Subversion
dissent:
Where ASIO draws the line
Jenny Hocking
he Tribune o f 22 Ju ne , 1983 Tribunal's perception of the C PA as a envisaged by Dr. Cairns bears a
reported the findings earlier that
non-subversive organisation, A SIO striking resemblance to that promoted
m onth of the Security Appeals m ay nevertheless continue to consider by the C om m unist Party of Australia";
Tribunal, concerning the appeal made
the C PA as "relevant to security" in his views "echo the current view of the
by Stephen Rix against a n adverse
terms of its security records.
C om m unist Party of Australia".1
security assessment given by A SIO
W hat follows is a clarification of the A S I O ' s a n a l y s i s o f C a i r n s '
(the Australian Security Intelligence areas o f political activity seen by ASIO participation in protest movements
O r g a n i s a t i o n ) d u r i n g R ix 's
as "relevant to security" for the concluded that this sort of activity
employment with the D ep artm ent of purposes of its security files, and an could lead "to the growth of elitism in
T rade an d Resources. Rix had been a assessment of the criteria on which every sphere, to the m anipulation of
m em ber o f the C om m unist Party of these files are maintained.
people by demagogues, to the fascist
Australia since 1980, and it was on that
cult o f the personality, to the worship
n 22 Ju ne, 1974, the weekly o f force, and to the destruction of the
ground alone that A SIO had denied
■ m magazine The Bulletin printed democratic system of government and
him a positive security assessment —
a n a r tic le tille d " C a ir n s : its replacement by a form of
A S IO declared the C P A a subversive
A SIO 's startling dossier", which collectivism .... That way ties Anarchy
organisation and Rix, as a member,
contained extracts from an assessment and in due course left-wing f a s c i s m . j
was considered a security risk.
by A S IO o f the then deputy Prime
The Security Appeals Tribunal
Minister, Dr. Jim Cairns. This report,
The publication of this article raised
reached a la nd-m ark decision in its
which had "fallen into the han ds" of two im portant questions: what criteria
findings tha t the C P A is not a
The Bulletin's Canberra c orresp on d­ was A SIO using as the basis for it&
subversive organisation within the
ent, had been written in 1971 a t the
meaning of the 1979 A SIO Act, and
maintenance of security files on
height of the anti-Viet N am war individuals or groups; and how
from this, thal membership of the
dem onstrations, and provided an adequate was the degree o f ministerial
C P A cann ot in itself be accepted as the
invaluable insight into A S IO 'sattitu d e
b asis for a n eg a tiv e s e c u rity
control of A SIO if A SIO was in a
tow ards this type of p o pu la r dissent, p o s i t i o n s e le c tiv e ly to disclose)
assessment. As the Tribune pointed
out, these findings "should go a long
its perception o f the nature of liberal- in t e llig e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n it had
w ay to r e m o v in g u n w a r r a n t e d
dem ocracy and its corresponding collected on members of a political!
conception of activities and ideologies party. However, the p oor standard ol f
impediments to the careers of people
which presented a threat to the the dossier's political analysis (referred |
given adverse security assessments by
to by The Age as "speculative,
viability of a democracy. The dossier's
A S I O " . H o w e v e r , th e S e c u r ity
Appeais Tribunal placed an im portant
assessment of Dr. Cairns was based exaggerated and paranoic"3) caused J
rider on its decision: "that o ur findings
largely on his writings and public widespread cond em nation of ASIO’s I
statements. It claimed that Cairns held "political illiteracy" rather than of us
do not, a n d indeed could not, in any
a " p o p u l i s t - t y p e t h e o r y " w h ic h m aintenance o f the lile itself. Hit
way affect the exercise of the functions
public concern expressed over the:,
a d v o c a te d g e n e ra tin g e x tra of (A SIO ) under section 17 o f the Act
parliam entary opposition lo the nature o f the docum ent and the
to obtain, correlate and evaluate
parliam entary system itself through political use to which it had been put^
intelligence relevant to security ... "
the developm ent of protest and dissent provided the federal Labor govern-,^
Section 17 of the A S IO Act relates
movements. Several references were ment with a politically opportune
to ASIO's m aintenance of security
made in the assessment to perceived m om en t at which to institute a judicss
files, from which, in turn, its security
similarities between Cairns' beliefs and i n q u i r y i n t o t h e a c t i v i t i e s of|
assessments derive. Clearly then, the
Security Appeals Tribunal was quite those of the C om m unist Party of Australia's security organisations. Tl
explicit in its view that, despite the Australia: "the kind of socialism editorial referred to above argued 1
J
j
38
A u s t r a l ia n L eft R eview 8S
and political
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O ff
strongly f o r th is i n q u i r y , a n d
concluded that "the affair underlines
the need fo r a th o ro ug h inquiry into
activities and operations of A SIO , a
clearer definition of its p ro p e r role,
and the establishment o f effective
safeguards against the abuse of its
powers". The subsequent establish­
ment, in August 1974, of the Royal
Commission on Intelligence and
S ecu rity w a s t h e r e f o r e n o t
unexpected. T he then Prim e Minister,
Mr, Whitlam, had included the
establishment o f such an inquiry in his
1974 pre-election policy speech, and it
had been rum ou red intermittently that
an inquiry was imminent ever since the
Labor government first assumed office
in 1972.
