIdentity and Self-Predication,the former holds for weak predicationsbut fails for
strong ones,whilg the latter holdsfor strong predicationsbut fails for weak ones.
There is no predication for which both assumptionshold. So Aristotle need not
80
fear the Third Man.
This is a very attractive picture of Aristotle's motivation,but it doeslittle to
relieve one's perplexity over the doctrine that has been attributed to Aristotle.
Aristotle has beenmadeto say that Socratesand Callias are both identical to one
and the sameessence,viz., the species-f.otm
man. But since no tuo things can be
numericallyidenticalto oneand the samething, Aristotle cannotseemto avoid,on
the Owen-Woodsline, identifying Socrates with Callias. Perhaps in
(i) Socratesis a man
(ii) Calliasis a man
we should take the predicate, a rnen, although it is the same in (i) and (ii), as
designatingdifferentitems in (i) and (ii). If we do this we will be able to treat (i)
withouthavingto concludethat Socrates= Callias.
and (ii) as identity-statements
And the predicateexpressionsharedby (i) and (ii) may indeedseemto designate
different items, for the man that Socratesis said to be is not identicalto the man
that Callias is said to be.
At this point,however,we shouldbe clear that the characterizationof (i) and
(ii) as identity-statements
will be defensibleonly if (i) and (ii) are regimentedas
(i') Socrates= manr
(ii') Callias= man2
where the subscriptsindicatethat manl $ man' which preventsthe inferenceto
"Socrates= Callias."But if manl f man2,what is the relationbetweenthesetwo
items?Manris the essenceof Socrates,and man2is the essenceof Callias;if these
are not identical,they seemto be individualessences,and we will be pushedonce
line is concerned,
againto solution(2).What is worse,as far as the Owen-Woods
is that we can also sav:
(i") Man,is a man
(ii")Manzisa man.
(Indeed,(i") followsfrom (i) and (i').)But (i") and (ii") are bothstrong predications,
and as such will require beingtreated,if Owenand Woodsare right, as identitystatements.Thus, their commonpredicate, "a man," will no more designaLeone
thing lhan did the predicatecommonto (i) and (ii). In fact, there will be no way to
say, in any kind of predicationalstatement Aristotle recognizes,what it is that
Socratesand Calliashavein common.Of coursethey are both men,commonsense
rushes in to say, but the statementsthat tell us this - viz., (i) and (ii) - do not
predicate anything of them in common,for manr $ man2.
Aristotle shouldthus look askanceat the gift of an identity theory of predication, evenif only a partial theory, for such a theory would go nowhere.In addition
to the problem mentionedabove-- of failing to explainthe predicationof anything
,incommon- there is also the familiar difficulty that identity theories of predication all seemto presupposepredicationrather than to explain it. I believeit can
alsobe shown,althoughI will not attempt to do so here, that Aristotle could have
no reason for treating strong predications as identity-statementsthat does not
carry over to weak predications,so that all predications,weak or strong, would
81
PAIDEIA
be statementsof identity. If socrates ends up being identical
not only to his essence but also to his accidents we have surely gJne too
far.
I have thus far been assumingthat the OwbnlWoodsline adheres to both of
features (a) and (b) above,and have found the line impossibleto follow. That
assumption may, however,be mistaken.Thus, Woods writes: r2.
W h e nw e u s ea p r o D c rn a m el i k e ' S u ' r a t c s t' o p i c ko u t a n i n d i v i d u a l
m a n ,w h a t w e p i t . ko u t i s a l w a y s
the form ' ' ' ' 'ihe't'ssen.e of Saratts i. .irlpil l[" ro.. man,
an essencewhich he shares with
callias ' . . . The essenceof callias * th; ;;Jnu';hich
he is - *t"-""r" .c"iiias picr<sout that
cssenceor form, thoughit picks it out in ils occurrencein a particurar
pi""" oi-uli"r.
