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Journal of Memory and Language 65 (2011) 98–108
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Memory and Language
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jml
Re-examining dissociations between remembering and knowing: Binary
judgments vs. independent ratings
Aaron A. Brown, Glen E. Bodner ⇑
Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Canada AB T2N 1N4
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 17 December 2010
revision received 5 April 2011
Available online 4 May 2011
Keywords:
Remember/know judgments
Independent ratings
Recollection
Familiarity
Recognition memory
Dissociations
a b s t r a c t
When participants must classify their recognition experiences as remembering or knowing,
variables often have dissociative effects on the two judgments. In contrast, when participants independently rate recollection and familiarity only parallel effects have been
reported. To investigate this discrepancy we compared the effects of masked priming at
test (Experiment 1), and levels-of-processing (LOP) at study (Experiment 2), on recollection
and familiarity using both binary judgment and independent-rating methods. With binary
judgments, repetition priming selectively increased familiarity, and deeper LOP increased
recollection but decreased familiarity. Independent ratings were positively correlated,
and priming and LOP both increased recollection and familiarity. This pattern occurred
even when each rating was made by a separate group to prevent rating cross-contamination. Thus, how recognition experiences are measured can influence whether dissociations
between recollection and familiarity are found. Our findings have implications for the measurement of recognition experiences and for current accounts of recognition memory.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
An ongoing debate in memory research concerns the
mechanism or mechanisms involved in recognition memory. A number of theorists have conceptualized recognition
as the result of two independent processes, namely recollection and familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002). Mandler (1980) proposed
that recognition can arise from explicit recollection of details about the past encounter, or could occur in the absence of any recollection through a familiarity process.
Explicit memory tests were purported to measure recollection, and implicit memory tests were purported to measure familiarity. Jacoby (1991) criticized the assumption
that specific tasks selectively measure single memory processes. His process-dissociation procedure attempted to allow the independent contributions of recollection and
⇑ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 403 282 8249.
E-mail address: [email protected] (G.E. Bodner).
0749-596X/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jml.2011.04.003
familiarity to be separated across different instructional
conditions within a single task.
Importantly, Mandler’s (1980) account focused not only
the processes underlying recognition memory, but also on
the subjective states of awareness that arise during recognition. Tulving (1985) developed the remember/know task
to help ascertain the separate versus shared origins of subjective recognition experiences. In this task, participants
subdivided each ‘‘yes’’ recognition judgment into either a
remember judgment (i.e., recognition with episodic recollection) or a know judgment (i.e., recognition without episodic recollection). Participants could reliably distinguish
between these two recognition experiences, leading Tulving to suggest that they might reflect the operation of distinct underlying memory systems or processes.
The remember/know procedure has since been heavily
used to investigate the basis of recognition experiences
and how they are influenced by different variables. Of relevance for our study, Gardiner (1988) found that a deep
levels-of-processing (LOP) manipulation at study (producing an association for each word) increased the proportion
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A.A. Brown, G.E. Bodner / Journal of Memory and Language 65 (2011) 98–108
of remember judgments relative to a shallow LOP task
(producing a rhyme for each word), but that LOP had no
influence on the proportion of know judgments – a remember/know dissociation. Gardiner’s finding suggested that
remember judgments may be tied to a recollection process.
Other variables associated with recollection have since
been found to selectively increase remember judgments
(see Gardiner & Java, 1993; Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn,
2000).
Conversely, other manipulations have been found to
selectively affect know judgments. Of relevance for our
study, Rajaram (1993) found that masked repetition priming of words during the recognition test increased know
judgments but had no influence on remember judgments
(see also Kinoshita, 1997). Rajaram suggested that know
judgments are tied to a perceptually based familiarity process (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Rajaram and Geraci
(2000) later found that semantic priming also selectively
increased know judgments, suggesting that fluency in general (whether perceptually or conceptually based) increases knowing.
These and other remember/know dissociations have
been used to claim that the two states of awareness tap
different underlying memory systems and/or processes.
Gardiner and Java (1993) noted that remember judgments
might reflect an episodic memory system or process,
whereas know judgments might reflect an implicit memory system or process. Rajaram and colleagues (Rajaram,
1996, 1998; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) suggested that distinctive processing increases remembering whereas fluent
processing increases knowing. Yonelinas and Jacoby (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995) posited a
dual-process account in which remember judgments provide a pure measure of a threshold recollection process
(i.e., recollection either occurs or does not occur), whereas
know judgments index an automatic strength-based (i.e.,
continuous) familiarity process. Others have conceptualized recollection and familiarity as arising from separate
processes that are subsequently combined into a single index of memory strength (e.g., Dunn, 2008; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004; Starns & Ratcliff, 2008; Wixted, 2007;
Wixted & Stretch, 2004). These dual-process signal-detection accounts view recollection as a graded process rather
than a threshold process. Confidence judgments and
source judgments about recollection are consistent with
this claim (e.g. Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009; Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005).
The need to posit that two distinct recognition processes underlie remember/know judgments has been
assiduously challenged. Donaldson (1996) was among the
first to propose that a single signal-detection process can
account for remember/know dissociations. On this account, the dissociations simply reflect different placements
of two recognition criteria along a memory strength continuum (e.g. Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004, 2008; Hirshman & Master, 1997). A recognition criterion separates
‘‘old’’ responses from ‘‘new’’ responses, and a stricter criterion separates ‘‘old’’ responses into ‘‘remember’’ and
‘‘know’’. Items that fall above the remember/know criterion are deemed remembered and those that fall below
the remember/know criterion but above the old/new crite-
99
rion are deemed known. Different placements of these
decision criteria can mimic remember/know dissociations.
