Russia`s Historical Privilege of Independent

Russia’s Historical Privilege of Independent Foreign Policy
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Russia’s Historical Privilege of Independent
Foreign Policy
A. Pushkov
Armen Oganesyan, Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs: Alexei
Konstantinovich, you were in Syria not so long ago. What did you see
there? What social layer can serve as a buttress to stabilize the situation
in the country?
A. Pushkov: It’s a difficult question to give a definite answer to, because
there is no single layer that could be a buttress for a new stability in
Syria. Members of all layers are keen for this stability, except for radical
Islamic groups. They precisely are the bearers of the idea of the armed
uprising and the practitioners of the armed uprising.
Syria does not want a civil war. In Syria, there is no potential for a
large-scale civil war, but there is potential for a limited armed uprising
which, if supported from the outside (and it is supported from the outside), may plunge Syria into civil war.
Five million people live in Damascus. Yes, there are ongoing demonstrations against Assad there. What are the demands? Release political
prisoners. There are slogans demanding regime change, there are the slogans of ensuring free elections and a multiparty system. But there are no
slogans from the series such as “let us take up arms and depose Assad.”
I admit that there are people among the demonstrators in Damascus who
think so, but they are a minority.
I happened to meet with representatives of the National Coordination
Committee for Democratic Change, one of Syria’s main opposition
groups. Of the five people who talked to me, only one said that he would
accept no compromises and that he said we'll go to the end to topple
Assad. The elections he promises are of no importance for the
_____________________
Alexei Pushkov, Chairman of the Russian Duma Committee on International Affairs
This interview was prepared as part of Voice of Russia Radio’s Vis-a-Vis with the World
project, http://rus.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/2227329/
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Constitution. The rest did not hold such a radical position. But all five
said that we do not want any armed intervention in Syria. Damascus is a
flourishing (by Arab standards), quite wealthy and developed city.
Q: Are people feeling calm?
A: It is relatively quiet there, though, of course, the anxiety is palpable.
At this time, fighting raged in Homs, 120 kilometers north of Damascus,
and there was also fighting in the south. In a city named Dara, almost all
government agencies and law courts were destroyed and burned down by
armed opposition. The impact, of course, is felt in Damascus.
Moreover, in Syria there is something now that they have never had
before. Terrorism has appeared and suicide bombers are operating alQaeda style. Nobody knows whether it is al-Qaeda or an affiliated group,
but even U.S. experts say the attacks bear the hallmarks of al-Qaeda in
Iraq. It has arrived in Syria.
Q: Yes, they have reportedly acknowledged that al-Qaeda is there.
A: Al-Qaeda members have arrived in Syria, organized two terrorist
attacks in Aleppo and two terrorist attacks in Damascus. The new alQaeda leader al-Zawahiri has called for Assad’s ouster. In this he is
absolutely friends with Hillary Clinton, and they have formed a very
strange tandem.
Damascus does not want a civil war. The Alawites surely do not want
a civil war, because Assad comes from among them. Alawites occupy key
posts in the army, intelligence, police and major positions in business.
They will be the first victim of armed Sunnis who fought in Homs.
Christians dread the advent of this armed opposition, because the
Christians are a wealthy community and Islamist radicals have launched
the slogan of killing Christians; they already look forward to it. Christians
are transferring money to Lebanon and trying to pawn or sell property.
While it’s not yet an exodus, there are already instances when families are
leaving because they’re afraid. At the very least they will return if all goes
well. But right now they are already leaving and transferring their assets
to those countries where they believe they will live more quietly.
Over the past 20 years, there has emerged a quite wealthy Sunni bourgeoisie, for example in Aleppo, and it also does not want a civil war.
Perhaps it would like to see the country headed by a Sunni, but not Assad.
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Perhaps it would like to create a powerful Sunni political party to contest
elections and even possibly become the ruling party. It can be assumed.
The uncertainty worries them.
