Brand Name Terror:
Al-Qaeda Affiliate Organizations
and Local Instability
Jessica Ward
May 22, 2013
Honors Program in International Security Studies
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Advisor: Prof. Martha Crenshaw
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................iii
Abstract...................................................................................................................iv
Introduction..............................................................................................................1
Chapter One: Literature Review...............................................................................6
Chapter Two: Methodology and Case Study Selection..........................................35
Chapter Three: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula...............................................57
Chapter Four: Laskhar-e-Taiba...............................................................................81
Chapter Five: Four Case Studies: Low Levels of Linkage to al-Qaeda...............104
Chapter Six: Conclusion.......................................................................................131
Works Cited..........................................................................................................140
Harmony Documents Cited..................................................................................149
Appendix One: Classification of Al-Qaeda Linked Groups.................................150
Appendix Two: Oath Sworn When Joining al-Qaeda..........................................151
Appendix Three: Figures......................................................................................151
Appendix Four: Acronym List.............................................................................152
Figures
Figure One: AQAP Attacks Over Time............................................Appendix Three
Figure Two: AQAP Attacks by Causality................................Total Appendix Three
Figure Three: Map of Yemen.................................................................................66
Figure Four: Map of Kashmir.................................................................................74
Note on Arabic Transliteration
There is no single commonly used standard for transliterating the Arabic alphabet
into the Latin alphabet. For this reason, Arabic words have been transliterated
according to their most common spelling in English language material.
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Martha Crenshaw, for all of her
advice over the past year. Prof. Crenshaw's advice has guided every aspect of this thesis.
Without her, this thesis would have incoherent, grammatically and logically, and probably
several weeks late.
Secondly, I would like to thank all of the staff at the Conflict Records Research Center
(CRRC) in Washington, DC, where I interned last summer. While I wasn't able to utilize
the research I did at the CRRC as much as I would have liked, my time at the CRRC
provided me essential time to do research, become better acquainted with the academic
study of terrorism, and to begin thinking about my thesis. The insights provided by
documents found at the CRRC and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point serve as
some of my most interesting evidence.
I'd also like to thank the rest of the CISAC International Security Program, including
Col. Joesph Felter and our Daniel Cassman, who along with Prof. Crenshaw, have served
as our brave leaders throughout the year. Also incredibly important is my CISAC cohort,
who throughout the year have offered insightful questions and support. Kathy, Flora,
Vaeme, Ravi, Daniel, Daniel, David, Scott, and Ryan, I'm incredibly glad that you were
along with me for this arduous, and rewarding, process.
There are many more people throughout Stanford and the academic community who
have contributed to my thesis through sharing their expertise and conversations that have
made me explain simply what exactly I was writing about.
Lastly, I would like to thank my family. Mom, Dad, Ryan, Grandpa, Grandma, you
made me who I am and you are the ones responsible for where I am today. I would also
like to thank my friends who are like family to me. Nikhil, Chris, Jorge, Breeshia, Albert,
Charles, Mark, and Sin Yee; thank you for putting you for putting up with me talking about
my thesis all year and being there for me these past four crazy years.
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Abstract
Al-Qaeda affiliation comes with both costs and benefits. For al-Qaeda affiliate
organizations, regardless of the strength of their connection to the al-Qaeda central
organization, an affiliation does not change the amount of instability that the affiliate
organization creates in its home country. This thesis uses case studies of groups at
varying levels of connection to al-Qaeda to determine the net effect of al-Qaeda
affiliation. The relationship with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, Laskhar-e-Taiba, Fatah al-Islam, the Islamic Army of Aden, Harkat ulMujahideen, and Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, are explored as well as their influence on
instability in Yemen, Pakistan, and Lebanon to determine the effect of an al-Qaeda
affiliation on local instability. The strengthening mechanisms are resources,
knowledge, and ideology, while the mechanisms that decrease local instability potential
are identification, local distrust, and foreign targeting. Because the benefits of al-Qaeda
affiliation are canceled out by its costs, al-Qaeda affiliation has no net effect on local
instability.
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Introduction
For al-Qaeda the recent years have been both the best of times, with the rapid expansion of its
power through regional affiliate organizations, and the worst of times, with the death of Osama bin
Laden and the decline of its central organization. Some of these regional affiliate organizations, such as
al-Qaeda in the the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), have wrecked havoc throughout their homes. Some, such
as a-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), in addition to waging campaigns within their home
countries have taken up the al-Qaeda mission of attacking the west and have become themselves
powerful threats against the United States. However, al-Qaeda affiliate organizations are not new. Some
groups, such as Laskar-e-Taiba have had a relationship with al-Qaeda since its initial founding years in
Afghanistan through connections in Peshwar, Pakistan.
What being al-Qaeda affiliate means varies across the al-Qaeda network and the radical Islamist
movement. Some groups have pledged formal allegiance to al-Qaeda. These groups generally have a
closer relationship to the central organization. The leadership of the affiliate organization
communicates and consults with the leadership of al-Qaeda central and the affiliate organization adopts
the central organization's ideology and strategic priorities. However, other organizations have a weaker
relationship with al-Qaeda. Some groups may share some operations, and some may share resources
like training camps, or assist each other through tactical assistance or facilitation of recruitment. Some
groups do not even have this level of cooperation, and instead are only connected ideologically.
My thesis addresses the the topic of this variation in strength of the relationship between alQaeda and its affiliate organizations. Do differing levels of connection to al-Qaeda result in any change
in the output of the group? I examine this question of output and effectiveness with particular regard to
local instability. Will a group that has a stronger connection to al-Qaeda make their home country more
unstable? The answer that I have found is no. Al-Qaeda affiliation comes with costs and benefits. While
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adopting an al-Qaeda ideology may draw more recruits, and at stronger levels of affiliation there are
benefits of strategic guidance and possibly resources, embracing the al-Qaeda name also has costs. The
first and strongest of these is immediately becoming a target and losing popular support from the local
population, causing a decrease in the amount of instability created by the group. With regard to
affecting instability locally, becoming an al-Qaeda affiliate can also influence targeting choices. This
finding has the implication that an al-Qaeda affiliation does not have a net benefit for the group and
does not make the group more dangerous in its home state.
To think about this question, the first topic that needs to be addressed is defining what the alQaeda organization is. Founded in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, al-Qaeda was an Arab
organization based in a non-Arab country. After leaving Afghanistan and spending time in Saudi
Arabia, bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization moved to Sudan upon the invitation of the Sudanese
government (Wright 164). After the revocation of bin Laden's Saudi passport and his expulsion from
Sudan with next to nothing of the millions he had invested in the country, bin Laden took al-Qaeda
back to Afghanistan (Wright 222). The organization had safe haven in Afghanistan until the American
invasion of Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks and Taliban unwillingness to give up al-Qaeda.
The last sight of al-Qaeda leadership until bin Laden's May 2011 death was in March 2002, when
Ayman Zawahiri, al-Qaeda second in command, and masked Arabs “disappeared into the mountains”
near Khost, Afghanistan (Wright 373). This was the end of the initial period of the al-Qaeda
organization, during which the central organization was powerful. It also marked the beginning of a
second period, in which the organization spawned a global movement which would come to out power
the dying central organization.
Following the intense counterterrorism action that al-Qaeda faced, it could no longer operate
fully as an organization. Strategically, public awareness of the group, from the western world to flyers
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dropped in Afghanistan, had undermined the need to keep the group covert. Ideologically, the decline
of the central al-Qaeda organization can be attributed in part to a failure to gain legitimacy; this decline
has resulted in the trend of localization of jihadi conflicts (Mudd 2012). Because of this decline, there
are some who believe that al-Qaeda central no longer represents a threat to the United States, the west,
or the world (Gerges 2011). After 9/11 The next major theater of war for al-Qaeda wouldn't be against
the west, but in Iraq, through its affiliate organization al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Documents captured in
Abbottabad show that bin Laden felt “burdened” by affiliate groups, particularly AQI, rather than
viewing them as a source of strength (Lahoud et al 2012). They also show that bin Laden did not regard
the localization of conflict as part of the al-Qaeda strategy, such as this letter to an AQAP leader
regarding establishment of territorial control in Yemen, “I would say that Yemen is the Arab country
most ready for the establishment of an Islamic state, but this does not mean that the necessary
fundamental elements for success for such a project have yet been realized,” (CTC 3).
However, despite the fact that affiliate groups were not necessarily considered to be beneficial,
al-Qaeda maintained relationships with various Islamic groups throughout its history in order to spread
its influence and create alliances which could be beneficial to the group. In a charter document, alQaeda comments on its relationships with outer groups, “Our relation with Islamic movements and
groups and workers of Islam is one of cooperation towards righteousness and strength, with continuing
attempts towards merger and unity,” and “our relation with non-Jihad Islamic groups is one of love and
friendship and advice, and bringing out the good in them and correcting their mistakes if the situation
requires it.” (CRRC 10). However, in order to become a member of al-Qaeda it was required that for
the individual, there be “no connection between al-Qaeda membership and any other Islamic group”
(CRRC 6).
Despite bin Ladens belief that affiliate organizations may be not be a source of strength, it can
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be argued that the greatest threat posed by al-Qaeda today is the local affiliate organizations. These
affiliations do not represent much of a threat to the United States. With the exception of AQAP, they
have generally avoided attacking the United States. They are do not possess the capabilities to
undertake a “spectacular” attack against the United States or the west even if they wanted to because of
reduced resource availability and increased security awareness and practices. Where the danger of these
groups come from is their threat to the domestic stability of the already unstable countries where they
have found bases. Al-Qaeda involvement can cause an escalation in an existing conflict, such as in
Mali or Somalia, or it can create its own area of conflict, like in Yemen.
State instability is a threat to society, both for those who live in the state and those abroad. From
an American view, instability in countries like Yemen or Pakistan can be a threat because instability has
been linked to increases in levels of terrorism (Piazza 2008a). Additionally, from a global view
instability can cause economic problems and fuel international tensions. One case where this can be
seen in Somalia, in which famine and a perpetual state of instability have led to an increase in piracy in
the seas near the Horn of Africa. Instability obviously also has domestic consequences. Instability,
through lack of government capacity, can result in increases in internal crime, and decreases in
government infrastructure such as police, and even basic health infrastructure such as hospitals and
clean water. This in turn can reduce the quality of life in the country. The country may become a
source of refugees, both internal and international.
By recognizing and evaluating the factors that fuel instability, such as terrorism, work can be
done to identify what the potential causes of inability are and then find a way to fight them. This study
can also increase knowledge about how al-Qaeda, and possibly other future large terrorist networks,
function. Such knowledge can be used to evaluate where to concentrate counterterrorist resources based
on threats and how to target terrorist networks.
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The central question that will be a addressed through the rest of my thesis is 'does variance in
strength of al-Qaeda affiliation cause change in the extent to which a group destabilizes a country?'.
Three sets of case studies of groups with varying levels of connection to al-Qaeda will be analyzed.
These case studies will ask what the connection is between al-Qaeda and the affiliate group, how
specifically the affiliate group has created instability in their home country, and how the affiliation
effected the creation of instability. This last section will be done through the model of six hypothesized
mechanisms of how an al-Qaeda affiliation could help or hurt an affiliate group: resources, knowledge,
ideology, identification, foreign targeting, and local distrust. I have found evidence to support all six of
these mechanisms, concluding that the net effect of an al-Qaeda affiliation is neutral. Instead the groups
that have the greatest impact on local instability are the groups with higher levels of capacity and those
that make local targeting choices. The first case study is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen.
The second case study is Laskhar-e-Taiba, in Pakistan. The last is a group of short case studies of all
four groups which make up the least connected category: Fatah al-Islam, in Lebanon; the Islamic Army
of Aden, in Yemen, and Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), both in
Pakistan.
Chapter One
Literature Review
The central question of my thesis can be distilled into three straightforward theoretical
questions. The first is 'does an effective terrorist group have an impact on state stability?'. The second is
'does having an al-Qaeda affiliation make a group more effective?'. The third question is 'why?'. There
is an extensive literature dealing with terrorism. This literature works to explain the organization of
terrorist groups, the strategic logic of terrorism, and searches for a root cause of terrorism at societal,
group, and individual levels. In addition, organizational theories explain about what makes
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organizations in general more effective. Based on the knowledge that al-Qaeda, like all terrorist groups,
is a strategic organization working towards goals, it is presumed that a more effective terrorist
organization will demonstrate more progress towards these goals, of which state failure is the primary
one. Lastly, I propose six possible mechanisms for how changes in the levels of al-Qaeda affiliation
could possibly increase or decrease the effect of a a group on stability of the country which they are
based. Recognizing that there are both benefits and costs from having an affiliation, three of these
increase instability while three decrease instability from the group.
Terrorism
Terrorism in general remains a infrequently occurring phenomenon in the world and
transnational or internationally based terrorism even more so. Since there year 2000, there have only
been 34,886 reported and recorded terrorist incidents, or about 3,000 a year (Global Terrorism
Database-GTD). The vast majority of these, 23,340 incidents, occurred in the Middle East or South
Asia (GTD). In comparison, there were 11,493 firearm homicides in the United States in 2009
(Kennedy 2013). While the number of transnational terrorist attacks did not increase 1979-2000, an
increase in the severity of the attacks led to an increased number of fatalities from transnational
terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2000). However, between 1973 and 2002 counterterrorism effectiveness
has increased (Drakos and Giannakopoulos 2009).
The predominant assumption of literature concerning terrorism is that terrorism is used as a
rational strategy for the pursuit of policy changes. In particular, terrorists can be identified as
representing a group, which represents a minority in ethnicity, religion, or ideology. These groups wish
to challenge the government but possess little political power. In the face of an asymmetric balance of
power these groups will turn to terrorist tactics (Crenshaw 1981). In general, terrorism could not be
called a strategy unto itself, but rather a set of terrorist tactics collectively become the strategy of an
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organization trying to achieve policy change. There are a number of documented ways in which
terrorists undertake strategic action. One example is undermining the peace processes in order to
continue conflicts and avoid compromising policy objectives (Kydd and Walter 2002). Another is
rebelling against the home state of the group even when this is not a part of their ideology (Aslam
2008). A third example is attacking the allies of the target country, a strategy based on the logic of 'the
friend of my enemy is my enemy' (Plumper and Neumayer 2010). Al-Qaeda has undertaken a number
of these strategies by choosing to attack allies of their target, such as the 2004 Madrid bombings, or
choosing to attack in their home state, such as the numerous al-Qaeda attacks in Pakistan.
Psychological profiling of terrorist leaders find that while the leader experiences cognitive
simplicity in one area, ideology, he demonstrates cognitive complexity in other areas that aid strategic
thinking such as organizational and problem-solving skills (Locicero and Sinclair 2008). Al-Qaeda
strategic documents demonstrate this surprising complexity of strategic thought, referencing Mao and
Clausewitz when outlining organizational grand strategy (CRRC 4). This can also be seen in how
'strategic thinking' when facing asymmetric resources and technology causes terrorist leaders to arrive
at unconventional technical solutions, such as the use of suicide bombers as literal 'smart bombs' in
place of expensive high tech guided weapon delivery systems (Lewis 2012).
A terrorist campaign can take on one of five strategies: attrition, intimidation, provocation,
spoiling or outbidding; all of these are based on using terrorism as a form of costly form signaling
preferences (Kydd and Walter 2006). The costliness of aspect signals the dedication of the individuals
involved and the intensity of the preferences to the state or target. The strategy of attrition is based on
the principle of 'a war by a thousand cuts.' While each individual attack does not have a significant
impact on the target, a continued number of attacks will be costly to the target. The strategy of
intimidation is to cause fear in the target. Provocation is an attempt to force the target to take action that
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is beneficial in someway to the group. Spoiling is preventing the target from achieving a favorable
outcome, such as a peace agreement. Outbidding is similar to attrition, but each subsequent incident
becomes larger and more costly. Al-Qaeda uses each of these strategies throughout the world through
its different affiliates in different situations. While the 9/11 attacks were a form of provocation, the alQaeda in Iraq campaign was based on attrition.
Terrorism is perceived by most of the population of a country as a form of crime, and thus as
illegitimate actions. However, to a certain population terrorism is a symbolic act in which crime has
been transformed into a morally praiseworthy act (Balagangadhara and Roover 2010). This population
is the terrorists' 'audience' or 'constituency' from which they can draw on for support, resources, and
recruitment. Generally, it is this symbolism drawn from terrorist attacks, such as fear or the destruction
of something viewed as bad, that terrorism draws its effectiveness from, not the actual damage caused
by the act itself. This symbolism is a kind of signaling. The symbolism of suicide terrorism intensifies
this signaling effect. Suicide terrorism, which has both symbolic and tactical advantages is a form of
coercion toward states. It is more effective than non-suicide terrorism (Pape 2003). Between 1980 and
2003 half of all suicide terrorist campaigns resulted in concessions by the target state (Pape 2005). An
alternative view is that mass casualty bombers, or bombers who incur more than twenty five casualties
per attack, are the most dangerous kind of terrorist groups. Mass casualty bombers cause more deaths
than suicide bombers and are more prolific than state sponsored groups (Quillen 2002).
Max Abhrams challenges the idea that terrorism is a rationally based strategic action, using
empirical analysis to find that terrorist campaigns are overall have a low likelihood of success in
causing any desired policy outcome (Abhrams 2006). Given of this low likelihood of succeeding, he
argues that terrorism cannot be a truly rational action because any rational actor would not choose such
a high-penalty low expected gain method of achieving strategic objectives. While indiscriminate
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violence is cheaper than selective violence, it is also less effective at accomplishing goals (Kalyvas
2004). This is supported by the findings of Erica Cheneworth and Maria J. Stephan, who find that
violent resistance is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds because non-violent campaigns are more
likely to succeed. Cheneworth and Stephan argue that non-violent campaigns have fewer obstacles to
participation and have more opportunities for civic disruption, ultimately resulting in more durable and
stable democratic governments (2011). However, this analysis is of movements with goals of resisting
authoritarian governments, a goal which is likely to have wide appeal across a population. When this
argument is applied to terrorist campaigns it loses some of its power because even to most followers of
fundamentalist Islam, Islamic terrorism is not justifiable, especially the 'far enemy,' type terrorism of alQaeda.
Abhrams suggests an alternative explanation for the cause of terrorism, arguing that social
incentives are the primary motivation for joining terrorist groups (Abhrams 2008). This model is based
on the idea that potential terrorists, typically young men, will gain socially from membership in a
terrorist group from the close connections with other members. This is supported by analysis done on
profiles of al-Qaeda members by Marc Sageman, who finds that a 'typical' Islamist recruit from
Western Europe is socially alienated, often from an immigrant background, is educated in a technical
field and did not receive a religious education (Sageman 2008). This is a type of person who would
benefit from social acceptance and from social connections, but does not have the awareness to know
standard interpretation of religious doctrine, leaving him open to radicalization.
One possible explanation for this pattern appearing in background of terrorist group members
is that while those with low levels of education and income are more likely to volunteer to join, the
group screens volunteers and selects the most highly qualified ones (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). In order
to join al-Qaeda, recruits are given tests on complex theological ideas in order to test both ideological
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purity and the ability to think (CRRC 3). Therefore, the terrorist group will be composed of more
highly educated people than the total population of radicalized individuals would suggest because of
this selection process. However, not al al-Qaeda affiliate organizations follow these procudures and the
quality of members allowed to join will vary.
American recruits to al-Qaeda do not fit into any particular ethnic, economic, educational or
social profile (Bergen et al. 2011). Sageman posits that American al-Qaeda recruits do not follow these
patterns because structural explanations limit American recruitment, specifically the lack of a welfare
state to support unemployed immigrants and the widely dispersed nature of the American Muslim
community. Bergen et al. argue that American recruitment is actually increased because the American
response to terrorism plays into the strategy of al-Qaeda, resulting in an increase of diversification of
militants (2011).
More generally, individual radicalization is dependent on the symbols of 'us' vs. 'them', or
intergroup conflict. First an individual creates an identification with a group, and than the individual
responds to perceptions of threats to that group. This means that the radicalization process is more
dependent on intergroup conflict than individual level psychological factors (McCauley and
Moskalenko 2008). One study found that in the Middle East, regardless of demographic factors,
terrorists had “pathological hatred” and “authoritarianism” tendencies more than the control group
(Gottschalk and Gottschalk 2004). This group identification and hatred aspects are especially
important in the case of terrorist groups based in the disputed region of Kashmir, where the PakistanIndia rivalry has created a powerful 'in group' and 'out group' distinction for Pakistanis who feel
threatened by India. Interstate rivalries, like India and Pakistan's, are in fact predictors of transnational
terrorism (Findely et al 2012).
There are numerous empirical studies which attempt to find a correlation between certain
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political variables and terrorism. Many of these studies center on whether democracy or
authoritarianism promote or suppress terrorism. In the Middle East, there has been found to be no
causal link between authoritarianism and Islamist terrorism (Dalacoura 2011). Aksoy et el refute this,
finding that terrorism is more likely in authoritarian countries where there is no legislature but
opposition parties are legal (Aksoy et al 2012). Suicide terrorism has been shown to be produced more
by democratic societies (Piazza 2008a) It has also been found that democratic participation can reduce
total terrorism in a country (Li 2005). However, others have has found terrorism to be more common in
democratic societies. One explanation is that terrorism is the result of a political competition creating a
'crowding effect,' which in turn produces intergroup competition (Chenoweth 2010). This explanation
supports Li's finding that states with proportional representation systems, which could reduce
intergroup competition, experience less terrorism than those with majoritarian or mixed systems, which
promote intergroup competition and limit the power of expression political expression minority (Li
2005). The types of regimes in the states where the case studies are based are not liberal democratic
states- they vary from the explicitly authoritarian, such as Yemen, to mixed military-and-parliamentary
controlled systems like Pakistan, to nominally democratic, such as Lebanon.
There are factors other than regime type that may contribute to terrorism. Findley and Young
argue that terrorism is the result of a credible commitment to restraint against future abuse of power
(Findley and Young 2011). An example of a credible commitment is an independent judiciary system,
which guarantees the correct enforcement of laws despite the regime in power. However those
currently abusing power, strict authoritarian states, have been found to experience lower levels of
terrorism. One explanation for this is that the security apparatuses of authoritarian states suppress any
terrorist activities because it increases the penalties for being involved in terrorism (Stout et al 2011). It
may also curb terrorist thought before it starts because the population is too afraid of what may happen
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if they were caught in any anti-government activities.
It is the opinion of many world leaders that terrorism is caused by poverty. In 2002, George W.
Bush publicly claimed that foreign aid could be a counter terrorism measure saying, “we fight against
poverty because hope is an answer to terror,” (Bush 2002). Colin Powell claimed that poverty was an
important aspect on the war on terror, saying, “We can’t just stop with a single terrorist or a single
terrorist organization; we have to go and root out the whole system. We have to go after poverty,”
(Harriman 2012). Economic prosperity, or lack of it was not found to be a factor which influences the
occurrence of terrorism (Abadie 2006). Another study found that in Bengal terrorists were richer and
better educated than the non-political engaged population, but had lower levels of social status,
measured through education level and employment, than the non-violent politically engaged population
(Lee 2011). Wealthy countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom are theoretically as
susceptible to terrorist acts as low income countries, once political liberties are controlled for.
Geography is a commonly identified factor that is linked with terrorism. In particular being
located in a 'hotspot' area, or having neighbors that experience terrorism can increase the likelihood of
terrorism in a country (Braithwaite and Li 2007). National size, the presence of Islam, and national
experience with suicide terrorism are factors that have been argued to make the tactic of suicide
terrorism in particular more likely. (Wade and Reiter 2007). Whether this this is truly is causation is
questionable, particularly with regard to the variable of size. It can be argued that having a higher
population makes the likelihood that a social phenomenon will happen higher, no matter what the
phenomenon. If the per capita incidents were increased in highly populated countries, this would cause
this argument to be more valid. Additionally, presence of Islam as a variable that causes higher rates of
suicide terrorism could be a result of a small number in total terrorist campaigns that have used suicide
bombing as a tactic. Historically, a high percentage of these terrorist groups that use suicide bombing
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have been Islamic groups, but there are notable exceptions, such as the particularly virulent Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a Hindu ethnonationalist group in Sri Lanka, which indicate that suicide
bombing is likely to have factors outside of religion involved. These factors all related to where alQaeda affiliate groups have been founded. Hotspot areas, such as Pakistan, have a high number of
groups, as do countries with a predominantly Islamic population.
One study attempting to explain lethality of terrorist groups found that organizational size,
ideology, territorial control, and connectedness are predictors of terrorist group lethality (Asal and
Rethemeyer 2008). The variable of ideology is defined not as a particular belief or belief system, but
the ability of the group in creating an audience and its capability in defining the 'other'. Recalling the
findings about individual radicalization, this shows that the definition of the enemy is a critical factor at
both the radicalization and implementation stages. Al-Qaeda has defined the 'other' clearly because they
have defined they only people who are not others as those who believe in a very strict and narrow
version of Islam that is almost only found within the al-Qaeda membership, creating an other that is
everyone except al-Qaeda members. Additionally while each individual cell or affiliate may be small,
the organization as a whole has a large membership due to the global nature of the al-Qaeda network.
Additionally, religiously based terrorism is more intense than non-religiously based terrorism (Fox
2004). Asal and Rethemeyer also found that state sponsorship, organizational age, and host country
characteristics are not predictors of terrorist group lethality. The fact that organizational age is not a
predictor of lethality may indicate that institutional knowledge, which presumably builds with time,
does not cause a group to be more effective. This finding may contradict my hypothesis because while
al-Qaeda is not an especially old terrorist group, it does lend institutional knowledge to its affiliates.
It is important to note when analyzing the results of these empirically based studies, particularly
those based on databases of terrorist incidents, all studies done on terrorism suffer from the same bias
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of underreporting. (Drakos and Gofas 2006). Throughout terrorism databases, incidents are not
recorded for various reasons, including improper labeling of the incident by media, suppression of
information by authoritarian regimes, lack of adequate media in the developing world, or the fact that
failed terrorist attacks generally do not become news. Additionally, there is the problem of correctly
attributing an attack to a particular group. For example, of the 267 attacks recorded in the Global
Terrorism Database occurring Quetta, Pakistan, only 63 attacks, 24%, have a known perpetrator listed1
(GTD). Because of this, studies which analyze the actions of a particular group or set of groups may be
incorrect in their conclusions if the patterns of violence found in the attributable attacks is significantly
different from the unknowable reality of who commits the majority of terrorist attacks.
One direct oppositional argument to my hypothesis is Fawaz Gerges, who argues that al-Qaeda
has reached the point where it is no longer a serious threat. He argues that al-Qaeda is facing a
leadership crisis following the death of Osama bin Laden, an escalating drone-based counterterrorism
campaign, and overall a lack of functional capabilities. Despite this, he believes al-Qaeda will continue
on in its weakened state, following a war of attrition against its enemies (Gerges 2011). Gerges does
not address the point that this 'war of a thousand cuts' has always been al-Qaeda's strategy, and is not
the result of changes since the death of bin Laden (CRRC 1). Additionally, while al-Qaeda's leadership
may be in crisis because of positions as a result of drones, the position of Emir of the organization has
been clearly filled by bin Laden's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has had previous
experience leading a group be founded Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an Egyptian terrorist organization
which later merged with al-Qaeda. This position of Emir is central the the operation of al-Qaeda, which
is a hierarchical system highly dependent on the decisions of its central leadership.