However, these accounts have been criticized for only
mimicking the observed patterns without providing explanations for why the decision criteria are placed in particular ways as a function of particular manipulations to
produce particular dissociations. Moreover, these accounts
do not explain why remember/know judgments are subjectively experienced as being qualitatively different if
they are only quantitatively different (e.g., Gardiner &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).
The validity of remember/know judgments for measuring recollection and familiarity processes is clearly an
important question for recognition theorists. In this connection, the structure of the remember/know procedure
has also been scrutinized. Instructional and context manipulations have been found to influence whether participants
classify their recognition as remembering or knowing
(Bodner & Lindsay, 2003; Geraci, McCabe, & Guillory,
2009; Hirshman & Henzler, 1998). For example, reports
of remembering can be amplified by labeling remember/
know experiences as Type A/Type B memory (McCabe &
Geraci, 2009). Furthermore, using a two-step recognition
test (i.e., old/new, then remember/know) produces fewer
remember judgments than a single-step test (i.e., remember/know/neither; e.g., Bruno & Rutherford, 2010; Hicks
& Marsh, 1999; Rotello & Macmillan, 2006).
Of particular relevance to the present study is claim
that remember/know judgments may produce artifactual
dissociations due to the mutually exclusive nature of the
two response options (Higham & Vokey, 2004; Kurilla &
Westerman, 2008; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In the standard remember/know task, participants can report having
recollection or familiarity but they cannot report having
both experiences for a given item. Thus, if a deep (vs. shallow) LOP task increases the proportion of remember judgments, for example, it has less room to also increase the
proportion of know judgments. Similarly, if repetition
priming at test increases knowing, then there are correspondingly fewer items remaining to be classified as
remembered.
The use of binary remember/know judgments is valid
only if these two states of awareness never co-occur. This
creates a problem for interpreting remember/know judgment findings within dual-process accounts that assume
independence between recollection and familiarity. To correct for the effects of mutual exclusivity, Yonelinas and
Jacoby (1995) used an independence remember/know (IRK)
correction to estimate familiarity (F) based on the proportion of non-remembered (R) items that received know
(K) judgments, i.e., F = K/(1 R). They found that LOP
had parallel effects on remember judgments and on
the IRK estimate of familiarity (see also, Gardiner, Java, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002).
Higham and Vokey (2004) went a step further, suggesting that binary remember/know judgments produce spurious dissociations. As an alternative, they created an
independent-ratings task in which participants rated their
recognition experience for each item on two separate
scales: one measuring recollection and one measuring
familiarity. Their instructions emphasized that a given
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recognition experience might consist of recollection, familiarity, both, or neither. Participants were encouraged to
independently assess and rate their recognition experiences using the two scales. A key advantage of this method
over binary judgments is that although it was designed to
encourage independent assessment of both experiences,
interpretation of the ratings does not require an assumption that the relationship between recollection and familiarity is one of independence, unlike with Jacoby’s (1991)
process-dissociation procedure.
To date, the independent-ratings task has been used
only to examine the effects of masked priming manipulations on recollection and familiarity. Higham and Vokey
(2004) manipulated the duration (long vs. short) of a repetition prime that preceded each target at test, and Kurilla
and Westerman (2008) compared repetition versus unrelated primes at test (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Both
studies found that primes increased both recollection and
familiarity ratings, in contrast to the selective effect on
knowing often found with binary judgments.
Both pairs of researchers took their findings as evidence
that remember/know dissociations may be artifacts of
using dichotomous judgments. The parallel influences of
priming obtained with independent ratings were taken as
evidence that recollection and familiarity experiences have
a common attributional basis (e.g., Bodner & Lindsay,
2003; Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997; McCabe & Balota,
2007; Whittlesea, 1997, 2002). According to this view, participants make attributions about their recognition experiences based on the information available to them and the
task situation at hand, not based directly on information
arising from underlying processes. By this view, recollection and familiarity experiences are merely different attributions arising from the same inferential process, and both
attributions were affected by the prime-modulated fluency
of target processing.
Given that remember/know dissociations often contribute to the development of accounts of recognition memory,
it is important to determine whether they are artifacts of
using binary judgments. Conversely, it is equally important
to determine whether the absence of dissociations reported to date using independent ratings is genuine. For
example, the different outcomes using the two methods
could be due simply to the fact that different labels were
used (cf. McCabe & Geraci, 2009): ‘‘remember’’ and ‘‘know’’
with binary judgments, and ‘‘recollection’’ and ‘‘familiarity’’ with independent ratings. To eliminate this confound,
recollection and familiarity labels were used in conjunction with both types of test in our experiments.
Alternatively, the parallel effects of priming on recollection and familiarity ratings may have been artifactual. The
rating given for an item’s familiarity could have biased the
rating of its recollection, and/or vice versa. For example,
participants might have thought it odd to give an item a
high recollection rating but a low familiarity rating, even
though the task instructions point out that this is possible
and valid. That dissociations between the two ratings have
not been reported to date is consistent with this rating
cross-contamination hypothesis. Our study evaluated this
possibility by comparing the pattern of results obtained
when participants made both ratings for each item on the
test to the pattern obtained when participants made only
recollection or familiarity ratings for all items on the test.
We examined two variables that typically produce a
remember/know dissociation: Masked priming at test
(Experiment 1), and LOP at study (Experiment 2). Participants in the R + F judgments group made binary recollection/familiarity judgments for each item. Participants in
the R + F ratings group independently rated their recollection and familiarity for each item (as per Higham & Vokey,
2004; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008). Participants in the R ratings group rated only recollection, and participants in the F
ratings group rated only familiarity, to eliminated the possibility of rating cross-contamination and response bias.
