Julius Ward
Can security sector reform alleviate poverty?
Julius Ward
After over a decade of security sector reform (SSR) by Department for International
Development (DfID) in Sierra Leone, the country ranked 180th out of 182 on the 2007
Human Development Index (HDI). For DfID the primary objective of SSR is poverty
reduction. Their policy statement Poverty and the Security Sector makes it clear that
for it to undertake any SSR activity ‘the poor must benefit’ (DfID 2000 p.4). Yet in
Sierra Leone, often taken as an example of good SSR practice, poverty levels remain
close to 70%. Afghanistan, ranked one place below Sierra Leone on the 2007 HDI,
poses further difficult questions about the potential of SSR to alleviate poverty. Is its
failure to reduce poverty because, as some suggest, SSR is a flawed concept or is it
one that has been poorly applied? Or, being a relatively new concept, is it too soon to
reach a verdict?
At a time when the development community is focussed on achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), donors, such as DfID, who promote SSR argue that it
can contribute to the first goal of halving world poverty by 2015. SSR is a hugely
expensive undertaking. Currently, Afghanistan and Iraq are the two main recipients of
overseas development assistance, a large proportion of which is being used to develop
the security sector of these countries. When the global financial crisis has led to some
donors reducing their aid budgets, for SSR to compete for resources with other
poverty reduction programmes and with other MDGs such as health and education, it
needs to show that it can provide an effective route to poverty reduction.
In this essay I will argue that although, SSR can play a significant role in poverty
reduction, its practice can lag far behind the theory, and even where practice is good,
such as Sierra Leone, it will not necessarily alleviate poverty. Poverty reduction is
extremely complex and difficult. A functioning security sector can help to create an
enabling environment for poverty alleviation but, for SSR to have an impact, it needs
to be part of a broader poverty-reduction project. I argue that it is too soon to declare
SSR a failure or a success in terms of poverty reduction. Both SSR and poverty
reduction are long term processes, SSR is relatively new and donors are still learning.
The challenges they face in bringing SSR practice closer to the theory, such as
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ensuring recipient country ownership and donor harmonisation, are challenges the
development sector has been struggling with for decades. It is therefore important to
be realistic about what SSR can achieve in terms of poverty reduction and to
recognise its limitations, if donors are not to become disillusioned and withdraw their
support.
This essay first traces the growing interest of development donors in SSR as a tool for
poverty reduction and places it in the context of the post-Cold War convergence of the
security and development sectors. Section two explores the mechanisms, such as
conflict-prevention, through which SSR can alleviate poverty. The third section
focuses on the gap between SSR theory and practice, illustrated by the case study of
Afghanistan. Afghanistan is likely to become a test case for SSR. However, it can be
argued that the lack of security in the country has led to the SSR process straying so
far from its core principles that it is in fact little different from previous train-andequip programmes. In these circumstances there is a danger that SSR as a tool for
poverty reduction will be discredited and the development community may begin to
question whether it is a legitimate use of development funding. Section four focuses
on DfID’s SSR work in Sierra Leone. It explores possible arguments for the failure of
SSR to alleviate poverty, questioning just how good this example of ‘good practice’
was and highlighting the dangers of developing the security sector in a vacuum. The
fifth section addresses the challenges faced by the donor community in reducing the
gap between SSR theory and practice and suggests that, given the scale of the
challenges this entails and the history of donors in meeting them, there will be no easy
or quick solutions.
The security sector can be defined as ‘all those organisations which have authority to
use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its
citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and
oversight’ (Chalmers 2000 p.6). Security sector reform serves two purposes – to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the security institutions and to improve
their oversight through transparency and accountability.
The interest of the development sector in SSR as a tool for poverty reduction grew out
of the convergence of the development and security sectors witnessed after the end of
the Cold War. From the development side, a growing concern with the negative
impact of conflict led to the recognition that, where previously it had worked around
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conflict, it needed to work in or on conflict (Waddel 2006 p.535). With the end of the
Cold War donors, such as the World Bank, became interested in reducing excessive
military spending in developing countries which was seen as crowding out social and
economic expenditure, whilst studies such as the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor
(2000) highlighted the importance of security in the lives of the poor.
