2014 한국국제정치학회 연례학술회의
A Siege Mentality of North Korea : Socio-Political
Analyses on Foreign Policies of Kim Jong Un Regime
김보미
(중앙대학교)
A Siege Mentality of North Korea : Socio-Political Analyses on Foreign Policies of Kim Jong Un Regime | 김보미
A Siege Mentality of North Korea :
Socio-Political Analyses on Foreign Policies of Kim Jong Un Regime
Bomi Kim (Chung-Ang University)
1. Introduction: What is a Siege Mentality?
This research paper will examine what a siege mentality means, and how it works
in North Korea, especially how the siege mentality is represented in foreign policies
of Kim Jong Un regime. To be specific, the research will look through how North
Korean government has been utilizing a siege belief in order to mobilize its people
and promote social cohesion and how this belief greatly helps to promote stability
and governance of the regime.
What is a “siege mentality”? Unfortunately, there is no common agreed definition
of a siege mentality in academic areas. However, it has been widely discussed in
order to reveal the nature of a certain society and explain the causes of behaviors
in internal and domestic affairs of the particular country. A siege mentality or siege
belief is generally used as a socio-political term in reference to the feeling of a
country that the rest of the world has highly negative intentions towards one’s own
society (Bar-Tal 2004). Israeli scholar Daniel Bar-Tal has made impressive works
on this theme, particularly represented in Jewish history and tradition. According
to him, a siege mentality can be defined as “a belief held by group members stating
that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioral intentions toward them”
(Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992, 49).
A siege mentality has some interesting characteristics. Since it is a psychological
concept, threat perception does not necessarily require existence of a real threat.
The number of dangers for a society is almost infinite, so what is the most deadly
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hazard is subject to a discourse and interpretation of the society (Campbell 1998,
1-2). In that regard, a siege mentality of the ingroup is close to a self-fulfilling
prophecy and subjective feeling toward the outgroups. Besides, a certain group with
a siege mentality can be characterized with loneliness because its group members
believe that they are alone in the world and surrounded by hostile enemies and no
one would help them. In current international community, most of nations have
at least one hostile country, but a core belief of the siege mentality implies more
hopeless situation that a country is surrounded by hostile neighbors and fighting
against the rest of the world. So, people in the same group share a same belief such
as “no one will help us in time of need,” or “We cannot rely on others advice” so on
(Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992, 49). In line with that, a siege mentality would not be able to
promote cooperation and decrease distrust among different groups, but is more
likely to hinder development of relationship. .
According to Bar-Tal (2004), a siege mentality fulfills several functions as
follows. First, it allows group members to define the world in relatively simple and
manageable terms. That is, a siege belief facilitates group members to classify who
are friends or enemy quite easily. Second, group members with a siege mentality
could prepare for the worst case and prevent disappointment in case of a desperate
situation. Third, a siege belief helps establishing a firm group clearly distinguished
from other groups, so it allows the group to have unique culture and identity.
Fourth, a siege belief is contributed to mobilizing people and promoting solidarity of
a group, and North Korea is very appropriate in this case. Harrison (2002, 8) insists
that North Korea’s siege mentality was an effective tool bonding its society together
and reinforcing absolute power of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Fifth, a group with
siege beliefs feels self-righteousness and superiority over other groups. The belief
that outgroups have hostile intentions toward the ingroup insinuates that other
groups are evil, malicious, and violent. Sixth, a siege belief stresses self-reliance,
so it asks to strengthen internal capabilities and minimize dependence on the
outgroups. For example, North Korea has been emphasizing on Juche in ideology,
independence in politics, self-sustenance in economy and self-defense in national
defense in order to build a completely independent and unaffiliated state in the
international system.
