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A pmoved
BY
ALIS8A J. CAMP
ADVISORi
DR. J. BUCKLER
A SENIOR THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HI8TORY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS
MAY, 1990
Introduction.............................*
tort It Violation* of tho Autonomy Ciouoo of tho
Xing'a Baaea. ............ ......... *• 3
Part lit Motivational Factor* Loading to Agaailaua' Blatant
Diarogard for tho Autonomy Clausa....... F. 22
A t tit* clot* of the Peloponnesian Htt la 494 S.C.,
Sparta found herself in a unique position.
Athefcs hod
boon dofoatod along with har naval empire and many Greeks
fait a naw ara of fraadora waa forthcoming for thair
country.
Sparta had baan tha daciaiva military forca
causing Athana to fall and many Greeks lookad to Sparta to
ptrotact tha paacaful atmosphere.
Sparta had battlad
againat Athana in tha nama of liberty and had triumphed.
Her influence in tha upcoming yeari would play a prominant
role in tha political arenas of all Greek poleis.
How
Sparta would handle this elevated position depended
largely on tha political figure who would work his way to
the forefront of Spartan politics, Agesilaus.
After tha
death of Agesilaus' half brother Xing Agis, tha death of
Lysandar, and tha exile of Pausanius, Ageailaua was able
to become tha moat influential Spartan leader, shaping
Spartan foreign policy.
Ageailaua* actual succession to tha throne was
surrounded by peculiar factors.
One certainty concerning
tha episode is that Lysandar secured Agesilaus' Kingship.
At the close of the Peloponnesian War, it was Lysandar who
shaped many of Sparta's initial policies.
72)
sor.
(Hamilton, p.
Agesilaus would borrow many ideas from his predeces­
One of the most significant beliefs which would be
carried ovmr from Lysandar's age of influence into
Agesilaus*, would be the idea that Sparta should go
ftOAinst tgidtt lflftil Dfietict and lit#nd har inllutiiei
outaid* tha Peloponnesus. Agesilaua was imperialistic.
In 3(7 B.C., an agreement with Persia was raachad.
Tha Xing's Peace was aignad and guarantaad tha autonomy of
ail Greek city atatas.
Sparta had bean aada guarantor of
tha paaca and thua tha protector of the freedom which aha
had wrested from Athen's control.
Agesilaua, however,
would choose to ignore his responsibility to maintain the
individual polls' independence.
Ha would Instead use the
peace as an instrument of imperialism.
Agaailaua would
continue the policies of his predecessor, Lysander, and
would choose not to honor the terms of the Xing's Peace.
By encroaching upon his allies and other Greek poleis,
Agesilaua would cause a common hostility to rise up
against Sparta.
Examination of specific instances in
which Agesilaus either blatantly ignored or re-interpreted
the autonomy clause of the peace, reveals his expansionistic policies.
From the very onset, Agesilaus would use this treaty
to lessen the influence of Thebes and settle a personal
grudge which he held against the city.
Agesilaus' hostil­
ity towards the Thebans was a well-known fact in the
ancient world.
According to Plutarch, Agesilaus exper­
ienced a drean in which he envisaged hinsel f a s the
successor of Agamemnon. (p. 715)
For this reason,
Agesilaus chose to stop and make sacrifice in Aulis before
his Persian campaign.
This is the same place Agamemnon
sacrificed before his voyage to Troy.
Agesilaus chose to
use his own soothesayer to complete the ritual or. Boeotian
territory.
In simplistic terms, the Boeotians were
angered because of Agesilaus' disregard for their coun­
try's sacrificial laws.
tions as well.
There were political considera­
Blundering the sacrifice of Agesilaus was
part of a course of action designed to alert Sparta that
the Thebans no longer intended to accept Spartan
control.
(Hack, p. 212)
Ismenias and his democratic
faction had come to power between 404 B.C. and 395 B.C.
The traditionally pro-Spartan oligarchy was out of favor
and the new leaders were proclaiming their independence.
The destruction of Agesilaus' sacrifice at Aulis was the
symbolic gesture indicating foreign policy change in
fiibes.
Thm ruined sacrifice caused Agesilaus to kail tb
Persia udder ill o m m
and insulted hi* personally.
8*
would never forgive tha Thebans for this disgraceful
avant.
This personal hatred, combined with tha fact that
Thebes was tha second most powerful land force in Greece
after Sparta, account for Agesilaus' continued hostility
towards Thebes.
At the vary conclusion of tha peace, both Agesilaus’
animosity towards the Thebans and his recognition of tha
autonomy elausa ware obvious.
At the peace conference,
the Thebans claimed the right to take the oath on behalf
of all of the Boeotian cities.
Agesilaus refused to allow this.
Xenophon reports that
In accordance with the
autonomy clause, Agesilaus demanded that each independent
city take the oath.
<Hellenic*. BK. v.l. 32-34)
Instead
of waiting for a response from the rebuked Theban ambassa­
dors, Agesilaus immediately instigated military operations
against Thebes.
The Thebans were not willing to face a
Peloponnesian army so sent ambassadors to accept
Agesilaus ' terms before he and his army had left the
Peloponnesus.
By buckling to Agesilaus' demands, the
Thebans surrendered their control over the Boeotian
league.
The Thebans lost more than one half of their
armed strength with this concession.
(Hack, p. 211)
autonomy clause had been interpreted by Agesilaus to
The
Pipe 9
m m that the Boeotians itin met ^titleii tc set m
hsgesxm over « league of
er# did
allied state*.
Agesilaus, howev­
net feel the need to give eg power over hie elm
Peloponnesian league.
When Agesilaua planned Military
action against Thebes, he was clearly using allied forces.
Xenophon says that Agesilaua "sent mustering officers to
the various cities of the allies."
33-4)
(Hellenics. BX. v.l.
Clearly, Agesilaus recognised the existence of the
autonomy clause and planned to use it as an instrument to
increase Sparta's power.
Agesilaus employs similar
techniques in his treatment of Mantinea.
At the close of the Corinthian War the Spartans
decided that the members of the Peloponnesian league who
had been disloyal must be punished.
campaign against Mantinea in 386 B.C.
They began with a
Xenophon states
that they "sent to the Mantineans and ordered them to tear
down their wall saying that they could not trust them in
any other way to not take sides with their enemies."
(Hellenic*, BK. V.II. 1-4)
The Spartans claimed that the
Mantineans had sent supplies to the Argives, had refrained
from fighting due to religious pretexts, and had performed
badly when they had fought.
It is not unreasonable to
suggest that these are mere excuses offered to enable
Sparta to secure her dominance.