Spring 1 96 4
Commission would suggest radical
changes in the operations and
accountability of Australia's security
services, and possibly even the
abolition of some o f these operations.
S p e c u la tio n th a t th e R o y a l
he
Royal Commission on Commission would result in at least a
Intelligence and Security was m ajor administrative reorganisation
established at a time of some o f s e c u r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s w a s
turbulence in governm ent and security
strengthened by the announcem ent
relations, following not only the that Mr. Justice Hope, a New South
immediate m a tte r of ASIO's security Wales Suprem e C ourt judge, would be
file on the d e pu ty Prime Minister, but heading the Royal Commission. Hope
also the m uch earlier "raid" o f ASIO 's was considered "an acknowledged
M elbourne
headquarters by the small-1 liberal", "a c ham pion o f civil
federal L a b o r A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l, liberties"4, and had been very active in
Sen ator Lionel M urp hy , in 1973. This civil liberties issues before going to the
tu rb u le n c e
underscored
t h e bench. This 'libertarian" profile has
e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e R o y a l since been irrevocably damaged.
Expectations of the Royal
Commission on Intelligence
and Security
r
39
The prospect of the inquiry being
highly critical of the security services
was further bolstered by continuing
revelations of the widespread abuses
by security services overseas of their
p o w e r to u n d e r t a k e o p e r a t i o n s
according to their own determ inations
of "national security". The lesson of
the earlier M urphy "raid" of ASIO
highlighted the problems associated
with a lack of accountability in these
crucial security determinations.
The e x p e c te d , in te rre la te d
recom m endations of the Hope report
regarding the resolution of these
security issues were tha t —
• A S I O w o u ld be m a d e m o r e
accountable to the minister in charge
of it, there would be an increase in
policy guidance from the government
to A SIO and the setting of strict
priorities in its operations.
•A S IO 's role and functions would be
more clearly defined to avoid any
extension o f its activities into areas not
relevant to national security.
O n these matters, in particular, Hope's
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s w e re e n ti r e ly
unexpected.
The Report of the Royal
Commission on Intelligence
and Security
he long-awaited inquiry into
Australia's security services was
finally establihsed in August
1974. with very broad terms
re fe re n c e w h ich d e m a n d e d an
e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n s ,
stru c tu re and c o -o rd in a tio n of
Australia's intelligence organisations,
of which the m ajor ones considered
w ere th e J o i n t In te llig e n c e
O rganisation (JIO ), the Australian
Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS),
and ASIO . The commission's fourth
report dealt specifically with A SIO
and provided an overall review of its
operations. It is this fo urth report
which will be principally discussed
here and referred to simply as the
"Hope report". The essential part of
Hope's terms of reference for this
report were: "in the light of past
experience, an d having regard to the
security of Australia as a nation, the
rig h ts a n d re s p o n s ib ilitie s of
individual persons, and future as well
as p r e s e n t n e e d s , to m a k e
recom m endations on the intelligence
and security services which the nation
should have available to it and o n the
J
40
of
-■11*1 iiwiifjab
.»>'• •V-
w a y in w h i c h t h e r e l e v a n t
organisations can most efficiently and
effectively serve the interests of the
A ustralian people and G o v e r n m e n t....