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2. Characteristics of North Korea’s Siege Beliefs
North Korea is considered to be a country where a siege mentality dominates
foreign policies as well as its domestic politics. Bar-Tal (2004) has categorized
causes of a siege mentality into three types. The first type of a siege mentality is
self-initiated one aroused by a leader of the country who voluntarily decides to
isolate the society from the international community. In general, North Korea is
known to be included in this category with Albania. The second type of a siege
mentality is normally found in the society maltreated from the world (i.e. groups of
people with traumatic experiences like Jews, Armenians in Turkey, Blacks in North
America, and Indians in South America) or suffering severance of an exchange from
the international community with punitive actions such as economic sanctions,
embargoes, boycotts or violent hostile activities. The third type of a siege mentality
is formed on the basis of accumulative experiences in the past which immensely
affects a perspective looking at the rest of the world. In this case, the siege mentality
is difficult to be ceased because it is constantly reproduced and strengthened by
education, societal channels, and cultural institutions of a society (Bar-Tal 2004).
As a typical example, members of Israeli Jewish society validate their siege mentality
based on their experiences of the Holocaust and the Israeli-Arab conflict, and in
particular, the former is reflected in foreign affairs, politics, psychology, education
and literature and the arts, enhancing the siege beliefs among society members
(Elon 1971, 198-199).
However, as Bar-Tal already pointed out, these three causes are not mutually
exclusive which means that North Korea’s siege mentality cannot be limited to the
first type but other types of siege beliefs can be found in the society. North Korean
regime has isolated itself from the international community with strong assertion of
self-reliance and independence, but the isolation is not only a spontaneous choice
of the regime but also derived from the pressures of international community. For
instance, since the international community has strongly warned of North Korea’s
nuclear program and ballistic missiles and reinforced sanctions against reckless
military buildups and development of nuclear program, isolation is unavoidable for
North Korea. Further, as mentioned earlier, North Korean society is consolidating
a siege mentality by claiming that its domestic and international difficulties were
completely attributed to hostile and condemned policies of the United States and its
followers.
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In general, war plays a central role in maintaining the domains of inside and
outside, foreign and
domestic, self and other (Jackson 2005, 153). North Korea’s resentment and
criticism toward the United States date back to the Korean War broken out on
June 25th, 1950. The leader Kim Il Sung had an ambitious plan to unify the Korean
peninsula but it was frustrated by intervention of the US military and the UN
forces. Due to the fearsome US bombings, North Korea was once at risk of collapse,
and since then the US has been considered as the biggest threat of the regime.
Repeatedly evoking miserable memories from the war and standing against hostile
policies by international community, the leadership has raised a level of criticism
on the United States. Condemnation and contempt on the US are pervasive in the
society including politics, literature, arts, and media in which a siege mentality of
the society has been reproduced and strengthened. After the collapse of the socialist
camp, a relationship with the US sometimes has shown little progress, but North
Korea’s underlying resentment against the US has not been changed. Whenever
the US made sanctions on North Korea or a talk was reaching at a deadlock, North
Korea strongly condemned the US and contended that the US and its followers have
a bad intention to overthrow the regime and urged its people to remain vigilant
against them. Fear and alert stemmed from the memories based on collective
antagonistic experiences with the United States serve to justify the war mobilization
and war readiness conditions of the society. For these reasons, a siege belief of
North Korea is not clearly categorized into one of the abovementioned three types
asserted by Bar-Tal, but it has a more complex nature.
Sung Chul Yang sees a siege mentality in a psychological perspective defining it as
a minor partner’s subjective feeling toward a major partner with an overwhelmingly
unfavorable objective inequality between the two of three additional sources (Yang
2001, 294). His argument is based on asymmetric alliance of North Korea and China
and North Korea and the Soviet Union in the early years of the regime, especially
in 1950s and 1960s. In spite of close relations with China and the Soviet Union,
North Korea had struggled with political and economic inequality inherited from
asymmetric alliances. Even though two great socialist countries had significantly
contributed to the Korean War and process of building socialist regime in the north,
a ruling group in North Korea including Kim Il Sung was highly sensitive to their
interference in domestic affairs. In the postwar reconstruction period, Kim Il Sung
and guerrilla group faced a strong opposition on economic policy from the Soviet
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and Yan’an factions. Kim and his group believed that the Soviet faction and Yan’an
faction were defying against the partisan group and hindering economic autarky by
direction of the Soviet Communist Party and Chinese Communist Party respectively.
It has raised distrust in other nations and importance in self-reliance.
