Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies:
How One-Party Dominant Systems Endure and Decline1
Renske Doorenspleet and Lia Nijzink
University of Warwick, UK and University of Cape Town, SA
Paper prepared for IPSA- ECPR joint conference, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil,
February 16-19, 2011.
Panel: Elections and the Transformation from One-Party Rule
Work in progress. Please do not cite.
1. Introduction
Our edited volume addresses one of the key issues that confront emerging
democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa: what are the current patterns of one-party
dominance on the continent and how can we explain the endurance and decline of
one-party dominant systems in African democracies?
We are living in an era with an unprecedented number of democracies all around the
world. Since 1989, democracy has spread not only to Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin
America, but also to large parts of Africa. Experts were worried that the adoption of
multi-party democracy would lead to highly fragmented party systems in Africa
because of deep ethnic divisions on the continent. However, this did not happen. In
contrast, party systems with one major dominant party emerged and in many African
democracies such systems have prevailed.
Surprisingly, research on this phenomenon has been scarce. There are not many
studies devoted to the concepts, measurements, and explanations of party systems
with one dominant party, let alone studies about one-party dominance in the African
context.2 Our edited volume aims to fill this gap. In our view, the question why some
one-party dominant systems have endured over time while other have not is highly
relevant to the broader political and public debate about democratization in Africa.
One party dominant systems are assumed to be a problem for democracy on the
continent (Giliomee & Simkins 1999; Schlemmer 2006). At the same time, they have
emerged through the ballot box and can thus be seen as an expression of the will of
the people. This apparent contradiction requires us to take a closer look at patterns of
endurance and decline of one-party dominance and the mechanisms behind them in
order to better understand the challenges one-party dominance present for the
development and deepening of democracy and good governance on the continent.
1
This is the first draft of the introductory chapter of an edited volume to be published by Lynne
Rienner Publishers. We would like to thank all participants of our September 2010 workshop at
Warwick University for their valuable comments and suggestions.
2
Important examples of existing research on one-party dominance are Pempel 1990; Giliomee 1998;
Rimanelli et al 1999; Giliomee & Simkins 1999; Bogaards & Boucek 2010. However, these works are
not based on systematic comparative research and focus mainly on established democracies, and
certainly not exclusively on Africa. For more conceptual discussions on one-party dominance, see
Bogaards 2004.
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
This book discusses theories, concepts and measurements of one-party dominance and
their application in the context of Africa’s young democracies. It brings together a
number of leading experts from both European and African research institutions to
discuss Africa’s one-party dominant systems, describe current patterns of dominance
on the continent and explain how one-party dominant systems endure and decline. Six
country chapters present new knowledge about party system developments in Mali,
Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, while the concluding chapter
enriches the volume by using a comparative framework to draw conclusions based on
the findings of the country chapters. Thus, this book presents new research on a theme
that is increasingly relevant to the policy goal of developing and deepening
democracy on the African continent.
We would like this introductory chapter to serve as a foundation for our edited
volume. First, we will discuss the issue of case selection and present the six countries
we decided to include in this book. In order to do so, we will describe the general
democratic developments on the African continent, not only looking at the concept of
democracy, but also discussing a typology of regimes that currently exist. This
discussion will show that we have selected 6 countries which display patterns of oneparty dominance and present high to middle scores on both political rights and civil
liberties. The next section of this chapter will move to possible explanations of the
endurance or decline of one-party dominant systems. Based on existing research, we
will introduce our newly developed theoretical framework which identifies the
following seven factors to explain the endurance or decline of one-party dominance in
Africa: historical legacy, social cleavages, institutional architecture, political culture,
government performance, state-party relationships, and international influences. We
will describe these factors on the basis of current theoretical knowledge and previous
research. We will give comparative quantitative empirical evidence for all six country
cases related to some of the factors. This evidence suggests that some factors have
little explanatory power in relation to the different patterns of one-party dominance in
African democracies. The final section of this chapter will present the main aims of
this study, the outline of the book and some very preliminary findings.
2. Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa
The main focus of this book is on African democracies and the development of their
party systems. As a consequence, we must first determine which African countries can
nowadays be considered as democratic, which is not an easy task. Democracy is a
highly contested concept. This introductory chapter will not go into the ideological and
normative debate around the meaning of democracy, but will use a descriptive
definition of democracy, which has been predominantly used in political science.
Robert Dahl (1971) presented a precise and useful classification of political regimes,
which we will employ here. Dahl distinguished political regimes along two dimensions:
the degree of political competition and the degree of political participation. First,
regimes vary in the extent of permissible public opposition to government policies. The
dimension of political competition (or contestation) distinguishes monopolistic regimes
in which political power is concentrated in the hands of a small elite from pluralistic
regimes in which power is dispersed among political parties and in which opposition is
possible. Political regimes that ban political opposition and competition among political
2
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
parties for the votes of the people are not ‘competitive’ and as a consequence not
democratic.
The second dimension is the extent of political participation allowed. This is defined as
the level of popular involvement in public life or the proportion of the population that is
entitled to participate. For example, regimes that restrict electoral franchise on the basis
of gender, race or class are more exclusive than regimes that allow the right to vote to
anybody without discrimination. The political systems that deny suffrage to part of its
society are not ‘inclusive’, and hence cannot be considered as democratic (see
Doorenspleet 2000).
In this context, ‘minimal democracies’ are defined as regimes in which there are
elections, which are relatively free and fair, and there is the possibility of competition
and inclusive suffrage in the political system. ‘Liberal democracies’ are minimal
democracies with a high level of political rights and civil liberties (Zakaria 1997;
Diamond 1999; Moller 2007).
The next question is which countries have democratized around the world, and
specifically in Africa. The number of transitions to minimal democracy since 1990
has been striking. At the end of the 1980s, the wave swept through Eastern Europe,
Latin America, parts of Asia and Africa. This recent democratization wave has not
only been more global and affected more countries than earlier waves did; there
have—at least so far—also been fewer regressions to non-democratic regimes than in
the past. There were many transitions to minimal democracy and only a few
transitions back to non-democratic regimes (cf. Doorenspleet 2000; Doorenspleet
2005).
