A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony
Cook, Jiyon
(Sogang University)
Cook, Jiyon. 2005. A Pragmatic analysis of irony. Language & Information
Society 6, 18-35. The purpose of this paper is to examine a process of
understanding verbal irony in relevance theory. According to Sperber and
Wilson (1995), an ironic utterance is second degree of interpretation of
someone's thought or utterance; the speaker echoes an attributed opinion to
express her attitude of disapproving or ridiculing, while dissociating herself
from it. In this paper I will show that echoic interpretation of an attributed
thought in relevance-theoretic terms can be applied to a variety of ironic
utterances which fall aside Grice's account.
1. Introduction
One of the main studies in pragmatics concerns how people understand
utterances. In verbal communication irony is a commonly used form of
nonliteral language in which the speaker means more than what is said. The
standard treatment of irony in pragmatics goes back to Grice (1975). Grice
states that people understand irony by recognizing that an utterance violates
a conversational maxim and then deriving an interpretation that is consistent
with the assumption of cooperative principle in communication. That is,
people can detect ironic meaning by assuming the opposite of an utterance's
literal meaning once the literal meaning is seen as violating the maxim of
Quality ("do not say what you believe to be false"). From this it follows that
an ironic utterance conversationally implicates the opposite of what it
literally says.1 Consider an example taken from Grice (1975:53):
1In the traditional account, irony has been discussed in terms of figurative language. As
Sperber and Wilson (1995) point out, Grice attempts to reanalyze the notion of figurative
meaning in terms of his category of conversational implicature.
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 19
(1) X is a fine friend.
In case that X, with whom the speaker has been on close relationship until
now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business competitor, and that the
speaker and the hearer both know this, the speaker says something
obviously believed to be false. (1) is obviously flouting the first maxim of
Quality ("do not say what you believe to be false"). Thus, to Grice, (1)
implicates "X is not a fine friend".
However, as Sperber and Wilson pointed out, the opposite of the literal
meaning as the interpretation of irony seems rather strong. Consider the
following example:
(2) I'll never be able to repay your help!
The speaker produces utterance (2) which shows ironic effect in the
following circumstance. Peter promised to help Mary in her moving day. In
that day, Peter, who was very muscular, moved only the clock across the
floor. Then Mary, who was moving many heavy boxes, said to Peter. In this
context Mary may flout the maxim of Quality but (3) cannot be seen as the
implicature of (2):
(3) I'll be able to repay your help!
Verbal ironies involve elements of exaggeration or caricature in hyperbole,
litotes, sarcasm, and humor etc. In some cases, the speaker could be
regarded as having said one thing and meant the opposite. There are also
some instances in which the speaker communicates more than the opposite
claim of what is said by using irony. Thus, Gricean approach is not enough
to explain the indeterminacy of ironic utterances.2
The aim of this paper is to examine a process of understanding ironic
utterances in cognitive pragmatics (relevance theory). In chapter 2, I will
2Some of communicated meanings of irony can be subtly different from its literal
meaning. And there exist cases where the opposite meaning is not intended by the speaker.
20 국 지 연
consider the basic assumptions of relevance theory and introduce Sperber
and Wilson's (1995) approach to irony as echoic interpretive representation.
In chapter 3, I will attempt to analyze some ironic utterances shown in a
literary text, Pride and Prejudice, focusing on the process of understanding
from the relevance-theoretic perspective. Finally, a conclusion will be given.
2. Relevance theory and utterance understanding
2.1. Principle of relevance
Relevance theory is a cognitive psychological approach which rests on some
general assumptions about the mind (Carston 2000). Sperber and Wilson
(1995) analyze communication as decoding the linguistic meaning of words
and making inferences based on contextual assumptions. This view shares
Grice's basic assumption that communication is a process of inferential
recognition of the communicator's intentions. But they developed Grice's
maxim of Relation ("be relevant") as the central key to understanding
communication. They have argued that a single 'principle of relevance'
suffices for the entire area of inferential work for which Grice has invoked
the maxims.
