NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008
update
Cuba’s Generation Gap
A video of student Eliécer Ávila confronting the president of the Cuban parliament took the international media by storm in February.
By Michelle Chase
christy thornton
C
uba
has
been
in
the
news
almost
c­ onstantly this year, as foreign observers have scrutinized the recent round
of reforms, reported on the activities of island
dissidents, and speculated on the plans of the
new president, Raúl Castro. But what ordinary
Cubans think has often been lost in the media
shuffle. In particular, with all the talk about
a “transition” in Cuba, the island’s youths—­
ostensibly the protagonists of their country’s
future—have escaped serious analysis. This
was the case in February, when a four-minute
video of a confrontation between university
students and the president of the Cuban parliament, Ricardo Alarcón, took the international
media by storm. Speaking without the usual
deference shown to the revolutionary leadership, the students challenged Alarcón with a
series of grievances: Why do Cubans need state
permission to travel? What justifies the system
of dual currencies? Why can’t government processes be more transparent?
The video was surprising not for what the
students said—such complaints are common
in Cuba—but for how audaciously they said it.
The video’s most vocal student, Eliécer Ávila,
was briefly celebrated as a poster child for youth
rebellion in the Miami media. When he reappeared on Cuban state television several days
later, assuring his support for the revolution,
the exile media’s initial jubilation gave way to
allegations that Eliécer had been coerced into
recanting.
The incident revived long-standing questions
over the relationship of young Cubans with the
revolution. Observers both within Cuba and
abroad have consistently noted the youngest
generation’s lack of “integration,” as revolutionary argot puts it. From Spain’s recent literary award for Cuba’s 32-year-old independent
blogger Yoani Sánchez to “the Eliécer case,” as
it was quickly dubbed, international observers have romanticized what seems to be an
emerging youth rebellion. Cuba’s leadership,
meanwhile, has long expressed concern over
the seeming political apathy and materialism of
Michelle Chase is a
doctoral candidate
in the history
department of New
York University.
She is writing a
dissertation on the
gender politics of the
Cuban Revolution.
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NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
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the island’s youth and has designed
a series of social programs aimed at
incorporating them. Recent government programs include the extension of higher-­education initiatives
through city municipios; the development of new fields like social work to
pull young people into employment;
and the creation of a brigade of “social
workers” (the label is something of a
misnomer), in which economically
disadvantaged youths are used as a
mobile labor force to serve as stopgaps
in problem areas—at gas stations,
­inter-provincial buses lines, and even
primary schools.
I spent part of the summer in Havana talking to Cuban youth about
their political views and hopes for
the future. (All of them asked that I
withhold their names.) Many of them
were clearly not invested in the revolutionary project in the same way as
their parents and grandparents. Most
were disaffected with the revolution’s
historic leadership and anxious for
better employment and consump10
tion. Nevertheless, few favored either
unregulated capitalism or U.S.-style
electoral politics.
While many proclaimed a kind of
anti-politics—regularly asserting that
they are disinterested in politics or
even that politics “makes me sick”—
such statements need to be examined
with care. For one thing, they reflect
the sense of political impotence that
is a central component of younger
Cubans’ consciousness. They feel
that the political decisions that affect
their lives are made off in the distance by their government and that of
the United States, without their own
opinions being taken into consideration. Furthermore, when young
people dismiss “politics,” they are
often referring to what they perceive
as dogmatism, which they sometimes
liken to religious fanaticism (Communist hardliners are sometimes mockingly referred to in Cuba as “the Taliban”). They are exasperated with the
revolutionary government’s constant
political “orientations”—that is, the
state’s specific exhortations, e.g., to
support the Cinco Heroes (the Cuban
Five), and the more general pressure
to attend official festivities and rallies
or join whatever mobilization is currently under way. In fact, almost every
person I spoke to in June made this
point, nearly verbatim, about the exhausting imposition of dogmatic politics in daily life.
Similarly, many young people expressed frustration with the Manichean worldview of the revolutionary
leadership. Over and over, the young
people expressed a desire for more
tolerance in Cuban politics, for a more
inclusive political spectrum, and for a
less confrontational attitude toward
dissenting views. This contrasts with
the popular image of today’s Cuban
youth as motivated primarily by materialist or consumerist demands—an
image that animates the sometimes vicious state discourse toward jineteras
(young women who work hustling
tourists) and less “integrated” youth
in general. And many young people I
Lukas Mathis / Latinphoto.org
An Internet café in Havana. Full online access, together with higher wages, an end to the dual-currency system, access to consumer goods, and permission to
travel abroad, was among a litany of “consumerist” demands expressed by young Cubans.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008
update
spoke to did launch a litany of “consumerist” demands—including higher wages, an end to the dual-currency
system, better housing, more food,
access to consumer goods, permission
to travel abroad, and access to the Internet (not only the state-sanctioned
Intranet).