Critics o f the Hope report have
referred to it as "bizarre", "a d ocum ent
of stunning illogicality and frightening
implications", and "a com m entary
which anticipated the laissez-faire
government attitude to clandestine
services"6. Even those who accepted
the report's findings found it difficult
to reconcile its trenchant criticisms of
many aspects o f ASIO's operations
w ith its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,
nonetheless, to diminish ministerial
control over A S IO and to widen
A SIO 's legislative powers in several
crucial areas.
■'v
iti J-ifrrf
Hope's Criticisms of ASIO
W r ope found that "neither the
M M q u a l i t y n o r re lia b ility "
submissions and informatioi
supplied to him by A S IO was as "o
might have wished"7. The Roynl
Com missioner and his staff personal!]
exam ined hundreds o f A SIO fill
partly because A SIO 's own evident
could not be relied upon. O f thi
files, Hope com m ented that theextei
of their disorder was such that "I ha^
been quite unable to establish the trul
or otherwise of m any of the particulai
of matters alleged in evidence,
raised by A S IO as the result of othe
inquiries"8. Hope also found t
A S IO had in the past departed from
A u s t r a lia n L eft Review 89
'principles of propriety, including
legality, to which A SIO should have
regard in fulfilling its functions"9. In
some areas, he continued, "its
operations were or may have been in
breach of the law"10. F urther criticism
was levelled against A SIO for leaking
its own intelligence information to
sections of the media: "ASIO has in the
past provided selected people with
security intelligence material for
publication"11. However, the report's
most strident criticism was reserved
for the operations of ASIO's Special
Projects Section which had been
disbanded prior to the writing of
Hope's report. The functions of this
section included taking action "to
build and maintain liaison with
selected contacts in a variety of fields,
including the m edia”*2. Hope referred
lo these functions as "im proper in the
extreme'". Raising another issue, he
noted tha t this impropriety was
exacerbated by ASIO's "tendency to
think of anyone they chose to call 'left
»mg' as subversive"IJ.
the past. H o p e ’s com m ents on ASIO's
past abuses set the tone and
perspective o f his report. "1 have taken
the view ... that my task is to make
recom m endations for the future rather
than lo seek to track dow n the truth or
otherwise o f past errors .... " I4.
do
not propose to deal with ASIO's
transgressions in detail. This report is
concerned with the future rather than
the past and to point to what should
happen in the future."15 Justice Hope
apparently felt that evidence of
A SIO 's past misdeeds had little
bearing on the realism or practicality
of his recommendations, and his
com m ents con trast starkly with his
terms of reference which specified that
his recom m endations were to be m ade
"in the light of past experience".
The main area o f the Hope report's
discussions and recom m endations to
be examined in detail here concerns
A SIO 's criteria for the maintenance of
security records, a n d in particular its
understanding ot "subversion".
Subversion: Hope's View
Clearly the maintenance by A S IO of
files on the basis of people being ''left
wing" r a t h e r t h a n g e n u i n e l y
subversive, introduces the possibility
that ASIO could maintain files on a
purely political basis which could then
be leaked to selected contacts in an
effort to discredit either a particular
political party or pressure group. The
document on Dr. Cairns compiled by
ASIO and leaked to The Bulletin can
be interpreted in this way, and Hope
does not dispute that A SIO has
misused its powers in such a m anner in
A S I O 's
p r i n c i p a l f u n c tio n .
Ju stice H ope co n sid ered ,
should be the protection of
Australia against four types of
a c tiv itie s : e s p io n a g e ; "activ e
measures" (the use of "agents of
influence", the dissemination of
"disinformation", an d "other forms of
clandestine or deceptive action");
sabotage and subversion.
Subversion is the most controversial
of the four principal activities listed
above, since the domestic variety
A l i o All.W C O M Pl^
ujrfH 7HB LAM L>
T h a t 's w w v e t e
Tie
Spring 1984
(H ope recognises two classes of
subversion, those involving "foreign
a c t iv iti e s " a n d th o s e in v o lv in g
"domestic activities") impinges so
closely on the legitimate activity of
political dissent. Unlike the other three
areas, which all involve the interaction
( in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s ) b e tw e e n
individuals and foreign governments
or foreign security organisations,
domestic subversion relates solely to
th e p o litic a l a c tiv itie s a n d
philosophies o f individuals "not
directed by, subsidised by or otherwise
undertaken in active collaboration
with a foreign power o r a foreign
political organisation"’6. Hope rightly
points out that at the "outer limit" o f
subversion — which "extends to the
mounting of arm ed revolution" —
id e n tif y in g s u b v e r s iv e a c t iv it ie s
presents few problems. The "inner
limit" is the area in which dissent and
subversion merge and which therefore
makes defining subversion not only
extremely difficult but also extremely
im portant.