From the security side, the post-Cold War period brought an increased focus on civil
wars, conflicts whose origins often lay in issues in the development arena such as
poor governance or structural inequalities (Ebo 2007 p.30).The 1990s also saw a
broadening of the concept of security, exemplified by the notion of ‘Human Security’
outlined by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. This identified the
individual rather than the state as the primary object of security and expanded the
notion of security threat beyond the military to encompass development-related
factors such as hunger and disease.
It was increasingly argued that, in the words of United Nations, ‘development and
security are inextricably linked’ (cited Waddell 2007 p.533). Security became seen as
a dimension of development, for example in the influential work of Sen. Development
began to be viewed, not just as meeting material needs, but as providing safety from
threats. It was argued that poverty and underdevelopment were factors that could lead
to conflict and hence development was required for stability and, less contentiously, it
became widely accepted that security was a prerequisite for development (ibid p.5368).
DfiD’s work in conflict-affected countries in the late 1990s led to an increased
awareness of the need to become involved in the reform of the security sector. This
view was reinforced by the collapse of the peace process in Sierra Leone which was
seen as a failure to address problems in the country’s security sector (Hendrickson
2009 p.8). The policy statement Poverty and the Security Sector and the 1999 speech
by Clare Short confirmed DfID’s commitment to SSR as a means of poverty
reduction. Short (1999) identified ‘a security sector of appropriate size, properly
tasked and managed’ as a key issue in the alleviation of poverty.
SSR is seen as providing several routes to poverty reduction. DfID emphasised the
role it can play in conflict prevention stating that, ‘An unreformed security sector
often fails to prevent and sometimes causes violent conflict’ (DfID 2000 p.3). Collier
describes conflict as ‘development in reverse’ and argues that civil wars ‘have
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generated or intensified a significant part of the global poverty problem’ (Collier et al
2003 p.ix). As well as its human cost, conflict has a serious negative impact on
growth. Amongst the many harmful economic effects, the World Bank lists
destruction of infrastructure, agriculture and businesses, the reduction in foreign direct
investment (FDI), education and health services and increases in military expenditure,
capital flight and the ‘brain drain’ (World Bank 2005). Collier et al estimate that
during conflict countries lose on average 2.2% of their economic growth per year. At
the end of a typical seven year civil war they estimate incomes to be 15% lower than
they would otherwise have been and suggest this equates to a 30% increase in the
number of people living in absolute poverty (Collier et al 2003 p.2).
Furthermore, the cost of conflict extends beyond the duration of the war and beyond
the borders of the country at war. Military expenditure, capital flight, emigration and
mortality and morbidity rates all remain high after the fighting ends. Conflict disrupts
trade in neighbouring countries and large inflows of refugees place additional burdens
on their economies. The risk of war spilling over their borders brings with it a
reduction in FDI and military expenditure increases as the conflict triggers a local
arms race. According to Collier the cost to the combined neighbours is often as great
as the cost to country in conflict. In all, the cost of a typical civil war to the country
and its neighbours is estimated to be $64 billion (Collier 2008 p.32).
Another important mechanism through which it is suggested SSR can alleviate
poverty is crime reduction. UNODC argue that crime can ‘distort economic values,
rob national budgets, dampen entrepreneurial spirit, discourage foreign investment,
promote capital flight and perpetuate human suffering’ (2005 p2). The smuggling of
natural resources such as oil, timber, diamonds and other precious minerals can deny
developing countries substantial revenues. In Nigeria the cost of theft of crude oil is
estimated to be $4 to $6 billion a year, over 10% of the country’s oil production
(UNODC 2005 p. 31). DfID note how improved coastal security in countries like
Sierra Leone and Yemen would reduce illegal fishing and enable the development of
potentially productive national fishing industries (DfID 2005 p.8).
Crime also drives away business. Like conflict, it encourages capital flight and
discourages foreign investment. Between 2003 and 2005 Africa attracted only 3% of
foreign investment despite a rate of return on investments over 10% higher than the
average for developing countries, a disparity attributed by UNODC to ‘the perception
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among investors that the rule of law does not prevail in Africa’ (2005 p.40). Crime
increases the cost of doing business. The loss of goods, corruption and the
requirement for increased security all drive up costs and so reduce the ability of
businesses to be competitive (ibid p.41). The World Bank highlights the importance
of self-employment and entrepreneurship as a route out of poverty (DfID 2000 p.18).
