Threat Networks employing IEDs
in North Africa
C
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JUNE 2016
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Disclaimer:
This Report is designed to provide specific information on IED incidents in North Africa.
The content of this Report has been extracted from the information gathered from C-IED CoE
collaborators and open sources. Consequently, the C-IED CoE claims no liability for such information and
does not identify with the opinions expressed and held by those sources. The CoE does not accept any
responsibility for use of the information made by those who have obtained it from this Report.
The Report should not be regarded as an official NATO Document.
INDEX
INDEX
3
Introduction
5
Main threat groups employing IEDs
8

Al Qaeda and proxies
8

DAESH (IS – ISIS – ISIL)
8

Muslim Brotherhood
8

Other Jihadist groups
8

Government (Libya)
9

Anti-Government (Libya)
9
IED Activity
11

IED Types and Components
12

Egypt
12

Libya
13

Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
13
Most common TTPs and targets
14

SLVBIED used to breach defenses and start attack

Complex attacks and/or coordinated assaults on secured locations 16

Sieges/Hostage taking/High casualty attacks
16

Targeted suicide attacks
16

Attacks on aircraft
17

Targeted assassinations
17

Female operatives
17
EXPLOSIVES
14
18
CONCLUSIONS
19

Algeria
19

Egypt
19

Libya
19

Morocco
20

Tunisia
20
REFERENCES
21
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to present an analysis related threat networks using IEDs in the
region comprising North of Africa (from Morocco to Egypt). This activity is linked with conflicts
between different religious and ethnic groups in this geographical area.
We can divide this area in three subareas sharing similar characteristics. From west to east, we
can start with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (West subarea), after this, the second place belongs to
Libya (Central subarea) and finally Egypt (East subarea).
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have had less terrorist attacks than Libya or Egypt. By the present
moment all of them have strong governments in power, taking control of the situation. Tunisia and
in a minor scale Morocco had suffered some terrorist attacks, with a big impact in their tourism
industry.
Libya is still in a civil war after the collapse at the end of Regime of Colonel Muamar el-Gadafi.
Some groups are struggling for the power, Al Qaeda proxies, DAESH, other jihadists groups, ethnical
groups (Toubou Militias, Amazigh Militias, Tuaregs), Government and Army, and anti-government
forces.
In Egypt the Arab Spring ended the Mubarak era, after some weeks of revolts and
demonstrations in several cities, being Tahrir Square at Cairo the most popular. After the changes in
the government there were elections and Mursi (from Muslim Brotherhood) was elected President.
After one year in government he was overthrown by another revolt and General al-Sisi took the
power. Apart from attacks in some areas in the desert, and Cairo, terrorist attacks usually
concentrates in Sinai Peninsula, focusing in military and police installations.
From these five countries, only Egypt use to be a kingdom under the rule of Pharaohs in history.
The rest of the area has been occupied from different people and tribes along history. The ancient
Carthage Empire covered parts of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco (and also Spain). From that
time until now, most of these countries were colonies of Powers (from Europe or Turkey), being part
of the Roman Empire, under the control of the Ottoman Empire, under the rule of Spain, United
Kingdom, France or Italy, especially during the XIX century.
Some parts of the area, mainly Morocco and Algeria have another common characteristic which
is a strong migration towards Europe (France in particular). These migrants send money back home,
but also ideas, and sometimes a feeling of rejection to western values.
Parts of this area also (in particular outside main cities) have a strong tribal structure and
culture. This tribal structure alongside the ideas supported by some Muslim religion currents collides
with western feelings (women liberation and democracy).
Demographic data:
Berbers
71%
Tuareg
10%
Arabs
19%
Religion:
Muslims
97%
Christians
2%
Jews
1%
Statistical Data
Area (Km2)
Population
(est. 2016)
Capital city
Algeria
2,381,741
40,400,000
Algiers
Arab and Berber
17.0
254.7 billion $
7400 $
Egypt
1,001,451
90,031,000
Cairo
Arab
89.9
500.9 billion $
6200$
Libya
Country
Flag
Languages
Hab/Km
GDP
GDP per
capita
1,759,540
5,448,000
Tripoli
Arab
3.1
89.03 billion $
13800 $
Morocco
458,730
33,890,000
Rabat
Arab, Tamazight, French
73.9
153.8 billion $
4900 $
Tunisia
163,610
11,176,000
Tunisia
Arab
68.3
125.1 billion $
11400 $
5,765,072
180,945,000
TOTAL
31.4
Northern part of the continent, Sahara Desert included, is predominantly occupied by Caucasian
peoples, mainly Berbers and Arabs. Its population is 25% of the continent.
