MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Hierarchic Realism and Imperial Rule in International Politics
Paul K. MacDonald
Fellow, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies
[email protected]
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
September 22, 2005
DRAFT – Please do not quote without permission
Acknowledgements: Lynn Eden, Stacie Goddard, Robert Jervis, Matt Kroenig, Dan Nexon,
Chick Perrow, Jack Snyder, Alex Weisiger, and participants in the Center for International
Security and Cooperation social science seminar.
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Introduction
One of the most common ways powerful states in international politics organize their relations
with weak polities is through empire. By one count, there have been over sixty-seven historical empires,
occupying vast stretches of territories and peoples. 1 At its apex, for example, the British Empire covered
forty percent of the world’s territory and contained twenty-five percent of its population. The Soviet
Union, the last of the great authoritarian empires, stretched over 8.6 million square miles and was
comprised of over 100 different nationalities. Empire, moreover, remains quite salient in contemporary
international politics. Imperial dynamics can be seen in the relations between Russia and the Near
Abroad, and in chronic economic underdevelopment in much of the third world. 2 The rising territorial
ambitions of China and American power, moreover, have provoked several debates over the future of
empire. 3
Yet for all the historical importance and contemporary relevance of empire, international relations
theory does not possess a complete theory of imperial rule. 4 Defensive realists, for example, emphasize
the importance of security-seeking and the balance of power in the international system, but tend to
minimize the importance and attractiveness of empire as a great power strategy. 5 Offensive realism, with
its focus on power-maximization, provides a persuasive account for why states have incentives to expand,
yet is unable to explain why expansion takes the form of empire and not other strategies, such as
hegemony, or why powerful states frequently refrain from establishing empires. 6 Finally, liberal
institutionalists argue that imperial rule can help states achieve security cooperation through the sharing
of sovereignty. 7 Such an approach, however, assumes that empire is a voluntary choice rather than an
institution imposed by force.
1
Ferguson 2004, 14-15.
Cf. Barkey and von Hagen 1997. Acemoglu et al. 2001.
3
Cf. Bacevich 2002. Ferguson 2004. Ferguson 2003. Mann 2003.
4
See Doyle 1986, introduction. Barkawi and Laffey 2002. Rosen 2003, 51.
5
Jervis 1978. Posen 1984. Glaser 1994/95.
6
Mearheimer 2001. Labs 1997. Zakaria 1998.
7
Lake 1999. Weber 2000.
2
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In order to remedy these problems, I propose a “hierarchic realist” theory of imperial rule. A
hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule sees empire as a strategy great powers adopt in order to provide
security by establishing reliable control over less powerful polities in the international system. Imperial
rule provides reliable control by acting as a transnational institution that mobilizes and organizes power.
By leveraging existing social ties, great powers are able to more efficiently and effectively deploy their
power and claim legitimate authority over less powerful polities. When faced with threats to their
security, great powers will leverage existing social ties—those ties between itself and the weaker power,
and within the periphery itself—to impose imperial rule. Contrary to existing theories, a strategy of
imperial rule, rather than being a strategy of power maximization, is congruent with a security-seeking
strategy; and imperial institutions, rather than being adopted to promote cooperation, are imposed to
establish control.
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section defines imperial rule and contrasts imperial rule
with other strategies in international politics. Next, I discuss treatments of imperial rule by international
relations theorists, and introduce the theory of hierarchic realism. In the final section, the paper evaluates
the plausibility of hierarchic realism through an examination of two cases of expansion in the British
Empire during the nineteenth century – that of India between 1798 and 1805 and Nigeria between 1884
and 1903. I argue that while taking place in radically different parts of the world at different periods, in
each of these cases the British adopted imperial rule not in order to maximize their power or in order to
foster security cooperation, but in order to provide security by establishing reliable control through
imperial institutions. In each of these cases, moreover, Britain’s ability to establish imperial rule
depended on configurations of social ties in India and Nigeria.
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Defining Imperial Rule
I define empire as a system of rule where one polity consciously and consistently claims
sovereignty, whether in whole or in part, over the foreign or domestic policies of a subordinate. 8 When
imperial rule is imposed, therefore, a more powerful polity is claiming some degree of sovereignty over a
previously sovereign polity.
Given this definition, imperial rule is substantially different than other types of relationships in
international politics. When great powers interact in international politics, they are said to do so in an
anarchic environment, in which no single authority can make or enforce binding agreements. Although
anarchy might characterize relations between great powers, imperial relations are hierarchic. According
to Waltz, hierarchy is characterized by a situation in which “political actors are…differentiated according
to degrees of their authority.” 9 Although sovereignty characterizes polities in anarchy, bonds of
dependence and obligation tie polities together in hierarchy. To paraphrase Max Weber, with relations of
hierarchy, one actor has the power to command while the other has the duty to obey. Relations of
imperial rule, therefore, are hierarchic in nature and thus fundamentally different than the types of
political relationships great powers establish between one another in the context of anarchy. 10
A strategy of imperial rule is just one of the many strategies a great power can utilize to translate
its advantage in military capabilities into control over weaker polities in the international system.