Yang analyzed that North Korea’s siege belief can be interpreted as a phobia, isolation,
and an instrument (Yang 2001, 295). According to his statement, a siege mentality of North
Korea’s ruling elites, abetted by three additional sources which are self-imposed, systemimposed, and other-imposed isolation. According to his statement, first, the self-imposed
siege mentality of North Korea is represented as Juche, sometimes translated to selfreliance. Underlining independence on foreign affairs and autarkic economy and turning
down cooperation with other nations, Juche derives to an excessive emphasis on selfreliance in politics and economy and is resulted in the isolation of North Korea from the
rest of the world. Second, system-imposed siege mentality is fundamental in terms of that
the country strictly controls and restricts its people in order to create a completely closed
and secluded society. North Korean government prohibits people’s free will in job transfer,
human transactions, and traveling, and all the network systems of the society are tightly
organized and
members in the organizations are instructed to monitor each other. Third, other-imposed
siege beliefs are influenced by not positive surroundings in which the U.S. military forces in
the South are still present, South Korea’s cooperation with China is increasing, and a formal
relationship with Japan is in absence. Facing reality maximizes a siege mentality of ruling
elites in North Korea. But North Korean leaders are utilizing this siege mentality as a tool of
physically mobilizing and psychologically gathering its people standing up to any kinds of
real or potential enemies. Militarization of North Korean society can be progressed by means
of manipulating and exaggerating a siege mentality of the people that no one would help
North Korea in the hostile world.
3. Genealogy of North Korea’s Siege Mentality
North Korea’s national identity is not pre-given nor established in a moment.
It has been formed over the years with historical events such as liberation from
Japanese colonialism, the Korean War, and division of the territory. The interesting
thing about a siege belief is that the larger number and more influential the group
members who have the strong belief, the stronger the consequences of the siege
mentality (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992, 50). So, leaders of the group sometimes spread
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the belief about negative intention of the world and characterize their groups with
manipulating the siege mentality. And constructing foreign adversaries is significant
to make an identity of the society, because society’s own identity comes from the
opposite property of the enemy (Ballbach 2014, 466). In this section, a few important
elements in North Korean history which is highly affecting on its siege mentality will
be introduced and how the leaders made efforts to take advantage of the beliefs.
Rise of Juche
North Korea, a country in the northern part of Korean peninsula is well-known
as its closed-door policy to foreign countries. An exclusive property of North Korea
has been persisted over time. Even in the 19th century, Korea (officially Chosun) was
first nicknamed the Hermit Kingdom which reflects its insular nature to the other
nations. Foreign influences in the late period of Chosun and more than thirty years
of Japanese colonization left terribly negative images about foreign powers and
constructed strong vigilance on interference in domestic affairs by other countries.
North Korea is no exception. Its hypersensitivity against threat and emphasis on
national independence or self-reliance have been perceived from the early period of
the regime (Armstrong 2009, 41). In North Korea, a term “Oese” which means foreign
powers in English is commonly taken in a highly negative sense. It is instinctively
connected to difference and danger in terms of “otherness” and naturally defines
the ingroup which is recognized as perfectly righteous and good.
With the end of 36 years of sufferings under Japanese colonialism, North Korean
leadership including Kim Il Sung and his colleagues were highly vigilant to possible
engagement of foreign powers in internal affairs. But, foreign engagement was
inevitable as long as North Korea was in desperate of economic and military aids
from the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in order to build a communist regime.
In September 1948, North Korea was established under the strong influences and
supports of the Soviet Union and initially adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ruling
ideology like
other socialist states. The Soviet and Yan’an factions advocated moderate policies
such as emphasizing industry and agriculture, moves toward more decentralized
management systems, and preference of retention of a mixed economy complete
opposite to Kim Il Sung’s economic plans. In December 1955, Juche was first
mentioned against the opposite groups such as Soviet faction and Yan’an faction
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within the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung made an speech entitled “On
the Need to Repel Dogmatism and Formalism and to Establish Juche in Carrying
out Ideological Projects” in which he openly denounced different factions because
of their indiscriminative acceptance of policy lines from the Soviet Union and
Republic of China. At the same time, North Korean leaders highlighted a necessity of
developing its own policies and creative application of the Marxism-Leninism. Juche
was raised in this process of getting rid of Soviet and Chinese influences in domestic
affairs and soon became a predominant ideology of the society. The ban on dual
citizenship between North Korea and the Soviet Union in 1957 and withdrawal of
Chinese troops from the North in 1958 were giving specific examples that Juche was
reflected in foreign policies.
