Casing the Cases
by DDA Kevin Hicks, San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office
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Below are highlights of the cases published during the past month with hyperlinks to the full case.
Please forward this to attorneys and judges who might benefit. To view the whole opinion, click on
the link or copy and paste the link into your browser.
WARNING: The below case summaries are not complete and may even be inaccurate.
Those published in March 2017, along with significant
actions by California Supreme Court
Often-used abbreviations
3X
AD
BIA
BPH
BRD
CSC
D
DCA
DJ
DJF
DP
DV
FTA
GBI
GJ
HC
HTA
IAC
IOE
J
JT
LE
LIO
three strikes
Appellate Division
Board of Immigration Appeals
Board of Parole Hearings
beyond a reasonable doubt
California Supreme Court
defendant
District Court of Appeal
double jeopardy
Division of Juvenile Facilities
death penalty
domestic violence
fail to appear
great bodily injury
grand jury
habeas corpus
held to answer
ineffective assistance of counsel
insufficiency of evidence
juvenile
jury trial
law enforcement
lesser-included offense
MDO
MSE
MX
NGI
NOA
P
PG
PNC
PNJ
PRCS
PX
SDT
SOL
SVP
SW
TC
TX
UT
V
VOP
W
1
mentally-disordered offender
motion to suppress evidence
motion
not guilty by reason of insanity
notice of appeal
people/prosecution
pled guilty
pled no contest
pronouncement of judgment
post-release community supervision
preliminary hearing
subpoena duces tecum
statute of limitations
sexually-violent predator
search warrant
trial court
transcript
upper term
victim
violation of probation/parole
witness
Federal Cases
(Criminal cases affecting California)
SCOTUS
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTED REOPENING DEF.’S
FEDERAL CAPITAL HABEAS CASE WHERE A DEFENSE EXPERT
TESTIFIED THAT DEF.’S RACE MADE IT MORE PROBABLE HE WAS
DANGEROUS
Buck v. Davis - Filed Feb. 22, 2017, in 15-8049 [2017 WL 685534; 2017 U.S.Lexis 1429].
Facts: During the penalty phase of a Texas capital murder trial, a defense psychologist opined
that def. was unlikely to be a danger if sentenced to life in prison. In discussing “statistical factors”
correlated with future dangerousness, the psychologist counted def.’s race—black—as increasing
the probability of dangerousness, explaining that black people are overrepresented in the criminal
justicesystem. This issue was not raised on def.’s direct appeal or first state habeas petition.
However, in a different case involving the same psychologist, the state conceded that this testimony
was improper. The state consented to resentencing in five other cases in which it had called the
psychologist, but not indef.’s case because def. had called him. Def.’s second state habeas raising
the claim as ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as successive. His federal habeas
petition was rejected due to the procedural default.
After the Supreme Court decided two cases opening the door for def. to claim the procedural
default should be excused due to ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, def. filed a
motion to reopen his federal habeas case on the ground of “extraordinary circumstances” under
FRCP 60(b)(6).
The district court denied relief, finding (1) no extraordinary circumstances because the expert had
only mentioned race twice, and (2) even though def.’s attorney was ineffective, def. was not
prejudiced because his crime was horrific and the expert’s mention of race was de minimus. The
Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
Held: (1.) Def. demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel and entitlement to relief under
Rule 60(b)(6). No competent defense counsel would offer testimony that def.’s race
disproportionately predisposed him to violent conduct. The testimony, which appealed to a
powerful racial stereotype, was not de minimus: when a jury hears expert testimony that makes a
defendant’s race directly pertinent on the question of life or death, the impact of the evidence
cannot be measured by how much air time the evidence received at trial or how many pages it
occupies in the record. The circumstances were extraordinary because def.’s case departs from the
basic premise in criminal law that people are punished for what they do, not who they are—a fact
confirmed by the state’s confession of error in the other cases involving this expert.
(Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., field a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined.)
A POST-ARREST PRETRIAL DETENTION WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
RAISES A FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
Manuel v. Joliet - Filed Mar. 21, 2017, in 14-9496 [2017 WL 1050976; 2017 U.S.Lexis 2021].
Facts: Def. filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting the following facts.