One may wonder why the rebels are fighting so furiously. Not only
because they are afraid that
In Syria there is something
they would all be shot, but
now that they have never had
also because they have the
feeling that the Arab and
before. Terrorism has apWestern world is supporting
peared and suicide bombers
them, and that they will soon
are operating al-Qaeda style.
prevail.
Russia was therefore
absolutely right when it vetoed the resolution formally introduced by Morocco but being de facto a Franco-American one saying that Assad must
cease fire while the rebels should do practically nothing at all.
Assad already did so once at the request of the Arab League. At the
end of January, he ordered troops to withdraw from Homs and cease fire.
The rebels came out from those areas they were surrounded in, returned
to areas from which they had been flushed out by the Syrian army, and
reached Damascus.
Now to insist that Assad should unilaterally cease fire is actually the
same thing as if he would sign his own death sentence.
Q: Yes, it is surrender.
A: It is surrender and he won’t do that. When they say that Russia bears
the responsibility for the deaths of women and children in Syria as government troops shell these rebellious districts, I will venture to remark
that the blame also rests on those who support the armed rebels. The
rebels know that they are fighting in urban areas. They know that their
combat actions lead to the deaths of women and children. They do so consciously and deliberately.
You know the story of the two American journalists who were killed
during the shelling. Edith Bouvier, a French journalist, was wounded.
Another two persons found themselves under siege in Homs, and they
could not be evacuated because of the shelling by government forces.
Syrian authorities sent local clergy members to hold negotiations with
the rebels. But the rebels refused to negotiate.
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Q: What are your impressions of your meeting with Assad? How much
control does he actually have over the situation and how determined is he
to continue the fight?
A: The situation in Syria is very difficult to assess because if it were only
about the internal armed revolt, I think Assad would have dealt with it.
But there is active ongoing support from the outside – the psychological,
political, and in arms. Some of these militants are able to sit a while out
in Turkey, and then return. It is difficult to assess how strong the armed
opposition is going to be in the next few months. Moreover, it appears
that Gulf States and some other countries have begun to engage in providing training for it. Incidentally, ten French Special Forces officers led
by a colonel were recently arrested in Homs, which also went almost
unnoticed.
Q: What is the attitude toward Russia after adoption of the UN resolution?
A: A minority says that this veto is the protection of Assad and therefore
it was wrong. But very many support the veto. A flight hostess came up
to me when departing from Damascus and asked, “Are you a Russian
diplomat?” I answered yes. She said: “Thank you ever so much for what
you are doing, we really appreciate it.” You do not allow Syria to be
destroyed – that was the point.
Q: How do you see the developments around Iran? Will the Americans try
to take control over Iran?
A: I would not go that far. U.S. control over Iran would be a nightmare
for Obama and for any president of the United States, because they
already have Afghanistan, which somehow remains too intractable to be
brought under control.
I believe the United States does not have the strength either to take
control of Iran or to even occupy it. They are well aware of this, and
hence the difficulty of the problem. If they had the strength, then why
wait so long – they would have occupied it long ago and shut down the
nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military. I think that Iran is a very
serious problem.
There is, of course, the theory that Americans, in fact, do not want
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order in Afghanistan, since they do not want to go away from there and
they want to create there a lot of bases whereby to constrict China’s
defense perimeter on the west side and ours on the south. They are indeed
building a base near Bagram – the United States’ largest in the region.
I think that there is a reason for your words. But I don’t think that
Americans – even if they do want to leave Afghanistan as a place which
will always be restless and they will have reason to stay there under the
banner of restoring order – also want Iran to be such a place.
For them, it would be a huge headache, and cost enormously. I think
destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities would suit Americans fine and that
they could rest content on this score, at least for a while. But these facilities are hard to destroy, there are very many of them. Half of them are
deep underground, half of them are decoys. You cannot determine from
satellites where the real thing is, and where a mere appearance.