Juche is referred to North Korea’s firm determination of self-reliance with a
siege mentality against a possible external intervention into domestic affairs.
Through Juche, Kim Il Sung appealed to the national sense of dignity, pride, and the
determination to avoid foreign domination and tried to use it in order to deal with
the South from a superior position (Gills 1992, 112). However, the role of Juche idea
in North Korean society has been changed and closely linked to succession process.
Juche ideology had been greatly dependent on self-reliance in foreign affairs, but
Kim Jong Il began to pervert Juche ideology for legitimizing a dictatorship and his in
the end of 1960s.
Anti-imperialism
A siege mentality has been playing a pervasive role in defining North Korea’s
anti-imperialism. Anti-imperialism of North Korea is deeply rooted in anxieties
about revival of Japanese militarism and possible subversive plans of the US after
the Korean War. Unhappy experiences with the US and Japan in history has led
North Korean leadership to counter imperialism and to perceive foreign forces with
suspicion and distrust. Indeed, it is not surprising that the US is considered as the
biggest threat to North Korean sovereignty. Kim Il Sung’s plan to reunite the Korean
peninsula was completely frustrated by the US and even worse, North Korea was
on the verge of collapse by indiscriminate attacks of the US military. In addition to
that, the US, a great power in world politics, is still the most influential and reliable
supporter for South Korea in terms of economic and military perspectives and
based on strong and tight relations with South Korea and Japan, is deeply engaged
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in the entire Northeast Asian issues. Kim Il Sung called the US imperialists and
believed their military presence in the South is the primary impediment to North
Korea’s reunification plan. Kim Il Sung, a founding father of North Korea, constantly
maintained that the US has a malicious intention to overthrow North Korean
regime and build the US-friendly capitalist state in the north after all. Emphasizing
importance of reunification, Kim Il Sung and his followers insisted to have vigilance
toward the U.S. imperialism and save South Korean people under its control.
Expanding diplomatic relations with the Third World countries in 1960s and 1970s,
North Korea brought to demonstrate anti-imperialism targeting the US in order to
attract newly born countries on its side. Kim Jong Il, a son and successor of Kim Il
Sung, continued to resist imperialism by claiming that “flunkeyism and the idea of
dependence on foreign forces lead to the ruin of the nation is the serious and
bitter lesson our nation learned through a long history of national suffering (Kim
Jong Il 04/18/1998).”
Japan has been the second imperialist enemy to North Korea since the Korean
War. North Korea has claimed that Japan is obstructing the prosperity, development,
and reunification of Korea in every way along with the United States. However, North
Korea and Japan were making some efforts to restore the relationship. In September
1990, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a ruling party in Japan and Japan Socialist
Party (JSP) sent a multi-party delegation to Pyongyang in order to normalize the
relations with North Korea, and North Korean government asked Japan to provide a
compensation for the “enormous misfortunes and miseries imposed on the Korean
people” by Japanese colonialism from 1919 to 1945 (Quinones 2009, 32). However,
negotiations for normalization have been stalled because abduction issues were
prerequisite to Japan for its national political issues and North Korea’s missile
problems in the international attention made Japan to be involved in economic
sanctions on North Korea.
Since relations with the US and Japan has not revealed any significant
improvement, Anti-imperialism of North Korea never been weakened. The failure
of negotiations with imperialist states deepened distrust in the outgroups and
convinced North Koreans of a siege mentality. North Korean leadership still has a
strong belief that the hostile policy toward DPRK is organized in Washington and
supported by Japan, and South Korea in flunkeyism will undoubtedly follow the
US policy in order to oppress North Korea (Quinones 2009, 34). In North Korea,
anti-imperialism has a power more than just an ideology representing indigenous
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characteristics of the society. It greatly helps to define who is good and evil or who
is my friend or enemy and plays a crucial role in strengthening the social cohesion
and maintaining the regime stable.