This is especially true
if Sparta and Agesilaus could be expected to proceed in
the same domineering fashion which they used to handle
Thebes.
Diodorus states not that tha action was ralatad
to Mantinea'a past actions but that tha action was due to
to Ageailaua * deaire to place pro-Spartan oligarchic
factiona in aa Many citiaa of Qraaca aa possible.
p. if?)
(Mice,
This ia probably ouch cloaar to tha nark,
ha
K.J. Seager pointa out in hia Athenaeum art I d a , Sparta's
treatment of tha aituation was both traditional and
predictable.
8ho had weakened Mantinea's oppoaition by
ridding of tho democratic faction ami frionda of Argos,
ami had aatabliahad an oligarchy loyal to Sparta,
(p.40}
Another predictable clement of thia aituation waa tha
diapatch not of Ageailaua, but of King Ageaipolia.
Ageailaua refrained from taking command on tha
pretext that tha Mantinaana had aided hia father earlier,
teen Xenophon hinta that thia ia mere pretenae atating
that Ageaipolia' father "was on exceedingly friendly terma
with the leadera of the popular party in Mantinea."
(Hellenics, BX. V.II. l>4)
Ageailaua emerged from the
proceedings in a more positive light than he would had he
been the actual aggressor.
Not only did sending
Ageaipolia save face for Ageailaua, but it also could have
harmed Ageaipolia' reputation with the other democrats in
Greece.
Ageailaua hoped to "instigate a conflict between
Ageaipolia and the democratic factions in Mantinea and
other Peloponnesian cities."
(David, p.27)
He also
wanted Ageaipolia to become a faithful supporter of his
liilisissaissa
Sails*
own policies.
Unfortunately for Agesilaus, Agesipolis'
father Pausanius interfered and prevented Agesipolis from
executing the democratic leaders.
This strengthened
Agesipolis' popularity with the Spartan allies, gained the
support of democratic factions throughout the
Peloponnesus, and earned the support of anti-Agesilaus
factions in Sparta.
(David, p. 27)
The Mantineans responded to the Spartan demand by
refusing to tear down their walls.
They had been a city
since 460 B.C. and had come together of their own accord.
They had every right to refuse t>uch a demand by Sparta.
Agesilaus' interference here clearly goes against the
autonomy clause.
"This behavior violated the spirit, if
not the letter of the Peace of Antalicidas."
167)
(Rice, p.
Rot only had Agesilaus blatantly affronted the
autonomous decision-making of Mantinea by ordering her to
tear down her walls, but also he ordered that the city be
divided into its original four villages after it had been
militarily pacified.
This was no longer simply a viola*
tion of the King's Peace.
of Greek tradition.
It now constituted a violation
The polls was a respected institution
of Greek custom and its destruction was frowned upon by
all Greeks.
An interesting political consideration is
that these individual cities were to be placed under the
control of the big landowners, thus increasing the oligar­
chic factions loyalty to Agesilaus.
(David, p. 27)
SSilliiliSifisiifil
Ageailaus is eonaciously striving to crests a power base
in Greek city states of oligarchies loyal to Sparta.
The
only possible way in which Agesilaus could have justified
hia actiona according to the King's Peace would have been
by claiming that he waa protecting the autonomy of the
four original villagea.
This is obviously absurd and is a
clear misuse of the peace.
Ageailaus is already beginning
to alienate his allies by a disregard for both tradition
and the autonomy clause.
The ties of the Peloponnesian
league along with the backbone of Spartan power were
beginning to weaken.
Another instance in which Ageailaus abuses the
autonomy clause appears in his dealings with Phlius.
In
384 B.C., Phliasian exiles sought aid from Agesilaus.
They appeared before the board of ephors requesting to be
reinstated to Phliasian government.
The exiles pointed to
past instances of their loyalty to the spartan state.
They argued that when they had been an active part of the
Phliasian government, Phlius had fought loyally alongside
the Spartans in the Corinthian War and that after they had
been exiled, Phlius refused to follow Sparta's command.
(Xenophon, Hellenlca. v . n .
8-12)
During the Corinthian
War Sparta could do little to rid of democratic rule in
Phlius.
After the war, however, and after the subjection
of Kantinea, no factors blocked Sparta's intervention in
favor of the oligarchal faction in this area.
The area
Pag* 9
was significant because of its strategic location.
"It
lay on a thoroughfar* from Arkadia to Namaa , Klaonai and
Corinth, and commanded tha route froa Stymphalos to the
Argiva plain."
(Cartledge, p. 228)
Claarly both th*
nacassity and timing coapallad Agasilaus to ignora tha
autonoay clausa and to iaposa his will upon tha city.
Accordingly, Agasilaus ordarad tha city to ra-instata
th* axilad oligarchic faction.
For raasons of their own,
Phlius had chosen a democratic form of government.
It was
Phlius' own right to decide tha method of rule for their
polis.
Again, Agasilaua is violating traditional Greek
theology concerning th* polis, as wall as entirely ignor­
ing th* autonoay clause.
Agesilaus justified his actions
by claiming that ha had com* to th* aid of those who had
been wronged.
(Xenophon, Hellenic*. W . m .
14) This
claim is a flimsy shield for his true intentions of creat­
ing another oligarchal ally.
In addition, it is question­
able whether or not the exiles claims pointing towards
Phliasian disloyalty ware founded.
In 391 B.C., Phlius
refused to admit a Spartan garrison fearing that the
oligarchic exiles would be restored.
Like the Mantineans,
th* Phliasians refused on religous grounds to fight in the
Settle of Msmea in 384 B.C.
These are the only two times
th* Phliasians refused to cooperate with Sparta.
After
391 B.C., with the Phliasian loss to Iphicrates of Athens,
Phlius was a loyal ally to Sparta, fulfilling her troop
commitments.
Thar* waa little or no basis for tha axilas
claim that Phliua had batrayad Sparta.
(Rica, p. 172)
Tha axilas aiaply eapitalisad on tha knowledge that
Agaailaua was attempting to sat up a syatam of loyal
oligarchias throughout nainland Qraaea.
Although Phlius raalisad that Sparta had no tradi>
tional right to intarfara with thair choica of a governaantal systan and was violating tha autonomy clausa of tha
Xing's Paaca, thay had littla choica.
With tha axaapla of
Kantinaa aat before them, Phlius raalisad that Sparta
would taka military action and thus votad to reinstate tha
exiled oligarchal faction.
abort lived.
This arranganent was, howavar,
Two years later, tha oligarchs ware again
appealing to Sparta for help.