Democratization has become incredibly manifest in Africa. The wave of
democratization to Africa in the early 1990s represented the most significant political
change on the continent since the independence period three decades before.
Throughout the continent, significant political liberalization resulted in the emergence
of a free press, opposition parties, independent unions and a multitude of civil society
organizations autonomous from the state. In many African countries, the first multiparty elections in over a generation were convened in the early 1990s. In a smaller set
of countries, these elections were fully free and fair and resulted in the defeat and exit
from power of the previous authoritarian head of state. By the end of the decade, only
a small minority of states was not officially a multi-party democracy, even if the
practice of democratic politics was often far from exemplary.
Table 1 here
To distinguish between different regime types, Freedom House collects data on both
political rights and civil liberties across the world and classifies countries as either
free, partly free or not free.3 In 2010, there are 17 African countries which, according
to Freedom House, are not free: political rights in these countries are not guaranteed
and civil liberties not safeguarded. Because we are interested in patterns of one-party
dominance in African democracies we will disregard these countries in our case
3
The data are derived from reports and scales of the Freedom House, see www.freedomhouse.org;
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=548&year=2010; and
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010
3
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
selection. The remainder of the countries on the continent can be divided into two
groups: one group of 9 countries that can be classified as free, with high levels of
political rights and civil liberties and another group of 22 countries that has been
classified as partly free with generally lower levels of political rights and civil
liberties. Because we do not want to equate the Freedom House classification of ‘free’
with ‘democracy’ and because we do not want to limit our analysis to the top
performers in Africa, we have selected countries from each group for inclusion in our
book: Namibia, South Africa and Mali from the list of countries classified as free in
2010 and Senegal, Zambia and Tanzania4 from the top half of the list of partly free
countries. We have selected these six countries because they display a pattern of oneparty dominance that is either enduring or declining.5
According to political scientists (see e.g. Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999; Przeworksi et al
2000), the existence of political parties competing for power within a framework that
guarantees equal chances for all is one of the fundamental characteristics of a
democracy. As noted above, political regimes that ban political opposition and
competition among political parties for the votes of the people are not ‘competitive’
and consequently not democratic. In many African democratic systems, though,
competition among political parties is allowed and protected by law but limited in
practice. There is no alternation of the party in power. The likelihood of the
opposition gaining control over government seems very small. Such systems are
central in this book. We have selected three country cases in which the pattern of oneparty dominance is enduring as well as three cases in which this pattern is in decline.
Table 2 here
The next chapter in this book by Erdmann & Basedau will present a detailed
discussion of the conceptualisation of one-party dominance and the various
definitions that have been used in the existing literature on this phenomenon. We will
take the definition presented by Sartori (1976) as our starting point: one-party
dominant systems are those party systems in which the same party wins 50 percent or
more of the seats in parliament in three consecutive elections.
Table 2 shows that Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa fall squarely in this category.
Since their respective transitions to democracy, all three countries have held four or in
the case of Namibia five multi-party elections in which the same political party gained
more than 50% of the parliamentary seats. In Namibia, the seat share of SWAPO has
consistently been around 75% with the transitional elections in 1989, when SWAPO
gained 56.9% of the seats, being an exception. In Tanzania, CCM shows repeated seat
shares above 75%, winning as much as 87.5% of parliamentary seats in 2000. In
South Africa, the ANC has an equally consistent but slightly lower seat share of
around two thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. Thus, these three cases can
be described as cases of enduring one-party dominance and in this volume we will try
4
In another democracy index, the Polity Project (see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)
Tanzania gets a score of -1 on a democracy scale that runs from -10 to +10 and appears to be an outlier
amongst our selection of country cases. We have nevertheless decided not to change the case selection
as presented here.
5
As the chapter by Erdman & Basedau will show, Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique also fall in the
free and (top end of the) partly free categories and are also displaying one-party dominant patterns.
These cases would be very interesting to include in future work on one-party dominance.
4
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
to find out what the mechanisms behind this pattern of dominance are: which factors
are most salient to describe and explain the endurance of one-party dominance in
these cases?
In contrast and in order to strengthen the explanatory power of our framework, we
have included three other cases in our analysis in which initial patterns of dominance
show signs of decline: Senegal, Zambia and Mali. Senegal is an interesting case in
which the PS after consistently winning more than two thirds of the parliamentary
seats for 20 years (from 1978 to 1998) has lost power to the SOPI coalition which in
turn and at first observation seems to show a new pattern of dominance (see table 2).
Zambia where the MMD has remained in power since 1991 shows a different pattern
of declining dominance: since 2001 the dominant party has stayed in power but no
longer holds a majority of the seats in parliament. Finally, in Mali, ADEMA lost its
initial position of dominance in 2002 but has returned to power as the main party in
the ADP coalition that won the 2007 elections. The country chapters in our book will
describe these patterns of declining dominance in more detail and try to identify the
factors that best explain the decline of one-party dominance in these cases.
Figure 1 here
We have found some indication of the importance of these patterns of dominance for
democracy in the Freedom House data. Figure 1 shows the six countries included in
this study and the average of their yearly political rights and civil liberties scores over
time. It is clear that the Freedom House scores of the three cases in which dominance
is in decline (Senegal, Zambia and Mali) show more fluctuations than the scores of
the cases in which dominance endures. In Namibia, Tanzania and South Africa,
enduring party dominance goes together with stable levels of political rights and civil
liberties. Without going into the causal direction of this relationship or the possibility
of intervening variables, this does suggest that patterns of dominance – their
endurance or decline – do matter for the consolidation of democracy on the continent.
3. Theoretical framework and comparative quantitative empirical findings
How to explain the endurance and decline of one-party dominant party systems in
African democracies? As has already been pointed out above, literature on one-party
dominant systems is scarce. Still, several possible explanations of the endurance or
decline of one-party dominant systems can be derived from the pioneering work of
existing studies.
3.1 Historical legacy
First, the endurance of one-party dominant systems seems to be related to the
historical background of the party systems in Africa’s modern democracies and the
history of the current ruling parties. Many African countries currently enjoying
democracy suffered a traumatic past characterized by colonization, civil war and/or
severe repression during authoritarian and military regimes.