The 1954 A SIO Act gave no
definition of subversion, and although
this neatly avoided the problem of
legislatively distinguishing between
subversion and political dissent, could
enable A SIO to impinge on legitimate
political behaviour and the expression
of political rights generally considered
essential to democratic practice. It was
the potential danger to democracy
which H ope cited in his reco m m end ­
ation for the inclusion of legislative
guidelines concerning subversion in
the A S IO Act.
There is an inherent potential danger o f
intrusion into proper political activity and
the resultant infringement o f basic
democratic and legal rights. Democracy
thrives on non-violent differences o f
opinion and attitudes and ASIO must be
careful to avoid mistaking mere dissent or
non-conformity fo r subversion.17
Hope suggested that the proposed
definition
of subversion should
include:
those activities which involve, or will
involve, or are intended ultimately to
involve, the use o f force or violence or
other unalwfulacts (whether by themselves
or others) fo r the purposes of:
(i) overthrowing the constitutional
government o f the Commonwealth o f
Australia or o f a State or Territory; or
(ii) Obstructing, hindering or interfering
with the taking o f measures by the
Commonwealth Government in the
interests o f the security o f Australia.
41
(H o pe notes that "security" here is
used in its c o m m o n and wider meaning
of "safety" and not in its statutory
sense as set out in the A SIO A ct.)T his
suggested definition has been criticised
largely on the grounds th a t it is too
broad, and certainly the second
purpose presents a vague area within
which A SIO 's discretion will continue
to o p e r a t e . H o w e v e r , H o p e 's
description of subversion confines
subversion
to criminal
offences
committed o r intended ultimately to
be committed (and as Hope points out,
this intention also constitutes a
criminal offence) with either of the
above two purposes. This element of
criminality does place a restriction on
the types of activities which A SIO may
legitimately consider subversive.
stated classes is foreseen o r the nature
o f the purpose or the ideology involves
that possibility, but not only the time
for their use but their use at all, even
though necessary to achieve that
purpose, has been left for future
d e c i s i o n " 19, ( m y e m p h a s i s )
special branches does not establish
that either the nation or its citizens’
liberties would be better provided for
if A S IO were not concerned with
s u b v e r s io n " ^ 0. T h is a s s e r tio n is
strongly disputed by the findings and
recom m endations of the White report.
Potential subversives
in particular presents
The Inquiry by Acting
Justice White Into the
Security Records of the
SA Special Branch
the possibility of
future conflict
between security
and political liberties.
he security role o f the special
brances of state police forces
h a s , u n t i l r e c e n t l y , been
extremely covert, The former So
A ustralian Premier, D on Dunstan,
has stated th at he was unaw are of the
existence of that state's special branch
until 1970, although he had been state
A ttorney-G eneral between 1965 and
1968.21 It was not until 1975 that
D u nstan was informed o f the nature of
sp e c ia l b r a n c h 's a c t i v i t i e s , and
s p e c if i c a lly o f th e c o -o p e ra tio n
between A SIO and special branch in
the m aintenance o f files on potential
o r a c t u a l s e c u r it y ris k s . That I
so m uch is now known of special .
branch operations is due to the
revelations of the White report,
established in S outh Australia in
N ovem ber 1977.
The conflict in S o uth Australia over I
its special branch was precipitated by ]
an article in The Australian on J I
Septem ber 1977, headed "Exposed,., I
th e S e c r e t P o l ic e D o s s ie r s on
D em onstrators". This article, co­
written by the Premier's former
executive assistant Peter Ward, i
claimed that:
r
n theory, this aspect of Hope's
definition removes the basis for
The am b it of this concept clearly
previous criticisms that A SIO 's use e n c o m p a s s e s t h o s e g r o u p s o r
o f the concept o f subversion hadindividuals with no history o f violence
extended to cover activities which
or criminality, and who m ay in fact
were lawful, non-violent a n d which
explicitly denounce such actions, yet
who (on the basis only of their ideas
were seen as subversive solely by virtue
of th e ir p o litic a l c o n te n t.