Crime discourages this. For example, UNODC cite an IMF study on poverty in
Malawi which reported that ‘insecurity makes it too risky for the poor to accumulate
assets and wealth […] as any assets or wealth are likely to be stolen’ (2005 p.47).
Through its emphasis on transparency SSR aims to reduce corruption in the security
services. The World Bank considers corruption to be ‘the single greatest obstacle to
economic and social development’ (UNODC 2005 p.41). UNODC note both the
extent of corruption within the security sector and its particularly pernicious effects.
‘Nearly all available African survey data show the police to be the most corrupt sector
of African government with the courts often close behind. Rule of law becomes
suborned to rule by connections and wealth and the public cynicism that comes with
these conditions can be difficult to erase’ (ibid p.50).
Through the reduction of crime and conflict SSR aims to create a secure environment
in which development and poverty reduction projects can be effective. As noted,
security is held to be essential for development. Without security development gains
can be destroyed, subverted or stolen, whilst some areas, such as parts of Afghanistan
and Pakistan, are considered so insecure that even local NGOs are unable to operate.
Chalmers proposes that ‘one of the key factors in determining the amount […] of aid
provided to individual countries should be how far they are working to provide the
degree of security necessary for […] development projects to be successful’ (2000 p.
22).
DfID suggest that SSR can also play a role in poverty reduction through efforts to
tackle terrorism. They note the effect of the Bali bombing on Indonesia’s economy
and cite the World Bank claim that the economic impact of 9/11 led to a worldwide
increase in poverty of ten million (DfID 2005 p.7).
Finally, it is suggested that basing military spending on principles of transparency and
accountability will help to prevent excessive military expenditure. Clare Short (1999)
noted how ‘a bloated security sector soaks up resources that would be better used
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elsewhere. And resources spent on excessive procurement and perks for the military
mean the denial of essential public services for the poor.’
In practice, Brzoska points out that many countries fail to publish credible data on
military spending and find ways of funding such spending from non-military budgets
(2003 p.10). And donors have always struggled to define excessive spending or to
ensure that money saved on military expenditure goes to support development.
Moreover, in many countries SSR can lead to an increase rather than a reduction in
the cost of the security sector.
Similarly, SSR does not necessarily lead to crime reduction or to an increase in
security. Reform of the police and justice sectors is only one of a raft of measures that
UNODC propose for breaking the cycle of crime and poverty. Police reform in
Afghanistan, explored in the following section, appears to have had little impact, with
up to 80% of the Afghan National Police involved in corruption and the force
described as ‘a source of insecurity […] rather than a solution to it’ (Hodes and Sedra
2007 p.62 & 66)
The above difficulties illustrate one of the central criticisms of SSR – that the process
is ‘sound in theory but problematic in practice’ (Brzoska 2007 p.2). This section
explores SSR in Afghanistan and the gulf between what donors consider good SSR
practice and what has actually taken place on the ground.
Sedra writes that ‘Donors have manipulated and manoeuvred Afghanistan’s SSR
agenda in an effort to bring it into line with existing conditions but in doing so have
overridden some of its core principles’ (2006 p.95). Amongst the core principles lost
has been the poverty reduction goal itself. The OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR refers
to the need to ensure that reform processes ‘underpin poverty reduction’ (2007 p.21).
Unlike Sierra Leone where a DfID-led SSR process held poverty-reduction as the
primary goal, Afghanistan has seen an international community fundamentally
divided over the purpose of SSR and the strategies and instruments that should be
used to pursue it. Perito points to divisions between European donors and the US over
American efforts to militarise the Afghan police and to divisions within the US camp
itself between the train-and-equip strategies of the Obama administration and General
McChrystal’s belief in the protection of the Afghan civilians as the main priority
(2009 p.13). As this last point suggests Afghanistan raises the question of whose
security the reforms are intended to promote. Whilst the OECD-DAC emphasises
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human security and ‘the safety, well-being and freedom from fear of the population’
(2004 p.1), Hodes and Sedra describe a strategy ‘rooted in regime security’ (2007
p.97). Others see the priority of SSR as the promotion of donor countries’ national
security interests (e.g. Duffield 2006 p32).