Q: But Obama has already admitted that, even if they strike the facilities,
it would only be a temporary measure.
A: So you need mop-up ground operations to check out what’s destroyed
and what’s not. Iran is the region’s largest country, with a population of
75 million. I find all this very doubtful. Although, of course, I understand
that if Americans fail to stop Iran, and it actually becomes clear that Iran
has nuclear weapons, I think that at least for domestic political reasons,
Americans will launch a limited military operation, just to say that, well,
we did try to do something.
Q: Let’s talk about the Eurasian project, which Vladimir Putin put forward shortly before the election. How will it evolve?
A: I think that under Putin the Eurasian Union is set to evolve, since it’s
his strategic idea, one of the key ideas of his program. This is a long-term
development thrust for the Russian Federation in the framework of the
new economic integration grouping.
Moreover, I think one reason why our Western partners react so nervously to Putin’s being elected as President is that they absolutely do not
want the formation of the Eurasian Union. The very idea that an economic
alliance may be formed around Russia not only confuses, but infuriates
quite a few people. Americans feel this is a direct blow to their interests.
As we know, the United States’ interests extend to the entire world. On
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Nauru Island, too, I am sure it is possible to find American interests. And
if we were to talk about Belarus and Kazakhstan, they are the main priorities for U.S. foreign policy.
Q: Central Asia is already declared as a top priority.
A: They always view the growth of Russia’s influence from the perspective of Cold War ideology. The greater the growth of Russia’s influence,
the smaller the growth of America’s which means that it is bad for
America. This is a zero-sum game. What’s good for the Russians is death
to the Americans. This is a basic American approach, no matter what they
say about it.
Putin, of course, greatly irritates them as the bearer of the idea of an
independent, sovereign Russia, which will be a power center in its own
right and likewise a center of attraction for other states. But this is not
how it is supposed to be. It is assumed that Russia will remain as a junior
partner and as a servitor state with regard to the Western alliance.
Q: It’s advantageous for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union in all
respects. How will relations be constructed with Ukraine in the Eurasian
Union-Russia-Ukraine triangle?
A: For the last two years, I’ve been watching Ukraine’s President
Yanukovych in Davos, where he communicates with the President of
Poland, the local public, investors, and European politicians. I’m always
amazed that in the space of a one and a half to two-hour conversation, discussion or speech he practically does not find time to say a word about
Russia. When Mr. Yanukovych arrives in Russia or meets with Russian
leaders, he speaks extensively, well and warmly about the partnership
with Russia.
I think this duality is not limited to Yanukovych; it is typical of the
Ukrainian elite. That is, they expect to get from Russia what they need as
far as possible and at the same time in every possible way to develop their
so-called European orientation. And develop a European orientation that
is detrimental to Russia, whatever they may say about this.
Q: And can it be otherwise?
A: I think it can be otherwise. Why not have close partner relations with
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the European Union and at the same time have partner relations with
Russia?
Ukrainian national identity is, unfortunately, being affirmed in many
ways as an anti-Russian identity.
I always think what they would be doing in Ukraine if Russia was not
close by, what they would construct their national identity on, and against
whom they would struggle? And now they have someone and something
to struggle with: the Russian culture, the Russian language, the Russianspeaking population, the Crimea… It’s very strong and pervasive among
Ukraine’s elite circles; not merely Yushchenko’s sentiments, they are considerably wider. It doesn’t reflect the opinion of the majority, but at the
level of the elite and the media this is a very strong position and it makes
us cautious.
Look at Kazakhstan. If you have a chat with Europeans or with
Americans about Kazakhstan, they will say they are very satisfied with
relations with Kazakhstan, that their companies have very broad opportunities in the country, and that they are investing there.
Q: It is a good example.
A: And it turns out that Kazakhstan is in the Eurasian Union, but at the
same time it is constructing diverse and highly productive relations in the
economic field, and in the political field, by the way with a whole array
of leading world players.