The Family State, Immortal Sociopolitical Body, and Our-Style Socialism
We already learned that a siege mentality is quite functional in promoting
social cohesion and regime stability. The theory of the “Socialist family state” and
“Immortal Sociopolitical body” and “Our-Style Socialism” can be explained as
a strong self-determination of North Korea to protect a regime, maintain social
uniformity, and consistently stand against unfriendly international environment.
North Korea degenerated into the family state with its Juche ideology (Jeon 2000,
128). According to “Socialist Family State” theory, North Korea has claimed that
Suryong (a Great Leader) is a father, the party is a mother, and the people are
children so they establish a household. In line with that logic, Suryong and the KWP
should love and tenderly care their people as parents, and the people as children
should absolutely obey and serve the party and Suryong. People’s absolute loyalty
and devotion to Suryong is in common with practice of filial piety to the parents. It is
not odd at all to find North Korean people call Kim Il Sung “father.” Although North
Korea calls itself a socialist state, but this theory is highly linked to Confucianism.
Kim Il Sung was described as minjok ui taeyang (sun of the nation) among North
Koreans and even he called himself the present-day Tangun, a founding father of
Korea (Shin 2006, 85). In the party bulletin Rodong Sinmun on December 25 1995,
Kim Jong Il stressed “respect for revolutionary elders” and reiterated the parentschildren relationship
between the leader and party and the people to instill collectivism (Rodong Sinmun
12/25/1995). In addition, a slogan “The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung lives
Forever in Our Hearts” was all over North Korean society after the 3rd anniversary
of his death in 1997.
North Korea has developed another theory called the “Immortal Sociopolitical
Body.” This theory contends that “the leader is the impeccable brain of a body, the
masses can be endowed with their life in exchange for their loyalty to him, and the
Party is the nerve of that living body” and they constitute a single organic whole.
The popular masses, the body of revolution and construction, must be united into
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one sociopolitical organism under the leader and party in order to have an infinite
sociopolitical life which is completely opposite to the physical life given by one’s
biological parents. Otherwise, the masses will remain dead bodies because they are
no more than the limbs. Therefore, the theory of the Immortal Sociopolitical Body
contends internal solidarity around the leader by unconditional obedience toward
the command of the Suryong. Bruce Cumings called it the North Korean version of
corporatism or the corporate state (Cumings, 197-230).
With the collapse of European socialist countries in the end of 1980s, North
Korea’s siege mentality had dramatically increased which led the regime to seek an
alternative theory to retain consolidation of unity and prevent internal disturbances.
“Our-style Socialism” or “Socialism of Our-Style” (urisik sahoejuui) was evoked as
an introverted manner of protecting North Korea’s own socialist system against the
wave of regime transitions in the socialist bloc. The content of “Our-style Socialism”
was not so clear but it evidently suggested that North Korea would not suffer the
same fate as European socialist states experienced, so it reflects that North Korea
is not willing to recognize capitalist states and will be remaining closed (Armstrong
2013, 101). Based on ruling ideology Juche, “Our-style Socialism” is emphasizing
that North Korea’s economy and politics would be independently operating without
relying on the experience of other countries. “Our-style Socialism” is nationalistic
and defensive measure to cope with besiege environment surrounded by constant
threats such as the US, Japan, and South Korea.
4. Kim Jong Un’s Foreign Policy with a Siege Mentality
Foreign Policy and Siege Mentality
As we already learned, North Korea’s siege mentality has been structured and
sophisticated over time, and utilized for political purposes by leaders of the society.
Although it is not clear how much a siege mentality is widely shared by the people,
it is obvious that influential North Korean leaders exactly know how to manipulate,
reproduce, and strengthen it for the purpose of promoting regime stability and
social cohesion. To enhance social solidarity, a siege mentality is increasing
pressure to conformity within the ingroup and at the same time it is closely
intertwined with ethnocentrism regarded as the most similar societal concept on
account of its exclusive tendency toward the outgroups (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992, 636).
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A siege belief of a nation which perceives itself as superior and virtuous and other
groups as inferior has a significant influence on the state’s foreign policy which
contains the negative recognition of the international community.