Thay coaplainad that
questions concerning thair property ware being settled by
tha democratic faction.
(Xenophon, Hellenics. V.III. 10)
Zt is probable that tha Democrats ware disregarding the
interests of the oligarchs dua to tha fact that
Agasipolis, tha second Spartan King was campaigning in
Olynthus.
Zt was against Spartan policy to sand both
kings on a military venture at one time hence, Agesilaus
supposedly would not invade.
Zn addition, Phlius had
recently donated a handsome sum to Agasipolis' war causa
in Olynthos.
This generous gift did not prove loyalty to
tha Spartans in tha ayes of Agaailaua.
•aw it on more personal terms.
As waa typical, ha
Agaailaua saw this
donation as a sign of Phliasian support in favor of
Agesipolis, Agasilaus' only raal contandar for control of
Spartan foreign policy.
was probably corract.
to pacify Phlius.
prataxt.
His assassmant of tha situation
Agasilaus was aagar for any pretext
Tha axilas plaa for aid gava him this
Xanophon raports that Phlius was surprisad by
Agasilaus' military praparations and attamptad to briba
him.
(Xanophon, Hallanica. V.lll. 14)
Tha democratic
loaders refused Agasilaus' request that tha axilas be
restored and Agasilaus besieged the city.
Tha Phliasians
withstood Agasilaus' siege tactics for an embarrassing two
years.
With the death of their ally, Agesipolis, in 380
B.C., they ware left without hope of survival.
Thus,
Agasilaus ignored tha same autonomy clausa for which he
had fervently fought in tha case of tha Boeotian league,
the Phliasians' autonomy was violated and they ware forced
to become subjects of an oligarchy which did not enjoy
popular support.
The next time Agasilaus chose to ignore tha autonomy
clause comes during tha course of Sparta's dealings with
Olynthus.
Tha account of Sparta's interference hare
appears in Xenophon's Hellenics, book five, chapter two.
Cleigenes of Acanthus appears as an ambassador in Sparta
to request Spartan military aid against the Olynthians.
During this period, around 383 B.C., the Olynthian alli­
ance was the second most powerful land force since the
Pag* 12
destruction of th* Boeotian Confederacy.
Sparta had not
interfered in this area because of its extreme northern
geographic position.
In addition, Olynthus had expressed
little or no interest in mainland Greek territories under
Spartan dominance, and had been primarily concerned with
northern Macedonian territory.
This understanding of
interests had, however, changed as Cleigenes shrewdly
pointed out to the Spartans.
As a bribe, Amnytas, King of
th* Macedonians, had promised Cleigenes' city of Acanthus
as well as the city of Pella to the Olynthians
The two
cities were adverse to Olynthian domination and appealed
to Sparta to save their autonomy as was Sparta's duty
under the King's Peace.
As in the past, Sparta did not
become involved because of enthusiastic concern over
preserving the autonomy of individual Greek city states.
Cleigenes informed the Spartans that the Olynthians
had sought to form an alliance with both Athens and
Thebes.
(Xenophon. Hellenics. v.Il. 15-18)
This drasti­
cally altered Agesilaus' interest in the situation.
Since
th* signing of the peace, Athens had remained relatively
low key.
She simply had remained independent and con­
cerned about coastal cities affecting her trad* routes.
Athens would naturally be interested in th* Olynthian
situation, since Olynthus occupied an area of great
economic importance in terms of Athenian trad* routes.
Pag* 13
Spartan domination of thia tarritory would constitut* a
throat to Athonian aconomie stability.
Th# Thebans also had raason to faar Spartan control
of this araa.
If Olynthus bacama a pro-Spartan forca,
Thabas would be surrounded by hostile political systems on
either side as well as being isolated from Athens, who
could offer no assistance.
Sparta could simply not allow
an alliance between her two old enemies, Athens and
Thebes, with th* up and coming strength of Olynthus.
An
alliance of this sort would most assuredly cause the end
of Sparta and Agesilaus' domination over mainland Greece.
This is why Agesilaus became involved.
He was not con­
cerned with the autonomy clause of the King's Peace.
Xenophon reports that the Spartans did not ask their
allies how they should respond according to terms of the
peace, but simply aaked the allies what they "deemed best
for the Peloponnesus and for th* allies."
(Hellenics.
V. II 18-21)
Hence, Agesilaus chose to interfere in the extreme
north.
This area was traditionally left alone by Sparta.
Again in this instance Agesilaus uses the peace as a means
of expansion.
Instead of taking the command himself,
Agesipolis was given the responsibility of executing th*
campaign.
Agesipolis badly needed a successful militexy
campaign to enhance his reputation.
Agesilaus could
benefit through his absence by following his oligarchic
:
:v
:
■■ ■.m i
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Page 14
revival In Phliua aa mentioned above.
Agesilaus also
capitalised on the campaign and absence of Agesipolis by
taking the opportunity to completely pacify Thebes.
The extreme northern positioning of Olynthus posed
some military difficulties.
After the Spartans questioned
their allies on their opinion of their military involve*
ment, it was accordingly decided that Sparta would send a
force.
Plans were immediately voiced concerning how the
campaign would be carried out.
were called for.
Traditional arrangements
Each ally was asked to send its propor­
tionate contingent for an army of ten thousand, and
proposals were made for the donation of money as an
alternative.
(Xenophon, Hellenlca. V.II. 18-21)
The
Acanthians suggested that there was not enough time for
such preparations.
As a result, a smaller force was sent
under Budamidas with the idea that more troops would
follow to strengthen this initial force.
Budamidas'
brother, Phoebidas, was chosen to follow with reinforce­
ment troops.
On his way to Olynthus, Phoebidas camped on
the outskirts of Thebes.
While in this position, his
troops entered the city and captured the Cadmea, the
Theban Acropolis, during a religous festival.
As Xenophon
relates this story, he makes a definite attempt to impli­
cate that Phoebidas' actions were independent of any
higher Spartan command and due largely to Phoebidas'
desires to enhance his personal glory.
Pag* 15
Phoabidaa did not actually formulate the plan,
according to Xenophon.
Leontiades, leader of the pro-
-Spartan faction, approached Phoebidas and offered to lead
him into the Acropolis.
Xenophon states that when
Phoebidas heard the plan he was filled with "buoyant
hopes" and with a great passion for "performing some
brilliant achievement."
Phoebidas is then described as a
man with little practical wisdom.
25-28)
(Hellenics. V.II.
Thus we are led to believe that Phoebidas indepen­
dently made the decision to break the autonomy clause to
gain fame.