This is so because Kazakh national identity, owing to both the country’s leadership and its elite, is not being affirmed at the expense of
Russia. They are searching for their roots in the past.
Ukraine is also searching for its roots, and that’s the right thing to do.
But don’t search for roots against Russia. It seems to me that
Kazakhstan’s example shows that one can have, as the Brits say, the best
of both worlds.
Q: A question from Cologne, Germany: “Russian-Chinese relations are
close and intimate. But from time to time you hear the voices of skeptics
who believe there’s oriental cunning in the rapprochement between
Moscow and Beijing. What do you think?"
A: I do not see any particular oriental cunning here.
China, first of all, needs resources. They are certainly interested in our
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energy supply capacity. They want to be part of the large system of distribution and sale of Russian oil and gas and have already become.
The second thing of interest to the Chinese is still to have a state on
which to rely upon when faced with strong U.S. pressure both on China
itself, and on a number of other issues. After all, Americans have a growing set of contradictions with China. Those once seemed to be only trade
and economic contradictions. I recently read an article in an American
journal which counted up 12 points of political differences between the
U.S. and China.
The Americans have realized that China is a rising superpower; they
saw that China is not ready to support America on many fundamental
issues for the United States. They’re going to, I believe, pursue a politico-military doctrine of containing China. There was recently concluded
an agreement with Australia to permanently deploy 2,500 U.S. Marines in
the country. Not many, it would seem. But it’s symbolic.
Prior to that, there had never been any U.S. troops on Australian soil.
But for what purpose? With whom to war? With Papua New Guinea? Or
with the Tuamotu? Then this is being done against the Chinese. It is indicated to the Chinese that they are surrounded on all sides: Taiwan, Japan,
South Korea, and the Philippines, with whom the United States also has
close military-political relations. Now add Australia, and then the base in
Afghanistan. I think that is a long-term strategy.
I expect a great deal politically from the BRICS countries. The fact is
that the BRICS countries already account for 25% of world GDP and
Brazil, India and China’s economies are growing very rapidly. If we are
able to maintain our current growth rate of 4-4.5% per year, it would also
be nice.
The main thing is that all these nations do not want to play by the
unipolar world rules. They all do not see the world as one of a recognized
hegemony of one state or alliance of states, but as one in which there is a
set of poles and a set of interests that must be balanced and taken into
account. It seems to me that these states are very promising for us as political, not just economic partners.
Q: Vladimir Putin’s recent article concerning Russia’s foreign policy has
been dubbed confrontational by the West, steeped in the spirit of his
famous Munich speech. In your opinion, why such a reaction, and does
the spirit of the article warrant such assessments?
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A: First, it doesn’t and secondly, the West expects Russia to acquiesce to
their views, yet we in no way accept that we should. If Americans can
convince us of something, if they put forward a realistic, serious point of
view on an issue, then we may perhaps accept it. But we must not automatically agree with them.
Putin does not want to automatically agree; he doesn’t think that
Russia should be acquiescent. He feels that Russia, as he quite rightly
said, has had in its history, the privilege of pursuing an independent foreign policy and will continue to carry it on. But this isn’t liked. Here’s the
point of the absolute non-acceptance of Russia. So long as Russia pursues
an independent foreign policy, the Russian president will not satisfy many
of our Western partners. And the fact that the country’s population supports him is just an unpleasant detail.
Q: A question from Donetsk, Ukraine, “Who would you set apart among
those foreign politicians and public figures with whom you have communicated in your life as the brightest both as a politician and as a person?”
A: To set someone apart as the brightest is very difficult. There are so
many very important people. On the positive side, I would single out
Chancellor Kohl, the man now sometimes accused here by some nationalist patriotic circles of having outwitted Gorbachev: managed to unite
Germany, at our expense; we withdrew our troops. He did what he had to
do. He played for Germany.
Key words: Syria, Iran, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, China.