But such demands, in the context
of socialist Cuba, have a very different meaning than they do in the developed world. Access to housing,
food, travel, and the Internet delineate privilege in contemporary Cuba,
which has arguably become, since the
1990s, a de facto class society. One
could thus read these demands as
calls for accountability from a revolutionary leadership that has continued
praising social equality, even as inequality has returned to Cuba. Taken
together,­ they also offer a deep criticism of Cuba’s precarious economy
and uncertain future, which are crucial issues for young people wondering if they should get a higher degree,
start a family, and so on. As one friend
of mine put it: “The problem isn’t really the material issue. It’s the feeling
that you don’t have a future.”
T
he geopolitical consciousness
of the younger Cuban generation is very different from that
of the generation that experienced
the early years of the revolution directly. The revolutionary solidarity
and “third worldism” of the 1960s,
still strong among many older Cubans, is almost imperceptible among
twenty- and thirtysomethings. This
is due to many factors: cynicism over
Cuba’s heavy dependency on the Soviet Union and the effect of its collapse; the painful legacy of the Angolan conflict, private memories of
which bear no resemblance to official
discourse; and the crucial importance of south Florida and, to a lesser
extent, Spain, as sites of emigration
in the 1990s. This is, above all, a gen- sweeping Latin America, they instead
eration shaped by the catastrophic express an acute sense of Cuba’s poSpecial Period.
litical isolation and the lack of posiCuba’s foreign policy is increasing- tive models to follow in the socialist
ly based on alignment with Venezu- and post-socialist world.
ela and support for emerging leftist
But migration occupies young
governments elsewhere in
Cubans more than interLatin America. But focused Access to
national relations. Most of
on their own struggle to housing, food,
the ones I spoke to knew
make ends meet, many
that if they ever leave the
island, it will most likely
younger Cubans are pri- travel, and
marily concerned about the Internet
be on a one-way trip to
Florida. Indeed, the topic
what impact bilateral relaof emigration casts a contions with Venezuela will delineate
stant shadow over Cuban
have on their daily lives. privilege in
youth. In 2005, I was imFor example, in 2005,
Cuba, which
pressed by how naturally
when I lived in Havana for
the topic came up in cona year, I remember com- has arguably
versation: “If so-and-so ever
mon expressions of anger become a de
leaves the country . . . ,”
over some local medical
my friends would say casufacilities going unstaffed facto class
ally, much as those in the
because of the flood of society.
United States might mendoctors to Venezuela. It is
also generally seen as offensive that tion moving to another city. And it
Cuba should subsidize other coun- can be surprising to hear parents
tries’ infrastructure. One young aca- refer to their children’s inevitable
demic told me that at his workplace emigration with resignation. As one
a major topic of anger in a recent mother of three, a university profesworkers’ assembly was the news that sor, wearily told me: “It’s not a quesCuba had paid for the construction tion of whether your children will
of some 20 hospitals in Bolivia. Even leave the country; it’s a question of
those young Cubans I have met who what country they’ll end up in.”
I know some young Cubans who
have voluntarily gone to Venezuela
or elsewhere on “missions,” medical are committed to staying. Still, even
or otherwise, did so mostly for the they concede that they may be forced
opportunities they offered to travel, to leave—usually, they imagine, for
make a higher salary, and acquire economic reasons. One young woman, a researcher at a cultural institute,
goods scarce in Cuba.
Some young Cubans are wary of summed up the thinking of many
their country becoming dependent of her friends: “Depending on what
on Venezuela as it once was on the happens, I’ll either leave the country
Soviet Union. They have little interest or stay and make the best of it, or
in or detailed knowledge of the left- maybe try to get a better job here at a
ward turn farther south—indeed, the mixed [i.e., joint venture] company.”