If this was, in fact, the case, then
Agesilaus' subsequent behavior is difficult to explain.
When Leontiades farced the ephors and an angry Spartan
citisenship, Agesilaus came to his and Phoebidas' rescue.
Agesilaus suggested that Phoebidas only deserved punish­
ment if his actions were harmful to the Peloponnesus.
(Xenophon, Hellenics. V.II. 31-34)
Agesilaus further
claimed that it was Spartan tradition for a commander to
act upon his own initiative when the well-being of the
state was involved.
Leontiades followed up Agesilaus'
advice by persuading the Spartans to
punish the anti-Spartan faction.
V.II. 34-37)
keep the Cadmea and
(Xenophon, Hellenic*.
Agesilaus' eager defense of Phoebidas'
illegal activities creates suspicion.
His statement
defending Phoebidas is not entirely implausible but
suggests that it is simply a front for Agesilaus' true
intention* and/or involvement.
This idea ia supported by
Diodorus who claims that all commanders were given secret
instruction to seise Thebes if an opportunity arose.
(Diodorus XV. 20. 2)
Xenophon places the responsibility of the attack upon
Leontiades, Phoebidas, and their individual scheming.
Both Diodorus and an overall view of Agesilaus and his
recent actions suggest that Agesilaus was behind the plan
and employing a scapegoat, which he typically did in such
situations.
At any rate, it cannot be denied that this
action clearly disregarded the autonomy clause of the
Xing's Peace.
Agesilaus. as he justified Phoebidas*
actions, was guilty of an unprovoked attack in a time of
peace upon a city upholding the Xing's Peace.
Agesilaus had interfered in the north using the
autonomy clause as justification and then ignored the same
clause during the same campaign in the case of Thebes.
There is no ethical explanation and accordingly,
Agesilaus' and Sparta's popularity plummeted throughout
Greece.
It is necessary to outline one of Agesilaus' last
political moves which completely ignored the autonomy
clause.
This final episode differs in nature from the
episodes mentioned above.
It involves a raid on Athens by
the Spartan commander Sphodrias.
According to Xenophon,
Sphodriaf the Lacedaemonian governor at Thespiae, was
persuaded by the Thebans to invada Attica provoking a war
batwaan Sparta and Athana.
Hence, ha decided to captora
tha Piraeus, a major Athenian outpost, which still had no
gates. (Xenophon, Hellenics.
was a failure.
V.XV. 18-20)
Tha invasion
Sphodrias had planned to taka tha area
before daybreak catching tha Athenians entirely off guard.
Due to rough muddy territory, not only ware Sphodrias'
troops caught red-handed on tha outskirts of Athens at
daybraak, but also, tha Athenians had received warning and
were waiting with a fully mobilised army.
Instead of
retreating at this point, Sphodrias foolishly ravished the
countryside.
The Athenians were accordingly outraged and
first confronted the Spartan embassy present in Athens at
the time of the attack.
The embassy claimed complete
ignorance of Sphodrias' actions and promised the Athenians
that Sphodrias would be put to death for his actions.
(Xenophon, Hellenics,
v.iv. 20-24)
Sphodrias was, in
fact, recalled by the ephors for trial.
appear and was acquitted.
He chose not to
Xenophon states that this
decision by the courts seemed to many to be the most
unjust in the history of Lacedaemon.
(Xenophon,
Hsllenica, V.IV. 24)
In light of Agesilaus' previous policies, in particu­
lar Phoebidaa' seisure of the Cadmea, it would not be
unreasonable to suggest that Agesilaus had put this scheme
into action.
There is no certainty concerning Sphodrias'
motives for the attack.
As mentioned above, Xenophon
suggests that the Thebans urged Sphodrias' military
initiative.
Plutarch accepts this idea and includes it in
the life of Agesilaus.
He also suggests that like
Phoebidas, Sphodrias was compelled by personal glory and
even hoped to outshine Phoebidas.
(p. 728)
Diodorus
uniquely suggests that Cleombrotus, leader of Agesilaus'
rival faction, ordered Sphodrias to take action against
Athens in an attempt to make Agesilaus' subjugation of
Thebes more difficult,
t Diodorus.
XV. 5-6)
At any rate,
no ancient source suggests that Agesilaus inspired
Shodrias' attack.
This makes it difficult to justify Agesilaus' subse­
quent action at Sphodrias' trial.
Earlier it was stated
that Agesilaus' handling of this episode was considered a
breach of the peace.
defense of Sphodrias.
This idea stems from Agesilaus'
The Athenians, who had upheld the
peace from the onset, had been attacked during a time of
peace by a power supposedly protecting the peace.
Athens
had every right to be angry and demand Sphodrias' punish­
ment.
Agesilaus, however, assured that 8phodrias was not
punished and was the chief instrument of Sphodrias'
acquittal.
(Ryder, p. 54)
cosw to Sphodrias* defense?
What motivated Agesilaus to
Xenophon states that
Agesilaus saved Sphodrias at the request of his son
Archidamus.
Archidamus was involved in a relationship
Pag* 19
with Sphodrlas' son, Cleonymus.
Cleonymus approached
Archidamus asking him to persuade Agesilaus to save his
father.
Archidamus reluctantly approached Agesilaus, who
was swayed by his son's emotions.
Agesilaus subsequently
decided to defend Sphodrlas on the grounds that he had
been a true and faithful Spartan in his youth and Sparta
needed this type of citizen soldier.
Hellenic*. V.ZV. 24-33)
(Xenophon,
Plutarch cites the same reason in
the life of Agesilaus.
It seems questionable that Agesilaus was willing to
risk war with Athens in the narnt* of his son's current
lover.
The decision tc acquit Sphodrlas had tremendous
military and political implications.
Athens would most
assuredly take military action against Sparta.
Agesilaus
must have realised this and believed that Sparta had the
strength to combat both Thebes and Athens at the same
time.
Agesilaus rarely if ever mad* such monumental
decisions without considering such foreign policy implica­
tions, and this was no exception.
Perhaps the most reasonable explanation is found in
the realm of factional considerations as outlined by
Kphraim David.
According to this idea Cleombrotus, as
suggested by Diodorus, was responsible for Shodrias'
attack.
Cleombrotus felt Athens was the main threat to
Spartan power, unlike Agesilaus who concentrated on the
Theban threat.
Any time Cleombrotus commanded a force
Pag* 20
against Thebes, virtually nothing was accomplished.
At
th* tin* of Sphodrias’ attack in 370 B . C ., there was a
Spartan aabaasy prasant in Ath*ns.
At least on* of th*s*
ambassadors, Etymocles, was a close associate of
Agesilaus.