Many of the current ruling parties evolved from nationalist movements that mobilized
citizens to fight for independence or from so called second liberation movements
(Salih 2007). Political parties such as the South West Africa People’s Organisation
(SWAPO) in Namibia began as broad independence movements whose main
5
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
objective was self-rule. Another example of a liberation movement turned dominant
ruling party in a democratic system is the African National Congress (ANC) in South
Africa. The Socialist Party in Senegal and the United National Independence Party
(UNIP) in Zambia are parties that began as independence movements and governed
for decades before being defeated in elections. Mali’s independence movement USRDA, on the other hand, gained power at independence in 1960 but quickly became a
minor political actor after a military coup in 1968 in which Traore and his UDPM
started a period of military rule that lasted until Toure’s counter coup in 1991.
Ruling parties such as SWAPO (in Namibia) and the ANC (in South Africa) make use
of their legacy of national struggle as a powerful political image and a justification for
their dominant position. Even in countries where decolonization was relatively
peaceful (as in mainland Tanzania), ruling parties seem to have benefitted from their
role during the move towards independence. The political goodwill earned in the
popular mobilization for independence or liberation seems to provide a basis for the
development of a one-party dominant system. In fact, the cases of enduring one-party
dominance in this volume all have a dominant party that is associated with the fight
for independence/liberation.
The principal nationalist or liberation movement usually had a broad membership,
often cutting across class and/or ethnic lines, with majority rule as the common goal.
In some countries, in our analysis Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal, the nationalist
movement once in power prohibited or limited the existence of opposition parties
thereby undermining multi-partyism and establishing single party rule. In most
instances, the introduction of multi-party elections in the 90’s transformed these
single party systems into one- party dominant systems. Interestingly, in both Senegal
and Tanzania the party of the single party era continued in power as the dominant
party under multi-partyism, SP and CCM respectively. In Zambia on the other hand,
the dominant party under multi-partyism, the MMD, is a so called second generation
post-independence political party with a history as a pro-democracy movement. The
same is true for ADEMA in Mali. Another interesting observation is that the cases of
declining one-party dominance have all had a history of single party rule. Tanzania is
the exception in this pattern: it has a history of single party rule and displays a pattern
of enduring one-party dominance.
Thus, the predominant legacy in our declining cases differs from the predominant
legacy in the enduring cases with Tanzania being the exception. Bratton and Van der
Walle (1997) have argued that successful transitions to democracy depend critically
on the way power was exercised by the rulers of previous regimes. Similarly, the
‘politico-institutional’ legacy of, in our analysis, socialist inspired single party rule or
the apartheid regime seems to influence the development of one-party dominant
systems. First generation political parties with roots in nationalist and liberation
movements seem to be more stable in their position as dominant party under multiparty politics; while the dominant parties with a history as pro-democracy movements
seem to be more vulnerable.
The independence or liberation history as well as the legacy of the previous regime
probably have an important influence on the ideology, character and strategy of the
ruling party and on the development of the party system as a whole but we need to
know more about this influence and how it works. How does historical legacy have an
6
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
impact on the endurance or decline of one-party dominant systems? How has the
country’s history influenced the development of the current party system? How and to
what extent does the country’s history influence the ideology, identity, image,
character and strategy of the dominant party? Has this historical legacy changed over
time? Is the continuing/diminishing influence of the historical legacy an explanation
for the endurance/decline of one-party dominance? The country-chapters in this
volume will try to address these questions and find out more about the mechanisms
behind the relationship between historical legacy and one-party dominance.
3.2 Social cleavages and fragmentation
Another set of explanatory factors for dominant one-party systems in Africa might be
social cleavages and ethnic, religious and linguistic fragmentation (see also Van de
Walle 2003; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Erdmann 2004; Posner 2005). As noted above,
the nationalist movements were usually broad multi-ethnic and/or multi-class
coalitions, including various ethnic and linguistic groups. They often included labour
unions, student unions, women and religious organizations. The unifying objective of
the movements was the overthrow of colonialism and apartheid. The current dominant
ruling parties also have a broad multi-ethnic and/or multi class character. Their
dominant position seems to be based on their ability to successfully transcend social
cleavages – religious, ethnic and linguistic divisions in society – and attract voters
from various social groups. Parties also make a deliberate attempt to reflect their
commitment to the inclusion of various social groups in their choice of party leaders.
Smaller political parties are often co-opted thus reinforcing the ruling party’s image as
a broad ‘umbrella’ body.
Table 3 here
Table 3 shows a number of indices for ethnic, linguistic and religious
fractionalisation. Despite small variations between our six country cases these indices
suggest that our countries are all heterogeneous. This means that in all six cases a
political party needs to successfully transcend various social cleavages in order to win
elections and stay in power. This also means that we expect the parties in our
enduring cases to be more successful in transcending cleavages, attracting broad
support, co-opting various groups than the parties in our declining cases. We need to
see whether the in-depth analysis of our country chapters confirms this expectation.
Similarly, we expect a ruling party once it has established its dominant position to
benefit from and in turn reinforce it by strengthening its links with society. The ruling
dominant party often has a closer relationship with most social groups than the
opposition or any new political parties. In countries with a pattern of declining
dominance the dominant party has probably not succeeded in consolidating its
position in this way. Again, we don’t know much about the mechanisms behind this
relation between social cleavages and patterns of one-party dominance. Therefore, our
country chapter will describe the qualitative evidence: What are the country’s main
social cleavages and their effect on the current party system? How have the country’s
social cleavages influenced the development of the current party system? To what
extent is the dominant party a broad multi-ethnic and/or /multi-class coalition - in
terms of voters, members and leaders? Has the dominant party employed
(un/successful) strategies to co-opt other party and/or social groups? How? Have the
7
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
composition of the broad coalition and the party’s cooptation strategies changed over
time? Is this an explanation for the endurance/decline of one-party dominance?
3.3 Institutional architecture
The electoral system and the institutional arrangements for executive-legislative
relations make up the institutional architecture for a system’s political competition.6
At first glance, these two elements of institutional architecture seem to be of little
influence. One-party dominant systems exist both in countries that run elections
according to a first-past-the-post constituency system and in those that use party list
based proportional representation. Similarly, one party dominance occurs in countries
with presidential and those with parliamentary systems. What might be more
interesting for the purposes of our project is to take a closer look at the combined
effect of the different elements of institutional architecture, particularly on the
position of the opposition parties and, where applicable, on the decline of one-party
dominance.
