Global Governance 16 (2010), 423–434
GLOBAL INSIGHTS
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
Roland Rich
THE UN DEMOCRACY FUND (UNDEF) IS A RELATIVELY NEW BODY ESTAB-
lished to contribute to building democracy around the world. It is the only UN
body with the word “Democracy” in its title, and one of only two entities singled out by name by President Barack Obama in his 2010 UN General Assembly speech as deserving of increased support.1 As a fund, its purpose is to
invest in democratization processes and thus to encourage progress toward the
ideals of democracy. In the first five years of UNDEF’s assistance, some
thirty-eight states have contributed around $110 million. The two leading contributors to UNDEF are the United States and India. The idea of creating
UNDEF emerged from discussions between these two countries. Other major
contributors are Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Qatar, Spain, and Sweden,
as well as a wide range of nontraditional donors from Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. By 2010, UNDEF had held four rounds of funding and launched 335
projects.2
To determine how and in whom to invest these funds, UNDEF must situate itself in several ways. First, it needs to understand the theoretical context
in which it works and determine where it fits into this wider picture. Second,
UNDEF needs to find its place within the UN family so as to complement the
work of other members of the organization, not duplicate it. Finally, it needs
to understand the market in which it is operating. Because UNDEF is a voluntary fund and contributions to UNDEF are eligible as official development
assistance (ODA), it is within the ODA processes that UNDEF must situate itself. In this article, I examine each of these issues before arriving at a solution.
Much of the information that I draw on is available at the UNDEF website,
www.un.org/democracyfund/.
Debating Democracy: Beware of Adjectives
The oft-repeated social science expression that “we are all footnotes to
Plato” is as true of democratic theory as other fields. Plato’s preference for
the philosopher king over the vulgar opinions of the masses is mirrored
today in the debate between the Beijing and Washington models of governance. It is beyond the scope of this essay to encapsulate two and one-half
423
424
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
millennia of debate or to proclaim new Platonic footnotes. Nor is it necessary to deal with the definition of democracy or “power to the people” that
has formed the basis of so much impressive scholarly work.3 But it is necessary initially to deal with the question of models of democracy because
those involved in promoting democracy require a vision of the ideal they are
working toward.
Beware of adjectives. This is the lesson we should draw from an instructive paper by David Collier and Steven Levitsky who found 550 adjectives
used in the literature to describe democracy.4 Some adjectives undermine the
noun they are describing such as Sukarno’s “guided democracy” or Singapore’s “disciplined democracy.” Many of these adjectives have been bundled
together in the concept of “façade democracy” where essential elements of
suffrage, contestation, or civil liberties are missing.5 But other adjectives are
necessary for reasons of taxonomy and analysis purposes to harness the meaning of this powerful and broad term. In this essay, I will draw on the three adjectives that are considered essential to the construction of modern national
democracies.
Liberal Democracy
Larry Diamond defines the term liberal in liberal democracy to mean “a political system in which individual and group liberties are well protected and in
which there exist autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from the state.”6 A society “where liberties are well protected” is essential to the success and quality of democracy. Yet there is a tension within
Diamond’s definition. While he sees individuals and civil society leading a
private life independent of the state, the protection of the liberties on which
that autonomous private life rests is dependent on the state. The tension inherent in the role of the state is at the heart of many of the deepest debates about
democracy.
One of the obligations of democracy promotion practitioners is to find the
space to operate within this spectrum of state action without injecting the external actor into legitimate internal debates about the place of the state in the
life of its citizenry. In relation to individual and group liberties, the dividing
line is clear as it is drawn by reference to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the six major UN human rights treaties.7 They enjoy near universal acceptance and broadly enough repeated articulation to allow for a conclusion that their basic obligations have become a part of customary international
law.
The realization of these rights is an important role of the state. It falls on
states to work progressively toward many of the economic, social, and cultural
rights elaborated in the human rights instruments. It also falls on states to assure respect for civil and political rights. Some rights require self-restraining
conduct on the part of the state but all rights need state action to one degree or
Roland Rich
425
another, including the provision of police, courts, and prisons or, put in another
way, the assurance of the rule of law.