The extent to which the poverty reduction goal has been marginalised is seen most
sharply in the anti-narcotics pillar of the SSR programme. Both UNODC and the
NGO Senlis strongly criticised early poppy eradication programmes which aggravated
rather than alleviated poverty. Accompanying alternative livelihood programmes,
such as crop substation schemes, were ill-thought through. Replacing poppies with
crops such as wheat, which provided a twentieth of the income, could only compound
the already considerable problem of rural poverty (Sedra 2006 p.99).
Another of the core principles lost in the Afghan SSR process was the emphasis on
governance. For Hendrickson this is ‘what sets SSR apart from other approaches’
(2009 p.5). The aim is not just to enhance the operational effectiveness of the security
forces but, as the OECD-DAC Handbook states, to ensure that they are ‘developed
adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reforms such as transparency and
accountability’ (2007 p.22). In Afghanistan the overriding aim has not been to create
‘an accountable, equitable and rights-respecting security system’ but to train and
equip the security forces to get them into the fight (Hodes and Sedra 2009 p.8). This
was typified by the police reforms which Perito describes as an attempt to create ‘little
soldiers’ to fight the Taliban (2009 p.1). Management and governance structures were
ignored. In the early years, little attention was paid to improving the capacity of the
Interior Ministry to which only one German advisor was assigned in 2003 (ibid p.3).
And whilst Germany, originally the lead nation for police reform, had aimed to create
‘an ethnically balanced force familiar with human rights standards and modern police
methods and capable of operating in a democratic society’ (ibid), US in-service
training involved seven weeks’ training on military tactics, counterinsurgency and
weapons and one week’s training on basic police skills and amounted to nothing more
than a train and equip programme (ibid p.5). As the International Crisis Group note, if
governance aspects are ignored the danger is that training ‘may merely turn abusive
security forces into more efficiently abusive security forces’ (2004 p.21)
SSR and Governance emphasises the need to focus on long-term changes to political
attitudes, social values and mindsets such as reforming ‘ingrained anti-democratic
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institutional practices’ (OECD 2004 p.6). In Afghanistan such long-term objectives
have often been sacrificed to immediate security needs. This was seen, for example, in
the early accommodations made with the warlords to maintain security until the
Afghan National Security Forces were trained and equipped and later in the
establishment of the Afghan National Police Auxiliary (ANPA). The creation of the
ANPA, which aimed to free the Afghan National Police for a counterinsurgency role,
involved a mere five days training on the Afghan constitution, ethics and policing
techniques and five days of weapons training (Perito 2009 p.9). According to Hodes
and Sedra, the units, which were locally recruited, trained and deployed, amounted to
little more than ‘a façade behind which commanders could maintain their militias’
(2007 p.73), undermining attempts both to establish a state monopoly on force and to
create an accountable, transparent police force.
Sustainability is listed by OECD-DAC as one of the four overarching objectives of
SSR (2007 p.21). Sedra notes that the recurrent costs for the Afghan National Army
(ANA) alone were $171 million in 2004/5, equivalent to approximately a quarter of
the government’s entire budget and over half of the country’s domestic revenue for
the same period. He points out that if the ANA reaches its ceiling of 70 000 the
recurrent budget could reach $290 million (2006 p.104). This is in stark contrast to an
SSR process that aims to make resources available for development and poverty
alleviation through reduced military expenditure. Senlis note how, in a country
experiencing widespread and chronic suffering, aid funding for poverty relief is equal
to only one tenth of the international community’s military expenditure (2006 p.45).
When the SSR process has strayed so far from its core principles and when its poverty
reduction goal has been overridden by the need to train and equip troops, it is
unsurprising that SSR has failed to reduce poverty in Afghanistan. In 2007 the
country ranked 181st of 182 countries on the Human Development Index with poverty
indicators worse than in 2004 when it ranked 173rd of 177 (UNDP 2009). Life
expectancy was one of the lowest in the world at 43.6 years whilst the adult literacy
rate stood at 28%. 78% of the population lacked access to clean water and 39% of
children below 5 years were underweight (ibid).
What does the failure of SSR to alleviate poverty in Afghanistan tell us about its
worth as a tool for poverty reduction? It could be argued that it is unfair to make any
such judgements when the level of insecurity has led to the SSR process regressing to
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a train-and-equip programme in what Sedra (2006) terms a ‘slide toward expediency.’