Opposition parties seem to suffer from fragmentation in one-party dominant systems.
The Senegalese case shows that a united strong opposition party is crucial to defeat
the incumbent party. In July 1998, after the dominance of the Socialist Party for
almost forty years, a new opposition alliance was formed: the Alliance of Forces for
Change (or ‘SOPI’) comprised not only the PDS, but also the African Party for
Democracy and Socialism (PADS) and the Convention for Democrats and Patriots. In
April 2001, this new and strong coalition of opposition parties won the parliamentary
elections with an overwhelming majority.
Table 4
Of the six countries included in our analysis South Africa and Namibia have a system
of proportional representation with closed party lists, while Zambia elects its MPs in
single member constituencies through a plurality of votes. Senegal has a mixed
system in which just over half of its MPs are elected through proportional
representation with closed party lists while the remainder is elected by a plurality of
votes in single member districts. Tanzania follows the same system as Zambia but has
an added element of proportionality through the 102 parliamentary seats which are
reserved for women and allocated to the political parties according to the number of
seats gained in the 232 constituencies. Finally, Mali elects its MPs in multi-member
districts where they need to gain a majority or face a second round run-off. Looking at
the variation in electoral systems amongst our six countries confirms the observation
we have made above: the type of electoral system seems to have little influence on the
pattern of dominance.
The second element of institutional architecture, the institutional arrangements of
executive-legislative relations, also varies amongst the six cases under study. South
Africa is the only country with a parliamentary system in the sense that the President
does not have a separate electoral mandate and the executive depends on the
6 See for studies on the impact of electoral systems on types of party systems Duverger 1951; Lindberg
2005; Pempel 1990: 336-339; Lijphart 1994; Bogaards 2000. See on the impact of parliamentary and
presidential systems Lijphart’s work; Siaroff 2003, Elgie 2006.
8
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
confidence of the legislature to stay in power. Of the other 5 countries with directly
and separately elected Presidents, only Zambia is purely presidential. Tanzania,
Namibia, Senegal and Mali all have a divided executive in the sense that the
constitution creates the position of Prime Minister or Premier who in theory shares
executive power with the President and is subject to the confidence of the legislature.
In practice, most of these prime ministers have little executive power. Senegal seems
to be the exception: it is the only country where the Premier chairs cabinet meetings;
in the other three countries the President is the chair. Thus, Namibia, Tanzania and
Mali can be classified as highly presidentialised semi-presidential systems (see Elgie
2006), whereas Senegal seems to be the only example of semi-presidentialism in
which executive power is to some extent shared between the President and the
Premier.
These variations of the institutional arrangements of parliamentary versus presidential
or semi-presidential systems although interesting seem to have little influence on the
patterns of one-party dominance in our analysis. Regardless of the institutional
arrangements of executive-legislative relations it is the power of the President in
practice that seems to matter for one-party dominance. Powerful presidents (in
combination with certain elements of political culture, see below) are an important
feature of one-party dominance in Africa. Badly managed succession issues seem to
play an important role in our cases of declining dominance. Again, we need to see
whether the in-depth analysis of our country chapters confirms our observations. In
addition, our country chapters will present evidence on a number of other aspects of
the institutional architecture that seem relevant to enduring and declining patterns of
one-party dominance: How has the country’s legal framework for political parties
influenced the development of the current party system? Have there been changes in
the legal framework? If so, are these changes or the lack there of an explanation for
the endurance/decline of one-party dominance? How institutionalized is the dominant
party? How institutionalized are the opposition parties? Is this an explanation for the
endurance/decline of one-party dominance? What is the effect of incumbency and
succession issues on the endurance/decline of one-party dominance?
3.4 Political culture
Neo-patrimonialism and big man politics have characterized the political regimes on
the African continent prior to the democratization wave of the 90’s (Bratton& Van de
Walle 1997) and have a lingering influence on the political culture of many African
countries. Despite the existence of written constitutions and formal institutions,
political leaders dominate the political landscape, where the person often seems more
important than the policy. Relationships of loyalty between so called patrons (political
leaders) and clients (specific groups of followers) create dependency and a focus on
personal wealth and status. This culture of personalized politics and patronage
networks seems not only to limit the state’s capacity to enhance development but also
to place loyalty and unity above tolerance towards opposition and dissenting views.
These cultural patterns seem to manifest themselves in society at large and also in
political parties, thus playing an important role in the emergence and endurance of
one party dominant systems. Hyden (2010) argues for a definition of culture that
focuses on as the way people define their own role and understand each other in the
context of organized groups such as political parties. Understood in this way, political
culture is a not separate from institutions like political parties. Rather institutions like
9
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
dominant political parties are infused with cultural norms that are constantly being
reinvented and redefined. In this way, the cultural patterns described above seem to
reinforce the position of dominant parties through the lived experiences of their
leaders, members and voters.
Hence, political culture consists of widely held shared, fundamental beliefs that have
political consequences. Although a democratic political culture is not easy to define,
its obvious characteristic is that it sets ethical norms and standards of behaviour for
governments, organisations and individuals.
Table 5 here
Above in section 3.1 we have identified historical legacy as a possible explanation for
patterns of one-party dominance. We suggested that it influences the ideology,
identity, image, character and strategy of the dominant party. We would also expect it
to influence political culture, people’s beliefs about democracy. Perhaps people who
have witnessed a transition from single party rule to multi-party elections have more
negative opinions about the previous regime than people who have never lived under
single party rule. Table 5 shows people’s opinions about single party rule in the six
countries included in our analysis. Interestingly, the main distinction is not between
countries with a history of single party rule and those with a different historical
legacy. Instead, there is a clear difference between public opinion on single party rule
in our enduring cases and opinions in our declining cases. In Senegal, Mali and
Zambia the percentage of people who reject single party rule is higher (94%, 76% and
81% respectively) than in Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania (70%, 67% and 63%
respectively). Similarly, the percentage of people who approve of a situation in which
only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office is lower in our
cases of declining one-party dominance: 5%, 16% and 17% compared to the 20%,
23% and 35% in our cases of enduring one-party dominance. Apparently, single party
rule is more acceptable in countries with an enduring pattern of one-party dominance.