Police stopped a car in which def. was the passenger and searched him, finding a vitamin bottle
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containing pills. Although a field test of the pills came back negative for any controlled substance,
the officers arrested def. The pills again tested negative at the police station, but the evidence
technician lied and said one of the pills was positive for ecstasy. An arresting officer also opined in
his report that the pills were ecstasy. Def. was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. The judge, relying exclusively on the criminal complaint, found probable cause and
ordered def. held for trial. The police laboratory subsequently retested the pills and again found no
controlled substances, but def. remained in detention for another month before the state’s attorney
voluntarily dismissed the case. Def. filed suit against the city and several police officers, alleging
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights for arresting him for no reason and for detaining him for
seven weeks based on fabricated evidence. The latter claim was dismissed based on Circuit
precedent that a pretrial detention following the start of legal process cannot give rise to a Fourth
Amendment claim; instead, the petitionermust allege a breach of the Due Process Clause.
Held: The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person absent
probable cause. That can happen when the police hold someone without reason before the formal
onset of a criminal proceeding. It can also happen when legal process results in pretrial detention
without probable cause, such as a probable-cause determination based solely on an officer’s false
statements.
(Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.)
A NO-IMPEACHMENT RULE BARRING JURORS FROM TESTIFYING
ABOUT JURY DELIBERATIONS DOES NOT APPLY WHEN A JUROR’S
STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT RACIAL ANIMUS WAS A SIGNIFICANT
MOTIVATING FACTOR IN FINDING GUILT
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado - Filed Mar. 6, 2017, in 15-606 [2017 WL 855760; 2017 U.S.Lexis
1574].
Facts: A Colorado jury convicted def. of unlawful sexual contact and harassment for assaulting
two teenage girls in a bathroom. Two jurors reported to defense counsel that during deliberations,
another juror said he believed def. was guilty because Mexican men are aggressive toward women,
and that def.’s alibi witness was not credible because he was “an illegal.” The trial court reviewed
the jurors’ affidavits obtained by defense counsel. The court acknowledged the juror’s apparent
bias, but denied a motion for new trial based on Colorado’s no-impeachment rule, which bars a
juror from testifying about jury deliberations in a proceeding challenging the validity of the verdict.
Held: Where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment
rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and
any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee. The court declined to address what procedures a trial
court must follow when confronted with such evidence or what standard the trial court should use
for determining if the evidence requires a new trial.
(Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J.,
joined.)
Rippo v. Baker - Filed Mar. 6, 2017, in 16-6316 [2017 WL 855913; 2017 U.S.Lexis 1571].
Facts: During his murder trial, def. learned that the trial judge was the target of a federal bribery
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probe. Def. surmised the district attorney’s office that was prosecuting him was playing a role in the
investigation. Def. moved to have the judge disqualified under the Due Process Clause, contending
that the judge could not impartially adjudicate a case in which a party was criminally investigating
him. The judge refused to recuse himself. The state supreme court, on appeal and on postconviction
review, held that def.’s allegations did not support the assertion that the trial judge was actually
biased in this case.
Held: The state court used the wrong legal standard. The Due Process Clause may sometimes
demand recusal even when the judge has no actual bias. Recusal is required when, objectively
speaking, the probability of actual bias us too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
(Per Curiam.)
--
Ninth Circuit
THE DISTRICT COURT’S GRANT OF DEF.’S HABEAS PETITION IS
REVERSED; ALTHOUGH DEF.’S PRE-PLEA INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
CLAIM WAS NOT BARRED BY TOLLETT v. HENDERSON, THE STATE
COURT REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT A MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN DENIED
Mahrt v. Beard, et al. - Filed Mar. 1, 2017, in 15-16404 [2017 WL 782447; 2017 U.S.App.Lexis
3696].
Facts: Def. pled guilty to being a felon in possession of guns and ammunition and then
challenged the plea in a federal habeas corpus petition on the ground that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence. The magistrate judge found that the claim
was not barred by Tollett, construing the claim as a challenge to “the intelligent nature of the plea,”
and then found counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress ammunition
observed during a protective sweep of the home while def. was detained outside.
Held: (1.) Def.’s ineffective assistance claim was not barred by Tollett, which, “properly
understood,” does not bar federal habeas claims of pre-plea ineffective assistance when the failure
to move to suppress evidence prevents a defendant from making an informed choice about whether
to plead. (2.) Even though counsel should have moved to suppress the guns and ammunition, it was
reasonable for the state court to conclude that a motion to suppress, if brought, would likely have
been denied.