Imperial relations are more sustained, consistent and intrusive than relations of hegemony, in which a
great power relies on the occasional application of coercion to establish control over the foreign policy of
a less powerful polity in a particular issue domain. At the same time, however, imperial relations are less
extensive and less encompassing than claims of full and complete sovereignty, as in annexation.
Establishing relations of imperial rule, therefore, is a mid-range strategy between the occasionally
8
For other definitions of empire, see Doyle 1986, chapter one. Lieven 2000, chapter one. Motyl 2001. Mann 2003. For
conceptions of hierarchy in international politics, see Kaplan 1957, 21-53. Waltz 1979, 81-88. Hoffmann 1978, 106-136. Onuf
1989, 166-168. Wendt 1995, 695-698. Lake 1999, 26-27. Weber 2000, 17.
9
Waltz, 1979. 87.
10
Hierarchy requires but is not synonymous with imbalances or inequalities of power in the international system. Cf. Wohlforth
2002, 2. Gilpin 1981, 30-31.
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unreliable strategy of hegemony and the more costly strategy of annexation (see Figure One). 11 Imperial
rule is a way in which great powers try to achieve balance in the tradeoff between reliability of their
strategy of control and its cost in terms of resources expended and capabilities committed. 12
Consider the differences between a strategy of hegemony and imperial rule. Hegemony involves
the occasional but consistent use of threats or promises to get another state to alter a specific set of
policies in a certain issue area. 13 With hegemony, therefore, the exercise of power is discrete. A great
power that utilizes hegemony does not claim some systematic right or obligation to exert control. While
imperial rule involves curtailments of sovereignty, hegemony merely places constraints on a subordinate
state’s range of potential behavior. Rather than the maintenance of sovereignty, however, imperial
relations demand subordination, and the substitution of authority for choice.
Because it is limited in nature, a strategy of hegemony has a number of advantages over imperial
control. 14 In order to establish sovereignty over subordinate polities, imperial rule requires the
establishment of institutions that organize and mobilize a great power’s capabilities. For this reason,
imperial rule requires a greater commitment – and often a greater expenditure – of resources than would a
strategy of hegemony. 15 In addition, a state utilizing hegemony also has more discretion than one using
the techniques of empire; 16 it need not respond to every challenge to its control with force because, unlike
a great power in an imperial relationship, it has not staked its reputation so heavily on the maintenance of
consistent control. Finally, hegemony has less of a chance of sparking balancing behavior on the part of
other great powers, because its selectivity, circumscribed claims, and occasional use appears to be more
limited in scope than strategies of imperial control.
11
Lake 1999. Cf. Weber 2000. Krasner 1999, chapter one.
Cf. Lieven 2000, 45-51.
13
Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 15. Cf. Gilpin 1981.
14
For other discussions of the advantages of hegemony (such as public goods provisions), see Gilpin 1981. Keohane 1984. Cf.
Lake 1993.
15
This does not mean that hegemony will not always be cheap. Indeed, one can hypothesize that the relative cost of hegemony
will be dependent on any number of factors – the relative power difference between the various parties, the logistical barriers to
projecting capabilities abroad towards the target of hegemony, the strength of interest a target of hegemony has towards a
particular policy, and so forth.
16
Alt, Calvert and Humes 1988.
12
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At the same time, however, a strategy of imperial control provides a great power with certain
benefits. First, because it is sustained, consistent, and more expansive, imperial rule provides a great
power with more control than hegemony. When the threat facing a great power is significant, therefore,
the more reliable control afforded by imperial rule becomes more attractive. Second, the control provided
by a strategy of imperial rule is not only more reliable but also more sensitive. Hegemony can be a rather
clumsy and time-consuming strategy for obtaining one’s interests – a state must mobilize its resources,
successfully issue demands, specify threats or promises attached to these demands, and deploy these
resources in order to carry out the threat or promises. Under imperial rule, in contrast, a great power’s
resources are already mobilized, its demands already clear, and its material power already deployed.
While the differences between strategies of hegemony and imperial rule are readily apparent, how
can international relations theory explain when great powers will employ one strategy rather than the
other? Under what conditions will a great power adopt a strategy of imperial rule?
Imperial Rule and International Relations Theory
Although examples of imperial rule are quite common throughout history, aside from a handful of
important studies, 17 international relations theorists have neglected the study of empire and imperial rule.