But, given the scale of the project and the resources and funding that various
international donors have contributed, SSR in Afghanistan will be judged and is likely
to be seen as a test case. Afghanistan clearly highlights the enormous difficulties of
putting into practice the donor vision of SSR. SSR is a hugely ambitious undertaking,
one that can be seen as nothing less than ‘social engineering’ (e.g. Smith 2006). The
OECD-DAC Handbook outlines an SSR process that should be ‘locally owned and
based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law’ (2007
p.21). Can it be both in Afghanistan? The long-term goal of changing attitudes and
mind-sets was noted, but how realistic is it to expect the values, attitudes and patterns
of behaviour of a society to change simply because that society is now a post-conflict
society? When both capacity and political will are lacking, to what extent can SSR be
‘a nationally owned and led vision’ whose programmes are ‘rooted in the reforming
country’s history, culture, legal framework and institutions’ (OECD 2004 p.4)? Sedra
suggests that this dilemma is particularly crucial in Afghanistan where the history of
foreign invasion and interference mean ‘the mere perception that reforms are being
imposed externally can serve to delegitimize and derail the process’ (2006 p.106).
Afghanistan also shows the dangers of concentrating on ‘hard’ security and assuming
that poverty-reduction will automatically follow. The hardship brought to an already
impoverished rural population by the ill-thought through early anti-narcotics
programme starkly illustrates the need for the poverty alleviation goal to be a central
consideration across the SSR process.
Finally, Afghanistan illustrates the limited applicability of SSR. Sedra describes the
process as one that has been ‘seized upon as a panacea’ (2006 p.95). Afghanistan
serves as a reminder that SSR is unlikely to work unless certain conditions are in
place. The donor vision of a holistic process that emphasises governance as well
effectiveness requires, as Sedra states, both the ‘minimum degree of security and
institutional capacity which are absent in the Afghan context’ (2006 p.95).
Afghanistan illustrates how SSR can fail to alleviate poverty when its practice strays
so far from the theory. But perhaps the SSR ‘success story’ of Sierra Leone poses a
greater challenge to its efficacy as a means of poverty alleviation. SSR in Sierra
Leone has undoubtedly been a success in terms of conflict prevention. There has been
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no return to conflict since the end of the civil war in 2002. In September 2004 the
government of Sierra Leone were able to take over primary responsibility for security
from UNAMSIL, the United Nations peacekeeping mission. And, most significantly
of all, the reformed security sector was able to oversee free and peaceful elections in
2007, elections which saw no political involvement from the army.
Yet national sources estimated 70% of the population to be living below the dollar a
day poverty line in 2004 (African Economic Outlook 2010). Sierra Leone ranked
180th out of 182 countries on the 2007 HDI (UNDP 2009). Life expectancy was 47.3
years, adult literacy 38.1% and primary enrolment 44.6% (ibid). Clearly, Sierra
Leone’s ‘success story’ did not extend to poverty alleviation – DfID’s primary goal.
The case of Sierra Leone raises two questions – is it really an example of ‘good
practice’ and more importantly can SSR alleviate poverty when developed in a
vacuum?
One possible argument for the failure of SSR to alleviate poverty is that, a closer look
at the implementation of the programme suggests the ‘good practice’ may not have
been quite so ‘good’ after all. The fact that the SSR programme in Sierra Leone was
UK funded and UK led meant that there was a far greater degree of coherence and
coordination than was the case is Afghanistan, whilst DfIDs key role meant that
poverty reduction remained central to the process. The establishment by the UK of
Conflict Prevention Pools is often taken as a model of ‘joined-up government’,
something recommended as good SSR practice (OECD 2004 p.3). Established in 2001
the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and African Conflict Prevention Pool included
the MoD, FCO and DfID, pooling funding from each department and bringing
together expertise in defence, development and diplomacy. However, some have
questioned just how ‘joined up’ this exemplar of joined-up government is. Fitz-Gerald
points out the ‘different departmental motivations across the joined-up partnership’
(2004 p.117) and Hills questions the extent of cooperation between ministries when
‘policy making remains hierarchical and adversarial’ (2000 p.50).