SONOMA COUNTY - FELON IN POSSESSION OF GUNS AND AMMUNITION - REVERSED
SF2015200421 - DAG PAMELA K. CRITCHFIELD - (415) 703-5952
Appellate Division, DCA, and CSC cases
3/1/17
P. v. S.M. (1/4)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A147596.PDF
PC 1385
Over P appeal, no abuse of discr in PC 1385 dismissal of insurance fraud charges. Charges
involved D buying comprehensive insurance policy and then making claim ($360) that day
for previous day loss, falsely claiming theft occurred after insurance bought. TC dismissed
4
charges in view of D’s age, lack of record, de minimis crime, and negative effect on D’s
profession.
3/2/17
City of San Jose v. (Santa Clara) Sup. Ct. (SC)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S218066.PDF
CPRA
Where city employee uses private account to communicate about public business, CPRA
applies.
3/2/17
City of LA v. (LA) Sup. Ct. (2/7)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B269525.PDF
Civil Discovery Act and CPRA
Plaintiff sought discovery from LAPD concerning vehicles seized. LAPD denied, asserting
it did not possess records held by towing companies under contract, also claiming Civil
Discovery Act did not apply to CPRA. TC Civil Discovery Act applied and held City had
waived any other objections. On City writ petition, Civil Discovery Act applied to CPRA,
but TC otherwise erred.
3/6/17
P. v. Lara (3)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C072355.PDF
PC 187 1st reduced, PC 187 2d reversed, Elizalde, Sanchez
As to one D, PC 187 1st reduced to 2d b/c suff evid only that he aided/abetted in an assault
and the 187 was a nat & prob consequence. IOE that two other Ds committed PC 187 2d
b/c IOE that they participated in the assault. Suff evid for gang charges/enhancements in
that the organizational connection per Prunty was sufficient. But gang
charges/enhancements reversed for Elizalde/Miranda error in gang admissions made in
booking. Error compounded by Sanchez error in gang expert’s testimony.
3/6/17
P. v. Shorts (3)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C078041.PDF
EC 1108
D received LWOP for DNA cold-case rape-187 of teen. No error in admission of D’s
crimes against girlfriend committed 3 yrs before the PC 187. Re D’s defense of 3d-party
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culpability, no error in refusing D’s proffered evid re the 3d party’s “propensity for
violence.” Even if error, it did not prejudice D (Watson standard) where the P was allowed
to elicit lay opinion testimony that the 3d party did not kill V.
3/6/17
P. v. Garcia (2/5)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B266889.PDF
PC 186.22(b) and Prunty
Suff evid to establish “associational connection” between subsets (Jungles and Bittys) of
Black P-Stones gang for purposes of PC 186.22(b), rejecting D arg that the two are distinct
gangs.
3/7/17
P. v. Vego-Robles (1/1)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A137121A.PDF
Sanchez error harmless, Chiu error
Gang-murders again affirmed following remand following Sanchez. Sanchez error, but
harmless BRD (Chapman). An aider-abettor conv reversed for Chiu (nat & prob conseq)
instructional error.
3/9/17
P. v. Reese (SC)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S230259.PDF
TX of prior proceedings for indigents
DCA committed harmless error (Chapman standard) in stating indigents are only allowed
TXs of witness testimony and in denying indigent appellant TX of opening and closing
statements from prior proceeding.
3/9/17
P. v. Villa-Gomez (3)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C073188.PDF
Gang admissions at booking
D conv of crimes from gang attack made in jail. No error in allowing evid of D’s
admissions re gang membership made at booking. The admissions were made before the
crime, so questions not reasonably likely to illicit incriminating response. If error, harmless
(Chapman standard).
Duarte concurs, stating that harmless error analysis was unnecessary.
6
3/9/17
In re Christian S. (6)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H043104.PDF
Arbuckle does not apply to restitution hearings
No error by visiting judge in denying J’s request to continue restitution hearing until judge
who took disposition could hear it, holding Arbuckle does not apply to restitution hearings.
Any error harmless (Watson standard).
3/9/17
P. v. Cervantes (1/4)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A140464.PDF
Prop 57 and retroactivity
D, 14 at time of crime, conv of burglary, rape, attempted murder, etc. Specific intent
offenses reversed for IAC in failing to investigate/present evidence re voluntary intox
negating intent.
Rejects D arg that Prop 57 is retroactive such that ALL counts must be reversed and
remanded for fitness hearing. However, as to counts reversed and remanded for retrial,
those must go to juvenile court for fitness hearing.
