C Cambridge University Press 2016
Modern Asian Studies 50, 5 (2016) pp. 1705–1747. doi:10.1017/S0026749X15000311 First published online 20 May 2016
Ruthless Manipulation or Benevolent
Amnesia? The role of the history of the
Fifteen-year War in China’s diplomacy
towards Japan before the 1982 Textbook
Incident∗
CHAN YANG
Institute for International Studies, Wuhan University,
People’s Republic of China
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
Exploring how the history of the Fifteen-year War was dealt with in pre1982 mainland China is an essential step towards understanding the currently
explosive Sino-Japanese History Problem; furthermore, this might shed light
on various issues in the post-war history of China and Sino-Japanese relations.
However, available research on the pre-1982 period is scarce and problematic.
Earlier political scientists argue that the history of the war was ruthlessly
manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party regime, while some recent studies
believe that the war was conveniently ‘forgotten’ as Sino-Japanese friendship was
vital for the government of the People’s Republic of China. This article aims at
providing an accurate and thorough picture of how the history of the Fifteen-year
War was positioned in the diplomatic practice of the Chinese Communist Party
regime in relation to Japan during the period.
∗
There are different names and periodizations for the second Sino-Japanese war: in
China people normally call it the War of Resistance against Japan (Kang Ri zhanzheng,
1937–1945), or the Fourteen-year War (Shisinian zhanzheng, 1931–1945); in Japan,
it has several names, such as the Great East Asia War (Daitoua sensou, 1941–1945),
the Fifteen-year War (Juugonen sensou, 1931–1945), and Pacific War (Taiheiyou sensou,
1941–1945). This article will mainly use ‘Fifteen-year War’ but will also use different
names for the war according to the context.
1705
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1706
CHAN YANG
Introduction
The Textbook Incident, which is often regarded as the first largescale diplomatic conflict between China and Japan over the history of
the Fifteen-year War, occurred in the summer of 1982.1 Since then,
it is observable that the problems related to the history of the war
have developed into a special, yet serious, element of Sino-Japanese
relations.2 While post-1982 developments have been well covered in
academic writing, studies on the equally important pre-1982 period
are scarce.
Before 1982, according to a small group of political scientists who
were pioneers in researching the Sino-Japanese History Problem, the
issue of wartime history was not as salient as it is now. If it was troubling
bilateral relations at all, it was usually seen by scholars as the fault
of the Chinese Communist Party regime. For example, it is argued
by Johnson and Ijiri that the Chinese Communist Party government
raised the issue of the history of the war frequently to emotionally
manipulate Japanese people, thus intruding into Japanese domestic
politics. Japan, on the other hand, responded with a ‘low posture’,
giving apologies and concessions, always in a humiliating way.3 In
short, these scholars believe that the history of the Fifteen-year War
1
The Textbook Incident occurred when the ‘governments of the PRC [People’s
Republic of China] and the Republic of Korea, among others, angrily upbraided the
Japanese government for allegedly attempting to rewrite the history of World War
Two’ in Japanese school textbooks. See Fogel, J. A. (2000). Book Review, Journal of
Japanese Studies, 26, p. 518. For more information on the Textbook Incident, see Pyle,
B. K. (1983). Japan Besieged: The Textbook Controversy: Introduction, Journal of
Japanese Studies, 9, pp. 297–300; Rose, C. (1998). Interpreting history in Sino-Japanese
relations: a case study in political decision-making, Routledge, London; Beal, T., Nozaki, Y.
and Yang, J. (2001). Ghosts of the Past: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy,
New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 3, pp. 177–188; Hasegawa, T. and Togo, K.
(2008). East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of
Nationalism, Praeger Security International.
2
Chanlett-Avery, E. and Nanto, D. K. (2006). The Rise of China and its Effect
on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices, CRS Report for Congress.
Iriye, A. (1990). Sino-Japan Relations 1945–1990, The China Quarterly, 124, pp. 624–
638. Rose, Interpreting history; Yang, D. (2002). ‘Mirror for the future or the history
card? Understanding the “history problem”, in Marie Söderberg (ed.), Chinese-Japanese
relations in the twenty-first century: complementarity and conflict, Routledge, London; Whiting,
A. S. (1989). China eyes Japan, University of California Press, Berkeley.
3
Johnson, C. (1986). The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952–1982,
Pacific Affairs, 59, pp. 402–428; Ijiri, H. (1990). Sino-Japanese Controversy since the
1972 Diplomatic Normalisation, The China Quarterly, 124, pp. 639–661.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1707
was manipulated in Sino-Japanese relations, mostly by the Chinese
side.
Nevertheless, several younger scholars, who apply a series of
European war remembrance theories and methodologies to explain
the origins of the Sino-Japanese History Problem, take a quite
different view. They argue that the Chinese Communist Party regime
‘suppressed’ the recollection of Japanese wartime atrocities since
friendship with Japan was important. For instance, Reilly argues
that ‘the Communist Party applied a similarly lenient approach [to
the Kuomintang’s] as to Japanese wartime atrocities’.4 He Yinan
further identifies the period of Sino-Japanese friendship as an illusion
created by the Chinese Communist Party regime after it normalized
its relationship with Japan in 1972. During this period, she implies,
young people did not learn of Japanese atrocities in state-controlled
textbooks, and ordinary people could not see Japan’s revisionist
treatment of the history of the war in the state-controlled media.5
Kosuge also points out that the lenient stance of the Chinese
Communist Party regime did not reflect Chinese public opinion.
The regime suppressed domestic anti-Japanese sentiment while
implementing a generous policy towards Japanese war criminals.6
Which of these two contradictory arguments about the Chinese
Communist Party regime’s treatment of the history of the Fifteenyear War is right? I contend that both of the arguments are partially
right, but problematic at the same time. The argument of the earlier
political scientists is insightful. However, by examining just a few
influential diplomatic conflicts over this issue, they saw only that the
history of the Fifteen-year War was a bargaining chip used by the
Chinese Communist Party regime vis-à-vis the Japanese government.
Ignoring other aspects, like the people’s feelings, the remembrance
of the war, and domestic affairs in the People’s Republic of China
4
Reilly, J. (2011). Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of
China’s War of Resistance to Japan, Modern Asian Studies, 45:2, pp. 463–490, at p.
469; Reilly, J. (2004). China’s History Activists and the War of Resistance Against
Japan: History in the Making, Asian Survey, 19, pp. 276–294.
5
He, Y. (2007). Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking,
Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006, History and Memory, 19:2
(Fall/Winter), pp. 43–74; He, Y. (2008). Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry? Commerce,
Realpolitik, and War Memory in Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations, Asian
Security, 4:2, pp. 162–197; He, Y. (2009). The search for reconciliation: Sino-Japanese
and German-Polish relations since World War II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6
Kosuge, N. (2005). Sengo wakai, Chuukou shinsho, Tokyo, p. 178.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1708
CHAN YANG
(hereafter China), they paid little regard to the wider context in which
the Chinese Communist Party government acted.
For scholars of the younger generation, the history of the Fifteenyear War was more than a bargaining chip—they also associated
the history of the war with the concept of ‘collective remembrance’
and paid greater attention to the contextual aspects ignored by the
earlier political scientists. The approach of these scholars—which is
also adopted in this article—would have been ideal for discussing the
Chinese Communist Party regime’s treatment of the history of the
war. However, they gave much greater weight to the era after the
1982 Textbook Incident, when the Sino-Japanese History Problem
became increasingly disturbing. In other words, they dealt with the
period before 1982 as merely a ‘preface’ to later events. Inevitably,
their examination of the pre-1982 period is not sufficient and appears
debatable.
One of the insufficiencies is that Sino-Japanese relations during
this period were simplified in their studies as ‘pursuing’ (1949–1972)
and ‘maintaining’ (1972–1982) friendship with Japan. Based on this
generalization, one could easily assume that the Chinese Communist
Party regime, who were eager for friendship with Japan, imposed a
‘benevolent amnesia’ over the Fifteen-year War in pre-1982 mainland
China.7 However, the reality of China’s relations with Japan was far
more complex than this and so was its treatment of the history of the
Fifteen-year War, which will be discussed in detail later.
Exploring how the Fifteen-year War was dealt with in pre-1982
mainland China is an essential step towards understanding the
currently explosive Sino-Japanese History Problem. Moreover, the
treatment of the history of the Fifteen-year War is also closely
related to other issues in post-war relations between China and Japan.
However, based on the existing literature, it is hard to find a thorough
and accurate panorama of the pre-1982 situation. Thus, the aim of this
article is to take a small step towards filling this gap in the literature,
by exploring how the history of the Fifteen-year War was dealt with in
China’s diplomatic conduct towards Japan before 1982. This article
will carve out a way for further discussions of the Chinese Communist
Party’s treatment of the history of the war both in the domestic field
and in other Chinese diplomatic relations.
7
The phrase ‘benevolent amnesia’ originated in Reilly, Remember History, Not
Hatred, p. 468.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1709
This article will first contextualize the treatment of the history of
the Fifteen-year War in pre-1982 China, reinterpret a well-known
slogan, and introduce the quasi-diplomatic event in Nanjing in 1965
as a dramatic yet informative case study. The article then moves to
discuss the Chinese Communist Party’s Japanese militarist-bashing
activities at a time when Sino-Japanese inter-governmental relations
were not friendly. It continues by taking a look at the treatment of
the war by the Chinese Communist Party leaders, the Chinese people,
and Japanese visitors during friendly encounters between China and
Japan. Nanjing will be used as a case study at times to demonstrate
the local dimension.
After an examination at the level of national and local state actors
as well as at the level of Chinese general public, this article can first
of all assert that the Fifteen-year War was certainly not benevolently
forgotten in mainland China before 1982. Although supporting the
view of earlier political scientists that the history of the war was
used as leverage by the Chinese Communist Party regime in its
diplomatic relations with Japan, this article has substantially enriched
this viewpoint. It argues that although Sino-Japanese relations went
through ups and downs, the history of the Fifteen-year War was always
an ‘indispensable element’ in China’s diplomacy with Japan before
1982. In addition to Sino-Japanese bilateral relations, the regime’s
utilization of the history of the war was also affected by China’s everchanging domestic and international context. Furthermore, besides
exploiting the history of the war on its own initiative, the Chinese
Communist Party regime was driven by the Chinese people as well
as their Japanese counterparts to engage with the legacy of the war.
Thanks to its slogan: ‘We should distinguish a handful of evil Japanese
militarists from the majority of kind Japanese people’, the Chinese
Communist Party regime were able to utilize the history of the war
flexibly and without being jeopardized by it.
Context, the slogan, and a case study
The main theme of the Maoist era, especially during the Cultural
Revolution, was ‘permanent revolution’, and the main task was
construction and class struggle. Meanwhile, the external enemies
were the United States as well as its ‘running dogs’: the Kuomintang
government in Taiwan and, eventually, the Soviet Union. For a
long time the right-wing Japanese government was considered by
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1710
CHAN YANG
the Chinese Communist Party regime to be a ‘running dog’ of
the United States; thus, as will be mentioned in this article,
when attacking ‘American imperialists’, the regime often mentioned
Japanese wartime atrocities alongside their criticisms of the postwar Japanese conservative administrations. After Mao’s death, China
experienced a short period of turmoil. In July 1977, Deng Xiaoping
returned to power and declared that in the following year ‘reform
and opening up’ would be the Party’s new line. With the changing
domestic atmosphere in China as well as on the international front,
the treatment of the history of the Fifteen-year War by the Chinese
Communist Party regime was also evolving.8
Before the Sino-Japanese normalization in 1972, the two countries’
inter-governmental relationship was a negative one overall and
the Chinese Communist Party regime frequently criticized Japanese
militarists. Furthermore, due to the East Asian Cold War, the Chinese
Communist Party regime and various Japanese administrations were
hostile towards one other. Nevertheless, friendship was to be found,
with ‘kind Japanese people’ and ‘friendly groups’. But as the Chinese
Communist Party regime constantly pointed out the dangers of and
evidence for a Japanese resurgence of militarism, this friendship
occupied only fragmented moments of time against the wider backdrop
of a fraught inter-governmental relationship. Even so, many historical
sources show that the topic of the history of the Fifteen-year War was
brought up on several occasions, even during the friendly periods.
Between 1972 and 1982, China’s relations with Japan progressed
to being good overall, and this period is usually referred to as the
period of the ‘Sino-Japanese friendship illusion’. During this time
there continued to be moments when warnings about a resurgence
of Japanese militarism were voiced.
The key to understanding how remembering the Fifteen-year War
and the Chinese Communist Party regime’s conduct towards Japan
played out in mainland China between 1949 and 1982 in general, is
the message: ‘We should distinguish the majority of kind Japanese
people from a handful of evil Japanese militarists’. This is in fact
a famous slogan promoted by the top Chinese Communist Party
leaders and used on various occasions by the party cadres to deal
8
See, Meisner, M. (1999). Mao’s China and after: a history of the People’s Republic, Free
Press New York, New York; Yim, K. H. (1980). China since Mao, Macmillan, London;
Kau, M. Y. M. and Marsh, S. H. (1993). China in the era of Deng Xiaoping: a decade of
reform, M. E. Sharpe Inc., Armonk, New York.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1711
with the Chinese people’s ill feeling towards Japan and to relieve ‘kind
Japanese people’ of their misgivings.9 This slogan has been mentioned
by many scholars; nevertheless, no-one seems to have discussed it in
an integrated and exhaustive way.