But what are people’s opinions about one-party dominance itself?
Table 6 here
In response to the question whether one-party dominant systems can be regarded as
democratic, public opinion in our six selected countries shows a similar pattern. In
Senegal, Mali and Zambia the percentage of people who reject one-party dominance
as undemocratic is higher (24%, 25% and 15% respectively) than in Namibia, South
Africa and Tanzania (7%, 13% and 10% respectively). The percentage of people who
regard a one-party dominant system as democratic is lowest in our cases of declining
one-party dominance: 47% and 48% compared to the 56% and 66% in our cases of
enduring one-party dominance. Apparently, one-party dominance is more acceptable
in countries with an enduring pattern of one-party dominance.
Thus, while political culture clearly relates to patterns of one-party dominance, it is
not clear how this relationship works. Therefore, the country chapters will investigate
this issue in depth and answer the following questions: To what extent is the political
culture - both within the dominant party and in society as a whole - characterized by
an emphasis on leaders rather than policies and an emphasis on unity above tolerance
towards dissenting views? Are there any changes over time – in charismatic
10
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
leadership (or other types of leadership), in attitudes towards dissent, in political
culture more broadly? Is this an explanation for the endurance/decline of one-party
dominance?
3.5 Actual and perceived performance
It is clear that the dominance of the ruling party in democracies with one-party
dominant systems has its origin at the ballot box. Voters continue to vote for the party
in power. Therefore, the question how government performance relates to one-party
dominance is a question about why voters vote. Voting for the dominant party could
be a matter of emotional ties (I want to belong to the majority) or beliefs (I don’t
believe in the value of competitive politics) or a lack of information (I don’t know any
better because my information is incomplete or manipulated). However, Bratton et al
(2005) show that in many African countries voters are rational actors who make
informed choices based on self interest. In other words, voters do evaluate
government performance and act accordingly. Nevertheless, these actions might not
be reflected in the election results.
In South Africa, dissatisfaction with government performance is more likely to lead to
protest and social unrest than to a change in electoral results that could threaten the
dominant ANC, at least not in national elections. Bad government performance might
have more direct electoral consequences at regional or local level, under certain
circumstances. On the national level, voters who are dissatisfied with government
performance prefer to stay away or continue to vote for the ruling party because the
opposition is failing to present itself as a viable alternative for the ANC (Piombo &
Nijzink 2005).
Another possible explanation for continued voter support for the dominant party
might lie not so much in the government’s policy performance but in the current or
future access to state resources it is providing (see next section below). In the rest of
this section, we would like to present and discuss the quantitative material with regard
to people’s perceptions of government performance, while the country-chapters will
focus on actual government performance: how the dominant party in government has
performed, and whether the government’s actual performance is an explanation for
the endurance or decline of one-party dominance.
Table 7 here
Table 7 presents people’s perceptions of their government’s performance in six policy
areas which they have identified as important: managing the economy; improving the
living standards of the poor; creating jobs; keeping prices down; narrowing gaps
between rich and poor; ensuring everyone has enough to eat. Using the combined
scores in these six areas, the table shows that the mean and median of the perceived
performance of the government is lower in our declining cases of one-party
dominance (Mali, Senegal, and Zambia) than in our cases of enduring one-party
dominance (Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania). In other words, people in our
declining cases have a more negative opinion about their government’s performance
than in our enduring cases. Negative public opinion about the government’s
performance seems to be an important factor in the decline of one-party dominance.
11
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
3.6 State-party relationships
Ruling parties have better access to state resources than the opposition and tend to use
this to entrench their dominant position. Thus, at first glance access to state resources
seems to be strongly related to the endurance of one-party dominance. A so-called
‘cycle of dominance’ seems to be taking place: long-term victory allows a dominant
party better access to state resources, thus increasing the opportunity for further
electoral successes.
This advantage is also acute in relation to party funding, both from the state and from
external sources. One-party dominant systems can easily become entrenched because
of external support and party funding. The amount of funding is crucial for a party at
election time. Funding determines the number of campaign staff, the number of
vehicles to reach voters, the amount of advertising on radio and television etcetera.
While some countries have provisions for public funding of parties, a few do not. To
our knowledge, Namibia and South Africa provide state funding for political parties,
while Tanzania, Zambia, Mali and Senegal do not provide public funds for parties.7
The type and scale of funding also varies. In some countries, funding is limited to
election campaign activities, in others it extends to other activities between and
beyond elections. Most public funding is connected to the number of seats in
parliament, thus favouring the dominant parties. New parties are consequently
‘trapped’ and have little chance to play a role in politics: a party without
parliamentary seats is excluded from funding, but the party requires resources in order
to mobilize membership to gain representation. In general, incumbent parties have the
advantage of access to both public and private funding sources.
Incumbent parties also tend to receive more funding from outside the country. There
are indications that donors tend to give more financial support to the incumbent
dominant parties than to new parties. Comparatively speaking, the ANC in South
Africa has been very successful in raising both domestic and external resources for
election campaigns. According to an IDEA-report, the ANC received in 1994 funding
from diverse sources in Sweden (US$20m), Russia (US$24m), Taiwan (R20m) and
from Indonesia (R20m). In South Africa, private and foreign donations to parties are
not subject to any regulation. Amongst the substantial foreign donations which the
ANC received for the 1999 elections were US$10 million each from the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Sachikonye, IDEA report).
In addition, the relationships with the media differ between incumbent and opposition
parties. The ruling parties have an advantage in getting more press coverage (both
news and advertising) than opposition parties. Hence, it is clear that access to state
resources assists dominant parties to stay in power. It is unclear, however, how stateparty relations impact on the decline of one-party dominance. The country-chapters
will pay more attention to this issue and try to find out whether dominant parties in
our declining cases failed to benefit from better access to state resources, including
party funding and access to the media. How does this work? Can state-party relations
explain the patterns of endurance and decline of one-party dominance?
7
Not sure about Zambia and Tanzania.