Such neglect is curious given that the primary focus of international politics is the study of how states
mobilize their resources in order to protect and advance their interests abroad. Because of their emphasis
on the importance of power in international politics, realists seem to be best suited to discuss the issue of
imperial rule. The notion that states might use forms of imperial rule to advance their interests is entirely
consistent with many of the central tenants of realism. Yet, realists neglect imperial rule in international
politics. Although realism has analyzed the motivations for great power expansion, the importance of
various types of military technologies in conquest, and the relative costs of occupation, there is almost no
17
The most prominent study of empire in international politics is Michael Doyle’s Empires (1984). While Doyle adroitly
discusses various definitions of empires, he does not discuss the applicability of various theories of international politics to
empire. Other important studies of empire in international politics include Snyder 1991.Kupchan 1994. Abernathy 2000. See
also dissertations by Narizny 2001. Nexon 2004.
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literature discussing why great powers might choose imperial rule as a way to advance their interests in
international politics. Indeed, most realists tend to conceive of empire, and other forms of hierarchy more
generally, as a relatively rare outcome in international politics. 18
This position is most commonly associated with Kenneth Waltz’s seminal book Theory of
International Politics, 19 in which Waltz took the concept of anarchy, which had long been a part of
international relations theory, and placed it at the center of an analytical theory of the structure of
international politics. 20 In doing so, Waltz advocated against the study forms of hierarchy in international
politics, such as imperial rule, claiming that they were both analytically extraneous and empirically
irrelevant. 21 Analytically, Waltz rejects considering international-political systems as “being more or less
anarchic” because “[it] would…move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less
theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy.” 22 Empirically, Waltz describes international
politics as “being flecked with particles of government and alloyed with elements of community.” 23 He
predicts that states will rarely give up sovereignty to one another, either voluntarily or even by force.
Because of the logic of self-help and the risk that potential partners in cooperation will cheat or use their
influence to take advantage of dependence, states will seldom volunteer to reduce their sovereignty.
Similarly, because of the logic of balancing in the international system, the growth of power in one state
should be counterbalanced and hierarchy that springs from the end of the sword should be relatively
rare. 24
Waltz has greatly influenced the defensive realist approach to empire. Defensive realists argue
that imperial rule should be a relatively rare outcome in international politics. States are primarily
18
Jervis 1978. Snyder 1991. Schweller 1994. Glaser 1994/95. Zakaria 1995. Glaser 1997. Jervis 1998. Van Evera 1998.
Liberman 1996.
19
Waltz 1979.
20
For general discussions of TIP, see Buzan 1993. Jervis 1997. Jervis 1998. For empirical criqitues, see Schroeder 1994.
Glaser 1994.
21
Waltz 1979, 92.
22
Waltz 1979, 114-115.
23
Waltz 1979, 114.
24
Waltz 1979, 128. For a theoretical discussion of this proposition, see Kaufman 1997, 179. For an empirical analysis, see
Strang 1991.
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security-seeking actors and given systemic factors in the international system, 25 such as the tendency of
states to balance against unnatural accumulations of power, great powers should usually avoid
expansionist imperial policies. The balance of power does not work so seamlessly that every great power
avoids aggression, but according to Posen, “enough learning takes place to make violent, unlimited,
expansionist policies the exception rather than the rule. Status quo policies are the rule rather than the
exception.” 26
It is only in very rare circumstances, such as when the balance of military capabilities
favors the offensive or when domestic interest groups logroll in favor of expansionist strategies, that great
powers will seek to establish relations of imperial rule. 27 In sum, defensive realists follow Waltz and
argue that because of systemic pressures to balance in the international system, security driven expansion
will be rare often prove to be self-defeating.
Many authors critique Waltz’s balancing prediction as unfalsifiable, logically unpersuasive, and
empirically false. 28 Leaving aside the specifics of the balancing proposition, the notion that hierarchy and
imperial rule have been rare in international politics is suspect. 29 Massive asymmetries and imbalances of
power are quite common in international politics, and imperial relationships have frequently formed
between relatively powerful states and other less powerful political entities. The history of international
politics is in many ways the history of imperial forms, whether suzerainties, dynasts, formal empires,
informal rule, and so forth. Perhaps Waltz does not consider these political relationships as significant
because, as he admits, he is only interested in explaining interactions among the great powers. 30 In this
way, his predictions about balancing may only apply to powerful states in international politics, not their
attendant subordinates. Yet not only does this restriction limit Waltz from developing a complete theory
of international politics, it also leads him to ignore one of the primary ways in which great power
organize their relations with the periphery, that of empire.
25
As Glaser argues, “states pursue security, not advantages in relative power.” Cf. Glaser 1994/95, 88.
Posen 1984, 68-69.
27
Snyder 1991. Cf. Zakaria 1995.
28
For critiques of Waltz and the balance of power, see Walt 1988. Schroeder 1994. Schweller 1994.