Tribal structures are very important in the sociological organization of these countries. Men will
go battle with their fellow tribesmen, if the leader change side, all tribe will do. Most of the militias
are organized by tribes.
Finally other crucial characteristic is that the war is not between two sides but among as much
sides as groups and tribes. In one of the attacks made by groups belonging to Wilayat Sinai (local
branch of DAESH for Egypt), one of the sons of a local tribe leader was killed. As a result of that the
tribesmen attacked the group, by their own, not in collaboration with Egyptian police or armed
forces. As in other geographical areas, DAESH affiliated groups can fight against governmental
forces, and also against Al Qaeda affiliated groups. But we must keep in mind that also they can do
business with enemies and make temporary alliances from time to time.
Main threat groups employing IEDs
Al Qaeda and proxies
-
Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Al-Murabitoun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar)
Ansar Dine and Front de Liberation du Macina (FLM)
Mujahedeen Shura Council
Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council
Moroccan Islamic Combatant group
Salafia Jihadia
Katibat ‘Uqba ibn Nafi’s (KUIN)
DAESH (IS – ISIS – ISIL)
-
-
Ansar al-Sharia (some branches also with Al Qaeda)
 Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi
 Ansar al-Sharia Derna
 Ansar al-Sharia Tobruk
 Ansar al-Sharia Sebratha
Wilayat al Sinai (Ansar Beit al Maqdis)
Wilayat Cairo
Wilayat al Barqah (Benghazi)
Wilayat al Tarabulus (Tripoli)
Wilayat al Fezzan (Sabha)
Wilayat Ifriqiya
Jund al Khilafah, (Califate Soldiers) Wilayat al-Jazair
Ajnad al Khilafah, Ajnad al-Khilafah bi-Ifriqiya
Wilayat al Jazair
Muslim Brotherhood
-
Muslim Brotherhood Egypt
Muslim Brotherhood Libya
Other Jihadist groups
-
Ajnad Misr (Egypt)
Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade (Libya)
Free Lybian Martyrs’ Brigade
Martyr Omar Mukhtar Brigade (Libya)
Al-Farouk Brigade (Libya)
-
Zintan Martyrs’ Brigade (Libya)
Government (Libya)
-
Libyan Army
Zintan Brigades
Tebu Militias
Tuareg Militias
Anti-Government (Libya)
-
Lybian Dawn
Amazigh Militias
For Al Qaeda and proxies, his traditional presence in the area has been thru Al Qaeda in Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), with attacks in Mauritania, Algeria, Mali and other areas. Some groups get away
from AQIM, returning later (like the group headed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar). Other groups like Ansar
Dine has also subgroups, like FLM (Front de Liberation du Macina).
The activities of these groups used to be not centered in the use of IEDs. They usually employ
IEDs mainly in suicide belts or vests (or hand grenades) in some assault type attacks (Bardo
Museum, Tunisia, 2015), and also in complex attacks (Casa España restaurant, Casablanca, Morocco,
2003). Historically their attacks were hostage or siege situations (hostage for ransom as one of the
main sources of income).
Groups like Ansar al-Sharia (in their different local branches) are between Al-Qaeda and DAESH
pledging allegiance to one or the other, asking for resources or support. Meanwhile, other groups
clash with DAESH or Al-Qaeda for the control of areas in Libya.
DAESH militants presence has grown in multiple areas (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia), although how
directly linked to DAESH core apparatus is still unclear. Some information speaks about loose
affiliation occasional limited direct contact, but other sources links forces building and command
directly with Raqqa, for example in Libya.
Due to the wide use of social media and Internet for propaganda, there are also cases when
people starts with indoctrination and finally commits a terrorist attack following general lines of
action of DAESH, but not under its direct command, following a process of self-radicalization.
In Tunisia, several significant attacks have been carried out in the name of DAESH, including two
on foreign tourists in Tunis and near Sousse, and a PBIED attack on a bus carrying security forces in
Tunis. In the attacks on tourists IED usage appears to have been limited to several basic improvised
grenades while the attack on the bus in Tunis was tactically reminiscent of a number of incidents in
Syria at the start of the conflict there, with a lone individual boarding the vehicle when it was
stopped.
In Egypt there is evidence to suggest that Wilayat Sinai, the most prominent and active DAESH
affiliate that was previously known as Ansar Beit al Maqdis, is supplemented by a further grouping
linked to DAESH that is focused on Cairo and is known as the Islamic State of Egypt. The relationship
between these two groups remains unclear.
In Libya DAESH is involved in direct conflict with multiple opposition groups, including the
conventional forces associated with General Haftar, as well as AQ-affiliated militant groups and nonaligned militias. It has strongholds in Sirte and Benghazi, and is influential in multiple locations