Inside these dividing lines, there is considerable room for national deliberations about additional roles for the state and additional liberties for its people. UN conventions on migrant workers and on disabilities point to some
areas where these rights and liberties may be extended. Nondiscrimination on
the basis of sexual preference is another important topic for deliberation. In relation to the role of the state in society, there is ample room for determining
the degree to which the state should be involved in welfare that goes beyond
the requirements of international human rights law and in working toward
thicker application of concepts of equality.
The point is that the contours of liberal democracy are discernable; they
are not intrinsically hostage to the vision of the beholder. Liberal democracy
is definable, at least in a minimalist sense. The advantage of definability is that
it allows the external actor who supports democratization a noncontroversial
space within which to practice.
Representative Democracy
Modern society knows no effective way to practice democracy other than
through representatives. The village square and the town hall may have been
appropriate in smaller and simpler societies in the past and may still be appropriate for making decisions about local issues. Technology may facilitate
more sophisticated processes of direct democracy in the future. But today’s
mass societies with their complex cleavages have no alternative other than to
practice representative democracy.
That is why democracy practitioners put emphasis on political parties,
elections, and legislatures. Political parties provide the means to give expression to societies’ cleavages, whether based on policy or ascription. Elections
are the means of determining, on a regular basis, who should be society’s representatives. Legislatures provide the forum where decisions of state are made
or at least ratified by those representatives. While political parties, legislatures,
and competitive elections are not sufficient elements to constitute a working
democracy, they are necessary elements.
Monitory Democracy
“The age of monitory democracy that began in 1945 has witnessed the birth of
nearly one hundred new types of power-scrutinising institutions unknown to
previous democrats.”8 Thus, John Keane describes a bewildering array of new
institutions, some global, some local, that monitor and criticize the public life
of societies. Some take the form of watchdog groups looking for corruption
and malpractice. These can be either publicly funded official bodies like the
Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong or privately
funded civil society groups like Transparency International. Some take the
426
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
form of guide dogs to formulate public policy like the Brazilian development
of participatory budgeting. Others take the form of deliberative institutions,
public forums, or think tanks.
Monitory democracy has brought a new dimension to the practice of
democracy that takes it beyond the boundaries of formal representative
democracy and introduces a form of citizen participation that goes further than
the formal periodic consultation in the form of elections. Monitory democracy
is a means of mitigating the dangers of delegative democracy by which the
elected leader is effectively beyond scrutiny after coming to office.9 It establishes a complex system of checks and balances both formal and informal. It
provides the process whereby citizens participate continually in the life of their
democracy.
Democratization
Liberal, representative, and monitory democracy is the broad ideal toward
which societies strive in the process of democratization. But why should this
process have an international dimension? Why should it not simply be considered “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” as described
in Article 2:7 of the UN Charter? If that paragraph were to apply to the democratization process, would this preclude the UN from intervening in favor
of democratization in any member state?
The three most recent UN Secretaries-General are in no doubt about the
active role of the UN in democracy building around the world. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali had the courage to introduce the issue at the UN in An Agenda
for Democratization,10 which he boldly saw as leading to less authoritarian societies. Kofi Annan’s contribution, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All,11 describes democracy as a “universal
right.”12 And Ban Ki-moon has made a significant contribution in his 2009
Guidance Note on Democracy.13 The Note makes clear that “democracy, based
on the rule of law, is ultimately a means to achieve international peace and security, economic and social progress and development, and respect for human
rights—the three pillars of the United Nations mission as set forth in the Charter of the UN.” Aside from its universal value, democracy is seen by the UN
as an instrument through which to achieve the organization’s purposes. Accordingly, there have been some fifteen years of continuous UN promotion of
democratization.