Sperber and Wilson suggest that human beings unconsciously and
automatically create expectations of relevance in communication. The central
claim of relevance theory is that the expectations of relevance raised by an
utterance are precise enough to guide the hearer towards the speaker's
meaning (Wilson 2002). The inference process is relevance-driven, which is
based on human cognition; it is not derived from observing or flouting
maxims or norms but a "cognitively- endowed" tendency (Wilson 2002). This
claim is captured in the cognitive principle of relevance in (4) below and it
differs basically from the Gricean approach because relevance theory does
not assume the Cooperative Principle with maxims which communicators
are expected to observe.3
3Relevance-theoretic approach differs from
important respects. The major differences are
inferential processes as the crucial factor
communicated content, as well as the implicitly
Gricean pragmatics in some
as follows: firstly, they take
in determining the explicitly
conveyed content of utterances.
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 21
(4) First (cognitive) principle of relevance:
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.
(Sperber and Wilson 1995:260)
Relevance is defined in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort. An
utterance as a stimulus is seen as relevant only when it achieves a cognitive
effect. The notion of cognitive effect is explained in terms of an interaction of
the new information carried by an utterance and existing assumptions in the
cognitive environment; when an utterance is given as new information to the
hearer, the information and the hearer's assumptions produce three positive
cognitive contextual effects (see Sperber and Wilson 1995:123-132,
and
265-278):
(5) Contextual effects
a. combining with an existing assumption to yield contextual
implication
b. strengthening hearer's existing assumptions
c. contradicting and so canceling hearer's existing assumptions
In order for the hearer to process the utterance, contextual effects and
processing effort are required. These two factors determine the degree of
relevance of the utterance; other things being equal, the more contextual
effects the information has, the more relevant it is and the more processing
effort it requires the less relevant it becomes. It is also assumed that the
hearer will pay attention to the most relevant stimulus and process it so as
to maximize its relevance in a context of easily accessible background
assumptions. Consequently, Sperber and Wilson argue that an utterance is
expected to be relevant if it achieves an adequate range of contextual effects
and causes the hearer no gratuitous effort. Such an utterance is seen as
'optimally
relevant'.
Essentially
they
assume
that
all
ostensive
Secondly, they argue against the distinction between generalized and
particularized implicatures. They also do not assume conventional implicatures
but rather assume the existence of degrees of implicature.
22 국 지 연
communication is governed by the communicative principle of relevance.
This is defined in (6):
(6) Second (communicative) principle of relevance:
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of
its own optimal relevance.
(Sperber and Wilson 1995:260)
(7) Presumption of optimal relevance:
a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the
addressee's effort to process it.
b. The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the
communicator's abilities and preferences.
(Sperber and Wilson 1995:270)
Therefore, the hearer, pursuing an interpretation consistent with the
communicative principle of relevance, accesses contexts with the least effort
and arrives at the speaker's intended meaning. This principle enables us to
understand how utterances are interpreted and is involved in every aspect of
utterance interpretation including rhetorical expressions.
2.2 Two forms of representation of language use: description and
interpretation
Just as any object in the world can be used to represent any other object it
resembles, an utterance can be used to represent things. It can represent
some state of affairs by virtue of its propositional form being true of that
state of affairs; in this instance we can say that the representation is a
description, or that it is used descriptively. It can also represent some other
representation which also has a propositional form - a thought, for instance
- by virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms; in this
case we can say that the first representation is an interpretation of the
second, or that it is used interpretively (see Sperber and Wilson 1995, chapter
4, sections 7-10).
Consider the following example where Mary says to Peter:
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 23
(8) a. I met an agent last night.
b. He can make me rich and famous.
(Wilson and Sperber 1988:138)
According to Wilson and Sperber (1988), (8b) can be understood in two
ways, (9a) and (9b):
(9) a. He can make me rich and famous, I believe.
b. He can make me rich and famous, he says.