The slogan has two equally important layers. The implication of
the first layer is that those who were defined as Japanese militarists
should shoulder the blame. Whether the Chinese Communist Party
leaders were genuinely concerned about Japanese militarist revision,
or whether they needed a convenient pretext to criticize the Japanese
government and its allies’ actions, which infuriated them, this
layer could justify their Japanese ‘militarist-bashing’. Nevertheless,
during friendly moments and periods when Sino-Japanese intergovernmental relations were good, how did the Chinese Communist
Party regime manage the aftermath of the Fifteen-year War and
maintain friendship with the Japanese at the same time?
This contradiction was solved by the Party’s ‘secret’ weapon—the
second layer of the slogan, that ‘kind Japanese people’ should not be
blamed for the misdeeds perpetrated by a small group of ‘evil Japanese
militarists’. Early political scientists often overlooked this layer and as
a result their arguments about the Chinese Communist Party regime’s
actions are one-sided. Most scholars of the new generation only saw
this layer, and thus overlooked the large number of Japanese militaristbashing activities conducted by the regime.
With its two layers, this slogan conferred great diplomatic flexibility
on the Chinese Communist Party regime. Thanks to it, the history of
the war could both facilitate the Chinese Communist Party regime’s
Japanese militarist-bashing activities and, at the same time, did not
prevent it from pursing friendship with its Japanese friends.
I particularly want to point out here that this slogan was not
merely created for the pragmatic aim of winning over the Japanese
and harnessing the animosity of the Chinese people.10 The Chinese
9
In fact, Chiang Kai-shek also emphasized the distinction between cruel Japanese
militarists and Japanese civilians during and after the war. See Huang, T. (2004).
Chiang Kai-shek in East Asia: The Origins of the Policy of Magnanimity toward Japan
after World War II, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 45, pp. 143–
194. The distinction between the evil fascists and ordinary people in fascist-controlled
countries was also emphasized by the Allies’ post-war tribunals.
10
Niu argues that China’s diplomacy evolved directly from the Chinese Communist
Party’s diplomatic conduct during the ‘revolutionary years’ before October 1949. See
Niu, J. (2010). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi shigailun [An introduction to
the PRC’s international relations] (1949–2000), Beijingdaxue chubanshe, Beijing.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1712
CHAN YANG
view (including those of the Chinese Communist Party leaders) of
the Japanese was largely shaped by the Fifteen-year War and even
the earlier period dating back to the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–
1895).11 The Chinese always (consciously or unconsciously) associated
the Japanese with being brutal invaders. On the other hand, the
Chinese Communist Party’s idea of ‘the majority of kind Japanese
people’ was also shaped during the same period.
Based on the ideology derived from the international communist
movement, the Chinese Communist Party formed an abstract idea of
‘Japanese people’: they assumed that many ordinary Japanese were
poor people like workers and farmers, who were exploited by the
Japanese imperialists. So, from the beginning of the full-scale war
between China and Japan, the Chinese Communist Party leaders
urged the Chinese not to forget the distinction between Japanese
invaders and Japanese people. They also kept appealing to Japanese
people on the home front and Japanese soldiers fighting overseas
to unite together against the invasion launched by the Japanese
imperialists. They also managed to convince themselves that a united
front of Japanese people was forming, which they believed would be a
very important force to help China win the war of resistance.12
Furthermore, many Japanese leftists and pacifists came to China
in the name of the ‘Japanese people’ and fought shoulder-to-shoulder
with the Chinese resistance, which provided many Party members
with an experience of support from ‘real’ Japanese people.13 The
combination of the idea and experience of the distinction between
11
This part—an analysis of what Chinese Communist Party leaders might have
been thinking—is based on Liu’s excellent study about (1) the Chinese Communist
Party’s idea and experience of ‘Japanese people’ before 1949; (2) the Chinese
Communist Party’s idea of post-war ‘Japanese people’; and (3) the ‘continuity of
history’. See Liu, J. (2010). Zhanhou Zhong Ri guanxi ‘buzhengchang’ lishide guocheng
yujiegou [Sino-Japanese relations after World War II: abnormal historical process and
construction], Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing.
12
‘Zai Yanan fanqinlve dahuishang deyanshuo’ [Speech at the anti-invasion assembly in
Yanan] (21 January 1938), in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhongyang
wenxian yanjiushi (1994). Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic works of
Mao Zedong], Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party
leaders believed, similarly to the Chinese people, that the Japanese would be ‘against
the Japanese imperialism invasion war from the standpoint of internationalism and
against Japanese militarist politics from the standpoint of democracy’. See Liu,
Zhanhou Zhong Ri guanxi, pp. 36–49.
13
For example, Japanese communist leader Nozaka Sanzo secretly came to Yanan
in 1940 where he organized the Japanese League Against War, passed on knowledge
about Japan to the Chinese Communist Party cadres, helped draw up strategy to fight
against the Japanese imperial army, and so on. See Liu, Zhanhou Zhong Ri guanxi.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1713
brutal Japanese invaders and kind Japanese people during the war
underpinned the Chinese Communist Party’s basic principle of
dealing with Japan in the post-war era. In the diplomatic field this
principle was the policy that one should ‘distinguish [the] conservative
Japanese government from revolutionary Japanese people’; in the war
remembrance field, it was that one should ‘distinguish evil militarists
from the kind Japanese people’. The post-war political connotations
of the term ‘Japanese people’ referred to those Japanese individuals
and groups who were friendly to China (not Taiwan) and were truly
remorseful for the Fifteen-year war. Post-war development in Japan
also supported the Chinese Communist Party’s idea of a new ‘Japanese
people’.
This is based on the following ideas. First, Japan had discovered
its similarities with and become closer to China. It was no longer
a colonial country as it had lost all its overseas territories after the
war. Furthermore, similarly to China, Japan also obtained its ‘political
capital’ by demanding repayment of a debt from the United States,
as it was suffering under the occupation of the latter. The Chinese
Communist Party leaders believed that the ordinary Japanese had
suffered as much as Chinese people had. They thought exposing the
crimes committed by the militarists would have resonance with the
Japanese.14
Secondly, the pacific movement in Japan showed the Japanese
people’s power and determination to resist militarism, which in turn
confirmed the Chinese Communist Party’s image of a revolutionary
Japanese people. Thirdly, most of the Japanese who visited China were
pro-China or friendly people, who kept apologizing to the Chinese
Communist Party leaders. These visitors claimed to represent the
Japanese people, which made the Chinese Communist Party leaders
believe that the majority of Japanese people felt guilty for the war.
Being offered a sincere apology from the people of a nation, makes it
seem likely that the Chinese Communist Party would have accepted
it graciously, even without the pre-existing slogan. Fourthly, Mao
had the somewhat unusual belief that he should be grateful for the
Japanese invasion. This is not because the invasion had weakened the
Kuomintang while strengthening the Chinese Communist Party—as
14
See Mao Zedong’s conversation with Japanese delegates: ‘Zhong Ri guanxi heshijie
dazhan wenti’ [Sino-Japanese relations and the issues about world war] (15 October
1955) and ‘Riben renmin douzhengde yingxiang shishenyuande’ [The impact of Japanese
people’s struggle is profound] (24 January 1955), in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1714
CHAN YANG
is wrongly believed by many Chinese internet activists nowadays—but
because the Japanese invasion had ‘educated’ the Chinese people by
stimulating their nationalist tendencies.15 Therefore, it was not simply
out of generosity that the Chinese Communist Party leaders made
comments like: ‘You have already apologised, you cannot apologise
everyday, right?’16
In short, the slogan was rooted in the Party’s ideology of
internationalism and was underpinned by the friendly support and
revolutionary actions of the ‘Japanese people’ during and after the
war. It was drummed into the Chinese people so that their resentment
would not harm China’s relationship with the ‘majority of kind
Japanese people’. It was also introduced to the Japanese, so that they
would not hesitate to embrace China, even though the war between
the two nations still lingered in the minds of their people.
Nanjing in 1965
In 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Nanjing was allocated
the mission of receiving Japanese delegations, consisting of Japanese
youths from many different interest groups across the political
spectrum.17 They came to China for a quasi-diplomatic event—the
Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Get-together.
This event is well worth special examination, as it was probably
the most extreme example of how the Fifteen-year War was dealt
with by the Chinese Communist Party diplomatically before 1982.
This friendly event happened at a time when Sino-Japanese intergovernmental relations were poor, and in a place where anti-Japanese
sentiment was still running high. It was also complicated by elements
from the domestic and international spheres at the time, such
as the hostility between the Chinese and American governments,
and the Chinese government’s plan to commemorate the twentieth
15
‘Meidiguozhuyi shi Zhong Ri liang guo renminde gongtong diren’ [The American
imperialist is the common enemy of Chinese and Japanese people] (21 June 1960),
in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, p. 438.
16
‘Zhong Ri guanxi heshijie dazhan wenti’, in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, p. 226.
17
The get-together was sponsored by the China-Japan Friendship Association,
the All China Youth Federation, and the All China Student Federation, as well as
the Japan-China Friendship Association, and many other ‘friendly’ Japanese groups.
The Japanese delegation consisted not only of leftists, but also neutralists and some
rightists.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1715
anniversary of the end of the Fifteen-year War. This kind of tangled,
and even contradictory, context provided the opportunity for the
slogan to prove a truly useful tool for the Chinese Communist Party
regime. According to a local record, one of the aims of this get-together
was to improve Sino-Japanese friendship and support the Japanese
anti-America youth movement.18 This aim was achieved mainly
through the local Chinese Communist Party regime’s manipulation
of the history of the war with the assistance of the slogan.
Starting on 21 August 1965, these Japanese youths toured Beijing
and 15 other big cities in China. Because of a passport problem caused
by the Japanese government, some members of the delegation only
arrived in November and the get-together was repeated for these
members. Both of the occasions were vast events. There were around
600 Japanese delegates and some 10,000 Chinese youths welcomed
them in Beijing alone.19
The get-togethers in Nanjing also went well according to official
propaganda. Ninety-six Japanese delegates arrived in the city on 7
September and left on 11 September. Another delegation consisting
of 75 Japanese youths visited Nanjing from 14 December to 18
December. The press was full of stories of Sino-Japanese friendship
during these periods. Souvenirs such as stamps were produced to
commemorate this event, which provided reminders to both the
Chinese and Japanese of this friendship event for several generations.
This event was the first among many Sino-Japanese youth gettogethers in the post-war era, and have featured in scholarly works
as well as some memoirs as being representative of Sino-Japanese
friendship.20 However, a closer look at the inside stories and the
18
Other aims were to introduce China’s revolutionary situation and Maoist theory
to the guests and to show China’s achievements in agriculture, industry, and
education as well as the new ideological outlook of Chinese youths. Nanjing Municipal
Archives (NMA)-6002-2-255: ‘Jiedai “Zhong Ri qingnian youhao dalianhuan Riben qingnian
daibiaotuan jihua caoan”’ [Draft plan about receiving a Japanese delegation for the ‘SinoJapanese Youth Friendship Get-together’] (27 June 1965).
19
The facts were mentioned in various articles published at the time in Renmin Ribao
and Xinhua Ribao. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) is an organ of the Chinese Communist
Party and Xinhua Ribao (Xinhua Daily) is an official newspaper of Jiangsu Province.
20
Most Chinese research on early post-war Sino-Japanese relations mentions these
events to varying degrees. There are also a few Japanese accounts: see Endo, K.
(2009). ‘Bukkyou kouryuu tsuuji, Nicchuu yuukou ni jinryoku’ [Devote myself to SinoJapanese friendship through Buddhism exchange], Watashi to Chugoku, 8 (August).
Compared to the 1965 get-together, the event held in 1966 attracted much more
attention from the media. The 1965 get-together was only briefly mentioned by the
left-leaning Asahi Shinbun: see, for example, ‘Pekin Nitsuku Nicchu Seinen Yokono 270jin’
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1716
CHAN YANG
wider background of this particular event reveals how complicated
the situation actually was.
From the very beginning, this quasi-diplomatic mission was strongly
questioned by Nanjing citizens. In response, cadres of the Nanjing
branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League made a painstaking
effort to mobilize the citizens of Nanjing. Their mobilization was very
thorough, especially in terms of teaching the citizens to be friendly to
the delegates. The cadres tried to indoctrinate Nanjing citizens with
messages such as: ‘We need to distinguish between the kind Japanese
people and evil Japanese militarists. Japanese militarists committed
many crimes in China, conducted “three-all” policies, and owed the
Chinese people countless bloody debts, but the Japanese people should
not be held responsible for this. They are the victims of Japanese
militarism as well.’21
The cadres also emphasized that, ‘In the past, we called Japanese
military invaders “dongyang guizi (east ocean devil)”, “Riben guizi
(Japanese devil)” or “xiao Riben (little Japanese)”; [but] please don’t
use these words to swear at our guests this time. We invited them to
influence them and win them over, not for venting anger at them.’22
Still, the cadres realized that there were citizens, especially those who
were the victims of Japanese atrocities, who could not accept the idea
of receiving Japanese guests in their city. Examples of the citizens’
complaints that were recorded include:
My mother’s arm was broken by the Japanese devil, when the Japanese come,
can I air my grievances to them?
Our house was burned by the Japanese devil, how can you have a get-together
with them? You should learn properly this time and settle this bloody debt
with them!