For the crimes affirmed, D’s potential sentence may still be functional LWOP in viol of 8th
Am. This is not mooted by PC 3051 b/c 3051 has an exception for sentences, like D’s, that
fall under one-strike law. The fitness hearing will involve facts re whether D
“irredeemable” such that LWOP may be constitutional.
3/13/17
In re Kyle T. (2/7)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B267722.PDF
PC 594 amount of damage
IOE that PC 594 damage exceeded $400 where sole witness on issue was officer with onpage sheet stating cost amounts of graffiti removal, with no further information as to what
the costs are for or how the amounts are composed. DCA suggests that the easiest way to
satisfy this is to submit the invoices for costs of repair.
3/13/17
P. v. Salas (4/1)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D070569.PDF
PC 273.5, 667.5, and restitution
7
B/c PC 273.5 is not “violent felony” listed in PC 667.5(c), error to order, as part of D’s
restitution, payment for V’s security enhancements (alarms and cameras)
3/13/17
P. v. (Riverside) Sup. Ct. (Lara) (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E067296A.PDF
Prop 57 re direct-filed cases
Denying P petition and request for stay, direct-filed adult charges against Js filed prior to
Prop 57 must be remanded to J court for fitness hearing.
3/14/17
P. v. Call (5)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F071500.PDF
Prop 47 and prison priors
D conv of HS 11378, 11379, with 3 prison priors. Re convictions underlying those priors,
Prop 47 petitions pending during trial, but reduced to misd prior to sentencing. Held, error
to impose the prison priors, citing “misdemeanor for all purposes” language in PC 1170.18.
(Note, this issue pending in CSC, People v. Valenzuela, S232900 (#16-97).)
3/15/17
P. v. Phung (4/3)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G051876.PDF
PC 3051
D, 17 at crime time, was in car w/ fellow gang members in chasing rivals. D’s fellow gang
member shot at fleeing car, killing one. D conv PC 187 2d, 664/187, 246, enhancements
per PC 186.22(b), 12022.53. Sentence 40-life.
Pursuant to PC 3051, Franklin, D’s 8th Am challenge rejected.
PC 654 does not prohibit punishment for PC 246 b/c subst evid of separate intent/objective.
3/16/17
P. v. Stapleton (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E064824.PDF
PC 666 probation conditions
No overbreadth in probation conditions where D, subject to PC 290, as condition of
probation, that D get probation officer’s approval of residence and not move w/o informing
probation officer. Requiring D to stay away from Target stores and parking lots (PC 666 V)
did not unconstitutionally restrict D’s travel.
8
3/16/17
P. v. Mejia (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E062962A.PDF
PC 654, 206, 262(w/ 667.61), 273.5, 422
Under the theory of torture presented to the jury, the rape and spousal battery were part of
the course of conduct for torture, so PC 654 bars multiple punishment. Re PC 422,
however, the separate criminal intent exception allows multiple punishment b/c torture
applies to physical pain. B/c the spousal rape charge with tying/binding (PC 667.61(e)(5))
has the longest incarceration period prior to parole eligibility, that sentence must be
imposed. B/c the PC 206 is stayed, the PC 273.5 (and 422) can be imposed.
3/17/17
P. v. Russell (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E064121.PDF
CCP 206, 237
Alleging juror misconduct, D got TC to send letters to jurors as to whether they wished
contact. All but one responded, and D argued that the non-response amounted to consent to
contact. Held, TC did not err in refusing to disclose contact info of non-responding juror,
reasonably concluding that the non-response to letter and several phone calls constituted an
objection to contact.
3/17/17
P. v. Angel (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E064000.PDF
IAC, reliance on interoffice courtesy
D counsel was not ineffective for not subpoenaing officer who were on P witness list,
reasonably assuming he did not need to do so, where the district attorney and public
defender had a longstanding professional courtesy to avoid double-subpoenaing Ws.
3/17/17
P. v. Chestra (2/5)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B264462.PDF
Self D instruction
No error in not sua sponte instructing on self-defense (and no IAC in not so requesting)
where D did not set forth self-defense at trial and it would have been inconsistent with his
theory of defense.
9
No error in not sua sponte instructing on vol PC 192 as LIO, where neither D’s confession
(which he recanted at trial) nor his trial testimony provided substantial evidence of heat-ofpassion or imperfect self-defense.