A disposition of siege belief can be weakened and less central to a society
according to a change
in conditions or circumstances (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 50), but North Korea’s siege
mentality has rather strengthened so far than decreased or less important which
is clearly represented in its foreign policy. Foreign policy is a critical element
for maintaining internal and external boundaries, and North Korea is utilizing
a siege mentality to distinguish itself from others through the foreign policy. As
poststructuralists contend in general terms, foreign policy can be functioning as
a boundary-producing political performance pivotal to a state’s identity (Ballbach
2014, 461). According to the poststructuralism, anything related to ‘outside,’
‘foreign,’ or ‘external’ is negatively taken, and an ‘ingroup’ is a meaningful and
positive subject which has properties completely opposite to those of outgroups.
Similarly, the society with a siege mentality tends to consider itself as moral and
good and even believes that it is constantly threatened by external forces and
no one would help. The positive self-image makes a foreign policy as a tool of
demonstrating the society’s distinctiveness in international relations, producing a
line of demarcation between a good ingroup and hostile outgroups. However, when a
government gives an undue prominence to positive self-images and nationalism, it
might be trouble with other states because this self-interested attitude produces an
extreme proposition that our nation is good but your nation is evil. This collective
belief promotes to establish hostile policies toward outgroups (Johnston 1999, 288).
North Korea reaffirms its identity through the foreign policy by addressing
itself always good and true and outgroups always evil and threatening, so strong
and stricter policies toward outgroups are justified in any case (Neack 2008, 89).
Moreover, in North Korea’s special case, it is very crucial to have an “enemy”
represented by the US for political purposes, because its presence justifies
prioritized allocation of resources to the army and beefing up military strength
(Ballbach 2014, 475). Therefore, North Korea’s foreign policy has been conceived
as a means to an end rather than diplomatic leverage to accomplish peace and
cooperation.
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Songun Politics and After
North Korea’s siege mentality is pervasive in a foreign policy fundamentally aimed
at sustaining its regime. Its foreign policy is not only self-interested, aggressive, and
preemptive but always stressing the possible external threats by the United States,
Japan, and South Korea. In the end of Kim Jong Il era, expectation about the change
of North Korean society was slightly detected. In practice, the change has been
perceived at Korean Worker’s Party Conference in September 29th, 2010. Kim Jong Il
regime has amended KWP rules in 30 years at the conference that ‘the ultimate goal’
of the party is no longer to ‘build communist society’ but to ‘complete the people’s
self-reliance’ (Korean Central News Agency, 10/29/2010). Before the amendment,
the Korean Worker’s Party had specified its aims in the party rules as below.
‘The immediate goal of Korean Worker’s Party is accomplishing a complete victory
in the northern Korean peninsula and fulfilling tasks of the people’s democratic
revolution and national liberation on a national scale. Beyond that, the ultimate goal
of KWP is to spread Juche Idea and build communist society all over the world.’
However, this ideological and political aim of the nation has been weakened with
a variety of unfavorable conditions such as the end of cold war, collapse of the
socialist system, and unprecedented famine in the mid of 1990s. The amendment of
the party rules led to a question if
North Korea has eventually given up communism or not and gave a hope that
North Korea might pursue a pragmatic diplomacy in order to survive in the
international system.
However, the supreme leader and First Chairman of the National Defense
Commission of North Korea Kim Jong Un, the third and youngest son of his
predecessor Kim Jong Il, continued his father’s policy stance emphasizing on
military so we called Songun Politics (Military First Politics). And North Korea’s anti-
American sentiment has not been changed at all which means a siege mentality is
still predominant and transmitted in the whole society. Songun Politics is adopted
by Kim Jong Il in 1995 as a “revolutionary idea of attaching great importance to
the army” and as “a politics emphasizing the perfect unity and the single-hearted
unity of the party, army and the people, and the role of the army as the vanguards”
(Global Security 04/27/2005). Slightly shifted from Juche ideology in Kim Il Sung
era, it is prioritizing the Korean People’s Army in allocation of resources and the
affairs of the state as a driving force in North Korean society. It is highly significant
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that imposing primary importance on the military and emphasizing a necessity of
a strong army reflect a high degree of siege beliefs because they are displaying the
state’s distrust and fear toward international community.