Pinpointing the exact objectives of al-Qaeda may be difficult. Theologically, al-Qaeda bases
1 This includes listings of 'suspected' perpetrators and unclear group labels such as “tribal group” or “gunmen”.
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itself on, but deviates significantly from, the Qutbist school of ideology, which is subset of the takafiri
movement2. Sayyid Qutb, a prominent extremist Islamist, wrote that the goals of Islamists should be to
establish a government-less global umma3 based on sharia law. Qutb argues that the initial step in the
creation of this umma is for a 'vanguard' force to wage jihad against the 'near enemy,' or Muslim
nations which do not follow his version of Islam (Qutb 1964). Al-Qaeda maintains the principles of
Qutb in what the ideal vision of the world, and the ultimate goal of their group should be4. However,
they differ on the method used to achieve this policy change. Al-Qaeda chooses to target the 'far
enemy,' or non-Muslim nations which project power in the world, particularly the United States instead
of Qutb's purposed starting with the Middle East and expanding outward approach.
However, al-Qaeda cannot operate solely with a goal that is essentially, 'take over the world'. As
a rational group, they have developed a set of more short-term goals. An example of one of al-Qaeda's
goals with a concrete definition is the removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.
In the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, bin Laden wrote about the United States:
“The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the
Prophet...is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places ... by the armies of the American
Crusaders and their allies,” (bin Laden 1996). In this fatwa, bin Laden urged jihad against the
Americans and Israelis, the “Jews and crusaders.”
A later fatwa signed by Osama bin Laden, Ayaman al-Zawahiri, and other terrorist leaders, calls
on Muslims “to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for
every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it,” (bin Laden et al. 1998).
This fatwa went beyond the scope of the first, not only calling for war against the Americans in Saudi
2 The Tafakari movement or ideology is a general form of extremist Islam which claims mainstream Muslims are infidels.
3 Islamic nation or Islamic community
4 For an example of Sayyid Qutb being used in al-Qaeda doctrine, see CRRC 2
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Arabia, but declaring that jihad against all Americans everywhere, and their allies, was a duty of all
Muslims. It is from this later statement that we can see an evolution in the scope of al-Qaeda's publicly
declared goals. Initially, they called for a specific policy action- the removal of troops from Saudi
Arabia. This eventually became a non-specific campaign against America, the aggressor of the world.
However, statements issued by al-Qaeda leadership cannot be taken at face value. As a group involved
in asymmetric conflict, their strength lies in the ability to manipulate an audience, provoke fear, and
establish themselves as unified, competent and powerful (Hellmich 2011).
From this non-specific goal, we can determine that al-Qaeda's overall goal is instability. While
the world they envision, a global umma governed by sharia, is theoretically stable, it is not realistically
feasible. So, instead al-Qaeda pursues strategic priorities that could lead to a global umma- namely the
promotion of instability. These strategic priorities are varied in scope, region, and feasibility. They
include furthering the “bleeding wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan, consolidating power in Pakistan, “the
eye of the storm” for terrorism, creating and building its networks and franchises it has built as “the
first truly global terrorist organization is history,” continued attacks against the United States and
Western Europe, anti-Shia violence, and action against Israel (Riedel 2008, chapter 6) .
Creating a networked organizational structure is another form of strategic thinking. Al-Qaeda's
organization consists layers of alliances, operational and ideological. Game theory suggests that when a
government is weak, a transnational terrorist organization gains a strategic advantage from deploying a
radical representative, both this can be removed with outside assistance or a changing of posture from
the government or terrorist group (Siqueira and Sandler 2010). The establishment of these affiliations
may also have its costs. Covert organizations face the issues of trust and community that legitimate
organizations do not ( Ellstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). These illicit network structures are less
adaptable and resilient than licit organizations; an adaptation of a network structure creates
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organizational dilemmas such as reduction of unity, cohesion and collective action problems, “
(Ellstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008).
These networks and franchises are an important aspect of how al-Qaeda has organized itself.
Several different models have been used to explain the organization of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has been
used as the model to describe a “dune organization,” an organization that vacillates between territorial
presence and disappearance (Mishal and Rosenthal 2006). An alternative, but not necessarily
oppositional, model classifies al-Qaeda as an “all-channel” organization that has a loosely coordinated
leadership and dispersed cell-network structure with extensive multi-directional communication
(Kilberg 2012). A different model is that there are two types of Islamist groups, “strategic groups,”
which are organized and operate similar to secular nationalist or regime-change movement and
“abstract/universal” groups which are affiliated with al-Qaeda (Piazza 2009). This model of the
“abstract/universal” group incorporates the larger network structure and affiliate groups. It also reflects
the wider scope of the goals of al-Qaeda, as opposed the the specifically defined strategic priorities of
other groups. What can be said about the organization of al-Qaeda is that at its center it is tightly run
and highly organized.
One problem encountered with the center-affiliate structure adopted by al-Qaeda is adjusting the
global mission to local realities. Terrorism works because it is dependent on a 'constituency' and it is
important that the grievances and preferences of the local jihadis and potential recruits are addressed. In
the case of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a group with strong ties to al-Qaeda leadership, this has
meant finding a balance between carrying out attacks abroad, in accordance with the strategy of alQaeda's center, and attacks against the Saleh regime, in order to maintain local support in Yemen
(Loidolt 2011). Contrastingly, al-Qaeda has not become successfully embedded in Saudi Arabia, the
homeland of Osama bin Laden. Thomas Hegghammer attributes this to a relative lack of social
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grievances causing al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to be based on a extreme pan-Islamist ideology instead of
the Islamic based social-revolutionary ideology of groups outside of Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer
2010a).
State Instability
Political instability can be defined in many ways. Generally, political science literature treats
political instability as a precursor to state-failure. Government illegitimacy and civil war are considered
to be the definition of state failure, “failure for a nation-state looms when violence cascades into all-out
internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life
decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their
surroundings,” (Rotberg 2002). Linked to this definition are numerous different indicators of quality of
life within the country. This includes simple things like the ability of the government to provide basic
services such as education, clean water, and roads. The security of the populace also plays an important
role, from the existence of a reliable police force to extended periods of conflict.
Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace publish a yearly “Failed States Index” in which nations
are classified and ranked according to stability. States with little or no instability are ranked “Most
stable” and states with high levels of instability are ranked as “critical,” with three categories in
between, “stable,” “borderline,” and “in danger.” In 2012, the most unstable state was Somalia and the
most stable was Finland. While the full methodology of the index is not fully explained, the Fund for
Peace offers this explanation:
Guided by 12 primary social, economic and political indicators..., the CAST software
analyzes the collected information using specialized search terms that flag relevant
items. This analysis is then converted using an algorithm into a score representing the
significance of each of the various pressures for a given country.The content analysis is
further triangulated with two other key aspects of the overall assessment process:
quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs based on major events in the countries
examined. Fund for Peace 2012
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These indicators range from specific and measurable, such as GDP per capita, to the difficult to define
such as power struggles. Overall, this index should be regarded as a good general guideline to the
relative stability and the stability trends of a country, but specific numerical scores and rankings should
be met with skepticism. Another earlier and more quantitatively based attempt to create a measurement
for political instability was proposed by William Linehan (1976).
What causes political instability? Instability is a complex phenomenon that has many possible
contributing factors. A 2005 report of the Political Instability Task Force, borrowing from Tolstoy,
perhaps phrases it best: “all stable nations resemble one another; each unstable nation is unstable in its
own way,” (Goldstone et al. 2005, 11). However, the task force was able to find four independent
variables which had a correlation with state failure. These are: regime type, infant mortality, instability
in neighboring states, and the presence or absence of state-led organization (Goldstone et. al 2005).
Specifically, instability was lowest in full democracies and authoritarian states, and highest in partial
democracies or partial authoritarian states. It may be possible that infant mortality is correlated with
political instability because it is a symptom, rather than cause, of instability. Interestingly, contrary to
expectations, “most economic, demographic, geographic, and political variables do not have consistent
and statistically significant effects on the risk of instability onset” (Goldstone et al. 2005, 11).
A study on regime duration echoes the findings of the Political Instability Task force, finding
that mixed or inconsistent regimes have the shortest duration, and thus the most changes in regime, a
time of high instability (Gates et al. 2006). This study also concludes that these regimes that are not full
democracies or pure authoritarian regimes lack self-enforcing characteristics; it finds that the two most
vulnerable types of regime structures are dictatorships with high political participation and highly
constrained elected executives when there is a small electorate (Gates et al. 2006).
James Vreeland proposes another way of explaining the correlation between partial democratic
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or partial authoritarian regimes. He argues that in a subset of these countries that experience extreme
factionalism resulting in violence. Removing this subset gets rid of the correlation between regime-type
and civil war, suggesting that instead there is a relationship between political violence and civil war
(Vreeland 2008). Claude Ake argues that there is no theoretical support for transitional societies, or
societies undergoing modernization, many of which are also transitioning politically should be more
prone in instability (1974)
State Failure and Terrorism
One interesting similarity between the possible explanations for state failure and terrorism is
that both appear to be most prevalent in partial democracies. This indicates that there may be either an
inherent structural problem with partial democracies that is especially problematic or an indication that
the causes of terrorism and instability are related. Empirical studies have shown that there is a
correlation between failed states and terrorism (Piazza 2008b). There is a great deal of literature which
attributes failed states to producing terrorists. However, it should be noted that despite the fact that
weak and failed states may enable terrorism, political instability is not a necessary condition because
terrorist groups can be observed operating in stable states across all varieties of government systems,
including stable liberal democracies. (Newman 2007). Aidan Hehir goes so far as challenge this
connection between state failure and terrorism, arguing that state failure does not attract terrorists, and
that the heterogeneity of state failures restrict any prediction or explanations stemming from it (Hehir
2007).
However, it has been found that in European parliamentary systems, incidents of terrorism
actually may strengthen governments (Indridason 2008). Specifically, when terrorist incidents occur in
these countries, the parliamentary government will form based on a surplus coalition. This results in the
elected government coalition lasting longer than the average governing coalition. However, it is
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important to note that this applies only the governing coalition, and not government stability in general.
It also applies to European democracies, countries that are already stable.
Overall, it is possible that terrorism could create state instability. However for the few clear
historical examples where this occurs at high enough levels to undermine the very existence of the
state, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Lebanon, it is unclear where to draw the line between terrorism and civil
war. There is also the complicated variable of existing stability. States which are at the most risk for
destabilization from terrorism also have man complicated ethnic, social, religious, and political
conflicts occurring at the same time as the terrorist campaign and may have multiple unrelated terrorist
groups operating in the same space in the same time.
Organization Theory
Al-Qaeda could be considered an example of the Weberian model of bureaucracy. Max Weber
argues that there are four characteristics of the structure of a bureaucracy: hierarchy, specialization,
division of labor, and standard operating procedures (Weber 1948). Captured documents indicate that
the al-Qaeda central leadership is highly hierarchical, with roles, duties, and rank order of each member
of the leadership clearly established (CRRC 9). There is also evidence of the al-Qaeda central
organization having clearly defined specializes across all of its operations, including assigning clear
roles and duties within four-person urban based operational cells, advanced training courses for
different types of combat specialties, and the functions of each camp staff member, from camp director
to kitchen assistant enumerated in camp charters (CRRC 10). However, while formal hierarchies are
important in determining organizational behavior, informal social structures and social status remain
important for behavior that occurs within and organization (Morril et al 1997).
One way in which organizations can gain effectiveness is through increasing organizational
trustworthiness towards their employees. Organizational trust is defined as behavior which supports the
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the expectation that the organization will act in the interests of its employees (Mayer 1995). This can
be demonstrated through benefits guaranteed to jihadis through the contracts they sign and the oath
they swear upon joining al-Qaeda (Appendix 2).
It is important to remember that covert political organizations differ widely from the
organizations that organizational theory is based on, which are primarily corporations. Some ways of
defining what a covert political organization is are contestation of institutionalized power, perceptions
of collective injury, social occlusion, and officially forbidden forms of dissent (Morril et al. 2003).
Organizations within an institution balance insider and outsider status by re-interpreting
institutional beliefs and texts, claiming to represent the majority of the membership, and by distancing
themselves from allegedly corrupt elites within the organization (Kretschmer 2009). The institution
which al-Qaeda belongs to could be considered to be Islam as a whole, or increasingly specific radical
ideological movements. Al-Qaeda exhibits this behavior by claiming to speak for all Muslims, by
picking choice selections from holy text to incorporate into organizational doctrine, and by attacking
fellow Muslims. If an al-Qaeda affiliate organization were to demonstrate this behavior towards alQaeda, it would be a sign that the organization no longer believed their affiliation to be beneficial. AlQaeda itself can also be thought of as an institution and its affiliates as being organizations within that
institution.
Organizational Mechanisms for Instability
Organization theory points to six potential ways in which an al-Qaeda affiliate organization
could either cause the group to become more of a threat to stability in their home country, or less so.
These mechanisms are: resources, knowledge, ideology, identification, foreign targeting, and local
distrust. In some instances, particularly with regard to foreign targeting, the mechanism does influence
the group, but it is not a result of the al-Qaeda affiliation. While the definition for these mechanisms
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can be overlapping, each has some key characteristics.
Resources
The resource mechanism is the most obvious example of how one group may help another.
Resources can be widely defined as financial resources, material resources, and other tactical resources.
In order to survive, all religious organizations must draw resources from the world outside of their
organization (Wuthnow 1994). Al-Qaeda has developed a multilevel funding bases and may share
these funds with others, “the basic sources of Jihad funding are charity, 'Sharia' funding' donations, and
also spoils of battles that the Islamic force face,” (CRRC 4). Resources generated by state sponsorship
allow terrorist organizations to maintain themselves internally while the state provides a safehaven to
the group (Carter 2012). An al-Qaeda affiliation is similar to state sponsorship in that the state offers
strategic guidance and resources. However, the al-Qaeda affiliation does not come with territorial
connections. In businesses, resource allocation is an iterated process that is initially shaped by
'corporate contexts' at the top levels which is then shaped by the early development results (Noda and
Bower 1996). Allocating resources within a terrorist group could follow the same model, with leaders
placing resources according to social-political contexts and then evaluating this allocation based on
success. This pattern could be a motivator for allocating resources to affiliated groups because the
central al-Qaeda organization cannot use its funds for attacks without expecting to be targeted. Outside
of Afghanistan, affiliate organizations may have more success because the political context allows them
to move about more freely. This iterated process also give al-Qaeda the option of providing one
payment to a group without the expectation of continual financing, something it cannot do within its
own organization.
Creating alliances may be an economic decision for al-Qaeda. Cost economizing is “the primary
drive of alliances following the loss of organizational distinctive,” for religious organizations (Miller
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2002). Funding local groups with the same ideology may be a more cost effective way of expanding
than expanding the al-Qaeda organization itself. Alliances allow related religious organizations to
establish an “economy of scale” and “transfer technologies” which can include knowledge like
recruitment strategies and leadership development (Miller 2002). By economizing, al-Qaeda may be
able to use its financial resources on a wider scale that it could have without its large network.
Knowledge
Knowledge is a mechanism that may be considered a subset of resources. Knowledge is a type
of resources for which the other group doesn't necessarily lose when shared with the other group,
making it a point for cooperation to occur. Knowledge could include practical knowledge, such as
bombmaking skills, or the less tangible, such as strategic knowledge or organizational leadership
knowledge. While learning is a phenomenon that occurs on the individual level, organizations can play
a critical role in articulating and amplifying knowledge (Nonaka 1994). In a business setting, one form
of knowledge transfer, sharing personal advice, has been found to improve work quality (Haas and
Hansen 2007). In the government context, interagency knowledge sharing is considered to increase
productivity and output (Dawes 1996).
In economics, it has been argue that entrepreneurship and innovation are the key motivators in a
capitalist process (Schumpeter 1934). If this same idea was to be applied to terrorist organizations, then
new organizations could be seen as entrepreneurs and investing resources in a new area with new
innovations could be a better way to generate 'profit' than continually investing in established
organizations. This 'Schumperterian innovation' system is based on “The reconceptualization of an
existing system in order to use the resources from which it is built to use the resources from which it is
built in novel and potentially rent-generating ways,” (Galuini and Rodan 1998).
Knowledge recombination can also be discussed using this paradigm. Important considerations
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for knowledge recombination are how explicit the knowledge base is, with the more explicit knowledge
base resulting in lower costs of exchange; another consideration is the extent to which personal
identities are associated with the knowledge, with highly personal knowledge having high transfer costs
(Galuini and Rodan 1998). This could mean that non-technical skills like strategy and leadership,
which are both generally implicit and highly associated with personal identity, will be difficult to
transfer. However, the overall recombination of information through transfer of knowledge to affiliate
organizations can be seen as an investment in the 'business' of terrorism.
An alternative argument is that even within the terrorist organization, leaders do not trust
operatives with funds because of fear of skimming (Shapiro and Siegal 2007). If terrorist leaders cannot
trust their own operatives with financial resources, why would they trust outside organizations? An
additional argument is that terrorism is not an expensive tactic. Those organizations without large
amounts of resources may attract more ideologically dedicate recruits. While resources may increase
recruitment in the short term, those who join violent political organizations for material gain have little
commitment to the organization's long term goals; in resource poor environments, recruitment is based
on social commitments- these recruits have increased willingness to invest their time and energy
(Weinstein 2005).
A study conducted on businesspeople in Taiwan suggested at the individual level, willingness to
share knowledge is negative correlated with a “Machiavellian,” or ethically dubious approach to the
business environment (Liu 2008). This suggests that there will be greater levels of knowledge sharing
within organizations which consist of individuals who prioritize ethics and morality over personal
material or status gain. A terrorist organization is made up of this type of person who considers their
personal morality to have a more importance than material or status gain, as evidenced by the
willingness to risk their lives and give up jobs to pursue what they believe to be the will of God. Within
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businesses, internal information sharing is facilitated by informal horizontal social relationships
amongst units that do not compete for resources, is negatively effected by formal hierarchical structures
(Tsai 2002). The informality of the affiliate-center relationship may allow for more knowledge sharing
than within the al-Qaeda the hierarchical central organization.
Ideology
Ideology is the base motivator for terrorist activity. Terrorist groups undertake attacks even
when there are no organizational connections or strategic motivations, it is the 'story' of jihadism that is
important to the movement at the local and global levels (Ramakrishna 2005). One group, Hizb alTahrir (Party of Liberation) is part of the transnational radical sunni movement without carrying out
any violence itself. The group indoctrinates individuals and serves as a “conveyor belt” to terrorist
organizations and has popularized the idea of the establishment of the caliphate as anything other than a
utopian goal (Baran 2005). It is from its ideological, instead of operation specific, focus, that Hizb alTahrir has been able to change the conversation in the Islamic world without violence.
The importance of ideology is further evidenced by examining the history of radical groups.
One of the reasons for the growth of jihadi organizations was the pan-Islamic identity movement which
resulted in an increase in transnational volunteerism (Hegghammer 2010b). Later, Iraq has served as an
ideological challenge to the global jihadi movement, who saw it as a 'crossroads' between the jihadis
and the 'crusaders'. This ideology drew in foreign terrorist volunteers to Iraq and increased recruitment
amongst militant Islamist groups (Hegghammer 2006).
The credibility of the founder's commitments to ideology and the perceived legitimacy of the
movement are two factors which influence the growth and viability of new religious movements and
organizations (Miller 2002). The al-Qaeda name can be seen as more credible and legitimate than other
lesser known groups. Bin Laden and the early members of al-Qaeda remained dedicated to their group,
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despite getting forced out of Sudan and into Afghanistan, where their camps were bombed by the U.S.
Government, indicating a very high level of commitment to the group. The perception of an
organization as an effective manager of tradition allows for group success among non-profits (GoldenBiddle 1995). In cases, innovation can be perceived as illegitimate, meeting resistance from
stakeholders within the organization (Dougherty and Heller 1994).
The strictness of the al-Qaeda ideology may be a point a strength for other groups.
Sociologically, there is a phenomenon in which sects which reassert historical principles of a religion
are have greater success than less strict religious movements they spawned from (Miller 2002). An
example of this is Martin Luther’s assertion of the teachings of Jesus Christ compared to the practices
of the Catholic Church. This is also equally applicable to the the Salafi movement, which claims to
return to the original principles of Islam. Al-Qaeda may draw power from the increasing popularity of
the ideology and the dedication of its ideology's adherents. However, for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam, an ethnonationalist terrorist organization based in Sri Lanka, ideology became one of the causes
for the ultimate failure of the organization because of the contradictory nature of their ideology and
practices (DeVotta 2009). Al-Qaeda is not immune from this kind of ideological dissonance.
Identification
The identification mechanism is based more on the organizational habits of intelligence
agencies and counterterrorism policy than the group itself. This mechanism is readily apparent in state
sponsored groups. State sponsorship a terrorist group can increase the risk of being eliminated by the
target state (Carter 2012). A similar pattern should occur with al-Qaeda affiliation, except there is not
sponsoring state to offer protection. In this case the target state would be primarily the United States,
but could also be the state where the group is located or other western nations.
One way in which an al-Qaeda affiliation may contribute to increased identification is through
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counter terrorist financing actions. One clear example is the U.N. 1267 Resolution, which has identified
and sanctioned individuals and organizations banned from the global payment system; one problem
with this system is that it only applies to al-Qaeda affiliates (Winer 2008). Other institutions, such as
the U.S. Treasury Department, acts on designations to impose sanctions on groups. These sanctions
come from being identification as a foreign terrorist organization.
The large multi-agency national security, intelligence, and law enforcement institutions provide
a logistical challenge to counterterrorism, particularly in the top down- command and control approach
taken by the Department of Homeland Security (Waugh and Sylves 2002). This style of organizational
management suppresses individual-level and small scale actions. The targeted identification of a
network, rather than unaffiliated groups or individuals, is easier to manage for these kind of
institutions. This challenge is multiplied by the fact that counterterrorism is an international activity.
Coordinated counterterrorism against transnational actors between different states is difficult because
of collective action problems and the costs occurred form proactive measures (Sandler 2005).
All of these institutional problems create an incentive to focus resources on targets for which
there is high incentive for interagency or international cooperation.Such targets would be groups that
are widely considered to be dangerous to every country and groups which lack a popular support base.
Al-Qaeda is this type of group, because it does not represent a specific geographical or ethnic
constituency and it does not have government support anywhere. From this increased identification, it
can be assumed that the group will be targeted more for counterterrorism action. Any group which is
targeted more will likely have less capacity than thus is less about to destabilize a country.
Foreign targeting
The foreign targeting mechanism is based on the logic that groups which attack primarily
foreign targets instead of local targets will have a smaller effect on a country than a group which
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attacks locally. Al-Qaeda is a group that exemplifies this type of transnational terrorism. Al-Qaeda's
attacks have been against the west and Western targets. Their central strategic focus is America, the
“crusaders,” who, in addition to being are allied with Zionists, earned the wrath of al-Qaeda because of
the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War at the request of the Saudi king (Bin Laden
1998).
This focus on the west and international targets can also been seen in al-Qaeda's internal
documents as well as their public stance. An al-Qaeda strategy document says of Europe, “ The
struggle is now in the West, where some understand and some do not understand the ideology or
observances and holy wars” (CRRC 4). Al-Qaeda lists the dangers that come from the Europeans: “As
for us, the source of war against us is:
As for us, the source of war against us is: 1. Corrupt appetites. 2. Extremely effective
drugs. 3. Birth control. 4. Nuclear waste. 5. Destroying the people's immune system;
spreading new diseases. 6. Biological and radiological weapons. 7. Spreading wars.
(CRRC 4)
These serve as both justifications for jihad against Europe and a warning or tactics that may be used
against them. In an employment contract, al-Qaeda attempts to define itself according to its targeting
practices : “Al-Qaeda's sphere of activity: International and transitional according to Al-Qaeda's
policy”. (CRRC 6). It does not clearly state what “international and transitional” means other than
defining its general goals in another document as, “Coordinate among the Jihad movements around the
Islamic world in order to create a united global Jihad movement,” (CRRC 10). These demonstrate that
in addition to an ideological commitment to attack the west, international targeting is also incorporated
into private al-Qaeda strategic doctrine.
However, there are ways in which attacking foreign targets has the potential to destablize a
country that the group is based in. An extreme example is how the 9/11 attacks, which took place in the
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United States, destabilized the nation of Afghanistan. While Afghanistan was not stable to begin with, it
did have a government and there was an Afghan Taliban state. Because al-Qaeda provoked the wrath of
the United States and the Taliban were unwilling to cooperate with the U.S., America invaded
Afghanistan and got rid of the government. It is also possible that foreign terrorist attacks could be
destabilize a home country by targeting local interests or persons abroad, or through choosing foreign
targets that may affect the economy, security, or diplomatic relations of a country. However, overall the
most direct way to destabilize a country is to attack it at home, so predominantly foreign targeting
choices are indicative of less destabilization unless foreign targets have been specifically strategically
chosen.
Local distrust
The last mechanism is local distrust. Because al-Qaeda is foreign focused, the makeup of the
group is generally different the local population. This is especially true of al-Qaeda when it was based
in Afghanistan, where the “Afghan Arabs” stood out from the local population and failed to establish a
home base (Wright 2006). This is less true for the affiliate organizations, which are made up Arab
volunteers returning home, in the case of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or from local volunteers,
lime many groups based in Pakistan.
In normal organizations, organizational trustworthiness, a precursor to trust, is based on seven
constructs: competence, legal compliance, responsibility to inform, quality assurance, procedural
fairness, interactional courtesy, and financial balance; these constructs are also tied to organizational
effectiveness (Caldwell and Clapham 2003). To its members, Al-Qaeda practices procedural fairness
according to what fairness means in the Salafi ideology within its institutions, such as in its training
camps, where it has a policy of racial equality, and declares on its training camp entry forms that “all
people are equal,” (CRRC 8). However, this fairness is not perceived to be practiced when al-Qaeda
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gains control over the local population, such as the case in Yemen where AQAP has instituted severe
punishments according to sharia law (Johnsen 279). This distrust is the “brand name,” of al-Qaeda can
be carried over to other organizations which have publicly allied itself with.
However, creating too many franchises can dilute the power of the brand name. Franchised
chains with a large portion of franchised to company owned outlets prevent with organization from
fully utilizing the brand name and tacit business practices because of opportunism and knowledge
considerations (Barthelemy 2008). Additionally, violent groups been found to have a history of
investing time in social work through charities and NGOs in order to gain popular support, in fact a
terrorist-charity organization may have more NGO activities than local non-terrorist purely NGO
organizations (Ly 2007). This builds trust with the local population.
Lacking local support can be a crippling disadvantage for a terrorist organization. Without
support and trust from the local population, the organization doesn't have a source of safehaven,
recruits, or resources. This is likely to result in a reduced operational capacity and and therefore a
reduced ability to create instability.
Al-Qaeda Affiliation has Costs and Benefits
It is important to take into account the many causes of state instability and the fluidity of the
definition of what instability is. It is also important to consider what types of power a terrorist group
has in creating instability. As a non-state actor, terrorist groups lack extensive armies or resources to
destabilize a country through overwhelming or overtaking its security forces. Instead, terrorist groups
create instability through two pathways. The first is careful strategic target selection, in which attacking
the weak spots of a country can bring it down. The second is through psychological, which cripples the
population through the sheer psychological force multiplying power of terror.