including near the oil center of Ras Lanuf. Assassinations and numerous VBIED attacks have taken
place and incident numbers are undoubtedly higher than reported in open sources.
Other IS-linked affiliates include Ajnad al-Khilafa in Tunisia and Jund al-Khilafa in Algeria
although directly linking them to activity remains difficult.
Currently the Muslim Brotherhood has an anti-government agenda in Egypt, and is widely
believed to be involved in militancy and operating a permissive environment for militant cells
throughout Egypt but mainly in more populated areas. IED activity is often intended to cause
disruption and chaos rather than mass casualty or significant destruction.
Seen as a terrorist organization by some countries, its subsidiaries are believed to possess
widespread if basic IED capability although some reporting from 2015 suggested an interest in
expanding its technical capability to include such things as UAV-delivered IEDs.
Ajnad Misr, active in Egypt in 2014 and 2015, this Islamist group generally targeted security
forces and sought to avoid civilian casualties. From mid-2015 to present the group has been
relatively inactive and has possibly stopped operations, or merged its efforts with other militants.
IED Activity
Country
Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco
African Mediterranean countries IED Activity Evolution
Mar-2014 / Feb-2015
Mar-2015 / Feb-2016
Evolution
Incidents
Casualties
Incidents
Casualties Incidents Casualties
328
505
513
1135
+56%
+125%
98
384
57*
464*
-42%
+21%
16
32
24
57
+50%
+78%
-------------
* (Low reporting activity due to general unrest and Civil war situation)
© Allen Vanguard. 2016
© Allen Vanguard. 2016
IED Types and Components
Egypt
Egypt has climbed two positions in the top ten IED countries ranking the sixth with 513 incidents
and 1135 casualties from March 2015 to February 2016. The previous year there were 328 incidents
and 505 casualties. These mean an increase of 56% in incidents and 125% in casualties in one year.
Many explosive devices used in Egypt, and especially those deployed in populated areas by
groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, tend to follow fairly rudimentary designs.
However several IED production facilities were overrun in 2015 and materials recovered
demonstrated a capability to produce a range of devices including low metal content IEDs,
directionally focused fragmentation charges, EFPs and RCIEDs.
Multiple attacks utilizing what were usually believed to be RC-initiated roadside IEDs have
targeted security forces in the Sinai area; although at least one command wire initiated attack on an
ECM equipped vehicle was claimed via militant media sources.
The continued use of quite basic IEDs by Muslim Brotherhood associated militants suggests that
the level of technology employed is often sufficient to serve the intended purpose of causing
disruption. This is further supported by the evidence of a capability to produce more complex IEDs
when and if required, although the impact of removal of IED construction facilities cannot be
underestimated.
The use of command wire initiation against security forces who are using ECM demonstrates a
capability to vary tactics depending on the situation and that the IS militancy in the Sinai is
technically and tactically capable, and possibly also utilizes command initiation to ensure targeted
rather than random casualties.
Libya
There has been a demonstrated capability to produce and utilize a range of IEDs and
components, from small VO devices to large SVBIEDs, including more advanced methods such as RC
initiation alongside simple VO switches using clothes pegs and medical syringes.
Reporting from areas where the Libyan National Army has retaken ground from mainly DAESHlinked militants claims that numerous devices, including VO-initiated, have been left in urban areas,
similar to TTPs employed in Iraq and Syria.
The deployment of multiple VO initiated devices as ‘booby traps’ and for area denial has several
effects, including an increased burden on security forces recapturing and securing ground, and also
a prolonged impact on both civilian and security force morale.
There have been reports of devices hidden inside children’s toys and within reoccupied homes
in Iraq and Syria, and it is likely similar methods are being used in Libya.
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia
There has been little detailed reporting of IEDs found within these countries although repeated
security force operations regularly result in the recovery of quantities of materials intended for the
production of HME.
Reports of occasional ‘landmine’ incidents may refer to VOIEDs or command initiated IEDs,
although again there is insufficient detail to confirm this. Groups active in Mali, with easy access to
extend capabilities into these countries, utilize ‘landmines’ and emplace IEDs along routes with
some regularity against security forces.
Most common TTPs and targets