On interpretation (9a), Mary's utterance is used descriptively; "Mary
commits herself to the existence of the state of affairs described". Under
interpretation (9b), her utterance is a case of interpretive representation;
Mary's utterance represents another utterance that it resembles in the
propositional form. The content of the original utterance by her agent can
possibly be "I can make you world-famous". In (9b), Mary represents the
content of her agent's utterance, and indicates this overtly with the phrase
he says. In (8b) above, it is left to Peter to infer that her utterance represents
what the agent said.
Description is a representation of a state of affairs based on truthfulness;
interpretation is a representation of another representation based on
resemblance.4 Thus, Interpretive use allows a reformulation of the original
proposition (Wilson and Sperber 1988).
2.3 Mechanisms of irory: irony as echoic interpretive representation
Fundamentally, in relevance theory, it is assumed that every utterance is an
interpretive expression of a thought of the speaker's, which may itself be
entertained as a true description of a state of affairs, or as a more or less
4For example, "onomatopoeia is based on resemblances in sound, verbal mimicry on
resemblances in phonetic and phonological form, direct quotation and parody on resemblances
in syntactic and lexical form, and translation on resemblances in logical form, and paraphrase
and summary on resemblances in propositional form" (Wilson and Sperber 1988:136). For a
detailed illustration of the representatoins and relationships see Sperber and Wilson (1995:232).
24 국 지 연
literal interpretation of an attributed thoght (Wilson and Sperber 1988;
Sperber and Wilson 1995, chapter 4, section 7). For instance, consider the
utterance (10):
(10) The bus is leaving.
(Sperber and Wilson 1995:248)
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:248-249), utterance (10) can be
understood as an ordinary assertion, or as a metaphorical utterance, or as a
report of speech. The first involves a descriptive relation between the
speaker’s thought and an existing state of affairs in the world. In this case,
the speaker produces an utterance "which is a fully literal interpretation of
the speaker's thought". The second is "a less than fully literal interpretation
of the speaker's thought". And finally, the third is just a literal report of
speech, in this instance, what the bus driver said.
In addition, (10) can be used as advising which involves a descriptive
relation between the speaker's thought and a desirable state of affairs.
Furthermore, in a particular context utterance (10) can be understood as an
ironic utterance which involves an interpretive relation between the speaker's
thought and an attributed thought or utterance. Among the possible
representations the hearer chooses the relevant one, which is guided by the
principle of relevance5. In case of ironic utterance the interpretation achieves
relevance by informing the hearer of what the speaker has in mind, and has
a certain attitude toward it. The speaker, for instance, uses (10) to let the
hearer know not only what the bus driver said, but what she thought or felt
about it.
Sperber and Wilson propose to analyze irony not as literal interpretation of
an attributed thought or utterance but as looser interpretation, literal or
non-literal, of an attributed thought or utterance (1995:237-243).6 Ironic
5Sperber
and Wilson (1995, chapter 4) show that tropes including irony and
metaphor are not regarded as figurative language. Their interpretations, like other
types of non-figurative utterances, are achieved by searching for relevance.
6Sperber and Wilson (1995) replace the notion of mention (1981) by the notion
of interpretive resemblance, or resemblance of content, where resemblance of
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 25
utterances belong to second-degree interpretations of someone's thought and
are defined as echoic interpretation in which the speaker dissociates herself
from the thought echoed. An echoic utterance simultaneously expresses the
speaker's attitude or reaction
toward what was said/thought. What is
echoed can be an immediately preceding utterance or a thought imputed
by the speaker to the hearer, or the thought of a certain kind of person, or
of people in general, or popular wisdom (Sperber and Wilson 1986:238-243).
"The attitude expressed by an ironical utterance is invariably of the rejecting
or disapproving kind" (Sperber and Wilson 1995:239).
Now Consider an example taken from Sperber and Wilson (1995:241):
(11) When all was over and the rival kings were celebrating their victory
with Te Deums in the respective camps...
(Voltaire, Candide)
Sperber and Wilson (1995) see (11) as a genuine case of irony and point out
the fact that it does not implicate (12a) and (12b); to treat this utterance as
equivalent to (12a) and (12b) would be wrong:
(12) a. When all was over and the rival kings were not celebrating their
victory with Te Deums in their respective camps...
b. When all was over and the rival kings were bewailing their defeat
with Misereres in their respective camps...