Overall, the brand name of al-Qaeda carries powerful connotations. While it can serve as a
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recruitment tool, or serve as a channel for resources or knowledge, becoming publicly allied with alQaeda immediately puts a target any group. Additionally, because of targeting choices and the makeup
of the group, becoming an al-Qaeda affiliate may draw attention away from the group's home country
and alienate them from the rest of the local population. The rest of this thesis will test whether al-Qaeda
affiliation has a net effect. Do the benefits of being affiliated with al-Qaeda ultimately outweigh its
costs?
Chapter Two
Methodology and Case Study Selection
The goal of this thesis is to determine how the strength of al-Qaeda affiliation affects stability
levels of the country where its affiliates are based. This question faces numerous theoretical challenges
in how to accurately measure both the independent variable, al-Qaeda affiliation closeness, and the
independent variable, instability caused by terrorist action. Other important challenges that must be
addressed are determining the causality of the relationship between terrorism and stability, and isolating
the specific effects of al-Qaeda affiliation and the destabilization effect of a terrorist group. Because of
the extreme variety of factors which contribute to instability, I will focus on actions undertaken by
terrorists and how they destabilize the country.
This thesis will be centered on three case studies, which will explore this question through
detailed studies of three groups with varying levels of al-Qaeda connection, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, based in Yemen; Lashkar-e-Taiba, in Pakistan; and Fatah al-Islam, in Lebanon. These case
studies will be structured around determining the level and types of the groups' relationships to alQaeda, determining the specific actions taken by the group which contribute to instability, and then
using six potential mechanisms to explain how the group's organizational ties to al-Qaeda can explain
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its contributions to instability.
Mechanisms for Destabilization
I hypothesize that there are three mechanisms by which al-Qaeda connections can increase
instability in a country, as well as three possible mechanisms by which al-Qaeda connections may
decrease the destabilizing power of the group. The three increasing mechanisms are resources,
knowledge, and ideology. The three decreasing mechanisms are identification, extra-local targeting,
and local distrust. These have been theoretically discussed in the previous chapter.
There are many types of resources al-Qaeda could potentially provide to its affiliated or
connected groups. These include physical resources, such as equipment; financial resources; logistical
resources, such as safe-houses; and strategic resources, such as media coverage. It is assumed that the
directionality of the resource flow is from al-Qaeda to its affiliate, but there is a potential for this
directionality to be reversed, and an affiliate to act as a fundraiser for al-Qaeda in the region with the
funds to be channeled out of the country. There is also the potential for this relationship to be
bidirectional, and both organizations give different types of resources to each other.
Knowledge is another mechanism by which al-Qaeda can increase the destabilizing power of a
group. One type of knowledge is operative level knowledge, either through the training of members of
the affiliate group or the loaning of knowledgeable al-Qaeda members, such as a skilled bombmaker, to
the group. This could also be institutional knowledge, such as a historical knowledge of the details of
past operations undertaken by al-Qaeda and what went wrong and what went right. It can also include
strategic knowledge, such as detailed knowledge about the operating procedures of the enemy or target,
such as transportation security procedures, and knowledge of how to evade these procedures.
The last increasing mechanism is ideology. Ideology is a powerful potential mechanism which
can supply the motivation behind the formation of the group. By giving a clear ideology and providing
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ideological statements, al-Qaeda can inspire its connected groups to pursue action on their own without
having close formal ties with the group. Additionally, ideology serves as a a recruitment tool. By
providing ideological statements or undertaking actions, al-Qaeda may inspire individuals as well as
groups. These individuals inspired by al-Qaeda may be recruited through social networks or the
internet by locally based associated groups. Additionally, ideology provides strategic guidance by
indicating who and what to target.
The first possible mechanism for al-Qaeda connections decreasing a group's destabilizing power
is identification. Al-Qaeda is powerful name in global politics. Considered to be one of the greatest
enemies of the United States and its allies, blacklisted by the United Nations, al-Qaeda has even served
as a point of agreement and cooperation between the United States, China, and Russia. This means that
the name al-Qaeda has garnered high recognition by the global public and especially government
security apparatuses. For this reason, there are a large amount of government resources devoted to
counterterrorism efforts related to al-Qaeda and there is greater potential for multilateral cooperation
surrounding these efforts. This has ensured that al-Qaeda, in its ideology, tactics, strategy, and history,
is perhaps the most well known terrorist group in the world. This public awareness could be costly to
an al-Qaeda affiliated group. This is because these groups may be more easily identifiable to
governments as a security threat. Any group that has publicly declared allegiance to al-Qaeda ensures
that they will be placed on terrorist lists and will be the target of counterterrorist efforts, such as placing
known members on no-fly lists, and in the case of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, becoming targets
for drone strikes. This identification also impedes the groups' ability to operate covertly. Because there
will be more government resources devoted to high-priority targets, any group which is found to have
communication with al-Qaeda is more likely to be closely monitored than a group which is considered
low priority.
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A second reason why al-Qaeda connection may decrease the destabilization ability of an
affiliated group is because if the group follows al-Qaeda strategy, it will focus its efforts primarily on
attacking targets which are overseas or domestic targets in which are of primarily interest to foreign
actors. Al-Qaeda has declared war on the United States, and it has attacked its European allies. This
represents a strategic focus on “the far enemy,” instead of local “near enemy” type targets. By focusing
its efforts on foreign actors, al-Qaeda may channel the efforts of the local extremist community away
from involvement in local conflicts and into its fight with the West. In Middle Eastern countries led by
authoritarian regimes, it is not uncommon for Islam to become the only counter-regime ideology
allowed to exist because it would not be politically feasible for the autocrat to deny religion a role in
public life, like it can socialism or other political ideologies. Therefore, in countries controlled by these
regimes, the strongest group of dissidents may be Islamists. By directing the most extreme of these
Islamists away from local concerns and onto the global politics, al-Qaeda ties may take away potential
actors in local conflicts.
The third potential mechanism which could decrease the destabilizing power of al-Qaeda
associated groups is local distrust. While it may be possible that connection to the al-Qaeda name could
help increase the power of a group locally, it may also be possible that because al-Qaeda is a foreign
group it may decrease the trust of the locals who may harbor or join the group. By bringing in foreign
people and ideas, an al-Qaeda associated group may be prone to ignore the local people. Having leaders
who did not grow up in the territorial base may mean that leaders may not operate according to local
customs or not be aware of local political dynamics, such as tribal systems. Additionally, its strict
Salafist ideology has caused al-Qaeda in the past in Afghanistan to ignore local customs and desecrate
local sacred or historical sites, such as the tombs of Islamic saints, which are not part of the Salafist
ideology. This has also occurred in the al-Qaeda uprisings in Mali in 2012. This may cause the
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indigenous population to become disenchanted or angry with al-Qaeda, as was seen in Iraq with alQaeda in Iraq.
Methodology
This study will be undertaken through case studies that are structured according to three
sections: al-Qaeda affiliation, effects on stability, and evaluation of the mechanisms of how al-Qaeda
connection may lead to increased or decreased contributions of the group to instability. By gathering
evidence, the first section will establish the strength of the group's ties to al-Qaeda. The second section
will identify specific actions through which the group has undertaken to establish a level of
contribution to instability in the country. The last section will compare these two levels and attempt to
explain correlation or lack of it and establish direction of causality through an analysis according to the
six hypothesized mechanisms.
The covert nature of these groups and the fight against them present several major challenges..
First, determining the exact nature of the ties of each group to al-Qaeda is difficult. The a large amount
of information about the actions of terrorist groups is either classified or unknowable. For this reason I
have adopted the simplest possible classification of ties system: groups that have a publicly declared
alliance to al-Qaeda, groups that are widely believed to be operationally associated with al-Qaeda, and
groups that draw from al-Qaeda ideology but are not believed to be associated with al-Qaeda. This
classification system reconciles the inability of knowing the full extent of the affiliate-al-Qaeda
relationship with the desire to create a full spectrum of cases. The oath of alliance to al_Qaeda is a
powerful symbol and signals that the group is formally part of the al-Qaeda organization, something
that distinguishes formally allied groups from allied groups. The difference between operational and
solely ideological allies is also an important distinction that must be made. These three categories
represent the basic structure of how al-Qaeda could relate to its affiliate groups.
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The exact nature of these connections is something that it is not possible to know, so I will
attempt to use what publicly available evidence there is about al-Qaeda links to determine what
evidence there is supporting the mechanisms I hypothesize cause al-Qaeda to be a contributing factor to
destabilization. Another challenge posed by incomplete or unknowable data is the inability to know the
full extent of activities of terrorist groups. The number of terrorist attacks is widely underreported and
those that are reported are often unattributable (Drakos 2006). It is difficult to assign responsibility for
an attack unless responsibility is claimed by that group. The claiming of responsibility is a highly
calculated strategic action. These two factors have led to adopting the working assumption that the
publicly available information about terrorist groups is representative of the actual nature of the
terrorist groups's actions. While there may be a likelihood that this is wrong, and some groups operate
at a higher rate of covert action than others, it is the only possible assumption that would allow for
analysis of group behavior.
Another major challenge is proving the direction of causality between state stability and
terrorism. Previous researchers have argued that there is a correlation between state instability and
terrorism, positing that the directionality of this relationship is one in which instability increases the
likelihood of terrorist groups forming in the state. What I am attempting to prove is that the opposite
relationship may also exist, that terrorism may increase state instability. Accepting the argument that
failing states see an increase in terrorism does not exclude the possibility that terrorism may increase
the failure rate of states. It is possible that both are true, and there is a cycle of state instability causing
an increase in terrorism, which in turn causes further decreases in state stability. These are all reasons
why the case studies are the best approach for answering this question. By doing a careful analysis of
groups, their history, and their relationships with their states and al-Qaeda, it is possible to fully analyze
each of the complicated factors that make up the group's contribution to instability.I will examine the
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overall stability situation within the state in order to demonstrate trends in state stability, but because of
the high pre-existing levels of instability and the the complexity of the actors in the regions, I will not
consider these general trends to be evidence of terrorism induced instability. What will be considered as
evidence are factors which can be directly tied to terrorist actions such as specific targeted attacks and
the overall level of attacks and violence caused by the group.
Each of my case studies will be structured into three sections: a description of the group and
explanation of its ties to al-Qaeda; a description of the general level of stability in the country and a
deeper discussion of how the group has effected stability; and an evaluation of whether the ties
described in the first section have could be argued to have increased the levels of destabilization
capabilities discussed in section two. .
The first section of each case study will determine what the group's connection to al-Qaeda is. I
will provide basic descriptive information about the group, such as where it operates and who it was
founded by and when. I will also discuss who makes up the membership of the group and whether the
group is banned by any states or receives any state support. If the group receives any state support, than
it may be considered to have another outside influence other than al-Qaeda. If the group is officially
banned by the state, this may indicate that the state has identified the group as a terrorist group. This
identification shows that the group either wishes to be publicly known or has done something to give
up their ability to act in a covert manner. Identifying the group as a terrorist group also shows that the
state considers the group to be a legitimate threat, and makes them a target for counterterrorist action.
I will then further discuss how each group is connected to al-Qaeda. This includes identifying
the public connections between al-Qaeda and the group, such as whether the group has sworn
allegiance to al-Qaeda or whether al-Qaeda has ever issued a public statement in support of action
undertaken by the group. I will examine the publicly stated ideology and strategy of the group, as well
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as any information about the group that available that is not public, to determine whether the group
ideology and strategy, including whether it places local or international targets as its priorities,
significantly deviates from the al-Qaeda ideology and strategy. This targeting selection is related to the
foreign targeting and ideological mechanisms. I will look for evidence of communications between alQaeda and the group, which is related to the knowledge mechanism. Another knowledge related aspect
of affiliation is whether the known leadership of the group to determine whether the leadership of the
associated group has ever played a role in al-Qaeda central actions or has been trained or recruited by
al-Qaeda central. I will also examine the timeline of available information about the connections
between al-Qaeda and the affiliated group, including when in the history of the associated group alQaeda ties have been formed, when these ties were more important and whether these ties have ever
been abandoned or downplayed. Any public dismissal of al-Qaeda ties could be a sgn of public distrust,
or emphasizing ties could be related to ideology. I will then try to find evidence of the types of benefits
these groups derive from their al-Qaeda connections, such as training for the membership, resources,
tactical and logistical assistance, media exposure, or branding. These fall under the category of
resources.
The second section of the case study will address state instability both generally and the specific
destabilization contributions by the al-Qaeda associated group to state instability. The general stability
trends will be used to place the terrorist group within the broader context of the patterns of the country
and region. The first part of this will be to identify the relevant region in which the group operates. The
relevant region is defined as the country where the group is operationally based as well as any countries
where they have undertaken or attempted operations. I will also determine the concentration of their
geographic reach, showing whether the group is based in a particular sub-national region or undertakes
operations in a particular sub-national region. I will then identify what are the main cleavages in the
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population which allow for instability and discuss the role the associated group has regrading these
cleavages. I will also take into account what the overall level of terrorism is in the country, including
number of groups based or operating in the country and how often terrorist attacks occur. I will then
look for evidence of specific examples of how the associated group has undermined stability of the
state. Examples of this include holding territory, targeted assassinations, an extension or reentrenchment of existing conflict, beginning new conflict, undermining peace processes, increasing
pressure along social cleavages, such as sectarian ones,, attacks on state infrastructure or institutions,
infliction of economic or physiological harm, and support for radicalization of the populace.
The concept of instability is difficult to define. While stable countries tend to be similar, each
unstable country or region experiences instability in its own unique way. So, one attempt to define
instability is simply the absence of stability. Stability implies that the country does not experience high
levels of uncertainty and unexpected change in its government and the political lives of its population.
This means that the government will be able to provide services, carry out essential functions and
continue to exist. The most essential and latent form of political stability is that the government and its
institutions will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. This means that unexpected forced regime
change, such as a coup or civil war, is an easily identifiable symptom of instability.
Another sign of instability is the inability of the government to provide security for its citizens
by implementing rule of law. Max Weber defined government as an institution with the monopoly on
legitimate use of force in a given territory (Weber 1919). When a government loses this monopoly, it
begins to lose its legitimacy as a governing institution. This can be measured by crime levels,
particularly violent crime; levels of political or ideological violence, and the power of violent non-state
actors in influencing policy. Violence can also come from outside the country, in the form of attacks by
international actors.
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The last measurement of stability is the ability of the government to function beyond
implementing basic rule of law. This is seen in essential government functions including both providing
services to the population and taxing them. One major component for both of these is the maintenance
of basic infrastructure which enables the establishment of government institutions in all of the territory
of the country. At its most basic level, government services should include: the ability to provide
property right protection, food in time of famine, water, and basic education and health service
infrastructure. The ability of the government to provide these services can be measured by the existence
and efficiency of government institutions. This can also be indirectly measured by testing for the
consequences of these institutions through changes in human development indicators (Goldstone et al
2005). Widespread preventable waterborne diseases could be a sign that the government is unable to
maintain basic health infrastructure and clean water sources. Low literacy and education levels indicate
that the government cannot efficiently provide education. Overall, trends in average life expectancy can
be representative of the relative stability or instability of a country (Rotberg 2002).
One way of tracking broad trends in stability is through indexes. Beginning in 2005, Foreign
Policy and the Fund for Peace have created an annual Failed States Index. The Failed States Index
assigns scores and rankings to every country. This score is based on a number of factors like the ones I
have previously discussed. This index score is useful in allowing the easy tracking of the relative
stability of a country over time. However, the rankings based on these scores can change independently
of what is happening in a country because unrelated countries may have their scores' drop or fall.
Additionally, the makers of the Failed States Index do not list the specific calculations undertaken to
produce the index, how data was collected, and how each factor was weighted.
In the first two sections of my case studies I will attempt to isolate the variables of al-Qaeda
connections and the destabilizing effects of the selected group as well as terrorism in general. In the
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third section I will attempt to establish a relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
The third section will attempt to tie the first two sections together by attempting to highlight the
organizational mechanisms coming from al-Qaeda affiliation which may have increased or decreased
the associated group's ability to destabilize the country in which they are based. Proving that
connections to al-Qaeda have increased or decreased levels of stability is a difficult problem because of
the complexity of the factors involved and the incomplete nature of the available information. Firstly,
effects on stability levels are influenced by a wide number of actors and factors. If the role of terrorism
in instability of a particular country can be established, it still may be difficult to isolate the
destabilizing effect of a particular group if, like in the case of Pakistan, there are a large number of
terrorist groups operating the the country. I plan on addressing this by using specific actions taken by
the group or responses to the group by the state, and how al-Qaeda connection has played a role in
these actions, as evidence for al-Qaeda connection being an explanatory variable in state instability.
The first mechanism that will be addressed is resource sharing. Using the evidence of what
resource sharing occurs between the group and al-Qaeda, I will establish whether the degree of
resource support given by al-Qaeda to the group makes the group dependent on al-Qaeda support for
undertaking its operations, or whether the amount of resources given to the group by al-Qaeda is
negligible, meaning the that group is largely independent of al-Qaeda for operational resources and can
function normally without any al-Qaeda help. Some of these resources are more tangible than others.
While funding is important for undertaking a mission, terrorist actions are typically relatively cheap.
However, the value of strategic assistance through media support may be very high.
The second mechanism to be evaluated is knowledge. I will analyze the known specifics of
actions taken by the group to determine whether they benefited from knowledge gained through their
connection with al-Qaeda. This can include operatives attending training camps run by al-Qaeda, or use
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of al-Qaeda methods in planning an attack. Whether a group has learned how to undertake attacks and
undertaken opposition research on their own, or with al-Qaeda assistance an what role this played in
the attacks the group has undertaken that have had the greatest effect on stability.
The third mechanism for the increase of destabilizing power is ideology. I will examine public
statements made by the group, and compare them to al-Qaeda ideology. I will also demonstrate whether
the group arrived at the ideology through inspiration or connection to al-Qaeda or of its own accord. I
will evaluate how much al-Qaeda provided ideology has influenced target selection and strategy.
Evidence supporting this mechanism would be specific citing of al-Qaeda doctrines justifying action
undertaken by the group.
Overall, I will be looking for evidence that the groups' connections to al-Qaeda have increased
the efficiency of action or created opportunities for destabilizing action that the group could not have
without the al-Qaeda connection, or evidence that that al-Qaeda connection has influenced the group to
pursue a course of action that is more destabilizing than it might be motivated to do without the alQaeda connection.
The first mechanism that I will build evidence for decreasing destabilization in the country is
identification. The evidence for this mechanism will be focused on counterterrorism efforts targeting
the group. I will find government statements about the group, and determine how the state categorizes
the groups within its counterterrorism priorities, whether these statements identify the group as a threat
because of connection to al-Qaeda or because of other reasons, and identify any public action taken by
the state against the group. This will include counterterrorism efforts by the country where the group is
based, countries within the region in which the group is based and any countries outside the region that
feel the group is a threat to their security, such as the United States. If the evidence shows that the state
has made the group a higher priority than similar terrorist groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda, or if the
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state has undertaken counterterrorism measures against the group because of their al-Qaeda affiliation,
then that will provide evidence supporting the identification mechanism.
The second mechanism that I will build a case for the al-Qaeda connection decreasing
destabilization is foriegn targeting. The basis of this logic is that a group that does not target the
country where it is based does not contribute to the the instability of that country. I will first use the
Global Terrorism Database to calculate the ratio of in-country to out-of-country attacks undertaken by
the group. I will also take into account the notoriety of these attacks, the importance of their targets,
and the total number of causalities and fatalities of these attacks. I will then determine why the group
choose to undertake attacks outside of its locality. If the reason is an al-Qaeda inspired far-enemy
ideology than this will support evidence of this mechanism being relevant.
The last mechanism I will build a case for al-Qaeda affiliation causing less destabilization in the
country is local distrust. By knowing how much of the group is composed of foreigners and how much
the al-Qaeda ideology clashes with local customs and ideology, I will establish how much group
effectiveness is undermined by local unwillingness to work with the group. Evidence in support of this
will be local opposition to actions taken by the group, the inability of the group to recruit locals, and
local resentment of the group. While it is assumed that there will be local opposition and unwillingness
of most terrorist groups, the evidence I will look for is whether this opposition is based on factors
relating to the groups al-Qaeda connection. If the opposition is based on resentment of foreign presence
or ideology, and the cause of this foreign presence or ideology is primarily al-Qaeda, then this
mechanism will be supported.
Case Selection
I have complied a list of Al-Qaeda affiliated or linked groups (Appendix 1). This list is based on
government terrorist designated listings which mention al-Qaeda from the United States, Canada,
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Australia, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United Nations 1267 Committee listings. This list
includes thirty-five groups from twenty-three countries. Pakistan has the highest number of groups with
seven affiliated groups. There are also concentrations of groups in Chechnya, North Africa, and
Southeast Asia.
I then classified this list into three categories: groups which have formally sworn allegiance to
al-Qaeda or its emir and have close ties, groups that have operational ties to al-Qaeda but have not
sworn allegiance, and groups that are ideologically inspired by al-Qaeda but have no clear operational
ties. I additionally created a sub-group of the operational ties but not sworn allegiance category for
groups who receive resources from al-Qaeda but have little or no other ties to the group. This
classification was done by finding descriptive non-partisan academic works profiling these groups. Two
academic sources were consulted for each group. This also necessitated the creation of a fourth
category “tenuous or inconclusive” for which the preponderance of academic work disagrees with
government designations that the group has al-Qaeda links, or for which there is no clear evidence for
or against al-Qaeda links. Of the thirty-five original groups, eight fall into this category, decreasing the
total groups to twenty-seven. For the first two categories, “formally aligned” and “operationally
aligned” I have selected one representative group to profile in a case study of how differing levels of
ties to al-Qaeda may affect how each group impacts regional instability. These groups are Al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula and Lashkar-e-Taiba For the third category, “ideologically connected,” all four
groups are small and have had little total impact on instability, and thus have not generated a sufficent
amount of literature to undertake a full case study for one selected group. For this reason, I have done
shorter case studies of all four of these groups: Harkat ul-Mujahideem, in Pakistan; Fatah al-Islam, in
Lebanon; the Islamic Army of Aden, in Yemen; and Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, also in Pakistan.
In selecting the groups for case studies, attention was paid to choosing groups that would have
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enough information publicly available to do a full case study as well as choosing groups that would
prove challenging cases for my theories. While it would have been ideal to choose groups for which all
variables but al-Qaeda affiliation could be held constant and are located in countries whose stability
patterns are simple to isolate the role of terrorism, due to the realities of the distribution of cases this is
impossible. Factors which vary across groups which may influence destabilization include group size
and the length of time the group has existed for. Because of the ongoing, and thus rapidly evolving,
nature of civil war and conflict within countries, I have chosen countries which, while unstable, are not
actively engaged in a declared civil war. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) was not chosen as a
case study on account of these criteria because of the ongoing conflicts in Mali and the tenacious nature
of stability in Libya. While there is certainly conflict occuring in Pakistan and Yemen, it has not
reached full scale civil war and the governments have control over the majority of their territory.
The three countries in which the case study groups are based in, Lebanon, Yemen, and Pakistan,
all face multiple stability challenges. Pakistan and Yemen are considered to be in the least stable,
“critical,” category in the 2012 Failed States Index, ranking 11 and 8 respectively for most unstable
countries, with scores of 101 and 104 (Foreign Policy 2012). In this index Lebanon ranks 42 overall
with a score of 85. Additionally, two of the countries in which case study groups operate in but are not
based, India and Saudi Arabia, are much more relatively stable, ranking 78 and 100 with scores of 78
and 73. Undertaking case studies which determine the stability of countries already facing challenges
requires careful attention acknowledging the contribution to instability by many factors which are
unrelated to the group or terrorism in general. For this reason, while case studies will reference the
general state of stability in the countries where the group is based and operates, the evidence that is
most directly related to actions taken by the groups will be weighted the strongest.
One other variation across groups that must be taken into account is size. Size estimates for
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AQAP vary from 100-600 (Gerges 2010, CBS News 2010). Fatah al-Islam is a smaller group, with an
estimated 200 members (Bloom 2007). Laskar-e-Taiba is much larger, with an estimated size of several
thousand (NCTC). Group size variation can be looked at in one of two ways: as a pre-existing factor
that should be controlled for, or as a product of effective or ineffective recruitment, which can be a
result of the ideology, resource, or local distrust mechanisms. Because of this, I have elected to allow
for variation of group size across groups. However, group size over time will be taken into account, as
will where the recruits come from. If the recruits are found to be primarily foreign nationals without
connections to the country, recruits inspired by al-Qaeda ideology, or those who have trained in alQaeda camps, then the al-Qaeda connection is likely responsible for group size. If the group is found to
be primarily citizens of the country where the group is based who have not trained in al-Qaeda camps,
then group size, and any additional operational abilities associated with it, will be taken into account as
not a product of al-Qaeda connection.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the group chosen as the case study group for the
“formal ties” category. The group is based in Yemen, but it also has operational objectives in Saudi
Arabia. AQAP was formed in the 2009 merger of al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.
Al-Qaeda has maintained a strong presence in Yemen since nearly its beginning, with the early alQaeda attacks against the United States occurring in the Yemeni Gulf of Aden against the USS. Cole in
2000. Al-Qaeda has also had a long history of Saudi Arabian presence. Osama bin Laden was a Saudi
of Yemeni descendent and many al-Qaeda recruits are Saudis, particularly during its early days of jihad
against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia is also a major source of al-Qaeda funding. However,
attacks taking place in Saudi Arabia have been ineffective. Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia was crushed by
the Saudi government in a counterterrorism campaign that was a response to a series of attacks
undertaken in 2003-2004. Because of this failure of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia to continue its existence
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in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia merged with al-Qaeda in Yemen to form the Yemen based alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This suggests that al-Qaeda is unable to operate in states like Saudi
Arabia which have strong security forces.
AQAP has formerly sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda since its beginnings as an organization. It is a
clear example of cooperation and collaboration between the central organization and the affiliate in
terms of goals, strategies, leadership connections and contributions to the global movement. It is also
an example of the balancing of local and global agendas. The four goals of AQAP are attacking the
U.S. homeland, attacking western interests in Yemen, destabilizing the Yemeni government, and
assassinating members of the Saudi royal family (Rollins 2011). These goals display a combination of
both the influence of al-Qaeda global ideology and a regional political agenda. These dual agendas are
the result of “ideological hybridization” brought by the group having interests that were both local and
foreign (Lindo et al 2011). The group operates internationally as well as in its home base in Yemen,
with connections to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb and al-Shabbab in Somalia (Rollins 2011).
AQAP leadership has a prominent place in the al-Qaeda global movement. In particular,
Anwar al-Awlaki, a former high ranking member of AQAP, has been responsible for radicalization
through taped sermons and has been connected as an ideological inspiration to several attacks by
individuals in the United States. Al-Awalaki, an American citizen, was killed in a drone strike in Yemen
in 2011. Additionally, AQAP has published the English language jihadi magazine Inspire, which was
aimed at radicalizing individuals and encouraging them to attack in the West, including providing tips
and instructions for relatively cheap attacks that could be undertaken individually without any
organizational connections.
