The Building
of a docile Islam
in Britain:
How not to
prevent violent
extremism
The bi-annual journal from Conflicts Forum
Winter 2009—10
Volume 01 / Issue 03
ISSN 1758-1230
CONTENTS
Winter 2009—10
Volume 01 / Issue 03
About
Conflicts Forum
Conflicts Forum effectively
acts as ‘translator’ of ideas and
of politics, rather than ‘reconciler’; situated in a space that is
neither a part of Islamic nor
Western spheres. It seeks to
look deeply for the roots and
causes of differences in thinking and narratives that explain
the symptoms that are present
in local conflicts throughout
the region, and in tensions
with the West.
The aim firstly is to pull the
debate in the West on Islamism
from the paradigm of one that
sees the issues largely in terms
of today’s violence and militancy, to one that looks beyond
the immediate—to the underlying ideas and thinking that
gave rise to such symptomatic
crises in the first place.
Secondly, it seeks to challenge the flawed Western
understanding of the template
of ‘moderation and extremism’,
by clearly differentiating between intolerant dogmatic
Islamism on the one hand, and
political, reasoning Islamism
on the other.
Thirdly, it acts as a catalyst,
directly initiating ‘politics’
between the two spheres—
encouraging shifts in language
and thinking about ‘how to do
politics’ without compromise
to principles, and by challenging conventional models of
‘peace processes’.
Conflicts Forum does this
work because it believes in the
principle that it needs to be
done—irrespective of whether
Conflicts Forum can be credited with specific achievements.
We are passionately committed to bring about a fundamental reappraisal of what constitutes the essence and significance of Islamism. Conflicts
Forum has a well-established
record of challenging conventional thinking on Islamism
and also on the construction of
political processes.
Cultures of Resistance is published
twice a year by Conflicts Forum
www.conflictsforum.org
Editor
Aisling Byrne
Editorial Committee
Aisling Byrne, Alastair Crooke,
Rabab El-Khatib and Neil Tinson.
Design and art direction
Neil Tinson Studio
Acknowledgments
Conflicts Forum would like to thank the Polden
Puckham Charitable Foundation for their support
for this project.
Submissions and information on the project
If you would like to submit articles, photos
or artwork for future issues, please contact
[email protected]
Please note that submissions should
relate directly to the themes of the project.
For further information on the project, please see
www.conflictsforum.org/culturesofresistance
Please note that due to capacity constraints, we
do not work with individuals or individual activists.
The reproduction of any editorial or images
without prior permission is strictly prohibited.
Views expressed in the individual articles within
Cultures of Resistance are those of the contributors
and are not necessarily shared by the publisher.
The publisher is not responsible for the breach
of copyright in the material supplied to Cultures
of Resistance.
ISSN 1758-1230
Spoooked!
How not to prevent
violent extremism
Pakistan Without
Borders
Cultural Sufism
and its Relationship
to ‘Irfan
The Experience of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran: The
Contemporary Debate
Recognising Resistance:
Lessons from Northern
Ireland for Palestine
and Israel
Armed Struggle and
Political Resistance:
Lessons from Ireland’s
and South African
resistance
04
Arun Kundnani
13
Faisal Devji
17
Seyed Sadreddin Safavi
20
Sheikh Chafiq Jeradeh
22
Ali Abunimah
Cover
Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamist
political party, demonstrate in London,
England on 10 December 2005.
The demonstration was called to
protest against anti-terror laws and
other government proposals which
they claim attack all Muslims.
© Marc Vallée 2005, marcvallee.co.uk
24
Ismail Patel
03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Spooked!
How not
to
prevent
violent
extremism
The British government describes its Preventing Violent Extremism
programme (hereafter Prevent) as a “community-led approach
to tackling violent extremism”. Prevent has become, in effect,
the government’s Islam Policy’.
Written by Arun Kundnani
It
believes that by selectively directing resources at ‘moderate’ Muslim
organizations to carry
out community development and ‘anti-radicalisation’ work, it can empower them to unite
around ‘shared British values’ to isolate
the ‘extremists’. With hundreds of millions of pounds of funding, the Prevent
programme has come to redefine the relationship between government and around
two million British citizens who are
Muslim. Their ‘hearts and minds’ are now
the target of an elaborate structure of surveillance, mapping, engagement and propaganda.
The Prevent programme, with a budget
in 2008/09 of £140 million, is a part of the
British government’s counter-terrorist
strategy which focuses on mobilizing
communities to oppose the ideology of
violent extremism. Despite the government’s claim that it is communities-led,
the allocation of Prevent funding to local
authorities has not been driven by decision-making process in which local agencies identify their own needs and access
central government funds accordingly.
Rather, local authorities have been pressured to adopt Prevent in direct proportion
to the numbers of Muslims in the areathereby constructing the Muslim popula-
tion as a ‘suspect community’.
Local authorities (municipalities) have
used Prevent funding, in its early stages, to
carry out “targeted capacity building of
Muslim communities”, focusing particularly on young people, women and
mosques. But serious problems arise when
deprived communities with many needs
consider that their voluntary sector
organisations can only access the resources
to meet these needs if they are willing to
sign up to a counter-terrorism agenda.
With the revised counter-terrorist strategy
published in March 2009, the focus of
Prevent widened to promoting shared values as well as opposing violent extremism.
So far, public discussion of Prevent has
focused on the question of whether the
programme is too soft on non-violent
‘extremists’ (who are said to clandestinely
benefit from the funding stream) and the
question of value for money (whether the
money is being wasted on ‘feel-good’
projects which do little to actually prevent
violent extremism). Our research set out
to address these questions but also to ask:
what is the general impact of Prevent funding at community level; what, in practice,
is the definition of extremism in Preventfunded projects; does Prevent funding foster cohesion across communities or exacerbate inter-communal conflicts and divisions; how do Prevent programmes interact
04
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
with local democracy; how does the
Prevent programme view Muslim communities; and whether the Prevent programme
involves non-police agencies in intelligence-gathering.
What we found in our research was that
there are strong reasons for thinking that
the Prevent programme, in effect, constructs the Muslim population as a ‘suspect
community’, fosters social divisions
among Muslims and others, encourages
tokenism, facilitates violations of privacy
and professional norms of confidentiality,
discourages local democracy and is counter-productive in reducing the risk of
political violence.
Moreover, there is evidence that the
Prevent programme has been used to
establish one of the most elaborate systems
of surveillance ever seen in Britain. We
also examined the general framework of
the Prevent programme and found the
underlying assumptions of a ‘hearts and
minds’ approach to be themselves problematic.
These concerns have been largely
ignored in the published literature, with
the important exception of the An-Nisa
Society’s Prevent: a Response From the
Muslim Community report of February
2009. Yet, as a result, of these concerns
with Prevent, for the first time in 20 years
there is a significant trend of voluntary
The Prevent programme
In 2004, the British government
launched what The Times newspaper
described as “one of the most ambitious
government social engineering projects in
recent years”. Alongside the legislative and
policing aspects of Britain’s domestic
counter-terrorism programme, it was
decided there should be an attempt to win
over the hearts and minds of young
Muslims in Britain away from the extremist narrative. The aim was to reduce the
circulation of “extremist ideas” and tackle
the widespread discontent and disaffection
which extremists were thought to exploit.
This was to be achieved by strengthening
the hand of moderate Muslim leaders
through government contact and targeted
capacity building. As a senior civil servant
explained: “We did the same in Northern
Ireland in the 1980s when, as well as
deploying police and troops on the streets,
we had a massive programme of investment in the local community, raising living
standards. We also set about bridge-building with the Catholic community.”
The fact that the 7/7 bombings (7 July
2004) in London were carried out by
‘homegrown’ terrorists increased prominence of this broadly ‘hearts and minds’
approach. The Preventing Extremism
Together taskforce, which was initiated by
the British government in the wake of the
7 July bombings and was made up of a relatively wide cross-section of Muslim community representatives, made 64 recommendations in its November 2005 report,
including a demand for a public inquiry
into the 7 July attacks. Its key argument
was that ultimately the solution to extrem
ism lay in tackling a series of issues that
affected Muslim communities: inequality,
discrim-ination, deprivation and foreign
policy.
In April 2007 the government launched
its Prevent programme, with the
Department for Communities and Local
Government (dclg) publishing Preventing Violent Extremism: winning hearts
and minds, which set out “a communityled approach to tackling violent extremism”. The ideas first aired three years earlier
had by now evolved into a new strategy
summed up in the dictum that “communities defeat terrorism”. Counter-terrorism’s
‘hard’ side of ‘emergency’ police power
needed, it was said, to be complemented
with the ‘soft’ side of community engagement and this meant a series of initiatives
at the local level, involving both the voluntary and statutory sectors. The overall
counter-terrorist strategy—known as
Contest—was thus made up of series of
distinct strands:
There is evidence
that the Prevent
programme has
been used to establish
one of the most
elaborate systems
of surveillance ever
seen in Britain
Above right
Young British Muslim women on an anti-Israel demonstration.
Israel had launched attacks on Gaza and Lebanon in retaliation
for the capture of three of its soldiers.