Experiment 1: Masked priming at test
Experiment 1 re-examined two conflicting findings:
Masked priming at test often selectively increases familiarity when binary judgments are used (for a review, see
Yonelinas, 2002), but increases both familiarity and recollection when independent ratings are used (Higham &
Vokey, 2004; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008). Both methods
were tested to evaluate whether binary judgments produce dissociations because the test requires mutually
exclusive responses, or whether independent ratings produce parallel effects because of rating cross-contamination. To evaluate the latter possibility, between-group
conditions were tested in which participants rated either
recollection or familiarity, but not both.
Method
Participants
Undergraduates at the University of Calgary participated for course credit and were randomly assigned to
group. The R + F judgments group, R ratings group, and F
ratings group each had 32 participants. The R + F ratings
group had 24 participants. Four participants were replaced
for failure to follow the test instructions.
Materials and design
The stimuli were 168 words, 5–7 characters in length,
with frequencies of 20–70 occurrences per million
(M = 31; Kucera & Francis, 1967). Of the 160 critical words,
80 were studied and 80 were new, with assignment counterbalanced across participants. The eight remaining words
were randomly assigned as primacy or recency buffers
(four of each) on the study-list. The masked priming manipulation involved pairing half of the studied words and half
of the new words with a repetition prime, and pairing the
other half with a unique unrelated prime of the same length
and frequency range that shared no more than two letters
with the target and never in the same position. Assignment
to prime condition was counterbalanced across participants. Priming and prior study were repeated-measures
factors and test was a between-group factor.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually using a Mac computer. All stimuli were presented in black courier 12-point
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font on a white background on the computer monitor. Participants were told to study a list of words for an upcoming
memory test. Specific encoding instructions were not provided. The 88-word study-list was then shown at a rate of
1 s per word with a .5 s blank screen between words.
Words were presented in uppercase.
The test instructions were presented immediately after
the study phase. The difference between recollection and
familiarity memory experiences was described. Participants had to successfully explain this distinction to the
experimenter in their own words before the test began.
The R + F judgments group received typical remember/
know type instructions, which asked them to classify their
recognition of each word as either recollection, familiarity,
or not (i.e., ‘‘not recollection or familiarity’’). Higham and
Vokey’s (2004) instructions were used in the independent-rating groups, to explain recollection and familiarity
and their independent nature (see Appendix B). Their rating scale was also used (1 = definitely no, 2 = probably no,
3 = probably yes, 4 = definitely yes) and it appeared on the
monitor during the test. The R + F ratings group rated both
recollection and familiarity for each item, and rating order
was counterbalanced across participants. The R ratings
group only rated recollection, and the F ratings group only
rated familiarity. These last three groups differed only in
whether they rated both types of experience, or one type
of experience, at test.
The presentation of the test trials was synchronized
with the raster scan of the computer to ensure precise timing. Each test trial consisted of a 495-ms mask (a row of
uppercase Xs matched for length with the target word),
immediately followed by a 45-ms lowercase prime, immediately followed by the uppercase target. The target remained on the screen until the participant verbally
responded. The experimenter keyed participants’ responses into the computer. The test phase began with a
random ordering of the eight buffer items from the study
phase, which were not analyzed. The 160-word test-list
was then presented one word at a time in a random order
with a brief break every 40 trials. After the test, participants were asked to provide an example of a recollected
item and to explain why it was considered/rated as being
recollected. They were also asked what they saw on the
monitor after the row of Xs and before the target was
shown to provide a subjective measure of their awareness
of the masked primes.
Results
On the subjective prime-awareness question only four
of the 120 participants (3.3%) reported noticing anything
between the mask and target. Therefore all participants’
data were retained for analysis. An alpha level of .05 was
used in all analyses. For brevity the main effects of prior
study are not reported; studied words always received significantly more recognition judgments or higher ratings
than new words.
Binary judgments
Separate repeated-measures ANOVAs with priming
(repetition vs. unrelated) and prior study (studied vs.
new) as the factors were conducted on recollection and
familiarity judgments in the R + F judgments group (see
Table 1 for means). The two judgments were analyzed separately because they were not independent: A participant
could not classify their recognition experience for a given
item as both recollected and familiar.
Recollection judgments were equally likely following
repetition or unrelated primes (.20 vs. .20), F < 1. The interaction of priming and prior study on recollection judgments was also not significant, F(1, 31) = 1.52, MSE = .003,
p = .22, g2 = .05. By contrast, familiarity judgments were
more likely after repetition primes than unrelated primes
(.29 vs. .25), F(1, 31) = 13.17, MSE = .003, g2 = .29. This
priming effect on familiarity did not interact with prior
study, F(1, 31) = 1.11, MSE = .005, p = .30, g2 = .03. Analysis
of the IRK estimate of familiarity (computed using familiar
judgments rather than know judgments) revealed the
same pattern: greater familiarity after repetition (vs. unrelated) primes (.40 vs. .35), F(1, 31) = 10.76, MSE = .01,
g2 = .26, and no interaction with prior study, F < 1. Thus,
repetition priming increased familiarity but not recollection with binary judgments, replicating the dissociation reported by Rajaram (1993) and Kurilla and Westerman
(2008).
Independent ratings
R+F ratings group. Rating (recollection vs. familiarity) was
included as a factor here because participants independently rated their recollection and familiarity for each test
word. Priming (repetition vs. unrelated) and prior study
(studied vs. new) were also repeated-measures factors
(see Table 2 for means). There were no effects of rating order in preliminary analyses, so rating order was not included as a factor in the reported analyses.