And Owensaysthat Aristotle'streatmentof strong predicationsas sratements
of
'helps
to persuadehim that the primary Jullects of air"ou"r" cannot be
idqltit:y
individualssuchas socrates,who cannotbedefined,uut sp"cie. suchas
man.,,r3It
now appearsthat when onesays "socratesis a man" on" is, indeed,producing
a
statementof identity, but without referring to Socratesat all. "socrates" in
ttis
context refers to the essenceall men sharu. Thus, the 26 equationis
only
o'ppwently about individuals,after all. The owen-woods line has taken us,
by a
roundaboutroute,backto the abstractinterpretationofthe 26 eluation.
Sincewe
havealready found sufficient-reasonto reject that interpretation, we are
as yet
without an alternative to individualessences.
III
I wouldlike to suggestthat the 26 equationbe interpretedas making,albeit
in a rather misleadingy?y, a good,recognizable,
Aristotelianpoint aboutindividuals,their identity conditions,and geneial essences.Aristotle, as we have seen,
is clearly taking a position that is opposedto plato's, so we may perhaps use the
anti-Platonicthrust of 26 as a foothold.In platonicmetaphysics,*" -uy assume_
using Aristotelian terminologyto expregsplato's position- an individual,such as
callias, really has no essenceat all. callias is just a participant in a variety of
Forms,and it is the Forms, rather than their participunts,that havedeterminate
natures,or essences.Ifthis is Plato'sview, then Aristotle may safelyconceiveof
the Platonic notion of partitipating ina Form as being
the same as his
own-notionof having-aproperty accidentally,"by wiy"ougl,ly
of*supervention,(kata
sumbebekos).
Thus, there can be, for plato, no yormai unr*"" to the question
"what is it to be callias?" That is, any answer such as "to be a man," o" ,.to be
pale," etc., would only mention something that superuenesin Callias and whieh,
conceivably,Calliascould lack.
A Platonist attempting to provide identity conditionsfor Callias,then, would
have no real requirements to impose.To be identical to Callias one need not be
pale,for callias neednot participate in the Form pale; nor needone be a man, for
Callias-need
not participate in the Form Man, either. Any candidatefor the role of
("what-it-is-to-be-Callias")
Callias'essence
expressedin generalterms (e.g.,that
rnon, that palc thing, e!c.), fails to provide an ans*rer, iithe platonic posi-tionis
3.9"p!qd. No -description in general terms provides necessary conditions for
being identicalto Callias.In Aristotle's terminology, as I understand it, this platonic_position.can
be put as follows: no individual thing is the sameas its essence.
In
opposition
to this, Aristotle maintains that, ai least as f.ar as kath, hauta
legomennareconcerned,eachindividual is the sameas its essence.The qualifica-
82
tion is important, for it limits, in effect, the descripl'ionsserving to pick out the
individualsfor which the equationholds. Mon is a kath' hauto lngomenon,and so
provides us with a description which picks out an individual, e.g', this mon,
Callias,for which the equationholds;palc mon is not a lcath'hauto lzgomenon,and
so the description"this paleman" will not be part of any acceptableinstanceof the
equation.
The equationitself, as I have said, provides necessaryconditions for being
identicalto the individual in question.In order to be Callias,i.e., to be identical to
Callias,an individualmust be the samernonas Callias.(Contrast: to be Calliasone
neednot be the samepalz nlul, as Callias,since Calliasmay ceasebeing a pale man
withoutceasingto be Callias.)And a man is what Calliasis; in Aristotle's terminology,man is Callias'to ti en e'inai,or essence.Aristotle seems to concludefrom
thesetwo facts that to be identicalto Calliasis to be the sameessenceas Callias,
andso,as he puts it, the individual(e.g.,Callias)is the sameas its essence.
It may appearthat Aristotle is here guilty of the fallacy later to be diagnosed
as the confusionof classmembershipwith classinclusion.For holdingthat Callias
is identicalto his essenceis tantamountto holdingthat Calliasis an essence(in
general,r is identicalto an F if, and only if, r is an F), and Aristotle seemsto have
reachedthis conclusionfrom the premisesthat Call:insis aman and that man is an
essence.