(The publication footnote says part “C” is to be published, and both self-defense section and
LIO section are labeled “C”)
3/20/17
P. v. Merritt (SC)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S231644.PDF
Harmlessness standard
Failure to instruct on criminal elements is only reversible per se if the failure “vitiates all the
jury’s findings.” This error harmless BRD b/c D’s argument conceded that the perpetrator
was guilty of robbery—his defense was that he was not the perpetrator.
Liu, concurring, would narrow the holding to highlight the case’s unique circumstances—
D’s concessions and the fact that both parties correctly stated the elements in argument.
Cuéllar dissents that the complete failure by a court to define a crime cannot be harmless
error.
3/20/17
P. v. Antolin (1/5)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A147075.PDF
PC 1170(h)
On P appeal, TC erred in recalling and modifying D’s sentence. D was sentenced in 2013 to
11 years in local prison. In 2015, D petitioned for recall, requesting remainder of sentence
be served under mandatory supervision in a residential drug program. TC granted
recall/modification, P appealed. As of 1/1/16, PC 1170(d) allows recall only within 120
days. Prior to that, there was no authority to recall Realignment sentences once their
execution began.
3/22/17
P. v. Bunyard (5)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F071846.PDF
PC 459.5
Error in refusing to reduce PC 459 2d to PC 459.5 where D stole from a vending machine
during business hours, holding that this conduct is “shoplifting” per PC 459.5. Remanded
for dangerousness determination.
10
3/23/17
P. v. Riddles (4/1)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D069419.PDF
IC 11760 (worker comp fraud), PC 1202.4
No error in ordering restitution to insurance provider for premiums D avoided paying by
falsely classifying residential care nurses as computer programmers.
3/23/17
P. v. Gonzales (SC)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S231171.PDF
PC 459.5
Prop 47, PC 459.5, includes as shoplifting non-larcenous thefts, such that D’s entry into
bank to cash forged checks was reducible from felony PC 459 2d to PC 459.5.
Chin (with Liu) dissents that PC 459.5 includes only larcenies, and the check forgery was
obtaining property by false pretenses, which is not larceny.
3/23/17
P. v. Van Orden (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E066432.PDF
Prop 47 and VC 10851
Acknowledging this issue is on review (People v. Page, review granted Jan. 27, 2016,
S230793), where a VC 10851 is based on the taking (not the driving) of a vehicle <$950, it
is reducible to a misdemeanor via PC 1170.18.
Hollenhorst dissents. He would affirm the denial of the Prop 47 petition, pending Page.
3/24/17
In re Loza (2/5)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B279566.PDF
PC 190.2, LWOP for aider abettor
Reviewing LWOP for aider/abettor in robbery/burglary PC 187 1st in light of Banks, suff
evid that D a “major participant who acted with reckless disregard to human life.”
3/27/17
P. v. Romanowski (SC)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S231405.PDF
Prop 47 and PC 484e(d)
11
Applying the “reasonable and fair market value” test to determine whether a theft of
information is >$950, PC 484e(d) can be eligible for Prop 47 reduction.
3/27/17
P. v. Patterson (SC)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S225193.PDF
PC 1016.5, 1018
A proper PC 1016.5 advisement that his plea “may” result in deportation does not bar D
from attempting to show lack of knowledge of immigration consequences may support
“good cause” to withdraw plea per PC 1018.
3/28/17
P. v. Hernandez (6)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H043551.PDF
Prop 47 and life sentence
Although D was sentenced to a life term for a PC 211 punished under 3x law, this did not
disqualify him from reduction of a PC 666 felony b/c the PC 211 was not, itself, punishable
by life imprisonment.
3/29/17
P. v. Gandy (2/4)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B264452.PDF
Collateral attack foreign prior
No error in denying D’s collateral attacks on his Oregon strikes on Boykin-Tahl grounds
where D failed to show Oregon had Tahl procedural rules. On merits, prior plea voluntary
and knowing under totality of circumstances.
3/30/17
P. v. Vandiver (4/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E065899A.PDF
Prop 47 and blank checks
Affirming Prop 47 grant re PC 496 of blank checks over P appeal (1) No requirement that
petition be accompanied by prima facie showing that PC 496 property <$950 (2) Applying
“willing seller to willing buyer” to set fair market value, blank check is <$950.
3/30/17
P. v. Smith (1/5)
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http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A146648.PDF
EC 1230
D conv as driver in VC 23153 trial after solo car crash where three in car, two passengers
injured. D proposed to intro evid that passenger, also intoxicated, said she was driver.