rather than their actions) may be
Unfortunately, this definition does not
nonetheless considered "potentially
remove the possibility th a t in practice
subversive" according to A SIO 's own
political analysis, an analysis which
A S IO m ay yet continue to consider
has already proved to be disarmingly
subversive anyone it perceives as left
superficial. The surveillance of, and
wing, as H ope noted had been its
maintenance of files on, alleged
tendency in the past. F o r although
"potential subversives" in themselves
Hope makes quite specific the
constitute an affront to the political
n a r r o w , leg al s e n s e in w h ic h
and
personal privacy o f those
subversive is to be understood, ASIO's
involved. But the impact o f this
prim ary use o f the term does not
vigilance is far more serious since these
require a precise legal opinion as to
w hether or not som eone is actually a
files form an essential c om po ne n t of
subversive, it requires only the A SIO 's "vetting" of applicants for
identification o f "known", "suspected" public service and defence force
or "potential" subversives. O f these
positions. A SIO 's vetting system has,
groups Hope writes: "the Governm ent
since the early 1950s, included all State special branches ostensibly collect
data to prevent "subversionBut those on
applicants
for clerical and professional file include many eminent lawyers, judges,
should expect that A S IO should look
at them and that some watch should be positions in the third division of the politicians, academics, journalists, and top
kept u pon their activities"18. "Potential
public service, regardless of whether or public servants ... Within each state they
subversives" in particular presents the
not they would actually have access to act as a "mini-AS/O". and the way they
possibility of future conflict between c la s s if ie d i n f o r m a t i o n in th o s e operate and collect data is entirely ■
positions. H ope does not specify the interchangeable with ASIO.21
s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s a n d p o li tic a l
liberties, for Hope's description o f this role o f state police special b ranches in
Following the repeated claims is
th is v e ttin g sy stem , n o r th e
term m arks a transition from the
maintenance by them of extensive tha t p a p e r that special brand
assessment o f actual or intended
criminal action, to an interpretation of security records which are used in m a i n t a i n e d " p o l i t i c a l files',
providing security checks for ASIO. and continued questioning of the
the likelihood of this action from
The relationship between A S IO and governm ent on the issue in parliament, !
a g iv e n id e o lo g y . " P o t e n t i a l l y
subversive" describes "those persons special branches, the nature o f special the Cabinet on 7 November 1971
branch security records, are all approved the a p p o in tm e n t of Mi
or organisations who have merely a
revelations of the White report to be Acting Justice White to conduct an
"contem plation" in respect o f these
actions ... mere contem plation exists discussed below. One of H ope's few inquiry into the nature and extent pf
when persons have a purpose or com m ents explicitly linking A SIO the records m aintained by the state's
espouse an ideology in which the and special branch activities, is that special branch. The terms of reference
possibility of the use o f acts within the "the m aterial before me a b o u t police given to White specified the criteria
/
42
A u s t r a lia n L eft Review (9
which the government considered to,
he th e p r o p e r b a s i s f o r t h e
maintenance of security files, and
White was asked to determ ine the
extent to which special branch files
complied with these criteria, and to
report o n what other criteria were used
to d e t e r m i n e th e r e c o r d i n g of
information by special branch.
Although these terms of reference
were quite explicit, White interpreted
t h e m b r o a d l y , a n d in t h a t
interpretation lies the importance of
assessing his report in relation to the
Hope report. The m utual bearing of
these reports on each other can be seen
from White's description of the scope
of his findings:
nn report explores two subjects which at
first sight might not appear to he directly
relevant to the terms o f reference —first,
the concept o f domestic subversion and the
application o f that concept to particular
cases and, second, the relationships
between the A ustralian Security
Intelligence Organisation and Special
Branches o f Stale Police Forces, and
between the E x e c u tiv e and the
Commissioner .... Special Branch records
can only be understood within the wider
framework o f ASIO policy and records
and the history o f liaison between Special
Branch and ASIO. In turn, ASIO's policy
and records are influenced by those o f
other friendly powers. My principal
concern about Special Branch records was
the width o f its interpretation o f "domestic
subversion", an interpretation obviously
influenced by ASIO and by the Federal
Bureau o f Investigation o f the United
States.13
1 W ~ \ unstan received White's report
I M M a i the end o f 1977. As he was
ab o u t to leave S outh Australia
for a short holiday, he "looked at it
briefly, realised that it was pretty hairraising, and locked it away until 1
returned to the office in the New
Year".24 Even the introduction to the
report was "hair-raising". In it White
summarised his major findings:
I found there a hard core o f genuine
security intelligence material, substantially
conforming with the criteria, relating to
extremist left-wing and right-wing
organisations and persons reasonably
suspected o f being potential security risks
in the security areas o f espionage,
terrorism, sabotage and subversion.