Massive SLVBIED used to breach defenses and start attack
Complex attacks and/or coordinated assault on secured locations
Sieges/Hostage taking/High casualty attacks
Targeted suicide attacks
Attacks on aircraft
Targeted assassinations
Female operatives
SLVBIED 1 used to breach defenses and start attack
This TTP has been widely used by DAESH militants in Iraq and Syria. Several LNA (Libyan National
Army) units have reported findings of garbage trucks (or other with similar capacity) fitted with
extensive homemade armor plating loaded with explosives. Also in Egypt there have been reports
about similar attacks (police station in al-Arish April 2015).
Initially the armor plating covered only the driver or the cabin, but later it has been extended to
cover the motor, the wheels and the charge. The intention is to provide maximum armor protection
for the SVBIED, enabling it to penetrate any obstacles in its route to the target and be initiated by
the suicide bomber driver right on target, achieving the maximum effect possible from the SVBIED
attack. Normally defending forces will need more than small arms to stop the vehicle. An RPG or
guided missile will do it.
Related to explosives, everything can be used, from aerial bombs to artillery shells, land mines
or HME. Even SA-2 SAM warheads has been used. Usually devices incorporate adapted munitions
and an AN-based HME in large containers, everything linked together with detonating cord or
electrical wire.
The containers used for HME or other kinds of explosive substances runs from metal homemade
containers (transformed gas canisters or metal cylinders) to long missile storage tubes.
There is a wide range of initiation methods in constructing SVBIEDS, with varying levels of
technical expertise. Errors such as insufficient power source to ensure successful initiation
demonstrate some key weakness in IED manufacturing knowledge and capacity.
There are also attacks similar in execution but not linked with military operations, like the one
against the police training academy in Zliten (Libya), killing between 50 and 60 people.
In Egypt, the interdiction of several cells and subsequent drop-offs in activity levels, suggest IED
construction competence is limited. And successful security force action can have a noticeable
1
SLVBIED Suicide Large Vehicle Borne IED (from LVBIED An IED built into any large ground-based vehicle (e.g.,
dump truck, panel truck, bongo truck, commercial bus, tanker, etc.) and/or serves as the concealment means for a
large amount of explosives (2000 lbs). (Weapons Technical Intelligence Handbook Edition September 2009)
impact on the IED capabilities of cells, especially in theatres where the militancy is less well
established.
Armored garbage truck SVBIED near Abugrein, northern Libya.
Aerial bombs in the trunk of the SVBIED
Complex attacks and/or coordinated assaults on secured locations
This TTP is widely used, from Taliban in Kabul to Al-Shabbaab in Mogadishu. Usually first part of
the attack is performed by a VBIED or SVBIED (sometimes a PBIED) in order to enable the access of
an assault team to the compound or secure location. Other times the intention of the first attack is
the evacuation of the building, followed by a second explosion outside. The target of these attacks
could be hotels with reinforced security or even police/military posts isolated. This tactic is used
mainly in two ways, one inside out, taking advantage of the evacuation to increase the death toll of
the attack. The second one is to ease the access to an outpost, first attack kills the security control
personnel and afterwards the assault takes place. Groups affiliated to both Al-Qaeda and DAESH use
this TTP.
Usually PBIEDS appear to be manufactured using adapted body belts, smaller than older devices
vest type. The explosive used is TNT, often with a fragmentation matrix. And the initiation system
generally is a mechanical pull switch utilizing an adapted grenade fuze.
In the past only suicide militants wear these belts or vests, now as most of the commanders are
wearing them, the practice has been extended to all level militants. The intention is to show their
will to fight till death. The intention is to use the device in an offensive manner (to inflict mass
casualties or remove defenders from key positions) or defensively to kill themselves and avoid
capture.
Sieges/Hostage taking/High casualty attacks
Similar to the previous TTP, several militant groups, in particular those linked with Al Qaeda and
DAESH, have a known history of carrying out attacks on vulnerable locations often targeting
foreigners. Incidents like Bardo Museum in Tunis, the beach resort near Sousse, or the kidnapping of