After the passenger at EC 402 hearing invoked 5th Am, TC said would not allow her to be
called simply to invoke 5th in front of jury. Though one W said that passenger claimed to be
driver, EMT testified the passenger stated she was seatbelted in back seat. TC did not err in
excluding alleged admission, finding it not trustworthy or reliable.
Simons concurs, critiquing controlling precedent that, he says, unnecessarily adds
trustworthiness/reliability requirement.
3/30/17
P. v. Mendoza (6)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H039705.PDF
Prop 57 not retroactive
D Ramirez, 16 at time of PC 187 2d w/ 186.22(b), was convicted and conviction affirmed,
but not yet final, when Prop 57 passed. Held, he may not have retroactive benefit of Prop
57 b/c (1) no clear voter intent that Prop 57 to apply retroactively (2) Estrada does not apply
(3) no equal prot or due proc viol in not applying Prop 57 retroactively.
3/30/17
A.T. v. (Solano) Sup. Ct. (1/2)
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A149772.PDF
WI 653
J charged with her J brother with a gun-possession offense. J admitted charge in response to
“package-deal” offer. TC kept J in custody until plea. TC also considered J’s mother’s
neighborhood in deciding not to release her pending plea. Held, TC directed to consider J’s
MX to withdraw plea in view of DCA’s statements re coercive nature of the circumstances.
CSC actions in criminal cases
Conference of 3/1/17
#17-74 People v. Chavez, S238929. (C074138; 5 Cal.App.5th 110; Yolo County Superior
Court; CRF042140.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a postconviction order in a criminal case. The court limited review to the following issues: (1)
Does Penal Code section 1203.4 eliminate a trial court’s discretion under Penal Code
section 1385 to dismiss a matter in the interests of justice? (2) Do trial courts have authority
13
to grant relief under Penal Code section 1385 after sentence has been imposed, judgment
has been rendered, and any probation has been completed?
#17-75 People v. Valenzuela, S239122. (B269027; 5 Cal.App.5th 449; Ventura County
Superior Court; 2013025724.) Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed an
order denying a petition to recall sentence. This case presents the following issue: Does a
conviction for active gang participation in violation of Penal Code section 186.22,
subdivision (a), which requires that the defendant willfully promote, further, or assist in any
felonious criminal conduct of the gang, remain valid when the underlying conduct in
question was reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47?
BUSSEY, PEOPLE v. S239540 C079797 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Page, S230793 (#16-28) (Prop 47 and car theft),
and People v.
Romanowski, S231405 (#16-24) (Prop 47 and PC 484e(d))
DEHUGHES, PEOPLE v. S239494 C077959 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. DeHoyos, S228230 (#15-171) (P47 and retroactivity)
GARCIA, PEOPLE v. S238634 B266328 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Mateo, S232674 (#16-147) (aid/abet and nat/prob conseq doctrine)
IN RE D.W. S239644 A146790 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for In re Ricardo P., S230923 (#16-41) (electronics search condition)
INATOWITZ, PEOPLE v. S239693 H043055 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Valenzuela, S232900 (#16-97) (P47 and prison priors)
SANCHEZ, PEOPLE v. S239701 F071824 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Arzate, S238032 (#17-32) and People v. Padilla, S239454 (#17-34)
(LWOP for Js)
VALLEJOS, PEOPLE v. S239749 A146470 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. DeHoyos, S228230 (#15-171) (P47 and retroactivity)
SIVONGXXAY, PEOPLE v. S078895 Vacate subm./suppl. briefing Subm. vacated/suppl. Briefing
HAYWARD v. S.C. (OSUCH) S237174 A144823 Grant - dismissal/lead case Dismissed - to CA ½
No conference of 3/8/17
Conference of 3/15/17
#17-85 People v. Baldwin, S239819. (A147588; nonpublished opinion; Del Norte County
Superior Court; CRF129177.)
GH for People v. Valenzuela, S232900 (#16-97) (Prop 47 and prison priors)
#17-86 People v. Cooper, S239928. (B269198; nonpublished opinion; Los Angeles County
Superior Court; MA011494)
GH for People v. Valenzuela, S232900 (#16-97) (Prop 47 and prison priors)
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#17-88 People v. Gittens, S239936. (F072237; nonpublished opinion; Fresno County
Superior Court; F07907272.)