Why do we not receive other kind people, but receive the people who killed
us?
[Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship’s 270 people arrive at Beijing], 24 August 1965. The
1966 event, and especially the struggle over the passport-issuing problem between
the people who wanted to attend the event and the Japanese government, however,
was closely followed by Asahi Shinbun.
21
The ‘three-all’ policy was adopted in China by the Japanese during the Fifteenyear War and refers to ‘kill all, burn all, loot all’.
22
Note: in this article, all quoted texts, which are originally in Chinese or Japanese,
have been translated by the author. NMA-6002-2-255: ‘Guanyu Zhong Ri qingnian youhao
dalianhuan xiang qunzhong jinxing xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian’ [Advice about educating the
masses about the Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Get-together] (21 August 1965).
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1717
If I see a Japanese, first of all I will go to slap him in the face.
Japanese did a lot bad things in China, and the Chinese all know Japanese
swear words. It will be really awkward, if we swear baka yaro [a stereotype of a
Japanese swearword among Chinese, meaning idiot] towards these Japanese.
How can we forget the old hatred? We should not forget the past ... the hatred
of the nation.23
Nevertheless, thanks to the hard work of local cadres, many Nanjing
citizens did change their attitudes towards Japanese people, at least
according to the few officially (well-)documented episodes. Their
hatred was still there, but only towards past and present Japanese
militarists. For instance, a Japanese delegate named Fujimori, an
artist, was painting alongside the Yangzi river, when an old boatman
came to him and pointed out some scars on his head. He gesticulated
emotionally towards the delegate and told him how he was chased
and slashed by about four Japanese solders around 20 years before.
The delegate was shocked by this unexpected visitor and his tale.
The accompanying translator immediately told the boatman that this
Japanese man was a guest for the get-together. In this very tense
situation, the boatman unexpectedly smiled. He answered, ‘I know,
the government had already educated us about this’ and he warmly
shook the delegate’s hand—the hand of perceived ‘kind Japanese
people’.24
Interestingly, the cadres were not shy to show the delegates the
Chinese people’s experience of the brutal war. In fact, they actively
engaged themselves in doing so. A revolutionary opera, ‘The Legend
of the Red Lantern’, was performed for the delegation on the evening
of 16 December. It is a classic Fifteen-year War-themed contemporary
Peking opera. The father and grandmother of the heroine—a 17-yearold girl called Li Tiemei—are killed by the Japanese occupiers for their
23
A conference for preparing the forthcoming reception work was held from 23 to
25 August. Four hundred and twenty cadres and citizen representatives participated
in this conference. The citizens passed on their complaints at this conference. NMA6002-2-255: ‘Zhong Ri qingnian youhao dalianhuan qingkuang jiangbao diwuqi’ [Bulletin
for the Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Get-together issue (5)] (25 August 1965).
24
This story is recorded differently by different people. This is based on NMA6002-1-25: ‘Guanyu Zhong Ri qingnian youhao dalianhuan zai Nanjing huodong dezongjie
baogao’ [Summary of the activities of the Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Get-together
in Nanjing] (30 November 1965–10 January 1966). For other records, see NMA6002-2-256: ‘Laochuangong jiexian fenming’ [The old boatman has a clear ideological
boundary] (18 December 1965), and Guan, Z. (2005). ‘Kawaranu yonjyuunen no youjyou’
[Friendship that has lasted for 40 years], Jinmin Chugoku, 8.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1718
CHAN YANG
underground anti-Japanese activities. To get her revenge and to save
her fellow countrymen, Tiemei completes the job her father did not
manage to finish by sending the secret telegraph code to the antiJapanese guerrillas. Many scenes show how the Japanese occupiers
bullied and oppressed the Chinese. For example, in one scene an
injured rickshaw puller complains, ‘I pulled a Japanese devil, he did
not pay me any money and beat me.’ The hatred of the Chinese people
towards the invaders is also manifested in the opera. For instance, after
members of Tiemei’s family are killed, she sings, ‘The bottomless fire
of my anger will burn down the dark earth and sombre sky.’25 The
cadres carefully observed the reactions of the delegates. According
to their observations, some delegates were interested in the opera,
while others (especially those who were considered right-wingers) were
uncomfortable with it.26
Moreover, the Japanese delegates were also aware of the atrocities
committed by their wartime government and communicated frankly
with Nanjing citizens about it. Shortly after arriving at Nanjing
railway station, many delegates said something like, ‘The Japanese
military slaughtered 300,000 innocent people in Nanjing, thus we
came to Nanjing with grief and remorse. When we saw the friendship
and enthusiasm conveyed by the Nanjing people, we felt really
uneasy’.27 Many delegates were keen to know more about the Nanjing
Massacre. Forums with the victims were hurriedly organized for the
first delegation. During the second get-together, according to the
instructions from the centre and demands from the delegates, a formal
exhibition and carefully worded presentation on the Nanjing Massacre
(mainly to avoid offensive words like ‘Japanese devils’) was arranged.
Still, the script of the presentation shows that many details of the
massacre were collected and revealed to the delegation. Three aspects
of the atrocity were introduced: inhumane massacre, brutal acts of
25
How ‘The Red Lantern’ reflected Chinese people’s hatred towards wartime Japan
is also discussed by Hughes, C. (2008). Japan in the Politics of Chinese Leadership
Legitimacy: Recent Developments in Historical Perspectives, Japan Forum, 20,
pp. 245–266.
26
NMA-6002-2-256: ‘Ri qingxieting Nanjing datusha jieshao defanying’ [The reaction
of the Japanese Association of Youths after hearing the introduction on the Nanjing
Massacre] (16 December 1965).
27
NMA-6002-2-255: ‘Zhong Ri qingnian youhao dalianhuan qingkuang jianbao dishiqiqi’
[Bulletin for the Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Get-together issue (17)]
(8 September 1965).
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1719
rape and robbery as well as destruction.28 Most of the delegates were
very shocked and apologetic.
Some delegates even requested to talk to the victims of the
Nanjing Massacre. Jiang Genfu, who was often invited to give his
testimony in public, and two other victims met with a journalist from
Shimbun Akahata (the Japanese Communist Party’s mouthpiece). After
listening attentively to their testimonies, the journalist reportedly
said, ‘Thanks for helping me understand the crimes committed by
Japanese militarists ... I will reveal these crimes to the Japanese
people.’ He also promised that he would publish their testimonies
in Akahata.29 Throughout the get-togethers, especially when the topic
of the war was touched upon, the cadres kept reassuring the Japanese
delegates by emphasizing the distinction they made between the
Japanese people and Japanese militarists. Still, after being exposed to
so many horrors committed by imperial Japan, some of the delegates
commented, ‘You suggest that the military and the people should be
distinguished [between]; for me it is not that simple. As Japanese
people, we should be responsible.’30
The Nanjing cadres were proud to have fulfilled this quasidiplomatic mission successfully.31 In their view, the true contributor to
this success was not the friendly activities undertaken and portrayed
by the official media, but exposing the crimes committed by Japanese
militarists.32 This was because the latter was ‘closely related to the
current anti-American movement, and directly targeted the American
and Japanese plot to revive Japanese militarism, as well as revealing
28
NMA-6002-2-257: ‘Riben diguozhuyi zai Nanjing datusha dezuixing’ [Crimes
committed by the Japanese imperialists during the Nanjing Massacre] (December
1965).
29
NMA-6002-2-225: ‘Zhong Ri qingnian youhao dalianhuan jianbao diershijiuqi’
[Bulletin for the Sino-Japanese Youth Get-together issue (29)] (12 September 1965).
30
Some of the delegates were also told of Japanese wartime atrocities by their
families back in Japan. NMA-6002-2-256: ‘Waibindui Riben diguo zhuyi zai Nangjing
datusha zuixing baogao, fanying qianglie’ [Foreign guests reacted strongly after hearing
the report about the Nanjing Massacre] (16 December 1965).
31
The whole paragraph is based on NMA-6002-1-25.
32
Some Japanese youths were taken to the Military Museum of the Chinese People’s
Revolution in Beijing. An article reporting this event also made this point and claimed
that the Japanese youths gained a clearer understanding of the crimes perpetrated
by the Japanese imperial army thanks to the Museum’s displays about the war. It
also reported that some delegates declared that they would smash the American
plot to revive Japanese militarism and would not take part in any war of aggression.
Anonymous. (1965). China and Japan: Young People Cement Their Friendship, China
Reconstructs, 11, pp. 14–15.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1720
CHAN YANG
to the Japanese youths the spurious nature of elements of their
education’.33 The cadres adopted a strategy that scheduled these
atrocity-exposing activities in the middle of the get-together, having
exposed the delegates to the ardour of the Nanjing citizens before and
again after these activities took place. The contrast made most of the
delegates, including left-wingers, right-wingers, and neutralists, feel
guilty about the crimes that had committed by imperial Japan. Some of
them also started to back up the Chinese by criticizing the militarists
in their own country. For instance, they highlighted the problems of
Japan’s education system, such as the fact that Tojo Hideki’s picture
was re-entered into the primary school textbook and the Japanese
invasion was taught as a ‘national liberation activity’. Furthermore,
after returning to Japan, ‘many of the Japanese youths’ started to
‘advocate Chinese-style revolution and launched activities against the
Japanese government’.34
Furthermore, in the background, from August 1965, a nationwide
campaign to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of winning the
‘Anti-Japanese War’ was launched. In Nanjing, a mass ceremony was
held on 3 September (the Chinese V-J Day) and many articles were
published in Nanjing’s local newspapers as well.35 Some of these were
written by the Chinese Communist Party leaders, like Vice-president
Lin Biao.36 Apart from introducing the basic historical facts of the war,
most of the speeches in the ceremony and the newspaper articles were
rather routine.37 However, there were other commemorative activities
going on, which provided the people with more direct opportunities to
33
NMA-6002-1-25, p. 6.
Asahi Shinbun, ‘Homusho Hukokano Hoshin’ [The Ministry of Justice’s Line of
No Permission], 8 September 1966. The leftist behaviour of those who returned from
the 1965 get-together, as shown in the text, was one of the reasons why the Japanese
Ministry of Justice was firmly against Japanese participating in the 1966 get-together.
35
A photo in Xinhua Ribao from 4 September 1965 captures the atmosphere of
the ceremony to some extent. It shows three very characteristic banners hanging in
the rostrum, bearing the slogans: ‘Global people’s struggle against imperialism will
certainly triumph!’, ‘Ceremony for celebrating the 20th anniversary of winning the
great Anti-Japanese War’, and ‘The victory of People’s War long live!’.
36
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Renmin zhanzheng shengli wansui’ [The victory of People’s War long
live!], 3 September 1965. All four pages were used to carry the accompanying articles.
37
The articles signalled a change in the Chinese Communist Party’s view about
the war: from initially heavily attributing Chinese V-J day to assistance from the
Soviet Union, to attributing the victory solely to Chinese people after the Sino-Soviet
split in the 1960s and emphasizing the significance of the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party as well as Maoist theory. Other messages were also included in these
articles, for example, ‘Since we won the war against Japanese militarists we must be
able to overthrow American imperialists, Soviet revisionists and their running dogs.’
34
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1721
remember the merciless war. Between August and September, many
memoirs of famous battles and stories from the war appeared in
Nanjing’s local newspapers or were published separately as books.38 He
Bingyan, who was the commander of the army that had participated
in the battle of Yanmen Pass, wrote in his memoir:
When we were marching towards Yanmen Pass, we could see the brutal
scenes caused by the Japanese bandits everywhere: many villages and towns
were burned into rubble, many fellow countrymen were slaughtered. Just in
Ningwu Town, countless people were killed; vegetable cellars of almost every
family transformed into pits for burying living people; all the wells were filled
up by the bodies of men and children who were stabbed by the bayonets, as
well as the women who were raped and killed ... bloody debt must be returned
by blood! ... I would never forget the monstrous crimes carried out by the
[Japanese] devils.39
In addition, other forms of commemoration were utilized for
this anniversary. For instance, special radio programmes were
broadcast and commemorative stamps were issued.40 Exhibitions of
photography, paintings, and historical materials were held in national
showrooms like the National Art Gallery. Many items on display
revealed the atrocities committed by the Japanese army, which,
according to a report, ‘stimulated Chinese people’s hatred towards
imperialists’.41 In Nanjing, the Jiangsu Provincial Art Gallery also
38
For examples of Xinhua Ribao articles, see ‘Shouzhan Pingxingguan’ [First battle in
Pingxing Pass], 11 August 1965; ‘Kangkai bei geshang zhanchang’ [Sing a sad song
fervently and go to the battlefield], 15 August 1965; ‘Yimeng kaige’ [The song
of triumph in Yimeng], 20 August 1965; ‘Tongchou dikai fansaodang’ [Share the
same hatred and fight against mop-up action], 22 August 1965; ‘Renmin zhanzheng
weiliwuqiong’ [The power of the People’s War is limitless], 28 August 1965; ‘Yexi
Yangmingbao budui’ [The army made a night assault on Yangmingbao], 1 September
1965; ‘Huanghai nutao’ [Raging billows of the Yellow Sea], 5 September 1965. For
examples of books, see those published by Jiangsu People’s Publisher for this occasion:
Huaiyin bashier lieshi [Eighty-two martyrs in Huaiyin]; Kang Ri zhanzheng gequxuan
[Collection of Anti-Japanese War themed songs]; Yehuo chunfeng dougucheng [Struggles
in an ancient city].