However, I also fo u n d there a mass o f
records (indeed, the greater part o f Special
Branch records) relating to matters,
organisations and persons having no
Connection whatsoever with genuine
Spring 198 4
security risks, A significant proportion o f
thefiles relates to political, trade union and
other sensitive matters. Grave difficulties
have been encountered in past attempts to
define domestic subversion and grave
mistakes have been made by Special
Branch in attempting to apply vague and
erroneous concepts to particular
organisations, persons and activities,2S
The report accepted Hope's view
that com m unists are to be seen as
security risks "on the grounds of
reasonable suspicion of ihe likelihood
that they might ultimately commit acts
of espionage and subversion when in a
position to do so". The various
comm unist parties therefore m ade up
the largest areas of legitimate concern
for special branch records. O f the
remaining categories, for which the
holding of inform ation was not
justified. W hite noted that files were
maintained on: "All A L P candidates
and elected mem bers .... There are no
corresponding files a b o u t Liberal
Party or C o un try Party personalities";
on unions: "There is an arm ful o f files
a b o u t the ACTU": on dem onstrators:
"M ost of this information seems
irrelevant to security purposes"; on
peace movements: "Most, if not all, of
the activity (on file) was peaceful and
non-subversive. Even prayer meetings
for peace were watched and recorded."
on ihe Council for Civil Liberties: "All
of the mem bers .... are on file .... Long
before the Council was formed, the
public utterances o f many prom inent
persons who advocated any form of
civil rights or liberties were indexed.
selected because the organisation or
situation, in which they were when
t h e y c a m e u n d e r n o tic e , w as
considered by Special Branch to be
potentially subversive per se, a
ju d g m e n t m ade on unsound criteria,
which were laid down long ago. and
continued uncritically, without review
by higher ranking officers sensitive to
policy matters''.27
O f sp ecial b r a n c h 's g en eral
consideration of "subversive" (which
will be discussed fully below) White
noted that
organisations and persons were conceived
to be "left wing", and suspected by Special
Branch o f holding or supporting
”subversive" views by reason only o f the
fact that such organisations or persons
adopted policies or opinions which were
"radical" or “to the left* o f an arbitrary
centre point fixed by someone in Special
Branch. I have no doubt that the arbitrary
centre point was established b\ Special
Branch with the assistance o f ASIO 2S
the activity (on file)
It was because o f this link between
A SIO and special branch that the
nature of ihe latter's files is so
significant, for the in fo rm a tio n
contained in these files provided the
basis fo r A SIO 's vetting system and
flows beyond this to ihe security
services with which ASIO conducts
inform ation
exchange.
Although
much o f the material White uncovered
m ay apear in itself innocuous, it does
not remain so when considered in
conjunction with ASIO's records and
the use to which they are put. The
corollary of this is that ASIO's records
can likewise not be assessed in
isolation from the nature of the special
branch records which provide them
wilh subsidiary information.
was peaceful and
Subversion: White's View
non-subversive. Even
prayer meetings for
■
"Most, if not all, of
peace were watched
and recorded."
In all. there were a b o u t 40.000 index
cards (opened on anyone who "came
under notice"), and ab ou t 28,500
o f these referred to individuals. While
describes this process of "coming
under notice": "Such persons were
f
\ ne of the m ajor areas of
m divergence between the White
and Hope reports concerns the
interpretations of "subversion", and
the extent to which this term provides
a legitimate basis for surveillance.