29
For examples of quasi-sovereign relationships in international politics, many of which are imperial, see Deudney 1995.
Jackson 1990. Strang 1991. Teschke 1998. Krasner 1999. Krasner 2001.
30
Waltz 1979, 94.
26
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Some realists, however, have parted with Waltz and argued that expansionist behavior and
unequal, hierarchic distributions of power are quite common in international politics. Offensive realists
contend that the insecure position of states in anarchy compels them to engage in power-maximizing
behavior that can include establishing dominion over others. 31 As Mearsheimer argues, “there are no
status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its
dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of
power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor.” 32 Similarly, hegemonic
stability theory contends that the international system is most stable when one state possesses a monopoly
of political power over less powerful states. Hegemonic powers, therefore, will act concertedly to try to
maximize their own power while simultaneously limiting the power of others. 33
Both offensive realism and hegemonic stability theory, therefore, argue that there are significant
systemic incentives for a great power to seek to establish imperial rule over less powerful polities. As
Frankel notes, “The uncertainty about intentions, and the absence of a central authority to adjudicate
disputes and enforce its verdict, heighten anxiety, suspicion, and fear. It is thus systemic characteristics
which compel states, regardless of their motives, to adopt offensive strategies in the pursuit of their
security.” 34 When seeking to maximize their power, therefore, great powers should expand at the
expense of vulnerable and valuable targets 35 : they should “weigh the costs and risks of offense against the
likely benefits” 36 and expand “a rational manner, in places and at times that minimize costs and risks, in
areas that are weaker than they, and when their power is on the rise.” 37
While offensive realism provides a plausible set of predictions as to when one might expect
imperial rule, it nevertheless has two important problems. First, offensive realism is unable to account for
why a power-maximizing great power would choose a strategy of empire verses hegemony or annexation.
31
Mearheimer 2001. Labs 1997. Zakaria 1998. Cf. Taliaferro 2001. Frankel 1996.
Mearsheimer 2001, 2.
33
Organski 1958. Gilpin 1981. Cf. Levy 1989.
34
Frankel 1996: xv-xvi.
35
This is the notion of “low-hanging fruit.” Presumably, states engage in expansionist behavior based on some function of value
verses vulnerability – great powers may be willing to reach up higher in order to grasp more succulent fruit, for example.
36
Mearsheimer 2001. 37.
37
Zakaria 1998. 9.
32
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Zakaria notes that imperial rule is just one of the many strategies for “expanding political interests
abroad” – including “protectorates, military bases, spheres of influence, and, most commonly, activist
diplomacy” – but he provides no guidance for when to expect one form of expansion verses another. 38
Similarly, HST is unable to account for why a hegemonic great power might adopt imperial rule, and
indeed some authors – such as Spiezio, 39 Modelski and Thompson, 40 and Mansfield 41 – measure the
power of hegemonic states without even including their imperial possessions 42 (a move that biases their
results by underestimating the power of those hegemonic states with imperial dependencies 43 ).
Second, offensive realists assume imperial rule is always part of a strategy of power
maximization, while ignoring the defensive, security-seeking motivations to adopt imperial rule. In many
cases of British imperial expansion, for example, policymakers were reluctant to adopt imperial rule and
viewed their actions in defensive terms. 44 Indeed, during the mid-nineteenth century, when Great Britain
was at the height of its relative power, many within Great Britain considered imperial possessions to be of
dubious value and thus denigrated them as a “millstone around our necks.” 45 It was only towards the end
of the century, when Great Britain’s military resources had begun to decline relative to its competitors,
that British policymakers exhibited a general enthusiasm for empire. 46
In sum, a cursory glance at the historical record seems to indicate that power-maximization does
not necessarily require expansionist policies of imperial rule, and that imperial rule can be part of
defensive, security-seeking behavior. Offensive realists have argued that imperial rule is congruent with
incentives to maximize power in the international system. Yet they have had difficulties explaining why
38
Indeed, it is strange to define expansion so broadly so as to include such decisive strategies as military conquest with such
vague activities as activist diplomacy. Zakaria 1998, 18.
39
Spiezio 1990.
40
Modelski 1988.
41
Mansfield 1992, 748-750.
42
When calculating percentages and concentrations, moreover, these studies tend to focus on the distribution of power within the
core system, and ignore peripheries. Cf. Haggard and Simmons 1987, 503. Lake 1993, 479-480. Some authors do include
imperial possessions, see Kim 1992, 158-159. Thompson 1992, 31-32. Boswell 1991, 137.
43
As Ingram notes, when studies of British decline fail to include the empire, they tend to exaggerate the extent and speed of
British decline. In 1897, for example, if one aggregates Britain and India together, the Empire’s “GNP was nearly twenty percent
larger than the United States’ and three and a half times as large as Germany’s.” Ingram, 2001, 21.