Following Songun Politics, Kim Jong Un at the KWP Central Committee Meeting
on March 31, 2013 proclaimed that North Korea plans to simultaneously build up
its economy and nuclear capabilities which is set as a permanent strategy of the
country. He said this plan is “a brilliant succession and development onto a new
higher stage of the original line of simultaneously developing economy and national
defense” which was initially suggested by Kim Il Sung. He also contends that the
party’s new line is not “a temporary countermeasure for coping with the rapidly
changing situation but a strategic line to be always held fast to.” In his speech,
the US is the biggest enemy of North Korea and the most important reason why
DPRK should not discontinue its nuclear program. Moreover, Kim Jong Un asserted
that DPRK is vigorously opposing to nuclear proliferation, and its possession of
nukes is only for “war deterrence” and “national defense” purposes. Kim Jong Un
consistently justified development of DPRK’s nuclear forces because of hostile
international environment. He insisted that armed forces should be “expanded and
beefed up qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world
is realized”. It is no doubt that his remarks play a crucial role in maintaining a
positive national self-image and inspiring nationalism among its people against
increasing external threats. A positive and nationalist self-image would be helpful
to keep stable governance (Hirshberg 1993, 78). However, a government’s efforts to
create a positive self-image and promote nationalism would not be helpful to expect
constructive criticism on a state’s foreign policy, so the government is more likely
to pursue undesirable policies without any sort of punishment (Hirshberg 1993, 96).
Distrust in the Outside World: Strengthening a Nuclear Capability
A group with a high degree of siege mentality may develop negative behaviors and
mistrust toward the outgroups which will lead to take drastic measures on grounds
that it should prevent possible dangers and inhibit any sort of hostile behaviors
(Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992, 642-643). It might be a good explanation why North Korea is
demanding a withdrawal of the US army from the Korean Peninsula and constantly
developing its nuclear program in spite of international opposition and
sanctions. For economic purposes, North Korea has traded weapons with many
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countries in the Middles East, Africa and south-east Asia but in terms of their
official statement, its military buildup is purely executed for self-defense in order to
be against a hostile policy of the US.
On April 13, 2012, North Korean government proclaimed itself a “nuclear state”
through a revision of its constitution. Part of the revised constitution said “National
Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-Il has turned our fatherland into an
invincible state of political ideology, a nuclear-armed state and an indomitable
military power, paving the ground for the construction of a strong and prosperous
nation” (Yonhap News 05/30/2012). DPRK conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009
and previously announced its nuclear capabilities through its state-run broadcaster
and newspapers but never included such a term in the constitution. Around that
time of the constitution revision, North Korean government also contended that
DPRK would give more efforts on its nuclear program in response to hostile policies
by the United States. That is, the US has an immense responsibility on development
of DPRK’s nuclear program, and Pyongyang would not give up nuclear weapons
under any circumstances.
North Korea had tried to improve a relation with threatening nations before, but
those attempts were all ineffectual which reinforced negative attitudes toward the
world. DPRK and the US signed their first diplomatic accord in October 1994 called
the Agreed Framework expected to be a great opportunity to improve relations and
release tension between the two countries. However, the Agreed Framework was
unfavorably implemented because of the deterioration of the political situation in
the US congress which made North Korea frustrated and keeping the hostile stance.
During the six-party talks in September 2005, Pyongyang agreed to dismantle
its nuclear program in return for economic and diplomatic benefits and security
guarantees. But the deal has not been favorably implemented since December 2008
and North Korea completely changed its original stance on the agreement and
conducted nuclear tests. It must be aggravating a matter to solve nuclear problems
and amplify DPRK’s distrust toward the US and relevant nations participating in the
six-party talks.