© Jenny Matthews / Panos Pictures
sector organisations refusing local authority funding on the grounds of principled
objections. Prevent has come to be perceived as an integral part of an authoritarian counter-terrorist system that violates
the human rights of Muslims through disproportionate arrests (less than a seventh
of those arrested under anti-terrorist legislation since 9/11 have gone on to be convicted) through the control order regime,
and the emerging evidence that the uk
intelligence services have been operating a
secret interrogation policy which facilitated the torture of Britain citizens by foreign
agencies. If the objective of Prevent is to
win the trust of Muslims in Britain, its
failure cannot be overstated.
It goes without saying that there is a real
and ongoing risk of terrorism within
Britain. It is not the purpose of this report
to downplay the seriousness of that danger
or the difficulties involved in intercepting
potential acts of violence. These difficulties
notwithstanding, it remains vital to apply
democratic and human rights standards to
counter-terrorism programmes, not least
because, in the long term, this is an essential precondition of ensuring community
support. This report is therefore part of the
essential project of researching, discussing
and campaigning on the role of the police
and security services in counter-terrorism,
a project which should not shy away from
taking a critical stand for fear of giving
succour to extremists. The stated aim of
the government’s counter-terrorist strategy
is to enable people to “go about their lives
freely and with confidence”. The question
we pose here is whether freedom and confidence for the majority can be enabled by
imposing a lack of freedom and confidence
on a minority—in this case, the Muslim
population of Britain.
Pursue: stopping terrorist attacks
through detection, investigation, prosecution and other sanctions;
Protect: protection of infrastructure,
crowded places, the transport system and
border controls;
Prepare: mitigating the impact of
attacks through strengthening the response of the emergency services and so on;
Prevent: stopping people becoming
terrorists and supporting violent extremism.
However, the form which the Prevent
programme’s community engagement was
to take turned out to be quite different
from what the Preventing Extremism
Together taskforce of 2005 had anticipated.
The government’s advice to local authorities involved in the Prevent programme
stated that:
“Preventing violent extremism in the
name of Islam must, first and foremost, be
about winning the struggle of hearts and
minds. Winning hearts and minds will
take significant efforts by Muslim communities to tackle the pernicious ideology
being spread by a small minority of
extremists, and will mean local Muslim
communities taking a leadership stance
against sophisticated campaigning and
extremist messages. Our aim is to support
that through targeted capacity building.”
This suggested that the focus of Prevent
would not be on inequality, discrimination
and deprivation but on an ideological
campaign that selected Muslim organisations would be empowered to carry out on
behalf of the government.
Also in early 2007, a new department
within the British Home Office, the Office
for Security and Counter-Terrorism
(osct), was formed with the aim of setting
the general parameters of uk’s Contest
counter-terrorism strategy within which
the police, the intelligence services and
other agencies would operate. The creation
of the osct was designed to overcome
departmental boundaries and encourage
cross-government working on counterterrorism. Later in 2007, the osct defined
the objectives of the Prevent strategy as:
Challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
Disrupting those who promote violent
extremism and supporting the institutions
where they may be active;
Supporting individuals who are being
targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism;
Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and
Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.
The objectives were to be supported by
two “cross-cutting streams” which were
“key enabling functions” in delivering the
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
strategy: “Developing understanding,
analysis and information; and Strategic
communications”.
The design of the strategy rested centrally on the notion that the work of
“countering violent extremist ideology”
would “rarely be done directly by government” but rather by Muslim communities
themselves, supported in this work
through “targeting capacity building”.
Embedding this ideological campaign
within communities themselves would, it
was hoped, provide for a far more effective
rejection of “the ideology of violent
extremism” and isolation of the “apologists
for terrorism”.
In 2007, the Preventing Violent
Extremism Pathfinder Fund (pvepf) was
established with a modest £6 million
budget to support seventy priority local
authorities in England in meeting these
objectives. In April 2008, the amount of
money being spent on Prevent increased
significantly. The pvepf money distributed by the dclg to seventy local authorities
developed into a three-year £45 million
area-based grant which, by 2010, will be
distributed among 94 local authorities. An
increase to this budget of £7.5 million was
announced in August 2009. A further £5.1
million is being distributed over the same
three-year period through the clf stand.
Along with other smaller funding steams,
this means that the total money spent on
Prevent by the dclg from April 2007–11 is
likely to be £80 million. It is expected that,
by April 2011, over £61.7 million will have
been provided to local authorities for
Prevent work. Finally, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office has a substantial
Prevent programme with funding of £400
million over 2008–2010 (see below).
Across all of these departments, the total
Prevent budget in 2008/9 was over £140
million. In March 2009, it was anticipated
that by 2010 the total Prevent budget would
have increased by a further £100 million.
The British Government’s Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (fco) has a substantial Prevent programme “to counter
extremists” false characterisation of the
uk as being a place where Muslims are
oppressed. This work has funding of £400
million over 2008–2010. It includes, for
example, facilitating visits by delegations
of British Muslims to Muslim-majority
countries and a “dedicated team of key
language specialists” working “to explain
British policies and the role of Muslims in
British society, in print, visual and electronic media” across the Muslim world.
The fco is also undertaking a programme
entitled “Bringing foreign policy back
home” which involves “explaining” foreign
policy to Muslims in the uk. Since March
2008, fco officials have taken part in fortyfive events, including in Towers Hamlets,
Birmingham, Bradford and Glasgow,
designed to discuss foreign policy with
British Muslims and “challenge myths
often peddled by violent extremists”. In
addition, the fco has paid £520,000 to an
organization called Deen International to
produce a public relations campaign in
Pakistan. The campaign, entitled I am the
West, involves television commercials featuring prominent British Muslims.
onstructing Muslims
C
into a ‘suspect community’
The problem with attempting to mobilise all these Muslims against ‘extremism’
is that it, in effect, constructs Muslims into
a ‘suspect community’ in which the failure
of Muslim individuals or organisations to
The danger is
that the distinction
between ‘moderate’
and ‘extremist’ is
flexible enough
to be exploited
by government to
marginalize those
who are critical
of its policies
comply with this mobilization makes them
suspect in the eyes of the counter-terrorist
system and shifts them from the bottom
layer of ‘mainstream Muslims’ to the middle layer of extremists.
However, Muslims may want to avoid participating in the government’s Prevent
programme for a number of reasons which
have nothing to do with support for political violence. According to one local
authority manager in the Midlands:
“There is strong pressure on the local
authority to sign up to Prevent. They didn’t
adopt [the counter-terrorism agenda], but
they still have to report on it. So it is frustrating to them when individuals raise
criticisms and hold the agenda back. The
Government Office and the police are
driving the agenda and putting a lot of
pressure on us but the local authority,
which is generally made up of ‘tickbox
people’, has no competency to deal with it.
We have no information from the police as
to whether there is actually a problem of
extremism in this area. I want to do evidence-based work on the underlying issues
of the housing, drug-dealing and so on—
all the issues that lead to Muslims being an
underclass. I also want to widen it to the
far Right. But as soon as I say something
critical about Prevent, I get called by management, police or a representative from
the Government Office. There’s scaremongering if you raise questions. They
say: ‘When something does happen…’,
implying you’re the one who’s going to be
responsible.”
There is no doubt that the need for
community development among Muslim
populations is great. But there are serious
problems when deprived communities
with many needs find that their voluntary
sector organisations believe that they can
only access the resources to meet these
needs if they are willing to sign up to a
counter-terrorism agenda. This is particularly so when that agenda brings with it an
element of surveillance. As one interviewee noted, it is counter-productive for the
government to relate “to Muslims only
through a counter-terrorism label rather
than as citizens through mainstream policies”. Another noted that “community
development and counter-terrorism are
fundamentally different and have different
objectives”.
Contest 2
In March 2009, the government published a revised counter-terrorism strategy,
written by the osct, known as Contest 2.
The new strategy signaled a commitment
to a much more overt campaign of challenging not just violent extremism but
extremism in general. This was a response
to two public criticisms which had been
made of the Prevent programme as it had
been implemented to date: first, that the
criteria determining who was entitled to
access funding were too loose so that
groups which were extremist but not
engaged in criminal violence could get
funding; second, that much of the work
being funded was of little relevance to
actually reducing the risk of extremism
and that there needed to be more of an
emphasis on direct challenges to extremist
ideas rather than general community
development work.
As a result of these criticisms, the government was able to be more explicit in
stating exactly what it wanted the Prevent
programme to do. Thus the key shift in
Contest 2 is the government’s attempt to
lead British society in overtly challenging
“views which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which
reject and undermine our shared values
and jeopardise community cohesion”.
brief history of
A
“international terrorism”
With the publication of Contest 2, the
osct included as part of its counterterrorism strategy document A Detailed
Account of the History of the Threat. This is
the first time that the British government
has decided to publish its own account of
the history of international terrorism,
which it traces back to 1968. “The first
modern international terrorist incident”,
this official history claims, took place
“when a faction of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (plo) hijacked an Israeli
commercial flight from Rome”. The next
key moment in this history is the early
1980s, when a “militant Islamist ideology”,
initially with only a domestic agenda,
emerged in Egypt and Afghanistan. But
this militant Islamism soon had a “growing influence” which was “seen elsewhere”,
notably in the first intifada, in the
Occupied Territories from 1987 onwards.