44
Robinson and Gallagher 1953. Robinson and Gallagher 1968. Hyam 1976.
45
The phrase is Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s. Cf. Galbraith 1961, 34-48.
46
Porter 1975. Porter 1983.
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great powers might opt for imperial rule verses other strategies to maximize their power and why many
great powers establish imperial rule hesitantly and for what appears to be security-seeking reasons.
An Alternative Theory of Imperial Rule – Hierarchic Realism
To remedy some of the problems with offensive realist approaches, I propose a hierarchic realist
theory of imperial rule. Because this theory emphasizes how great powers use imperial rule to maximize
their security, it is a realist theory. At the same time, because the theory considers how great powers use
the institutions of imperial rule to mobilize and organize their power, it is concerned with the importance
of forms of hierarchy, rather than anarchy, in international politics.
A hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule starts from the following foundational assumption –
great powers in international politics seek to maximize their security and one of the primary ways in
which they can achieve this goal is by exerting control over other polities. 47 For traditional realist
approaches, the inability of security-seeking states to foster mutual trust under anarchy compels them to
adopt self-help strategies, such as acquiring military capabilities that provide security by deterring wouldbe aggressors. 48 From the perspective of a hierarchic realist theory, however, great powers can also
provide security not only by helping themselves, but also by exerting control over other states.
Great powers can employ a variety of strategies – including moral suasion, diplomacy, the
establishment of alliances, hegemony, or conquest 49 – to establish control. When implemented
effectively, establishing control over other polities in international politics has a multiplicative effect – it
allows a great power to increase the security provided by its existing capabilities. At the same time,
establishing control is a potentially costly use of capabilities. 50 An attempt to establish control may fail.
The resources necessary to establish and maintain control may be significant. When seeking security
47
To say that states seek to maximize their control over others is similar to Zakaria’s description of states as “influence
maximizers” (Zakaria 1998, 19).
48
Grieco 1993. Mearsheimer 1995. Powell, 1994.
49
Cf. Gilpin 1984. Kennedy 1991. Kupchan 1994.
50
Maximizing control, however, is not necessarily the same as maximizing power. While exerting control may be easier for
states with more relative capabilities, increasing one’s relative capabilities can have negative repercussions – such as
overextension, sparking balance of power responses, and so forth – that ultimately decrease one’s control over others.
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through control, therefore, a great power is hoping that expending its resources to control the policies of
others will provide security more effectively and efficiently than a policy of isolation.
Great powers, therefore, can provide security not only by relying on strategies of self-help but
also by establishing control over less powerful polities in the international system. Yet the strategies of
control described above vary considerably in the reliability and sensitivity of control they provide. From
a hierarchic realist perspective, imperial rule provides a great power with more reliable and sensitive
control because its institutional characteristics allow it to more effectively and efficiently deploy its
military capabilities. 51 Hegemony is maintained by the use of gunboats, airpower, and expeditionary
forces. In contrast, imperial control is maintained by the use of garrisons, colonial governors, and
constabulary forces. Imperial rule is both more formal and institutionalized.
At its most fundamental level, therefore, imperial control is a transnational institution through
which a great power can mobilize and organize its power. Traditional realist approaches have viewed
institutions with suspicion, seeing them as epiphenomenal reflections of the distribution of power. 52
Unlike realism, however, liberal institutionalism has been much more willing to accept the possibility that
institutions can emerge in international politics that can mitigate anarchy and introduce some element of
hierarchy into the international system. 53 The best expression of a liberal institutionalism theory of
imperial rule is the relational contracting approach. Building on arguments about the possibility of
cooperation under anarchy, these theories contend that hierarchy emerges in situations when it can
effectively facilitate cooperation between states in international politics. In his path-breaking book
Entangling Relations, 54 for example, David Lake maintains that cheating, free riding, dependency and
opportunism often undermine cooperation. Because states frequently want to gain the benefits of pooling
security resources, therefore, they may seek to find ways to overcome these potential problems.
Hierarchy, which Lake conceives of as inclusive of but not limited to empire, can often decrease these
51
I follow Hall and Taylor by defining institutions as the “formal or informal procedures, routines, norm and conventions” (Hall
and Taylor 1996). On the unique features of social institutions, see Knight 1992. Pierson 2000. Thelen 1999. March and Olsen
1999.
52
Krasner 1976. Grieco 1988. Mearsheimer 1994/95. Cf. Powell 1994.
53
Keohane 1983. Lipson 1984. Axelrod and Keohane 1985. Cf. Haggard and Simmons 1987. Milner 1992.
54
Lake 1999.
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costs of opportunism. If hierarchy is relatively cheap to produce, states may opt to utilize it as a
mechanism for achieving cooperation. Thus, for Lake, imperial rule essentially serves an important
functional role in the international system – it facilitates security cooperation between polities when the
possibility of opportunism is high and the benefits of cooperation great.