As Sperber and Wilson (1995:241) say, "Voltaire was not suggesting that
neither side won the battle and celebrated victory, nor that both sides lost
and bewailed their defeat... Voltaire is echoing claims made by the rival
kings". After a battle both sides always claim victory. By representing both
king's claim or behaviour the speaker implicitly expresses an absurd, foolish
behavior and so on. By regarding (11) as echoic, we can grasp the speaker's
attitude of ridicule. This kind of meaning of (11) is not caught by Grice
since it is not derived from flouting the maxim of Quality.
propositional content is involved.
26 국 지 연
Therefore, to interpret ironic utterances the following should be performed:
first, "a recognition of the utterance as echoic"; second, "an identification of
the source of the opinion echoed"; and third, a recognition of "the speaker's
attitude to the opinion echoed such as rejection or disassociation" (1995:240).
In processing contextual clues (the shared cognitive environment of speaker
and hearer) and the principle of relevance are crucial. We will see this idea
through analyzing some ironic utterances in the next chapter.
3. An analysis of ironic utterances
3.1 Irony and implicatures
Verbal irony conveys the implicit expression of attitudes and creates a
certain impression in the hearer. Such vague facts as impressions or attitudes
can be handled in terms of implicature; some communicated assumptions by
an ironic utterance are either strongly or weakly implicated.7 Now let us
look at following examples.
In the circumstance that Jane gets the letter from Bingley's sister, which
says Miss. Bingley wants her brother to marry Miss. Darcy though Mr.
Bingley is in love with Jane, Jane suffering from depression asks her sister
Elizabeth some advice. Elizabeth, recognizing that both Jane and Bingley
sincerely love each other and hopping that their love will lead to marriage,
says the following:
"You must decide for yourself," said Elizabeth, "and if, upon mature
deliberation, you find that the misery of disobliging his two sisters is more
than equivalent to the happiness of being his wife, (13) I advise you by
all means to refuse him." (p.96)8
7According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:193-202) the implicatures of an
utterance may be more or less determinate in their strength. The strongest
implicatures are fully determinate premises or conclusions, for which the speaker
is responsible. In cases of metaphor and irony, a wide range of weak
implicatures arise.
8All quotes are from Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice (London: Zodiac Press,
1954).
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 27
The utterance in (13) can be understood as an advice or an echoic utterance.
If the reader9 reads (13) as an advice based on descriptive relationship
between the speaker's thought and a desirable state of affairs, he would
misunderstand Elizabeth's intended meaning. (13) is not an assumption that
the speaker wants to make manifest. Let's see how the reader could
interpret Elizabeth's remark to capture the speaker's intention.
Suppose the advising is the first to occur to the reader. It would be tested
for consistency with the principle of relevance. To be consistent with the
principle of relevance, it must achieve adequate contextual effects. To achieve
contextural effect, a representation must either have contextual implications,
strengthen an existing assumptions, or eliminate an existing assumption.
Now the hypothesis that, in the context described, Elizabeth might genuinely
believe that she wants Jane to refuse Bingley contradicts the known facts. In
this case, Elizabeth could not rationally have expected what she said to Jane
to achieve adequate contextual effect. Thus, advising based to descriptive
representation will be rejected as inconsistent with the principle of relevance.
Suppose now that the reader decides to test the hypothesis that (13) is an
echoic utterance: Elizabeth is echoing Miss Bingley's thought that she is
expecting Jane to give Mr. Bingley up. In echoing Elizabeth expresses her
attitude toward it, dissociating herself from the opinion it echoes. If
Elizabeth's utterance is consistent with the principle of relevance, it would
achieve adequate contextual effects with minimal effort. In this case,
Elizabeth's remark (13) draws Jane's attention by creating contextual
implications. That is, Jane's happiness at the prospect of being Bingley's wife
is more important than refusing his two sisters instead of Bingley, and Jane
should not give Bingley up because of his sister's letter, and so on. That is
what Elizabeth implicates. These sorts of contextual implications could make
Elizabeth's statement relevant enough to be worth Jane's attention. Since
there is no more economical way of conveying these implicatures, the reader
is entitled to assume that the statement (13) is consistent with the principle
of relevance. Thus, she is entitled to interpret the statement as an ironic
9Here
the 'reader' and the 'hearer' have identical status.