(Smith, p. 280)
Th* presence of the embassy
supports th* idea that Agesilaus did not instigate th*
attack.
In addition, it suggests that Cleombrotus was at­
tempting to undercut Agesilaus' attempts to com* to an
agreement with Athens»
an agreement which would simplify
conditions for attack on Thebes.
By defending Sphodrias*
actions, Agesilaus may have planned to ease factional
tension and gain allies in th* opposite camp.
David suggests that Agesilaus was attempting to
pleas* middle-men who were anti-imperialistic, preferring
to limit Sparta's sphere of interest to the Peloponnesus.
Pausanius, Agesipolis, and probably AntalcIdas were
members of this conservative faction.
Agesilaus may have
felt that by condemning Sphodrias, he would antagonise
this conservative faction into creating an alliance with
the faction of Cleombrotus.
This could considerably
lessen Agesilaus’ power in the realm of foreign
politics.
By preserving his own dominant position,
Agesilaus had secured th* fate of his Spartan Empire.
Athen's autonomy had clearly been imposed upon by a
Spartan agent,
instead of coming to Athens defense and
punishing th* aggressor affronting her autonomy, Agesilaus
chose to
disregard the clausa and ignore Athens grievances.
His
motives for Sphodrias' defense are not certain but are
unquestionably based on personal considerations.
decision would push Athens to the edge.
This
Athens would ally
with Thebes and become the champion of liberty for other
Greek states against Sparta's tyrannical rule.
Thus, by a
series of foolish foreign policy moves in which Agesilaus
ignored his responsibility to uphold the Xing's Peace, he
caused a common antagonism to rise throughout mainland
Greece against Sparta.
The result would be Sparta's
dramatic fall from power.
'M
Mv.mil
Pag* 22
Part H i
Motivational Factor* Laadino to Aaeaileus'
Blatant Di»r*aard for tha Autonomy Clauaa
Thar* must hava toaan some reasoning bahind Agasilaus'
blatant disragard for th* paac*.
Although ha oftan moved
according to paraonal vangaanca, for inatanca in moat
relations with Thabaa, in a largar aana* h* acted aa ha
did becauae h* did not baliav* in th* apirit of tha paac*
from tha onaat and bacaua* ha waa aimply following th*
practices of his political predecessors.
In addition to being called "The King's Paac*," tha
peace of 38? B.C. was also called th* "Peace of
Antalcidas.*
This second titl* has obvious connotations
which are pertinent.
Th* paac*, just as tha titl* sug-
gasts, was not mainly due to th* political maneuvering* of
Agasilaus.
in 394 B.C., whan Agasilaus returned from
Asia, h* was in ill favor at home.
Sparta was at war with
Persia as wall as a united Greece lad by Athens and
Thebes.
Th* battle of Cnidus in 394 B.C. caused his
prestige to plummet.
To command th* Spartan navy, h*
chose his inexperienced brother-in-law, Peisander.
As
commander, Peisander received a crushing defeat at the
battle of Cnidus.
The loss was largely Peisander's fault
and many blamed Agasilaus for choosing Peisander to
command.
Agasilaus is even dropped from the sources
Pag* 23
between th* battl* of Nemea, in 394 B.C. and his attack on
Argos in 391 B.C. (Smith, p. 274)
During this tin*
period, and th* period during which th* King's P*ac* was
signed, Agesilaus was not the dominant fore* in polities.
It was Lysander who was the domineering force leading to
Spartan interference in Persia (Plutarch, Life of
Agesilaus).
After Lysander's death in the Corinthian War,
his faction was left without a leader.
fell from power.
It subsequently
Agesilaus became prominent for a period,
but as mentioned above, he did not immediately gain secure
control over th* political scene.
Agesilaus and his
faction, concerned with Spartan dominance over mainland
Greece, could not effectively end the Corinthian War.
As
a result, Antalcidas moved to the forefront of Spartan
politics and it was Antalcidas and his conservative party
which secured the peace.
(Rice, p. 165)
Antalcidas took a conservative position favoring the
restriction of Spartan foreign interests to th*
Peloponnesus.
The factional set up of ancient Sparta is
not altogether obvious.
At times, groups and their
interests overlapped, which is typical of any governmental
system.
It has been suggested by some scholars that there
were three main factions as opposed to two, which is th*
widely accepted number.
The main cause for this specula­
tion is a statement mad* by Xenophon during the Sphodrias
episode.
In book five, chapter four, verse twenty-five of
the Hellenic*, Xenophon state* that Cleonhrotua,
Sphodrias, and their faction "feared Agesiiaus and his
friends, and those who stood between the two parties."
This fear of the middle-of-the-road ideology, briefly
mentioned above during the discussion of Sphodrias, may
indicate that this third conservative faction existed.
It
is certain that two factions, both imperialistic, were
present during this time period, ca. 379 B.C.
Cleombrotus
wanted naval expansion and felt that Athens was Sparta's
worst enemy, while Agesiiaus wanted expansion throughout
mainland Greece and felt that Thebes was Sparta's greatest
enemy.
(David, p. 34)
David G. Rice, in an article appearing in the journal
Hlatorla. speaks of this third faction in no uncertain
terms.
Rice states that AntalcIdas' faction was first led
by Pausanius.
(p. 165)
Pausanius and AntalcIdas are also
included as conservatives in a list by David, (p. 34), and
Hamilton suggests that Antalcidas was backed by a group of
moderates during negotiations with Persia,
(p. 76)
In
many instances, both men art level-headed diplomats and
often appear to not possess imperialistic ideas.
Pausanius, for example, stepped into the Mantinean affair
in 386 B.C., as mentioned briefly above, and displayed
tempered diplomatic prowess.
Agesipolis took the command
against Mantinea because of Agesiiaus' pretext, and
appeared to be the aggressor.
Agesiiaus shrewdly used
Pag* 25
Agesipolis.
If th* young, fairly inexperienced Agesipolis
blundered the expedition, Agesilaus could step in and save
th* day enhancing his own military reputation.
If
Agesipolis was successful, it would be a minor victory
over one of the lesser military threats to Spartan power.
It would not result in immediate popularity, as might a
successful campaign against a more formidable opponent.
In short, Agesilaus could not lose.
Agesipolis, on the
other hand, could lose and was saved by the diplomatic
interference of his father.
Pausanius had always handled
political negotiations generously.
He dealt respectfully
with potential enemies maintaining a friendly co-existence
with other governments in the Peloponnesus.