NGO members for ransom are part of them. Generally IEDs use in this kind of attacks is limited to
hand made grenades and suicide belts or vests.
Sometimes the intention of the attack is the kidnaping of foreigners (in order to get a ransom, or
just publicity), but other times the idea is provoke as much damage as possible (and casualties), also
to get international publicity thru news and to damage tourism industry.
The once strong tourism industry in these five countries has suffered a big blown, especially
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The damage to the economy is later on transferred to families and people,
bringing better conditions for social unrest.
Targeted suicide attacks
The DAESH suicide attack on a bus carrying security forces in Tunis was reminiscent of several
seen in Syria at the start of the current crisis with a single operative approaching or boarding a bus
carrying or wearing a PBIED.
The success of such attacks often appears to be exacerbated by poor security regimes, with a
lack of route variation, and the setting of easy to target patterns. Often the attacker may also be
wearing a uniform as a form of disguise or even be a soldier or police officer.
Attacks on aircraft
Regionally there have now been several recent instances of IED attacks on civilian aircraft with
the 31 October 2015 attack in Sinai on a Russian airliner with the loss of all on board, being the most
prominent and effective. The recent loss of an Egyptair aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea with no
clues about the reason (but also not claimed by any group) opens the possibility of a second
successful attack.
Close to the area of study there was a recent failed attempt to down an aircraft in Somalia on 2
February 2016 appears to have exploited vulnerabilities in airport security.
The execution of such attacks suggests a possible outside influence in both IED construction and
tactics, and given the spread of IS influence in Africa the presence of more experienced and
technically capable IED facilitators who have relocated from other theatres is likely and further such
attacks possible.
This threat appears limited to DAESH or Al Qaeda linked groups, with Al Shabaab (which claimed
the recent airliner attack at Mogadishu) only having undertaken such an attack since recent DAESH
influence has caused some members to drift from the traditional AQ ties.
Targeted assassinations
A number of senior militants and officers in Libya have been assassinated with IEDs.
These can of course be initiated by a number of different methods, but it is believed the
majority are initiated by RC. Evidence of this can be seen in the reports covering the assassination
attempt of Colonel Mehdi Bargathi, the Brigade Commander of 204 Brigade, and another
commander of a 204-supporting militia, belonging to Libyan National Army, instigated by Wissam
Ben Hamid, the leader of the Islamist militant group FLMB (Free Libya Martyrs Brigade), an affiliate
of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. He bribed a LNA soldier to place an IED in their
vehicle.
Also the VBIED attack that killed the Egyptian Prosecutor General in Cairo in June 2015 is an
example of a well planned and executed attack that used a known part of a route where the road
conditions would cause the target vehicle to slow down or stop.
It is speculated that a number of such attacks exploit either poor route security regimes, or that
the militants act on leaked information from within the local security apparatus. In general such
attacks demonstrate effective coordination and planning.
All threat groups are capable of using such methods to target individuals.
Female operatives
In general all the groups have avoided using female operatives for ideological reasons, and there
is little indication this will change soon. This is one of the main differences with similar groups south
of Sahara desert (Boko Haram).
EXPLOSIVES
Explosive used in this area runs from military stocks and ammunitions to HME at industrial scale.
Aerial bombs, SA-2 SAM,s warheads, artillery rounds, old anti-personnel landmines, old antitank
landmines or weapons, every kind of explosive material is useful for IED makers. Also they take
advantage from experience in HME at industrial scale from other theatres.
In some images we have seen cylindrical metal containers (some similar to gas canisters) stuck
together with foam adhesive. Same method is used with aerial bombs.
The containers or bombs are connected with detonating cord. The quality and characteristics of
the containers suggest an industrial capacity also in this area.
CONCLUSIONS