Just as the Conflict Prevention Pools were seen to lead the way in joined-up
government, so the integration of security and development through Sierra Leone’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) was viewed by the international
community as good practice. Understanding and Supporting SSR set out DfID’s
approach to the PRSP as ‘a mechanism for mainstreaming security sector issues into
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development policy’ (DfID 2002 p.12), an important step given that the PRSP serves
as the primary poverty reduction tool in most post-conflict countries. However,
although the Sierra Leone Security Sector Review did provide input into the PRSP,
White questions the extent of the integration between security and development
policies (2009 p.109). He also argues that this innovative approach to security had
little impact because, once published, Sierra Leone’s PRSP became a ‘dead
document’ (ibid). Furthermore, White argues that ‘the perception of the securitisation
of the PRSP’ may have discouraged donor funding and contributed to the shortfall in
the PRSP budget (Albrecht and Jackson 2009 p.119).
The UK’s long-term commitment through its ten year memorandum of understanding
(MoU) with the Sierra Leone government, signed in 2002, was a radical departure
from the typical three year development funding cycles and was seen as excellent
practice for the long-term SSR process. But, as will be shown, the fixed nature of the
MoU had drawbacks as well as advantages.
Finally, Gbla criticises the dominant role of external actors in the Sierra Leone
reforms which he describes as ‘SSR under international tutelage’. When ownership is
seen as key to reform’s success, he points out that the donor-led nature of the SSR
process in Sierra Leone raises questions about the programme’s sustainability and
viability (Gbla 2006).
Thus, it could be argued that the failure of SSR to alleviate poverty in Sierra Leone,
does not necessarily mean that SSR as a poverty reduction tool is flawed. Problems
with the implementation of some of the innovative and laudable approaches taken by
DfID may have played a part in its failure. Against this, it needs to be noted that many
of the elements considered key for SSR success, such as recipient country political
will, donor coherence and long-term commitment, were in place in Sierra Leone.
Clearly no strategy designed for post-conflict environments should require every
element of an extensive list of conditions to be in place for success.
A more persuasive defence of SSR as a poverty alleviation strategy is that, however
successful the reforms, they cannot be expected to alleviate poverty on their own. The
key role of the security sector is to create an enabling environment in which
development can take place. Security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
poverty reduction. In the case of Sierra Leone it can be argued that the failure to
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alleviate poverty was not due to the failure of SSR as a poverty reduction tool but the
failure, first, of the government to pursue the opportunities created by the secure
environment and, secondly, the outcome of the aid and trade policies pursued by the
international community.
As Ebo states, if SSR is to be effective it needs to be part of a broader transformative
project (2007 p.45). The 2005 PRSP set out an ambitious programme of development
for Sierra Leone and the success of the country’s SSR had provided an enabling
environment for such a programme to work. However, White argues that little or no
action was taken to implement the reforms outlined in the PRSP. He contends that
‘the stable secure environment lessened the immediate imperatives to lead’ and that
‘some members of the Government instead opted to use that security for their own
ends’ (White 2009 p.116). Amongst the government elite it was back to ‘business as
usual’. The period saw several high profile government corruption cases and little
work done on poverty reduction. For White, SSR in Sierra Leone demonstrated the
dangers of ‘developing a competent security sector in a vacuum’ (ibid).
The international community must share responsibility for the failure to seize the
development opportunities security had created. As mentioned, the inflexibility of the
UK’s funding MoU with Sierra Leone meant that when resources should have been
diverted from security to development they could not be. As White states, ‘the work
undertaken in the security sector […] created opportunities for work in trade,
diamonds, health, education and local government, but the funding was not there to
take advantage of the opportunities’ (2009 p.115).
More importantly, the international donor community failed to provide sufficient
funding to implement the policies outlined in the PRSP. Smillie (2009), who describes
Sierra Leone as an ‘aid orphan’, contends that the country was poorly served by the
majority of donors. In The Bottom Billion Collier criticises the donors’ approach to
post-conflict countries which are typically flooded with aid in the years immediately
following the conflict, when they lack the capacity to use the funds effectively. Then,
when support is most useful in the second half of the post-peace decade, donors lose
interest (Collier 2007 p.106). This, Smillie argues, was the case in Sierra Leone (2009
p.23). He also criticises the recent ‘selective’ approach to development funding
pursued by many bilateral donors (ibid p.17). Influential studies such as Collier and
Dollar (2004) reported that aid is most effectively used in countries with the right
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policies and institutions and so should be channelled to such countries. Without
coordination between donors, this movement towards greater selectivity meant some
countries, like Sierra Leone, were almost abandoned (ibid p.23). Whilst developing
countries are on average supported by twenty six different bilateral donors (Riddell
2007 p.52), Sierra Leone has only four (African Economic Outlook 2010).