White expresses "some reservations"
a b o u t Hope's suggested definition of
subversion. Although he accepts
Hope's emphasis on the potential or
actual use of force o r violence as the
standard against which an assessment
of any actions as subversive should be
predicated. White mirrored several
criticisms already mentioned in his
43
view th at Hope's failure to specify any
criteria for determining "the interests
of the security of Australia'' was quite
inappropriate. White's own view is, in
line with that implied by his terms of
r e f e r e n c e , " t h a t th e t h r e a t o f
immediate o r ultimate force or
violence must be the touchstone which
d is tin g u is h e s le g itim a te from
illegitimate political activity".29 This
tenet is consistently used thro ug ho ut
his report as the criterion on which
W h ite a s s e s se s s p e c ia l b r a n c h 's
determ ination of groups or individuals
as security risks, and was also the
criterion referred to by the Security
Appeals Tribu nal in their findings
concerning Stephen Rix's appeal.
A lthough
there is substantia!
similarity in the approaches to
subversion presented in these two
re p o rts, th ro u g h th e ir m u tu al
concentration on the "threat of
im mediate or ultimate force or
v io le n c e " , H o p e 's c a te g o r ie s o f
legitimate subject m atter for security
r e c o r d s a r e s ig n if ic a n t ly m o re
expansive th an White's. This is so
because Hope's view o f subversive
actions as those which may ultimately
involve the use of force or violence, is
repeatedly qualified by W hite who
introduces an additional criterion of
"reasonable suspicion" tha t force or
violence may ultimately be involved.
Hope's description of legitimate areas
f o r s e c u r ity r e c o r d s is f u r t h e r
expanded by his inclusion of the
category of "potential subversion"
which perceives incipient violence
according to A SIO 's analysis of the
likelihood o f violence from a group's
or a n individual's ideology.
Although W hite does not refer
specifically to Hope's description of
"potential subversion", he does note
t h a t " p e r i p h e r a l s e c u r ity r is k s"
constitute "too subtle a n exercise for
any Special Branch o f a State Police
F o r c e t o u n d e r t a k e " , 30 T h e
implication th rou gh ou t the White
report is that any action which is not
expressly violent o r which does not
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of
future violence, is not a n area for
s p e c ia l b r a n c h s e c u r ity r e c o r d s
concern.
The dangers implicit in the "subtle
exercise" o f identifying legitimate
areas of security surveillance from
Hope's "inner limit" o f subversion are
c le a r ly d o c u m e n t e d by W h ite 's
f in d i n g s . T h e q u e s t i o n r e m a in s
whether these dangers (to personal
44
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
special branch security records
in it ia l
REPORT
TO
l * - “
"OOtVfAV.
privacy, to political expression, to the
practical workings of democratic
principles) are justifiably risked by the
security benefits which flow from the
collection of information on groups
and individuals not yet reasonably
suspected of incipient violence or
subversion. These threats are posed
not only because o f the m aintenance of
files on the basis of an obsolete notion
ol subversion , but a ls o because of
the dissemination o f information thus
collected being determined by ASIO
w ithout any ministerial oversight. 0«
o f th e a r e a s
w h ic h
Hope
recom mended should be relieved <S
ministerial control and which was lats
enacted in the 1979 A SIO Act was
''Whether, to whom, and in whil
m an ner any intelligence held by ASlOi
A u s t r a l ia n L eft R eview I
should be com m unciated".31 It is this
provision fo r A S I O 's o p e r a t i v e
in d e p e n d e n c e w h ich a c tu a lly
translates the m aintenance of files on
"peripheral security risks" into a
potential area of political misuse of
security information. In his speech to
1ilhc House o f Assembly on 7 February,
| 1978 on the White report, D unstan
referred to an incident which provides
evidence of the existence of precisely
I Ihis type of political manipulation.
actual, o r a reasonable suspicion of,
potential violence, could (particularly
where there exists an ineffectual
ministerial control of the security
organisation) give rise to such specific
p o l i t i c a l use o f a t le a s t t h e
organisation's information, if not of
the organisation itself. The bro ader a
perception of subversion is, the more
speculative must be the determination
of specific instances of subversion, and
the m ore imprecise is the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate
political activity.
In the instance described above, the
speculative net had been cast so widely
that it encompassed not only extraparliam entary dissent movements,
iu t also those parties or individuals
A'ho circulated ideas within the
parliamentary sphere, which were to
the left of A SIO 's "centre point".
References
1. "Cairns: ASIO's Startling Dossier”, The
Bulletin. 22.6.74:9-1 I.