There was a main effect of priming: repetition primes
produced higher overall ratings than unrelated primes
(2.35 vs. 2.26), F(1, 23) = 13.17, MSE = .03, g2 = .36. There
was also a main effect of rating: familiarity ratings were
generally higher than recollection ratings (2.48 vs. 2.12),
F(1, 23) = 53.17, MSE = .11, g2 = .70; this was particularly
true for new words, resulting in an interaction with prior
study, F(1, 23) = 6.77, MSE = .03, g2 = .23. As in Higham
and Vokey (2004) and Kurilla and Westerman (2008),
Table 1
Binary judgments from Experiment 1: Mean proportion of recollection and
familiarity judgments, and IRK estimates of familiarity.
Repetition
prime
Unrelated
prime
Priming
effect
Recollection judgments
Studied words
.37 (.03)
New words
.03 (.01)
.38 (.04)
.02 (.004)
.01
.01
Familiarity judgments
Studied words
.35 (.02)
New words
.22 (.03)
.33 (.03)
.17 (.02)
.02
.05
IRK estimates of familiarity
Studied words
.57 (.03)
New words
.23 (.03)
.53 (.03)
.18 (.02)
.04
.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2
Independent ratings in Experiment 1: Mean recollection and familiarity
ratings.
Repetition
prime
Unrelated
prime
Priming
effect
R + F ratings group
Recollection ratings
Studied words
New words
2.79 (.11)
1.55 (.09)
2.63 (.11)
1.53 (.08)
.16
.02
Familiarity ratings
Studied words
New words
3.07 (.11)
1.98 (.10)
2.93 (.10)
1.94 (.09)
.14
.04
R ratings group/Recoll. ratings
Studied words
New words
2.98 (.06)
1.71 (.07)
2.93 (.06)
1.60 (.06)
.05
.11
F ratings group/Fam. ratings
Studied words
New words
2.94 (.07)
1.89 (.06)
2.81 (.08)
1.72 (.06)
.13
.17
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
for both studied words (2.96 vs. 2.87), F(1, 62) = 9.10,
MSE = .02, g2 = .12 and new words (1.80 vs. 1.66),
F(1, 62) = 51.53, MSE = .01, g2 = .45. The selective priming
for studied words in the R + F ratings group appears to be
an unusual result, and hence should be interpreted with
caution. There was no main effect of rating, F < 1. Prior
study marginally interacted with rating, F(1, 62) = 3.39,
MSE = .02, p = .07, g2 = .05: the pattern of higher ratings
for studied (vs. new) words was more pronounced for recollection than familiarity. The three-way interaction was
not significant, F < 1. Priming interacted with rating,
F(1, 62) = 3.98, MSE = .02, g2 = .06, reflecting a larger priming effect on familiarity (2.41 vs. 2.27), F(1, 31) = 39.29,
MSE = .02, g2 = .60, than on recollection (2.34 vs. 2.26),
F(1, 31) = 9.44, MSE = .02, g2 = .23. In summary, masked
priming influenced both recollection and familiarity ratings, even when separate groups made the two ratings to
prevent cross-contamination.1
Discussion
priming did not interact with rating, F < 1, and priming was
significant for both recollection ratings (2.17 vs. 2.08),
F(1, 23) = 10.49 MSE = .02, g2 = .31, and familiarity ratings
(2.52 vs. 2.44), F(1, 23) = 10.58, MSE = .03, g2 = .32. The
interaction between priming and prior study approached
significance, F(1, 23) = 3.61, MSE = .05, p = .07, g2 = .14.
Averaged across recollection and familiarity, the priming
effect was significant for studied words (2.93 vs. 2.78),
F(1, 23) = 10.04, MSE = .03, g2 = .30, but not for new words
(1.77 vs.1.74), F < 1. This pattern is unusual given that
priming typically affects ratings of new words as much
as, or more than, studied words (e.g., Higham & Vokey,
2004; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008). The three-way interaction was not significant, F < 1.
The parallel increase in recollection and familiarity ratings following repetition primes could indicate that participants did not consider and rate each recognition
experience independently. Consistent with this rating
cross-contamination possibility, participants’ mean recollection and familiarity ratings were highly correlated,
r(22) = .83. The correlations at the trial level within participants ranged from .52 to .95 (M = .77) and were significant
for all 24 participants. On the other hand, these correlations would also be expected if the same underlying process drives both ratings.
R ratings group vs. F ratings group. If recollection ratings
somehow biased familiarity ratings and/or vice versa (despite the absence of rating order effects), then priming
might produce a dissociation when different groups make
each rating. Analysis of the R ratings and F ratings groups
tested this possibility. A mixed-factor ANOVA was conducted with priming and prior study as repeated-measures
factors, and rating (recollection vs. familiarity) as a between-group factor. Repetition primes resulted in higher
overall ratings than unrelated primes (2.38 vs. 2.27),
F(1, 62) = 42.37, MSE = .02, g2 = .41. Priming did not interact with prior study, F(1, 62) = 2.05, MSE = .02, p = .15,
g2 = .03. Consistent with Higham and Vokey (2004) and
Kurilla and Westerman (2008), priming was significant
Masked priming selectively increased familiarity when
binary judgments were made (R + F judgments group),
but it increased both recollection and familiarity when
independent ratings were made (R + F ratings group). A
strong positive correlation between recollection and familiarity ratings was shown for the first time to be present in
the ratings group. The different pattern of results across
the two testing methods allows two interpretations: (1)
the dissociation in the R + F judgments group was an artifact of using mutually exclusive judgments, or (2) the parallel effect in the R + F ratings group was an artifact of the
two ratings not being made independently. The betweengroup conditions (R ratings vs. F ratings) support the first
interpretation: Priming affected both recollection and
familiarity even when different groups made each rating.