AQAP was chosen because it is a clearly defined example of an organization with formal ties to
al-Qaeda. Additionally, there is adequate information publicly available about the group. . AQAP
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presents a difficult case to prove my hypothesis that al-Qaeda increases instability because the group
has become increasingly active over time despite the declining role of al-Qaeda global leadership in the
al-Qaeda movement. Additionally, there is a question as to the validity of all my proposed mechanism
because AQAP throws into questions the directionality of the al-Qaeda- affiliated group relationship,
with AQAP doing more to actively spread the al-Qaeda ideology globally than al-Qaeda central.
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is the group that has been selected as the case study for the “ties to alQaeda, but not formally,” classification group. While they have not sworn any formal allegiance to alQaeda, they have had al-Qaeda ties dating from the founding of the group in 1987. Lashkar-e-Taiba
operates primarily in the Kashmir region.They are also responsible for attacks throughout Pakistan and
India, notably the 2008 Mumbai attacks and suspected of involvement it the 2001 attack of the Indian
parliament. LeT also has ties to jihadis in the West, such as the “Virginia paintball jihad network”
(Tellis 2012).
As a case study the LeT may prove challenging because the exact nature of their al-Qaeda
connection is something that cannot be determined from available documents. However, this is
significant work done on LeT, such as that of Stephen Tankel, which connects them to al-Qaeda. An
additional challenge of this case study is the connections between the LeT and other non-al-Qaeda
groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), as well as potential connections to the government of
Pakistan. Despite that fact that it is a banned group in Pakistan, it is believed that the LeT may be
receiving money from Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Cordesman 2011). This could be a
potential variable that could complicate full analysis of how al-Qaeda ties influence the organization
because state ties and funding could be a powerful influence over organizational behavior.. For this
reason, I will not discount LeT as a case, but will additionally consider the ramifications of state
support on group behavior.
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One advantage of using the LeT as a case study is their history spans the entire length of the
time period studied and throughout this history they have experienced large variations in activity
levels., with high levels in the early 1990s, low levels in the early 2000s, with rapidly increasing and
decreasing levels in the late 2000s. These activity level variations will provide an opportunity to try to
explain variation within a particular case. It also proves to be a case that will be the most challenging to
my hypothesis because of the large size and political power the group has. The Mumbai attacks and the
repercussions that follow, such as increased awareness of the threat of terrorism, and heightened
Pakistani-Indian tensions, show in 2008 a case in which this group clearly undermined the security of
India, a large, stable nation. Additionally, the LeT case challenges the mechanism of ideology because
its Deobandi ideology, while essentially the same as al-Qaeda Salafism, was developed indigenously as
is not dependent on the al-Qaeda organization for its spread.
An additional challenge of this case study is the complexity of determining stability in the
region which LeT operates. Pakistan, LeT's geographical base, is home to a large number of Islamist
terrorist groups. Kashmir has become an important battleground for these Islamist groups. Pakistan also
faces numerous non-terrorist stability challenges and has a history full of coups and assassinations of
its leaders. Determining what exactly the terrorist contribution to this stability level, and then singling
out the LeT's specific contributions will be key to understanding the role in instability of LeT and its alQaeda ties. .
Fatah al-Islam is an example of the groups within the “ideologically, but not organizationally,
linked,” category. These four ideologically linked groups are smaller and less prominent than most of
the groups with closer al-Qaeda connections. While this general fact supports my hypothesis, it makes
choosing as case study difficult. Fatah al-Islam founded in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon in
2006. The group is not a part of or related to the Palestinian group Fatah. They officially deny having
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any links to al-Qaeda (BBC 2007). However, their ideology is highly influenced by al-Qaeda and
endorses the ideas of al-Qaeda. Fatah al-Islam's goal is the establishment of an Islamic state of
Palestine and the destruction of Israel. The group is not connected to al-Qaeda at the leadership or
organizational levels, however some non-leader members of the group do have al-Qaeda experience or
affiliations. Group membership is small, approximately 150-200 militants, some of whom are Arab
volunteers with combat experience in Iraq (BBC 2007). The group is most noted for its 2007 conflicts
with the Lebanese army in the south of Lebanon. Despite being based in Lebanon, the most of the
members of the group are of Palestinian origin, and the group has its power bases in Palestinian refugee
camps inside of Lebanon.
Establishing stability levels in Lebanon is a challenge because of the complex nature of its
conflict. Lebanon underwent civil war for 15 years, ending in 1990. The south Lebanon in particular,
where Fatah al-Islam is based is a high conflict region. South Lebanon has become the focal point for
conflict in Lebanon because it is where Hezbollah maintains the territorial base for its paramilitary
forces. The Israel-Lebanon border in the south of Lebanon has drawn in not only attention from those
wishing to secure the border, but the attention of multiple terrorist groups which operate in the region.
The instability analysis will focus on conflict within this particular region of Lebanon because it does
not experience the same kinds of conflict as occurs in Beirut, a religiously mixed city, which still
experiences fallout from its civil war between Muslims and Christians, as well as Sunni-Shia and
Lebanese-Palestinian tensions.
In conclusion, these three groups each represent a varying level of ties to al-Qaeda. Limitations
on available cases to study create potential challenges, but these challenges can be addressed if
recognized and accounted for. These case studies will allow for an in depth analysis of how each of the
six hypothesized mechanisms of al-Qaeda connection may affect the ability of each group to contribute
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to instability in their home region.
Chapter Three
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a case of “close ties” to al-Qaeda central. This
group has formally sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda. In addition to the public alliance, they also are
closely connected privately. Through communications with al-Qaeda central, AQAP has gained
knowledge about strategy and the running of an organization. However, the closeness of the two
organizations does not mean that AQAP has adopted the al-Qaeda targeting strategy. While AQAP has
attempted a small number of attacks in the west, they have focused most of their attention locally.
AQAP has managed to become a significant source of instability in Yemen, having seized territory
under its subsidiary organization Ansar al-Sharia. However, its al-Qaeda affiliation has come with
costs, such as it becoming the a target for the U.S. drone program, and local distrust.
AQAP is an excellent example of an al-Qaeda affiliate organization that is neither a fully
transnational nor a fully local organization: “AQAP’s single most impressive achievement remains the
successful balancing of local, regional and global operations” (Koehler-Derrick 16). AQAP was
founded in 2009 with the merger of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda in Yemen. While it has
undertaken a number of high profile attack attempts against the United States, most of AQAP's focus
has remained on the destabilization of Yemen. However, AQAP's al-Qaeda ties have not contributed
significantly to its in Yemen, and it seems that AQAP is a force in Yemen despite its al-Qaeda
connection and not because of it.
Ideologically and strategically, AQAP can be tied closely to al-Qaeda. The cover of the latest
issue of their English language magazine, Inspire, proclaims, “We are all Usama: America you have
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passed on the message of Sheikh Usama that you are truly the enemy of Islam,” and the letter from the
editor specifically calls on the Muslims living in the west, “Finally I call my Muslim brothers in the
West: You have a responsibility towards this Ummah5. The infidel West has once against insulted our
Prophet (peace be upon him). Those who insult our prophets should be taught a lesson, and Brother
Muslim, you can do it, Inshallah6,” (Ibrahim 2013). AQAP is a Sunni extremist group whose
ideology is based on the fundamentalist Salafi interpretation of Islam, the same as al-Qaeda. Their
public strategic stance is vehemently anti-Western, and they present one of the strongest transnational
terrorist threats to the United States. However, less publicly, they also manage a local strategy to
implement sharia law within Yemen.
Despite its prominence, AQAP is not a large organization. Size estimates of the organization in
2010 range from 100-600 (Mapping Militants). In 2011, the U.S. Department of State estimated that
AQAP's membership consisted of “a few thousand members” (Department of State 2012) However,
this small cadre is made up of experienced and dedicated fighters. In this sense, AQAP can be thought
of, at least in its initial years, as a kind of al-Qaeda alumni group in Yemen. Most of the members of
AQAP have been trained by al-Qaeda and have fought in Afghanistan or Iraq. The composition of the
group is majority Yemeni at 56%, with Saudis representing 37% of the membership and foreigners 7%
(al-Shishani 2010). AQAP's primary geographical base is in Yemen's Abyan province and throughout
south Yemen, where the organization controls territory. The organization does have focused efforts in
the Yemeni capitol of Sanna or elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula.
In addition, Ansar al-Sharia (Yemen) is part of the AQAP organizational structure. Ansar alSharia has been labeled an “alias” of of AQAP by the US State Department and is part of a rebranding
5 Muslim community
6 God willing
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effort to improve engagement with the local population (Joscelyn 2012). Ansar al-Sharia's primary goal
is the implementation of Sharia in AQAP controlled territory in the south of Yemen. This includes both
the administration of sharia justice as well as more secular governance duties such as provision of
infrastructure and services. The separation of the local agenda from the AQAP organization in name
allows AQAP to continue pursuing the global al-Qaeda agenda. This delegation of operational
objectives to different sections of the organization is both a mechanism for balancing as well as
branding. The creation of a new new named organization allows AQAP to appeal to multiple
audiences- AQAP to the radical jihadis and Ansar al-Sharia, which does not have the connotations of
being attached to al-Qaeda, to the local Yemenis.
Attack History
In the less than four year existence of AQAP they have undertaken a large number of attacks.
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) lists 131 attacks known or suspected to be attributable to AQAP.
The number of attacks have rapidly increased over time, nearly doubling between 2010 and 2011
(Appendix 3, Figure 1). The vast majority of these attacks, 122 out of 131, have occurred in Yemen. Six
attacks have occurred in Saudi Arabia and one in the United Arab Emirates, which both fall under the
AQAP area of interest. The GTD also lists one attack in the US and one in the UK, although there have
been more attempted attacks on the US. Most of these attacks have low casualty rates, with only two
attacks having more than fifty casualties and majority of attacks have less than ten casualties
(Appendix 3-Figure 2). The two high casualty attacks occurred in March and November of 2011, in the
cities of Jar and Dhahian in Yemen, resulting in 110 and 40 fatalities (GTD). It is likely that a large
number of attacks that are in the 1-10 causality category because many AQAP attacks are suicide
attacks, and causalities include the bomber. This indicates a focus on Yemen and pursing low-scale
targets instead of “spectacular” attacks like the 9/11 attacks. However, some of these attacks within
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Yemen have been directed against foreign targets. One of the first attacks undertaken by AQAP was a
suicide attack against a group of South Korean tourists in the UNSECO World Heritage Site of Sihbam;
this was followed up by an unsuccessful attempt against the South Korean delegation sent to
investigate the bombing. This attack was justified as an attempt to “expel the infidels from the Arabian
peninsula” (Johnsen 243).
AQAP has been traced to several attempted attacks against the United States. One of the attacks
that was successful was Major Nidal Hasan's 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and
wounding 29. While AQAP did not claim official responsibility, Anwar al-Awlaki, a senior AQAP
leader, admitted to “having exchanged e-mails with (Nidal) Hasan for nearly a year... and praised him
as a hero, but stopped just short of saying he had given the order for an attack,” (Johnsen 261).
Similarly al- Awlaki also admitted to communicating with Christmas day bomber Umar Farouk, calling
Farouk, “one of my students” (Johnsen 261). US investigators, based on Farouk's testimony, argue that
Awlaki “recruited (Farouk) and instructed him on the mission,” (Johnsen 262). Other attempted attacks
against the United States include attempts in 2010 to mail plastic explosives hidden in a computer
printer from Sanaa; these attacks were discovered before any damage was done, with one package
found in Chicago and one in central England, thanks to information from defecting AQAP member
Jabir al-Fayfi (Johnsen 267). AQAP's strategic shift toward occupation of territory had not stopped
AQAP ambitions in the West. In April 2012 an AQAP operative was given a bomb sewn into a pair of
specially made underwear with the instructions to catch a US-bound flight from Europe (Johnsen 287).
The bomber, an undercover agent, handed over the bomb to a Saudi handler, who turned it over to US
intelligence (Johnsen 288). AQAP maintains in its ideology that its principal goal is to target the West
and undertake jihad, not government.
In 2009, AQAP also attempted spread its influence beyond Yemen. Adbdullah Asiri, younger
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brother of AQAP bombmaker Ibrahim Asiri, was able to arrange a meeting with Saudi Minister of the
Interior and member of the Saudi royal family Muhammad bin Nayif. Asiri detonated a bomb, killing
himself and injuring bin Nayif. This attack followed the al-Qaeda doctrine of actively attempting to
overthrow the Saudi monarchy. However, since this early attack, AQAP has not focused attention on
Saudi Arabia, although the organization is officially composed of both Yemeni and Saudi branches of
al-Qaeda.
In an 2010 issue of its magazine Inspire, AQAP took credit for the crash of a UPS Cargo plane
in Dubai. They refer to the crash as “Operation Hemorrhage,” providing proof of involvement through
pictures of a printer and a copy of Great Expectations; they also show a picture of a UPS plane with the
caption “9/3/2010: The day a tree fell in the forest and nobody heard” (Ibrahim 2010). Officials from
the U.S. and Dubai investigating the incident believe that there was no terrorist involvement in the
incident, claiming based on cockpit recordings that the crash was caused by a fire that was not started
by an explosion (Ahlers 2010).
The early tendency to focus internationally has shifted inward to controlling territory within
Yemen. This is seen through AQAP's relationship with its own sub-organization, Ansar al-Sharia,
which has not only held onto territory in the Abyan province in South Yemen, but has attempted to
govern and implement sharia law in the region. This contributes to destabilization in the region by
undermining the Yemeni government's control of its own territory to the extent that Ansar al-Sharia has
become the government in these regions.
This dual management of global and local agendas indicates that while global al-Qaeda
ideology is essential to AQAP as an organization, but they also recognize the importance of local
political dynamics. AQAP has seen that they they have not had success in attacking the west, but have
had success in attacking Yemen, where the group has become a powerful influence. This shows that
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while AQAP may have a public ideology focused on the West, their internal strategy has become
concentrated in Yemen.
Instability in Yemen
Yemen has faced numerous challenges to its stability in recent years. The most prominent of
these is the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, a campaign which resulted in the resignation of Yemeni president
Ali Abduallah Saleh. In November 2011, after months of protests organized by opposition parties, an
assassination attempt, and the resignation of a large number of his cabinet, Saleh stepped down from
his position as President of Yemen, a post he had held since 1978, in a power transition to Vice
President Abd Rabbuch Mansur Hadi. This was a result of a deal negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation
Council. AQAP has benefitted from the Arab spring, taking advantage of the weak government to
expand its territroy and support base (Hoffman 2012).
In a January 2013 interview with al-Khaleej, Yemeni Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Abdel-Qader
Qahtan was positive about the state of the security situation in Yemen, but the interview brought up
numerous challenges to Yemen's security, including a growing numbers of assassinations of security
officials by “invisible hands” belonging to “various entities, including al-Qaeda.” Qahtan goes on to
say, “We are aware of the hidden goals of these criminal acts that aim to upset the atmosphere of
security and stability which prevails and to influence the national dialogue, as well as to try to sabotage
the Gulf Initiative and its operational mechanisms.” When questioned directly about al-Qaeda Qahtan
only noted that the Yemeni government will continue to pursue al-Qaeda and will not tolerate violence
as part of the national political dialogue (Nasher 2013).
Yemen also faces destabilization challenges from other movements within the country. This
includes challenges to the authority of the state by tribal leaders. AQAP has found allies in these tribal
populations. Additionally, Yemen faces sectarian challenges from its Zaydi Shi'a population in the
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north. This anti-government Shi'a movement has been a a “sporadic” challenge to the regime since
2004 (Phillips and Shanahan 2009).
When it comes to human development, Yemen is amongst the worst countries in the Middle
East. The picture created by human development statistics shows a fragile society. In 2005, 35% of the
population was below the national poverty line (World Bank 2010). The national literacy rate is 64%,
only 47% for adult females. 44% of the population is younger than 14 years old. The fertility rate is
high, with 5 births per woman. In 2009, an estimated 15% of the labor force was unemployed. The life
expectancy at birth is 65 years old. The infant mortality rate is 57 per 1000 live births. This lack of
development is reflected in the state of the stability of the country. Yemen ranks eighth overall in the
Foreign Policy Failed States Index, scoring a nine out of possible ten in five of the twelve categories,
these categories are “group grievance,” “delegitimization of the state,” “public services,” “security
apparatus,” and “fractionalized elites.” In 2010, there was an estimated 250,000 internally displaced
persons in Yemen, approximately 1% of the population of 25 million (World Bank 2010).
Connections to al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has had close ties to al-Qaeda since its beginning.AQAP has
formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda since its founding in 2009. It has publicly maintained that it is
close to al-Qaeda and supports its goals and ideology. The Yemeni co-founder of AQAP, Nasir alWihayshi, served as personal secretary to bin Laden for four years before being captured in
Afghanistan and held in Guantanamo Bay. These close connections have been an asset to AQAP in its
initial years, lending strength and experience to the organization, and continue to be beneficial in its
limited international efforts. The initial organizational relationship was based on personal relationships
between leaders. As these leaders on both sides have been captured, killed, or defected, their
replacements do not have the same personal relationships, but the organizational relationship has been
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maintained through the continuance of public formal allegiance to al-Qaeda and allowing al-Qaeda
leadership to continue to offer strategic guidance.
There has been an al-Qaeda global presence in Yemen since the organization's first years. One
of the first attacks against the the United States by al-Qaeda, the U.S.S. Cole Bombing, was located
Yemen in the Gulf of Aden. Osama bin Laden himself is of Yemeni descent. His father, Muhammad bin
Laden, having moved to Saudi Arabia as a young man. Additionally, Osama bin Laden's fifth marriage
to a young Yemeni woman, Amal al-Sadah, was arranged through connections in the country (Bergen
2012).
There is evidence that AQAP maintained close contact with the al-Qaeda global organization
and sought the advice of bin Laden on courses of action and organizational decisions. Bin Laden
personally choose the leadership positions in AQAP in 2010, asking in a letter to Mahmud Atiyya,
“How excellent would it be if you ask brother Basir (Wihayshi) to send us the resume, in detail and
lengthy, of brother Anwar al-‘Awlaqi, as well as the facts he relied on when recommending him,” (CTC
1). Wihayshi sought guidance from bin Laden concerning strategic priorities and wishing to establish
territorial control in Yemen, to which bin Laden responded with specific and detailed recommendations
(CTC 2). In one nearly fifty page letter to Mahmud Atiyya, bin Laden appoints Atiyya to the AQAP
clerical position formerly occupied by Sheikh Sa'id Mustafa Abu'l-Yazid (CTC 3). This this letter, bin
Laden talks at length about the strategy of al-Qaeda and the role AQAP plays in this strategy, while
issuing specific advice on media relations. These letters, spanning the first years of AQAP's existence,
2009-2010, show close connections between al-Qaeda and AQAP. These letters demonstrate that bin
Laden, in his role as commander of al-Qaeda, paid close personal attention to the AQAP, weighing in
on personnel decisions, targeting, and especially strategy.
It is not likely that AQAP's financing comes from al-Qaeda. For the al-Qaeda central, funding
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comes from fake charities, illicit activities, and donations from wealthy Saudis. It is likely that AQAP
has a funding scheme similar to al-Qaeda, but not integrated with the al-Qaeda funding structure. One
instance in which AQAP might be linked to criminal funding sources was an especially brazen bank
robbery of half a million dollars which occurred Yemen in August 2009and was believed to be an alQaeda operation (Lichtblau and Schmitt 2010).
However, in recent years, AQAP has attempted to rebrand itself, with the portion of the
organization that maintains territorial control in south Yemen operating under the name Ansar alSharia. Ansar al-Sharia believes that the al-Qaeda name hurts its ability to recruit local Yemenis
(Johnsen 272). This rebranding has split AQAP into two subdivisions- Ansar al-Sharia, which
downplays its connections to al-Qaeda but is still very much part of the movement and AQAP which
publicly remains tied to al-Qaeda.
Overall, AQAP has always had a strong relationship with al-Qaeda. This relationship is based
on both close personal connections but also on formal organizational affiliations. Al-Qaeda leaders
have been closely involved in the development of AQAP as an organization, have chosen AQAP
leadership positions, and have offered advice on strategy, including targeting choices and media
relations. Despite the fact that its operations are highly concentrated locally, AQAP maintains a public
commitment to al-Qaeda ideology by making vehemently anti-western public statements, choosing to
attack the west and encouraging Muslims living in the west to pursue individual level independent
action against the west.
Destabilization
AQAP has dramatically
destabilized Yemen gaining through its
seizure of territorial control in the southern
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province of Abyan. In 2011, Wihayshi sought guidance from bin Laden about seeking territorial control
in Yemen. Bin Laden responded that it was not “the right time,” citing lack of popular support on the
ground (Johnsen 271). AQAP did not follow bin Laden's advice and gained control of the small south
Yemeni city of Jaar in the Abyan in April 2011, one month before the death of bin Laden. Adil al-Abab,
the top AQAP cleric, declared openly after the militant action, “tonight we control Jaar,” (Johnsen 271).
This signaled the beginning of AQAP strategic shift toward territorial acquisition and control instead of
transnational terrorism.
In May 2011 AQAP, under the name Ansar al-Sharia, seized Zanjubar, capitol of the province
of Abyan, effectively ensuring control of the entire province to al-Qaeda (Johnsen 278). While AQAP
had not declared President Salih as a target in particular, it is clear that they do not consider the Yemeni
state or its president to be legitimate, during the seizure of Zanjubar,“one al-Qaeda fighter videotaped
another as he pulled a framed picture of Salih off the wall and stomped on it with his sandals.”
(Johnsen 277). This gesture is especially insulting in the Arab cultural context. Other political events in
Yemen occurring at the same time, as well as internal confusion and dissent about proper response to
AQAP, distracted the army and the Salih regime from responding to this action. During this time
President Salih was in Saudi Arabia for an emergency surgery following severe burns from a bomb
attack against the presidential palace mosque because of a refusal to step down as president (Johnsen
278).
With the power that comes from holding territory, al-Qaeda has brought terror to Abyan while
making attempts to improve administration in the region. One of the first administrative changes that
was made was implementation of sharia law. This strict implementation of sharia law came principally
came from a new police force and sharia court. These actions included cutting off the right hand of
teenagers who had been caught stealing electrical wire (Johnsen 279). Even more terrifying, they have
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made public spectacles of accused spies against AQAP. AQAP sentenced two spies to death, making
the executions a “well attended,” public spectacle, including sentencing a man who had been accused
of placing electronic tracking chips in cars used by al-Qaeda to death by crucifixion and forcing his six
year old son to watch (Johnsen 287).
However, AQAP has shown a public desire to improve non-religious aspects of governance in
Abyan. In the initial announcement of the seizure of Jaar, Al-Abab told listeners on an online jihadi
forum that al-Qaeda would work towards improving public services such as sewage and water (Johnsen
271). Proving true to their promise, during the summer AQAP drove around Jaar and Zanjubar
distributing water to families and also dug water lines and strung electrical lines (Johnsen 279). This is
especially important trust building operation, demonstrating that they are more capable of governance
than the Yemeni government . Less than half of the rural population of rural Yemen has access to an
improved water source and only 40% of the total population has access to electricity (World Bank
2010). These infrastructure building attempts are very public actions which help build local trust and
help build the image of AQAP. This is particularly significant because AQAP has had problems
building a local support base in Yemen and recruiting young Yemenis who have not been involved in
jihadi activities in Afghanistan.
Overall, this seeking to territorial control undermines the ability of the Yemeni government to
govern in its own territory. This loss of the monopoly over legitimate violence shows that the
government has been destabilized in Yemen to the point where it has lost the ability to provide security
to its own citizens in certain areas where AQAP has begun to function as a government. The inability to
maintain territorial control and the complete lack of any government presence in these regions is the
worst and most explicit form of destabilization, and it is also the easiest to prove that AQAP is directly
responsible.
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Mechanisms
Resources
Tracking where any covert organization gets its resources from is difficult due to the nature of
the transactions and the organization. The State Department 's sole statement on AQAP's fiances is:
“AQAP’s funding primarily comes from robberies and kidnap for ransom operations, and to a lesser
degree donations from like minded supporters” (Department of State 2012). These “like minded
supporters” could be wealthy Saudis or Emiratis, or those with prior connections to al-Qaeda.
There is little evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda gives significant funds to AQAP. The types of
expenses that AQAP needs money for are not particularly expensive. Locally focused campaigns
require maintaining large numbers of operatives and providing them with weapons, making them more
expensive. The type of operations that al-Qaeda may wish to encourage AQAP to undertake are less
expensive. Foreign target operations involve fewer people, who most often support themselves, and
less expensive equipment. Additionally, for suicide operations, operatives may donate their material
wealth to the cause. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq obtained most of its money from donations
by martyrdom seekers, comprising eleven thousand USD, 68 thousand Syrian lira, and four million
Iraqi riyal in a single two week period in February 2007 (CTC 4).
The role of al-Qaeda and its relationship with AQAP regarding financing is murky. However,
there is enough evidence to suggest that there is likely not a large exchange of resources between alQaeda and AQAP, in either direction. This means that AQAP mostly relies on itself for financial
support and does not provide financial resources to al-Qaeda. However, al-Qaeda does provide 'in kind'
resources, in particular training for individual operatives. This training will be addressed as belonging
to the knowledge mechanism.
Knowledge
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Al-Qaeda has been an important source of knowledge for AQAP. Evidence for this can be found
in communications between al-Qaeda and AQAP, as well as through an analysis of AQAP's strategic
decisions. In addition to providing training to individual operatives, AQAP draws strategic guidance
from al-Qaeda. This knowledge has shaped the strategy of AQAP and provided a foundation for the
organization. AQAP learns from al-Qaeda's past, such as recognizing mistakes made by al-Qaeda in
Iraq in its relationships with the indigenous population. AQAP's ability to draw so much organizational
knowledge from al-Qaeda is result of its close relationship to the al-Qaeda global organization.
One way in which AQAP acquires knowledge from al-Qaeda is though seeking strategic advice
at the leadership level. Lessons that al-Qaeda has learned from the war on terror have been passed on to
AQAP. These include strategic advice from al-Qaeda as well as lessons learned through observing
other al-Qaeda affiliate organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq. In Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) initially
had success at challenging the American occupation of Iraq. However the locals turned against AQI and
began informing Americans about the whereabouts of AQI members. Those locals who may have been
recruited into AQI instead aligned themselves with forces that did not challenge the legitimacy of the
regime or work against the occupation. AQAP used this experience when shaping their strategy for
entrenchment in Yemen.
Guidance was also given regarding operational decisions. One of area where al-Qaeda
attempted to sway AQAP the most strongly was its media presence. In a letter to an AQAP religious
leader, bin Laden wrote:
Provide them (potential jihadi recruits) with advice and guidance to avoid the
mistakes that would impact either the reputation of the Mujahidin and the
sympathy of the nation's masses or that would impact the mind and the character
of the youths (CTC 3).
In the same letter bin Laden discussed a media strategy based on appealing to Muslims in Muslim
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countries through not attacking these countries and emphasizing the American presence in the Muslim
world as a grievance. This media strategy is the same as the one AQAP has taken- focusing on the
western world, and guiding potential recruits to commit jihadi activities through inspiring sermons,
such as Anwar al-Awlaki's and practical instructions, such as the “open source jihad,” series in the
AQAP published English language magazine Inspire.