39
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Yanmenguan fuji’ [Ambush in Yanmen Pass], 13 August 1965.
40
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Zhongyang renmin guangbo diantai bosong youxiu jiemu jinian weida
kang Ri zhanzheng shengli ershi zhou nian’ [Central people’s radio station broadcasts
outstanding programmes to commemorate the 20th anniversary of winning the
great Anti-Japanese War], 19 August 1965; Xinhua Ribao, ‘Youdiangbu faxing kang
Ri zhanzheng shengli ershi zhounian jinian youpiao’ [Ministry of Post and Telegraphs issues
commemorative stamps for the 20th anniversary of the victory of Anti-Japanese War],
4 September 1965.
41
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Jinian kang Ri zhanzheng shengli ershizhounian sheyingmeishu zhanlan
zaishoudu kaimu’ [Commemorate the 20th anniversary of winning the Anti-Japanese
War: exhibition of arts and photo inaugurates in Beijing], 23 August 1965.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1722
CHAN YANG
held an exhibition, and pictures of the Nanjing Massacre could be seen
there.42 A group of Nanjing veterans organized an exhibition of their
own army’s history as well. Visitors to this exhibition said that these
diplays brought back memories of the War of Resistance.43 In addition,
classic Fifteen-year War themed films, such as ‘Little Soldier Zhangga’
and ‘Five Warriors in Langya Mountain’, were shown from 15 August
to 25 September in Nanjing. Concerts of classic war songs, which were
popular during the Fifteen-year War, were also organized.44
The Chinese side did not try to stop this massive war remembrance
campaign for the sake of the large-scale Sino-Japanese friendship
mission. During the first youth get-together, commemoration
activities for the twentieth anniversary were taking place. For
example, an article describing how around 3,000 youths in Nanjing
gave a magnificent welcome to Japanese friends was printed on the
front page of Xinhua Ribao (Xinhua Daily) on 9 September. However,
advertisements for Fifteen-year War themed films and concerts were
also printed in the same issue.45 Also, according to the press, during
the get-together period, despite reports of a deep Sino-Japanese
friendship, the Nanjing citizens still swarmed to the cinema to watch
‘Long Live the Victory of People’s War’, a documentary film made
for the twentieth anniversary; the audiences still reacted strongly to
the scenes showed the Japanese invading army trampling Chinese
territory and slaughtering Chinese people.46
42
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Jinian weida kang Ri zhanzheng shenli ershizhounian zhanlanhui zuokaimu’
[Exhibition to commemorate the 20th anniversary of winning the great Anti-Japanese
War inaugurated yesterday], 30 August 1965.
43
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Nanjing moubuduishi zhanlan’ [Exhibition of a Nanjing unit’s army
history], 25 August 1965.
44
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Guanggao’ [Advertisement], 13 August 1965; Xinhua Ribao, ‘Jinian
kang Ri zhanzheng shengli ershi zhounian wenhuabu dengdanwei jiangjuban gezhong wenyi
huodong’ [Ministry of Culture will organise various artistic activities to commemorate
the 20th anniversary of winning the Anti-Japanese War], 15 August 1965.
45
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Nanjing gejie qingnian shenghui huanying Riben qingnianpengyou’ [Youths
in Nanjing hold ceremonies to welcome Japanese youth friends], 9 September 1965;
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Dianying zhanlan kang Ri gequyanchang dengwenyi huodong’ [Film exhibition
and concert of the Anti-Japanese War themed songs and so forth], 9 September 1965.
A similar example are those articles about the get-togethers and commemorative
activities that were included in the same issue of China Reconstructs, a Chinese
propaganda magazine targeting foreign readers. See, for example, Anonymous.
(1965). ‘Young people cement their friendship’ and Anonymous. ‘Commemorating
the People’s War’, China Reconstructs, 11.
46
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Nanjing guanzhong yongyue guankan ‘renmin zhanzheng shengli wansui’
[Nanjing audiences swarmed to watch ‘Long Live the Victory of People’s War’], 10
September 1965.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1723
Although the situation in Nanjing in 1965 was exceptional, it
nevertheless exemplified the ways in which remembering the Fifteenyear War was positioned in the complicated picture of China’s
relations with Japan. The case study of Nanjing in 1965 suggests that
remembering the war was consented to implicitly and explicitly by the
Chinese Communist Party regime. It also exploited the history of the
Fifteen-year War substantially and its practice of utilizing the history
of the war was informed not only by Sino-Japanese bilateral relations,
but also the domestic and wider international context of China at the
time. Moreover, memories of the Fifteen-year War were still vivid for
both Chinese and some Japanese people. Although sometimes people’s
remembrance of the war could be a troublesome for China’s diplomacy
towards Japan, the Chinese Communist Party regime did not try to
suppress it. However, the slogan was a marvellous assistance to them.
This—and the points made above in the case study of Nanjing in
1965—will be further explored through a discussion of the Chinese
Communist Party’s war remembrance activities throughout the pre1982 period in the next two sections.
Bashing Japanese militarists when the inter-governmental
relationship was poor
In the Chinese Communist Party’s discourse, ‘Japanese militarists’
consisted of two groups. The first group comprised those people
who had invaded China or supported the invasion and were labelled
as (old-style) Japanese militarists, Japanese imperialists, Japanese
invaders, and so forth. The second group consisted of those who were
charged with reviving militarism in post-war Japan. Blaming past and
present Japanese militarists was not just an empty slogan. Many largescale campaigns, which directly or indirectly made Chinese people
remember the cruelty of the war, were initiated by the Chinese
Communist Party. These campaigns exposed the many atrocities
committed by past Japanese militarists and provided evidence (which
was kept updated) of how wartime ideology and practices were being
revived. Apart from Japan’s military build-up, the evidence frequently
shown was surprisingly similar to what we often hear of happening
today, such as textbook revision, the Yasukuni Shrine, right-wing films,
and so forth.
Helping to demonstrate this section, Figure 1 is based on an analysis
of the headlines of the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece Renmin
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1724
CHAN YANG
Figure 1. The graph above shows the number of times ‘Rikou’ appeared in Renmin
Ribao article headings; the graph below shows the number of times ‘junguo zhuyi’
appeared in Renmin Ribao article headlines.
Source: Renmin Ribao.
Ribao (People’s Daily) from 1946 to 1982. ‘Rikou’ (Japanese bandits)
is a very negative word to call the Japanese. Before 1952 it was
used substantially in the article titles of Renmin Ribao, but its use
in headlines stopped almost completely after 1953 (the first graph in
Figure 1). On the other hand, the use of ‘junguo zhuyi’ (militarist) in
the article titles of Renmin Ribao has completely different results (the
second graph in Figure 1).47
At a glance, these two charts are at odds with each other. In fact, both
of them reflect the Sino-Japanese inter-governmental relations very
well. The decline in the use of abusive language like ‘Rikou’ to refer
to the Japanese after 1952 implies that Japan’s status as a disgraceful
foe was officially redefined to that of a foreign nation. Nevertheless,
this does not mean official accusations of Japan as a past or potential
invader disappeared entirely.
47
Renmin Ribao’s search engine was used to identify articles with titles that included
‘Rikou’ and ‘junguo zhuyi’. However, as ‘junguo zhuyi’ was also used to label other nations
like the Soviet Union, I then selected only articles that related to Japan.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1725
According to the second graph in Figure 1, there were three phases of
continuous yet fluctuating growth and decline in terms of the Chinese
Communist Party’s Japanese militarist-bashing: from approximately
1947 to 1955, from 1957 to 1962, and from 1964 to 1972. This
graph reflects the ups and downs of Sino-Japanese inter-governmental
relations between 1945 and 1982, and shows the peaks and troughs
of the Chinese Communist Party’s Japanese militarist-bashing (that
is, the years when no article titles used ‘junguo zhuyi’). In what follows,
I will discuss in chronological order how the two graphs show that
the Chinese Communist Party’s war remembrance activities centred
around Japanese militarist-bashing against the background of the
Sino-Japanese inter-governmental relationship.
From undisguised accusations to undisguised courting: 1945 to 1956
Immediately after the end of the Fifteen-year War, the main issue
related to the war for the Chinese Communist Party was that
of Japanese war crimes. Its propaganda sector reported on the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East and published articles
that revealed the extent of Japanese atrocities. In addition to its aim of
attacking Japanese militarists, it was intended that this propaganda
would ultimately help strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s
position in the Civil War. To achieve the latter, the regime’s accused
the Kuomintang regime of colluding with the United States and
Japan of bullying China during and after the war,48 and criticized the
Kuomintang’s domestic governing of China. The Chinese Communist
Party alleged that the Kuomintang was corrupt in taking over Japanese
properties, its behaviour towards the Chinese people was as brutal
as that of the Japanese military, and even that it had employed
Japanese solders to kill Chinese people in the civil war.49 Thus, many
articles deprecating the Japanese military also attacked ‘Jiangzei’
48
See, for example, Renmin Ribao articles: ‘Jiangzei goujie Meidi Rikou dagao zousishengyi
zhu Mei jingji qinhua’ [Chiang Kai-Shek the thief colludes with American imperialists
and Japanese bandits, undertaking excessive smuggling and helping America invade
China through economic means], 30 September 1947; ‘Jiangzhengfu wushikangzhan
cantong mei Mei qin Ri jingtongguo huifudui Ri maoyi fujiang quanbugongye zhuquan maigei
ta Meiguo baba’ [Chiang Kai-Shek government ignores the pain of the Anti-Japanese
War and colludes with America and Japan, selling its industrial sovereignty to its
American father through resuming trade with Japan], 4 August 1947.
49
See, for example, Renmin Ribao articles: ‘Riben peichangwuzi kaishi yunhua sidajiazu
hanrandutun’ [Japanese reparations start being transferred to China; the four
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1726
CHAN YANG
(Chiang Kai-Shek the thief), the ‘Meidi’ (American imperialists)
and ‘Maimo’ (MacArthur the demon). It also praised the friendship
offered by the Soviet Union and its assistance during the war.50
Finally, this propaganda aimed at building a ‘just’ image of the
Chinese Communist Party by reporting the abnormal lenience of
the International Military Tribunal and the Kuomintang’s military
tribunals, while promising that Japanese war criminals would be
punished in the areas occupied by the Chinese Communist Party.51
From October 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party
established China, until October 1952, its narratives relating to the
Fifteen-year War and its extra propaganda aims were similar to those
of the previous period.52 As before, accusations and revelations of
atrocities committed by the Japanese imperial army were open and
undisguised. According to the first graph in Figure 1, abusive language
was frequently used to refer to this group of Japanese. The primary
reason for this, I would argue, is that the Chinese Communist Party
government still saw Japan—governed by right-wing politicians—as
an enemy.
Formerly, the Chinese Communist Party did not trust Japan. How
to defend China against a potential attack from Japan and its allies
was considered by Mao to be one of the fundamental purposes of
the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1950, which was considered to be the
most important treaty for the new-born China.53 Later, the Yoshida
Shigeru government (22 May 1946–22 May 1947 and 15 October
1948–10 December 1954) signed the San Francisco Treaty and the
big families outrageously take everything], 22 February 1947; ‘Guomindang yong
gaoguanhoulu shouliu Rikou tusha tongbao’ [The Kuomintang bribes Japanese bandits
to kill fellow countrymen], 22 September 1946.
50
See, for example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Zhong Su maoyi tiaoyue dada bangzhule Zhongguo
kangzhan dangshi Meiguoque jijizi Ri qinhua’ [Sino-Soviet trade treaty helped China
resist Japan while the United States helped Japan invade China], 26 June 1948.
51
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Yuandong guojifating shangdeguaiju’ [The strange drama
in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East], 2 August 1946; ‘Jiefangjun
baohu shoufa waiqiao, danduipeihe Rikou canhai renminde zhanfan jue yuyi yingdezhicai’ [The
PLA (People’s Liberation Army) protects law-abiding foreigners, but will punish the
war criminals who cooperated with Japanese bandits to harm Chinese people], 4
August 1946.
52
In the view of the Chinese media, North Korea joined the Soviet Union as
another of China’s friends during the war. See, for example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Zhong Chao
renmin zaidongbei kang Ri zhanzheng zhongde guojizhuyi tuanjie’ [Internationalist solidarity
between Chinese and Korean people in northeastern China during the Anti-Japanese
War], 11 November 1950.
53
Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, p. 122.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1727
Japan-United States Security Treaty, which confirmed the nation’s
image as the ‘running dog’ of the United States among the
Chinese Communist Party leaders. Yoshida and Chiang Kai-Shek
also concluded the Japan-Taiwan Treaty and institutionalized Japan’s
pro-Taiwan stance, which further enraged the Chinese Communist
Party.54 Moreover, when the Korean War erupted, there was
widespread fear that this would spark a Third World War; Chinese
Communist Party officials also believed there was evidence that Japan
had helped American solders in the battlefield. By this point, Japan,
rather than being a potential danger became a real enemy (although
as the accomplice in the war this time). The combination of all this
suspicion, indignation, and hostility made the Chinese Communist
Party regime refuse to be friendly with the Japanese government,
although the Party was still embracing ‘kind Japanese people’.55
During this first phase of the Chinese Communist Party’s Japanese
militarist-bashing, they launched three mass campaigns to ensure
that the Chinese people recalled Japanese atrocities. The first two
campaigns were related to Japanese war criminals. The aim of one
of the campaigns was to ‘protest against the release of Japanese
war criminals by America’, which began in around March 1950
and ended around December of that year.56 Another campaign was
54
See, for example, ‘Zhou Enlai waizhang guanyu Meiguo jiqi pucongguojia qianding
Jiujinshandui Riheyue desheng ming’ [Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s statement about that
the United States and its satellite countries that signed the San Francisco Treaty]
(18 September 1951), and ‘Zhang Hanfu fuwaizhang guanyu Riben Jitianzhengfu xiang
Meiguozhengfu baozhengyu Guomindang fan dong canyu jituandijie heyuede shengming’ [Vice
Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu’s statement about the fact that the Japanese Yoshida
government promised the American government it would sign a peace treaty with
the remaining Kuomintang reactionary group] (23 January 1952)’, in Shijiezhishi
chubanshe. (1955). Ribenwenti wenjian huibian (1) [Compilation of documents of
Japanese issue 1], Shijiezhishi chubanshe, Beijing.