There are at least two problems, however, with the relational contracting approach when applied
to imperial rule. First, relational contracting emphasizes the voluntary nature of hierarchy, thus ignoring
the importance of power in imperial relations. As Katja Weber argues, “hierarchy is rooted in the choices
of sovereign states” 55 and “even in a self-help system that stresses autonomy, self-interested actors
voluntarily curtail aspects of their sovereignty to obtain needed assurances.” 56 Yet reducing empire to
choice strips it of its distinctiveness as a political concept and treats empire simply an empty vessel, an
equilibrium point that fulfills state interests. Moreover, the imposition of imperial rule is rarely voluntary.
Powerful states often use empire not to achieve mutual security but to enhance their security at the
expense of the less powerful.
Second, relational contracting approaches are unable to explain the form of imperial institutions.
For relational contracting approaches, empire is an equilibrium point that allows states to most efficiently
cooperate. How imperial rule reduces a state’s sovereignty and how it constrains states from reclaiming
their lost sovereignty is a mystery. In essence, empire is all function, no organization. Thus, liberal
institutionalist approaches are unable to account for why states design imperial institutions the way they
do or how imperial institutions imbue a great power with legitimate authority.
A hierarchic realist approach, in contrast, does not see the institution of imperial rule as simply an
equilibrium point, devoid of power and produced by mutual interests. Instead, it argues that the
institutional aspects of imperial rule are the very things that make it attractive to a great power, which
seeks to mobilize and organize its power to provide security through control. Specifically, the
institutional characteristics of imperial rule help great powers mobilize and organize their power in three
55
56
Weber 2000, 7.
Weber 2000, 17.
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distinct ways. First, in imperial relations, the deployment of power is routinized. 57 Channels of political
control are clearly established. The mechanisms in which imperial demands are issued, obeyed, and
enforced are visible, familiar, and systematic in their operation. In this way, the institutional component
of imperial rule provides a set of shared expectations around which patterns of behavior can coalesce.
Second, in imperial relations, the effectiveness of deployed power is multiplied. Relations of
imperial rule are more intrusive in the local politics of the subordinate than simple hegemony, and thus
imperial institutions multiple the channels through which influence can be mediated and exerted. By
identifying, mobilizing, and integrating collaborators, imperial institutions guarantee that influence is not
simply channeled between a great power and other polities but reproduced in the domestic structure of
subordinate polities themselves. 58 In addition, because they are more formal in character, relations of
imperial control can also lock in these coalitions that reproduce imperial rule.
Third, relations of imperial control can more effectively mobilize and deploy power by
socializing subordinate polities into accepting not just reality but also the righteousness of domination.
Imperial institutions can be used to bolster the legitimacy, the moral purpose, and the inevitability of
imperial rule. The notion that powerful states can socialize other states is not a new one. 59 But whereas
the avenues for socialization under anarchy are relatively few, those in relations of hierarchy are much
more extensive. In this way, imperial rule provides great powers with more effective and consistent
opportunities to use moral suasion and political persuasion to socialize subordinates.
In sum, imperial rule is a form of transnational institution that mobilizes and organizes power in
hierarchic relations. For this reason, imperial rule functions in significantly different ways than anarchy.
In anarchy, great powers are primarily focused on maintaining sovereignty and preserving their freedom
of action and flexibility through strategies of self-help. Given this, firm commitments are seen as risky
and generally avoided, except when expedience dictates. In imperial rule, however, control is maintained
through a sense of obligation and authority and thus an emphasis is placed on firm commitments rather
57
Cf. Barnett and Finnemore 1999.
Robinson 1972. Newbury 2000.
59
Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990. Cf. Mansfield 1992. Hurd 1999, 390-393.
58
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than transient relations. In anarchy, great powers must avoid becoming functionally differentiated from
other states in the system, and because specializing in providing particular goods (whether security,
economic or otherwise) can lead to unwise dependence on others, a policy of self-help is generally
preferred. In contrast, in relations of imperial rule, great powers encourage differentiation and
specialization precisely because this creates relations of dependence between a great power and
subordinate territories. In anarchy, the ability of great powers to achieve their goals is a function of their
relative power. In imperial rule, great powers must effectively design imperial institutions to mobilize
and organize not just their material capabilities but also their legitimate authority over subordinates.
SOCIAL TIES AND IMPERIAL RULE
While a great power may have incentives to employ imperial rule to increase security, however, it
may not always be able to effectively construct imperial institutions. What conditions are necessary for a
great power to employ imperial rule? For a hierarchic realist approach, military capabilities are a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the establishment of institutions of imperial rule. In addition to
military capabilities, a great powers must rely on their ability to find institutional access points into
subordinate societies through which they can deploy their power and establish the legitimacy of their
control. Imperial institutions do not emerge de novo. Rather, they are constructed from the available
social and political resources and connections within and between great powers and subordinate polities.