Additionally al-Qaeda is a source of operative-level knowledge for AQAP. Many AQAP
operatives have trained in Afghanistan and fought in Afghanistan or Iraq. These include bombmakers
who are essential AQAP plots against the west such as Ibrahim al-Asiri (BBC 2012). However, this
operative level training is based in the AQAP portion of the organization and not the Yemeni focused
Ansar al-Sharia. Therefore, this tactical knowledge does not contribute at the same levels in local
operations as it does in transnational attempts.
While knowledge gained from al-Qaeda does contribute to AQAP's goals, it is not apparent that
this knowledge has been used in the destabilization of Yemen. While knowledge of AQI's mistakes
have contributed to AQAP's local success, the lessons taken from the AQI experience may have been
learned through studying publicly available information about current events and terrorist organizations
without necessarily being connected to the organization. Additionally, AQAP directly contradicted the
advice of al-Qaeda leadership to not expand its local base. Where al-Qaeda knowledge has clearly
contributed to AQAP is in its transnationally focused operations, such as its attempts to attack the
United States, and its media presence.
Ideology
AQAP has used al-Qaeda's ideology as a way to strengthen its organization. However, in terms
of total contribution to destabilization in Yemen, this ideology draws attention away from Yemen to
other targets. In one way, al-Qaeda ideology initially drew recruits to AQAP. But as the organization
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grew in Yemen, this 'far enemy' focused ideology had to be balanced with ideologies which challenge
secular power within the country. Additionally, because those who are recruited as a result of this
ideology are more likely to be foreigners than those who are recruited for reasons not relating to alQaeda ideology, this focuses attention away from Yemen.
Communications between Al-Qaeda and AQAP leadership provide evidence that the al-Qaeda
has tried to shape AQAP ideology. These communications demonstrate that it is the relationship
between al-Qaeda and AQAP that has influenced the direction of AQAP strategy using ideology. One
example of this use of ideology is as evidenced from a letter by bin Laden to AQAP leadership:
I need to remind you about the general politics of al-Qaida concerning the military sector
and media. Al-Qaida concentrates on its external big enemy before its internal enemy.
Even though the internal enemy is considered to be a greater nonbeliever, the external
enemy is more clearly defined as a nonbeliever and is more dangerous in this stage of
our life. America is the head of the nonbelievers. (CTC 2)
Bin Laden clearly tried to steer Wihayshi away from a Yemen-based focus to a 'far enemy' based
ideology. This also directed AQAP away from paying attention to local political dynamics and
discouraged the pursuit of a large base of supporters in Yemen.
The effects of this influence can been seen through AQAP's production of the English language
magazine Inspire. The ideological influence of al-Qaeda is apparent throughout the publication in its
appeal to the rhetoric of a global jihadi movement instead of a locally focused one. The cover of
Inspire's spring 2013 issue declares its allegiance and dedication to the global al-Qaeda movement
through the headline “We are all Usama,” and shows a picture of the American flag being replaced by a
jihadi one at the American embassy in Cairo (Ibrahim 2013). The magazine also encourages, “open
source jihad” against America and western countries, containing instructions for individuals operating
without organizational ties to wreck havoc including covering cars in gasoline and lighting them on fire
and causing car accidents on a highway. This publication clearly demonstrates that while its operational
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focus may be on Yemen, AQAP's media arm has been influenced by the global movement because it
chooses to espouse the far reaching goals of al-Qaeda. The magazine is aimed at a western diasporic
audience and not a Yemeni population because it is written in English and has a focus on the west.
Ideology has served as a powerful recruiting tool for AQAP, at least in its early years. Many of
these recruits, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, were not based in Yemen prior to joining AQAP. This foreign
based recruitment base was less knowledgeable about Yemen and its politics and more interested in
pursuing transnational actions. Because this foreign group demonstrated commitment by leaving their
homes and moving to Yemen, they may have been more likely to have the commitment level needed to
pursue action such as suicide attacks. These initial recruits focused their attention attacks against
foreign interests in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. This initial group established the structure of alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula organization which would later grow. In comparison to those drawn in
by the ideology of global jihad, a local recruit, who may return home with less difficulty, may be less
dedicated to the cause and may be more concerned about local political grievances rather than abstract
ideas such as total global sharia.
Overall, ideology is one area where AQAP has been forced to balance its local and global
commitments. Publicly, AQAP maintains close adherence to the al-Qaeda ideology and works to
promote this ideology throughout the world. This is likely due to its close relationship with the alQaeda organization. However, within Yemen, the Ansar al-Sharia sub-organization has been created as
a way to compromise this global ideology to fit with a local strategy. It can be speculated that if the
global ideology was less important, then AQAP may devote more attention to these local priorities,
increasing its destabilizing potential.
Identification
Identification is one area where the local and international areas of focus have converged.
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Because of their international actions, AQAP is considered very dangerous by the United States. The
only group mentioned in the Department of State country report on terrorism for 2011for Yemen was
AQAP, despite the operation of multiple terrorist groups and the widespread unrest in the country
(Department of State 2011). This perceived threat to the United States has provided an opportunity for
security collaboration between the United States and Yemen through Yemeni cooperation and
communication in drone attacks (Allen 2010). It is possible that the increased counterterrorism actions
against AQAP is partially because of its al-Qaeda connection. AQAP has been identified as terrorist
group since its founding. It was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in by the U.S. Department of
State and as a al-Qaeda connected entity by the U.N. 1267 Committee in January of 2010, within
months of the merger of al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. As a consequence it has had
to operate more covertly than a group that has not been identified as a terrorist group. It is also
possible that more counterterrorist efforts have been undertaken against AQAP because they pose an
increased threat.
It may be possible to argue that the extent of US drone action in Yemen is due to AQAP's
association with al-Qaeda. Had AQAP not been an al-Qaeda affiliate organization the US might have
been less willing to undertake drone strikes or perceived AQAP as less of a threat. Individual terrorists
such as Anwar al-Awlaki who became prominent within the global al-Qaeda movement, and who have
been connected with attempts against the United States became targets for counterterrorist action.
Because of AQAP's close connections to al-Qaeda it is easier to identify who these leaders are and
make a convincing case for these actors constituting a threat to American national security.
However, Yemen has not unilaterally taken as much counterterrorist action against AQAP. This
may partially be due to other political factors, such as the instability of the presidency, that dominate in
Yemen. It is possible that before the Yemeni government seeks to undertake counterterrorism action in
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its provinces, it has to be stable in Sanaa first. Yemen faces many challenges to its stability from antigovernment groups, and it does not appear to assign special significance to AQAP because of its alQaeda connection. When specifically asked about al-Qaeda, one Yemeni official answered, “Yemenis
will maintain their relentless fight against terrorism as long as extremist factions resort to violence” and
discussed general counterterrorism and stability operations in the country (Nasher 2013).
The mechanism of identification for counterterrorism purposes has weakened the AQAP
organization. The organization faces constant pressure and fear from counterterrorism undertaken by
the United States in cooperation with Yemen through drone strikes. Because of these strikes, numerous
AQAP members, including much of the leadership, have been killed including Anwar al-Awlaki. In 68
drone strikes since 2002, 333 AQAP deaths have been reported (Roggio and Barry 2013). For an
organization the size of AQAP, this is a significant percentage of the total members. It is also
significant that the leaders of the group are targeted for drone strikes more than low level members, so
this total likely represents a high leadership death rate. Drone strikes have left leadership positions
open, making the the group less able to function efficiently. While it is is possible to argue that this is
because of the threat against he United States and not the al-Qaeda connection, it is important to note
that while AQAP does present a threat against the United States, they have not successfully
orchestrated an attack against the United States. Therefore, the scale of the American response is likely
due to its status as an al-Qaeda organization.
Foreign Targeting
AQAP has developed two different sets of targets: Yemeni based targets, who are attacked with
high frequency and a relatively high casualty rate, and foreign based targets, who are attacked at a
much lower rate with essentially no success. Because AQAP has developed the ability to balance these
targets through separate organizational structures, its pursuit of foreign targets does not appear to
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undermine its ability to destabilize Yemen.
It is clear than al-Qaeda has attempted to influence AQAP in its target selection. One
communication to AQAP tells the leadership: “Do not target military and police officers in their centers
unless you receive an order from us,” (CTC 2). Target selection is one area where al-Qaeda directly
conveys orders to AQAP. Attempts against the United States are a result of following al-Qaeda orders
and ideology. AQAP's international targeting efforts through its failed attempts against the United
States have both hurt and helped the organization. These attempts have caused the group to be a target
for counterterrorism, but they have also brought the organization into higher prominence globally. It is
possible that the prominence gained from making threats at the international level could encourage
recruitment. They also encourage individuals to act on their own, such as its 2012 offer of three pounds
of gold for the murder of the American Ambassador to Yemen or 3 million Rials (approximately
$23,000) for the killing of any American solider in Yemen (El Gamal 2012). It is al-Qaeda's initial
warning against attacking local targets that may temporarily have slowed AQAP's progress in territorial
control. However, AQAP on its own volition sought territorial control while maintaining its close
relationship with al-Qaeda.
Overall, this mechanism does not appear to significantly detract from AQAP's ability to
destabilize Yemen. The effect of foreign targeting may be connected to other mechanisms which may
either add to AQAP's strength, such as ideology, or decrease it, such as identification. However, foreign
target selection on its own appears does not involve enough individuals or resources to prevent AQAP
action in Yemen.
Local Distrust
Distrust of al-Qaeda is one clear area where AQAP's al-Qaeda affiliation could cause a decrease
in its ability to destabilize Yemen. The local population is aware of the connotations the al-Qaeda name
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carries with it and therefore less willing to join the organization or work with it. This particularly
undermines actions that require extensive interactions with the local population, such as territorial
governance. Because AQAP does not have the necessary forces to intimidate and threaten the
population into compliance, it requires a certain level of cooperation from the population to ensure that
it maintains control over its territory. AQAP itself recognizes the local distrust problem, as evidenced
by actions it has taken to distance itself from al-Qaeda through the creation of a separate Ansar alSharia organization. However, this solution focuses on balancing allegiance to local constituencies and
the global al-Qaeda movement instead of choosing one over the other. As long as this solution of a dual
organizational structure continues, AQAP can continue the dual track strategy of both domestic and
international targeting.
AQAP has addressed the local distrust problem through the use of its subsidiary, Ansar alSharia. This is seen as as a way to “empower” the local population (Swift 2012). While AQAP retains
its far enemy approach, Ansar al-Sharia is adapts a more “populist” approach that attempts to reach out
to the local population (Swift 2012). Having learned to fear an indigenous uprising from the experience
of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, AQAP has pursued a “three pronged” strategy for
local relations, through “engagement, empowerment, and dependency on Yemen's tribes”. (Swift 2).
This active work at building trust of the local population is something that AQAP may have had to do
more of because of its connection to al-Qaeda and AQAP's continued close alliance to al-Qaeda.
AQAP has worked with the tribal populations of rural Yemen especially closely. The general
perception is that AQAP is dependent on the tribal population for its support base (al-Shishani 2010).
Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda deputy head, called on Yemen's tribes in February 2009 to support
al-Qaeda: “I call on the noble and defiant tribes of the Yemen and tell them: don't be less than your
brothers in the defiant Pustun and Baluch tribes... noble and be helpers of Alu Abdullah Salih... support
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your brothers the Mujahideen” (cited in Phillips and Shanahan 2009). This reaching out to tribal
populations is also seen in al-Qaeda plans concerning the strategy for the establishment of an affiliate
“kernel” (or cell) organization in Somalia (CRRC 5). These tribal leaders are less interested in working
with AQAP because of its goals and beliefs than interested in cooperation in the common objective of
the decreased government power in tribal regions. Building this cooperation has required building trust
with the tribal leaders. One way this trust has been built is through refraining from attacking
infrastructure and foreigners in the Marib tribal area of Yemen (Phillips and Shanahan 2009).
Numerous organizations operating under the name Ansar al-Sharia have developed across the
Arab world, including Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Morocco. These groups are part of a jihadist
rebranding attempt to shift attention towards the “supporters” (Arabic: ansar) (Zelin 2012). This is in
stark contrast to those who make up the smaller and more radical “base” (Arabic: qaeda). Ansar alSharia, while certainly part of AQAP, does not carry the al-Qaeda name. This sentiment is reflected in
the statement of Adil al-Abab, AQAP religious leader, who said in an interview with a jihadist website
that Ansar al-Sharia had been “set up to attract people to Sharia rule in the areas under control of
AQAP and allied groups” (al-Shishani 2012). Al-Qaeda recognizes that in order to maintain local
affiliate organizations, it must appeal to the local population. It is possible for the central organization
to function with a small number of members in widespread cells. However, the locally oriented
organizations need to have higher levels of popular support in order to continue to function.
The mechanism of local trust is something that has been recognized as a potential area for
AQAP's close relationship with al-Qaeda to undermine AQAP actions in Yemen. The strategy of
developing a large local support base through the creation of Ansar al-Sharia is a solution that AQAP,
along with other al-Qaeda groups, have developed in order to deal with this problem and it appears to
be working. However, there is the potential for this to unravel in the future, leaving large sections of
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south Yemen realizing that they have been governed by al-Qaeda.
Is there a relationship between AQAP's Relationship to al-Qaeda and Instability?
Ultimately, the key concept AQAP uses with regard to its al-Qaeda ties is “balance.” The
management of dual agendas has forced the organization to split into two branches, AQAP with a
global, far enemy approach, and Ansar al-Sharia, with a local approach. This indicates that al-Qaeda
affiliation may have initially been a powerful tool for AQAP, but it has since become less useful to the
organization. One way this can be seen is through the mechanism of knowledge. AQAP drew strategic
knowledge from more experienced al-Qaeda leaders. Additionally, the mechanism of ideology has
helped strengthen the recruitment base, at least in the initial period. There is no evidence that al-Qaeda
provides AQAP with enough resources to substantially assist the organization financially.
To answer the question of how al-Qaeda helps AQAP, it is important to differentiate where alQaeda helps and where it hurts the organization. Internationally focused targeting is strengthened by its
al-Qaeda connection, but the same cannot be said for the locally focused campaigns which make up the
majority of AQAP operations. This can be best observed through the local distrust and identification
mechanisms. While international attack attempts receive high levels of media attention, it appears that
operationally foreign targeting does not draw attention away from the pursuit of local agendas.
The effect of the relationship between al-Qaeda and AQAP is changing as AQAP shifts its
strategic focus. While it maintains public allegiance to al-Qaeda, the amount of attention devoted to
local operations is much larger than those devoted to international operations. Because AQAP can be
more easily identified as a dangerous organization, this relationship may eventually become more of a
liability than an asset. The net effect of an al-Qaeda affiliation on instability in Yemen has been neutral.
While AQAP is strengthened by al-Qaeda ideology and knowledge, it is undermined by easier
identification, creation of local distrust and the desire to devote resources to foreign targets.
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Chapter Four
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Laskhar-e-Taiba (Urdu: Army of the Pure, LeT) is a case of the “has ties, but not strong ones”
category of affiliate connections to al-Qaeda. LeT was founded in the same period as al-Qaeda. The
founders of LeT had connections to al-Qaeda since the beginning of both groups. Because of this, LeT
has served as an affiliate for al-Qaeda in Pakistan since the early 1990s. However, LeT is not part of the
the people of Pakistan, but they may have had a part in the identification of LeT as a terrorist group.
Overall, LeT's al-Qaeda affiliation does not have a strong affect in either direction on LeT's
destabilizing activities in Pakistan. This is likely related to LeT's lack of direct destabilizing actions and
narrow targeting focus on India and Kashmir.
The Army of the Righteous
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Lashkar-e-Taiba, like al-Qaeda, targets primarily international targets. However, LeT looks
eastward to India for its targets rather than westward as al-Qaeda does. Both groups have their origins
in the earlier 1990s in Pakistan and both organizations are now currently based in Pakistan. However,
LeT is an organization composed of Pakistanis and operates under a Pakistani ideology, while al-Qaeda
is primarily made up of Arabs and follows an Arab ideology. Al-Qaeda has made some attempts to
attack Pakistan from within, but these have involved the cooperation of other Pakistani affiliate groups.
LeT targets India overwhelmingly, choosing the jihadi approach for foreign countries and the preaching
approach to spread its ideas in its home base. The two organizations have had operational connections
since their beginnings and likely coordinate some activities, including offering each other assistance
and safe haven, training and recruiting, and an exchange of membership.
LeT has its origins in the merger of two smaller groups, a preaching group led by Zaki-ur
Rehman Lakhvi and a small missionary group called Jamaat-ul Dawa (Organization for Preaching), to
form Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad (Center for Preaching and Guidance). Among the seventeen founders
of the group was Abduallah Azzam, a mentor to bin Laden and important figure in bringing foreign
fighters into Afghanistan during the jihad against the Soviets (Tankel 2010). LeT was founded around
1990 as the military wing of Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad, responsible for undertaking jihad (Tankel
2010). This group was dedicated to the spread of the Ahl-e-Hadith sect of Islam. Ahl-e-Hadith Islam is
a South Asian variant of Islam which focuses on living life strictly according the the Qu'ran and the
Hadith, and is similar to the Arab Salafi or Wahhabi sects. LeT is is the only major Ahl-e-Hadith
Pakistani group. Most other jihadi groups in Pakistan follow the Deobandi sect, a South Asian Islamic
sect founded in Deoband, India. Deobandi groups, such as Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), tend to focus on
domestic sectarian targets more than LeT does. In comparison, 80% of Sunni Muslims in Pakistan, or
the majority of the overall Pakistani population, follow the Barelvi sect of Islam, which combines
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Islam with pre-Islamic South Asian religious traditions7. Both the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi sects
oppose the Barelvi sect as 'folk Islam,' and not representative of the fundamentals of Islam based on its
sacred texts.
Ideology
LeT's ideology is based on the principle that all Muslims are required to wage jihad. They
believe that this jihad should be a militarily backed movement outside of Islamic controlled areas.
While they do not agree that the state of Pakistan properly follows Islam according to their beliefs, they
consider the Pakistani government to be Islamic enough to not necessitate violent action. The group is
primarily outward looking in these goals. It officially does not aim to overthrow the Pakistani
government or pursue Pakistani targets, because they believe that 'reform' within the Islamic state of
Pakistan is best undertaken by dawa (preaching) instead of jihad (Tankel 2010). They rationalize this
by having established eight conditions for when violent jihad is required as a duty of Muslims:
Eliminating Muslim persecution; achieving the dominance of Islam as a way of life
throughout the entire world; forcing disbelievers to pay jizya (a tax on non-Muslims);
fighting those who oppress the weak and feeble; exacting revenge for the killing of any
Muslim; punishing enemies for violating their oaths or treaties; defending Muslim states
anywhere in the world; and recapturing occupied Muslim territory. Tankel 2010
While al-Qaeda considers its number one enemy the United States, LeT perceives India to be its
primary adversary. This is based on the condition of 'recapturing Muslim territory'.LeT believes India
to be an occupier of Muslim territory, especially in the region of Kashmir, where LeT's activities
overwhelmingly have taken place.
Support Base
LeT has built up a considerable support base in Pakistan, allowing it to become politically
7 Officially, Pakistan is 96.4% Muslim, 85-90% of Pakistani Muslims are Sunni, 10-15% are Shi'a. The remaining 3.6%
of Pakistanis are predominately Hindu or Christian (CIA 2013).
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influential. The group is estimated to have “several thousand members” reconstituting primarily of
“Pakistani nationals seeking a united Kashmir under Pakistani rule,” (NCTC). According to a study of
LeT member biographies, the mean age of recruits is 16.95 years, and the mean number of years before
their death after joining is 5.14 years (Rassler et al. 2013). These fighters do not have high levels of
religious education, with less than five percent of fighters having earned a sanad, a certificate of
completing religious education in a madrassa. However, these fighters on average had higher than
average non-religious education than Pakistani males (Rassler et al. 2013). This is consistent with the
findings of a 2009 survey, which found that while Pakistanis with higher levels of education were less
likely to support the Taliban than those with low levels of education, this did not hold true for support
for militants in Kashmir; one explanation for this is “strong anti-Indian sentiment and support for the
Kashmir struggle in the Pakistani school curriculum,” (Tankel 15). This pattern is also consistent with
the profiles of al-Qaeda foreign fighters (Sageman 2004).
Additionally, the group has reached out beyond Pakistan to find support within the Pakistani
diaspora. It has found supporters in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In 2004, a
group of Virginia men, the 'Virginia paintball jihad network,' were found guilty of aiding Lashkar-eTaiba. Their activities included listening to Islamic lectures and participating in paintball to practice for
jihad. One member, Masoud Khan was charged, among other things, with providing material assistance
to al-Qaeda, but was found not guilty (Brohn and Frieden 2004). Most of this network were Pakistani
immigrants to the U.S. or had connections to Pakistan. In 2011, Jubair Ahmad, another Pakistani man
living in Virginia, was arrested for producing and distributing jihadi propaganda containing images of
LeT leader Hafiz Saeed and explosions from improvised explosion devices (Roggio 2011).
Attack History
LeT's record of attacks is consistent with their anti-Indian ideology. They have been implicated
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in a total of 118 incidents of terrorism (GTD). Most of these incidents occurred in the disputed
Kashmir region. However, there are numerous attacks in major Indian metropolitan areas outside of
Jammu and Kashmir, including Bangalore, New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Chennai. Attacks
outside of Kashmir began with a December 22, 2000 killing of three people at at the Red Fort in Delhi,
a target that was incredibly symbolic in addition to its military value as a army garrison (Tankel 65).
This was part of an attempt to stop cease-fire talks between India and Pakistan on the subject of
Kashmir. Ninety-four percent of LeT fighers list Kashmir as their fighting front, but Afghanistan,
Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Bosnia are also listed (Rassler et al 2013). This concentrated targeting on
Kashmir and India is reflected in a statement made by LeT following an attack on the airport in
Srinagar, India: “ “Prior to September 11, we were in a position to liberate Kashmir any time, but our
target is the whole of India and Israel’s turn after that. We only want the destruction of India…we are
the ones fighting for the liberation of Kashmir and the future of Pakistan,” (Ali and Shehzad 2009).
Only one suspected LeT attack occurred outside of India, in the Pakistani city of Lahore. This attack
took place in 2009, against 'private citizens and property,' and resulted in six facilitates and eight
injured persons (GTD).
These attacks occur in two waves of high activity level. The first occurs begins in 1999,
reaching a high of 22 attacks per year in 2001, before dramatically declining to five attacks per year in
2003. The second wave begins in 2007, reaching a high of 22 attacks one year later in 2008, before
declining to five attacks in 2009 and one attack in 2010 (GTD). Politics between Indian and Pakistan as
well as American counterrorism demands of Pakistan can be seen as influencing these ups and downs
in attack levels. The late 1990s was a tense time between India and Pakistan. While peace talks were
attempted, tensions only became worse, resulting the the 1999 Kargil War. Following the Kargil peace
settlement brokered by Bill Clinton, conflict continued in Kashmir, spreading beyond the region in a
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2001 attack against the Indian Parliament which further inflamed the tension between the two
countries.
The two preferred methods for LeT attacks are 'armed assault,' with 68 attacks, including the
2008 Mumbai shootings, and 'bombing/explosion,' with 53 incidents (GTD). These attacks tend to be
deadly, with only 36 incidents having ten or less causalities, and eleven incidents having more than
fifty causalities. The group's tactics in Kashmir have included “expressive violence to intimidate the
local populace,” including “mutilating informers and leaving them in the town square for all to see
(Tankel 59). Most of the targets in Kashmir were Indian military targets, but the group was also known
for massacring Hindu civilians. Following the end of the Kargil War, LeT began fidayeen, or
martyrdom, attacks. The distinction between these attacks and suicide attacks is that the fidayeen do
not kill themselves, such as a suicide bomber would, but undertake an activity nearly always
guaranteed to end in their death by the hands of others, usually in the form of shooting until the
attacker is shot down. This distinction is important for theological reasons. The objectives of these
attacks “was not for fighters to be martyred right away, but to inflict as much damage as possible on the
enemy in order to inspire fear in others,” with some engagements lasting “many hours and sometimes
more than a day,” (Tankel 63). The dual purpose of these attacks are escalation of violence through a
high causality rate and causing physiological damage through the use of terror tactics.
LeT is most infamous for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. This series of attacks began on
Wednesday, November 26, 2008 and continued until Saturday, November 29. A total of 164 people
were killed in the attacks and at least 300 were injured. Targets of the attack were spread throughout
south Mumbai, and included a hospital, a cinema, two hotels, a Jewish community center, a cafe, St.
Xavier's College, and the street outside of the Times of India building (Fox News 2008). The attack
resulted in the death of all but one militant involved, Ajmal Kasb,who was later found guilty on 86
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charges in 2011 and hanged in 2012.
Another notable attack which LeT has been accused of perpetrating was the December 13, 2001
attempted attack against the Indian Parliament House, resulting in the death of five policemen and two
parliament employees, but no Members of Parliament or government officials. An Indian court later
ruled that while “it is possible Laskhar or elements associated with the group provided assistance,” all
known attackers belonged to the Pakistani group Jaish-e-Muhammad (Tankel 112). This attack,
believed to have been ordered by a senior ISI official, heightened tensions between Pakistan and India
and led India to taking a new approach to counterterrorism based on the right to pursue militants,
including in Kashmir, which was now framed as a counterterrorism issue instead of an state level
conflict with Pakistan. America's post- 9/11 cooperation demands and this new framing of Kashmir as
a terrorism issue would lead Pakistan to institute a crackdown on Islamic terrorism. Despite their new
status as a banned organization, LeT, as an ISI proxy, was not affected as much as the jihadi groups
which opposed the Pakistani government.
LeT and al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda and LeT are both products of the early years of the Islamic jihad movement in
Pakistan. One figure, Abduallah Azzam, was prominent in the founding of both organizations. Azzam
served as a mentor to bin Laden while he was based in Peshawar and was a founding member of
Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad, the umbrella group from which LeT was formed. This connection may
have influenced the ideology and operation practices of both LeT and al-Qaeda when they were both in
their early stages. LeT and al-Qaeda have evolved as separate groups but have remained loosely
connected. Throughout their history, LeT has maintained “good relations with al-Qaeda,” through these
loose connections (Tankel 110). Doctrinal disputes is one reason which may explain LeT on the
organization level has not cooperated as closely with al-Qaeda as other groups have (Tankel 108).
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Another reason is the desire to avoid connection with al-Qaeda in order to avoid becoming the target of
counterterrorism. One example of this is distancing is the statement of support initially issued by LeT
following the 9/11 attacks, calling them, “not an act of terrorism, but an Islamic duty,” but the later
denial of this statement ever having been made (Tankel 111).
Following the banning of the LeT organization by the Pakistani government, “most militants
not allowed to fight in Indian-administered Kashmir were confined to their camps,” leading many to
join al-Qaeda or the Taliban (Tankel 128). When individuals left to fight with other groups, such as the
Afghani Taliban, “they did not always break form the group completely and were often welcomed back
into the Lashkar-fold,” (Tankel 111). While this intensified after the 2002 banning of the group, this
exchange of members has existed throughout the history of the group. One early example is Dhiren
Barot (Abu Essa al-Hindi), a British man of Indian descent who wrote a book about his experience with
LeT in Kashmir before joining al-Qaeda (Tankel 100). Another example is David Hicks, an Australian
who had his first introduction to jihad and Islam with LeT in Pakistan, who later sent him with a letter
of introduction to al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan (Tankel 101). Following 9/11, this was
transition from the Kashmir-centric jihad of LeT to the global jihad of al-Qaeda was repeated by a
number of LeT members. One of these was a British national of Pakistani descent named Omar
Khyam who was persuaded by his Pakistani grandfather to leave LeT and return home to the UK.