This trajectory then leads to the formation
of Al-Qaida in the late 1980s in
Afghanistan. In this rendering, as some
commentators have noted, a whole range
of movements involving Arabs or Muslims,
including an uprising by Palestinians
which was dominated by secular national-
ist politics, is merged together to form an
idea of Islamist international terrorism.
The political context to international terrorism is minimized, and political violence
by Muslims is implicitly taken to be a cultural problem located within Islam’s failure to properly transition to modernity.
This point was illustrated when, on the
eve of the publication of the Contest 2
strategy document, the government wrote
a letter to the Muslim Council of Britain
(mcb) stating that unless its deputy general
secretary Daud Abduallah resigns, it
would sever relations with the organisation. Abdullah had recently signed the socalled Istanbul declaration which called
for Muslims to resist the blockade of Gaza.
The public rift with the mcb was a symbolic matter; it had long since fallen out of
favour with the government. But the government’s distancing of a major Muslim
organization sent a signal that, as one
interviewee noted: “The crunch was now
coming for all sorts of organizations which
had received Prevent funding in the past”.
Much of the community development
work that had been funded in the past
would now have to involve itself in the
explicit promotion of ‘British values’ and
the rejection of ‘anti-Western’ views.
A community activist put it like this:
“With the Contest 2 agenda, it makes it
impossible for us to continue the sort of
work with young people we have been
doing, for example theatre work, which is
now considered too much of a ‘softly softly’
approach. When we did a play about a
young person who becomes radicalized,
we had a panel event afterwards, with discussion and young people asking questions.
But the Contest 2 agenda instructs people
what is right or wrong in a more directive
way. It tells young people ‘you will not disagree’, ‘you will support British troops’, that
sort of thing. There is no room for us to let
young people explore their anger in the
way that they need to. With Contest 2, we
can’t listen to what young people tell us—
as we have a duty to report it”.
Moderates and extremists
For Muslims organizations that are able
to present themselves as ‘moderate’, significant financial and symbolic resources
are being offered by central and local government. The danger is that the distinction
between ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ is flexible enough to be exploited by government
to marginalize those who are critical of its
policies. And the use of government fund-
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
ing to promote particular interpretations
of religious texts is potentially dangerous.
One effect of Prevent is to undermine
exactly the kind of radical discussions of
political issues that would need to occur if
young people are to be won over and support for illegitimate political violence
diminished.
Our interviewees identified three
potential problems which arise when such
an approach is put into practice: The terms
‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ are at times
defined in practice by the degree to which
Muslims support or oppose central government or local authority policies. The
general atmosphere promoted by Prevent
is one in which to make criticisms is to risk
losing funding and face isolation as an
extremist, while those organisations which
echo the government’s own political line
are rewarded with large sums of public
money. What this suggests is that Prevent
is being used to cultivate politically loyal
community leaders rather than support
communities in leading a drive against
terrorism. Organisations which have
refused to work on Prevent projects, been
critical of it, or withdrawn from it because
of concerns over the issues it raises, have
themselves been branded as extremists.
The category of ‘moderate Muslims’ is
at times defined theologically, leading to
the potential danger of government sponsorship for its preferred religious trends.
Extremism is seen by the government as a
‘twisted reading’ or misreading of Islam
that justifies terrorism. To counter this
extremism, the Prevent programme seeks
to identify and empower moderate
Muslims who can offer an alternative reading of Islam. For example, the government
is backing roadshows of mainstream
Islamic scholarship to tour Britain to
“counter extremist propaganda” and
“denounce it as un-Islamic”.
Prevent funding has been widely used
to incorporate ‘mainstream mosques’ into
the orbit of local authority funding, professionalising them and making them partners in the wider Prevent programme.
Most local authorities funded to do
Prevent work by the dclg have included
some kind of engagement with mosques as
part of their programme. In particular,
‘moderate’ mosques are being encouraged
to engage with young people and win them
over, an area in which they are seen as
weaker than extremists at present. In
Walsall, for example, the Prevent action
plan includes training for Imams “to iden-
“The Contest 2 agenda
instructs people what is
right or wrong in a more
directive way. It tells young
people ‘you will not disagree’,
‘you will support British
troops’, that sort of thing.”
© Jason P Howe
Baghdad, Iraq, 02 October 2005:
British Army Rangers sunbathing at the
Liberty Pool. Once only frequented by
Iraq’s Ba’athist elite, the luxury swimming
pool and gym now fills with troops.
Their body armour, helmets and weapons
all within easy reach, they either soak
up the sun or compete with each other
in diving competitions. After a daily
briefing the troops have access to the
Mosquito and Camel Bar, where they
watch TV or play pool and, in accordance
with the ‘two-can rule’, are allowed to
drink two beers per night.
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
tify individuals who show signs of misinterpreting the Quran”. In Bradford, the
Council of Mosques has been supported
by Prevent funding of £80,000 from the
dclg’s community leadership fund in
2008/09 to develop a teaching resource for
madrassahs known as Nasiha. Much of the
resource is an impressive attempt to introduce key religious concepts. There is a
perception, however, that, on occasion,
the resource might appear too eager to
interpret the original Islamic sources as
having meanings useful to the Prevent
programme. For example, verses are interpreted as meaning that “the root cause of
extremism, racism and bullying is
hatred—and all three can destroy a community… Hatred can also lead to arrogance and anti-Western sentiments—
again this is not what Islam teaches”.
Another verse is interpreted as meaning:
“We have to communicate with our local
authorities and get involved in electing
suitable leaders for our religion”.
The perception that the government is
sponsoring Muslim organisations on the
basis of theological criteria—for example,
holding Sufis to be more favourable than
Salafis [an orientation of Islam that seeks
literal emulation of the early Muslim community and a literal interpretation of the
Koran and Hadith]—runs counter to the
secular separation of Church and state,
even though such a separation is itself
upheld as a marker of moderation which
Muslims should aspire to. As Asma
Jahnangir, the United Nations’ Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief, pointed out in her 2008 report on
the uk, “it is not the Government’s role to
look for the ‘true voices of Islam’ or of any
other religion of belief. Since religions or
communities of belief are not homogenous
entities it seems advisable to acknowledge
and take into account the diversity of
voices… The contents of a religion or belief
should be defined by the worshippers
themselves.”
There is also a risk of discovering
extremists where none exist, if an interpretative framework based on the simple
binary of ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ is
imposed on the complex and dynamic picture of Muslim religious life. For example,
since the 1990s, a major trend among
young Muslims has been identification
with the global ummah as a third way
alternative to either assimilating into what
many perceive to be a hostile society or
following their parents’ religio-cultural
The terrain
on which
this “battle
of ideas”
is to be
fought is the
attitudes and
opinions of
mainstream
Muslims in
Britain
traditions, which are bound up with South
Asian languages, poetry and ‘folk’ practices such as reverence for holy men or pirs.
The emphasis is thus on purifying oneself
from these cultural accretions which are
seen as contaminating the Islamic message. This ‘return’ to the original Islamic
texts and a global version of Islam is often
seen as a Salafist precursor to extremism
although it is more likely to lead to new
kinds of positive engagement with British
society.
The basis for this theological and cultural approach to preventing violent
extremism is twofold. First, there is the
idea that terrorist radicalisation is rooted
in religio-cultural rejection of Western
modernity. Second, is the idea that such
rejection needs to be combated by a government-led ‘battle of ideas’.
The government sees the emergence of
an inter-linked global insurgency as the
real threat represented by Al-Qaida: “At
various moments Al-Qaida and its associates have made the transition from terrorism to insurgency, notably in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As insurgencies they have
posed different and a wider threat to the
uk and its interests than their forebears.”
The terrain on which this ‘battle of ideas’ is to be fought is thus the attitudes and
opinions of mainstream Muslims in
Britain. The possibility of anti-Western
extremists winning over mainstream
Muslims to their cause comes to be seen as
a strategic challenge to British national
security. The danger here is that British
Muslims become, in the imagination of
the counter-terrorist system, no longer
citizens to whom the state is accountable
but potential recruits to a global counterinsurgency that is threatening the state’s
prospects of prevailing in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. This international
dimension means that the attention
focused on this extremism is of a completely different kind to that focused on,
say, right wing extremism, which is taken
to be no more than a public order threat.
What emerges is a determination that the
problem can only be fully addressed if
Muslims take it upon themselves to do
more, to actively mobilize against the
extremists, and that therefore more pressure should be brought to bear upon
Muslims in general and their community
organisations. This is an edited extract from Spooked!
How not to Prevent Violent Extremism
by Arun Kundnani (Institute of Race
Relations, London, October 2009). A full
copy of the report can be downloaded for free
at http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf
We are grateful to the author and the
Institute for Race Relations for permission
to reprint this edited excerpt.