The institutional power of imperial rule, therefore, comes from the social ties connecting a great power to
other polities in the international system. 60
In anarchy, relatively few social ties exist between actors. Because of the pressure to engage in
self-help behavior, building social ties with other actors is often avoided.61 In hierarchic forms such as
imperial rule, however, social ties between actors are much more common and fundamental. Yet, while
social ties are likely to be more prevalent in relations of imperial control, they are not necessarily
60
61
For sociologists, social ties are an important source of social power. See Nadel 1957. Cf. Wasserman and Faust 1994.
Cf. Wendt 1999.
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complete. In fact, social ties between actors can vary in their strength and frequency. It is this variation in
social ties that accounts for whether great powers can adopt a strategy of imperial rule when seeking to
control others, as well as what form of imperial institutions a great power can impose.
A hierarchic realist approach, therefore, places emphasis on the social ties that connect great
powers to other subordinate polities in the international system. 62 Specifically, two types of social and
political relations are vital to explaining the feasibility of establishing particular forms of imperial rule:
(1) those between the great power and the subordinate polity itself, and (2) those between salient political
actors within the subordinate polity. Social relations between the great power and the subordinate polity
are obviously important because they can act as plausible avenues through which political control can be
institutionalized in an imperial relationship. Social relations within the subordinate polity are crucial
because one of the distinctive features of imperial control is that it relies in part upon local collaboration
and the use of indigenous political institutions.
Social relations between the great power and the subordinate can vary between those that are
relatively sparse the other in ties are relatively dense (see Figure Two). When sparse social ties are
present, the connection between the great power and the periphery is characterized by interactions that are
relatively infrequent, unidirectional, and homogeneous. In contrast when dense social ties are present, the
connection between a great power and the periphery is characterized by interactions that are relatively
frequent, multi-directional, and heterogeneous. 63 The greater the density of social ties connecting a great
power and the periphery, the more numerous the available channels of political control. When social ties
are limited, therefore, great powers tend to rely on hegemony or informal political control. The more
dense social ties, the easier it will be for a great power to establish relations of imperial control.
62
These social ties can be economic (the trade of goods or exchange of capital, for example), political (movement of troops,
bureaucrats, and so forth), or cultural (exchange of media, religious missions, and so forth).
63
Unidirectional interactions are those that involve exchanges that tend to only flow from one part to the other, while
multidirectional interactions are those ties that involve exchanges that flow both ways along a given social tie. Reciprocal
interactions are multidirectional, but not all multidirectional interactions need be completely reciprocal. Homogenous ties involve
interactions or exchanges primarily in one issue domain and that are relatively narrow in scope, while heterogeneous ties involve
exchanges across many issue domains and that are wide in scope.
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Similarly, social ties within subordinate polities can vary between those that are relatively dense
and those that are relatively sparse (see Figure Three). When social ties are dense, then a number of
robust connections exist between elites of a subordinate polity and the regime; social ties are relatively
integrated. In contrast, when social ties are sparse, then fewer political connections exist between elites
of a subordinate polity and the regime; ties are relatively fragmented. In general, it is easier for great
powers to impose imperial control when subordinate polities are relatively fragmented because they can
take advantage in the gaps between social actors in fragmented polities and can leverage these gaps into
avenues of imperial control. 64
Taken together, variation on these two categories creates four different ideal type configurations
of social relations upon which a great power can apply imperial rule (see Figure Four). Not surprisingly,
the ability of a great power to use the institution of imperial rule to transfer its power into control varies,
and certain strategies of imperial rule are likely to be successful only under certain conditions.
Hegemony. In situations where social ties between a great power and subordinate polities are
sparse and subordinate polities are integrated, a great power will find it difficult to rely on imperial rule in
order to maintain control. The limited ties between a great power and the periphery in this situation make
it difficult for a great power to find plausible political, economic or cultural channels through which
imperial claims can be made or legitimated. In addition, the integrated nature of the subordinate polity
means that the access points through which a great power can insert itself politically are limited and the
capacity for a subordinate polity to resist more overt imperial ventures is likely to be great.
Indirect Imperial Rule. In situations where social ties are sparse but subordinate polities are
fragmented, a great power has an incentive to rely on indirect imperial rule. 65 The weakness of a
fractured subordinate polity provides the great power with opportunities to play factions off one another
and assert greater influence. Techniques of indirect rule, for example, include the buying off fragmented
64
Cf. Doyle 1984, chapter two.
For debates about definitions of indirect rule, see Robinson and Gallagher 1953. Eldridge 1973, 1-24. Eldridge 1978, 74-122.