Khyam was arrested in the UK four years later for an al-Qaeda bombing plan (Tankel 102). In addition
to LeT fighters being caught in Afghanistan, two LeT members were caught fighting in 2004 in Iraq
(Tankel 154).
One way in which LeT has found considerable room for cooperation with al-Qaeda is through
mutual training and recruitment activities. LeT “picked up some of the slack,” of al-Qaeda's post 9/11
training capacities, including training foreign fighters coming into the region (Tankel 154). As a result
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of this cooperation LeT members began to staff al-Qaeda camps. Additionally LeT operated training
camps in the Waziristan and Mohmand agencies of FATA, near the al-Qaeda training bases (Tankel
154). LeT militants trained at camps in Afghanistan controlled by al-Qaeda and “allegedly... run in
cooperation with the ISI,” (Tankel 109). This indicates that the relationship with regard to running
training camps runs in both directions, with al-Qaeda assisting LeT and LeT assisting al-Qaeda at
different times and places.
LeT also serves a role as a logistical assistant to al-Qaeda. LeT and al-Qaeda shared one notable
member, Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda lieutenant who screened recruits in Peshawar and made
logistical arrangements for their travel to Afghanistan. In March of 2002, Abu Zubaydah was captured
in Faisalabad in an LeT safe house (NCTC). Following 9/11, with the increase in jihadis wishing to
join al-Qaeda, LeT served as a “gateway,” to individuals in the Pakistani diaspora (Tankel 156). LeT
members would be the first contact by these potential jihadis, and would have the information about alQaeda member whereabouts to direct the recruits to al-Qaeda. One possible example of this is al-Qaeda
'Shoe Bomber' Richard Reid. French authorities investigating the December 2001 attempted attack by
Reid asserted that an LeT representative in Paris facilitated Reid in Paris and directed him to contacts
in Pakistan, from whom he received technical assistance (Tankel 165).
Pakistan has served al-Qaeda as a safe haven and logistics base for the organization since the
2001 American invasion of Afghanistan (Rassler 2009). Unlike LeT, al-Qaeda has sought to directly
challenge the government of Pakistan, in order to “undermine its support for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan,” and “promote cooperation among a variety of Pakistani militants,” which include LeT
(Rassler 2009). It accomplishes this through serving as a “force multiplier,” a “mediator and coalition
builder for militant organizations,” and by providing “religious 'justification'” for these activities
(Rassler 2009).
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By encouraging other militant groups in Pakistan, such as LeJ and the Pakistani Taliban, alQaeda upsets the careful alliance between Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani government by making
Islamic terrorism enough of a problem in the country that government officials are forced to address it.
In one pre-9/11 letter to Abu Hafs, a senior al-Qaeda leader, one operative wrote about a Pakistani alQaeda members plans in Pakistan, “He presented me with a number of targets, ranging from the 'broad'
[Benazir Bhutto], to her aides, to westerners, and ending with heretics. If you want, I will send him to
you. He says he is ready,” (CRRC 7). Benazir Bhutto was later killed in Rawalpindi in 2007 in an
attack attributed by the Pakistani government to LeJ. Al-Qaeda officials have claimed responsibility for
the assassination, to which al-Qaeda number number two Ayman al-Zawahiri allegedly personally gave
to order for (Daily Mail 2007).
Overall, LeT and al-Qaeda have found areas for organizational cooperation, despite their
differences. LeT is not part of the hierarchical structure of the larger global al-Qaeda movement, but
serves as an informal facilitator for recruitment and an ally in Pakistan. This means that LeT is able to
maintain a separate identity from its al-Qaeda affiliation and operate according to its own goals,
strategies, and ideology.
LeT and the ISI
One element which complicates an analysis of LeT's relationship with al-Qaeda is its other,
stronger, organizational affiliation with the Pakistani state. LeT receives support from Pakistan's InterServices Intelligence (ISI). The Pakistani state and its army have a history of using non-state proxies in
its conflicts, with past use of proxies in its 1947 and 1965 conflicts with India and the 1971 war which
resulted in the creation of an independent Bangladesh (Tankel 2011). Despite the fact that LeT was
banned by the Pakistani government in 2002, and its assets were legally frozen, the ISI remains a major
source of support for LeT. ISI provides funding for LeT and uses the group as a proxy in Kashmir to
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avoid any official military engagement with India. The group has become a major source of tension
between India and Pakistan.
The ISI has utilized LeT as a proxy in Kashmir since the early 1990s, when it adopted a strategy
of using proxies in combat positions in Kashmir instead of the Pakistani army. As a result of the
relationship between the ISI and LeT and the resources it was able to command, “By the end of the
[1990s] Indian forces considered Lashkar to be the best trained of all the militant groups operating in
Kashmir” (Tankel 60). This cooperation between LeT the the ISI has been extensive and in exchange
for their use as a proxy, LeT has received strong support from the Pakistani state, which includes:
...funding; assistance with organizing; combat training; campaign guidance;
provision of weapons and kit, including sophisticated communications equipment; hides,
launching pads and fire support for cadres crossing into Indian-administered Kashmir;
assistance infiltrating or exfiltrating out of India and other countries; intelligence on
targets and threats; diplomatic support; and, of course, safe haven and protection in
Pakistan. Tankel 60
ISI control over LeT operations goes so far as the giving orders to LeT about their behavior in the
region, such as “telling Lashkar militants to pay for food, avoid theft or extortion and not to fraternize
with local women,” (Tankel 59). However, as much as the ISI can wish to control LeT, whether they
follow them is another matter. Following these orders, LeT militants began paying for food and lodging
or bringing their own food and water with them to Kashmir, however they continue to be implicated in
the mistreatment and rape of Barelevi women and participation in extortion (Tankel 59). When it came
to strategic planning, one former LeT member recounts that “coordination was so close that
representatives from the army, ISI and Lashkar would sit at the table together to plan attacks and
strategy” (Tankel 61).
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif changed the policy towards India in the later 1990s,
though the holding of peace talks. This change in policy was “vehemently” opposed by the jihadi
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groups (Tankel 61). The new relationship with India came to a halt with the 1999 Kargil War between
the two countries in Kashmir and the rise of General Perez Musharraf to power in a military coup.
These political ups and downs can partially explain the peaks and drops in number of attacks per year
undertaken by LeT.
While LeT does contribute to the Pakistani national agenda through its role as a proxy against
India, this role may also serve the interests of Pakistan by containing the group. Because LeT is “one of
the few militant outfits that officially refrain from launching attacks in Pakistan,” the ISI is motivated
to prevent LeT from having motivation to attack Pakistan in order to prevent the group from becoming
a source of domestic instability in Pakistan (Tankel 2011). If Pakistan were to target LeT for
counterterrorist action, this could cause them to begin attacking within the country, where now they
only carry out missionary and preaching work. Any work done to destroy LeT would ultimately benefit
India, who the group attacks, and the costs would be born by Pakistan, who the group benefits (Tankel
2010). Provided the group continues to not to be perceived as a threat to Pakistan, the country has no
interest in confronting it or destroying it.
ISI backing likely influences the target selection of LeT by discouraging them from attacking
domestically and encouraging action against India. In order to buy LeT's strategic support, the ISI is
also a major source of financial and material resources for the group. Because of this stronger and more
formalized connection, it can expected that there will be less of an al-Qaeda influence over resources
and target selection. However, as shown in the last case study, even for a closely aligned group, alQaeda was not a major source of resources and could only minimally influence target selection, so LeT
does not deviate from the pattern of other al-Qaeda affiliate groups in this aspect.
Challenges to Pakistani Instability
Pakistani faces many diverse and serious threats to its internal stability. Terrorism is one of the
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most important of these, but there are many others. One of these domestic stability threats is the state of
water and drought in Pakistan. Because its main source of water, the Indus River, begins in India,
Pakistani water security could be severely threatened if India choose not to honor its water agreements
with Pakistan. Another source of instability is the lack of development and poverty. Because many
families have more children than they can afford, they send the boys to madrassas, where they become
radicalized.
Political instability in Pakistan is something that has been present since nearly the beginning of
the history of the country. Pakistan was born in its partition from India, which resulted in the the largest
mass migration in human history, may have caused two million deaths, and was a source of massive
confusion and chaos (Guha 48). Just two years later, Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
died. The first Pakistani Prime Minister to finish a full term was Raja Pervez Ashraf in March of 2013.
The country's political history is a cycle between military rule and fragile limited democracy.
Terrorism and Instability in Pakistan
Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to Pakistani stability. There a a large number of terrorist
groups in the country, which draw power and territory away from the state. Terrorists threaten Pakistani
development, hurt Pakistani people, and undermine Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan is perceived to
be a hotbed of terrorism because of the role it has served as a passageway and safe haven for groups
like al-Qaeda for the past twenty years. In Baluchistan, armed Baluchi separatist groups attack
pipelines taking natural resources out of the province. In the Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, gang
rivalries have resulted in the deaths of 2,000 people (Amnesty International 2012). Non-state actors
have become powerful in certain regions where the government's ability to protect its citizens and
infrastructure is severely limited.
Al-Qaeda
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Al-Qaeda and its associated movements serve as a persistent threat to Pakistani stability. The
group and its affiliate organizations undermine the state's ability govern its territory and provide basic
services. Al-Qaeda central, unlike LeT, not only does not support or ally itself with the Pakistani state,
but does not recognize it as a legitimate Islamic state. Because of this, al-Qaeda actively opposes
Pakistani state control and seeks to destroy state structures. Additionally, the both al-Qaeda and LeT
serve has indirect causes to Pakistani instability through foreign policy decisions made by and about
Pakistan. The United States has used al-Qaeda as an excuse to disregard Pakistani sovereignty over its
territory. LeT serves as a potential catalyst for increased tension between Pakistan and India.
Seven of the identified twenty four al-Qaeda affiliated groups are based in Pakistan, including
the central al-Qaeda organization, which has a stronghold in Pakistan (Appendix 1). Pakistan was the
first gateway for Arabs traveling to join the Afghani jihad and it has become the place where al-Qaeda
has been able to firmly establish itself after being driven out of Afghanistan. While much of the alQaeda infrastructure of camps and bases are in the FATA areas bordering Afghanistan, the 2011 death
of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad serves as evidence that al-Qaeda has spread itself throughout the
country. Abbottabad is city of 1.4 million people only 31 miles from the Pakistani capitol of Islamabad.
Abbottabad is also home to the Pakistani Military Academy. The use of this city as a hideout shows that
al-Qaeda could have roots essentially anywhere in Pakistan. In addition to the central al-Qaeda
organization, al-Qaeda's numerous affiliate organizations in Pakistan have regional bases in
Baluchistan and Kyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as extensive involvement in the Kashmir area. In the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pakistani Taliban destroyed 246 schools and damaged another 763 schools
in 2012 (Amnesty International 2012). Sectarian conflict led by Islamic extremists, such as the alQaeda affiliated LeJ, were responsible for 280 causalities in 2012 (Amnesty International 2012)
Al-Qaeda is to blame for most American incursions into Pakistan. The 2011 Abbottabad action
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was also a high profile incident of America crossing into Pakistan, this time into major city far from the
border. Pakistan was not informed about the mission until after it was completed (The Guardian 2011).
The most high profile incidents of American disregard for Pakistani sovereignty is the continued use of
drones, despite Pakistan instance to stop the program. In February of 2013, Pakistani Ambassador to
the United States Sherry Rehman called US drone strikes in Pakistan a “red line” and said that “there
was no quiet complicity in this,” (Wood 2013). All of these incidents of American incursions into
Pakistani territory without regard for the wishes of the Pakistani state demonstrate that al-Qaeda has
caused the state of Pakistan to lose a degree of territorial control and basic state sovereignty.
LeT also can serve as a potential catalyst for Pakistani instability. India has long accused the ISI
of supporting LeT, and as a state sponsored group, any action taken by LeT can be interpreted to be a
Pakistani state action. As demonstrated by the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks crisis, these non-state actors have
been responsible for dangerously heightened states of tensions between the two countries. If LeT were
to undertake another operation as significant as the 2008 Mumbai incident, then India may choose to
respond in a way that may threaten Pakistani stability. The threat of an Indian response to non-state
Pakistani actors is especially significant in light of Pakistan's tying of its strategic depth problem to its
nuclear doctrine (IISS)8. As two strongly antagonistic nuclear powers, the continual rivalry between
India and Pakistan is a power keg which could go off at any time with catastrophic consequences.
Non-Islamic Terrorism and Unaffiliated Islamic Groups
Not all terrorists within Pakistani are Islamic extremists, and not all Islamic terrorist
organizations have affiliations with al-Qaeda. These organizations consist of separatist organizations
and Islamic organizations with significantly different ideologies and goals than al-Qaeda. One example
8 Pakistani's nuclear doctrine is tied to five “threshold” threats to Pakistani state continued existence: 1) Political
threshold 2) economic threshold 3) spatial threshold , 4) military threshold (IISS). India has a declared second strikeonly nuclear doctrine.
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of a terrorist movement that has no connections to al-Qaeda is the Baluchi separatist movements. There
is a long history of the creation separatist movements by the Baluchi people as a response to facing
grievances. Baluchistan, a province that borders Afghanistan and Iran, is an important source of natural
gas for Pakistan. Baluchistan and the Baluchi people receive much less for their gas than other
provinces in Pakistan, which is especially serious because of the severe underdevelopment in the
province compared the rest of Pakistan. This economic inequalities and the perceived extractive nature
of the Baluchi-Pakistani state relationship is a powerful grievance that has led the Baluchi separatist
groups, such as the Baluchistan Republican Army and the Baluch Liberation Army to gain territory and
power in the province.
Mechanisms for Instability
Resources
Resources is one area where LeT and al-Qaeda coordinate. Unlike most other organizations
within the al-Qaeda network, LeT is not hierarchically beneath al-Qaeda because the two were founded
contemporaneously. Instead of the vertical relationship between al-Qaeda and its other affiliates LeT
has a horizontal relationship with al-Qaeda. This means that the resource exchange between al-Qaeda
and LeT in bi-directional, with both groups providing material and tactical assistance. A large part of
the resource exchange between the two groups is human resources in the form of training and
exchanging recruits and operatives. However, despite the fact that resources are exchanged between the
groups, this mechanism only contributes indirectly to LeT's destabilization of the Pakistan.
The close relationship of sharing training camps is one form of resource exchange between alQaeda and LeT. LeT and al-Qaeda have shared camps as well as LeT providing camps to al-Qaeda
follow its displacement from Afghanistan. These camps are an important source of training for jihadis
for both groups. Training new recruits is an important aspect of the overall strength of a group. By
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providing al-Qaeda recruits with training LeT contributes to the instability of Pakistan because some of
these newly trained recruits will go on to join al-Qaeda and other affiliated groups in Pakistan, which
pursue sectarian attacks which undermine the fragile sectarian balance in Pakistani society and cause
fear in the general population. In addition to training recruits, LeT's role as a gateway for new al-Qaeda
recruits through Pakistan and among the Pakistani diaspora also contributes indirectly to instability in
this way.
In addition to its recruitment role, LeT also unofficially exchanges members with al-Qaeda.
Some LeT members have later fought with al-Qaeda, either as a member of the al-Qaeda organization
or as a member of LeT temporarily joined to an al-Qaeda group. These individuals may join al-Qaeda
for a time to fight in al-Qaeda targeted countries, like Afghanistan, and then are welcomed back into
LeT. This was seen with more frequency when a decrease in LeT activity in Kashmir left members
with nothing to fight.
In terms of financial resources, it is unlikely that there is much exchange between al-Qaeda and
LeT. LeT gets funding from its front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), however, the funding LeT
gets from JUD is limited due to JUD's 2008 UN terrorist organization designation (NCTC). However,
LeT may receive some funding from the same donors as al-Qaeda. There is evidence that LeT received
financial assistance from a Gulf charity connected to al-Qaeda (Tankel 93). LeT also raises funds
though control of legitimate businesses. These include “fish farms, a hospital, a market, agricultural
tracts, mobile clinics, and ambulance services,” (Kambere et al 2011). The group also earns money
through the collection and sale of the hides of up to 1.2 million animals slaughtered during Eid
festivities (Kambere et al 2011) , Additionally, JUD collects a 10% religious tax on the farmers to
whom it provides social services (Kambere et al 2011). LeT, like most terrorist organizations is also
involved in illicit funding activities, including “false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion, and
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involvement in the drug trade,” (Kambere et al 2011). Another fundraising method is collection of
money from diaspora population. LeT provides traditional informal hawala banking services to British
Pakistanis to send remittances to their families and collects fees for these services (Kambere et al
2011). Any financial connections between LeT and al-Qaeda are likely negligible because of LeT's
ability to finance itself.
Overall, these indirect resource exchanges between LeT and al-Qaeda do increase the instability
of Pakistan. By increasing the total number of terrorists in the region, LeT empowers non-state actors
and increases the number of individuals willing to act violently outside of state authority, which
ultimately undermines the state monopoly over legitimate violence. Additionally, by training those who
will later commit destabilizing acts in Pakistan, LeT contributes to the acts of al-Qaeda and its affiliate
organizations, even when these acts are on victims that LeT itself does not target.
Knowledge
There is little evidence to support knowledge as an active mechanism of promotion of
instability by LeT in Pakistan. While it can be argued that providing training to recruits is a form of
knowledge, the training provided to recruits is not specialized knowledge, but rather general jihadi
training that al-Qaeda or LeT has knowledge of and needs support in the resources to provide this
training. Because LeT and al-Qaeda were founded in the same time period, neither group has had the
opportunity to use institutional knowledge from one group to help build the other. While one figure,
Abduallah Azzam, was prominent in the founding of both organizations, any knowledge taken from
Azzam was given equally to both organizations. LeT's main pathways for causing instability in
Pakistan, foreign policy disruption and human resources, cannot be tied to knowledge, demonstrating
that for LeT this mechanism has neither a positive or negative effect.
Ideology
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Ideology is one area where there is not a significant amount of exchange between al-Qaeda and
LeT. Doctrinally, the two groups have subtle but significant differences in ideology. These differences
are a likely cause for the different targeting postures of the group. However, Widespread awareness of
al-Qaeda and its acts may increase visibility of Islamic extremism. This increased visibility of ideology
may be a recruitment tool for LeT. This may bring a new recruitment base for LeT, which already had a
very strong recruitment aid in the nationalistic nature of its conflict operations in Kashmir.
Identification
Identification is one mechanism which may have caused a decrease in LeT strength. Following
9/11, the United States exerted pressure on Pakistan to increase its counterterrorism operations within
its own borders. With tensions with India rising to crisis level, and the notoriety of LeT attacks in
India, Pakistan was influenced to use this counterterrorism framing to declare LeT as a designated
terrorist group. While this designation has come with practically little effect on LeT by the state of
Pakistan, it has served to cause LeT to become an internationally recognized group. While the
perception of the group's level of danger comes mostly from the group's history and not its connection
to al-Qaeda, this affiliation may lead the group to face more scrutiny by international intelligence
agencies. Additionally, international intelligence agencies which already know a lot about al-Qaeda
may gain information from LeT's al-Qaeda connections. This official identification has a terrorist
group, partially linked to its al-Qaeda connections, have led to the ISI giving less support to LeT in
Pakistan. This lack of activity in Pakistan has motivated LeT operatives to join al-Qaeda and its
affiliates in domestic attacks. Therefore, while the additional attention received by LeT by intelligence
agencies through the identification mechanism may undermine its group strength, the decrease in state
support following identification as a terrorist organization may indirectly cause an increase in
instability. These contrasting factors mean that the identification mechanism is likely a neutral
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mechanism for LeT's contributions to Pakistani instability.
Foreign Targeting
In the case of LeT, the nature of its al-Qaeda affiliation does not allow for the foreign targeting
to have either a contributing or undermining effect on instability. While LeT does primarily target
foreign targets, this is not related to its al-Qaeda affiliation. The choice to target India was one that has
existed since the beginning of the organization. Eastward targeting is a strategy that runs contrary to alQaeda's targeting of the West. LeT's has not had any significant public targets in the West. There is
little LeT activity in the West. This activity includes training of recruits in Virginia and an alleged
terrorist plot in the United Kingdom (Ali and Shehzad 2009). This lack of strategic coordination can be
explained by the horizontal relationship between al-Qaeda and LeT. Because of this relationship, alQaeda does not provide strategic directives or guidance as it would to its other affiliate organizations.
Doctrinal differences may also explain this deviance in targeting strategy.
Local Distrust
While its al-Qaeda affiliation may have been linked to LeT's identification as a terrorist
organization, the affiliation does not cause a similar distrust amongst Pakistani locals. LeT has a
significant base of local support throughout Pakistan and the its prominence of its own name is the
primary draw of the organization, not its connection to al-Qaeda. In 2000, LeT and its associated
organizations had 70 district offices in Pakistan, as well as more than 2,000 smaller offices (Kambere et
al 2011). LeT maintains facilities to help the local population, which builds local trust in the
organization. These facilities include schools and medical clinics (NCTC). JUD, LeT's charitable front,
provided aid to those affected by floods in Pakistan in 2008; the organization has “done exceptionally
well to meet the population’s expectations in times of crises or natural disasters,” in fact, “through the
provision of social services, the JuD is able to connect with the people in a way that surpasses the
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state’s ability,” (Ali and Shehzad 2009). In Pakistan, JUD and LeT have built trust and loyalty among
the population and are viewed as “progressive Islamists” because of their ability to provide services to
the population in ways that the state does not have the capacity to; these services include “religious
education, employment, water, food, housing, and security,” (Ali and Shehzad 2009). Throughout
Pakistan, JUD has 50,000 registered members (Kambere et al 2011).
There is no evidence for the local distrust mechanism having any effect on LeT and instability
in Pakistan. LeT and JUD have built up a trust level and reputation with the local population that an alQaeda affiliation cannot undermine. It is also possible that in Pakistan, a country where in 2012 more
people reported being favorable towards al-Qaeda than the United States, an affiliation with al-Qaeda
does not create distrust (Pew 2012)9.
Conclusions
Ultimately, there is little evidence for LeT's al-Qaeda affiliation having any direct effect on its
ability to destabilize Pakistan. This is mostly because LeT does not choose to target Pakistan, directing
its activities to India. However, there is some evidence that LeT may contribute indirectly to instability
in Pakistani. The instability caused by LeT's influence over foreign policy is not related to its
relationship with al-Qaeda. These actions which influence foreign policy, such as its continual violent
campaign in India, are strategy made either at the hands of the ISI or by LeT independent of al-Qaeda.
However, LeT's resource sharing with al-Qaeda is one area where the affiliation is related instability in
Pakistan. The training of terrorists who later attack Pakistani targets is a indirect pathway for LeT to
create instability.
LeT is a difficult case for the hypothesis that an al-Qaeda has any effect on domestic instability
9 However, Pakistan does not stand out from most of the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed. Pakistan reported a
13% favorable rating for al-Qaeda, compared to 14% for Jordan, 6% for Turkey, 16% Tunisia, 2% Lebanon, and in 2011
21% Indonesia and 28% Palestine (Pew).
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both because of LeT's persistent lack of direct contribution to domestic instability in Pakistan and
because the LeT-al-Qaeda relationship is different than al-Qaeda's relationship with its other affiliated
organizations. Overall, LeT's al-Qaeda affiliation is neither a source of strength or a determent to the
organization. However, these affiliations are the one source of the group's contributions to instability
within Pakistan, even if it is through indirect actions. These affiliations are also likely connected to the
group's identification as a terrorist group, and as such this affiliation also serves as a detriment to LeT
promotion of instability in Pakistan.
Chapter Five
Four Case Studies: Low Levels of Linkage to al-Qaeda
All four of the small groups that fall into the “ideologically, but not operationally linked,”
category of relationships to al-Qaeda have had little impact on the instability in their territorial bases.
Three of the groups occupy the same or similar territory as the previously discussed al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Two of these groups, Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and
Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), are based in the terrorist haven of Pakistan, with HuM, like LeT,
having its primary operational center in Kashmir, and HuJI having expanded into Bangladesh as well.
The Islamic Army of Aden is a small terrorist group based in Yemen. One group, Fatah al-Islam, is
based in Lebanon, a country not previously discussed. These groups cause instability in different ways.
Fatah al-Islam had a significant, but short lived, standoff with the Lebanese government that in 2007
severely affected Lebanese control over its own territory in south Yemen and among its Palestinian
refugee population. Similarly, the Islamic Army of Aden undertook a small number of high profile
attacks during the height of its activity. On the other hand, HuM and HuJI have had a much less readily
apparent effect on instability in Pakistan through their attacks in Kashmir, but have committed these
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attacks over a longer time frame. Overall, these groups' lack of ability to create instability is not due to
their al-Qaeda connection but due to the low operational capacities of the group themselves.While an
al-Qaeda connection may increase this capability in a small way, other mechanisms detract from the
strengthening mechanisms to cause an approximate net contribution of zero to the groups' local
destabilization potential.
Fatah al-Islam
Fatah al-Islam is a small Islamic extremist organization based in south Lebanon. The members
however are Palestinian refugees and ethnic Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, with the
Nahr al-Bared camp serving as the group stronghold. While many of these Palestinians were born in
Lebanon or have lived the majority of their lives in Lebanon, there is separation between ethically
Lebanese Arabs and ethnically Palestinian Arabs in Lebanese society, seen through the concentration of
Palestinians in refugee camps and the discrimination faced by Palestinians. Fatah al-Islam was founded
in November 2006, after a split from Fatah al-Intifada, which is itself a splinter group of the Palestinian
Fatah group. On August 9, 2007, it were designated as a “Specially Designated Global terrorist”
organization by the US Department of State on grounds that the group “has committed, or poses a
significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States" (Anti-Defamation League 2007) .
Despite their ideological connection, Fatah al-Islam differs ideologically from al-Qaeda in that they
recognize members of the Shi'a sect as Muslim and possible allies (Rosen 2007).
The Global Terrorism Database has records of only two attacks by Fatah al-Islam, one in Nahar
al-Bared in 2007 and one in Abdeh, Lebanon in July of 2008. These incidents total three fatalities and
two injuries (GTD). Outside of these recorded attacks, the group has committed other alleged attacks
and one sustained campaign. Fatah al-Islam became prominent in 2007 for a three month long
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offensive campaign based in the Nahr al-Bared camp, which was the worst internal violence within
Lebanon since the ending of its civil war (Bloom 2007). This action resulted in the first Lebanese
military incursion into a refugee camp since May 1972 (Ranstrop and Saab 2007). After this 105 day
siege, Fatah al-Islam was left “defeated” (Ranstrop and Saab 2007). It is believed that all but 30 of
Fatah al-Islam's fighters were killed in this action (BBC 2010). However, the group is alleged to have
had some involvement in bombings of police in the Lebanese city of Tripoli in 2007 and 2008 (BBC
2010).