Consequently, a donor meeting to raise funds to support the 2005 PRSP ended with a
substantial shortfall between the required budget of over $2 billion and the amount
pledged. Furthermore, as White points out, even amount pledged differed greatly from
the amount actually given (2009 p. 115). Donor bureaucracy meant that in 2006 less
than half of the aid committed to Sierra Leone was disbursed (Glennie 2008 p.70).
These problems were compounded by a high rate of inflation and, more recently, by
the fall in value of the pound against the leone - a drop of 30% between 2007 and
2008 (African Economic Outlook 2010).
Smillie also questions the targeting of the funding for Sierra Leone. He points out that
40% of US aid consists of food aid, funds which, he argues, would be much more
productively used to develop the country’s agricultural sector (2009 p 24). The current
level of rice production in Sierra Leone stands at only 60% of the average production
in the 1980s when the country was self-sufficient in rice. Yet less than 1% of the EU’s
assistance goes to support agriculture and, whilst only $9 million a year is spent on
this sector, Sierra Leone is spending $50 to $55 million a year importing rice (Smillie
2009 p24-25).
Perhaps more damaging than aid policies, are trade policies which prevent poor
countries such as Sierra Leone competing on the global market. High levels of
protection and subsidies for agriculture in the US, EU and Japan leave many
developing countries unable to compete. Subsidies of over $1 billion a year enable US
rice farmers to sell rice that costs $415 per metric tonne to produce for $274 a tonne,
20 to 25% less than the cost of Sierra Leonean rice (Smillie 2009 p. 24-5).
Sierra Leone illustrates the difficulties of implementing SSR even under conditions
far more favourable than those present in Afghanistan. In a country where many of the
key requirements, such as political will, were in place, this raises the question of the
extent to which the SSR process envisaged by donors can be operationalised in postconflict environments.
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Unlike in Afghanistan, SSR did bring security to Sierra Leone but it still did not
alleviate poverty. In the words of Horn and Olanisakin (2008 p32), ‘The UK
government policy sees SSR as a fundamental pre-requisite for the achievement of
broader development goals, yet the evidence form Sierra Leone is that one does not
necessarily lead to the other.’ A reformed security sector alone cannot alleviate
poverty. Security sector reforms need to be integrated with other poverty reduction
policies as part of a broad transformative project. As White says, without this
integration there is a danger that ‘we are left with a series of rather glib assertions that
‘development needs security and security needs development’’(Gberie 2009 p.2).
Poverty reduction is a complex process in which security, however important, is only
one factor. Sierra Leone shows how the benefits of any advances in security can be
swamped by other influences on poverty such as donor aid and trade policies.
One of the difficulties in evaluating the success of SSR is that it is impossible to
isolate the effects of SSR from the influence of other policies which impact on
poverty. This remains one of several challenges donors face in attempting to
demonstrate that SSR can alleviate poverty. Brzoska noted that SSR has its roots in
the development donor debates about how best to target and implement development
assistance (2003 p.2). Many of the disparities described earlier between SSR policies
and practices are not unique to this area, but are part of those wider debates about aid
effectiveness and, as such, suggest there are no easy or quick solutions to bridging the
policy/practice gap.
A criticism of the SSR practiced in both Afghanistan and Sierra Leone was that it has
been heavily donor led. The importance of recipient country ownership to the
effectiveness of aid has been recognised since the Pearson Commission of 1969 and
impact studies have shown it to be one of the key factors in determining success
(Riddell 2008). Even though ownership is beginning to happen, through for example
the PRSPs, it is, as Riddell points out, still very much the exception rather than the
rule (2008 p.222). Acknowledgment that attaching conditions to aid is ineffective has
left donors still struggling with the dilemma of how to bring about reforms that may
not be in the interests of the recipient government. Similarly, as Smith points out, a
fundamental challenge posed by SSR is that it ‘cannot be implemented successfully
without the cooperation of those who stand to lose the most’ (2001 p.14).