North Korea’s attempt to cooperate with international community was fruitlessly
ended which stirred up distrust among all parties, and Pyongyang’s siege
mentality to the outside world has been steadily increased. A resolution on DPRK’s
denuclearization has been a lot more difficult because Pyongyang announced that
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A Siege Mentality of North Korea : Socio-Political Analyses on Foreign Policies of Kim Jong Un Regime | 김보미
denuclearization of the US is a prerequisite to resume a dialogue between North
Korea and its enemies. In January 2013, Pyongyang insisted that it is impossible to
lead the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as long as the denuclearization
of the whole world is not realized. Pyongyang clarified that there would be no more
dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula unless a peace treaty
is concluded with the US. North Korean leadership believed that the US needs to
participate in the denuclearization as well in order to establish a “nuclear free
world,” so they proposed talks on mutual nuclear disarmament to the US which is
very unlikely to be accomplished with a peace treaty for an official end to the Korean
War.
Negative attitudes toward outgroups not only increase use of all means for self-
defense but justifies preemptive risk behaviors toward outgroups. In defiance of the
UN resolutions, North Korea conducted its 3rd nuclear test on 12 February 2013 at
its underground testing site. According to Pyongyang’s official news agency KCNA,
the test was for a self-defense against the US hostility, and DPRK would continue
testing and building its arsenal. On April 3 in 2014, Rodong Sinmun reaffirmed
the state’s new strategic line of simultaneously building up its economy and
nuclear capabilities. It also warned that a nuclear war may erupt depending on
the enemies’ actions toward North Korea, especially targeting at the US. In the
bulletin, North Korea has consistently charged off its nuclear development to hostile
policies of the US and claimed that the purpose of its nuke possession is clearly on
increasing deterrent force against external threats. North Korea has a strong belief
that nuclear arms are helpful to accelerate the process of unification of two Koreas
that is the ultimate aspiration of all Koreans. In addition to that, there have been
more than 20 times of North Korean missile tests in 2014 which caused international
concerns.
5. Instead of Conclusion
In general, a siege mentality is conceived as a central belief widely shared by
members of a group that rest of the world has highly negative behavioral intentions
toward them. A siege belief in North Korea is pervasive in a wide range of fields in
society such as education, culture, economy and politics. Pyongyang has continued
to take advantage of this belief for political purposes, which tends to be manipulated,
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2014 한국국제정치학회 연례학술회의
strengthened, and reproduced by influential leaders of the society in order to secure
the regime. The siege mentality of North Korea is primarily utilized as a crucial
instrument in order to achieve stable governance and social cohesion rather than it
is accepted as predominant psychological phenomena among the people. It might be
working as engines sustaining the society. In Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il era, Juche,
anti-imperialism, the Theory of Family State and Immortal Sociopolitical Body, Our-
Style Socialism had been designed on the basis of the belief. Currently, Songun
Politics of Kim Jong Il has been continued and even more strengthened by Kim Jong
Un, the successor and son of Kim Jong Il.
For North Korea, the United States is still recognized as the most dangerous
threat whose ultimate objective is destroying the North and establishing the US
friendly capitalist state in the Korean peninsula. However, it has been more than
60 years since the United States and North Korea fought in the war and so far no
sign has been detected that the United States physically threatened or at least is
willing to inflict harm on DPRK. It can be said that a siege mentality of North Korea
is deeply rooted in historical relations with the US which dominates the society and
constituted the framework of DPRK’s mistrust toward the outside world.
Making a threat and increasing vigilance against possible dangers might be
considerably helpful for North Korean leaders to mobilize people, stabilize a
regime, and allocate resources to where they want. However, in foreign affairs,
negative or aggressive attitudes toward other nations would not be beneficial for
international cooperation, but it would be more likely to result in isolation of North
Korea. Because most attempts in the past to build a cooperative system with the
outside world ended in failure, North Korea seems to prefer isolation by sustaining
and reproducing a siege belief. Although a siege mentality is based on a negative
experience with outgroups in history, its maintenance depends on the political,
cultural, and educational mechanisms. That is, a siege mentality can be diminished
by adding new stories on peoples’ collective memories (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992, 65).
So it is desirable for North Korean leaders to establish new ideas on threats, convey
accurate information about outgroups, and reinterpret the views on the outside
world. And of course, international community should assist North Korea to push
ahead with aforementioned issues and
create the favorable global environment in which where North Korea can
be actively engaged in and international community can promote peace and
cooperation.
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