12
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
3.7 International influences
International influences refer to a vast range of factors that might explain the
endurance and decline of one-party dominance: for example, the actions of different
types of international actors (foreign states, international governmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and other transnational actors), international
structural conditions (such as power asymmetries, global economic conditions, and
proximity to the West), the role of international norms, and the effects of diffusion
and globalization. Simply stating that the international context matters is easy. Much
more difficult is selecting from a long list of potential international factors which
particular variables play a significant role in explaining one-party dominance, and
then determining how they actually influence our patterns of endurance and decline.
One way to approach the international dimension is to begin by establishing different
types of international influences and determining which type(s) is most salient in a
given case, region, or time frame. A typology provided by Whitehead (1996) has
proven useful in helping scholars identify the types of international influences
involved in specific cases.
Whitehead groups international factors into three categories: A) contagion, B) control,
and C) consent. This typology gives us a useful starting point by narrowing the scope
of the international dimension when analyzing one-party dominance in a specific
country case. Contagion is the most parsimonious interpretation of international
effects because it ignores actors, intentions, and causal dynamics. At issue is simply
whether there are "enough clusters and sequences to eliminate the possibility of
random association." Control, the second approach, emphasizes power politics by
exploring the calculation of outside, dominant powers in political processes such as
democratization. Powerful external agents like the United States can intervene or
impose, or they can use more indirect tactics, such as providing economic support in
the event of political liberalization, or in promoting particular types of party systems.
Consent is the most complex of the three. It links external agency with the intentions
and actions of domestic groups and thus develops a more nuanced understanding of
the process of democratization, and in our case the endurance and decline of one-party
dominance. The consent perspective embraces a number of dynamics, including 1)
international structures such as alliance systems, 2) ties between national democratic
actors with transnational groups, and 3) international demonstration effects.
The third type of consent, international demonstration effects or ‘diffusion’, is used in
a variety of ways in the literature, sometimes referring to an outcome – that a number
of countries have one-party dominant systems in a certain geographical area within a
particular period of time – and sometimes to a process – that a one-party dominant
system in a particular country is one of the factors contributing to the endurance of
this type of party system in another country. We propose to define diffusion as a
process of ‘uncoordinated interdependence’ (Elkins & Simmons 2005:38). This
means that ‘the actions and choices of one country affect another, but not through any
collaboration, imposition, or otherwise programmed effect on the part of any of the
actors’ (Elkins & Simmons 2005:38).
13
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
There is convincing evidence that international factors matter for the endurance or
decline of one-party dominance, but the mechanisms are not so clear.8 The countrychapters in this book will describe how international influences affect patterns of oneparty dominance. How have international influences affected the endurance/decline of
one-party dominance? Is there any voluntary international cooperation, or coercion by
donor countries or international financial organizations that has affected the
endurance/decline of one-party dominance? Are there any diffusion effects that
explain the endurance/decline of one-party dominance, i.e. any international
influences that are not the programmed effects on the part of another country or
international actor.
4. Main aim of this book
This book seeks to explain the endurance and decline of one-party dominance in
Africa by using our newly developed theoretical framework which identifies the
seven factors discussed above. Although the authors of the country chapters will have
a certain degree of flexibility, especially if an explanatory factor seems less relevant
in their specific country case, each country chapter will discuss the available evidence
for each of the seven identified factors. Thus, after a further conceptual discussion of
one-party dominance by Erdman & Basedau, the remainder of the book will focus on
case studies of durable and declining one-party dominant party systems. Each case
study expert will answer the following questions in his chapter:
1) What are the patterns of one-party dominance over time? Has the system been
stable or has it been in decline?
2) What are the mechanisms behind the pattern of dominance? Which factors are most
salient to describe and explain the pattern?
In the final part of the book, we will make systematic and thorough comparisons
between the cases in order to discover whether overall generalizations can be made
about the patterns of one-party dominance in African democracies. It will become
clear that there is an interesting variation of patterns over time. In the conclusion, we
will also briefly address the issue of possible consequences of one-party dominant
systems. We would like to emphasize, however, that the consequences are not the
main topic of our current book project, which already offers sufficient interesting
material for an edited volume.
For now, the initial comparative analysis presented above, allows us to draw the
following preliminary conclusions:
1) The predominant legacy in our declining cases differs from the predominant
legacy in the enduring cases (with Tanzania being the exception). First generation
political parties with roots in nationalist and liberation movements seem to be
more stable in their position as dominant party under multi-party politics; while
the dominant parties with a history as pro-democracy movements seem to be more
vulnerable.
8
See Elkins & Simmons, ‘On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework’, The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 598, No. 1, (2005), pp. 33-51.
14
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
2) While our countries are all heterogeneous, we expect the parties in our enduring
cases to be more successful in transcending cleavages, attracting broad support,
co-opting various groups than the parties in our declining cases.
3) The institutional arrangements of the electoral system and executive-legislative
relations seem to have little influence on the patterns of one-party dominance in
our analysis. A number of other aspects of the institutional architecture such as the
legal framework for political parties and incumbency and succession issues seem
to be more relevant to enduring and declining patterns of one-party dominance.
4) There is a clear difference between public opinion about single party rule and the
acceptability of one-party dominance in our enduring cases and opinions in our
declining cases. The proportion of people rejecting single party rule is higher in
our declining cases, while the proportion of people accepting one-party
dominance as democratic is higher in countries with an enduring pattern of oneparty dominance. Thus, people’s beliefs seem to be related to the patterns of oneparty dominance.
5) People in our declining cases have a more negative opinion about their
government’s performance than in our enduring cases. Negative public opinion
about the government’s performance seems to be an important factor in the
decline of one-party dominance.
6) It is clear that access to state resources assists dominant parties to stay in power. It
is unclear, however, how state-party relations impact on the decline of one-party
dominance.
7) There is convincing evidence that various international factors matter for the
endurance or decline of one-party dominance, but we need to know more about
how these factors affect patterns of one-party dominance.
These preliminary conclusions will be further tested by systematically comparing the
additional evidence and findings of the country chapters. In this way, we believe our
edited volume will contribute to the existing knowledge on one-party dominance in a
number of ways.