In addition, where the UN Security Council considers a situation to be a
threat to international peace and security, it may take mandatory action. In recent years some of the decisions adopted by the Council, in Haiti, Sierra
Leone, and Timor Leste,14 have directly involved supporting aspects of the democratization process.
The following provides a partial list of the fields in which external actors
may be able to contribute to democratization processes around the world:
Roland Rich
427
• Conducting and observing elections;
• Strengthening legislatures;
• Strengthening political parties;
• Strengthening civil society;
• Promoting human rights;
• Promoting the rule of law;
• Promoting gender equality;
• Enhancing civic education;
• Strengthening oversight institutions;
• Contributing to a vibrant media; and
• Resolving civil-military relations.
The challenge for external actors is to fit themselves within one or more
of these fields in support of local actors and processes.
Within the UN Family
The Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Democracy reflects the reality
that many UN actors are involved in providing support for democratization.
The Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs has
become an established international actor in its field.15 The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has a particular focus on helping both executive
and legislative branches of government master the difficult art of democratic
governance.16 The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) is
strongly involved in supporting gender equity aspects of democratization.17
Other bodies factor in democratization issues in their peacebuilding or
peacekeeping role, their promotion of human rights, and their support for the
rule of law.
In this effort UN organs work primarily with the member states of the UN;
their executive branches; their legislative branches; and their independent organs such as election commissions, ombudsman entities, or national human
rights institutions. This is critically important work that reflects several of the
fields in which democracy promotion occurs. One way of categorizing this
work is to consider it as support for the “supply side” of democratization supplying the indispensable institutions of democracy.
But as the economic analogy suggests, the supply side of the equation
needs to be balanced by a “demand side.” This side of the equation tends to be
less formal and structured. It comprises the many forms of mass media with
their comments and criticisms of the political situation in their country. It consists of formal lobbyists such as trade unions and industry associations. It comprises the whole panoply of civil society. And most important, it encompasses
the voting public.18
The UN contributes greatly to the demand side through its generation of
428
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
relevant norms. By articulating that democracy is a “universal right,” the UN
generates great interest in and support for this concept in the public domain.
But as an intergovernmental organization, the UN is more comfortable in its
practical operations to work on supply-side issues as a partner of the incumbents of these formal institutions of governance. The challenge facing the UN
is how to engage effectively in projects on the demand side of the equation.
Democratization as Part of Development Assistance
There has been a strenuous debate about the relationship between democracy
and development. Many commentators believe that there is a strong link between the two, although it is difficult to demonstrate in a direct causal manner.19 In his Guidance Note, the Secretary-General accepts the existence of a
clear link:
The appeal of democracy stems in part from its association with the advancement of the quality of life for all human beings, and thus, with the work
to reach the Millennium Development Goals. Development is more likely to
take hold if people are given a genuine say in their own governance, and a
chance to share in the fruits of progress.
It therefore is of little surprise that the great bulk of funds directed toward
international democracy support are from ODA as determined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), which has been overseeing the aid process since
its establishment in 1960.20 It stands to reason that half a century of studying
ODA will generate lessons learned, and the key document in this regard is the
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.21 The Declaration attempts to
make ODA deliver. And one of its core concepts is to end donor-driven aid
processes by transferring ownership of the process so that “partner countries
exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies
and co-ordinate development actions” (para. 14) while donors agree to “respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise
it” (para. 15).
This worthy concept to make ODA fit in better with recipients’ development plans, and make recipient country officials more responsible for outcomes,
makes some sense from an economic development perspective. But it poses significant problems from a democratization perspective because the term country
has simply been defined to mean the government of that country. In effect, it
gives control over the ODA process to governments that may or may not be
democratic and, indeed, may have a vested interest in resisting democratization.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) were quick to see this problem, arguing that
“without addressing how the diverse voices of civil society will be incorporated
Roland Rich
429
into national policies, there is no guarantee that the policies generated by the
country governments will be democratic or representative.”22
The response of the donor community in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action was to give greater recognition to the role of nonstate actors, including
CSOs.23 While this was seen as a welcome development, it fell considerably
short of transforming the concept of “country ownership” into a concept of
“democratic ownership” as requested by many CSO representatives.24 The
resulting situation is one of considerable uncertainty where CSOs may be
recognized by donors as important actors in the development process, but
may not be so accepted by the theoretical owners of that process—the aid receiving governments. The seventeenth-century Westphalian notion of sovereignty therefore comes into tension with the twenty-first-century reality of
globalization, cross-national civil society alliances, and instant communications. Support for democratization often finds itself situated within this area
of tension.