The independent rating results – including the strong positive correlation between ratings in the R + F ratings group –
therefore challenge the claim that priming increases familiarity while leaving recollection unaffected. Instead, it appears that priming increases both experiences, as argued
by Higham and Vokey (2004) and Kurilla and Westerman
(2008).
Experiment 2: Levels-of-processing at study
To date, the independent-ratings procedure has only
been used in conjunction with priming manipulations
(Higham & Vokey, 2004; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008). It remains possible, therefore, that dissociations between recollection and familiarity ratings might occur with a
manipulation other than priming. Experiment 2 examined
1
We do not report signal-detection analyses because our goal was to
determine whether dissociations occur between recollection and familiarity judgments and/or ratings. We made no predictions regarding whether
priming and LOP would influence discrimination and/or response bias.
Moreover, it was not expected that the use of judgments versus ratings
would alter whether these variables influence discrimination and/or
response bias. Nonetheless, such questions can be examined using signal
detection analysis, even when independent ratings are collected (see
Higham & Vokey, 2004), and this remains an area for future research.
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this possibility using a LOP manipulation at study. Deeper
LOP has been found to increase remember judgments
while either decreasing or not affecting know judgments
(for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002). When the IRK estimate
of familiarity is applied, however, Yonelinas (2002)
showed that deeper LOP typically increases both recollection and familiarity in these studies. In Experiment 2, it
was expected that LOP would produce a dissociation in
the R + F judgments group: deeper LOP should increase
recollection and either decrease or not affect familiarity.
In contrast, with independent ratings, LOP was expected
to increase both recollection and familiarity.
Method
Participants
Additional participants from the Experiment 1 pool
were randomly assigned to the three groups (12 per
group). Three participants were replaced for not following
test instructions.
Materials and design
The Experiment 1 stimuli were now divided into four
blocks of 40 words, assigned as follows: one block to deep
LOP list, 1 block to shallow LOP list, two blocks to be lures
at test. Block assignment was counterbalanced across participants. Two buffer words were assigned to the beginning
and end of each LOP list. LOP was a repeated-measures factor in each group.
Procedure
The study phase was as in Experiment 1 except participants now studied two lists of words. For the deep LOP
list, participants said the word out loud and then indicated
whether the word was wanted on a desert island (yes or
no). For the shallow LOP list, participants indicated
whether the word contained the vowel A (yes or no). List
order was counterbalanced across participants. The test
phase was as in Experiment 1 except no masks or primes
were presented.
Results
Recognition judgments and ratings were always significantly higher for deep and shallow LOP words than for
new words with one exception noted below; significant ef-
fects of prior study are not reported. List order did not produce any significant main effects or interactions with one
exception noted below, so it was not included as a factor
in the analyses we report.
Binary judgments
As in Experiment 1, the effects of LOP on recollection
and familiarity judgments in the R + F judgments group
were analyzed separately (see Table 3 for means). LOP produced a crossover dissociation: Deep (vs. shallow) LOP increased the proportion of recollection judgments (.75 vs.
.19), F(1, 11) = 388.09, MSE = .01, g2 = .97, but decreased
the proportion of familiarity judgments (.18 vs. .40),
F(1, 11) = 22.21, MSE = .01, g2 = .66. Inclusion of list order
as a factor in the familiarity analysis showed an interaction
of LOP and list order, F(1, 10) = 8.15, MSE = .01, g2 = .44. The
reversed LOP effect on familiarity was larger when the
deep LOP list was first (.20 vs. .44), F(1, 11) = 12.61,
MSE = .03, g2 = .56, rather than second (.25 vs. .35),
F(1, 11) = 4.92, MSE = .01, g2 = .33. Deep LOP words received nonsignificantly fewer familiar judgments than
new words (.18 vs. .24), F(1, 11) = 1.15, MSE = .01, p = .31,
g2 = .09.
The crossover dissociation pattern on recollection and
familiarity (and the equivalent familiarity of deep LOP
words and new words) most likely emerged because the
majority of the deep LOP items were judged recollected,
leaving few to be judged familiar. The IRK estimate of
familiarity attempts to correct for this problem by estimating familiarity based only on items that were not recollected, thus eliminating this dependency. The IRK
estimate of familiarity was greater in the deep LOP condition than in the shallow LOP condition (.67 vs. .49),
F(1, 11) = 6.14, MSE = .03, g2 = .35, consistent with Yonelinas’s (2002) review of IRK estimates from published
remember/know studies. The LOP dissociation in the raw
judgments thus appears to have been an artifact of using
binary judgments. If so, then parallel effects of LOP on recollection and familiarity should be obtained when independent ratings are collected.
Independent ratings
R+F ratings group. The R + F ratings group was analyzed
using a repeated-measures ANOVA with LOP (deep vs.
shallow) and rating (recollection vs. familiarity) as the
factors (see Table 3 for means). The ANOVA revealed a
Table 3
Experiment 2: Mean recollection and familiarity judgment proportions and ratings, and IRK estimates of familiarity.