Cuban media cover Latin American Emigration to some extent can be repolitics much less than one might ex- stricted by sector. For example, it is
pect, and young Cubans may be less particularly difficult for doctors and
likely to follow the state-run media. educators to get permission to leave
Rather than excitement about the the country. But young engineers,
anti-neoliberal revolution currently architects, and computer scientists
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seem to be leaving in droves. A 27year-old engineer I spoke to, who
had attended a boarding school for
high-performing students, estimated
that a third of his high school class
had left the country.
Emigration is not restricted to
Cubans of a particular social class,
although one’s level of privilege determines one’s method of departure.
Less skilled, underprivileged Cubans, driven by economic desperation, risk the dangerous crossing on
makeshift rafts. Those lucky enough
to have family members abroad who
can save or borrow the $10,000 fee
board clandestine motorboats bound
for either the Floridian or, increasingly, the Mexican coast. From there,
most make their way to Miami, where
they often find themselves staffing
the city’s low-paid service sector and
inhabiting Hialeah’s working-class
sprawl. Young professionals often
leave primarily in search of more
fulfilling career options. They may
prefer to wait for a legal opportunity
to leave the country, such as a scholarship to study abroad, or a work
contract, real or fictitious, in Mexico
or elsewhere. From there they may
cross the U.S. border or simply stay
in their new host country and try to
attain residency.
Because of the political sensitivity of leaving the country, it is common for people to tell only their very
closest friends they are planning to
emigrate, and then only very close
to the date of departure. It creates
a depressing environment. One 25year-old friend of mine, if he hadn’t
seen someone for a while, would say
gloomily, “Who knows, maybe he’s
left the country.” Contemporary Cuban literature, music, and cinema are
littered with melancholic references
to old friends departing for el yuma
(slang for the United States).
Some young Cubans express opti12
mism that emigrating to the United
States will mean political liberty and
personal opportunity. And it is true
that many experience a heady sensation of freedom when they leave the
island. Yet others are more cautious,
saying their friends in Miami describe it dismissively as “Cuba with
more money,” “Cuba part two,” or,
in reference to the politics of the Miami community, “the same bullshit
in reverse.”
about the feasibility of “reformed socialism.” “All these people who think
there can be a different socialism,
something more open, well, it’s a great
idea, but it’s just not going to happen,”
a 35-year-old journalist and translator said. “First, because the people in
power won’t let it. Second, because
if [reformists] ever did gain power
here, they wouldn’t survive, because
the U.S. government wouldn’t permit
it. Because it’s precisely this system,
which I think is terrible, that’s prehere are some young cubans
vented the United States from entering
who fully support the revolu- here and doing whatever it wants with
tion. They may be few and far us. Because if there were a system that
between, but they are there. They tend was more egalitarian, but at the same
not to evince the hero worship of the time weaker, this country would turn
leadership one often finds in
into a colony of the United
Some young
the older generations. Their
States.” He mentioned the
support is, rather, based on a Cubans fully
Nicaraguan revolution as
true ideological commitment support the
the clearest example of
to social equality and an end
this
­dynamic—meaning
to capitalist exploitation. In revolution, but that because the Sandinista
other words, they are social- do so without
government lacked Cuba’s
ists rather than fidelistas.
command economy, miliBut most young Cubans the hero
tant mobilization, and conwould like change. The worship of their trolled media, it was graduquestion is: What kind of
ally undermined.
elders. They
change? Some youths beStill, everyone I spoke to
lieve that the best of social- are socialists,
expressed a preference for
ism and best of capitalism not fidelistas.
a slow, gradual change that
can feasibly be combined.
would give them and othOne 31-year-old woman who worked ers time to adapt and that, they hoped,
in a cultural center expressed opti- would preserve some of Cuba’s hardmism about such a path: “I think we won social rights and protections.
have to conserve what’s best and im- Furthermore, the desire for change is
prove the rest. We have to keep evolv- not the same as calling for the abrupt
ing.” She spoke hopefully about one overthrow of the government and a
day opening her own cultural center, return to capitalism. Certainly some
with the support of the revolutionary think that a post-socialist Cuba will be
authorities. She and other optimists characterized by first-world standards
tend to see the recent round of re- of living and a buoyant economy. But
forms and slightly more open public others fear an onslaught of the neodebate as promising signs of further liberal reforms that devastated many
openings. They hope Cuba can carve Latin American economies in the
out a more inclusive, open system 1990s, and the final collapse of every
within socialism.
sector other than tourism. Neither do
Other young people—likely the most harbor idealism about electoral
majority—are far more pessimistic politics, for they know that in Latin
T
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2008
update
America procedural democracy has
not led to social justice.