Arun Kundnani is the editor of the journal
Race & Class and author of The end
of Tolerance: Racism in Twenty-first
Century Britain’ (Pluto Press, 2007).
t
u
o
h
t
i
W
PakistanWithoutBorders
B
order wars of a textbook kind
fought outside civilian areas
for the most part and full of
instances of old-fashioned
honour and respect among
enemy soldiers, these conflicts are a far cry from the brutal operations conducted in urban areas that mark
modern warfare in the world beyond. This
kind of unregulated violence is in South
Asia characteristic of domestic strife,
whether among civilians or between them
and the state, and has been so since colonial times. Even when instigated from
abroad, therefore, such violence fits into or
mimics internal forms of conflict, resulting in the rhetoric of a citizenship betrayed
from within rather than in the language of
geopolitical calculation. In this sense even
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism comes to be
conceived as fundamentally domestic in
nature, not only because of any support it
might enjoy among Indian Muslims, but
also by reason of the long and intimate history of shared relations that it invokes.
When India blames Pakistan for terrorist attacks it is partly to prevent Indian
Muslims from being victimized and so to
clamp down on civil strife. And when
Pakistan blames India’s domestic enmities
for the same attacks it is precisely to intensify internal conflict and evade responsibility for terrorism. The role played by civil
strife is therefore crucial in accounting for
the behaviour of both countries beyond
the geopolitical fantasies and war scenarios
so beloved of the global press. Pakistan
tends to be situated within one of two
geopolitical landscapes by scholars, journalists and policymakers alike. In the first
it is seen as a South Asian country whose
politics is directed chiefly by a history of
confrontation with India, which determines Pakistan’s relations with everyone
from China to the United States. And in
the second it is viewed as a Muslim country whose relations with both allies and
While the international media routinely begins
analysis of regional politics in South Asia by referring
to the history of warfare between India and Pakistan
—now inevitably described as “nuclear-armed rivals”
—their wars have in fact all been models of restraint.
Written by Faisal Devji
Photograph by Warrick Page
enemies are informed by Islamic solidarities that have become increasingly internationalized. In its South Asian landscape
Pakistani politics is defined by reasons of
state, while its politics as a Muslim country
is informed by popular opinion. It is
impossible to put together a “big picture”
of the country’s political life by combining
these incommensurable visions. I would
like to suggest instead that Pakistan should
be seen not as a country situated in some
geopolitical space, but as a borderland created by the overlapping jurisdictions of a
number of such spaces.
We need only reflect upon the Pakistani
army’s master doctrine of “strategic depth”
to realize how its own military strategy
deprives the country of geopolitical integrity. According to this doctrine the country’s geography can only sustain a narrow
corridor of infrastructure, whether civilian or military, that is strung out along the
Indus and its tributaries, and whose vulnerability to attack necessitates the drawing of Pakistan’s strategic borders outside
its political ones. What is important about
this doctrine is not its truth or falsehood,
nor even its ability to explain Pakistani
actions in India and Afghanistan, but
rather the fact that it divests the country of
all integrity by rendering its already
porous borders strategically irrelevant.
Whatever social or economic unity it
might possess, therefore, Pakistan does
not exist as a country from the military
12
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
point of view, which thus resolves it precisely into a borderland.
And in fact it is Pakistan rather than the
old “buffer-zone” of Afghanistan that has
served as the borderland of conflicts across
the region as well as the globe. Whereas
Afghanistan had in the past constituted a
borderland for the imperial rivalry of the
Mughals and Safavids or the “great game”
of the British and Russians, Pakistan has
in our own times formed a political borderland between the Americans and the
Soviets or the Indians and the Chinese.
But the country has not simply become the
site of regional or global conflict as a proxy
state. Having significantly outpaced its old
enemy economically and politically, for
instance, India is now in the curious position of treating Pakistan as a problem
internal to its rapidly expanding sphere of
influence. This was made evident once the
Asian giant had cemented alliances of one
sort or another with all its smaller rival’s
neighbours, thus encapsulating Pakistan
within what are in effect the economic and
military borders of British India.
However all of this represents nothing
more than the paradoxical fulfilment of
Pakistan’s doctrine of strategic depth,
whose politics of supporting militancy in
Kashmir and other parts of India had long
ago made the country into an internal
problem for its larger neighbour. In this
sense Pakistan presents for India almost
the same kind of problem as semi-autono-
Left
April 2007, Islamabad, Pakistan: A religious student
of the radical Islamist Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) stands
behind a jihadist flag during an anti-vice drive where
thousands of CDs and DVDs were torched after Friday
prayers in Islamabad. In a siege lasting a week beginning
03 July 2007, Pakistani special forces stormed the
madrassa compound on 10 July, killing an unknown
number of militants and students; with reports varying
from 200 to more than 1,000 killed.
mous tribal areas like Waziristan do for
the Islamic Republic, with both countries
interested in preserving these enclaves and
containing their fractious politics. But
then much of what is today Pakistan had
existed precisely as this sort of enclave
within British India, a status to which it
arguably returned after the violent separation of Bangladesh in 1971, following which
Indian policy was dedicated to containing
its enemy and even keeping it in place
rather than risking the possibility of
Pakistan’s remaining portion dissolving
into anarchy.
Even when Pakistan serves as a proxy
for some other state or supplies the site for
a war waged by outside forces on its territory, a double role it has played in two global conflicts already, as an American ally
during the Cold War and now in the War
on Terror, it does so in an unusual way.
After an Islamic republic was established
in Iran, for example, Pakistan quickly
became an important ideological battlefield between the forces of Shiite revolution sponsored by Iran and those of the
Sunni counter-revolution funded by Saudi
Arabia. With the Iran-Iraq war another
front was added to this battle that saw the
emergence of sectarian militias and suicide
bombings in Pakistan, from where such
forms were introduced to the Middle East.
Pakistan became the setting for sectarian
struggle because it is the most important
Sunni country in the world, with a large
population at home and abroad, a skilled
workforce, industrial capacity and a
sophisticated elite, all of which made it
into a significant site of Islamic ideological
production.
Yet Pakistan, together with India, is
also home to the only important Shiite
elite outside Iran, one that is instrumental
in funding sectarian causes worldwide. So
it is not surprising that Pakistan should
have become the model of sectarian militancy throughout the Muslim world.
14
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
The role played by civil
strife is therefore crucial in
accounting for the behaviour
of both countries beyond the
fantasies of the global press
Indeed this struggle, sponsored by states
like Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
itself, can even be said to have given substance to both the recent wars in
Afghanistan, whatever the Russians or
Americans thought was happening there.
Unlike Afghanistan, however, Pakistan
has never been a mere proxy in such conflicts, since it is by no means weak in military or even economic terms, until recently
enjoying a growth rate of eight percent
despite its continuing political crisis. In
fact Pakistan has been embroiled in these
conflicts precisely because of its strengths,
which include a professional army that has
since colonial times been used around the
region as a mercenary force, in our days
rented out to countries like Saudi Arabia
or Kuwait as much as it is to the United
States.
Whether or not they are supported by
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence or
by its army for strictly geopolitical reasons,
militant outfits like the Jaish-e Muhammad
or Lashkar-e Taiba possess ideologies that
diverge from that underwriting the Islamic
Republic. The latter group, for example,
claims to want a subcontinent fragmented
into Hindu, Muslim and Sikh states more
or less as these existed in colonial days.
Not the Mughal Empire, in other words,
but the princely states of the British past
are what constitute the Lashkar’s model,
though of course regions like Kashmir are
reserved for Muslim rule rather than seen
as the inheritance of their erstwhile Hindu
maharajas. Resembling in some ways the
wildest imaginings of Pakistan during the
last days of the Raj, or some of the more
balkanized British plans for an independent South Asia, the Lashkar-e Taiba’s utopia not only harks back to a past shared by
Hindus and Muslims, it also intertwines
these communities in the most intimate
ways. If anything this intimacy signals the
failure of the Muslim League’s attempt to
divorce the two by insisting upon the par-
tition British India in 1947. And in fact the
Lashkar’s geopolitics can be seen as deriving less from the League than from antiPakistan movements among the Muslims
of British India, which imagined the political co-existence of Hindus and Muslims in
a variety of interconnected ways.
Whatever its genealogy, however, the
Lashkar’s utopia with its nostalgia for the
colonial past is worlds removed from the
Islamic emirates and universal caliphates
that serve as models among many of its
peers. Can this curious vision of the future
be a force that mobilizes young men to
sacrifice their lives in cities like Mumbai?
Or it is simply the sectarian narrative of a
Shiite or Hindu threat that works to
inspire these militants bent upon righting
historical wrongs? Perhaps the Lashkar-e
Taiba only achieves meaning as a constituent element of Indian as well as Pakistani
societies, without relying upon the geopolitical language of international borders
and interests. In other words it is only by
ignoring or erasing these boundaries that
the Lashkar can operate, which it in fact
does by deploying a rhetoric of familiarity
with the enemy, often going so far as to
plan its sorties in Kashmir together with
the Indian troops stationed there, each
side staying out of the other’s way and
claiming victory in the operations that
follow. Similar are the relations of corruption that the Lashkar’s operatives enjoy
with their ostensible enemies, which
include purchasing weapons from the
Indian military across the border in
Kashmir, or smuggling them with the connivance of Indian customs and police officials into Mumbai by sea.