His conserva­
tive policies calling for Spartan involvement only in the
Peloponnesus eventually led to his disfavor and subsequent
exile at the onset of the Connthian Mar in 395 B.C.
(Rice, p. 168)
Pausanius exercised significant influence
in foreign policy considerations.
His exile was brought
about directly by followers of Lysander after Pausanius
failed to arrive at Haliartus in time to rescue Lysander
and his forces.
(Xenophon, Hellinlca. V.III. 23-25)
Although Agesilaus and Lysander's personal relationship
had suffered considerably at this point, it is presumable
that they still shared the same basic factional interests.
Agesilaus and his supporters no doubt felt that Pausanias
was threatening enough to merit exile.
Pausanius' interference in Nantinea was designed to
prevent Agesipolis' fall from favor due to the manipula­
tive practices of Agesilaus; the same practices Pausanius
himself had fallen victim to.
After Mantinea fell to
Agesipolis, the democratic faction feared for their
safety.
Understandably so, since Sparta under Agesilaus
was in the process of establishing as many loyal oligar­
chies as possible throughout Greece,
tDiodorus
XV.5. 1-4)
Pausanius appeared in Mantinea and advised his son to save
the democrats allowing them safe conduct into exile.
By
destroying the democratic regime, Agesipolis would damage
his reputation with democratic factions throughout Greece.
Whether or not he crushed the democrats, the oligarchal
government of Mantinea would ally with the more powerful
and traditionally pro-oligarchic Agesilaus.
Agesipolis
had nothing to gain by the democrats execution.
By
showing the democrats benevolence, however, Agesipolis
could strengthen his reputation with other democratic
factions in Greece, thus counter-balancing Agesilaus'
policy.
(Mice, p. 170)
Hence, by interfering and coach­
ing his son into a shrewd diplomatic move, Pausanius
exercised his conservative influence, and traditional
practice of maintaining friendly relations with as many
Peloponnesian groups as possible.
Antalcidas made political moves in a similar fashion
i'MUallftfte
Wkim m m
fen n m y in kin
negotiations with Persia, which lad to the King's Peace.
Recognising that Sparta was unable to maintain military
fronts on both mainland Greece and in Persia, Antalcidas
first tried for a peace agreement which would pacify all
of Greece and provide for the autonomy of Greek city
states.
(Ryder, p. 28)
The first peace was not signed
due to various points of disagreement on both sides.
After the failure in Asia, another attempt at a peace
conference took place a year later.
The second confer­
ence, held in Sparta, was an entirely different peace
initiative negotiated by Andocides.
was a peace actually agreed upon.
Not until 387 B.C.
Like the first attempt,
it was aimed at creating a peaceful co-existence between
Greek city states#
(Ryder, p. 323)
Aside from the fact
that the terms are almost exactly the same as the terms
independently negotiated by Antalcidas in 392 B.C., and
that the peace in also called the "Peace of Antalcidas,"
the Thebans are favorably treated.
If Agesilaus had been
a dominant force in these negotiations, Thebes would not
have been handled so positively.
(Smith, p. 278)
The terms of the peace were clearly not imperialis­
tic.
Agesilaus, however, as we have seen above would
reinterpret the autonomy clause to use the peace as an
instrument of expansion.
Agesilaus did not honor this
peace largely because it was not a peace with terms
Pag* 28
force had maneuvered ita main clauaes.
Ageailaua' feel­
ings towards AntaleIdas are not expressly stated in the
writings of Xenophon.
Their relationship is, however,
mentioned by Plutarch in his life of Agesilaus.
Plutarch
calls Antaicidas a "bitter enemy" of Agesilaus who only
strove for peace in 392 B.C. to prevent Agesilaus from
improving his military reputation, (p. 727)
David Rice
feels that the two men did, in fact, represent different
spheres of political ideology.
Agesilaus eventually comes
to dominate Spartan foreign policy because the contest was
unequal, according to Rice.
Agesilaus was a king and
after the exile of Pausanius there was no able political
figure capable of leading Antaicidas' conservative fac­
tion.
(p. 185)
Agesipolis showed signs of supporting an
eventual leadership of this faction.
He worked in a
sensible and neutral fashion in Mantinea.
Also, the
democratic goveriunent of Phlius donated large sums of
aonay to the war chest of Agesipolis.
As mentioned
previously, this donation was probably designed to show
their support for Agesipolis' conservative tendencies as
opposed to the imperialistic tendencies of Agesilaus.
Agesipolis' untimely death in the Olynthian campaign
prevented him from becoming the champion of the conserva­
tive movement.
disspproved ojf
Antaicidas and his faction no doubt
jLXatis* £oxaJ»0fi policy
that* argument*, Agesilaus' aisuaa of tha peace is more
understandable.
Agasilaus was not securely recognised as
the dominant foreign policy-maker at the outset of the
peace negotiations in 392 B.C.
Although he steadily
gained influence, the peace was not dictated according to
his terms.
Agasilaus had always been concerned with
expansion outside of the Peloponnesus.
Before he firmly
established his domineering political power, the peace was
signed
Agasilaus was forced to recognise it, and did so
on his own terms.
Rarely in the historical process are rulers guilty of
a complete break from their predecessors.
policies follow some type of continuum.
Generally,
Often there are
original innovations or drastic unexpected forward move­
ments but these changes usually find their basis in past
practices.
This is the case with Agesilaus and his
foreign policy.
Although Sparta is most often thought of
as a power limiting its interests to the Peloponnesus,
imperialistic trends were beginning before Agesilaus came
to power.
The tradition of hegemony existed in Sparta
long before Agesilaus, and tha Peloponnesian War decided
for Sparta the particular type of dominance which they
would exercise over mainland Greece.
Originally, the
Spartans entered the Peloponnesian War to break the
oppressive Athenian empire.
The idea of autonomy appear-
incompatible with the concept of a subject empire.
The
Peloponnesian War forced Sparta to reorganise her institu­
tions to make them capable of dealing with powers outside
of the Peloponnesus.
Sparta switched from her policy of
incorporating conquered Peloponnesian powers, to a policy
of creating a league of allied autonomous states who
followed her leadership in foreign policy matters.
(Parke, p. 37)
Through subjection, Sparta attempted to
create an empire.
Spartan tradition allowed only for Kings to lead
military campaigns.
This is partially the reason for
their two King syatem.
In case of military maneuvers,
rule would still be secure in Sparta itself.
tice changes during the Peloponnesian War.
This prac­
In addition, a
system of control for far away territories had to be
created.
As a result, Lysanaer developed a system of
harmosts and these harmosts formed a power base for the
Spartan empire.