The Work of UNDEF
The 2005 General Assembly World Summit Outcome resolution welcomed the
establishment of UNDEF by the Secretary-General:
We renew our commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’
capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy and resolve
to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to assist Member States upon
their request. We welcome the establishment of a Democracy Fund at the
United Nations. We note that the advisory board to be established should reflect diverse geographical representation. We invite the Secretary-General to
help ensure that practical arrangements for the Democracy Fund take proper
account of existing United Nations activity in this field.25
The translation of this paragraph into operational reality is the task of the
UNDEF Advisory Board, which operated on the basis of interim terms of reference until it adopted new terms of reference in 2009.26 The terms of reference have some innovative governance features in relation to the composition
of the board whose members are selected by the Secretary-General as follows:
• The seven largest donors based on the previous three years’ contributions;27
• Six states to reflect diverse geographical representation based on their
capacity to participate in UNDEF activities;28
• Two civil society organizations;29
• Four individuals, one of whom shall be selected as chairman.30
The participation of CSOs and individuals, primarily distinguished aca-
430
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
demics, gives an important voice to nonstate actors at the apex of UNDEF’s
governance structure.
One of the General Assembly’s directions to the Secretary-General is that
UNDEF “take proper account of existing UN activity in this field.” In process
terms, this is accomplished by the establishment of a Programme Consultative
Group (PCG) of UN bodies active in this field that meets regularly to discuss
the UNDEF’s work.31 The PCG together with resident coordinators contribute
significantly to the quality control phase of the UNDEF project selection.
Beyond process issues, UNDEF needs to complement the work of other
UN bodies and not duplicate it. The terms of reference make clear that
the overall purpose of UNDEF is to support democratization around the
world by funding projects that strengthen the voice of civil societies, promote
human rights, and encourage the participation of all in democratic processes.
. . . UNDEF will preferentially fund projects implemented by civil society organizations selected through a competitive process that includes quality control and due diligence.
Because most of the UN’s work delivered by other agencies is in support
of government institutions, UNDEF’s focus on civil society provides a means
of complementarity by design.
The terms of reference require UNDEF to select projects through a competitive process. To that end, UNDEF has conducted four rounds of project applications resulting in thousands of applications being received at the UNDEF
database (see Table 1).
Clearly, there is demand for the UNDEF process. Thousands of CSOs
around the world want to be involved in building democracy in their countries.
UNDEF engages outside assessors to score each project application under ten
published criteria.32 Only those scoring at least forty out of fifty are subject to
the next phase in the selection cycle—quality control consideration by UN
colleagues and board members. The final short list recommended by the board
and approved by the Secretary-General is subject to intense due diligence investigation in the course of the project document negotiations.
The selection of the short list does not involve the governments of the
Table 1 Projects Funded from Applications Received
Application Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
Applications Received
1,303
1,866
2,143
1,966
7,278
Projects Funded
122
82
67
62
335
Roland Rich
431
countries in which projects are to be delivered. The projects are based on the
request of nonstate actors through the application process. Once the board has
adopted the short list, however, and prior to its submission to the SecretaryGeneral for final approval, governments are advised of this selection and have
an opportunity to provide any information they deem relevant to UNDEF. In
the course of the processes of due diligence and advice to governments, a
small number of projects do not proceed.
Projects Funded by UNDEF
It remains for me to describe the types of projects that UNDEF has funded.