55
In fact, the Japanese government’s close ties with the United States and the
Republic of China also precluded it from having a friendly relationship with the
Chinese Communist Party regime.
56
Officials’ speeches of denouncement and victims’ accusations started being
published in Renmin Ribao in March 1950. Publication ceased gradually in December
of that year. For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Feng Wenbing Liao Chengzhi Xie Bangding
fabiaotanhua tongchi Meidi baobi Rikou zuixing’ [Feng Wenbin, Liao Chengzhi and Xie
Bangding give a speech to rebuke American imperialists’ crime of shielding Japanese
bandits], 16 April 1950; Renmin Ribao, ‘Rehe Shanxi Gansu dengdi renmin kangyi Maimo
shifang zhanfan Chongguangkui Riben zhanfan manshen qintoule Zhongguo renminde xianxue
women juebuyunxu Maimo yishoutumo zhebixuezhai’ [People in places like Rehe, Shanxi, and
Gansu protest against the release of Shigemitsu Mamoru by MacArthur the demon:
Japanese criminals’ hands are stained by the blood of Chinese people; we will never
allow MacArthur the demon to erase this blood debt], 29 November 1950.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1728
CHAN YANG
launched to ‘expose Japanese Biological Warfare atrocities’.57 This
campaign was triggered by the Khabarovsk trial, conducted by the
Soviet Union from 25 to 30 December 1949, which revealed the
extent of Japanese biological warfare atrocities, and was followed
closely by the Chinese media. After March 1950, the first wave of
the campaigns gradually ceased, until the discovery of an alleged
attempt by the United States to use biological weapons in the
Korean War in February 1952. Newspaper articles criticizing the
Americans and providing tips for surviving in a biological war were
published extensively thereafter, gradually ending in 1953. Naturally,
the memory of Japanese biological warfare was revived in this latter
wave.58
The third campaign can be summarized as ‘remembering the bitter
anti-Japanese war and protesting against the American plan to rearm
Japan’, which was started in around February 1951. Memories of all
kinds of Japanese atrocities suffered by the masses were consistently
written about in the media.59 According to a labour union record in
Nanjing, this campaign was started in the previous year as part of
mobilizing for the Korean War. Establishing patriotism and hatred
towards the United States was its main aim. However, this did not go
down well with Nanjing’s workers and new guidelines were introduced
in February 1951. The new core task was to protest against the
American plan to rearm Japan and to conclude peace with Japan on
its own.
57
There were plenty of articles carried in Chinese newspapers like Xinhua Ribao
and Renmin Ribao during this period. For a good work on this campaign, based on
archive research, see Cathcart, A. and Nash, P. (2009). ‘To Serve Revenge for the
Dead’: Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the PRC Foreign
Ministry Archive, 1949–1956, The China Quarterly, 200, p. 1053.
58
See, for example, Renmin Ribao articles: ‘Kangyi qin Chao Meijun goujie Ribenzhanfan
jinxing xijun zhanzhen’ [Against American invading troops colluding with Japanese war
criminals to conduct biological warfare in Korea], 1 March 1952; ‘Liudianxiang nongmin
juxing dahui kongsu Rikou zaigaidi tusha wosiqian tongbao dezuixing’ [Farmers in Liudian
county assembled to accuse Japanese bandits of the crime of killing around 4,000
people in the area], 8 July 1952.
59
See, for example, Renmin Ribao articles: ‘Jianyi chuban Rikou baoxing zhaopian zhuanji’
[Suggest publishing a photo album to reveal Japanese bandits’ atrocities], 25 February
1951; ‘Wurenqu’ he “wurenquan”—huiyi Rikou “jijia bingcun’ dexuexing baoxing”’ [‘No Man
district’ and ‘No Man circle’—recollect Japanese bandits’ bloody atrocity of ‘merging
families and villages’], 28 February 1951; ‘Xuede jiyi you xin tidao Riben yeshou wojiu
hongleyan Renmin jiefangjun zhanshide Kongsu’ [The memory of blood is still vivid; my
eyes become red immediately when the Japanese beast is mentioned—accusation
from a People’s Liberation Army solider], 14 March 1951.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1729
Why was Japan the centre of this campaign? According to the
Chinese, the United States was experiencing setbacks in the battlefield
but was not willing to be defeated. As a result they made some
disgraceful moves to stay afloat. John Foster Dulles was sent to Japan
to conclude a peace agreement, which included rearming Japan. This
outraged Chinese workers as: ‘300,000 Nanjing people were killed by
the Japanese invasion army during the Anti-Japanese War. The people
and workers will never forget this huge debt of blood.’60 Thus, the
Japan-centred campaign was the response to try to destroy America’s
plan—but it was also in line with the sentiment of the workers.
To fulfil the task, mobilization of the masses was planned by
organizing mourning ceremonies, petitions, and so forth. The result
of this renewed campaign was notable, as the sentiments of Chinese
people were harnessed successfully. However, in late April, the central
government started to warn that in some places the results of
the campaign had miscarried, as local people only expressed their
hatred towards the Japanese but did not transfer their anti-Japanese
sentiment to the Americans and to the task of reconstructing the
motherland. This indicated that the campaign, originally designed to
attack the United States, was becoming increasingly anti-Japanese
because painful memories of Japanese atrocities were still deeply
entrenched among the Chinese people.61 Gradually, the media reports
of this campaign devoted more space to talking about how the local
people could successfully transfer their anti-Japanese sentiment to the
Americans.62
60
NMA-6001-1-11: ‘Benshi gongren kang Mei yuan Chao yundong degaikuang yudangqian
gongzuode jige wenti’ [The general situation about the mobilization movement of this
city’s workers for the Korea war and several problems of the current job] (26 February
1951).
61
Renmin Ribao, ‘Ying yindao renmin choushi Meidiguozhuyi’ [We should guide the people
to hate American imperialists], 22 April 1951. This article asserted that ‘The hatred
towards Japan prevails among people, as Japanese bandits had invaded China for eight
years and the whole of China was trampled on. Thus, when one mentions the phrase
“against the re-armament of Japan”, people are inclined to focus their hatred towards
past Japanese bandits.’ The article suggested that the people should be guided to
‘transfer their hatred from past Japanese bandits to present American imperialists’
and ‘participate in practical struggles, like assisting in the Korean War, cracking down
on anti-revolutionaries and increasing production’.
62
See, for example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Zhaodongxian renmin yi shiji xingdong fandui Meiguo
wuzhuang Riben’ [People in Zhaodong county protest against American rearmament of
Japan through actions], 4 May 1951. The intention of this article was to report on the
radio the activity of citizens who accused imperial Japan of atrocities. Nevertheless, it
responded to the direction above and described how recollecting Japanese atrocities
improved the efficiency of a paper-making factory.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1730
CHAN YANG
There was no contact between the Chinese Communist Party and
Japanese governments until three members of the Japanese Diet
came to Beijing and signed the first bilateral trade agreement on
15 May 1952.63 Following this initial visit, 13 Japanese delegates
came to Beijing to participate in the Peace Conference of the Asian
and Pacific Region in October 1952.64 Although the sentiments of
the Chinese people could still be observed, after the conference the
undisguised condemnation of the atrocities committed by the Japanese
imperial army gradually disappeared in official media.65 Articles about
biological warfare were still written, but only in the context of its use
by the Americans. Furthermore, abusive language was rarely used
to refer to the Japanese in the Chinese Communist Party’s official
discourse after that. In brief, the Chinese Communist Party regime
gradually changed its hostile stance towards the Japanese government
after some semi-official communication took place between the two
regimes.
Still, criticism of Japanese militarism or the resurgence of militarism
continued after the end of the Korean War, despite the increased
communication between the two governments. This was mainly
because the Chinese side still considered the Yoshida administration
to be a right-wing government that represented the wishes of
Japanese militarists and was unwilling to build a proper state-to-state
relationship with it.66
Nevertheless, as the Soviet Union started advocating peaceful
relations with the Japanese government and a change of leadership
was going on in Japan, China cautiously changed its attitude. In late
September 1954, Khrushchev visited China and tried to persuade
63
Note: to get a better sense of the Chinese perspective, this article’s discussion
about Sino-Japanese relations is based largely on mainland Chinese scholars’ research
as well as official Chinese documents. A few indirect and direct trades between China
and Japan were interrupted by the American-led embargo on China during the Korean
War. Some Japanese Communist Party members also visited China during the period
to negotiate the repatriation issue or take political refuge. Liu, Zhanhou Zhong Ri
guanxi; Zhang, L. (2011). Xin Zhongguo yu Riben guanxishi (1949–2010) [History of
relations between new China and Japan], Shanghai renmin chubanshe, Shanghai.
64
‘Shijiezhishi chubanshe. (1950). Shijie zhishi cidian [World knowledge dictionary],
Shijiezhishi chubanshe, Beijing.
65
For example, the last article in Xinhua Ribao to criticize Japanese atrocities during
the first phase of Japanese militarist-bashing is: Xinhua Ribao, ‘Duzhe laixin’ [Letters
column], 19 October 1952. The letter talked about the Nanjing Massacre and the
conference.
66
For the part played by the Chinese Communist Party’s policy change, see Liu,
Zhanhou Zhong Ri guanxi.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1731
the Chinese to follow the Soviet Union’s lead by changing its policy
towards Japan as well.67 Scholars noticed the fundamental change
in China’s Japanese policy from the statements issued at the SinoSoviet summit meeting: previously the Chinese Communist Party
regime only pursued friendship with ‘kind Japanese people’, now they
did not mind making friendly overtures to the Yoshida government.
Hatoyama Ichiro took over the Japanese premiership on 7 December
1954, and the Chinese Communist Party publicly welcomed his
government’s statement about normalizing Sino-Japanese relations.68
At last, the two countries stepped into the first chapter of good
inter-governmental relations in the post-war era. In contrast to its
tough stance on Japanese war criminals, the Chinese Communist
Party actively engaged in repatriating Japanese prisoners-of-war (and
nationals), as well as conducting lenient military tribunals. Also,
quasi-diplomatic communication between the two countries increased
greatly. This is reflected in first graph of Figure 1; once the first phase
of the Chinese Communist Party’s militarist-bashing was over, there
is no instance of ‘junguo zhuyi’ appearing in Renmin Ribao during the
tenures of Hatoyama and Ishibashi Tanzan (10 December 1954–25
February 1957).
The Chinese Communist Party’s grudge against the Kishi-Sato brothers
These good times did not last long, however, as the next Japanese
prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke (25 February 1957–19 July 1960)
soon upset the Chinese Communist Party, with his series of proAmerican and pro-Taiwan actions. His unprecedented visit to Taiwan
in June 1957—the first by a Japanese prime minister since the end
of the war—and his support for Chiang Kai-shek’s speech about
reclaiming the mainland, annoyed the Chinese Communist Party.69
67
‘Zhonghua renmingongheguo zhengfuhe Suweiai shehuizhuyi gongheguo lianbang guanyudui
Riben guanxide lianhexuan yan’ [Sino-Soviet joint statement about relations with Japan]
(12 October 1954), in Riben wenti wenjian huibian (1) [Compilation of documents of
Japanese issue (1)], Shijiezhishi chubanshe, Beijing.
68
‘Lun Riben he Zhongguo huifu zhengchang guanxi’ [Talk about Sino-Japanese
normalisation] (30 December 1954), in Riben wenti wenjian huibian (1) [Compilation
of documents of Japanese issue (1)], Shijiezhishi chubanshe, Beijing.
69
‘Zhou Enlai zongli tong Riben jizhe tan Zhong Ri guanxi’ [Prime Minister Zhou Enlai
talks about the Sino-Japanese relationship with Japanese journalists] (25 July 1957),
in Riben wenti wenjian huibian (2) (1958) [Compilation of documents of Japanese issue
(2)], Shijiezhishi chubanshe, Beijing.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1732
CHAN YANG
Around this time, the discourse surrounding Japanese militarism
and Japanese imperial atrocities reappeared, albeit on a small scale.