28 국 지 연
utterance. In this case the speaker of an echoic utterance is dissociating
herself from the thought it echoes may be evident to the hearer on the basis
of the context.
However, in some cases, the speaker gives the hearer some sort of
indication that this is how the utterance should be understood. In spoken
discourse the speaker uses her tone of voice or facial expression (Kreuz and
Roberts 1995). In the following except, the speaker gives the hearer a clue a title of honor sir, a very polite speech style - as to the attitude she expects
to adopt.
"I do assure you, (14) sir, that I have no pretensions whatever to that kind
of elegance which consists in tormenting a (14) respectable man. I would
rather be paid the compliment of being believed sincere. (15) I thank you
again and again for the honour you have done me in your proposals, but
to accept them is absolutely impossible. My feelings in every respect
forbid it. Can I speak plainer? (16) Do not consider me now as an elegant
female, intending to plague you, but as a rational creature, speaking the
truth from her heart." (p. 88)
Because the speaker, Elizabeth, already realizes that Collins became a
clergyman and attained his position in society only with the help of Lady
Catherine and he concentrates only on flattering his sponsor, Catherine,
Elizabeth never respects him. Being over confident about his wealth and
position, Collins undoubtedly believes that any woman would undoubtedly
accept his courtship and even feel flattered to do so. Thus, he proposes
Elizabeth to be his wife, but is unexpectedly rejected. Elizabeth chooses very
polite term such as sir, respectable man, and honor in (14). Readers who know
the context realize that Elizabeth's behaviour achieves a presumption of
optimal relevance and creates contextual effects: Elizabeth ridicules or mocks
Collins by using the honor tiles and talking in an extremely polite way.
The statement in (15) is also an ironic utterance. In (15) Elizabeth is echoing
the sort of deferential remark that Collins is thinking. Elizabeth relies on
Collins to recognize the absurdity of the thought or opinion echoed. In
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 29
echoing she expresses her attitude of disapproving, while dissociating herself
from the opinion echoed. She is also insinuating in (16) by retorting so
politely that her refusal is not the same as typical females at that time did.
(It was the social convention that at first, they often formally refused their
partner's courtship even though they would have liked to accept it eagerly.)
Elizabeth is echoing the typical females' reaction to courtship dissociating
herself form the thought echoed to express her attitude of disapproving.10
The following statement also has ironic effect in the dialogue between Kitty
and Mr. Bennet. When Mr. Bennet's youngest daughter, Lydia, eloped with
Wickham who is notorious for licentiousness, and Wickham was declared to
be in debt to every tradesman in the town and to be exceedingly wicked, Mr.
Bennet is aware of Lydia's unhappiness and knows that her short stay in
London was due to a lack of money.
"Do you suppose them to be in London?"
"Yes; where else can they be so well concealed?"
"And Lydia used to want to go to London," added Kitty.
(17) "She is happy then," said her father, drily; "and her residence there
will probably be of some duration." (p.229)
Based on the described context, Mr. Bennet's statement in (17) is an
interpretation of his thought which is echoic. Mr. Bennet is echoing Lydia's
opinion that she will be happy and can stay longer in London after running
away with Wickham. Mr. Bennet is dissociating himself from the thought it
echoes. Mr. Bennet's statement implicates that Mr. Bennet is ridiculing
Lydia's behaviour on the conviction that Lydia must be unhappy, cannot
stay longer in London, moreover, Mr. Bennet does not want to be interested
in Lydian's life, and Mr. Bennet feels annoyed at Lydia's behaviour and so
on.
An understatement also creates ironic effect. When Lydia ran away with
Wickham and actually married him she felt no guilt regarding her supposed
10We can echo the thought of a certain kind of person, or of people in
general; the source of echoic utterances does not need to be a precisely
attributable thought as Sperber and Wilson point out.