Aristotle would be guilty of a fallacy, however, only if he understood the
equation- which is tantamountto saying that, e.9., Callias is an essence- as
claiming that a flesh-and-bonesspatio-temporal individual such as Callias is
identicalto an abstract entity (as essencesare traditionallyconceived).But, if I
am right, Aristotle did not understandthe equationin this way. Rather, as Aristotle intendedit, the equationcomesto this: to be identical to Calliasis to be ti.e
s(nne rnan as Callias. for man is the essenceof Callias'
We are now in a positionto reconsiderwhether the essenceAristotle identifies "eachthing" rvith is individualor general.The questionmay still seemto have
no satisfactory answer, but on our interpretation of the equationthis poses no
problem.Aristotle is interestedin the conditionsunder which somethingis the
sameindividualas Callias,so you might say that the essencewhich providesthe
answer is individual.But this would be very misleading,since lhe description
which specifiesthe essencewill be a generalone,applicableto other individuals
as well.The ideaof an individualessenceis expressedin a formulasuch as this: r
and y are identicalif, and only if, r andE haue Lhesameessence. But Aristotle's
equation,which talks not of "having" an essencebut of "being the same" as an
essence,suggests a rather different formula:
r andy are identicalif, and only if, c and
y are the same-E(where "E"'specifiesthe
tien ehniof r, "what r is").
.Ois, of course, a general essence,such as tnan, or horse. But the things whose
identity eonditionsare stated in terms of such essencesare individuals,such as
Callias,or Bucephalus.The essencesthat figure in Aristotle's equationare, if you
like, at once individual and general.Socratesand Calliasare not the same man,
and (hence)not the sameessence;but Socratesand Calliasare both men, and so
they have the same (general) essence.
E8
PAIDEIA
cmergefrom this interpretationof
To the extent'towhichindividualessences
lheZ6 equation,then, they will do little of the work that is ordinarily expectedof
things and help to pick out
such entities.'lhey will not, for example,indiuid,uate
thosesamethingsin other possibleworlds.Onemight expressAristotle's view in
this way: an individualin anotherpossibleworld is Socratesjust in casehe is the
s(nnern(m.as Socrates,but there is no description purely in general terms that
will pick out just Socrates,and no oneelse,in all possibleworlds. The descriptive
in principle,to more than
parCofan "individualessence"will alwaysbe applicable,
one individual.
I havearguedthat the 26 equationshouldnot be taken as the literal expresview aboutindividualsand their essences,but as
sionofan arcaneor indefensible
a somewhatmisleadingway of putting a perfectlysaneand plausibleposition.The
argument thus far has beenthat none of the kteral readings of the equationplopoint for Aristotle to be
videsa plausible,or plausiblyAristotelian,philosophieal
justified.
suggesteds-eem:
reading
The
is
reading
making.andso somenon-literal
not to itrain the text excessively,and attributes to Aristotle just the sort of antiPlatonic positionthat one would expect in the context. I will coneludewith a few
on the fit betweenthis interpretation of the equationand the context in
"omments
26.
To deny the applicationof the ZG equationto spatio-temporalparticulars,
Aristotle suggests,is to accepta Platonicmetaphysicsof "separation"betweena
thing andits essence.But eventhe Platonist,Aristotle goeson to argue,must f!1$
on pain of facing an infinite regress (103fb
the equationapplicableLosom.eth'ing,
will have to allow the equationto apply to
the
Platonist
Prliumably,
28-1032a4).
the Forms. On the presentinterpretationof the equation,what the Platonistwill
be acceptingis the claimthat the Forms havedeterminatenaturesor essences.If
the Platonist were to deny this, he would be left with Forms devoidof explanatory
value.Of course the Platonist will gladly allow the applicationof the equationto
such"individuals"as the Forms; he wouldmerely insist that it has no application
to spatio-temporalindividuals.
Aristotlsoffers no reasonwhy Plato shouldbe unableto allow the application
of the equationto the Forms.Indeed,he seemsto invite the Platonistto acceptthe
equation.If this is right, the regress with which Aristotle threatenshis opponent
interpreted,26doesnot offer a knockin 26 is onethat the opponentcanmeetJaSo
down argument against the Platonic opposition.