Although the Indian government has
expended great efforts in describing the
Mumbai attacks in geopolitical terms, as
part of its traditional enmity with Pakistan,
we have seen that this explanation makes
little sense, even if we attribute the strike
to some faction within Pakistan’s military
or secret service that operates outside state
control. Such an explanatory framework
in fact deprives the attacks of geopolitical
weight by reducing them to mere throws
of the dice, meant either to goad India into
a pre-scripted response or allow Pakistan
to achieve some temporary advantage,
such as diverting its armed forces, together
with the world’s attention, from its border
with Afghanistan to the one it shares with
India. All of the geopolitical explanations
proffered after the Mumbai strikes in
November last year have been of this type,
which is to say high-risk conspiracies
meant to achieve uncertain and short-term
ends. None of them can therefore claim
the status of political analysis, dispensing
as they do with strategic issues to focus on
tactics alone. But explanations that would
attribute the strike to global forms of
Islamic militancy are equally unsatisfactory, as they are unable to account for any
of its particularities, which are seen to be
entirely opportunistic and therefore quite
random. Perhaps the time has come for us
to recognize that the two forms of terrorism I have been describing no longer
belong to the political traditions of this
region. On the one hand there is the
Lashkar-e Taiba, for which the IndiaPakistan border has become inconsequential, not least because its bi-national politics has been distorted by the Afghan war’s
gravitational pull. The Kashmir issue has
therefore been subordinated to a wider
struggle, while becoming at the same time
marginalized within the arena of HinduMuslim strife elsewhere in India. Written by Seyed Sadreddin Safavi
Cultural Sufism
and
its
Relationship to
‘Irfan
Faisal Devji is Reader in Modern
South Asian History at St Antony’s
College, Oxford University and is
author of Landscapes of the Jihad:
Militancy, Morality and Modernity
(Hurst and Cornell University Press,
2005) and The Terrorist in Search
of Humanity: Militant Islam and
Global Politics (Hurst and Columbia
University Press, 2008).
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
T
he essence of Islam is ‘Irfan or
Sufism, which is the path of
spiritual wayfaring towards
Allah for the purpose of attaining union with Him, reaching
perfection through annihilation (Fana) in the Divine attributes, acts
and essence and attaining subsistence
(Baqa’) in Allah. ‘Irfan is deeply rooted in
the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition.
The socio-cultural manifestation of Sufism
occurred at the very beginning of Islamic
history and is best portrayed by Prophet
Muhammad, his successor Ali and the
Ashab Al-Suffah, who were companions of
the Prophet. They lived in the mosque of
the Prophet in Medina and had no worldly
possessions. In times of war, they fought
in defence and preservation of Islam, and
at other times they engaged in worship,
dialogue with Allah and contemplation.
The spiritual aspects of Islam were
explained and presented by Imam Ali in
his conduct, character and speech, some of
which are mentioned in the Nahjul
Balaghah, and his Sermon of Muttaqin is
the manifesto of mystics. The Zabur of the
Ahlul Bayt, which is the Sahifa Sajjadiyah
of Imam Zein al-Abidin, is also one of the
most important representations of the
essence of the Islamic tradition of spirituality, known as ‘Irfan.
The continuation of the manifestation
of Sufism as a culture of criticism and
resistance against oppression and the distortion and abuse of Islam, and as the
institution for the teaching and propagation of the reality of Islam, occurred after
the martyrdom of Imam Ali and the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty. This
dynasty, which in essence moved away
from Islam and established an immoral
and unjust socio-political system, was in
sharp contrast to the Islamic system and
values, but in appearance wore the shroud
of Islam in order to maintain its legitimacy
in the eyes of the masses, and set the precedent that was followed by future dynasties which ruled Muslim communities.
The social movement of ‘Irfan started
to form as a means of protest, criticism and
resistance against the abuse of religion by
the government and the extreme distancing of the official institutions of power,
which spoke of religion and taught a false
image of Islam. This movement strove to
spread and preserve the truth of Islam,
which was ethics, spirituality, love of Allah
and the people, justice, equality and the
lack of attachment to the material world.
This movement is best symbolised in
the Hussaini revolution. On the one hand
there was the caliph and the materialism
and the distorted version of Islam that he
represented, and on the other hand the
Sufis with their ascetic behaviour; the
mystics wore simple and cheap attire, ate
very little, either did not have a house or
lived in very cheap and simple houses, and
continually opposed the established system and its false materialist and superficial
version of Islam.
This demonstrated the contrast
between true Islam as represented by the
Sufis who were part of the masses, and the
Islam of the caliphate and government.
Gradually the Sufis became known and
respected in society and ruled the people’s
hearts, while the caliph ruled their bodies.
Perfect examples of such Sufi figures are
Hassan Basri and Sufian Suri. As the Sufis
criticised the dark conditions of society
and materialism’s reign over it, which
stood in sharp contrast to the ideals of
Islam, and criticised the caliphs with their
speech and conduct, the caliphs in turn
confronted the Sufis, employed a number
of religious authorities who stressed on the
appearance of religion and justified the
conduct of the government and the statusquo. Gradually, huge conflicts arose
between the government, supported by
representatives of the literalists, which
included some of the prominent theologians and jurists of the time, and the
teachers of the Truth and the Sufis. This
resulted in the martyrdom of some of the
most important characters of Sufism, such
as Manthural-Hallaj and ‘Ayn al-Qudhat
Hamadani.
After the Mongol invasion, different
resistance movements were formed under
the leadership of Sufis. One of the most
significant of these movements was the
Hurufiyyah movement, led by Sheikh
Fadhlullah Na’imi and his student
Imaduddin Nasimi, who was killed in a
horrific manner by the Teimurids. The
most important social movement of Sufism
was the Safavid movement under the leadership of Sheikh Safieddin Aradebili. The
Safavids, who were originally a Sufi order
engaged in the propagation of Islam and
‘Irfan. After seeing the need for active
resistance against the oppression of landowners against the poor, they initiated
military training for the Sufis in the
Khaniqah so that they could defend the
poor against the landowners. This movement grew in strength with popular sup-
port to the extent that they were successful
in establishing the Safavid dynasty, and is
of particular importance for highlighting
the social activism inherent to Sufism and
the deep connection between Sufism,
social resistance, politics and power.
The socio-cultural manifestation of
Sufism has continued into the 20th and
21st century, an example of which is Sheikh
Abdul Qader Jazaeri, the leader of the
resistance of Algiers, who was a mystic and
a great commentator of the Futuhat of Ibn
Arabi, in addition to Ayatollah Khomeini,
the founder of the Islamic Revolution in
Iran, who was also a mystic.
Cultural Sufism is the organised movements of spiritual groups who have historically organised themselves in Sufi orders,
Khaniqahs, Zawiyyahs, Hussainiahs and
Zurkhanahs, such as the Ni’matullahiyyah,
Safiaviyyah, Khaksariyyah, Shazilliyyah
and Dhahabiyyah Sufi orders.
These groups have a unique culture and
code of etiquette based on Islamic spiritual
teachings. Cultural Sufism is manifest in
Islamic spiritual poetry and music, such as
the Mathnawi of Rumi, the Sama’ of the
Mowlawiyyah mystics in Syria and Turkey,
the great Islamic architecture and arts,
particularly Islamic calligraphy, and the
architecture and decoration of mosques
and the emphasis of these groups on
i’tikafat (spiritual retreat), arba’in, dhikr
(invocation and remembrance of Allah)
and contemplation. The socio-political
aim of Sufism is the establishment of a just
society through the propagation of Divine
knowledge and wisdom, noble moral values and the movement of society on the
path towards Allah.
Today, a great spiritual void exists in
human society, which has led to severe
social problems such as the breakdown of
the institution of family, the loss of morality and countless wars and acts of injustice
and aggression on the global stage. The
relationship between members of different
communities and societies, between
nations with their governments, and governments with each other, i.e. international
relations, is on the basis of power and not
justice, and as such, there is constant conflict and a lack of durable peace. This is a
multi-factorial problem; some of the primary factors in this process are the alienation of the human being, the spiritual void
in society, a lack of dialogue and acceptance of difference, materialism and the
severe corrosion of morality.
‘Irfan or Sufism offers a solution to this
problem. In the social sphere, ‘Irfan aims
to raise and nourish a human being who
has attained the majestic and beautiful
attributes of Allah, and manifests his love
and servitude for Allah through loving and
serving the human society as a collective,
regardless of religion, gender, race or
nationality. A mystic is a human being who
attains perfection through annihilation in
the Divine attributes, acts and essence,
and as such, portrays the Divine attributes,
most importantly the attributes of mercy
and compassion, justice and testifying to,
and preserving and upholding, the Truth
in his or her social behaviour.
Therefore, the project of ‘Irfan in the
social sphere is the creation of a society
based on the foundation of the Islamic
social system which relies on the six principles of unity, justice, equality, dialogue,
and enjoining good and forbidding evil.
The individuals who form this society act
with compassion and justice towards each
other, share each other’s responsibilities
and burdens, use consultation as a means
of making decisions, accept difference and
engage in dialogue, and strive to eradicate
poverty and ameliorate its conditions
through charitable acts . Such a society is
established through the creation of mystics who act as social reformers, teach the
Divine knowledge (ma’rifah) and wisdom
(hikmah) and guide society on the path of
the Greater Jihad, which is the jihad
against the whims and desires of the nafs
(soul). This project is an organic and
peaceful process which, instead of using
force in order to silence difference and
opposition, uses compassion and dialogue.