New words
R + F judgments group
Recollection judgments
Familiarity judgments
IRK estimates of familiarity
Shallow LOP words
Deep LOP words
LOP effect
.04 (.01)
.24 (.03)
.25 (.04)
.19 (.03)
.40 (.05)
.49 (.05)
.75 (.04)
.18 (.04)
.67 (.06)
.57
.22
.18
R + F ratings group
Recollection ratings
Familiarity ratings
1.39 (.07)
1.62 (.07)
2.14 (.13)
2.46 (.11)
3.49 (.10)
3.58 (.13)
1.35
1.12
R ratings group/Recoll. ratings
F ratings group/Fam. ratings
1.59 (.07)
1.79 (.08)
2.20 (.14)
2.60 (.07)
3.69 (.06)
3.64 (.07)
1.50
1.04
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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marginal effect of rating: Familiarity ratings were somewhat higher than recollection ratings (3.02 vs. 2.81),
F(1, 11) = 3.77, MSE = .13, p = .07,g2 = .25. A robust main effect of LOP was also present, reflecting higher ratings for
deeper LOP items (3.53 vs. 2.30), F(1, 11) = 141.12,
MSE = .13, g2 = .92. LOP interacted with rating,
F(1, 11) = 12.22, MSE = .01, g2 = .52, such that the LOP effect
was larger on recollection than on familiarity. Nonetheless,
the LOP effect was significant on both recollection ratings
(3.49 vs. 2.14), F(1, 11) = 160.89, MSE = .07, g2 = .93, and
familiarity ratings (3.58 vs. 2.46), F(1, 11) = 100.88,
MSE = .07, g2 = .90. Thus, independent ratings did not reveal evidence of a dissociation in the effects of LOP on recollection versus familiarity.
As in Experiment 1, participants’ mean recollection and
familiarity rating were highly correlated, r(10) = .80. The
correlations at the trial level within participants were significant for all 12 participants (range = .42–.94; M = .78).
These correlations could mean that the rating scales were
not used independently, or they could mean that a single-process drives both ratings. The between-group conditions were analyzed next to adjudicate between these
possibilities.
R ratings group vs. F ratings group. A mixed-factor ANOVA
was performed with LOP (deep vs. shallow) as the repeated-measures factor and rating (recollection vs. familiarity) as the between-group factor. A main effect of LOP
was obtained (3.67 vs. 2.40), F(1, 22) = 373.32, MSE = .05,
g2 = .97. No main effect of rating was found (3.12 vs.
2.95), F(1, 22) = 2.24, MSE = .05, p = .14, g2 = .09. As in the
R + F ratings group, LOP and rating interacted,
F(1, 22) = 12.43, MSE = .05, g2 = .36, reflecting a larger LOP
effect on recollection than familiarity, but a LOP effect occurred for recollection ratings (3.69 vs. 2.20),
F(1, 11) = 162.01, MSE = .08, g2 = .93, and for familiarity
ratings (3.64 vs. 2.60), F(1, 11) = 320.75, MSE = .02, g2 = .96.
Discussion
LOP produced a dissociation between recollection and
familiarity when binary judgments were used: deep (vs.
shallow) LOP increased recollection judgments but produces a ‘‘reversed LOP’’ effect on familiarity judgments.
This dissociation in the R + F judgments group was eliminated when the IRK estimate of familiarity was analyzed,
suggesting that the use of binary judgments underestimates the influence of LOP on familiarity. In striking contrast to the pattern in the raw binary judgments, parallel
effects of LOP on recollection and familiarity were found
with independent ratings. Having different participants
rate recollection and familiarity did not eliminate the parallel effect of LOP on both ratings, suggesting rating crosscontamination was not behind the pattern in the R + F ratings group. Instead, the independent-rating data suggest
that recollection and familiarity are both increased by deeper LOP, though this increase is larger for recollection. The
strong positive correlation between the two ratings in the
R + F ratings group suggests that a single process exerts
considerable influence on both type of experience.
General discussion
We obtained two types of dissociation between recollection/familiarity judgments akin to remember/know
judgments. Using binary judgments, a priming manipulation at test increased familiarity but did not affect recollection (Experiment 1), and a LOP manipulation at study
increased recollection but decreased familiarity (Experiment 2). In contrast, we found that priming and LOP consistently increased both recollection and familiarity when
participants independently rated these recognition experiences. The differences in masked priming effects across the
two methods replicated the two extant studies that have
collected independent ratings (Higham & Vokey, 2004;
Kurilla & Westerman, 2008), and the LOP pattern demonstrated that obtaining different patterns across the two
methods is a replicable finding.
Several of our results suggest that the dissociations
across binary judgments – rather than the parallel effects
across independent ratings – were anomalous. First, parallel effects on ratings occurred when participants made only
one rating, thus ruling out the possibility that rating crosscontamination (i.e., one rating biasing the other rating)
produced the parallel effects. Second, having ruled out
the cross-contamination possibility, the strong positive
correlations between ratings of recollection and familiarity
in our R + F ratings groups suggest that LOP and priming
have similar rather than dissociative effects on the two
states of awareness. And third, in Experiment 2 deeper
LOP increased recollection judgments and the IRK estimate
of familiarity in the R + F judgments group, thus replicating
the parallel effect obtained with independent ratings. We
next consider our findings in more detail, before discussing
their implications for recognition memory theories.
Implications for measuring recollection and familiarity
What aspects of the two methods were responsible for
the different outcomes? Given McCabe and Geraci’s
(2009) finding that labeling ‘‘remember/know’’ as ‘‘Type
A/Type B’’ influenced responses, our experiments rule out
the use of different labels for response options across
methods. Higham and Vokey (2004) and Kurilla and Westerman both used ‘‘remember’’ and ‘‘know’’ labels with
judgments, but used ‘‘recollection’’ and ‘‘familiarity’’ labels
with ratings. We used the latter labels in all conditions, ruling out this potential locus.