30 국 지 연
humiliating behavior and in addition she claimed that she could find spouses
for her sisters, as well, in Brighton, her sister Elizabeth stated the following:
(18) “I thank you for my share of the favour," said Elizabeth; "but (19) I do
not particularly like your way of getting husbands." (p243)
In this case it is natural that Elizabeth should be angry with her sister and
Lydia deserves to be blamed for her imprudent behaviour. Looking at this
example from a Gricean point of view, we can say that the speaker flouts the
first maxim of Quality, since it is obvious to the hearer that the speaker says
something which she believes to be false. However, Elizabeth communicates
more than what is said in (18). Elizabeth speaks about her proposal like (18)
in a polite way, but she is actually criticizing Lydia's marriage which ignores
social custom. In (18) she echoes Lydia's thought that Elizabeth would be
thankful for her proposal and expresses her disapproval of Lydia's behaviour
with scorn rather than overt criticism. Her use of an understatement in (19)
indirectly conveys criticism.11 This kind of ironic utterance can not be
handled by flouting Quality maxim: it is hard to think that (19) is intended
to imply (20):
(20) I do particularly like your way of getting husbands.
The speaker of (19) would strongly implicate "I do not like your way of
getting husbands" and weakly implicate "Your conduct disappointed me"
and so on. Elizabeth produces utterance such as (19) in order to present
discontent in a more polite way. Here the cultural norm - regarding Lydia's
behaviour as supposed humiliating- seems to influence on making us decide
whether Elizabeth's remark is ironic.12
11Brown and Levinson (1987) mention that ironic insults can be used to convey criticism
in a less face-threatening way than literal insults. According to the tinge hypothesis
(Dews and Winner 1995), irony mutes the meaning conveyed by literal language.
When irony is used to insult, it is less critical than literal language; when irony
is used to compliment, it is perceived as less praising than literal language.
12According to Furst (1984), the key to correct understanding of irony depends
on a series of cultural norms shared by the speaker and her interlocutor and
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 31
The following statements seem to fit the traditional account of irony saying one thing and meaning the opposite. Bingley whom Jane loves, leaves
Netherfeild without giving her previous notice. Jane gets a letter from
Bingley's sister which says Bingley stays in London where Darcy lives, and
is interested in his sister. Furthermore, Miss. Bingley also states that she
hopes her brother will marry Miss. Darcy. But Jane is so reserved that she
does not reveal her hatred of Bingley and does not even try to know why
Bingley should leave. Then Elizabeth says:
"My dear Jane!" exclaimed Elizabeth, (21) "you are too good. (22) Your
sweetness and disinterestedness are really angelic." (p 106-107)
In Grice's view (21) and (22) would implicate the exact opposite, (23) and
(24), respectively:
(23) You are too bad.
(24) Your sweetness and disinterestedness are really not angelic.
It may be obvious in the situation where she believes the opposite of what
is said. However, the point is the fact that Elizabeth uses expressions like
(21), (22) to convey more than the strict counterpart of the literal meaning,
(23), (24). The traditional account of irony is missing this point. Instead, if we
recognize Elizabeth's statement as echoic, then we can account for her
attitude of ridiculing: Elizabeth is echoing some thought that Jane or others
would think while dissociating herself from the thought echoed to express
her disapproving or discontent. In (21) and (22) Elizabeth does not applaud
Jane's goodness, but actually blames Jane for her passive attitude - lack of
courage -toward her spouse and her life. This is what Elizabeth means
(implicates) rather than (23) and (24).
3.2 Sarcastic humour as strategy
Consider the following dialogue between Mrs. Bennet and her husband, Mr.
intention.
32 국 지 연
Bennet. When Mr. Bennet continuously watches his wife become so nervous
about getting Bingley who earns four or five thousand a year as their
son-in-law he says (25):
Mrs. Bennet: "Ah! you do not know what I suffer."