Shaker Abssi, the founder of Fatah al-Islam, identified two primary goals for his organization:
“reforming the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon according to Islamic sharia law and
opposing Israel” (Bloom 2007). In addition, the group further “aims to expel the United States from
the Islamic world” (Bloom 2007). These goals focus on the creation of local instability and confronting
first the administration of the Palestinian refugee community and then neighboring Israel. While the
United States is considered as a target for Fatah al-Islam, it is only included as an afterthought, and
then only in order to expel American interests in the local area. Abssi told the New York Times in 2007
that “the only way to achieve our rights is by force,” indicating the a violent posture is justified because
of the perceived grievances of the Palestinian community and the Islamic world's opposition to the
American invasion and occupation of Iraq (Mekhennet and Moss 2007). In the same interview, Abssi
spoke about targeting America, referencing American involvement in Iraq as justification: “"We have
every legitimate right to do such acts, for isn't it America that comes to our region and kills innocents
and children? It is our right to hit them in their homes the same as they hit us in our homes”
(Mekhennet and Moss 2007). Despite this rhetoric, Fatah al-Islam has not targeted any American
interests or targets. Abssi disappeared following the Fatah al-Islam defeat in Lebanon and is believed to
escaped to Syria; Fatal al-Islam declared in 2008 that he had been “captured or killed” in Syria, going
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on to explain, “We don't know his fate, but we believe he probably was martyred, but we don't have
solid evidence” (Al-Jazeera 2008). Following Abssi's disappearance, Fatah al-Islam had elected Abdal-Rahman Awad as its new leader; Awad was killed at a checkpoint in August 2010 (BBC 2010).
In addition to Palestinians, Fatah al-Islam also draws members from Lebanon and other Arab
countries (Reuters 2007). Nir Rosen claims that the members of Fatah al-Islam were “not homegrown
and and not focused on liberating Palestine;” instead, “they were largely foreign jihadists, with the
same weapons, tactics, and sectarian goals of Iraqi resistance fighters” (Rosen 2008). Al-Jazeera
Middle East analyst Marwan Bishara goes so far to claim the group is “transnational” on the basis that
in addition to fighters' histories in Iraq, many have trained in camps in Jordan and other places (AlJazeera 2007). By setting up base in a refugee camp, Fatah al-Islam was essentially shielded from any
interference from the Lebanese government as well as provided access to a large potential recruitment
pool of Palestinian youths (Mekhennet and Moss 2007).
Fatah al-Islam and al-Qaeda
Fatah al-Islam does not have any formal connections to al-Qaeda or the al-Qaeda movement.
Group founder Shaker Abssi claimed that Fatah al-Islam had “no organizational or logistical links to alQaeda,” (Bloom 2007). With the exception claims made by the Syrian government, this statement is
generally excepted as true. However, al-Qaeda leaders have urged Muslims to support Fatah al-Islam
(Bloom 2007). They have also threatened the Lebanese government if they did not stop targeting the
group, saying “what we want is that you order the Christian Lebanese army to pull its men from around
all Palestinian camps and the Nahr al-Bared Camp in particular,” and “if you do not stop we will
wrench out your hearts with ... bombs” (Yalibnan 2007). Additionally, statements made by Fatah alIslam have appeared on websites also used by al-Qaeda for its public statements, suggesting some
minor shared connections in the media relations departments of the groups (BBC 2010).
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The two groups share the goal of deposing the governments of Muslim countries in favor of a
fundamentalist Islamic government based solely on the Qu'ran and sharia law. Fatah al-Islam also
“subscribes to Osama bin Laden's ideology,” especially with regard to war against non-Muslims,
particularly those in the West (Bloom 2007). Abssi told the New York Times, “"Osama bin Laden does
make the fatwas. Should his fatwas follow the sunnah, we will carry them out,” (Mekhennet and Moss
2007). He also stated opinions regarding Islamic war practices similar to al-Qaeda's interpretation of
these traditions, “"Originally, the killing of innocents and children was forbidden. However, there are
situations in which the killing of such is permissible. One of these exceptions is those that kill our
women and children" (Mekhennet and Moss 2007).
Additionally, Abssi allegedly had a close connection to al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab alZarqawi (Bloom 2007). Abssi and Zarqawi both helped plan the assassination of US diplomat Laurence
Foley in Jordan; a crime for which in 2002 they were both sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan
(BBC 2010). This connection may indicate that Fatah al-Islam leaders and members identify with alQaeda ideology, and while they do not coordinate with al-Qaeda they have scattered personal
connections between Fatah al-Islam and al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations. Some members of the
group have been involved in fighting in Iraq (Reuters 2007). Fatah al-Islam members also have been
involved with other Palestinian Islamist groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as Tawhid (Rosen
2008). Fatah al-Islam also received operational assistance from Asbat al-Ansar, a group with “tenuous”
links to al-Qaeda (Rosen 2008). When Awad and his deputy Abu Bakr Ghazi Mubarak were killed in
2010, they were reportedly going to Iraq to meet with AQI leadership to seek aid for Fatah al-Islam
militants in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp (Tawil 2010).
Fatah al-Islam and Instability in Lebanon
The 2007 siege in the Nahar al-Bared camp is the lone incident through which Fatah al-Islam
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has contributed to Lebanon's precarious instability.The sectarian violence of Fatah al-Islam can only
erode the tenuous peace created after the sectarian motivated civil war. Additionally, the thousands of
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are a point of fragility for Lebanese society. While Palestinian
Christians have been given citizenship in Lebanon, Palestinian Muslims live in a permanent state of
limbo. The 2007 violence in south Lebanon caused by Fatah al-Islam caused most of the 30,000-40,000
of the Nahar al-Bared camp to flee, worsening the refugee crisis (Anti-Defamation League 2007).
Because the Lebanese army was brought in to control the situation within the camp, this indicates that
Fatah al-Islam had become enough of a problem that the government of Lebanon felt it necessary to
intervene in the camps, something it normally does not do. While this single incident did temporarily
cause stability in Lebanon to erode, it was quickly dealt with. This incident is indicative of the fragile
state of ethnic and sectarian co-existence within Lebanon, which could slip into chaos at any time.
Mechanisms For Instability
Resources
There is no indication that there is any exchange of resources between Fatah al-Islam and alQaeda. It is suspected that Fatah al-Islam funded its activities thought bank robberies, smuggling, and
theft (Anti-Defamation Leaguge 2007). As a result of the designation as a terrorist organization, the
group cannot operate within the American financial system (Reuters 2007). The resource mechanism
does not cause Fatah al-Islam's al-Qaeda connection to increase its destabilization capabilities in
Lebanon.
Knowledge
It is possible that al-Qaeda has passed some knowledge indirectly and unintentionally to Fatah
al-Islam through the group's connections to AQI. This is evidenced through Fatah al-Islam creating a
specialized department for media relations, which includes the production of an news magazine to help
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reach new recruits (Mekhennet and Moss 2007). This move is similar to al-Qaeda strategy. However,
Fatah al-Islam has failed to create a strategy that allowed it to continue past its short lifespan, meaning
that long term strategic moves such as media presence cannot have any effect if the organization does
not continue to exist. Therefore, this mechanism of knowledge sharing has had little or no effect on
Fatah al-Islam's contributions to instability in Lebanon.
Ideology
Ideology is the one area in which al-Qaeda is influential. Having a public ideology following
the well known al-Qaeda ideology inspired some of the initial Fatah al-Islam recruits (Amos 2010).
Additionally, the radicalism of the al-Qaeda ideology helped identify the Palestinian cause in Lebanon
with jihadi causes in Afghanistan and Chechnya, which helped Fatah al-Islam to attract recruits (Rosen
2008).Additionally, political factors in the region, such as “endemic anti-Americanism” and “a crisis
locked government” have fueled al-Qaeda recruitment in Lebanon as a whole (Blanford 2007). AlQaeda promoted the cause of Fatah al-Islam publicly (Bloom 2007). This ideological draw likely
increased the capabilities of Fatah al-Islam, which in turn has increased its ability to create instability in
the south of Lebanon.
Identification
The Lebanese government has been the primary adversary to Fatah al-Islam. The government
identified the group because it posed a direct threat to Lebanese territory. However, the group's
perceived al-Qaeda connection has caused attracted attention in the media, which frequently mentions
an al-Qaeda connection to Fatah al-Islam when the group is discussed10. American designation of the
group as a foreign terrorist organization may have brought additional attention to the group
internationally. America assisted Lebanon in suppressing the group with airlifts of artillery and a 550%
10 For example, see Mekhennet and Moss 2007, BBC 2010, Saidi 2007, Roggio 2012b
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increase in military aid to Lebanon in 2007 compared to 2006 (Blanford 2007). However, there is no
official link between the group being identified as an al-Qaeda affiliate and the actions taken against it.
Foreign Targeting
While Fatah al-Islam does denounce the west, there have been no identified attacks by the
group outside of Lebanon. Even these attacks within Lebanon are not against American or western
interests. An ideological al-Qaeda affiliation has certainly influenced the rhetoric and stated goals of
Fatah al-Islam. However, this connection has not influenced the actual targeting choices of the group
and thus has not reduced the groups destabilization capacity in Lebanon.
Local Distrust
While Fatah al-Islam is significantly composed of fPalestinians, who may be considered to be
foreigners in Lebanon, there is no specific evidence for the group is distrusted locally for any reason
other than the fact that it is a terrorist group. The group has been able to draw upon already existent
anti-Lebanese and anti-Israeli sentiment within the camps for its recruitment pool. However, the mass
exodus from the camp that was the result of the siege shows that Fatah al-Islam is not a locally trusted
group because the choice of the fellow Palestinians to leave the camp rather than support the group.
However, this cannot be traced clearly to any al-Qaeda connection.
Conclusion
There is little evidence supporting any effect of Fatah al-Islam's al-Qaeda affiliation on its
contributions to instability in Lebanon. Overall, the reason why Fatah al-Islam did not survive as a
functioning organization after its initial year of existence is its lack of capability to sustain a long term
organization. Connection to al-Qaeda ideologically may have increased the total number of available
recruits, and may have drawn some strength into the group. However, this has shown to not have any
significant long term effects on its ability to cause instability in Lebanon because the group did not
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reach enough strength to become a significant influence in its own territory.
Islamic Army of Aden
The Islamic Army of Aden is is a defunct terrorist group that was based in southern Yemen's
Aden and Abyan governorates. It was founded in Yemen in the early 1990s by Zein al-Adideen alMehdar (alias Abu al-Hassan el-Modader) after he returned from jihad in Afghanistan (Al-Qaeda
Sanctions Committee). The group was primarily made up of Yemeni and Saudi dissidents and other
returning Yemeni jihadis. Some of these jihadis who had originally gone to Afghanistan were exiles
from South Yemen during the unrest surrounding the unification of the two Yemens and the subsequent
domination of North Yemen (Carapico 2000). The group is also known as the Aden-Abyan Islamic
Army, based on “an apocryphal hadith that claims that in the last days an army will arise from AdenAbyan to fight for victory in God's name, and that God will grant them success” (Johnsen 2006). While
not officially affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Islamic Army of Aden has received funding from Osama bin
Laden. It has also coordinated with al-Qaeda on some of its earliest attacks, such as the 2000 bombing
of the USS Cole. The group emerged publicly in 1998 with statements expressing support for bin
Laden, calling for the overthrow of the Yemeni government, and threatening western interests in Yemen
(Aftergood 2004). Speculative estimates of the size of the group from Arab news sources place group
membership between 80 and 100 members at it height in the late 1990s (Cook 2006).
The Global Terrorism Database lists three attacks attributable to Islamic Army of Aden. The
first is in Sanaa, Yemen, in 1999 which resulted in two fatalities and 12 injuries. In October 2002, there
was an attack coordinated with al-Qaeda in the Gulf of Aden, resulting in one fatality and 12 injuries.
In 2003, there was a suspected attack by the Islamic Army of Aden in the city of Hattat against a
military target which resulted in seven injuries (GTD). They are also suspected of attacking Yemeni
socialists prior to the 1993 parliamentary elections (Carapico 2000). In October 2000, they were
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responsible for the bombing of the British Embassy in Sanaa (Aftergood 2004).
The most notorious attack which the Islamic Army of Aden claims responsibility for also caused
its the eventual collapse. In December 1998, the group kidnaped 16 American, British, and Australian
tourists in Mudiyah, Yemen. Four of these hostages were killed in the recovery effort. The leader of the
group, al-Hassan, was captured by the government and sentenced to death. In response, the Islamic
Army of Aden issued “numerous threats” to westerners and the Yemeni government, going so far as in
March of 1999 to warn the U.S. and British ambassadors to Yemen to leave immediately (Global
Security). In 1999, on the orders of President Salih, al-Hassan was executed.
Similarly, a 2003 attack on a medical convoy in Adyan caused the downfall of the leader who
replaced al-Hassan, Khalid al-Nabi Yazidi. Following this attack, the Yemeni government conducted a
raid on Islamic Army of Aden hideouts. These raids resulted in the killing and capturing of several
individuals, including Yazidi (Aftergood 2004). However, unlike al-Hassan, Yazidi was released from
prison less than a year later in October 2003. According to one anonymous Yemeni security official,
Yazidi was pardoned by Salih and now “lives as an average citizen and owns a farm” (Johnsen 2006).
The Islamic Army of Aden and Al-Qaeda
The Islamic Army of Aden was not a formal affiliate of al-Qaeda, nor did it have any permanent
operational relationship with al-Qaeda. One of the Islamic Army of Aden senior members, Tariq alFadhli, has been quoted as saying, “"Osama bin Laden provided me with funding as a person and not as
a leader...I have only heard about al-Qaeda recently because there was no such thing when I was in
Afghanistan” (cited in Johnsen 2006). However, the group has coordinated attacks with al-Qaeda. The
Islamic Army of Aden had some involvement in the October 12, 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in the
Aden Harbor, which resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors and 39 injuries (Al-Qaeda Sanctions
Committee). Surviving members of the Islamic Army of Aden were also suspected of cooperating with
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al-Qaeda on the attempted bombing of the USS The Sullivans in January 2000 and attacking the MV
Limburg, a french oil tanker, in October 2002 (Cook 2006).
The Islamic Army of Aden also has ideological connections to al-Qaeda. They issued public
statements supporting al-Qaeda in 1998 (Aftergood 2004). They also declared support for the 1998 alQaeda attacks against the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, as well as support for bin Laden
after the retaliatory American strikes on al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan (Al-Qaeda Sanctions
Committee). These ideological connections to bin Laden and al-Qaeda were reportedly a result of
“financial and material support from Osama bin Laden in exchange for its support for al-Qaeda's
agenda” (Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee). While there was certainly a connection between al-Qaeda
and the Islamic Army of Aden, it was not a close relationship and was based more on personal
connections between bin Laden and the group than organizational linkages.
Islamic Army of Aden and Instability in Yemen
The Islamic Army of Aden was not a long lived group, nor was it a particularly influential one.
Overall, its importance in Yemen is considered “minimal” because “this was not a very major group
and certainly posed no serious challenge to the regime” (Cook 2006). While the group had
responsibility in some high profile operations, such as the kidnapping of 16 westerners or the bombing
of the USS Cole, Yemeni government quickly followed up these attacks with harsh punishment. The
Yemenis cooperated fully with the United States on the investigation of the USS Cole attack and
executed al-Hassan for his role in the kidnappings. This harsh handling by the government caused the
group to deteriorate in its operational capacity until it became functionally defunct and defeated. This
lack of strength of the group and the fact that it focused its attention on western interests in Yemen
demonstrates that the Islamic Army of Aden was not a very dangerous group. It also shows that the
high internal instability in Yemen is not something that the Islamic Army of Aden has contributed to
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significantly.
Resources
Resources from al-Qaeda have not caused the Islamic Army of Aden to increase instability in
Yemen. Osama bin Laden personally provided the Islamic Army of Aden with funding at some point in
the group's history. However, this financial relationship was short lived and not maintained. The
financing of this terrorist group allowed it to pursue its goals and be a source of terror for westerners in
Yemen. This had minimal effect on Yemeni stability, but did serve to identify Yemen as a hotbed of
terrorism in western eyes.
Knowledge
It is unlikely that al-Qaeda contributed any of its institutional knowledge to the Islamic Army of
Aden. There may have been some indirect knowledge transfer between the two groups because the
Islamic Army of Aden was led and largely made up of jihadis returning from Afghanistan, who may
have had contact with al-Qaeda in its early years. Al-Qaeda also cooperated with the Islamic Army of
Aden on several attacks and could have provided tactical knowledge through these cooperative
operations. However, knowledge is not an area that has caused the Islamic Army of Aden to become
more dangerous.
Ideology
Ideology is another area where there has been some exchange between al-Qaeda and the Islamic
Army of Aden. The Islamic Army of Aden has publicly supported al-Qaeda and operates under an
ideology that, like al-Qaeda, is overwhelmingly anti-western. This ideological connection may have
been a factor that drew in new recruits or connected jihadis from other organizations to this group. This
ideological connection could have provided the Islamic Army of Aden with support for attacking
western targets, but it did not encourage the destabilization of Yemen and thus ideology is not a
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mechanism that has increased the Islamic Army of Aden's ability to destabilize Yemen domestically.
Identification
The Islamic Army of Aden's al-Qaeda connection did not contribute to its identification as a
terrorist group. Counterterrorist action by the state of Yemen against the group has been a response to
specific attacks and operations undertaken by the group. The group has not been a target of foreign
instigated counterterrorist action like AQAP. While the actions taken against the group were crippling,
resulting in the deaths of one leader and the capture of his successor, there is no evidence which could
support an al-Qaeda connection being an extra motivation for the pursuit of this action by the Yemeni
state.
Foreign Targeting
There is evidence to support the mechanism of foreign targeting detracting from the Islamic
Army of Aden's destabilization of Yemen. Because the Islamic Army of Aden subscribed to al-Qaeda
“far enemy” ideology, it focused its efforts against non-Yemeni targets, even though the overthrow of
the Yemeni government was one of the group's stated goals. The focus on foreign interests used up the
groups capabilities, which could have been focused on domestic targets. This mechanism did likely
cause the Islamic army of Aden to not be a force for destabilization in Yemen because the group chose
to devote its limited assets to foreign targets, which reduced its potential to attack domestically.
Local Distrust
Failure to build up an adequate local support base could be one reason for the Islamic Army of
Aden's failure to survive, but there is no evidence to indicate that the group's al-Qaeda affiliation
caused this. The group was never large and never attempted to reach out to the local population, instead
being made up of a membership which already had experience with jihad elsewhere. This strategic
misstep might ultimately be traced to the group's choice of targets and its foreign focus, thus making a
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local base a lower priority. However, there is nothing to indicate that the group attempted to reach out
to the local population and was found to be illegitimate or untrustworthy.
Conclusions
Ultimately, the Islamic Army of Aden had little effect on domestic stability of Yemen. This is
due mostly to its lack of capability. Its ineffectiveness with regard to the production of local instability
can also be attributed choosing to target foreign interests. Through the Islamic Army of Aden, al-Qaeda
contributed to Yemeni instability with the mechanisms of resources and ideology, but these are
counterbalanced by the mechanism of foreign targeting. While the group did not have a close
relationship with al-Qaeda, this lack of operational connection is not the reason that the group was not
successful. Rather, lack of capability through a small and inactive membership caused the group to fail
to maintain itself as an organization or pursue major attacks.
Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami
Harkat ul-Jihadi al-Islami (HuJI) is a Deobandi terrorist group based in Pakistan. Like LeT, they
focus their efforts on the Kashmir region. Additionally, they have established their own affiliate
organization in Bangladesh. Like several other organizations, HuJI has its roots in the Afghani jihad
conflict. Qari Saifullah Akhtar, Maulana Irshad Mhmed, and Maulana Abdus Samad Sial, students from
Karachi laid the foundation for a group called Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneed in 1980 (South Asia Terrorism
Portal-SATP). After the drawing down of the Afghani jihad, the group shifted its focus to another
ongoing jihadi conflict in Kashmir. In Kashmir, the group merged with Harkat ul-Mujadhideen to for
the group Harkat ul-Ansar. Harkat ul-Ansar changed its name to Harkat ul-Mujahideen in 1997 , “in
order to avoid the ramifications of the U.S. Designation of Harkat ul-Ansar as a foreign terrorist
organization” (SATP). HuJI was listed as a designated terrorist organization in the United States in
2008, by the UN in 2010, and it is also a listed terrorist organization in India (Mappin Militants 2012).
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Following 9/11, HuJI Afghan bases were lost. The leaders of the group moved to the South
Wazirstan agency of FATA, while regular members fled to Chechnya, FATA, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(SATP). In 2004, Akhtar was arrested in Dubai, extradited to Pakistan, and then released in 2007
(SATP). In 2008, the leader of HuJI in India, Bashir Ahmed Mir, was shot by police in Jammu and
Kashmir (SATP).
HuJI established a Bangladeshi branch in 1992 known as Harkat ul-Jihad aL-Islami-Bangladesh
(HuJI-B). In its early years HuJI was part of the Fazlur Rahman's Jihad Movement in Bangladesh
(SATP). HuJI-B claims that their goals are “to establish Islamic rule in the country by waging war and
killing progressive intellectuals (SATP). It's slogan is “Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe
Afghanistan”- We will become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan (SATP).
Following post 9/11 “government crackdowns on terrorist activity,” HuJI activities in Pakistan were
reduced. Currently, the main cell of the organization is locaked in India in Uttar Pradesh, but the group
“appears to have sleeper cells in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajastan” (Mapping Militants
2012). The group has connections to two groups in Northeast India, the United Liberation Front of
Asom (ULFA) and the People's United Liberation Front (PULF), as well as the Taliban (Mapping
Militants 2012).
Current estimates of force strength of HuJI in Kashmir are 500-700 members (SATP). The
membership is made up primarily of Pakistanis, mostly from Kashmir or Punjab and to a lesser extent
Sindh and Baluchistan; however, some HuJI members killed in battle in Kashmir who can be traced to
Afghanistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Arab countries (SATP). HuJI also operates in
Uzbekistan, the Philippines, Fiji, Malaysia, Ireland, the UK, the US, and Africa (Mapping Militants
2012).
Attack History and Targeting
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Like LeT, HuJI focuses its attention on India. Of the twenty one attributable or suspected
incidents involving HuJI listed in the Global Terrorism Database, eighteen took place in India. One
took place in Bangladesh and two in Pakistan. Most of the incidents took place in the Jammu and
Kashmir region, but there are major incidents which have occurred elsewhere in India. Many of these
were undertaken in cooperation with other jihadi groups. These include a 2011 attack in New Delhi
that was Indian Mujahideen which resulted in 15 fatalities and 45 injuries, a 2007 attack in Hyderabad
with LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) which resulted in 13 deaths and 64 injuries, a 2005 attack in
Bangalore with LeT, and a 2002 attack in Calcutta with the Asif Raza Commandos (GTD). Both of the
attacks in Pakistan took place in Karachi. An October 2007 attack in Karachi was the deadliest attack
undertaken by the group. A suicide bomber detonated an improvised vehicle-based device and another
operative threw a grenade into a crowd near a homecoming procession for Benazir Bhutto, resulting in
141 deaths and 250 injuries, but failing to kill Bhutto (GTD).
HuJI and Al-Qaeda
HuJI has not sworn formal allegiance to al-Qaeda, nor does it have any operational connections.
However, the group is connected to other al-Qaeda affiliate organizations with operational links such
LeT. HuJI is also ideologically connected to al-Qaeda. The leaders of HuJI and HuJI-B were both
signatories to a 1998 fatwa by bin Laden declaring American citizens to be targets (bin Laden et al
1998). Also signing the fatwa were Ayman al-Zawahiri, who would later become al-Qaeda second in
command, but was then leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, of the
Egyptian Islamic Group; and Mir Hamzah, secretary of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan. Aside from bin
Laden and Zawahiri, none of the other signers were promient leaders in the jihadi movement.
It is also reported that al-Qaeda's leader in Pakistan, Badr Mansoor was “able to funnel in
recruits from Pakistani terror groups such as the Harkat ul-Mujahideen, with which was was closely
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linked,” (Roggio 2012a). In addition to its al-Qaeda connections, that the group is alleged to received
assistance from the ISI along with a numer of other groups based in Kashmir (Mapping Militants
2012). They are also connected to other jihadi groups in Pakistan, such as LeT and JeM, and outside of
Pakistan, such as the Taliban (SATP).
HuJI and Instability in Pakistan
HuJI does not seek the overthrow of the Pakistani government, and from their attack history, it
is apparent that they have a strategy focused on India. The major attack in 2007 in Karachi is the lone
example of a direct HuJI threat on Pakistan. This attack could have been an attempt to assassinate
Benazir Bhutto, who had widespread popular support and posed a threat to Islamists. Her assassination
undermined the stability of Pakistan because the country was headed by a perceived illegitimate
military actor and with the assassination of Bhutto, the front runner in the elections, there was no clear
legitimate leader of Pakistan.
The attacks on India can also be a source of indirect instability in Pakistan. Because of the
continued tensions between Pakistan and India, any attack is a potential catalyst for increased state of
alert between the two countries, particularly in the Kashmir region. India is increasingly aware and
vocal about the role of terrorist groups like HJI and LeT as ISI proxies, and continually feels threatened
by these non-state actors. A terrorist attack against India could severely damage the relations between
Pakistan and India, which in turn may affect the stability of Pakistan and its foreign relations.
Mechanisms for Instability
Resources
Funding for HuJI and HuJI-B does not appear to be al-Qaeda related. Funding comes form a
variety of sources from around the world, particularly Islamic charities like Servants of Suffering
Humanity in South Africa and madrassa leaders in Bangladesh (Investigating Terrorism Project). HuJI
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also allegedly received support from the ISI and it benefits from its connections to other Islamic
extremists in Pakistan like LeT (SATP). They have also been involved in criminal activities, such as
money laundering in India (Mapping Militants 2012). There is no evidence supporting an exchange of
resources between al-Qaeda and HuJI.
Knowledge
Because of the lack of organizational connections, it is apparent that there is also no exchange
of knowledge between al-Qaeda and HuJI. HuJI may benefit indirectly through knowledge transmitted
between al-Qaeda and groups like LeT, but HuJI does not communicate with al-Qaeda directly
regarding organization building or strategy. The knowledge mechanism does not appear to have any
effect on instability in Pakistan.
Ideology
Ideology is the one area where al-Qaeda and HuJI do have connections. This established
ideological connection is a recruitment tool for HuJI. However, like LeT, the recruits of HuJI do not
directly contribute significantly to instability in Pakistan. Those who join HuJI because of ideology
could have joined other Pakistani groups which contribute to instability to a greater extent than HuJI
such as LeJ. This could indicate that the ideology mechanism is ultimately neutral- while it does add
recruits to HuJI it also draws recruits away from other organizations which could undermine instability
more.
Identification
While signing the 1998 fatwa may have been a red flag, HuJI's affiliation with al-Qaeda has not
made it a target of Pakistani counterterrorism. Overall, HuJI has not been a target of extensive
counterterrorist action, largely because of its weak capacity and the Pakistani government's support of
its proxies in Kashmir. The United States has not pursued action against HuJI because they are not
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considered to be a threat to the west or western interests. Overall, the mechanism of identification has
not decreased HuJI's contributions to instability in Pakistan.
Foreign Targeting
While HuJI does primarily pursue foreign targets in India, its al-Qaeda affiliation does not
influence this. Like LeT, HuJI is eastward looking in its targeting strategy. HuJI does not appear to be
influenced by al-Qaeda with regards to strategy or targeting. Additionally, HuJI's the foreign targeting
could be an indirect source of instability in Pakistan because of its potential to undermine the foreign
relations of Pakistan though increased tensions with India. HuJI's attacks in Pakistan appear to be more
influenced by al-Qaeda than its actions in India. There is no evidence of HuJI pursuing western targets
or targets outside of South Asia.