Most young Cubans, even those
highly critical of their government,
have little interest in either Cuba’s
internal dissidents or the Miami organizations. Like other Cubans, they
usually find out about internal dissident groups only when they are denounced by the Cuban state media.
Such groups are easily discredited
among the general population. For
example, Cuban television recently
revealed that the leader of the opposition group Damas de Blanco had received support from right-wing Florida representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
and money channeled through the
U.S. Interests Section. As one friend of
mine, himself deeply critical of Cuba’s
revolutionary government, said dismissively, “Let’s face it, those people
are U.S. lackeys.” Regardless of their
possible connections with the U.S.
government, many opposition groups
emphasize demands for the release of
political prisoners, which is a low priority for most Cubans, and generally
speak in a framework of liberal political rights, rather than one of sociopolitical rights, would would better address many Cubans’ disaffection.
If they are disinterested in the internal opposition, most young Cubans are even less interested in the
Miami exile groups. Young Cubans
rarely listen to Radio Martí, and not
because they lack access to it. (Many
more sporadically watch CNN en
Español or Univisión using clandestine TV antennas.) What they lack is
political sympathy. The Miami community’s domination by political reactionaries, its sheltering of terrorists,
its paternalism and condescension toward island Cubans, and the vulgarity
and violence of its verbal attacks on
the revolutionary leadership alienate
many Cubans. And the freedom that
young Cubans long for bears only
minimal resemblance to the freedom
demanded so stridently by Miami’s
right-wing politicians.
A friend of mine envisioned a
worst-case scenario of a post-socialist
gold rush in which ordinary Cubans
would be left floundering without
capital, relevant training, or experience with market-oriented labor discipline: “And then you have to count on
the fact that a whole bunch of Cubans
living outside the country are going to
come back here with all those things in
their favor, not to mention all the foreigners.” Young Cubans want to make
sure they are the beneficiaries of any
future transition, fearing that they will
be displaced due to outdated technical
skills, upheavals in the economy, and
a return wave of émigrés with years
of private-sector experience. Far from
seeing young Cuban Americans as potential future political allies in some
idyllic reconciliation of “the Cuban
family,” many young island Cubans,
explicitly or implicitly, see them as future professional competition.
D
espite the general ambience
of negativity and discontent
one finds among most young
Cubans, anyone wondering if the left
has a future in Cuba might do well
to listen carefully to their complaints.
Most of them, I found, openly sympathize with the goals of the revolution but disagree with its method
of implementation or see it as too
utopian given Cuba’s current socioeconomic reality. Many respect the
idealism of the 1960s as something
noble but say socialism can’t work
in such an underdeveloped country,
with few natural resources and low
population density (as compared to
China), and with the U.S. hovering at
the gate. In one typical conversation,
a 27-year-old engineer voiced a series
of complaints about the current government, swore up and down that he
despised politics, then finished by
saying: “But if I had to define myself,
I’d say I was on the left.”
Additionally, their worldview has
been formed by the socialist state in
many ways, shaping their criticisms of
the revolution. For example, they tend
to see the world as divided into socialist and capitalist countries, rather than
into democracies and dictatorships, as
described by politically active exiles.
Notably, not only do some young Cubans not denounce socialism per se,
but they critique contemporary Cuba
by insisting they are already living under state capitalism.
If they exhibit a deep insecurity
about the future, they also display a
certain wistfulness about the socialist
past. Even people in their late twenties exhibit some nostalgia for the
1980s, that fabled golden age when
people could live well on their salaries, before the social disparities and
budding materialism produced by the
market reforms of the 1990s arrived.
They recall the Cuba of their childhood as a place of relative equality,
social cohesion, and unity.
Of course, nostalgia is not exactly
a politics. But such memories reveal
something of a generational sensibility, and suggest that the legacy of
socialism in a future Cuba will be
complex. Similarly, young people I
have spoken to sometimes describe
“real socialists” as those who have
stood up fearlessly in recent popular assemblies to denounce Cuba’s
problems. They see these “socialists
of the heart,” as one friend of mine
described them, as self-sacrificing,
the true defenders of social equality, as opposed to opportunistic
state bureaucrats or the “red bourgeoisie.” Cuban youth are thus not
only political, but also interested
in socialism—if in ways not always
recognized by their elders or the
revolutionary authorities.
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