The first contribution it provides a clear overview of different theoretical approaches,
and a general framework with comparable factors. This enables us to compare cases,
and to judge the specific merits of different explanatory factors. In our book, the
major theoretical factors that have been developed serve as an important heuristic tool
for inquiry. Each chapter contains a detailed description and review of the main
factors, and determines which factors are most important in the specific country case.
In this way, existing theoretical ideas can be tested and refined, and the book will
contribute to the development of new theory in this field.
The second contribution is an empirical one, in that the book presents a systematic
empirical analysis of one-party dominance in African democracies. Each chapter
describes the country case and the crucial factors, thus presenting new empirical
findings. Although the book is case-oriented, it is important to mention that we also
search for generalizations, while underlining some of the unique characteristics of
specific cases. The theoretical framework and empirical results in this book identify
the specific dynamics that arise from the particular context and time in which oneparty dominance occurred in Africa.
15
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
The final contribution is methodological, as the country chapters in this book follow
the methodology of what is known as ‘process tracing’ (cf. George and Bennett
2005). We are interested in patterns of one-party dominance in Africa and seek to
know more about the mechanisms and processes behind the various trajectories of one
party dominant systems on the continent. The general method of process tracing is to
generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms or processes that link the
independent to the dependent variables. Tracing processes helps us to narrow the list
of potential causes and offers the possibility of mapping one or more potential causal
paths that are consistent with the outcome and the evidence in a single case. With
more cases, we will be able to map the repertoire of causal paths that lead to a given
outcome and the conditions under which they prevail (George and Bennett 2005).
This method allows us to answer our research questions in a systematic and
comparative way. We will be able to detect and describe patterns of one-party
dominance in Africa, and find out which mechanisms play a role, to what extent and
under which conditions.
We hope the book will speak to different audiences, and will be attractive to students
and scholars working in a variety of fields, such as comparative politics and
government, African politics, political parties and party systems, or democracy and
democratization. Given the elaborate overview of theoretical approaches, the book has
a clear relevance for scholars and students working in the field of political parties and
party systems. Furthermore, as the book combines different theoretical factors in
order to understand the trajectories of one-party dominant systems, and develops an
encompassing and coherent framework for comparative analysis, it is of considerable
interest to scholars and students in comparative politics. The book addresses
important questions in comparative politics, and constitutes the first analysis of the
trajectories of one-party dominance in African democracies. It is unique in
transcending the traditional case study bias in contemporary comparative analysis of
this topic. In our book, a description of theoretical approaches and country specific
information are interwoven to gain understanding of one-party dominance in Africa.
Selection of relevant literature:
-
-
-
-
Barkan, J.D. ed. (2009) Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies,
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Bogaards, M. (2004) ‘Counting Parties and Identifying (Dominant) Party Systems
in Africa’, European Journal of Political Research 43: 173-197.
Bogaards M. and Boucek F. eds. (2010) Dominant Political Parties and
Democracy, Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science.
Bratton, M. and Van der Walle, N. (1997) Democratic experiments in Africa:
regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Doorenspleet, R. (2003) ‘Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in SubSaharan Africa’, in: Salih, M. (ed.) African Political Parties: Evolution,
Institutionalisation and Governance, London: Pinto.
Erdmann, G. and Basedau, M. (2008) ‘Party systems in Africa: Problems of
Categorising and Explaining Party Systems’, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 241-258.
George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
16
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
-
-
-
Giliomee, H. (1998) ‘South Africa's Emerging Dominant-Party Regime’, Journal
of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 128-142.
Giliomee, H. and Simkins (1999) The Awkward Embrace, London: Routledge.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004) Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress,
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Lindberg,
S.L.
(2006)
Democracy
and
Elections
in
Africa,
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Pempel, T.J. (1990) Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rakner, L. and Van de Walle, N. (2009) ‘Opposition Weakness in Africa’ Journal
of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 108-121.
Rakner, L. and Svåsand, L. (2004) ‘From Dominant to Competitive Party System:
The Zambian Experiences 1991-2001’, Party Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 49-68.
Rimanelli et al (1999) Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in
Single-Party-Dominant Countries, St Martin’s Press.
Salih, M. ed. (2003) African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and
Governance, London: Pinto.
Salih, M. (2007) ‘African Liberation Movement Governments and Democracy’
Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 669–85.
Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Schlemmer, L. (2006) ‘Deformations of Political Culture by One-Party
Dominance’ In: Challenges to Democracy by One-Party Dominance: A
Comparative Assessment, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 117-122.
Svåsand, L. and Randall, V. (2002) ‘Party Institutionalization and the New
Democracies’, Party Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 5-29.
Svåsand, L. and Randall, V. (2002) ‘Political Parties and Democratic
Consolidation in Africa’, Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 30-52.
Villalon L.A. and Von Doepp, P. (2005) The Fate of Africa's Democratic
Experiments: Elites and Institutions, Indiana University Press.
Walle, N. van de (2003) ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging
Party Systems’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 297-321.
Walle, N. van de, and Buttler, K.S. (1999) ‘Political Parties and Party Systems in
Africa’s Illiberal Democracies’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.
8, Nr. 1, pp.14-28.
Widner, J.A. (1997) ‘Political Parties and Civil Societies in Sub-Saharan Africa’,
In Ottaway, M. ed. Democracy in Africa. The Hard Road Ahead, Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, pp. 65-82.
