Bureaucracy and coordination

POAD8014: Public Policy
Bureaucracy and Coordination
Two of the key issues in explaining the development and delivery of public policy
centre on the relationship between politics and public administration, and the
question of the internal structure of the bureaucracy and the means of directing it to
achieve public policy aims. These notes are concerned with these matters and how
they shape contemporary practice.
Politicians and Bureaucrats – Separation or Integration?
The relationship between politics and bureaucracy, or between politicians and
bureaucrats has long been a matter of debate and contention. A useful review of the
kinds of relationships that can exist between these contesting parties is provided by
Aberbach et al. (1991). They explore the shifting relationships between these policy
actors over time. In particular, they note that the policy role of bureaucrats in the US
and Australia seems to be changing in the face of intensified efforts on the part of
political leaders in each country to secure greater control of the bureaucratic and
executive apparatus.
Against this background, Aberbach et.al. review four images in their explanation of
the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and their development of a view
of the relationship that has contemporary relevance. They also explore the ways in
which political and bureaucratic roles are similar and different.
Image 1 – Policy/Administration
This earliest and simplest description of the relationship between the politicians and
bureaucrats endorses a clear separation of the two with a formal hierarchy of
authority and strict division of labour. Bureaucrats administer and implement policy,
while politicians set policy and make decisions. There is virtually no overlap of
function or responsibility in this separation of administration and politics.
This is the classical model which, according to Aberbach et al, is ‘unrealistic today
and perhaps always was’. In their view program knowledge is important in the setting
of policy directions and to the mediation of interest group relationships – therefore
the role of administrators has become more political in the modern context. Highlevel bureaucrats have broader policy responsibilities while civil servants and
politicians share responsibility across both dimensions.
Image 2 – Facts/Interests
In this model, bureaucrats focus on the facts and technical aspects of the policymaking process while politicians focus on preferences and interests. Both participate
in, and share responsibility for, policy-making but with distinctive contributions to the
process.
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POAD8014: Public Policy
Politicians debate values and resolve conflicting interests, responsive to constituents.
Bureaucrats are technical and efficiency experts, who evaluate the practicality of
political decisions and advise on probable consequences.
Of course, it is never as simple as that. The dilemma is to adequately separate facts
and values, and to divide and assign responsibility to the two different realms.
Image 3 – Energy/Equilibrium
This image suggests that both politicians and bureaucrats engage in policy-making and
both are concerned with politics. The important difference between the two groups is
in the constituencies they serve. Politicians are seen to articulate broad and diffuse
interests while bureaucrats mediate the more narrowly focussed interests of
organised clienteles. Politicians seek publicity, raise innovative issues and energise
the policy system while bureaucrats manage incremental adjustments and provide
policy equilibrium.
Both need distinctive and different political skills:
• Civil servants are prudent, practical, moderate and risk-averse
• Politicians are more passionate, partisan, idealistic and ideological
Image 4 – The Pure Hybrid Model
This image reflects a more politically sensitive bureaucracy and a more technically
sensitive politics which is being evidenced by the greater reviewing of policy by
parliaments. The roles and responsibilities of the two groups are acknowledged as
overlapping to a great extent. Politicians have more administrative oversight while
bureaucrats become program entrepreneurs and advocates of policy causes.
In summary, Image 1 may adequately describe lower levels of the bureaucracy where
administrators may follow orders routinely without questioning or even considering
the political aspects of their actions. However, at increasingly higher levels of
bureaucracy, where the political implications of administration become more
apparent, bureaucrats and politicians share more responsibility and accountability for
decisions and actions.
Overall, Aberbach et.al. suggest a more subtle and complex relationship between
politics and bureaucracy in explaining the formation of public policy. The two realms
are not neatly separated even if there are specific and different purposes served by
each.
Bureaucratic Structure and its Reform
Perhaps the main issues surrounding the debate about bureaucracy and its impact on
policy-making are matters about its structure – in particular, the problem of hierarchy
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and its management, and the dilemmas of ensuring adequate coordination of public
institutions in the development and delivery of public policy. For many, the problems
of hierarchy and coordination are ongoing and difficult.
Considine (1992) and Davis (1998) both reflect on Australian examples in the search
for new solutions to the problems of hierarchy and coordination in government. In the
Australian context, problems of coordination are exacerbated by Australian federalism
and the differences in power between the various levels of government – federal,
state and local.
Reform to deal with these problems continues and takes interesting new forms in the
contemporary era. Ideas about ‘holistic’ or ‘joined-up’ government are perhaps the
most visible of the new arenas of thought about these problems. We will look at some
of these debates here.