Alternatively, the different patterns across the two
methods could be due to differences in the wording of
the test instructions, rather than to differences in how
the responses were collected. To ensure we could replicate
the prior studies comparing the two methods, we used
typical judgment instructions, and we used Higham and
Vokey’s (2004) rating instructions (see Appendix). Although
differences in how recollection and familiarity were described may have had some influence (McCabe & Geraci,
2009), it is unlikely that these wording differences produced the different outcomes. After all, the independent
ratings instructions encouraged participants to treat recollection and familiarity as independent, yet we found that
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priming and LOP had parallel effects on both ratings. It
seems unlikely that the wording of the rating instructions
– which were designed by Higham and Vokey (2004) to elicit independent ratings – would bias participants toward
producing parallel effects of both priming and LOP on recollection and familiarity, in both our within and betweengroup conditions, in both our experiments. Nonetheless,
future studies could equate the wording used for defining
and explaining recollection and familiarity across methods,
then indicate either that the two states are mutually exclusive (binary judgments) or not (independent ratings method), then provide the response options.
We found parallel effects of priming and LOP on both
ratings, despite participants having been instructed to
treat recollection and familiarity as potentially independent states of awareness. These findings support Higham
and Vokey (2004) and Kurilla and Westerman’s (2008)
claim that dissociations obtained with judgments are artifacts of the binary-judgment method. These findings suggest that the independent ratings method is preferable.
Alternatively, one could argue that binary judgments are
appropriate as long as the IRK correction is applied to correct for possible underestimation of familiarity (Yonelinas
& Jacoby, 1995). In Experiment 2, the binary judgment results obtained when the IRK estimate was applied paralleled the pattern obtained with independent ratings (i.e.,
an increase in both following deeper LOP at encoding).
But in Experiment 1, applying the IRK estimate to the binary judgment group did not produce the same pattern of
priming effects shown in the independent rating groups.
Use of independent ratings is preferable in part because
a correction does not need to be applied to interpret ratings, unlike familiarity judgments. Moreover, the IRK estimate assumes that the proportion of non-recollected
items that are ‘‘known’’ is the same as the proportion of
recollected items that would have been ‘‘known’’ if participants were permitted to give both judgments to a single
item. Binary judgments also assume that recollection and
familiarity are mutually exclusive, yet the IRK correction
assumes the two are independent. This creates a mismatch
between the measure and the constructs being measured.
In contrast, the independent-ratings method encourages
participants to independently evaluate both experiences,
but, as our results clearly show, it does not force participants to make ratings that are uncorrelated. If situations
exist wherein recollection and familiarity processes are
mutually exclusive, then the two ratings should be negatively correlated. And if situations exist wherein the two
are redundant (e.g., if recollection is always preceded by
familiarity), then the two ratings should be positively correlated (see Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996).
Our study evaluated a hitherto unaddressed potential
concern with the validity of the independent ratings method, namely the possibility that the two ratings might be
cross-contaminated. The strong positive correlations between the two ratings in our R + F ratings groups added
some credence to this possibility, but the replication of
our findings when participants rated only recollection or
familiarity effectively ruled it out. Even so, the betweengroup method may be preferable because it eliminates
the potential for rating cross-contamination. The be-
105
tween-group variant also has the advantage of being more
sensitive to differential effects of variables on recollection
versus familiarity. In Experiment 1, priming increased
familiarity ratings more than it increased recollection ratings across the between-group conditions, whereas it increased both ratings to a similar degree in the R + F
ratings group. The between-group results suggest that
priming influences both familiarity and recollection, but
to different extents, rather than having process-pure effects. An issue for future research is whether the greater
sensitivity of the between-groups method is due to the
elimination of rating cross-contamination, or due to participants focusing on identifying and gauging only one type of
recognition experience.
It would be informative to compare the influence of
instructional and contextual manipulations on judgments
versus ratings. For example, different groups could be told
that 70% or 30% of test items were studied, when the actual
percentage was 50%. Hirshman and Henzler (1998) found
that this instructional manipulation resulted in the 70%
group being more liberal in using both remember and
know judgments in comparison to the 30% group. Determining whether the 70% group also gives higher recollection and familiarity ratings would help elucidate whether
the same process underlies both ratings. Similarly, Bodner
and Lindsay (2003) found that mixing the memorability of
context items across groups on a recognition test influenced remember/know judgments for a common set of
items. Our lab is currently testing whether this test-list
context manipulation also influences recollection/familiarity ratings.
Implications for recognition memory accounts
Testing for dissociations between remember/know
judgments is a common means of evaluating whether
one or two processes support recognition memory. Given
that two ‘‘popular’’ dissociations between recollection
and familiarity obtained using binary judgments do not occur with independent ratings, judgment dissociations may
not provide valid support for dual-process models (e.g.,
Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Yonelinas, 1994). Of course, amnesic patient data, analyses of receiver operating curves, and
other types of finding can also be used to support or challenge the distinction between recollection and familiarity
processes (Malmberg, 2002; Yonelinas, 2002).
A striking aspect of our data is the strong positive correlations we obtained between participants’ ratings of recollection and familiarity. These correlations are difficult to
reconcile with the notion that recollection and familiarity
experiences arise from two entirely independent processes. In addition, the effect of priming on recollection
ratings in Experiment 1 challenges Yonelinas’s (1994)
claim that recollection reflects a threshold process (see
also Higham & Vokey, 2004). Dual-process signal-detection
accounts in which recollection and familiarity both contribute evidence to an overall index of memory strength
may be better able to explain this effect (e.g., Rotello,
Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004; Starns & Ratcliff, 2008; Wixted,
2007; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). On the other hand, the
absence of dissociations in ratings in our experiments
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questions the need to posit two separate processes whose
products are contrasted or combined.