Nor, I wouldcontend,doesAristotle here intend to offer such an argument.
His purpose,rather, is to show that his own view, that the "primary and self-subsistentihings" (protakut kath' hautaIngomena)are identicalto their essences,is
one that his opponentmust also share. There will still be disagreementabout
whut thesubstancesare, with the Platonistholdingout for Forms,while Aristotle
(on this interpretation)opts for individualspecimensof natural kinds. But the
importanceof thr Ari"totelian notionof essencewill have been established,for
both sides will have to agree that substancesare the same as their essences.
Aristotle hasargued,in effect,that the notionof essenceis onethat his opponent
cannotget alongwithout. What is left unstatedin 26, but is abundantlyclear, is
that Aristotle believes that he is not himself similarly committed to Platonic
Forms. The battle betweenAristotle and his Platonicopponentmay still rage on,
but the argumentof 26 has providedAristotle with a crucial dialecticaladvantage.tt
g4
Footnoteg
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
85
As we shallseebelow(in III) part of this superiorityconsistsin the fact that
Plato is forced, so Aristotle thinks, to accept the claim that each Forrn, at
least,is the sameas its essence.Thus, Plato'smetaphysicsrequires Ariswhile Aristotle's can do without PlatonicForms.
totelianessences,
I was greatlyassistedin seeingthis point by discussionswith Alan Code.
For a brief considerationof the history of these two interpretations,cf. H.
Cherniss,Aristotle's Criticisrn of Plnto snd the Aca'demy(New York, 1962)'
n.246, pp. 33?-339.
Cf. De Partibus Animal:ium,l, l.
The ideathat individualessencesor individualforms are part of Aristotle's
metaphysies
has beenwidely discussed,and perhapsnot all the discussants
havethe samething in mind. I conceiveof.individ,ualessencesas being property-like entities that are capableof.individuating; thus, if ,B (Socrates)is an
individualessence,then anything,in any possibleworld, that has E' (Socrates)is Socrates.This is what I meanby callingindividualessencesnonsharable.But a recent proponentof individualessencesin Aristotle, Edwin
Hartman,apparentlyhas somethingIessextravagentin mind: cf. his "Arispp. 545totle on the Identity of Substanceand Essence,"Phil. Rea. 85 (1976),
561,and Substonce,Body,and Soal (Princeton,1977),ch. 2, esp. pp. 61-64.I
find much in Hartman's interpretation to agree with. The sort of traditional
"individual form" interpretation to which I am seekingan alternative is to be
found,most recently,in Edward D. Harter's "Aristotle on Primary OUSIA"'
archiu fur Geschirhteder Philasophip,STBand1975Heft 1, pp. 1-20.
Cf..Metaph. Zl0, Zt1.
'24.
CI. Meta.ph.
In "substance and Essence in Aristotle," Proceed:ingsof the Aristotel:tnn
pp. 167-180.
Socinty 75 (1974-5),
In "The Platonismof Aristotle," British AcademyLecture 1965,reprinted in
Studies in the PhibsophE of Thought ond Actinn (Oxford, 1968)ed' P. F.
Strawson,pp. 125-f50.
And so the so-called"non-identity"assumptionholds:Socratesand his pallor
are two different things.
assumptiondoes
For pallnr is not pale;thus, the so-called"self-predication"
not hold in this case
Woods, l,oc. cit., pp. 1??-1?8.
Owen, bc. cit., p. 137.
Hence,it seemsto me unlikelythat the regress Aristotle here envisagesis
the Third Man, sincehe seemsto have thought that Plato could not avoid the
Third Man by simply acceptingthe notion that Forms are identical to their
essences.Yet he offers the Platonistan easyway out of the regress in 26: to
accept the 26 equation.
This paper was presentedas part of a symposiumon Aristotle_onForm and
Ossencesponsoiedby the Departments of Philosophyof the University of
wisconsin-(Milwaukee)and Marquette university in February, 1979.It was
thoroughly discussedand criticized by two commentators,Robert Heinaman
and Teiry Penner.Unfortunately, publicationdeadlineshave prevented me
from taking their commentsand criticism into accounton this occasion.