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
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Julius Ward
The lack of integration between security and wider poverty-reduction policies was
noted, with Sierra Leone being the first country to attempt to this. How far donors are
from actually achieving such a goal is illustrated by the fact that, despite longestablished concerns over their lack of integration with recipient country priorities and
the duplication of objectives, the majority of foreign aid continues to be channelled
into discrete development projects (Riddell 2007 p.186-9).
The tension seen in Afghanistan between short-term security objectives and longerterm goals was also evident in Sierra Leone. Even in Sierra Leone, where the UK had
given a long-term commitment through its MoU, there was at times pressure from
London to bypass the government it was helping to build in order to ‘get things done’
(Albrecht and Jackson 2009 p.179). This tension between support for long-term
sustainable objectives, such as the strengthening of institutions or the empowerment
of citizens, and support for short-term more easily visible outcomes is another of the
key dilemmas faced by donors. For example, the Commission for Africa (2005) called
for longer funding time frames to deter the focus on short-term targets.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for SSR as a poverty reduction strategy, is the
problem of donor coordination. Afghanistan illustrates the problems posed by
multiple donors with different goals for SSR, whilst Sierra Leone illustrates how the
lack of coordination can lead to countries being poorly served by the donor
community. The need for donor coordination has been long emphasised in reports
such as OECD/DACs 1996 Shaping the Twenty First Century – The Contribution of
Development Coordination and at aid conferences from Monterey to Paris. But only
recently has there started to be some coordination between donors. The vast majority
of aid is still provided through separate decision making and continues to be shaped
by the different political, commercial and strategic interests of the donor nations.
DfID remains one of only three of the nine largest bilateral donors whose aid is
‘specifically driven’ by poverty considerations (Riddell 2007 p.98).
The OECD-DAC Handbook is intended as a guide to help SSR donors to ‘close the
gap between policy and practice’ (p.15). However, when this involves many of the
same key dilemmas that the donor community has been struggling to resolve for, in
some cases, decades, it is not a gap that will be easily or quickly closed.
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
15
Julius Ward
It would be wrong to conclude from its failure to alleviate poverty in Sierra Leone or
Afghanistan that SSR cannot work as a poverty reduction tool. As development
donors have become increasingly aware, context is vital. Initiatives that work in one
country may fail in another and what fails to reduce poverty in Sierra Leone or
Afghanistan may succeed elsewhere. But Afghanistan has provided an important
reminder that, in the words of Chanaa, ‘SSR is as much about understanding and
identifying the limitations of external assistance as it is the opportunities’ (2002 p.76).
A minimum level of security clearly needs to be in place if SSR is to succeed. The
donor community has perhaps, as Hills (2000) suggests, been over-optimistic in their
expectations of what SSR can achieve. Both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan show the
difficulty of implementing the donor vision of SSR and clearly much needs to be done
to bridge the divide between theory and practice. The OECD-DAC Handbook (2007
p.) states that ‘SSR helps create a secure environment conducive to other political,
economic and social developments, through the reduction of armed violence and
crime.’ Sierra Leone and Afghanistan both show the dangers in assuming that poverty
reduction will automatically follow security. Security is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition. To impact on poverty SSR needs to be integrated with broader
development policies and its activities need to be informed by its poverty-reduction
goal. And it needs to be recognised that, important as it is, security is only one host of
factors that influence poverty.
The challenges donors face in closing the gap between SSR theory and practice are
not new. The development sector has been grappling with many of the same key
issues for decades, suggesting that the route to poverty reduction through SSR will, as
Clare Short concluded, be neither easy nor straightforward. Both SSR itself and
poverty reduction are long-term processes. SSR is a new concept and development
donors are relatively new to security. As Brzoska notes, ‘A cumulative learning
process has only begun’ (2006 p.12). If Afghanistan comes to be seen as a test case
for SSR, there is a danger that its failure to alleviate poverty may undermine the
important advances made in incorporating security issues into development thinking.
The recent closure of the DfID-sponsored Global Facilitation Network for SSR raises
doubts as to whether this learning process will be allowed the time it needs.
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
16
Julius Ward
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