Similarly, Rajaram and Geraci’s (2000) distinctiveness/
fluency account purports that distinctive processing increases remembering whereas fluent processing increases
knowing. Evidence for this account has rested largely on
remember/know dissociations, particularly that masked
priming selectively increases know judgments (Rajaram,
1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). To the extent that these
dissociations are absent when independent ratings are
used, support for this type of two-process account is also
lost.
The parallel effects of variables on recollection and
familiarity ratings, as well as the strong correlations between
these ratings, fit well with single-process models of recognition, including traditional single-process signal-detection
accounts. These results also fit well with attributional
accounts of recognition memory, in which recollection
and familiarity are merely inferences made about one’s
subjective experience in a given task and context (e.g.,
Bodner & Lindsay, 2003; Gruppuso et al., 1997; Higham &
Vokey, 2004; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008; McCabe & Balota,
2007; Whittlesea, 1997). By these accounts, masked priming
might increase the fluency of target processing, leading
to higher ratings of greater familiarity and recollection.
Attributional accounts are also consistent with deeper
LOP increasing participants’ experienced recollection
and familiarity alike. To avoid circularity, attributional
accounts will need to specify the factors that shape these
joint attributions of recollection and familiarity. Toward
this goal, factors such as Rajaram’s distinction between
processing distinctiveness and processing fluency may
prove helpful. If a single process underlies recognition
memory judgments/ratings, then the degree to which this
process is strength-based or attributional will need to be
carefully assessed.
Conclusion
Our experiments add to a growing literature that questions the adequacy of using remember/know recognition
judgments for measuring recollection and familiarity. We
have shown that two common dissociations between recollection and familiarity are obtained only when binary
judgments are collected. Methods that allow these two
subjective experiences to be independently reported may
provide more accurate information about the relationship
between recollection and familiarity. So far, the results obtained using independent ratings suggest that recollection
and familiarity are more interrelated than previously
thought.
Acknowledgments
The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada supported this research through a Discovery
Grant to GEB. The research was conducted as part of AAB’s
Master’s thesis. We thank John Vokey, Chris Sears, and Penny Pexman for serving on AAB’s thesis committee, Yara
Haddadin for assistance with data collection, and two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. Corre-
spondence should be sent to Glen E. Bodner, Department
of Psychology, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive
NW, Calgary AB T2N 1N4, Canada (e-mail: bodner@
ucalgary.ca).
Appendix A
Test instructions for binary-judgment groups
You will now be given a recognition test. A list of words
will be shown to you one at a time. You studied some of
these words but not others. Your task will be to report your
recognition experiences as outlined below. Recollection occurs when you are sure that you recognize the word and
ONLY when you remember some specific detail about your
study experience with it. Reading the word triggers a specific thought, image, or feeling that you experienced at the
time you studied it. In other words, you remember why
you recognize that word (e.g., ‘‘I remember thinking what
a funny-looking word it is’’). Familiarity occurs when you
are sure you recognize the word but you can’t remember
any specific details about your study experience with it.
In other words, you’re sure you recognize it, but you’re
not sure why (e.g., ‘‘I just know I studied that one’’). We
are interested in how often you have each of the recollection and the familiarity types of recognition experience. If
you recognize a word in the recollection sense, say recollection. If you recognize a word in the familiarity sense, say
familiarity. Otherwise, say not.
Appendix B
Test instructions for independent-rating groups (after Higham
& Vokey, 2004)
You will now be given a recognition test. A list of words
will be shown to you one at a time. You studied some of
these words but not others. Your task will be to report your
recognition experiences as outlined below.
Recollection
If the word is accompanied by a conscious memory of
its prior occurrence in the study-list, then you are recollecting it. Recollection is the ability to become consciously
aware again of some aspect or aspects of what happened or
what was experienced at the time the word was presented
(e.g., aspects of the physical appearance of the word, or of
something that happened in the room, or of what you were
thinking or doing at the time). In other words, the recollected word should bring back to mind a particular association, image, or something more personal from the time of
study, or something about its appearance or position (i.e.,
what came before or after that word).
Familiarity
Sometimes you may know a word occurred in the
study-list because it provides a feeling of familiarity.
This feeling can be thought to occur independently of
recollection. A word might seem familiar whether or not
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A.A. Brown, G.E. Bodner / Journal of Memory and Language 65 (2011) 98–108
you recollect anything from the time you studied it.
Likewise, recollection can occur with or without a feeling
of familiarity.
To clarify the difference between these two recognition
experiences, consider the following examples:
High recollection–high familiarity
The word evokes a feeling of familiarity, and you can
recollect something about the word’s occurrence in the
study-list.
High recollection–low familiarity
You recollect your encounter with the word, but it does
not seem familiar. For example, you might remember
coughing when this word was presented earlier, but you
have no feeling of familiarity associated with this memory.
Low recollection–high familiarity
The word evokes a feeling of familiarity, but you do not
recollect anything about your encounter with it in the
study phase.
Low recollection–low familiarity
The word evokes no feeling of familiarity or
recollection.
[R + F ratings group: We are interested in how much recollection and how much familiarity you experience for
each item. Therefore, you will be asked to rate both the level to which you experience recollection for the item, and
the level to which you experience familiarity for the item.]
[R ratings group: We are only interested in how much
recollection you experience for each item. Therefore, you
will only be asked rate the level to which you experience
recollection for the item.]
[F ratings group: We are only interested in how much
familiarity you experience for each item. Therefore, you
will only be asked rate the level to which you experience
familiarity for the item.]
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