Still, the Chinese Communist Party regime did not give up hope of
normalizing their relationship with the Kishi government. Its Japan
affairs team devoted itself to preparing for the negotiations of the
fourth bilateral trade agreement, which was considered an important
step towards normalization.70
Against this background, Liu Lianren, a forced labourer who was
taken to Japan by the Japanese imperial army during the war, was
found in Hokkaido, Japan, on 8 February 1958. Many reports about
the story and the refusal of the Kishi government to acknowledge the
culpability of the Japanese imperial government were printed in the
Chinese media.71 However, it seems that these reports restrained their
criticisms of a militarist resurgence and did not directly target the
Kishi cabinet (although, technically, Kishi himself was a ‘resurgent’
member of the former militarist government). It seems that the
Chinese Communist Party regime did not want to fall out with
the Kishi cabinet by including its members on the list of ‘Japanese
militarists’ at this point. It was only when the Kishi cabinet refused
to acknowledge the fourth bilateral trade agreement on 9 April that
the Chinese Communist Party regime started to directly criticize the
Japanese government for the resurgence of Japanese militarism. After
the Nagasaki Flag incident of 2 May 1958,72 criticism of both imperial
militarists and resurgent militarism increased quickly and reached a
peak in 1960.73
The justification given for the 1960 wave of Japanese militaristbashing was that it supported the Japanese people’s movement against
the Japan-US Security Treaty, which was reported in China from 1958.
70
For the association of the fourth trade agreement negotiation with the Liu
Lianren incident, see Liu, Zhanhou Zhong Ri guanxi.
71
See articles in Renmin Ribao and China Reconstructs during this time.
72
On 2 May 1958 a group of Japanese right-wingers pulled down a Chinese flag
hanging outside an exhibition of Chinese merchandise in Nagasaki.
73
China ceased relations with Japan after the incident. It was not until March
1959 that the Chinese Communist Party regime started to publicly show that its
stance had changed, when a Japanese Socialist Party delegation led by Asanuma
Inejiro visited China. China suggested the famous three principles of Sino-Japanese
economics during the meeting. ‘Zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehuihuizhang Zhang Xiruo,
Riben Shehuidang fanghua daibiaotuan tuanzhang Qianzhao Daocilang gongtong shengming’
[Joint statement agreed by Zhang Xiruo, the president of the Chinese diplomacy
society, and Asanuma, the chief of Japanese socialist delegation] (17 March 1959),
in Riben wenti wenjian huibian (3) (1961) [Compilation of documents of Japanese issue
(3)], Shijiezhish chubanshe, Beijing; Zhang, Xin Zhongguo yu Riben guanxishi.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1733
The nationwide campaign started in Beijing on 9 May 1960. By 15
May, assemblies and demonstrations were launched in 33 cities and
some counties, with around 12 million people reportedly participating
in these activities. Japanese atrocities were recalled repeatedly both by
party leaders and participants. For example, Liao Chengzhi said in a
Beijing meeting on 9 May, ‘Chinese and other Asian people’s memory
of atrocities committed by Japanese militarists is still vivid.’74 The
citizens were very emotional during the 700,000-participant assembly
in Wuhan—a city that was ruled by the Japanese occupiers for a long
time. For example, a woman whose husband was shot by the Japanese
army expressed her outrage to the media about the resurgent Japanese
militarism.75
In Nanjing, there were two assemblies organized on 13 May
(400,000 participants) and on 22 May (1 million participants).
According to the records of the Nanjing municipal government, the
assemblies were carefully planned. The intention was to mobilize
105,000 people across Nanjing to participate in the first meeting.
The participants were required to be energetic and spirited to
represent the mood of demonstration. All of the physical and mental
equipment, such as banners, slogans, and songs were prepared by
the government. To avoid any accidents, caused by over-emotional
masses, for example, the Public Security Bureau put careful security
measures in place as well.76 Although it was rainy on 13 May, 400,000
citizens showed up at the meeting and demonstration, nearly four
times more than the authorities anticipated.77 From party heads to the
farmer’s representative, those who gave speeches all mentioned how
Nanjing had suffered since December 1937 at the hands of wartime
74
Nanjing Ribao (an official Nanjing newspaper), ‘Liao Chengzhi tongzhizai shoudugejie
zhiyuan Riben renmin zhengyi douzheng dahuishang dejianghua’ [Comrade Liao Chengzhi’s
speech at the meeting in Beijing], 10 May 1960.
75
See Nanjing Ribao, ‘Quanguo yiyou jinjiubaiwanren jihuishihui zhiyuan Riben renmin
zhengyi douzheng’ [Around nine million people nationwide participated in the assembly
and demonstration to support Japanese people’s justice struggle], 15 May 1960.
The article reads: Chinese people, ‘who used to be oppressed by the Japanese fascist,
including the farmers in Marco Polo Bridge, survivors of the Nanjing Massacre, victims
who escaped from under piles of corpses buried by the Japanese, participated in
demonstrations and assemblies’.
76
NMA-5003-3-788: ‘Zhiyuan Riben renmin fandui Ri Mei junshitongmeng tiaoyue
dahuijihua caoan’ [Draft plan for the assembly to support Japanese people and protest
against the Japan-American Security Treaty] (9 May 1960).
77
Nanjing Ribao, ‘Nanjing sishiduowanren juxing dashiwei’ [About 400,000 Nanjing
citizens have demonstrated], 14 May 1960. Note: since the rally occurred during the
Great Leap Forward period, the numbers reported might be an exaggeration.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1734
CHAN YANG
Japan.78 The meeting triggered many testimonies from the victims of
the Nanjing Massacre and from the veterans who had participated in
the war.79
This series of movements carried on in Chinese cities until Kishi
approved the renewed security treaty with the United States and
resigned in July 1960. Nevertheless, after Ikeda Hayato formed a
new cabinet (19 July 1960–9 November 1960), criticism of past and
present Japanese militarists did not stop. Not until the Liao-Takasaki
Memorandum Trade Agreement was signed in November 1962 was
the relationship between the two governments normalized, for the
first time since relations broke down publicly in light of the Nagasaki
Flag incident. Jailed Japanese war criminals were released ahead
of schedule.80 Accusations aimed at Ikeda regarding the revival of
militarism also ceased at this time.81 This is reflected in the second
graph of Figure 1. Compared to the first phase of Japanese militaristbashing, the second phase was more moderate, not only in terms
of the Party’s discourse. Chinese people were thoroughly and widely
mobilized to condemn the crimes of the Japanese militarists at every
possible occasion during the campaigns in the first phase, but, although
they were still being encouraged to speak out about their hatred in
the second phase, this was confined to the big assemblies, carefully
controlled by the authorities.
Although Ikeda, as a low-key and pragmatic politician, found himself
balancing his position between mainland China and the United
States/Taiwan, he still belonged in the latter’s camp. Issues that would
be damaging towards Sino-Japanese inter-governmental relations
were buried during his tenure of office and exploded soon after his
78
NMA-5003-3-788.
Nanjing Ribao, ‘Zijinshang xiade housheng’ [Roar at the foot of Purple mountain],
14 May 1960.
80
For example, Xinhua Ribao, ‘Wotiqian shifang wuming Riben zhanfan’ [We release five
Japanese war criminals ahead of schedule], 4 September 1963; Renmin Ribao, ‘Tiqian
shifang zuihousanmin Riben zhanfan’ [Release of the last three Japanese war criminals
ahead of schedule], 7 March 1964.
81
Still, a few articles reported North Korea’s criticism of resurgent Japanese
militarism and China’s commemoration of the people who died during the war, for
example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Chaoxian minzhu falvjia xiehui lishu Riben diguozhuyi qin Chao
zuixing’ [A Korean association of democratic law experts has listed several Japanese
imperialists’ crimes of invading Korea], 26 March 1964; Renmin Ribao, ‘Dongbei
xianhouyou wushiduo wanrendao Fangjiafen pindiao “Wanrenken” daonian Riben diguozhuyi
qinlve shiqi sinankuanggong’ [500,000 northeastern people went to Fangjia Cemetery to
ponder on the ‘ten-thousand-corpse pit’ and mourn the miners who died during the
period of the Japanese imperialist invasion], 8 April 1964.
79
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1735
successor Sato Esaku took office (9 November 1964–7 July 1972).82
China carried out its nuclear trial successfully on 16 October 1964,
which made Japan worry about its safety. This in turn encouraged
Japan to enhance its own military capabilities and strengthen its
military alliance with the United States. Other emerging problems
also threatened the mutual relationship, like the Japan-Korean
Treaty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island issue. More importantly, Sato,
with the ultimate political aim of regaining Okinawa, carried out
a pro-American and pro-Taiwan policy much more openly and the
Chinese Communist Party regime struggled to tolerate this. He made
comments that were considered to be supportive of ‘two Chinas’ as
early as November 1965. Unsurprisingly, criticisms of the resurgence
of militarism under the Sato administration appeared in Renmin Ribao
headlines for the first time in a relatively long period. As all of
the elements mentioned above—among other factors—took effect,
tensions between the two governments ran high and, as a result, the
Chinese Communist Party’s Japanese militarist-bashing carried on
throughout Sato’s tenure and reached its peak in 1970. However,
compared to the previous two phases, the third phase concentrated
on revealing evidence of the current Japanese militarist resurgence,
rather than exposing or castigating the atrocities of the past. Although
evidence of Japanese military resurgence was revealed throughout the
post-war period, the revelations during this phase was more thorough,
dense, and systematic.83
In terms of newspaper coverage, how the Sato administration used
cultural and educational tools to whitewash Japan’s history of invading
other nations was often analysed item-by-item in articles or special
columns.84 For example, one article started by criticizing the annual
82
There were mainly two ‘time bombs’: the second Yoshida Letter to Taiwan and
the Mitsuya Plan.
83
For evidence reported in the previous two phases, see, Renmin Ribao, ‘Zhanqian
Riben zuidade junguozhuyi zuzhi “Riben zai xiang junrenhui” kaishi huodong’ [The biggest
wartime Japanese militarist organization ‘Association of Soldiers who are not on
Active Duty’ start limbering up again], 14 August 1952; Renmin Ribao, ‘Liyong jiaoyu
he xuanchuan guanshudusu’ [Use education and propaganda to instil poisonous ideas],
27 December 1959; Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben junguozhuyi fenzi jingwei Dongtiaodeng jian
jinianbei’ [Japanese militarists build memorials for people like Tojo Hideki], 19 August
1960.
84
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Buzhun Riben junguozhuyi jieshihuanhun’ [Reviving
Japanese militarism in a new guise is forbidden], 7 July 1971. For examples of special
columns, see a series of critical articles published in Renmin Ribao on 29 January
1971: ‘Riben fandongpai liyong xinnian dasifangdu’ [Japanese reactionaries [who] use the
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1736
CHAN YANG
memorial ceremony for the war dead held by Japan on 15 August that
year.85 Sato was reproved for applauding those who were killed in the
war as this was taken as a sign that he wanted to ‘learn lessons from
senior militarists and fight hard to expand abroad’. After criticizing the
enhancement of Japan’s military production and military training, the
article continued to express its outrage that the Sato administration
had authorized cinemas to show the film ‘Turbulent Showa History:
Warlord’. The article stated, ‘This film reversed the verdict for the
Japanese invasion by the means of turning history upside-down ... it
also brazenly called back the spirit of the major war criminal Tojo
Hideki, [who was] a Japanese militarist leader of countless crimes and
the hands of whom were full of the blood of Chinese and other Asian
people.’ It was also revealed that Japan’s notorious Mitsubishi A6M
Zero fighter aircraft as well as the uniforms and the swords used by
Tojo and Yamamoto Isoroku were exhibited alongside the film.
In the end, the article warned that there was a lot of ‘poisonous
weed’ produced to propagandize militarism and it listed many
examples. One of them was that, encouraged by a right-wing Japanese
government, a wartime primary school textbook in Japan, which
encouraged expansionist tendencies and people to sacrifice their lives
for the emperor and the militarists, was reprinted. This textbook also
attempted to deny the crimes carried out by the imperial Japanese
military by describing the Manchuria Incident as a military operation
between the Japanese and Chinese armies. The article also revealed
that the Tokyo National Museum was preparing an exhibition exalting
Japan’s military successes, and many paintings, photo albums, and
memoirs that commemorated past militarists were produced, such as
Okamura Yasuji’s memoir, which was published in newspapers and
as a book. The article concluded that all of these facts indicated that
Japanese militarism had come to life again. New Japanese militarists
were reviving the old dream of a ‘Great East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere’, and targeting the people in China, North Korea, Indochina,
and other Asian countries.
New Year to spread poisonous ideas]; ‘Zhanlan bingqi guchui kuozhangqinlve’ [Display
weapons to advocate expansion and invasion]; ‘Jisishengui weiqinlvejun zhaohun’ [Hold
rites to call back the soul of the dead militarists]; and ‘Guangbo junge xuanyang duwu
jingshen’ [Broadcast military songs to preach a warlike spirit].
85
Xin Nanjing Ribao, ‘Riben junguozhuyi quanmian fuhuode zuizheng’ [Evidence of an
overall revival of Japanese militarism], 19 August 1970. (Xin Nanjing Ribao was
published as a replacement for Nanjing Ribao for a while.)