Algeria
Reporting of ongoing security forces operations and subsequent detention of large numbers of
militants suggests a strong militant presence, especially in the mountainous and less accessible
border regions.
Reporting of actual attacks remains relatively rare although it is unclear if this is due to
government restrictions on media access – the number of reported cache finds and arrests suggests
that actual clashes between security forces and militants are probably more frequent than is
reported and minor IED activity is probably widespread.
Given the usual evolution of such insurgencies more spectacular incidents are likely in Algeria,
and considering the relative strengths of AQIM and its operational capabilities a similar scenario to
that seen at the In Amenas gas facility in 2013, where the facility was attacked and hostages taken,
is perhaps as likely as a mass casualty attack in a large city.
The continued recovery of arms and materials suggests a desire to manufacture and employ
IEDs, and given the ongoing undercurrent of violence in Mali the further spread of such activity into
Algeria by groups operating there appears likely.
Egypt
There appears a consistent undercurrent of IED-based militancy in Egypt and especially the
Sinai. While reporting in open sources is relatively sparse, there are indications from government
sources of multiple IED incidents daily in the Sinai region targeting security forces. There are also
attacks across the border to Israel, trying to get a reaction from them to capitalize it. Some of these
attacks are from Hezbollah.
Activity in more populated areas remains sporadic, and is perhaps as limited by security forces
operations against IED production facilities as by militant intentions.
More spectacular IED incidents such as the actual and attempted downing of aircraft may
continue to occur, especially given apparent and significant gaps in security at airports in multiple
countries and an apparent intention to pursue such means.
Additionally occasional attacks on tourists at popular locations remain a distinct possibility
especially considering the significant media exposure, and potential impact on economies, such
incidents can have.
Government action, including the clearance of border areas in Rafah, will likely continue to
increase resentment from local people who will in turn become vulnerable to radicalization and
exploitation.
Libya
The clashing factions are generally domestically focused on the struggle to establish their own
positions within the country rather than projecting efforts outside of Libya, and IEDs are likely to
continue to be used as local force multipliers or to target specific individuals or locations rather than
for more ‘spectacular’ purposes. IEDs also compensate for a lack of conventional munitions.
Multiple IEDs, often VO initiated, have been reported in urban areas that have been retaken from
DAESH control.
The use of suicide operatives by DAESH-linked groups appears constrained compared to the
levels of such activity in Iraq and Syria, possibly reflecting a relative lack of such operatives and a
tendency for the fighting to be more ‘conventional’ in nature.
Fighting between the various factions continues on a daily basis with little sign of cessation and,
despite political moves towards establishing a more stable situation, in reality the country is likely to
continue in its current restive state. DAESH is losing control of some key locations and apparently
being defeated.
Morocco
There has been a persistent undercurrent of militancy in Morocco. Arrests of militant cells are
reported with some regularity, although actual militant activity is rare. As yet there is little indication
that the militancy will become more violent in Morocco, although the country may serve as a
conduit for militants and materials passing to other areas.
Tunisia
As in other countries in the region the main focus of militant presence is in remote mountainous
areas. Consistent reporting of security force actions against militant cells indicates a persistent
threat although at the moment this seems relatively contained. Being the home country of many
FTF (Foreign Terrorist Fighters), should have a reflection in terrorist activity sooner or later.
Occasional attacks such as that in Tunis on security forces are highly likely, while the threat
against tourists remains with the DAESH-linked Ajnad al-Khilafah having a resilient presence.
Additionally social conditions within the country remain perilous, with youth vulnerable to
radicalization and exploitation.
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Terrogence, IS Armored Truck SVBIEDs Libya, May 2016