Islam is misunderstood and distorted,
not only in the West but also by many socalled “Islamic” groups and movements
which abuse Islam and distort its teachings
in order to obtain power or maintain it,
and to justify their violent crimes and acts
of injustice which are inherently against
Islam. An evident example of this is what
is referred to as “Islamic extremism”,
which in the name of Islam massacres
innocent civilians who many a time are
Muslims, or establish governments which
govern through the use of force and
oppression.
The solution to this problem is not the
de-politicisation of Islam as proposed in
Western academic and government circles,
or the move towards neo-Sufism, which is
devoid of the essence of Islam. Rather, we
must return to true Islam and gain a syn-
optic understanding of it—it places equal
emphasis on Islamic Fiqh or Shari’ah
which is the outward aspect of Islam,
Islamic philosophy, and Islamic mysticism
or Sufism/‘Irfan which is the essence and
inner aspect of Islam.
‘Irfan plays the central role in the sociopolitical program of Islam, as it is through
the training of mystics who are on the
journey towards Allah and have shed their
material desires and gained the Divine
attributes, and as such, are not corrupted
by material desires and power, that society
can be reformed and justice established.
Therefore, ‘Irfan is essential for politicians
and all those involved in socio-political
activities, be they academics or resistance
fighters, for it ensures that they are not
corrupted by power, nor do they abuse it ,
nor do they use oppression and injustice in
order to maintain their power. Through
spiritual training, as set out in ‘Irfan, they
come to see their purpose as serving society and assisting in its growth and development, rather than ruling society and
using different means of coercion and
oppression in order to retain power.
One of the principles of ‘Irfan is “unity
within diversity and diversity within unity” which, in the social sphere, means the
acceptance of difference within society.
The acceptance and treasuring of difference results in the initiation of the much
needed process of dialogue, which is currently lacking in nearly every sphere of
human society, particularly in its political
sphere. The aim of Islamic movements
working in multicultural and multi-faith
societies such as Lebanon in the Middle
East or Western countries, cannot be the
establishment of an Islamic government
which imposes its laws on the society;
rather, the aim should be accepting difference, re-introducing spirituality, and
striving for the establishment of the aforementioned principles of unity, justice,
equality, dialogue, and enjoining good and
forbidding evil. Seyed Sadreddin Safavi is Co-ordinator
of the Transcendent Philosophy Journal
in London.
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
The Islamic Revolution
in Iran has come to
be defined for many
by the concept of
Wilayat al-Faqih (the
Jurist’s Guardianship),
instituted by Imam
Khomeini—May Allah
Sanctify His Soul (mashs).
Written by Sheikh Chafiq Jeradeh
W
ilayat al-Faqih represents
an Islamic concept that is
based on the values of the
Sufi-Irfan idea that it is
possible for humans to
ascend through a thorough knowledge of themselves to the state
of a ‘Perfect Human Being’. Such a person
is sometimes referred to as the ‘Pole’ or
‘the Pole of the Poles’. In the Sufi-Irfan
concept, this state of being carries clear
contractual obligations—including political obligations for any human on this path.
It also implies that such leadership also
requires a strong understanding of law and
the literal application of Islam in the dayto-day life of individuals and of Islamic
societies. Beyond this juridical understanding, a leader has to possess the ability
to manage and organise the elements of
society—that is, he must be able to act
‘politically’, following the lead provided by
Mohammed’s (pbuh) and his Household’s
method of managing the early Muslim
communities.
What is remarkable about the Wilayat
al-Faqih, and the act of revolution that
gave rise to the Islamic State of Iran, was
the interaction between the development
of the concept of Wilayat al-Fiqih within
the context of the reality of revolutionary
action. As political reality impinged, and
as the revolution imposed new challenges,
these events reinforced and opened further scope for the concept to grow and to
exhibit new dimensions.
The more the concept expanded and
added substance, so it created a new
atmosphere amongst Iranians generally.
Furthermore this leadership concept
opened new horizons for dealing with the
external international order, as well as in
the military and scientific spheres via its
bold declaration to achieve a nuclear fuel
cycle. This latter ambition was placed
within a moral and religious stance which
forbids nuclear weaponisation—in contrast with the peaceful use of energy
derived from nuclear fuel.
Thus I believe that it is plain both that
the Wilayat al-Faqih concept is susceptible
to further evolution and certainly is not
immutable; it has not assumed its final
shape—as it lies at the intersection of the
religious structure intended to manage the
day-to-day reality of existence with the
desire to live in harmony with the divine
values.
Therefore both the substance and the
detail of Wilayat al-Faqih are mutable, and
should reflect the requirements appropriate to both time and place. It was this need
to place the Wilayat al-Faqih in its correct
setting that explains why the concept
altered and developed during the late
Imam Khomeini’s (mashs) lifetime.
Between the phases of preparing the revolution; the revolutionary phase and the
rise of the state; the imposed war phase;
and the phase of drafting the constitution,
the concept evolved under the pressure of
these events. If this transformation was
not always very evident during Imam
Khomeini’s (mashs) life, this is largely
due to the fact that this period spanned a
period dominated by extraordinary
change and was overshadowed by the
towering figure of the founder.
Nevertheless, after the demise of the
Imam (mashs) and Imam Khameini
assuming office, the Imam’s methodolgy,
i.e. as Wali Faqih, was impacted by three
major debates:
Firstly, until now the tension between
the underlying religious principles and
contemporary structures of statehood and
the international order have not been satisfactorily resolved. The relationship
between Islamic values that demand direct
involvement with political and social
affairs, and the prevailing global order
influenced by contemporary mores and
ideas, methodology, and institutions,
places it [Iran] at each and every juncture
in face of a debate on the values of Islam
versus the values of the wider world (which
have been created by so-called ‘modernity’).
Although similar dilemmas face all
Islamic movements, this potential conflict
takes, in Iran, a more serious form, owing
to it being a doctrinal state that has surpassed the limitations of being a movement, rather than a state. Iran also—perhaps uniquely—possesses the virtue of
having the option to find the balance
between these opposing currents.
These tensions however are evident
today in Iran: They have given rise to a
strand of thinking within society that
seeks to place doctrinal religion within a
secular framework—this, in addition to
their desire to establish the political structures on a similar secular basis. This has
caused the religious parties to react in two
ways: it has led some to wall themselves in
behind the Wilayat al-Faqih formula and
to reject any new thinking about this concept arising in the Iranian intellectual or
political arena. It has also led to a wider
discussion regarding the relationship
between Islam and Wilayat al-Faqih. The
object of this discussion is centred on how
to Islamise contemporary institutional
systems of governance, whilst another
strand is moving in the opposite direction:
It looks at how to revise the concept
(Wilayat al-Faqih) better to reflect contemporary reality, and its needs.
This is the real dilemma facing the
present al-Wali al-Faqih (the Guardian
Jurist, i.e. Imam Khamenei) and the institutions affiliated with him.
Secondly, during Imam Khamenei’s
rule some circles began to discuss the following issues:
One. Does the concept of Wilayat presuppose a tradition of (cognitive) knowledge of its own, which in itself enables the
Wali (Supreme Leader) to lead and to
manage the actuality? Or, does it require
some additionally acquired expertise in
governance, as well as the special vision,
which only spiritual attainment can provide?
Two. Does Wilayat al-Faqih have one
form, and one form only - the one presented by late Imam Khomeini, or there are
other possible forms that Imam Khamenei
can reveal?
Three. Finally, does the concept rest on
a basis of popular acceptance and commit-
The Experience
of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran
—
The
Contemporary
Debate
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
The concept…
created
a new
atmosphere
amongst
Iranians
generally
ment within the ranks of the Iranian elites?
Or does its basis lie in the emotional circumstance of revolution? This is an important point that needs to be clarified—for
the answer to this question will spell out
for us the possibilities for dissension
between Iranian elites and the popular
will.
Thirdly, there has been in Iran an
ancient debate that is perennially renewed:
the issue is what should govern Iranian
policy—the logic of interest, or the logic
of ideology? Does Iran’s interest lie within
Iran internally, or does the Iranian interest
intersect with other peoples who uphold
the same revolutionary Islamic values?
A debate about such issues may look
nothing out of the normal at first glance;
but, taking into account the doctrinal
nature of the state, and the cultural mood
of the people, each of these issues and the
debate surrounding them, has an impact
and consequences whose potential scope
are difficult to predict. Time and experience will be the judge, when it comes to
observing how successfully such debates
can be resolved. Sheikh Chafiq Jeradeh is Director
of the Institute of Sapiential Knowledge
for Philosophical and Religious Studies
in Beirut.
Recognizing
resistance:
lessons from
Northern
Ireland for
Palestine
and Israel
“I formed the conviction that there is no such thing
as a conflict that can’t be ended. Conflicts are created,
conducted, and sustained by human beings. They can
be ended by human beings. I saw it happen in Northern
Ireland, although, admittedly, it took a very long time.