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1737
Individual pieces of evidence were revealed separately as well, and
can be catalogued as follows. Artistic works, especially Japanese war
films like ‘Gateway to Glory’ and ‘Men and War’, were attacked. Even
a book that condemned the Japanese militarist resurgence shown in
Japanese war films was published.86 Commemorative activities on
memorial days, like Shusen Kinenbi (the anniversary of the end of
the war) and Kenkoku Kinenbi (National Foundation Day), were also
targets for attack.87 Revisionism in Japan’s education was watched
closely by the Chinese Communist Party regime as well.88 Glorifying
militarists especially triggered the Party’s anger.89 From the early
days of the People’s Republic of China the Japanese emperor was seen
as the spiritual mainstay of militarism. Thus, any encouragement for
Japanese people to worship him was criticized by the Party as a sign of
the continuity of Japanese militarism. For example, even a mourning
ceremony for the writer Mishima Yukio—who started a coup out of his
belief in bushido (loyalty towards the emperor and extreme patriotism)
and who committed hara-kiri after the coup failed—was denounced.90
The Chinese media also warned that the Sato government and the
United States were following the old road of Japanese militarists—
86
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Liyong chubanwu, dianyinghe gequdeng dasixuanyang
junguozhuyi’ [Using publications, films and songs to advocate militarism], 29 August
1970; Renmin Ribao, ‘Ping Riben fandongyingpian “A, haijun”’ [Review of Japanese
reactionary film ‘Aa, kaigun’] 20 July 1971; The book is: Qin, P. and Tao, D. (1971).
Jisui Mei Ri fandongpaide mimeng [Strike the delusional dream of American and Japanese
reactionaries], Renmin chubanshe, Beijing.
87
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Zuoteng zhengfu jinzai Riben touxiang ershizhounian dasi
xuanchuan junguozhuyi shandong fuchouzhuyi’ [Sato government stirred up militarism
and revanchism on the 20th anniversary of the end of the war], 20 August 1965;
Renmin Ribao, ‘Zuoteng fandong zhengfu liyong “jiyuanjie” shandong junguozhuyi kuangre’ [Sato
reactionary government used ‘kigensetsu’ to stir up militarist fanaticism], 1 March
1971. Kigensetsu was Empire Day in imperial Japan and was abolished during the
American occupation. It was revived as National Foundation Day in 1966 as a national
holiday.
88
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Pizhunchuban dierci shijiedazhan shide xiaoxuejiaokeshu
bing jielixiugai xianxing’ [Authorise the publication of the wartime primary school
textbook and revise the current primary school textbook], 28 June 1969.
89
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben fandongpai weierbaiwan “zhanwangzhe” zhaohun’
[Japanese reactionaries call back the souls of two million war dead], 14 January 1971;
Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben fandong pai jinggei qiming jiaji zhanfan kai’zhuidaohui’ [Japanese
reactionaries hold a mourning ceremony for seven Japanese Class A war criminals],
11 June 1971.
90
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben fandongpai litu huifu “tianhuangzhi”’ [Japanese
reactionaries attempted to restore the emperor], 1 June 1971; Renmin Ribao,
‘Sandaoyoujifu yinhun busan’ [Mishima Yukio’s soul is still haunting], 20 February
1971.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1738
CHAN YANG
a road to destruction.91 Apart from attacking resurgent militarism,
atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese invasion army in other Asian
countries were introduced.92 Interestingly, the Japanese left-wing’s
exposure of the evidence provided a great avenue for China’s Japanese
militarist-bashing. Evidence of resurgent Japanese militarism exposed
by these Japanese and their protests against militarism were reported
in detail.93
Just as happened ten years before, in 1970 the Japanese people’s
struggles over the renewal of the Japan-United States Security Treaty
and the resurgence of militarism were substantially reported by
the Chinese domestic media as well as journals targeting foreign
readers.94 The actions and speeches of the Japanese Socialist Party,
pro-China groups, and individuals on 7 July, 15 August, and other
Fifteen-year War related memorial days were widely reported.95
However, as regards activity on the Chinese side, in contrast to ten
years previously, a propaganda campaign—as opposed to a physical
mass campaign which empowered bottom-up collective condemnation
of Japanese militarism—was launched by the Chinese Communist
91
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Latiemoer shuo Meizhengfu suozuosuowei tongsanshiniandai
Riben yiyang, Meiguo zoushang Riben junguozhuyi huimei delaolu’ [Owen Lattimore said the
American government’s current behaviour is similar to Japan’s behaviour during the
1930s; America has walked into Japanese militarists’ old road of destruction], 14
April 1965.
92
For example, Renmin Ribao articles, ‘Riben diguozhuyi cengjing zheyang qintun
Chaoxian’ [This was how Japanese imperialists invaded Korea], 23 June 1965;
‘Riben diguozhuyi cengjing zenyang qinlve jianpuzhai’ [How Japanese imperialists invaded
Cambodia], 6 January 1966; ‘Faxisizhouxin youxiang jiumengchongwen Xidezongli tong Riben
shouxiang mitan’ [Fascist axis countries want to revive an old dream; prime ministers
of West Germany and Japan have a secret discussion], 14 April 1965.
93
For example, Renmin Ribao articles, ‘Riben zhongxuesheng fandui junguozhuyi jiaoyu’
[Japanese middle school students oppose militarist education], 28 March 1969;
‘Fandui Riben fandongpai dagao junguozhuyi xuanchuan Riben gedi qunzhong jihui shiwei’
[Meetings are held all over Japan to oppose Japanese reactionary’s militarist
propaganda,], 21 February 1972.
94
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Fandui Mei Ri fandongpai hanranxuanbu “zidong yanchang”
Ri Mei “anquantiaoyue”, Riben yibailiushi wanren juxing daguimo jihuishiwei’ [Protest
against American and Japanese reactionaries’ decision to ‘automatically’ renew the
Japan-American security treaty, 1.6 million Japanese hold large-scale assemblies and
demonstrations], 25 June 1970; Anonymous. (1970). Down with Revived Japanese
Militarism, China Reconstructs, 12.
95
See, for example, Renmin Ribao articles: ‘Buyunxu sanshisannianqian Riben
junguozhuyi zhizaode Lugouqiao shibian chongyan’ [No more Marco Polo Bridge Incident
happening 33 years ago], 8 July 1970; ‘Buxu “jiuyiba shibian” chongyan Dongjing xuesheng
heshimin jihuishi wei’ [Not another September 18 Incident; Tokyo students and
residences hold meetings], 20 September 1971.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1739
Party regime.96 In other words, the mass-driven character of the
three phases of Japanese militarist-bashing was diminishing, one after
another. Furthermore, apart from having revealed a large amount of
evidence, this year also commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary
of the end of the war on 7 July and 3 September. ‘Against resurgent
Japanese militarists’ was clearly included in this year’s slogans for the
memorial days.97
Criticisms of the Japanese militarists lessened swiftly around the
time that Sato was replaced by Tanaka Kakuei as Japanese prime
minister on 7 July 1972. As reflected in Figure 1, the third phase
of Japanese militarist-bashing came to an end around this time.
After that, war memorial days like 7 July and 15 August, which
were previously commemorated at least once every five years, did
not receive any attention in Renmin Ribao. Nevertheless, the Chinese
Communist Party regime still commemorated 3 September in 1975.
The real change came after 1978, when the Treaty of Sino-Japanese
Friendship was signed. Indeed, as some scholars have argued, the four
commemorative dates were either ignored or became occasions for
praising Sino-Japanese friendship. In brief, roughly speaking, there
was a positive correlation between the extent to which the Chinese
Communist Party’s war remembrance centred around Japanese
militarist-bashing, and the state of Sino-Japanese inter-governmental
relations.
Remembering the war during friendly encounters
In the course of Sino-Japanese friendship before the 1972
normalization, many empirical sources show that the topic of the
history of the Fifteen-year War was also frequently mentioned. Even in
the so-called ‘Sino-Japanese illusion’ period between 1972 and 1982,
96
A demonstration of 1.5 million people was organized in Beijing to protest against
‘the US and all its running dogs’. However, the main aim of this demonstration was
to support the Indochina people’s resistance war against the United States and show
support for global anti-American movements, and had little to do with Japanese
militarists.
97
An editorial entitled ‘Dadao fuhuode Riben junguozhuyi jinian Zhongguo renmin kang
Ri zhanzheng shengli ershiwu zhou nian’ [Down with the resurgent Japanese militarism—
commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Chinese people’s victory of the AntiJapanese War] was carried on the front page of Renmin Ribao, the People Liberation
Army organ, and other local newspapers, like Xin Nanjing Ribao, on 3 September 1970.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1740
CHAN YANG
remembering the war was still a part of China’s public life. This section
talks first about three occasions on which the war was recalled before
1972, and then explores the situation after 1972.
When Chinese Communist Party leaders spoke to Japanese
delegates face to face, they sometimes brought up the topic of the
Fifteen-year War, which were the first occasions on which the war
was recalled during friendly moments. Often, they merely made a
brief reference to the war to remind the delegates of it, for the
following possible reasons. First, Chinese Communist Party officials
wanted to dispel the misgivings of Japanese people, who felt guilty
for the war, by letting it be known that although they had an
unfortunate past, the two countries could still build a friendship.
Secondly, the Chinese Communist Party wanted to unite those
Japanese people who were pro the People’s Republic of China
against the conservative Japanese government, which they accused
of representing the Japanese militarists. An example of this is when
the Nanjing cadres shared with the Japanese youth delegation the
details of the Nanjing Massacre and showed them ‘The Red Lantern’.
Thirdly, the Chinese Communist Party could remind less ‘friendly’
Japanese of how big a debt Japan owed to China, which was usually
very effective.98
On those occasions when the Japanese side did not show repentance
for the war atrocities, the Chinese Communist Party leaders would
make a fuss about it, although usually not publicly. An episode which
occurred during the negotiations for Sino-Japanese normalization
exemplifies this well. In his first meeting with Zhou Enlai on 25
September and at the welcoming banquet that evening, Prime
Minister Tanaka described the atrocities inflicted on the Chinese
people as imperial Japan ‘gave Chinese people troubles’. The
problematic phrase ‘gave troubles’ caused a strong reaction among
Chinese officials. Both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong took a very
98
For instance, just before the negotiation of Sino-Japanese normalization in 1972,
Prime Minister Tanaka sent a delegation, consisting of some hard-core right-wing
Diet members, to Beijing. Zhou Enlai received them on 18 September. He started
an (obviously planned) conversation by asking the delegates, ‘What day is today?’
Confused, the delegates could not answer. Zhou then explained, ‘[The] September 18
Incident broke out 41 years ago. Forty-one years later, [the] Chinese and Japanese are
holding each other’s hands firmly.’ These Diet members were in fact not in favour of
normalization and Tanaka hoped their opinions would be changed by this trip. Zhou’s
sudden words did move them, and caused them to change their minds. See Zhang, Xin
Zhongguo yu Riben guanxishi; Yomiuri Shinbun, ‘Senso Shazai, Socchoku’ [Sincere Apology
for the War], 25 September 1972.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1741
tough position against this phrase, which suggests that the Chinese
Communist Party leaders actually did have a bottom line that
they stuck to and they tried their best to make the Japanese side
compromise. The result of this dispute was a much more sincere
sentence in the China-Japan Joint Statement: ‘the Japanese side is
keenly aware of Japan’s responsibility for causing enormous damages
in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches
itself’.99
However, sometimes it was the Japanese who initiated discussions,
as many of them were aware of the horrors committed by their
wartime troops. Frequently seen during meetings between the visiting
Japanese and Chinese leaders were scenes of apology. In particular,
those Japanese who had participated in the war experienced a kind
of urge to apologize when they revisited China as friendly envoys.100
Chinese leaders would reiterate the distinction they made between
Japanese people and Japanese militarists to reassure them. Similarly,
those Japanese who were taken care of by the Chinese Communist
Party regime (particularly those who were repatriated from mainland
China), were inclined to publicly compare the terror imposed by the
Japanese invaders with the humanitarianism shown by the Chinese
Communist Party regime.
What is more, the atrocities carried out by the militarists during
the war were often used by the Japanese leftists in their struggles
against the conservative Japanese government. As a consequence,
some of the atrocities that took place in the name of the Japanese
empire—which were unknown to the Chinese—were investigated,
causing a huge sensation in China. The most well-known example
was the Hanaoka Massacre, which was initially investigated by and
reported in Huqiao Minbao (a newspaper run by Chinese nationals
99
See the memoirs of the people involved, like Zhang Xiangshan and Ji Pengfei:
Zhang, X. (1998). ‘Zhong Ri fujiao tanpan huigu’ [Recall [of] the negotiation of the
Sino-Japanese normalization], Riben Xuekan, 1; Ji, P. (1995). ‘Yin shui buwang juejin
ren’ [Don’t forget the well-diggers when you drink from this well], in An, J. Zhou
Enlai zuihoude suiyue [[The] last days of Zhou Enlai], Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,
Beijing. See also some secondary sources, such as: Shuzaiyihan, N.H.K. (1993). Syuu
Onlai no ketsudan [Zhou Enlai’s determination], Nihon housou kyoukai, Tokyo, p. 149.
100
For example, when Endo Saburo, who was a former lieutenant-general of the
Japanese airforce, met his old opponent Chen Yi, who was famous for leading an
anti-Japanese guerrilla group, he kept apologising. See Wang, J. (2010). Zhong Ri
guanxi juejingren: ji sishiwuwei Zhong Ri youhaode xianqu [Well-diggers of Sino-Japanese
relationship: 45 forerunners of Sino-Japanese friendship], Shijiezhishi chubanshe,
Beijing, p. 66.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1742
CHAN YANG
living in Japan) on 11 January 1950. The report, which also accused
the Yoshida administration and the occupation authority of covering
up this incident, was covered by the Chinese media in late 1950, which
ran emotional stories by former forced labourers. For example, Ma
Zixin, who was working for a high school in Nanjing, wrote to Xinhua
Ribao in response to the report about his own experience as a forced
labourer in Fukushima prefecture and Hokkaido.101 However, this
episode was soon submerged in the flood of accusations of Japanese
atrocities in the early 1950s, and it was not until 1953 that it was
unearthed again.