GH for People v. Gonzales, S231171 (#16-39) (Prop 47 and PC 459)
#17-89 People v. Goldsmith, S239978. (F071723; nonpublished opinion; Fresno County
Superior Court; F12906208.)
GH for People v. Gonzales, S231171 (#16-39) (Prop 47 and PC 459)
#17-90 People v. Jorgensen, S239471. (F071472; nonpublished opinion; Fresno County
Superior Court; F09901895)
GH for People v. Gonzales, S231171 (#16-39) (Prop 47 and PC 459)
#17-91 People v. Granados, S239715. (F071321; nonpublished opinion; Fresno County
Superior Court; F14903336.)
GH for People v. Gonzales, S231171 (#16-39) (Prop 47 and PC 459), People v.
Romanowski, S231405 (#16-24) (Prop 47 and PC 484e(d))
#17-92 People v. Lewis, S239919. (F071853; nonpublished opinion; Madera County
Superior Court; MCR017299.)
GH for People v. Chaney, S223676 (#15-13), and People v. Valencia, S223825 (#1514) (Prop 36 vs. 47 dangerousness)
#17-93 People v. Moffett, S239323. (A143724; nonpublished opinion; Contra Costa County
Superior Court; 050513788.)
GH for People v. Arzate, S238032 (#17-32) and People v. Padilla, S239454 (#17-34)
(LWOP for Js)
#17-94 In re R.F., S239950. (A146082; nonpublished opinion; San Francisco County
Superior Court; JW126300.)
GH for In re Ricardo P., S230923 (#16-41) (electronics search conditions)
#17-95 People v. Rodriguez, S239432. (B266674; nonpublished opinion; Los Angeles
County Superior Court; KA037343.)
GH for People v. Estrada, S232114 (#16-104), and People v. Frierson, S236728
(#16-362) (Prop 47 proof of ineligibility)
Conference of 3/22/17
MENDOZA, PEOPLE v. S239436 F070324 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Ruiz, S235556 (#16-312) (HS 11372.7)
MERAZ, PEOPLE v. S239442 B245657 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Arzate, S238032 (#17-32) and People v. Padilla, S239454 (#17-34)
(LWOP for Js)
LOPEZ, PEOPLE v. S239567 B267494 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Maita, S230957 (#16-40) (HS 11379 as prior)
CORDER, PEOPLE v. S239594 B261370 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Mateo, S232674 (#16-147) (PC 664/187, aid/abet, nat & prob conseq)
MARTINEZ, PEOPLE v. S239744 B263067 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
15
GH for People v. Page, S230793 (#16-28) (Prop 47 and car theft)
GARCIA, PEOPLE v. S239826 B259708 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Canizales, S221958 (#14-134) (PC 664/187 and kill zone)
CAMPBELL, PEOPLE v. S240025 B264913 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Chaney, S223676 (#15-13), and People v. Valencia,
S223825 (#15-
14) (Prop 36 vs 47 dangerousness)
BENNETT, PEOPLE v. S240053 F071015 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Chaney, S223676 (#15-13), and People v. Valencia,
S223825 (#15-
14) (Prop 36 vs 47 dangerousness
SANDOVAL, PEOPLE v. S240119 H041939 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for In re Ricardo P., S230923 (#16-41) (electronics search condition)
Conference of 3/29/17
COLEMAN (LAVAR) ON H.C. S240039 A149484 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GANN, PEOPLE v. S239935 C077898 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Estrada, S232114 (#16-104) (Prop 36 ineligible for dismissed charges?)
MIZNER, PEOPLE v. S239837 H040421 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Chaney, S223676 (#15-13), and People v. Valencia, S223825 (#15-
14) (Prop 36 vs 47 dangerousness)
PEREZ, PEOPLE v. S239961 C081047 Petition for Review GRANTED and Held
GH for People v. Buycks, S231765 (#16-19) (Prop 47 and on-bail enhancement)
GUINEY v. S.C. (PEOPLE) S240076 C083958 Petition for Review & Stay G&T 3 <osc>
LOS ANGELES, CITY OF v. S.C. (GRUPPIONI) S240182 B280429 Petition for Review G&T 2/3 <osc>
WALKER v. S.C. (PEOPLE) S240021 B280100 Petition for Review G&T 2/5 <osc>
SCOGGINS (WILLIE) ON H.C. S234842 Habeas Corpus petition 3 Transferred - OSC
16