I believe deeply that with committed, persevering, and
patient diplomacy, it can happen in the Middle East.”
George Mitchell, Obama Administration
Middle East Envoy, 22 January 2009
Written by Ali Abunimah
D
uring Israel’s December 2008/
January 2009 invasion of the
Gaza Strip which killed more
than 1,400 Palestinians, the
vast majority civilians, veteran Irish journalist Patrick
Cockburn reported that Israeli society
reminded him “more than ever of the
unionists in Northern Ireland in the late
1960s.” Like Israelis, he wrote, unionists
were a community “with a highly developed siege mentality which led them
always to see themselves as victims even
when they were killing other people. There
were no regrets or even knowledge of what
they inflicted on others and therefore any
retaliation by the other side appeared as
unprovoked aggression inspired by unreasoning hate.”
Today, more than a decade after the
1998 Belfast Agreement, Irish nationalists,
who are mostly Catholic, share power with
mostly Protestant pro-British unionists, in
what is in effect a bi-national state in
Northern Ireland. The power-sharing
executive, led jointly by the Democratic
Unionist Party (dup) and Sinn Fein,
would until recently have been viewed as
being as unlikely as a joint Likud/Hamasled executive in a single Palestinian-Israeli
state.
Not all of Northern Ireland’s problems
have been solved; the agreement did not
definitively settle the status of Northern
Ireland, but set out democratic rules for
changing its status and governing it in the
meantime. Yet, a generation of children,
now teenagers, has no memory of the pervasive violence that traumatized their
society for decades. That alone is no small
achievement.
Does this experience hold lessons for
Palestine/Israel? Both conflicts have long-
recognized parallels and both have at
times been described as “intractable” and
both are the legacies of settler-colonial
interventions which in each case created
two mutually exclusive claims to sovereignty and self-determination underpinned by two diametrically opposed narratives, and a material reality of one community monopolizing state power,
resources and symbols to dominate and
denigrate the other. The tap root of the
modern conflict in Ireland was the 17th
century Plantation of Ulster—the systematic colonization of the north east part of
the island. The English crown granted land
to English and Scottish Protestant settlers
who forcibly displaced native Catholics in
large numbers.
The 1921 British partition of Ireland
created Northern Ireland, a semi-autonomous state run by and for the settlerdescended unionist community who
monopolized political and economic power. British forces and unionist militias violently suppressed nationalist resistance to
partition. In the words of Northern
Ireland’s first prime minister, the state’s
seat of government at Stormont Castle was
a “Protestant parliament for a Protestant
people.”
From the late 19th Century, Palestine
was the target of Zionist settler-colonialism whose openly declared purpose was to
transform Palestine into a Jewish “national
home.” From the outset, the Zionist movement understood that this could not be
achieved without the involuntary removal
of the native Arab population. The partition of Palestine was accompanied by the
expulsion and flight of 750,000 Palestinians
in the months preceding and following the
declaration of the State of Israel in May
1948 as the British prepared to withdraw.
These partitions generated enduring
resistance—expressed as indigenous
nationalism—among a significant part of
the population. Lacking sufficient consent
and legitimacy, Israel and Northern
Ireland could only be sustained with massive and escalating use of state violence.
In Northern Ireland, a peaceful nationalist movement for civil rights starting in
the late 1960s was met with violence by the
Northern Ireland state. This inaugurated
the 30-year low-level civil war known as
‘The Troubles’ in which more than 3,500
people were killed and 50,000 injured—
nearly two percent of the Northern Ireland
population. The British sent in the army
which quickly began to act and be seen by
nationalists as an occupying force. A
reconstituted Irish Republican Army
(ira) resumed armed struggle, initially in
defense of Catholic communities, but later
went on the offensive against the police,
army, and unionist militias (known as
‘loyalists’). The ira and other armed
groups also carried out bomb attacks and
political assassinations. British tactics
included internment, curfews, assassinations and extrajudicial executions in collusion with loyalist militias that killed hundreds of Catholics in sectarian attacks.
Although nationalists sought to end
partition, the Belfast Agreement preserves
an existing ‘two-state solution’ in Ireland
unless and until people north and south
choose to alter it by democratic means.
Nationalists were able to accept this compromise in part because it required
Northern Ireland—for as long as it exists
—to transform itself from a unionist-run
and sectarian Protestant state into an
inclusive democracy.
It would have been impossible to reach
this point in Northern Ireland without the
slow but fundamental change in British
and unionist attitudes towards dealing
with the ira and Sinn Fein, the nationalist
party close to the ira. The British vilified
both groups as “terrorists” and shunned
them for decades. Sinn Fein had a considerable electoral mandate from nationalists,
but Britain would not deal with them
unless they accepted its preconditions.
Here the obvious parallel is with the
Palestinian resistance movement Hamas
which Israel and its Western supporters
have refused to recognize even though the
Islamist group won Palestinian legislative
elections in 2006. Instead, the us and
European Union threw their financial,
military and political backing to Fatah –
which lost the election – and its leader
Mahmoud Abbas. The ‘Quartet’ of the us,
eu, Russia and the un Secretary-General
demanded that Hamas commit “to the
principles of nonviolence, recognition of
Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations.” These conditions
are a reprise of the long-standing British
ban on contacts with Sinn Fein (though in
fact there were secret contacts).
The British categorically rejected
nationalist demands for a united Ireland,
but in 1992 conceded that this could be the
outcome of a democratic political process
—an important concession. The British
government maintained, however, that
there would never be political talks with
Sinn Fein until the ira abandoned violence. American intervention helped soften this position, most controversially, in
1994 when President Bill Clinton—against
strenuous British protests—issued a visa
to Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams.
George Mitchell, one of several senators
supporting the move, argued that visiting
the us would “enhance Adams’ stature”
and “enable him to persuade the ira to
declare a cease-fire, and permit Sinn Fein
to enter into inclusive political negotiations.”
Once the ira declared a ceasefire in
1994, the British government and unionists still insisted on “prior decommissioning” of ira weapons. As chair of a threeman international committee, Mitchell
crafted a compromise where all parties to
negotiations had to pledge nonviolence,
and decommissioning was to be carried
out in “parallel” with negotiations. Later,
when implementing the Belfast Agreement, ira decommissioning with was
done in parallel with British Army withdrawals, “security normalization” and the
dismantling of military installations in
nationalist areas.
Intriguingly, Mitchell proposed something similar in his 2001 report, at the
behest of President Clinton, into the causes
of the second Intifada which began in
2000. The Mitchell Report recommended
Israel and Palestinians “should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence” as a prelude to negotiations. While Palestinians were urged to
act against “terrorists,” Israel was expected
simultaneously to end its own violence
including the lethal use of force against
civilians, “that security forces and settlers
refrain from the destruction of homes and
roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas,” and
that Israel “freeze all settlement activity,
including the ‘natural growth’ of existing
settlements.” Thus, Mitchell recognized
Israeli violence, including settlement
expansion, as constitutive of the conflict.
By offering Israel a long-term ceasefire
or hudna, Hamas leaders have already
demonstrated their acceptance of a
Mitchell Principles-like approach and
explicitly cited the ira ceasefire as a model. The us and eu, however, continued to
view Palestinian violence as purely aggressive, senseless “terrorism,” while often
unprovoked and astronomically greater
Israeli violence—including alleged war
crimes and crimes against humanity—are
viewed as legitimate if occasionally “excessive” forms of “self-defense”. Unlike in
Northern Ireland, Israel’s Western supporters have never supported a reciprocal
ceasefire.
After negotiations began, the British
still focused on securing agreement and
then power-sharing between unionist and
nationalist “moderates” in the hope that
this would undermine support for the
“extremist” Sinn Fein and dup. British
chief negotiator Jonathan Powell later
conceded that this strategy of “building
out from the center” failed and in the end
“it is only the extremes who can build
a durable peace because there is no one
left to outflank them.” Including the
“extremes” does not predetermine that
they would be the ones to achieve peace in
Palestine/Israel, but only that efforts
excluding them guarantees failure.
Although many factors contributed to
the achievement of a peace agreement with
broad public support in Northern Ireland,
undoubtedly the British recognition of
Sinn Fein, and the abandonment of one-
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
sided preconditions were prerequisites for
a successful outcome.
The relevance of this experience has
been recognized by Hamas leaders.
Ahmed Yousef, an advisor to Ismail
Haniyeh, the Hamas Prime Minister
elected in 2006 wrote:
“Irish Republicans continue to aspire
to a united Ireland free of British rule, but
rely upon peaceful methods. Had the ira
been forced to renounce its vision of reuniting Ireland before negotiations could
occur, peace would never have prevailed.
Why should more be demanded of the
Palestinians, particularly when the spirit
of our people will never permit it?”
Hamas leaders, and other Palestinians,
have refused to recognize Israel as a condition for entering a peace process, not least
because plo recognition of Israel as part
of the 1993 Oslo Accords led to no reciprocal Israeli recognition or changes in
behavior. Recognition of Israel as a decolonized, nonracial state affording equal
rights to all citizens and Palestinian refugees could conceivably be an outcome of
negotiations in which Palestinians felt
their rights were fully restored.