On 7 July 1953, the remains of the victims of the Hanaoka Massacre
were returned to China by pro-People’s Republic of China groups in
Japan, such as the Japan-China Friendship Association, and a grand
ceremony was held in Tanggu port. This mission was covered widely
in the Chinese media as was the massacre itself.102 The Japanese side
continued to compile lists of names of Chinese forced labourers, collect
their remains, and return them to China. The handing-over ceremony
for the ninth set of remains received renewed attention in 1964.103 The
Hanaoka Massacre gradually faded from the memories of the Chinese
people but was revived by Japanese leftists during the protests against
the renewal of the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1970. The
Chinese media gave in-depth coverage to how friendly Japanese groups
had investigated the crimes of Japanese militarists in Hanaoka.104
101
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Dongjing Huaqiao Minbao jielu Riben fandongpai touxiang qianxi
cengcansha woguo shibinggongren’ [Tokyo Huaqiao Minbao revealed Japanese reactionary
killed Chinese soldiers and workers before surrender], 14 April 1950; Xinhua Ribao,
‘Wobei qiuzai Riben zuokugong’ [I was taken prisoner [and became a] forced labourer in
Japan], 18 April 1950.
102
See, for example, Renmin Ribao articles: ‘Woguo xishengzai Ribende Kang Ri lieshi
yigu yunhui zuguo’ [The remains of martyrs who died in Japan had been carried back
to the motherland], 8 July 1953; ‘Gejie daibiao liangqianduoren zai Tianjin longzhong
juxingdahui’ [Around 2,000 representatives held a ceremonious meeting in Tianjing],
9 July 1953; ‘Riben junguozhuyi de tao tian zuixing—‘Huagang canan’ [The atrocity of
Japanese military—‘Hanaoka Massacre’], 8 July 1953.
103
For example, Renmin Ribao articles, ‘Wolieshi yigu jiaojieyishi zaijichang juxing’
[Handing-over ceremony of the martyrs’ remains was held in airport], 20 November
1964; ‘Huansong Riben husong Zhongguo lieshi yigu daibiaotuan’ [Send off [for the] Japanese
delegation which escorted the remains of Chinese martyrs home], 27 November 1964.
The handing-over ceremony in other years also received some media attention. See,
for example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben “Zhongguo xunnan lieshi mingdan pengchi daibiao tuan”
daoda Tianjin’ [Japanese delegation, bringing Chinese martyrs’ list of names, arrives
at Tianjin], 3 June 1961.
104
For example, Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben liang youhao tuanti zuzhi Huagang canan diaocha’
[Two Japanese friendly groups investigate Hanaoka Massacre], 12 November 1970.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1743
Above all, before the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship,
talking about the war and dealing with the legacies of the war were
inevitable when the Chinese and Japanese met.
Lastly, if any friendship event went too far and upset the
Chinese people, they would react strongly. Their animosity was not
suppressed—in fact, they were able to air it publicly, and this was faced
squarely by the Chinese Communist Party leaders. According to the
memoirs of some of the cadres who were in charge of Japanese affairs,
such as Wu Xuewen and Sun Pinghua, the resistance of the Chinese
people to friendship with Japan was fairly strong. For example, Wu
recalled that in Shenyang, when some citizens saw Japanese delegates,
they would stare at them angrily. Even the cadres, including Wu
himself, would feel resentful when they heard Japanese delegates
casually using words like ‘Shina’ (an old Japanese word for China)
and ‘Manchu’.105
A vivid example to illustrate this resulted from the trouble caused
by the Japanese flag. A Japanese products exhibition was held in
Beijing in 1956. Zhou Enlai recalled that ‘a very big Japanese flag
was hung in the exhibition hall in Beijing Hotel ... which gave me a
strong impression. This was the very first time Chinese people saw
the Japanese flag after the foundation of PRC.’106 This triggered
painful memories of the misery inflicted by the Japanese invasion.
Many Beijing citizens made violent objections to the office in charge
of the exhibition. Posters depicting Japanese flags were torn down as
well. According to the records of a Japanese member of staff, similar
105
Wu, X. (2002). Fengyu yinqing wosuo jinglide Zhong Ri guanxi [Sino-Japanese
relations I experienced], Shijiezhishi chubanshe, Beijing, p. 17. Sun also said,
‘Japanese militarism’s long-term occupation and governance left countless painful
memories among people. After the foundation of [the] PRC, the party took many
opportunities to find explanations and conducted internationalism education . . .
People’s image of Japanese was still negative . . . The job of explanation and education
were especially difficult to carry out in the rural areas which were devastated by
the iron heels of Japanese militarists.’ Sun, P. (1986), Zhong Ri youhao suixianglu
[Memoirs about Sino-Japanese friendship], Liaoning renmin chubanshe, Shenyang,
p. 8.
106
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi
(1990). Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic works of Zhou Enlai],
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, Beijing, p. 415. The Japanese were also sensitive
to the fact that this was the very first time Chinese people had seen the Japanese
flag after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. An incident in which
a Japanese flag was damaged by rain was reported in the Japanese media; see, for
example, Asahi Shinbun, ‘Pekinno Nihon Shohin Mihonichi’ [Beijing’s Japanese Trade
Fair], 8 October 1956.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1744
CHAN YANG
scenes occurred in Guangzhou and Wuhan in 1958, where Japanese
merchandise exhibitions were also held. Many citizens posted their
queries and complaints regarding the Japanese flag in the message
box at the event or sent them to a news agency. A factory cadre who
was obliged to visit the exhibition lost control of his emotions when he
saw the flag and started describing through his tears how his brother
was killed by the Japanese imperial army.107
The Chinese Communist Party leaders were, of course, aware of
the sentiments of the Chinese people and the potential dangers
surrounding them. Zhou Enlai once again instructed the cadres to
‘distinguish [between] Japanese militarists and Japanese people’, and
the cadres, in turn, made great efforts to educate the masses. Also, the
People’s Liberation Army was deployed to guard the exhibition halls
in case any physical threat was posed by the Chinese people. When
Prime Minister Tanaka visited China in 1972, paper flowers instead
of Japanese flags were used to greet his delegation, the purpose of
which was to avoid triggering people’s resentment.108 Nonetheless, the
Chinese Communist Party never attempted to forcefully suppress the
Chinese people’s sentiments and consistently showed understanding.
It confined its efforts to redirecting the Chinese people’s anger to a
small group of Japanese militarists and to convincing the people to
accept its diplomatic missions with Japan.
After the two nations normalized their relationship in September
1972, the Sino-Japanese friendship in both the official and non-official
spheres became mainstream. Remarks made by Chinese leaders in
public about Japan were mostly about how to learn lessons from
Japan’s economic reconstruction.109 Still, the Chinese Communist
Party leaders did not see Japan, as a completely trustworthy friend
107
Cai, C. (2002). ‘Hongdong Beijing de diyici Riben shangpin zhanlanhui’ [The first
sensational Japanese products exhibition in Beijing], Zonghen, 12; Senjin, Z. (1988).
‘Renmin shizenyang duidai taiyangqide—Ri Zhong jingji duanjiao xianchang baogao’ [How
people dealt with the Japanese flag—an account of when China and Japan severed
their economic relations], in Baigen, Z. Zhanhou Ri Zhong maoyishi, Liaoning renmin
chubanshe, Shenyang, pp. 52–55.
108
Cai, ‘Hongdong Beijing’; Liu, Zhanhou Zhong Ri guanxi, p. 267. Gao, F. (2012).
‘Bunengyong ganqing daiti zhengce—Zhong Ri fujiaoqian Zhongguo zhengfu duiminzhongde
shuifu jiaoyu’ [We cannot use emotion to replace rationality; the Chinese government
persuades and educates the Chinese people before Sino-Japanese normalization],
Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu, 5.
109
Mao and Zhou’s public speeches about Japan decreased after Sino-Japanese
normalization. In the early stage of Deng Xiaoping’s era, he paid great attention to
Japan’s economic miracle and mentioned the success of the People’s Liberation Army
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1745
but instead, pragmatically, as a partner in the camp of capitalist
countries.110 Thus, occasionally, warnings of Japanese militarist
resurgence can be observed. For example, a Japanese right-wing
organization Seirankai, founded in 1973 by a group of pro-Taiwan Diet
members, held several national meetings in places like Tokyo (on 26
January 1974) and Nagoya (on 10 March 1974). Apart from reporting
these meetings, the Chinese media also criticized its members for
being resurgent militarists. Similarly, in the same year the House of
Representatives passed the Bill of Yasukuni Shrine, which also alerted
Chinese officials to the danger of a Japanese military resurgence.111
Nevertheless, these reports would normally suggest that these were
the actions of a small group of right-wing Japanese, acting against the
will of the Japanese people, left-wing parties, and even the Liberal
Democratic Party regime.
The discussion above shows that before 1972, based on their
‘innocent Japanese people theory’, the Chinese Communist Party
leaders made great efforts to persuade themselves, their cadres, as
well as the Japanese and Chinese people that, although the war should
not be forgotten, developing the Sino-Japanese friendship could—and
should—be carried out. The war was also consistently remembered by
the Chinese Communist Party leaders, the Chinese people, and the
Japanese people during friendly encounters between China and Japan,
although in a much softer manner (in comparison to the vigorous
manner in which Japanese militarist-bashing activities were carried
out when the Sino-Japanese inter-governmental relationship was
poor).
during the Fifteen-year War in his speeches, which were targeting Chinese domestic
audiences. Deng, X. (1994). Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Vol. 2 [Selected works of Deng
Xiaoping], Renmin chubanshe, Beijing.
110
For example, when asked in 1974 ‘Do you believe the view of peace advocated by
the Japanese?’ Mao answered, ‘We believe it now, but the future is difficult to judge.’
Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, p. 606.
111
Xinhua Ribao, ‘Riben yixiaocuo fanhua shili youzai chundong’ [A handful of Japanese
anti-PRC forces carried out disruptive activities again], 2 February 1974; Renmin
Ribao, ‘Rizhongyouxie fabiao shengming qianglie fandui fandongde “Jingguoshenshe faan”’
[Japan-China friendship association made a statement to strongly protest against
the reactionary Yasukuni Shrine Bill], 26 April 1974; Renmin Ribao, ‘Riben zhongyuan
qiangxing tongguo fandong de “Jingguoshenshe faan”’ [Japanese House of Representatives
coercively passed the Bill of Yasukuni Shrine], 27 May 1974.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
1746
CHAN YANG
Conclusion
The history of the Fifteen-year War was an ‘indispensable element’
in the relationship between China and Japan before 1982. When
inter-governmental relations between China and Japan were bad,
remembering the Fifteen-year War was vigorously pursued. However,
the war was also consistently referred to when Sino-Japanese relations
were friendly, as a way of reaching out to the Japanese left. What is
more, the history of the Fifteen-year War was not a forbidden topic
when good Sino-Japanese inter-governmental relations were enjoyed
during the periods of the Hatoyama cabinet, the second half of the
Ikeda cabinet, and after Sino-Japanese normalization. The slogan,
‘We should distinguish the majority of kind Japanese people from a
handful of evil Japanese militarists’ allowed the Chinese Communist
Party regime great diplomatic flexibility to both attack the Japanese
conservative government (when remembering the war was an asset),
and pursue friendship with Japan (when remembering the war was
not a barrier).
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party regime did not always
take the initiative. As shown in this article, the regime was sometimes
forced to take action against the legacies of the Fifteen-year War,
such as harnessing the Chinese people’s anti-Japanese sentiment and
reassuring those Japanese visitors who felt guilty about their country’s
wartime aggression. Just as happens today, remembering the Fifteenyear War was also a double-edged sword for the Chinese Communist
Party regime, but despite this, it was not deliberately avoided nor
suppressed by the regime. In short, before 1982, war remembrance
activities were not as prevalent as they are currently, but nevertheless,
the war was well remembered in mainland China (and at certain
times, it was even central to the public life). Although the Chinese
Communist Party regime significantly manipulated remembrance
of the Fifteen-year War, as a whole it was a joint enterprise
between the Chinese government, the Chinese people, and visiting
Japanese.
Finally, the perspective adopted in this article is that of both central
as well as local Chinese government and is largely based on Chinese
official sources: direct accounts from Chinese people and the Japanese
side of the events described in this article are not fully included. Thus,
there is more work to be done to provide a full picture of the situation
before 1982.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311
ROLE OF WAR HISTORY IN PRC’S DIPLOMACY
1747
Furthermore, apart from being an important element in the Chinese
Communist Party regime’s diplomatic practice vis-a-vis Japan, the
history of the Fifteen-year War was also utilized in other fields. For
example, as mentioned in this article, when criticizing ‘American
imperialists’, Japanese wartime atrocities were often raised by the
regime. Similarly, the history of the Fifteen-year War was entangled
with various domestic affairs in mainland China during the period as
well. For instance, commemorative activities held on Fifteen-year War
memorial days were closely related to domestic issues, such as national
identity construction and public education. Although treatment of the
history of the Fifteen-year War in these fields is only lightly touched
upon in this article, it definitely deserves further exploration.
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 88.99.165.207, on 18 Jun 2017 at 21:38:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X15000311