The ‘Holistic’ & ‘Joined-up’ Government Agendas
Bureaucratic structures reflect a clear separation of portfolio areas within
government. There have been many attempts to bring about greater coordination and
integration in government. Methods have included the implementation of top-down,
macro methods of service delivery through the creation of gigantic central structures
with broad jurisdictions. These mega-departments have tended to lead to situations
of inertia with massive and complex bureaucracy eventually bogging down the
organisation. Other attempts have included the development of multipurpose local
authorities and exploration of shared decision-making forums through joint planning
in the 1970s.
In recent times, however, the notion of ‘holistic’ or ‘joined-up government’ as a
solution to coordination problems in government has emerged – probably best
expressed and developed by the Blair Government and forming part of the latter’s
‘third way’ agenda. The aim is to develop horizontal integration and linkage between
fields and functions of government as a way of tackling complex issues which impact
across a number of previously distinct portfolio areas.
This has led to a raft of initiatives including:
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Interdepartmental cooperation
Collaboration across functions of government
Centralisation
Joint production of services
Case management
Holistic budgeting and purchasing
According to Perri 6 (1997), moves towards holistic government have been hampered
by considerations of privacy which have prevented the flow of personal information
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across government agencies. With proper safeguards in place, new information and
communications technology is now enabling the integration of information as never
before.
For Perri 6, the development and implementation of holistic government entails a
number of things:
Integration of budgets and information with the following key dimensions
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Budgets should be designed around outcomes and purposes, not functions or
activities;
More competition is needed to achieve those purposes;
Emphasis should be placed on building of partnerships across traditional
functional boundaries; and
The goals should be the achievement of measurable improvements in real
outcomes
Balance of recentralisation and decentralisation
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Overall goal-setting should be recentralised along with outcome measurement
and budget setting – central systems of oversight, audit and policy review are
necessary; and
There should be a corresponding decentralisation of intelligence and
information gathering, initiative and innovation in programme design and in
local accountability to users and the public. This would lead to a form of
downward accountability to citizens and service users
Budget dimensions
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Outcomes based contracts are encouraged;
Service delivery is open to competition;
Budgets are linked to enforceable performance contracts;
Area-based initiatives are needed to target the needs of particular groups.
Perri 6 points to examples of education action zones, employment zones and
health action zones in the UK;
There should be more downward accountability to citizens and service users;
and
Budgets will be supervised by central systems of oversight, audit and
evaluation
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Source: Perri 6, 1997, p. 47
Case workers
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Frontline staff will be able to access, customise and package programs from
across a wide range of agencies;
The importance of professional discretion increases and results in the practice
of ‘street level’ bureaucracy; and
More responsibility is placed on the competence of frontline staff
Information systems
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Holistic government will increase the importance of ‘front-end’ government
and result in the creation of ‘one-stop’ shops organised around life events
which trigger people’s need for services – for example, becoming unemployed,
bereavement. These centres would become the principle means by which the
public deals with government both physically and electronically, through a
common interface, in order to simplify the process of dealing with government.
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Source: Perri 6, 1997, p. 48
The ‘holistic government’ vision replaces governing by functions with outcomefocused departments:
‘One could imagine not a department for education and unemployment but one
charged with enhancing the one and reducing the other and with powers to
operate across the whole range of functions in housing, family policy, public
health, public information, cultural policy, crime and so on.’ (Perri 6, 1997)
Perri 6 argues that the problems of coordination are not eliminated by this model.
Nevertheless, organisational boundaries are redrawn in ways which may be better
able to address the needs of the citizens that government serve. The model would
help shift the structure and process of government away from the culture of the
‘departmental silo’ towards one of genuine partnership.
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More recent debates about ‘joined-up’government explores these issues in historical
perspective and with attention to the contribution and limits of these ideas in
contemporary policy practice. (see Bogdanor, 2005; Davies, 2009 & Dunleavy, 2010)
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References
POAD8014: Public Policy
Aberbach, J.D., Mazger, D.B. & Rockman, B.A. 1991. ‘Bureaucrats and Politicians: A
Report on the Administrative Elites Project’, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, 50, 2, pp. 203-17.
Bogdanor V (ed). 2005. Joined-Up Government, Oxford University Press (chapters by
Christopher Hood, Geoff Mulgan & Perri 6 in particular)
Considine, M. 1992. ‘Alternatives to Hierarchy: The Role and Performance of Lateral
Structures inside Bureaucracy’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 51, 3,
pp. 309-20.
Davies, J.S. 2009. ‘The Limits of Joined-Up Government: A Political Analysis’, Public
Administration, 87, 1, 80-96.
Davis, G. 1998. ‘Carving Out Policy Space for State Government in a Federation: The
Role of Coordination’, Publius: The Journal Federalism, 28, 4, pp. 147-64.
Dunleavy, P. 2010. The Future of Joined-up Public Services, 2020 Public Services
Trust at the RSA, London.
Perri 6, 1997, Holistic Government, Demos, London.
Pollitt, C. 2003. ‘Joined-up Government: A Survey’, Political Studies Review, 1, 3449.
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