The first time this type of system occurs
is in 426 B.C., in Hereclea, when Sparta responded to
appeals from Trachis and Doris to aid them against the
Octaeans.
It was decided that Sparta would assist them by
founding a colony in this territory which was strategical­
ly important according to Thucydides.
(Parke, p.38)
Hereclea was thus crested and run by Spartan officers.
This colony was the wsbryonic form of the garrison system
Page 31
which would later be employed by Sparta to stabilize her
control.
Another early example of a harmost appears with
Brasidas.
In 424 B.C., the Spartans planned a mission to
Thrace which would be led by Brasidas, not a Spartan Xing.
In addition, Brasidas was supported by an entirely new
type of army*
a mercenary group of soldiers.
He led this
army on varying military maneuvers at his own discretion.
Brasidas' only power check was carried out annually by a
board of Spartan commissioners.
This is the exact same
check system imposed later on Dercyllidas, who was a
harmost in no uncertain terms.
(Parke, p. 42)
Thus, it
is obvious that a system designed for handling imperialis­
tic expansion began long before Agesilaus would become the
forerunner of Spartan foreign policy.
To gain further insight into Agesilaus' motivation
for his expansionist policies, it is necessary to examine
his immediate predecessor, Lysander.
Lysander exercised
considerable influence on foreign policy during the
Peloponnesian war.
So much s o , that Parke refers to the
military set-up Of Spartan power as "Lysander'a Empire."
(p. SO)
Lysander's influence is not considered a point
for debate.
Only his motives for obtaining and maintain­
ing such an influential power base are discussed.
In book
XIV of Diodorus. Lysander is simply portrayed as the
ihSfruiiffit for Spartan foreign policy.._
other hand, writes that Lysander is motivated by personal
ambition in his life of Lysander.
Either way, Lysander is
at the forefront of Spartan foreign policy-making during
his lifetime and is clearly imperialistic.
He used his
power as treasurer to dominate foreign policy and planned
to take over the role of the Athenian empire.
He first
weakened Athens by blocking the Bosphorus, reducing her to
starvation, and by overtaking all of her main outposts.
He then began to establish his system of harmosts, garri­
sons, and tribute which would enhance and maintain
Sparta's influence, as well as his own.
Lysander planned
to secure the support of each individual polio by main­
taining a pro-Spartan oligarchy in power.
In the life of
Lysander, Plutarch attributes extreme acts of violence
against democrats by Lysander.
(p. 536-537)
The island of Samos and Lysander's handling of the
situation is exemplary of his method.
Lysander seised the
city in 404 B.C., and than placed a dearchy in power.
(Xenophon, Hellenic a . l l . m .
7-11)
Thorax was empowered
as harmost and left with a garrison to maintain control.
Lysander did not actually attack the island.
According to
Xenophon, Lysander was preparing to attack when an agree­
ment was reached.
The agreement stated that "every free
person should depart from the city with but one cloak and
that ail else should be surrendered; and on these terms
they withdraw.*
(Xenophon, Hellenics, II.III. 6-7)
Presumably, these "free” people resisting Lysander were
the democrats, which he was trying to remove throughout
his sphere of interest.
Later, in 402 B.C., Thorax was
put to death by the ephors.
The ephors in Sparta were
antagonistic towards Lysander,
fearing his growing power
and used Thorax to make this point.
(Plutarch, p. 537)
The dearchies were subsequently removed.
In spite of the
absence of the harmost, dearchy, and presumably the
garrison, Samos remained on friendly terms with Sparta.
This is probably due to the fact that Lysander had removed
the democrats replacing them with a loyal oligarchy.
(Parka, p. 60)
Thus we see an area historically insignif­
icant to Spartan policy become pacified, fortified, and
run by officials loyal to Sparta.
This is exactly the
same thing Agesilaus did when he came to power and began
his imperialistic policies.
Agesilaus used the peace to
further his goals and continue expanding Lysander'a
system.
Lysander was undoubtedly respected by Agesilaus and
heavily influenced Agesilaus* beliefs and policies.
Although Lysander exercised considerable influence in
Spartan foreign interests, he was limited by his heredi­
tary position.
Lysander was not eligible for Kingship.
This fact was the only factor blocking him from a position
of complete dominance.
To tackle this barrier, Lysander
planned to assure a Kingship, namely Agesilaus*, which
Pag* 34
could be used a* an instrument for furthering his own
plans.
After the death of King Agis, there was some
dispute over who should become King.
The apparently
rightful heir, Leotychides, was suspected not to be King
Agis' son, but the bastard son of Alcibiades.
According
to Plutarch, Lysander who was at the time one of the
greatest powers in Sparta, attempted to block Leotychides
accession to the throne.
(Plutarch, p. 713)
instead championed Agesilaus' cause.
Lysander
An expert on ancient
oracles, Diopethes, claimed that there had been an ancient
oracle stating that it was unlawful to make a lame man
King.
Lysander simply interpreted this "lameness'' to mean
the bastard status of Leotychides and not the club foot of
Agesilaus.
As a result, Agesilaus became King.
Lysander's promotion of Agesilaus' career did not stop at
this point.
Zn the life of Lysander Agesilaus makes the
following statesient t
"And he (Lysander) wrote to his friends in
Asia, bidding them request to have Agesilaus
appointed to command them in the war against the
barbarians...
ibid this would seem to be a
second favour don* Agesilaus by Lysander, not
inferior to his first in obtaining him the
Kingdom.” (p. 540)
When Plutarch speaks of this episode in Agesilaus'
life, he says that Agesilaus saw Lysander's obtaining this
command for him as a more prestigious obligation than the
obtaining of the Kingdom,
(p. 715)
It is also apparent
in this description that Lysander is still very much in
ills
li ii l
Si
Page 35
charge.
Agesilaus agreed to command and requested thirty
Spartans for captains and counsellors.
Lysander was
immediately placed in charge of these men.
(p. 715)
Also, after Agesilaus' arrival in Persia, no political
questions were directed to M m .
All political considera>
tions and honors were directed towards Lysander.
This
situation eventually led Agesilaus to become envious of
Lysander.
Agesilaus used his iafluence as King to de­
crease Lysander's preecige and actually replaced him in
the realm of Spartan politics.
Agesilaus, p. 716)
(Plutarch, Life of
Thus, Agesilaus was the successor to
Lysander's policies.
A peace treaty drafted by political
figures with markedly different interests, was hardly
likely to cause him to change his beliefs.
Agesilaus was
determined to prove to Lysander and the rest of Greece
that he was no political puppet.