From its first day in office the Obama
administration repeatedly reaffirmed the
Quartet preconditions for dealing with
Hamas, ignoring significant overtures
from the movement, and has continued
the disastrous Bush administration policy
of providing training and weapons to antiHamas militias loyal to Abbas. Mitchell’s
attempt to secure an Israeli settlement
freeze was fatally undermined when the
Obama administration failed to back him
in the face of Israeli intransigence. The
Obama administration and its allies
ignored virtually all the lessons from
Mitchell’s valuable experience in Belfast
and have thus forfeited for the foreseeable
future the opportunity to set the stage for
an inclusive political process that would
stand a chance of ending a century of
injustice and bloodshed. Ali Abunimah is co-founder
of The Electronic Intifada
(www.electronicIntifada.net) and author
of One Country; A Bold Proposal to
End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse.
This article is taken from a longer paper
presented at the conference: Palestine
and the Palestinians Today, at the
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies,
Georgetown University, April 2009.
Lessons
from
Ireland’s
and
South
African
resistance
Commentators on the Palestine/Israel
conflict routinely draw parallels between
the crisis and the experiences of South
Africa under Apartheid and the case
of Northern Ireland. While similarities
do exist, it is in fact the differences
that shed light on the current impasse
with peace negotiations in the region.
Written by Ismail Patel
M
© Pacemaker Press International, Belfast
Armed
Struggle
and
Political
Resistance:
IRA fire a volley
of shots at Kieran
Doherty’s funeral,
August 1981
any have focused attention
on the evolution of resistance
groups like the ira and the
Umkhoto we Sizwe (the
anc’s military wing) from
the resistance ‘militia’ to the
political arena which helped fortify a lasting peace. However, in both of these scenarios, their negotiating partners played a
key role in the success of this metamorphism. Both Britain and the leadership in
Apartheid South Africa called their opponents ‘terrorists’ for many years, before
recognising that they were essential negotiating partners and acceding them this
role in genuine pursuit of a real peace.
Ending the colonization and occupation of one people over another involves a
multitude of complex factors which challenge any move away from the status quo.
Most significantly, one group is required
to relinquish usurped privileges and economic, social and political advantages. For
the opposition, the Northern Ireland and
South African examples demonstrate the
need for adherence by the resistance
groups to their central goal of freedom by
converting the occupation/status quo
from an asset into a burden for their opponents. All other factors leading to peace,
including international consensus and
support, followed in both cases.
The ira never abandoned their call for
a united Ireland and even today this aspiration remains intact although political
realities have led them to reconfigure it in
more pragmatic terms, rather than to
abandon the aspiration. The African
National Congress (anc) at no stage com-
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Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
promised on the ‘one man one vote’ principle despite attempts by the apartheid
regime to enforce a partitioned South
Africa.
However, the most significant factor in
both of these cases was on the military
front. The ira began its campaign for a
free Ireland by calling for strikes and non
co-operative actions following the Second
World War, but to no avail. In the second
phase of struggle—post-1969—the ira
escalated their actions and began military
engagement. This started with targeting
British officials and buildings within
Northern Ireland, which the British government managed to contain for several
decades using its own military power.
However, when the attacks arrived in
mainland England, there was a gradual
shift in the political pendulum and within
a decade the means for conflict resolution
had transformed from military containment to political resolutions.
The ira bombings within mainland
England were significant and remain
etched in the memories of the public in
England. With the first significant attack
in 1974 on the M62 motorway, the ira
began a new chapter which was first met
with resolute defiance by the government
followed by the imposition of draconian
legislation resulting in wholesale subjugation of the Irish (predominantly
Catholics). However, the ira continued
unabated.
Despite the increased rhetoric and subjugation of Irish Catholics, the ira persisted. They began to operate in small
‘cells’ of two’s and three’s making capture
more difficult, and they became bolder in
their attacks. The bombing of cities and
economic targets followed. The ira called
for a number of unilateral cease fires in the
hope of initiating peace talks but to no
avail.
The Birmingham pub bombing of 1984
was followed by the Brighton bombing of
the Conservative Party conference, where
Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime
Minister, escaped unharmed. This attack
on the highest echelons of British politics,
interspersed with calls to the police about
potential bombs, most of the time hoaxes,
brought with it a pandemonium that
resulted in entire transport networks and
at times whole cities being brought to a
standstill.
The British government at this stage
was adamant in its pronouncement to
never engage with those who use the gun
and in no uncertain terms dismissed the
ira—and Sinn Fein who were linked to
them - as terrorists. The poignant reality
though was that the ira on the other hand
were using the gun where all else had
failed, and it was left as the only means of
resistance available to them.
Ceasefires were declared and broken,
and what ceasefires failed to reap, resumed
military action accomplished. In 1996, the
ira ended its ceasefire with a massive
bomb at London’s Canary Wharf, killing
two men and causing at least £85m of damage. The decision to target London at that
stage was not accidental but was chosen by
design as the ira knew that this would
have a far greater impact on the British
government.
As envisaged, back door negotiations
ensued while the government continued
to publicly cite its refusal to engage. In
early 1997, another ceasefire was adopted.
Before the year was out, for the first time
in seventy-six years, a British Prime
Minister sat face-to-face with the leader of
Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams. Significantly, at
this stage, the ira still had all of its weapons and continued to demand a united
Ireland. It was only once fair terms for
peace were established that the process of
disarmament began, and even then, no
guns were ever actually handed over.
The anc adopted a similar path to the
ira in achieving recognition for its struggles, and achieving respect and legitimacy.
Some fifty years after its formation, in 1961
the anc came to the conclusion that a
non-violent movement was not going to
reap dividend and proclaimed, “The time
comes in the life of any nation when there
remain only two choices: submit or fight.
That time has come to South Africa. We
shall not submit and we have no choice but
to hit back by all means within our power
in defence of our people, our future and
our freedom…”.
What followed was a period of sustained attacks for twenty-nine years on
targets of economic and social significance
in South Africa. A number of civilians
were killed in these attacks, but the attacks
continued. By 1989, the anc reached
increasing levels of sophistication and
were emboldened enough to attack a South
African Air Force secret radar installation
at Klippan in the Western Transvaal causing extensive damage and undisclosed
casualties. The impact of the military
resistance of the anc cannot be underestimated as a force which facilitated an end
to the apartheid regime’s racist control.
The current Palestinian resistance
movement mirrors the beginnings of both
the anc and the ira. In the early years
they sanctioned strikes and non-co-operative actions which in the end harmed them
more than their opponents. The military
resistance of the first Intifada forced
Israel to recognise the existence of the
Palestinian people and their leadership.
However, the similarity ends there. The
Palestinian leadership over the years has
become enslaved by the language, ideas
and vision of the colonizer. Fatah, the first
organisation to confront the Israelis,
began by calling for a free Palestine but
changed its stance to a two state position
and now is essentially prepared to accept
any viable entity that is offered to them.
On the military level, Fatah has gone
through the full 360 degrees, now considering military resistance as a legal option
but not a means for liberation. The acceptance of the most objectionable ideas
reflects the state of mind of Palestinians,
and no where is this reflected more clearly
than in the case of Jerusalem. When
Israel unilaterally and illegally annexed
Jerusalem, it expanded its borders into the
West Bank. Palestinians followed suit and
began to refer to the expanded area deep
into the West Bank as Jerusalem as well.
Hamas, like the anc and ira, is pursuing liberation using both military and
political fronts. Just like the anc and ira,
it believes that military action is both justifiable and effective. However, Hamas’
military resistance remains wedged where
the ira was in the 1960s.
26
Cultures of Resistance / Volume 01 / Issue 03
The
Palestinian
leadership
over the years
has become
enslaved by…
the colonizer
The Qassam rockets fired by Hamas
have provided Israel with a greater pr coup
than any other ‘security’ concern. While
the vast majority of Israelis are occupied
with their European lifestyles, the imprisonment of the whole Palestinian population—including 1.5 million people stewing
in the cesspit that is the Gaza Strip—might
as well be a million miles away. Since
repercussions of Palestinian grievances do
not hurt or significantly affect the ordinary
Israeli—like the British pre-1969 and
white South Africans pre the 1960s—the
Israeli government is happy to continue
containing them with brutal military force
in the occupied territories.
It remains to be seen if Israel follows in
the way of South Africa and Britain which
both came to the negotiation table unconditionally after a heavy price had been
exacted from their citizens—or will Israel
heed the lesson of history and end their
intransigence of dictating who, where and
what to discuss. Imprisoning people does
nothing but spur them on to break free—a
fact witnessed repeatedly throughout history. In the conflict in Palestine/Israel,
bloodshed has largely effected Palestinians.
But Israelis must ask themselves how
much longer this can continue, and
whether they will forge a peace based on
mutual recognition rather than waiting to
be forced by a threat to their peaceful
existence. Ismail Patel is the Director of Friends
of Al-Aqsa in Leicester and a noted
commentator on the Palestinian issue
and the status of the Muslim community
in Great Britain.
Prevent has come to be
perceived as an integral
part of an authoritarian
counter-terrorist system
that violates the human
rights of Muslims
Arun Kundnani’s Spoooked! How not to Prevent Violent Extremism,
page 04