2. ibid.: 11
3. The Age 21.6.74:9
4. The Sydney Morning Herald 17,3.76:6
5. Hope, Justice Robert, The Royal
Commission on Intelligence <S. Security,
4ih report, vol. I (Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra, I977):3
6. Booker, Malcolm, Imsi Quarter
(Melbourne University Press, Melbourne
1978):4; Nation Review, 27 October
"The Analysis"
1975:10: New Statesman, 4 March 1983:13
7. Hope, Justice Robert op.cit.:6
A t the hearings of the Royal
8. ibih.-.l
jCM Commission on Intelligence
9. ibid. .IQ
I
and Security in July 1975, a
10. ibid. -.72
i Sydney journalist, Robert Mayne,
11. ibid.-.m
gave evidence that A SIO files on five
12. ibid.:130
'left wingers" had been made available
to him five years earlier by the leader
13. ibid.: 131
of the NSW Liberal opposition, Peter The Implications for Political
14. ibid .:7
; Coleman, These files were to be used
15. ibid. :71
Liberties
1 as the basis for articles in a new
16. ibid. .4 \
magazine a im e d s p e c if ic a lly a t
17.
ibid. :38
he events which have been
1 d isc re d itin g r a d i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s
18.
ibid.: 48-49
(including members o f the A L P) and
d escrib ed abo v e, to g e th e r
highlight the potential abuse of 19. ibid.:44
political organisations (including the
Vietnam M ora to rium C am paign).32
political rights presented by the use20.ofibid. \55
1 This evidence was not new; it had first a broad and ill-defined notion of
21. South Australian Parliamentary
been raised in M arch 1973 by the subversion as one of the criteria on Debates. December 14, 1977:1361
National Times which disclosed that in which security files are maintained.
22. The Australian 3.9.77:1
September 1971, Mayne, Colem an, an A S I O 's d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f " n o n ASIO officer Ernest Redford, and a subversive" political behaviour has 23. White, Acting Justice, Special Branch
Security Records Report (S o u th
Sydney businessman Peter Warren, been shown as not only based in its
A ustralian Government Publishers.
met to discuss the proposed magazine own entrenched bias, but as also Adelaide. 1977):3
called The Analysis, for which Mayne c om pounded by the secrecy which
24. Dunstan, Don, Felicia: Ihe Political
was offered S I,000 a year to prepare surrounds its activities and which,
Memoirs o f Don Dunstan (MacMillan
material on the basis of information particularly since the enactm ent of the Australia Ptv. Ltd.. Melbourne, I981):285
supplied to him by A S IO ,33 Coleman 1979 A S I O A c t, p r o v id e s for
25. White, acting Justice, op.cit.:9
persistently denied having ever seen i n a d e q u a t e s u p e r v i s i o n o f its
26.
ibid.: 12-14,
any personal A SIO files, although he operations.
The clear misconception of our 27. ibid.: 18
admitted that he had registered the
name The Analysis at that time, and security services as to the nature of 28. ibid.: 10
that he had been shown some ASIO dem ocracy and the integral role of 29. ibid.:24
material.M D unstan raised this m atter public dissent and agitation within it, 30. ibid.
in parliament soon after the release o f is cause for substantial concern. It is
31. Hope. Justice Robert, op.cit.: 173
the White report because one of those particularly revealing that the bulk of
32.
South Australian Parliamentary
five files handed to Mayne had been the security records which White
Debates
ibid,: 1370
that of a prom inent S o uth Australian. considered were "not legitimately” the
Dusntan claimed tha t this file was one subject m atter o f special branch files, 33. The National Times, 13-18 February,
1978: 7-8
of the South Australian special branch comprised the activities of people and
34.
ibid.
files maintained for purely political organisations concerned with political
and
social
issues
a
t
a
largely
extrareasons, and that this incident
indicated the chain of inform ation p arliam entary level. At a time of
exchange between special branch and growing political "consensus", with its
ASIO. The importance of recounting c o r o l l a r y o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g
Jenny Hocking is a post-graduate
this episode is that it presents an marginalisation of political activity
student at the University o lS ydney,
empirical foundation to the concern outside that consensus, the left should
writing a thesis on the Hilton
not
become
com
placent
a
b
o
u
t
the
expressed th ro ughout the White
bom bing and Australia's anti­
report, that the maintenance of everyday workings of Australia's
terrorism legislation.
■ security files on a basis other than domestic security services.
r
Spring 1984
45