Ha was the King of
Sparta and would misuse this position to maneuver his
disastrous policies following the examples set by his
Agesilaus established firm control over Sparta at the
height of Sparta's power.
A peace had just been signed
establishing Sparta a # t h e hegemon over Greek peace,
backed by Persian power.
Instead of using this position
to keep Greece peaceful end prosperous, Agesilaus warped
its meaning end either used it as a tool or ignored it
entirely to forge his empire.
m
The Peloponnesian allies
Pag* 36
became subjects.
Agesilaua had thus alienated Sparta's
power base and Sparta's tyranny eventually surpassed the
Athenians.
Sparta oppressively demanded manpower while
Athens had sore tolerably demanded money.
(Smith, p. 276)
Eventually Greece was forced to unit* against Sparta and
Sparta would be utterly destroyed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ancient Sources!
Diodorus Siculus.
Diodorus of Sicily. Trans. C.H. Old
Father Vol. 6. Loeb Classical Ser. London> William
Hsinsaann Ltd., 1982.
This was a valuable source because it provided an
ancient perspective without a bias in favor of
Agesilaus.
It was useful in specific instances,
adding facts which Xenophon failed to Mention.
Diodorus' writing is creative and interesting, but
little work has been done on him personally.
It is
therefore somewhat difficult to rate his credibil­
ity.
In terms of his writings referring to
Agesilus, Diodorus seemed to be right on the mark.
Plutarch.
Yorki
Plutarch's Lives. Trans. John Dryden. New
Random House, Inc.
I relied heavily on this source.
Its worth lay in
the many different perspectives which Plutarch
offers.
Plutarch evaluated numerous ancient
sources at his disposal and related discrepancies
between them.
Specifically concerning Agesilaus,
Xenophon's bias in favor or of Agesilaus
occasionally enters into his writings, but over
all, Plutarch presents a well-rounded, informative
picture.
L. Brownson.
I. Loeb Classical Ser. Londont William Heinemann
Ltd., 1930.
Xenophon.
Vol«
Hollenica.
Trans. Carleton
This was ay primary source. Although the account
was written after Agesilaus' death, Xenophon was a
conter orary of Agesilaus' and his writings are thus
invaluable. Xenophon's reports should, however, be
read critically due to the fact that he was a patron
of Agesilaus and often writes prejudice accounts in
AgasiLlaus' favor.
SSS&fti
Cartledge, Paul. Aoesllaos. Londont Duckworth. 198?
Aoesllaos is a broad, in depth study. It provides
valuable tactual information concerning not only
Agesilaus, but also military statistics, the Spartan
political system, racial issues in the Peloponnesus
etc. In specific instances such as Mantinea, fhlius
etc., it provided helpful insight and statistics.
This book is a rsvissd edition of a doctoral
dissertation.
David offered sane original ideas.
In particular, he elaborated on Spartan factional
politics, which I found useful for my research.
The
rest of the book was interesting but irrelevant to
my topic.
Ryder, T.T.B. Koine Eirene.
Press, 1965.
London*
Oxford University
Ryder provided a thorough discussion of the King's
Peace, its clauses, and negotiations leading to it.
The account took into consideration all major
ancient sources and served as a valuable subjective
resource.
Periodicals*
Cawkwell, 6.L. "Agesilaus and Sparta."
Quarterly. 70.
(1966)t 62-04.
Classical
Cawkwell is clearly a well-read, respected scholar.
His writings are thorough and deserve attention and
consideration.
His conclusions concerning
Agesilaus' actions and their consequences for Sparta
are incomputable with my thesis, however, so X did
not rely heavily on his information.
—
.
"The King's Peace."
(i;U)t
69-83.
Classical Quarterly.
31.
This is an interesting factual article discussing
the actual terms of the King's Peace.
It is
important in that it clearly establishes the
existence of the autonomy clause. Over-all, it was
a minor source.
•fljeOeclineof Sparta."
(1983).
385-400.
SlAIilM
Again, Cawkwell provides a thorough, factual
account. This time, he deals with the military
factors which he feels lead to Sparta's decline,
this is a significant source because it offers a
differing view point from my thesis.
I did not,
however, rely on it heavily.
33*
Hack, H.M.
’Thebes and tha Spartan Hegemony, 386-382
B.C. ■
Arerlcan Journal of Philology.
99.
(1978)<
210-227.
«■ ■ ■ * M H M M H a n W N M M R M a i M M M m M M a i M H a M n a M H M i a M r M M M a M M i a a M M H M I
Tha relationship between Agesilaus and Thebes is
covered in depth in this article.
It proved to be a
highly significant source adding insight by
illuminating the Theban's reaction to Agesilaus.
Hamilton, C.D.
"Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan
Hegemony." The Ancient World.
5.
(1982) i 67-78.
Hamilton offers a concise account of the period of
Agesilaus' domination.
This article is not an in
depth study but important because it re-enforced my
basic beliefs concerning Agesilaus and hie policies.
Parks, H.W.
"The Development of the Second Spartan
Empire."
(405-371 B.C.)."
Journal of Hellenic
Studies. 50.
(1930)«
37-7^
For my arguments concerning Lysander's influence on
Agesilaus' policies, this article was of inestimable
value. As well as being a major source, this is
highly interesting, well-written, and thorough.
Rice, D.G.
"Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics,
386-379 B.C." Historla.
23.
(1974)«
164-182.
When formulating Agesilaus' violations of the Xing's
Peace, this article proved to be an important
source.
It is well organised and adequately deals
with available ancient sources.
Seager, R.J.
"The Xing's Peace and the Balance of Power
in Greece, 386-362 B.C," Athenaeum.
52.
(1974)t
36-63.
Seager offers an interesting perspective on the
King's Peace and its implications for Greek city
states and Agesilaus. The article was a significant
source, offering an objective interpretation of the
facts.
Sinclair, R.X.
"The Xing's Peace and the Employment of
Military and Naval forces, 387*378 B.C." Chiron.
8.
(1978)t 29-54.
This article dealt primarily with military consid­
erations as opposed to political.
It was helpful
because it helped create a complete picture of
Agesilaus' situation after the Xing's Peace.
It was
worth reading but not a primary source.
Saith, R.B.
"The Opposition to Agesilaus' Foreign
Policy, 394-371 B.C." Hiatoria.
2.
(1953/4)i
274-288.
For diacuaaiona concarning Agaailaua' factional
conaiderationa, thia article was a aajor source,
in
coatbination with the book by Ephraia David, it
established a relatively complete picture of Spartan
political auneuvers.
Smith's interpretation was
well supported and highly beneficial for ay thesis.