Local Distrust
The local distrust mechanism does not appear to apply to HuJI. As a locally based group
supported by the local population, HuJI is dependent on its local support for its existence.
Conclusion
Overall, HuJI has a weak ideological connection, but no functional or operational connections.
There is no exchange of resources or knowledge between the groups and al-Qaeda does not have
control over HuJI's strategy or targeting choices. HuJI does not face local distrust or identification
problems because of its al-Qaeda affiliation. This group has both a weak affiliation and weak
contribution to instability, but these two are not related. Instead, the group's irrelevance to Pakistani
instability is because of its targeting choices and weak operational capacity.
Harkat ul-Mujahideen
Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is another Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan. It is a
splinter group of HuJI, and follows similar patterns as HuJI, attacking primarily in Kashmir. Due to its
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designation as a terrorist group by both the U.S. and Pakistan, it changed its name to Harkat al-Ansar to
avoid detection and then later changed its name back to HuM. HuM also has a front organization called
al-Faran. The group was founded in Afghanistan as a splinter group of HuJI in 1985 (SATP). The group
consists of “several hundred armed supporters” who are located in Azad Kashmir in Pakistan and the
southern Kashmir and Doda regions of India (Department of State 2011). While operations are
conducted in Kashmir, the group itself is based in the central Pakistani cities of Muzaffarabad and
Rawalpindi (Department of State 2011). These supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also
include Afghans and Arabs who fought in Afghanistan (Department of State 2011). HuM turned
towards pursuing jihad in Kashmir following Soviet withdrawal from Pakistan.They have also been
involved in action against coalition forces in Afghanistan (SATP). A serious challenge came to the
group after it became centered in Kashmir with the arrests of three of its top leaders, Nasrullah Mansur
Langrayal, Maulana Masood Azhar, and Sajjad Afghani, by Indian Security Forces beginning in 1993
(SATP).
After Masood Azhar's release and the subsequent formation of Jaish-e-Mohammed, HuM's
operational capabilities have been “severely curtailed,” because “a significant portion of HuM's
membership defected to JeM” (Department of State 2011). The group is now active in Kashmir “only
in isolated instances” (SATP). In 2005, the group was responsible for the deaths of fifteen people in
Kashmir; the group also killed two members of Indian Security Forces in 2007 (Department of State
2011). In 2009, a death threat received by Lalchang Kishen Advani, leader of the Indian Bharatiya
Janata Party, was attributed to HuM (Department of State 2011).
In January 2005, the leader of HuM, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, stepped down, possibly in response
to Pakistani government pressure (SATP). He was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir. Khalil now lives
completely free near the Pakistani capital of Islamabad (Associated Press 2011). This fact alone
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suggests a relationship between HuM and the Pakistani government, despite has been a recognized
terrorist group in Pakistan under its multiple names since the early 2000s.
Attack History
HuM's activities primarily consist of kidnapping foreign tourists and members of the Indian
Security Forces in attempts to get their leaders out of prison. These kidnappings include two members
of the security forces abducted and killed in January 1995, foreign tourists in Kashmir abducted and
released in June 1994, four foreign tourists abducted in New Delhi in October 1994, who were
successfully rescued, and six hostages abducted in July 1995 of which one escaped and one body was
later rescued (SATP). In July 1999, HuM was involved in a jailbreak attempted staged by Sajjad
Afghani (SATP). Additionally, they are suspected of being involved in a 1999 hijacking of Indian
Airlines Flight IC 814 from Kathmandu, Nepal (SATP). This hijacking resulted in the release of
Masood Azhar who had been in prison in India since 1994 (Department of State 2011). A former
member of HuM,Omar Sheik, who was also released from prison as a result of the hijacking,
kidnapped and killed American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 (Department of State 2011).
HuM and al-Qaeda
HuM leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil has been linked to Osama bin Laden. He also publicly allied
with bin Laden through signing his February 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against western interests
(SATP). HuM operated training camps in the same region of Afghanistan as al-Qaeda until the 2001
invasion (SATP). The group has “especially deep roots in the area around Abbottabad” and it is
possible that they may have had contact with bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members while he was
hiding in Abbottabad (Gall et al. 2011). They may have been especially helpful to al-Qaeda in Pakistan
because as Pakistanis “they can roam widely... something the foreigners who make up al-Qaeda's ranks
cannot do,” (Gall et al 2011). However, Khalil denied allegations that HuM had been in touch with bin
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Laden based on telephone numbers found in the bin Laden raid, telling the Associated Press, “It is 100
percent wrong, its rubbish... Osama did not have contact with anybody” (Associated Press 2011). A
senior Pakistani government official contributed Khalil, saying about the former HuM leader, “He was
significant for Osama bin Laden.... He has connections with all these groups in Waziristan but he is
living here and we don’t go after him. He is the one you go to when you need to get to these groups”
(Associated Press 2011). Whether or not Khalil's personal connection to bin Laden continued in
Pakistan, the relationship was one between two men and not between two organizations. Overall, while
HuM does follow the al-Qaeda ideology, they do not cooperate significantly with al-Qaeda as an
organization.
HuM and Instability in Pakistan
Because it focuses its operations in India, HuM does not significantly affect instability in
Pakistan. The kidnappings of Indian military personnel and foreigners may make some diplomatic
trouble for the government of Pakistan, but it is easy for Pakistan to claim to have no connection to the
group, which it has officially recognized as a terrorist group more than once. Like LeT and other
groups based in Kashmir, it is possible that building up tensions between India and Pakistan could have
the indirect potential to destabilize Pakistan in the future. However, there are many Pakistani groups
operating in the Kashmir region and HuM is not the most active, making it not the most likely to be a
catalyst for an international incident. Overall, HuM has a weak, if any, destabilizing effect on Pakistan.
Mechanisms for Instability
Resources
The only evidence of al-Qaeda and HuM sharing resources is the alleged tactical resources
HuM was able to provide bin Laden and his circle in Abbottabad. While by aiding al-Qaeda HuM may
have increased instability in Pakistan because of American undermining of Pakistani territorial
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sovereignty, this exchange of resources benefited al-Qaeda and not HuM. Overall, the resource
mechanism has not strengthened HuM's contributions to instability in Pakistan.
Knowledge
If there is any exchange of knowledge between HuM and al-Qaeda it is indirect. HuM is
connected to several other al-Qaeda affiliates, such as HuJI, who it is a splinter group of, and JeM, who
splintered from it. Al-Qaeda may have a closer relationship with some of these groups, particularly
JeM. It is possible that through its relationships with these groups, knowledge is transmitted second or
third hand from al-Qaeda. However, it does not appear that HuM necessarily uses any al-Qaeda
strategies in its attacks or organizational practices. From this, it can be determined that the knowledge
mechanism does not have an effect on HuM and instability in Pakistan.
Ideology
HuM is contemporaneous to al-Qaeda, meaning that it developed its ideology independently. As
a Deobandi and not Salafi group, HuM's ideology is slightly different from al-Qaeda's. However,
HuM's ideology is close enough for the two groups to be connected. HuM may benefit from this from
the existence of Arab and Afghan volunteers among its ranks. In this sense, the ideology mechanism
may slightly increase HuM's contributions to instability in Pakistan.
Identification
The identification mechanism may have a slight influence on HuM and instability in Pakistan.
Because Khalil signed bin Laden's 1998 fatwa, he publicly aligned himself and his group with al-Qaeda
beliefs and goals. This may have been a motivating factor for the increased scrutiny the group has had
to endure by the Pakistani government. Because of this early identification of HuM as a terrorist group,
they have been limited in activities and capacity. Therefore, identification may have decreased HuM
destabilization potential in Pakistan.
Ward 118
Foreign Targeting
While HuM does pursue solely foreign targets, al-Qaeda did not have any influence over these
targeting choices. HuM falls into the LeT-like India/Kashmir-centric targeting strategy group, and
while it views the U.S. and the west as an evil in the world deserving of targeting, they have never
actively pursued attacks in the west. With the exception of some targeting of foreigners for kidnapping
in India, HuM has never pursued western targets. Even targeting the foreigners was a choice made
because of their increased leverage to try to influence India to release their leaders and not because of a
pursuit of western targets alone. The foreign targeting affiliation mechanism has not decreased HuM's
contributions to instability in Pakistan.
Local Distrust
HuM's status as a Pakistani group predominantly made up of Pakistanis has not caused any local
distrust. There is evidence that “local outcry” may have influenced the group to release foreign kidnap
victims in 1994 (SATP). However, this does not indicate that actions taken to destabilize Pakistan have
been affected by local distrust coming from its relationship to al-Qaeda. The group contributes, in its
limited capacity, to operate in Kashmir and its leaders walk free in the cities of Rawalpindi,
Muzaffarabad, and Islamabad.
Conclusion
Overall, HuM has a limited effect on instability in Pakistani because of organizational
splintering and defection, low group membership, and a focus on kidnappings rather than attacks which
destabilize. The extent group's relationship with al-Qaeda is not certain, but it is likely limited and at a
personal and ideological, not organizational, level. While it may be argued that the ideology and
identification mechanisms apply in the case of HuM, neither of these mechanisms are strong. The
effects of an al-Qaeda affiliation on HuM are limited and weak, and the positive effect of ideology
Ward 119
cancels out the negative effect of identification.
What can be learned from these four groups?
Taken together, these four cases demonstrate that when a group is allied with al-Qaeda at an
ideological level, the affiliation does not have a strong effect on the group's potential destabilization of
their home country. Overall, these four groups have a weak destabilization effect on their countries. For
Fatah al-Islam this destabilization came in one three month burst and the Islamic Army of Aden a
several years, but for HuM and HuJI it has been continuing since 1985. However, this weak effect
cannot be attributed to their weak al-Qaeda affiliation, but rather to the weak capacity of the groups and
their targeting choices. The little benefit these groups get from their ideological affiliation with alQaeda, generally in recruitment, is canceled out by its costs, generally identification. This indicates
that for these four groups, an al-Qaeda ideological affiliation has a net neutral effect.
Chapter Six
Conclusion
The al-Qaeda 'brand' is known throughout the world and carries with it powerful connotations
everywhere. However, adopting the al-Qaeda brand name is not something which ultimately results in
an increase in the local instability. While the al-Qaeda name can be quick to attract recruits to an
organization, it also is a red flag that is quick to attract the eye of governments. While knowledge and
resource sharing may strengthen the organization, the local distrust that comes from being an al-Qaeda
affiliate serves as a crucial weakness. Additionally, when evaluating the role of the group in local
instability, a commitment to al-Qaeda ideology can result in a strategic focus on foreign targeting,
drawing capabilities away from local targets. Being an al-Qaeda affiliate does result in an increase in
group strength, but it also results in a decrease in local instability produced. Taken together, these costs
Ward 120
of affiliation cancel out any benefits, resulting in al-Qaeda affiliation not having any net affect on local
instability created by the affiliate group.
This neutral effect of al-Qaeda affiliation is not dependent on the strength of the relationship
between al-Qaeda and the affiliate organization. For groups with strong ties and a formal affiliation,
such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the al-Qaeda affiliation comes with greater benefits than
groups with a weaker affiliation, but they also must pay equally greater costs. The magnitude of the
effects of affiliation are stronger for groups that are more strongly affiliated with al-Qaeda. However
for every mechanism which increases the power of the group to influence local instability, there is an
equal and opposite decreasing mechanism, resulting in affiliation have neutral effect for all levels of
relationship between the two groups.
Within the cases discussed, there is evidence to support the validity of all six of the
hypothesized mechanisms. Exchange of resources can be seen in the LeT case, with the bidirectional
sharing of training camps, and in the case of the Islamic Army of Aden, which received financial
assistance from bin Laden. The knowledge sharing mechanism can be observed clearly in the case of
AQAP, which received strategic guidance from bin Laden and al-Qaeda leadership as well as advice on
more mundane matters including media relations and organizational management. The ideology
mechanism can be seen in every case, but stands out in the cases of the case of Fatah al-Islam, who,
despite having no operational connections to al-Qaeda, benefited from increased recruitment due to the
perception of an al-Qaeda ideological connection (Amos 2010). The identification mechanism is most
explicit in the case of AQAP, which has been the target of drone strikes, resulting in the deaths of more
than 300 of its members (Roggio and Barry 2013). Foreign targeting as a result of al-Qaeda affiliation
can be observed in AQAP's attempted attacks on the west as well as the Islamic Army of Aden's
targeting of western interests in Yemen. AQAP is also a clear case of local distrust. Because of this
Ward 121
distrust, AQAP has been forced to adopt a new name, Ansar al-Sharia, for its local operations. Local
distrust can also be seen to a lesser extent in the case of HuM, whose operations have been stunted due
to “local outcry” (SATP).
The particular strength of the benefits brought to an organization through the ideology
mechanism is an important take away from these findings. Despite the fear of an al-Qaeda network, the
way in which al-Qaeda proves most beneficial is not through any organizational connections, but
through its ideological ones. The al-Qaeda ideology can be adopted by many different groups,
including those like LeT, whose group ideology is based in the Ahl-al-Hadith and not Salafi sect, or
those like Fatah al-Islam who have a key ideological difference with al-Qaeda in their belief that
members of the Shi'a sect are Muslim. However, despite these differences in foundational ideology, the
al-Qaeda anti-American and anti-western ideology can be easily taken up in a way that attracts recruits
who identify the al-Qaeda name with their interpretation of their ideology.
Another important conclusion is the weakness of the resource sharing mechanism. Even AQAP,
the most strongly affiliated group discussed, did not receive resources from the al-Qaeda central
organization. For groups which did receive resources from al-Qaeda, this resource sharing was
primarily tactical, such as in the LeT case, or limited in scope and time, such as the financial assistance
given to the Islamic Army of Aden and HuM. In the cases of financial assistance, this financial
relationship was at the individual level, with bin Laden personally giving funds to the leaders, rather
than at the organizational level.
The last significant theoretical implication is the importance of the identification mechanism.
This is likely closely linked to the ideological mechanism. Just as groups benefit most strongly from
their publicly perceived connection to al-Qaeda through increased recruitment, the public perception of
an al-Qaeda affiliation serves as the greatest source of damage to the groups capabilities through
Ward 122
identification. Groups that are ideologically connected to al-Qaeda, like Fatah al-Islam or HuM, are
listed as designated terrorist groups quicker and more often than other non-affiliated groups with the
same low capability level. Because of their al-Qaeda affiliation they are also designated as a terrorist
group by the UN, instead of just the group in which they are based or target. This quicker identification
of the group can result in cutting off group capabilities before they are able to develop as well as
pursuing action against the group to the point where they are defeated.
Curiously, despite the fact that there is no evidence of a causal link between strength of an alQaeda affiliation and contributions to local instability, there does appear to be a correlation among the
groups discussed here. Of the case study groups, AQAP has had the greatest effect on local instability
and the four “ideologically connected” groups have had the least effect. This is likely due to difference
in two factors which are not entirely associated with al-Qaeda affiliation. The first of these is capability
level. The four ideologically connected groups are small and thus do not possess the organizational
infrastructure or membership size of a larger group. These groups may be less selective with who they
allow to join because of their size, while al-Qaeda and larger groups can reject recruits they don't
believe to be adequate. While an al-Qaeda affiliation does have some relationship to capability levels,
in that it can increase recruitment, the failure to develop a capable group cannot be attributed to lack of
an al-Qaeda affiliation.
The second factor that influences local instability is targeting choice. While it can be predicted
that an al-Qaeda affiliation can influence targeting choice, there are also other factors that go into
targeting strategy. The case of LeT best illustrates this. LeT is a highly capable group with a large
network, but for reasons not related to al-Qaeda it chooses foreign targets, decreasing contribution to
instability in Pakistan but becoming a powerful enemy of India. Additionally, AQAP has contributed to
Yemeni instability because has chosen, despite al-Qaeda strategic guidance to pursue a strategy of
Ward 123
territorial control in Yemen. Another example, and a counterexample to the apparent correlation, is
LeJ, who falls in the “operationally connected” category but has had a significant affect on stability
within Pakistan. Because LeJ is a strongly capable group and because they pursue primarily domestic
Pakistani targets, they have a greater contribution to Pakistani instability than LeT despite being within
the same category of strength of al-Qaeda affiliation.
The findings about the effect of al-Qaeda affiliation on local instability have policy as well as
theoretical implications. The most obvious of these is the conclusion that the fact that a group is
affiliated with al-Qaeda does not make it more dangerous than a group with the same capability levels
which is not affiliated with al-Qaeda. There are those in the policy world who believe that al-Qaeda
affiliated groups present a clear danger to America and to global instability. The 2010 National Security
Strategy declares, “We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, and its terrorist affiliates who
support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners,” (White House 2010). The National
Security makes it clear that it considers the affiliates throughout the world as part of the al-Qaeda
threat, which makes up a significant portion of the security strategy, “going forward, there should be no
doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security—through our
commitments to allies, partners, and institutions; our focus on defeating al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the globe” it furthers goes on to promise, “Wherever al-Qa’ida or its
terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven—as they have in Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and
the Sahel—we will meet them with growing pressure” (White House 2010). This emphasis on pursuing
al-Qaeda affiliates declares them to be dangerous and important threats to the security of America and
its allies.
The term al-Qaeda affiliate is not defined in the National Security Strategy. It is also not clearly
defined by 2001 authorization of force which serves as the legal declaration of war against al-Qaeda by
Ward 124
the United States. The Hoover Institution has put forth a proposal to increase the power of this statute
to “give the president license to create a list of organizations at war with the United States;” this listing
of organizations at which the United States is at war with, presumably al-Qaeda affiliate organizations,
could expand American counterterrorism efforts drastically and have implications of further
entrenching the United States in conflict (Rosenthal 2013). In 2011, Congress explicitly allowed
authorization for the “indefinite detention of members and supporters of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
associated forces, even if not linked to the Sept 11 attacks” (Savage 2013). This allowed targeted alQaeda “associated forces” as more dangerous than non-al-Qaeda militants for the sole reason that they
are affiliated with al-Qaeda.
In a hearing regarding the reauthorization of the 2001 statute, Senator John McCain asked, “So
we can expect drone strikes into Syria if we find al-Qaeda there?” to which the Obama legal
representation replied hesitantly that that would be legal, but refused to say whether it would ever
happen (Savage 2013). This perception that al-Qaeda involvement could potentially escalate the
situation in Syria is seen through the increased attention paid to the Jabhat al-Nusra group in Syria,
despite the fact that its announcement of al-Qaeda ties decreased its support from the Syrian population
(The Economist 2013). Conservatives have been quick to link an al-Qaeda affiliation to a group being
more dangerous, such as Steven Bucci, who said is his critique of Obama counterterrorism policy:
Al-Qaeda has metastasized from a centrally led organization to a nearly completely
decentralized web that operates on the vaguest of “commander’s intent.” Groups in
diverse areas attach themselves to al-Qaeda, and individuals self-radicalize in America
and around the world. Instead of being beaten down, al-Qaeda grows every day.
Bucci 2013
The non-partisan Congressional Research Service has also reached a similar conclusion, warning in a
report on al-Qaeda and its affiliates, “new Al Qaeda-allied militant leaders have arisen to pose major
threats beyond the region (of Pakistan). Among the most notable is Ilyas Kashmiri, the commander of
Ward 125
the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul Jihad Islami” (Rollins 2011).While claims like these about the expansion
of al-Qaeda have an element of truth, the conclusion that just because an organization is affiliated with
al-Qaeda it is dangerous is not true. While arguments like these acknowledge the benefits an al-Qaeda
affiliation can bring to a group, they do not recognize that there are costs created by the affiliation as
well. In the case of Syria in particular, where there does not appear to be any significant threat to the
American homeland, but instead a significant threat to Syrian instability, it is important to consider the
fact that an al-Qaeda affiliation does not strengthen a group's local instability creation capacity. While
Americans fear Jabhat al-Nusra becoming like AQI because of its al-Qaeda affiliation, in reality they
have already lost support locally.
The recommendation that should be taken from this conclusion is that whether a group is
affiliated with al-Qaeda or not should be not a primary factor in determining its level of threat to local
instability. Because the affiliation is ultimately neutral, an al-Qaeda affiliated group will not necessarily
be more dangerous than a non-al-Qaeda affiliated group located in the same country. Instead, what
should determine how dangerous a group is to local stability should be an evaluation of their
capabilities, which will determine the strength of the group and its potential for action, and its targeting
choices, which will determine where the group focuses its energy.
The lack of strength of the resource mechanism also provides a policy challenge. The first effect
of a terrorist designation is generally the freezing of funds and the shutting out of the group from the
financial system. Tracking and targeting terrorist funding is one element of counterterrorism that the
American government is able to do effectively and has devoted large amounts of time and energy into
doing. However, the fact the resource sharing is not a major benefit of al-Qaeda connection would
indicate that anti-terrorist financing operations may not be the most effective counter-al-Qaeda actions.
While these efforts are certainly important, the overall effect on the capabilities of al-Qaeda and its
Ward 126
affiliate organizations may be minimal.
A more effective way of reducing terrorist group capabilities would be targeting where an alQaeda affiliation benefits the group the most, in its public connection. Because an al-Qaeda affiliation
can increase recruitment, terrorist recruitment at the local level should be addressed. How to decrease
radicalization and terrorist recruitment is a difficult question that likely has no single universal answer.
However, one way of reducing the ideological power of an al-Qaeda affiliation would be to
delegitimize the al-Qaeda ideology. This could include running a public awareness campaign in the
area where the group is located about crimes committed by al-Qaeda against Muslims or the failure of
al-Qaeda to achieve any of its goals.
An additional way to counteract this effect would be to decrease the power of the al-Qaeda
brand name by decreasing its use in U.S. government state. The 2010 National Security Strategy
identifies al-Qaeda and its affiliates as of of the most important security threats to the United States and
its allies. The recognition of al-Qaeda as a powerful actor, when in reality the threat presented by them
is questionable, allows al-Qaeda to claim it is of the main enemies of the United States, which itself a
powerful actor. If instead the more general terms “transnational terrorism,” “terrorism,” or “non-state
actors” were to be used in important government documents such as the National Security Strategy,
than this will reduce the perceived importance of al-Qaeda in the eyes of potential recruits with antiAmerican sentiments. By not recognizing them specifically as an important enemy, America could take
away the power of the al-Qaeda brand and allow ideological and local differences between al-Qaeda
affiliates to take precedence over the global anti-American agenda.
Ultimately, while al-Qaeda remain's terror's brand name, the power of its name can only go so
far. The perception of a public alliance of a group with al-Qaeda can fuel membership, bringing
strength to the group, but this public connection brings with it additional scrutiny from intelligence and
Ward 127
counterterrorism agencies. There are benefits from being associated with al-Qaeda, but there are also
costs, leaving an al-Qaeda affiliation something that neither creates nor undermines a group's ability to
destabilize its home country. Instead other aspects which have a direct relationship to inability, such as
targeting or capabilities, can determine group's danger to local instability.
Ward 128
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2: CRRC AQ-THEO-D-001-156, “Islamic Theory- eliminating sin and vices” date unknown,
prior to 2003.
3: CRRC AQ-PMPR-D-000-059 Handwritten exam and answers for a test to determine
worthiness to join al-qaida, date unknown (prior to 2002)
4: CRRC AQ-SHPD-D-000-312 Jihadist war strategies: Guerilla warfare and its relation to the
political poal, date unknown, prior to April 2003
5: CRRC AQ-POAK-D-000-950 Description of what could be a part of al-Qaida work plan in
Somalia, date unknown
6: CRRC AQ-PMPR-D-000-072 An employment contract that describes al-Qaeda beliefs,
Ward 138
objectives, and sphere of activity, including requirements for joining, regulations, and
instructions, dated prior to 2002
7. CRRC AQ-MCOP-D-000-922 Personal Letter regarding training and other issues from Abu
Ataa al Sharqi to Abu Hafs , 1 May 1997
8. CRRC AQ-TRED-D-001-117 Training instructions and form, Date unknown, prior to 2003
9. CRRC AQ-SHPD-D-000-201
10. CRRC AQ PMPR-D-000-016 Al-Qaida organizational carter and duty decriptions for all
members and their qualifications, date unknown
Appendix One
Classification of al-Qaeda Linked Groups
Ties tenuous, rumored, or inconclusive
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)- China
Jundallah- Pakistan
Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani- south Thailand
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) – Algeria
Caucasus Emirate- Chechnya
Jemmah Ansorut Tauhid – Indonesia
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) – South Lebanon
Ideologically inspired by al-Qaeda, little or no ties to core
Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM)- Kashmir, Pakistan
Fatah al-Islam- Lebanon
Islamic Army of Aden- Yemen
Harkat ul-jihad al-Islami (HuJI)-Pakistan/Bangladesh
Has Links or is allied but has not sworn allegiance
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)- Uzbekistan
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)- Pakistan/India
The Taliban- Afghanistan
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (circa 1990s)- Libya
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group-Morocco
Islamic Jihad Group ( Islamic Jihad Union)- Uzbekistan
Jemmah Islamiyah (JI)-Indonesia
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)- Pakistan
Ansar al-Islam (Ansar al-Sunna)-Iraq- Kurdistan
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)-Philippines
The Haqqani Network, Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan
al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), Somalia
Islamic International (Peacekeeping) Brigade- North Africa
Sworn allegiance to al-Qaeda
al-Qaeda in Yemen,Yemen
Ward 139
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),Yemen/Saudi Arabia
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Iraq
Egyptian Islamic Jihad-Egypt
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), North Africa (Algeria, Libya)
al-Qaeda Kurdish battalions, Iraq (Kurdistan)
Al-Shabbab, Somalia
Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan/Pakistan et al.
Appendix Two
Oath (Bayat) Sworn by Individual Joining al-Qaeda
I pledge by God's creed to become a Muslim soldier to support God's religion, and may God's
word be the most supreme. I pledge to adhere to the holy book and Assuna11 and commit to the brothers
committed with us in this mission, so God is my witness.
An oath from the Mujahed12 brother: In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. I
vow by God's creed to obey those responsible in this mission, in thick and thin, and thereupon may
God 's word be most supreme. By supporting God's religion, I am a warrior in this mission regardless
of my position, as long as the work is existing. I have to preserve the secrecy of work in AL-QAEDA ,
so God is my witness. (CRRC 6)
Appendix Three
Figures
Figure 1
AQAP attacks over time
Global Terrorism Database
11 The Sunnah, normative traditions for a Muslim way of life based on the teachings and practices of Muhammad and
interpretations of the Quran; not to be confused with sharia-Islamic law, or the hadith- the teachings and sayings of
Muhammad
12 Mujahideen
Ward 140
Figure 2
AQAP attacks by casualty total
GTD
Appendix 4
Acronyms list
AQ- Al-Qaeda (The Base)
AQAM-Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements
AQAP- al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI- Al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM-Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb
CTC-Combating Terrorism Center
CRRC- Conflict Records Research Center
HuM- Harkat ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Movement)
HuJI- Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement)
JeM- Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad)
FATA-Federally Administrated Tribal Area
GTD- Global Terrorism Database
ISI- Inter-services Intelligence Agency- Pakistan
LeJ- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi ( Army of Jhangvi)
LeT- Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous)
NCTC- National Counterterrorism Center
SATP- South Asia Terrorism Portal