Mr. Bennet: "But I hope you will get over it, and (25) live to see many
young men of four thousand a year come into the neighbourhood." (p.6)
Intuitively, what Mr. Bennet tries to communicate is not like (26a) or (26b),
as the traditional account - saying one thing and meaning the oppositesuggests.
(26) a. I do not hope you will live to see many young men of ...
b. I hope you will not live to see many young men of ...
The speaker, Mr. Bennet uses humour to reveal his attitude of satiring
someone. Mr. Bennet's utterance manifests the hearer's cognitive
environment by making manifest to her a variety of assumption. The hearer's
task is to recognize Mr. Bennet's communicative intention in order to decide
which set of assumptions he intended. Among the assumptions made
strongly manifest to the hearer by Mr. Bennet's utterance will be (27):
(27) Mr. Bennet has said to Mrs. Bennet that he hopes she will get over it,
and live to see many young men of four thousand a year come into
the neighbourhood.
If (27) is what Mr. Bennet actually intended, this interpretation should be
the first one consistent with the principle of relevance and in order to this,
it has contextual effects in a context easily accessible to the hearer: for
example, by adding contextural implications, or by strengthening an existing
assumption or by eliminating an existing assumption. But (27) will be
rejected by the hearer without any contextual effect. In the circumstance that
Mrs. Bennet's only concern in her life is getting a young man with a fortune
A Pragmatic Analysis of Irony 33
as a son-in-law, she is possessed by the idea of how she attracts him. And
Mr. Bennet disagrees with her on the condition of a satisfactory marriage.
Based on this context, the reader does not take (25) as a descriptive
representation. It is automatically inferred that Mr. Bennet echoes his wife's
thought that she always desires for many young men of great fortune
around her, who are qualified for her son-in-law. Mr. Bennet dissociates
himself from the echoed opinion and expresses his attitude toward it with
scorn; he looks consoling to her but actually satirizes his materialistic wife
without seriously considering her health. Some contextual implications of Mr.
Bennet's utterance would include the assumptions, for instance, what makes
Mrs. Bennet suffer is caused by her own attention for getting Bingley as a
son-in-law, Mrs. Bennet's greed for money even does her health harm and so
on. These assumptions are derived from searching the interpretations on
which Mr. Bennet's statement achieves adequate contextual effects for
minimal effort.
The following statement also shows ironic effect when Mr. Bennet replies to
his wife's complaint about his disinterested reaction to her poor nerves. In
the circumstances that Mrs. Bennet is nervous whenever she is discontented
and that Mrs. Bennet attributes her narrow-minded understanding to her
poor nerves, Mr. Bennet says (28):
"Mr, Bennet, how can you abuse your own children in such a way! You
take delight in vexing me. You have no compassion on my poor nerves."
"You mistake me, my dear. (28) I have a high respect for your nerves.
They are my old friends. I have heard you mention them with
consideration these twenty years at least." (p. 6)
From a Gricean point of view, (28) would implicate the opposite of the literal
meaning, which is derived from flouting the maxim of Quality:
(29) I do not have a high respect for your nerves.
However, based on the context, (29) is not what Mr. Bennet wishes to
34 국 지 연
communicate. Mr. Bennet uses a humorous remark (28) in order to
deliberately ridicule Mrs. Bennet or to lighten up the unhappy situation.13
Mr. Bennet makes fun of the fact that his wife's nerves are always with his
life, and weakly implicates that Mrs. Bennet's poor nerves are resulted from
her simple and narrow-minded character, he is sick of (hearing about) her
poor nerves and so on. Mr. Bennet may present annoyance by producing
(28). These are contextual implications which are consistent with the
principle of relevance unless there are other assumptions for least effort.14
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that the notion of echoic interpretive
representation suggested in the relevance-theoretic framework provides an
explanatory account of various ironic utterances which involve disapproval,
reject, ridicule, or discontent besides opposite meaning. I have also shown
that the interpretation of ironic utterances, like other utterances, is achieved
by searching for the relevant assumptions consistent with the principle of
relevance.
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국지연
서울시 마포구 신수동 1
서강대학교 영어영문학과
우편번호: 121-742
E-mail: [email protected]