UNDEF has received funds from thirty-eight national governments, including
many from the South. More than $110 million has been contributed to UNDEF
to date allowing for a wide range of projects to be funded. The vast majority
of these projects have been delivered by CSOs from the South. UNDEF
groups projects under six broad headings as described below.
The first and largest slice has been “community development” projects.
These are projects where the community organizes itself to have a voice in the
local or national political debate of their societies. Some projects focus on remote villages while others center on marginalized communities such as the indigenous communities of Central America, the Roma of Central Europe, or the
pygmies of Gabon. Some projects focus on formal subjects such as election
monitoring while others adopt an adult education learning circle approach.
A second large slice of the UNDEF projects gives particular emphasis to
women’s empowerment. There can be no effective process of democratization
without the active involvement of women in society’s deliberative and representative processes. Many projects aim to give women’s groups the skills and
confidence to participate in their nation’s political life. Some projects prepare
women to be candidates for local or national elective office. Others act as
watchdogs to enhance the implementation of women’s rights.
A third category of projects concerns youth leadership. These projects
help prepare young people who are interested in effective participation in the
public domain. Some projects focus on training young people. Others feature
youth legislatures as a means of debating the major issues of concern.
A fourth category deals with human rights and the rule of law under which
civil society projects encourage participation in debates on constitutional or
legislative issues, train human rights defenders, or facilitate public interface
with national oversight bodies such as ombudsman or national human rights
institutions.
The aim of strengthening the voice of civil society leads naturally to a
fifth category of projects concerning the means of disseminating that voice
through the various media. UNDEF has funded projects to develop community radio, train journalists, and launch street newspapers. One of the most dif-
432
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
ficult projects has been in support of journalists in Somalia where many are
subject to intimidation and violence.
Finally, UNDEF funds a category of projects under the general title of
“tools for democratization,” which develop learning materials for civic education and civil society participation. Among these projects have been the decentralization of the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project’s
compendium33 on electoral system design and operation; the deepening of the
International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics (iKNOW Politics)
website34 for women’s integration into the political processes; the adaptation
for civil society of the Building Resources on Democracy, Governance and
Elections (BRIDGE)35 democracy and electoral training; and the dubbing
into the main African languages of the award-winning Why Democracy? series36 of documentaries and then distributing them to CSOs in Africa and
elsewhere. Conclusion
UNDEF pursues a strategy to contribute to the democratization processes
around the world by bringing the strength and legitimacy of the UN brand to
this work. In so doing UNDEF does not promote any national model of
democracy, but instead works toward a vision of liberal, representative
democracy where the checks and balances are undertaken by many groups
both formal and informal. UNDEF respects the ownership of projects by their
local implementers and, thus, tries to fit within the concept of democratic
ownership within the ODA sector. Finally, UNDEF works resolutely on the
demand side of democratization in support of the voice of civil society groups
around the world. This focus gives the UNDEF a unique place in the work of
the UN family.
Notes
Roland Rich is executive head of the United Nations Democracy Fund. He joined the
Australian foreign service in 1975 and had postings in Paris, Rangoon, Manila, and,
from 1994–1997, as Australian Ambassador to Laos. From 1998 to 2005, he was director of the Centre for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National University.
He has also served as legal adviser and assistant secretary for International Organisations in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His most recent publication is Pacific Asia in Quest of Democracy (2007).
1. http://gadebate.un.org/Portals/1/statements/634209239344218750US_en.pdfp.
2. There are 259 projects in 104 countries; 56 regional projects adding a further 9
countries; and 20 global projects.
3. An excellent survey is provided by David Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd ed.
(Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 1996).
4. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy ‘with Adjectives’: Conceptual
Innovation in Comparative Research,” Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Roland Rich
433
Working Paper No. 230, August 1996, available at http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/230.pdf.
5. Judith Large and Timothy D. Sisk, Democracy Conflict and Human Security:
Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance, 2006), pp. 132–137.
6. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy—Toward Consolidation (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 3.
7. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entered into force 3 January 1976); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (entered into
force 4 January 1969); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (entered into force 3 September 1981); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (entered into force
26 June 1987); Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990).
8. John Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (New York: W. W. Norton,
2009), p. 680.
9. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no.
1 (1994).
10. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2006).
11. Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005).
12. Ibid., para. 149. In paragraph 151, the report supported the establishment of the
UN Democracy Fund.
13. “Special Document: United Nations,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (2010):
182 186, available at www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/UNSG%20Guidance%20
Note%20on%20Democracy.pdf.
14. Roland Rich, “Bringing Democracy into International Law,” Journal of
Democracy 12, no. 3 (2001): 20–34, at 31.
15. Robin Ludwig, “The UN’s Electoral Assistance: Challenges, Accomplishments,
Prospects,” in Edward Newman and Roland Rich, eds., The UN Role in Promoting
Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality (Tokyo: United Nations University Press,
2004), pp. 168–187.
16. Richard Ponzio, “UNDP Experience in Long-term Democracy Assistance,” in
Edward Newman and Roland Rich, eds., The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), pp. 208–229.
17. Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, “Deepening Democracy by Building Gender Equality,” available at www.opendemocracy.net/5050/anne-marie-goetz-robjenkins/deepening-democracy-by-building-gender-equality.
18. Political parties defy this neat typology as they straddle both sides of the divide.
19. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, “The New Thinking on Development,”
Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (October 1995): 50–64.
20. OECD, DAC in Dates: The History of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, Paris, 2006, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/38/1896808.pdf.
21. Ibid., pp. 54–57.
22. Aurora Steinle and Denys Correll, Can Aid Be Effective Without Civil Society?
The Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda and Beyond (Utrecht: International Council
on Social Welfare, August 2008), p. 10, available at www.acp-programming.eu/wcm/
434
Situating the UN Democracy Fund
dmdocuments/2008%20Accra%20ICSW%20Full%20Paper%20FINAL%202Aug08%
20.pdf.
23. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Accra Agenda for
Action (2008), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.
24. See, for example, Alliance 2015, “Alliance 2015 Analysis of the Outcome of
Accra,” 16 September 2008, available at www.alliance2015.org/.../user.../Alliance2015
_analysis_Accra_outcome.doc.
25. UN General Assembly, Res. A/Res/60/1, para. 136 (16 September 2005), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760
.pdf?OpenElement.
26. UNDEF terms of reference, www.un.org/democracyfund/About_Us/TOR
_EN.html.
27. The countries that have participated on the board under the donor category are
Australia, France, Germany, India, Japan, Qatar, Spain, and the United States.
28. The countries that have participated on the board under the geographic category are Benin, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq,
Lebanon, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Panama, Peru, the Philippines,
Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu.
29. Past and present CSO members of the board are the Arab NGO Network for Development, the Asia Society, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation,
Conectas Human Rights, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research
in Africa, Femmes Africa Solidarité, the International Commission of Jurists, and the
International Peace Institute.
30. The current chairman is Michael Doyle of Columbia University. Other individual members who have served or are serving include Sanam Anderlini, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, Amir Dossal, Ashraf Ghani, Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi,
Guillermo O’Donnell, and Aye Aye Thant.
31. PCG members are the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
UNDP, UNIFEM, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN Development Group Office, and the Peacebuilding Support Office.
32. The ten criteria are: (1) The project promotes the objectives of UNDEF; (2) The
project draws on the United Nations’ comparative advantage; (3) The project will have
a significant impact; (4) The project will encourage inclusiveness; (5) The project will
enhance gender equality; (6) The project has strong prospects for successful implementation; (7) The applicant organization has a strong track record; (8) The project is
technically sound in conception and presentation; (9) The project represents good value
for the money; and (10) The project has strong prospects of sustainability beyond the
project duration.
33. http://aceproject.org/.
34. www.iknowpolitics.org/.
35. http://bridge-project.org/.
36. www.whydemocracy.net/.