17
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
Table 1: Freedom House Status 2010 (with political rights and civil liberties scores)
Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Cape Verde 1,1
Ghana - 1,2
Mauritius - 1,2
Benin - 2,2
Namibia - 2,2
S. Tome & P. - 2,2
South Africa - 2,2
Mali – 2,3
Botswana – 3,2
Lesotho - 3,3
Senegal - 3,3
Seychelles - 3,3
Sierra Leone - 3,3
Comoros - 3,4
Liberia - 3,4
Malawi - 3,4
Zambia - 3,4
Mozambique - 4,3
Tanzania - 4,3
Guinea-Bissau - 4,4
Kenya - 4,4
Burundi - 4,5
Burkina Faso - 5,3
Niger - 5,4
Nigeria - 5,4
Togo - 5,4
Uganda - 5,4
CAR - 5,5
Djibouti - 5,5
Ethiopia - 5,5
Gambia - 5,5
Madagascar - 6,4
Angola - 6,5
Congo, Br. - 6,5
Cote d'Ivoire - 6,5
Gabon - 6,5
Mauritania - 6,5
Rwanda - 6,5
Cameroon - 6,6
DRC – 6,6
Zimbabwe - 6,6
Swaziland - 7,5
Guinea - 7,6
Chad - 7,6
Equa. Guinea - 7,7
Eritrea - 7,7
Somalia -7,7
Sudan – 7,7
Source: Freedom in the World website, see www.freedomhouse.org
18
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
Table 2: Results of Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in 6 selected countries
since transition to democracy
Country
Year
Winning
Party
Namibia
1989
1994
Tanzania
South Africa
Senegal
Zambia
Mali
Vote share
winner
presidential
elections
Seat share
winner
parliamentary
elections
Seat share
runner-up
parliamentary
elections
SWAPO
-
56.9
29.2
SWAPO
76.3
73.6
20.8
1999
SWAPO
76.8
76.4
9.7
2004
SWAPO
76.4
76.4
6.9
2009
SWAPO
76.4
75.0
11.1
1995
CCM
61.8
79.6
10.4
2000
CCM
71.7
87.5
7.5
2005
CCM
80.3
85.1
9.6
2010
CCM
62.8
75.2
12.8
1994
ANC
-
63.0
20.5
1999
ANC
-
66.5
9.5
2004
ANC
-
69.8
12.5
2009
ANC
-
66.0
16.8
1978
PS
82.0
83.0
17.0
1983
PS
83.5
92.5
6.7
1988
PS
73.2
85.8
14.2
1993
PS
58.4
70.0
22.5
1998
PS
-
66.4
16.4
2000/1
SOPI
31.0*
74.2
9.2
2007
SOPI
55.9
87.3
2.0
1991
MMD
75.8
83.3
16.7
1996
MMD
72.6
87.3
3.3
2001
MMD
29.2
46.0
32.7
2006
MMD
43.0
48.0
29.3
2008
MMD
40.6
-
-
1992
ADEMA
44.9*
65.5
7.8
1997
ADEMA
95.9
87.1
5.4
2002
Espoir 2002
28.7*
44.9
34.7
2007
ADP
71.2
76.9
20.2
* Vote share winner second round: Senegal 2000/1 presidential elections 58.5%; Mali
1992 presidential elections 69%; Mali 2002 presidential elections 64.4%
Sources: African elections website, EISA Election Archive, Wikipedia for Tanzania
2010
19
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
Figure 1: Freedom House scores (average of scores for political rights and civil
liberties) in 6 selected countries since transition to democracy
Table 3 Various indices for ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation in 6 selected
countries
ethnic
fractionalization
country
Ethno-
Ethnic
Ethnic
Ethno-
linguistic
fractionali-
fractionali-
(combined
2-cat ethnic
linguistic
fractiona-
zation in
zation in
religious
linguistic and
fractionali-
fractionali-
lization
Africa
Africa
fractionali-
racial)
zation
zation
(Fearon
(Posner)
2003)
column 6)
al. 1989)
2002)
(Alesina 2002) (Alesina 2002)
(Roeder 2001, (Morrison et zation (alesina
Mali
.6906
Heterogeneous
.78
.75
.84
.72
.1820
Namibia
.6329
Heterogeneous
.68
.72
.69
.83
.6626
South Africa
.7517
Heterogeneous
.88
.88
.88
.
.8603
Senegal
.6939
Heterogeneous
.72
.73
.75
.71
.1497
Tanzania
.7353
Heterogeneous
.93
.95
.91
.87
.6334
Zambia
.7808
Heterogeneous
.82
.73
.82
.74
.7359
20
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
Table 4 Electoral systems for parliamentary elections in 6 selected countries
Country
Type of
system
Namibia
Proportional
Closed list
72
1
72
South Africa
Proportional
with 2 tiers
Closed list
400
200
200
9
1
4-46
200
Plurality/
proportional
Single/
closed list
120
55
65
1
30
55
1-5
Tanzania
Plurality (with
proportional
element)
Single
232
232
(+ 102 seats for
women)
1
Zambia
Plurality
Single
150
150
1
Mali
Majority/ 2nd
round run off
Multiple
147
55
1-7
Senegal
Type of ballot
Seats
Nr. of districts
Magnitude
Table 5 Public opinion on single party rule in 6 selected countries (in %)
Enduring One Party Dominance
Namibia
Disapprove
Neutral
Approve
South Africa
70
7
23
67
12
20
Declining One Party Domnance
Tanzania
Senegal
63
2
35
Mali
94
1
5
Zambia
76
8
16
Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or
approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for
election and hold office?
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4, 2008
21
81
2
17
Patterns of One-Party Dominance in African Democracies
Table 6 Public opinion on one-party dominance in 6 selected countries (in %)
Enduring One Party Dominance
Namibia
Not a
democracy
Democracy
with major
problems
Democracy
South Africa
Declining One Party Dominance
Tanzania
Senegal
Mali
Zambia
7
13
10
24
25
15
37
31
24
29
28
37
56
56
66
47
47
48
Question: Beatrice lives in a country with regular elections. It has one large political
party and many small ones. People are free to express their opinions and to vote as
they please. But so far, elections have not led to a change of ruling party. In your
opinion, how much of a democracy is Beatrice’s country?
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4, 2008
Table 7 People’s perceptions on government performance in 6 selected countries
Mean
Median
Stand dev
Mali
Senegal
Zambia
Namibia
9.4
9.0
3.2
7.5
7.0
2.9
7.6
6.0
3.1
10.9
11.0
3.6
South
Africa
10.7
10.0
3.7
Tanzania
10.2
10.0
3.3
Question: ‘Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or
badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or
haven’t you heard enough to say: Managing the economy?’ (Q57a), ‘Improving the
living standards of the poor’ (Q57b), ‘Creating jobs?’ (Q57c), ‘Keeping prices
down?’ (Q57d), ‘Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?’ (Q57e), ‘Ensuring
everyone has enough to eat?’ (Q57j). Table 7 presents the combined scores for these
six questions.
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4, 2008
22