Kennedy 1984.
65
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political system through gift giving and offer of military protection, backed up by the constant threat of
punitive military expeditions.
The main advantage of indirect imperial rule is that it is relatively cheap. By relying on local
elites to implement imperial control, a great power limits the amount of resources it needs to commit to
build new governance institutions. In addition, because it uses local indigenous rulers, indirect rule tends
to have more legitimacy than other forms of imperial rule. Finally, the limited nature of indirect imperial
rule is relatively less threatening because rarely can such connections be utilized to extract resources and
manpower or act as a springboard for future expansion.
Direct Imperial Rule. In situations where subordinate polities are fragmented and a great power
has dense connections with a subordinate polity, a great power has an incentive to rely on a direct
imperial rule. In this form of imperial rule, control is primarily maintained by keeping individual political
elites separated through techniques of divide and rule. Direct rule encourages compliance by isolating
elites and making them dependent on the imperial connection and by separating those potentially
rebellious groups from one another thereby limiting their effectiveness. The main advantage of direct
imperial rule is that it is highly reliable as a form for maintaining control. The extensive social ties
linking a great power to a subordinate polity open up many avenues for control while the fragmentary
nature of the subordinate polity limits the effectiveness of rebellion.
Federative Imperial Rule. In situations where social ties are dense between a great power and a
subordinate polity and subordinate polities are integrated, a great power will rely on a federative imperial
system. 66 In such a system, a great power relies on the strength of social ties to integrate indigenous elites
into the system by encouraging specialization, providing voice opportunities in exchange for
collaboration, and appealing to the legitimacy of imperial rule. The great advantage of federative
imperial rule is its low vulnerability to foreign interference. Because the subordinate polity in a relation
of federative imperial rule is socially integrated, it is less vulnerable to foreign pressure or collusion. If
66
I use the term “federative imperial rule” to refer to relations of imperial rule that have some sort of quasi-federal character –
e.g. the subordinate member unit has some formal space to make claims on the imperial power. Unlike federations, however,
member units in the context of imperial rule are not necessarily functional equals in a constitutional sense.
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the legitimacy of a great power is questioned and if the social ties connecting a great power to its
subordinate fray, then a great power may have to rely on more expensive guarantees to buy local support.
In sum, a hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule argues the following – great powers seek to
provide security by extending control over less powerful polities in the international system. When
threats to their security are minimal, great powers need not seek to extensively control other polities.
When threats are great, however, great powers have significant incentives to establish control to enhance
their security. The mechanisms for establish control are numerous and can range from hegemony, to
imperial rule, to annexation. In general, great powers prefer to minimize the cost of establishing control,
and thus prefer to rely on hegemony rather than imperial rule. When security threats are high, however,
great powers will face significant incentives to adopt more reliable and sensitive strategies of control.
The ability of a great power to impose imperial rule, however, is not just a function of its power but also
on existing social ties. It is easier, ceteris paribus, for a great power to impose imperial rule when it has
extensive ties connecting it to a subordinate polity and when a subordinate polity is fragmented. Social
ties also constrain the form of imperial institutions a great power can impose. While great powers might
wish to impose forms of imperial rule that provide more reliable or sensitive control or require small
outlays of resources, they are constrained by the existing social and political ties when constructing
imperial institutions. When seeking to control less powerful polities, therefore, great powers seek to
employ strategies that are appropriate to both its security requirements and the existing social conditions.
When security threats are high, great powers will face significant incentives to adopt more reliable and
sensitive strategies of control, such as imperial rule. Similarly, when a great power possesses significant
ties with a subordinate polity and when a subordinate polity is fragmented, then it will find it easier to
impose imperial rule.
The Origins of Imperial Rule: two cases from the British Empire
In the previous section of the paper, I proposed a hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule. In this
section of the paper, I evaluate this approach in comparison to other theories of imperial rule, including
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those derived from offensive realism and liberal institutionalism, by examining the case of the British
Empire during the nineteenth century. 67 The case of Great Britain during the nineteenth century is useful
for three reasons. First, the case affords numerous examples of imperial rule across space and time, 68
which allows the testing of various theories of imperial rule across a diverse number of cases. Second,
the security requirements and social position of Great Britain also varied significantly across space and
time, which allows the testing of how variations in systemic factors, such as the security environment,
interacted with the decision to adopt imperial rule. Finally, the experience of Great Britain in the
nineteenth century is particularly relevant both to debates in international relations theory and to
discussions of contemporary international politics. The British case figures quite prominently discussions
of hegemonic stability theory and imperial overstretch. 69 In addition in discussions of contemporary
American foreign policy and the utility of empire, authors often cite the British Empire as an illustrative
case. 70
The question of the origin of empire in general and the scramble for territories at the end of the
nineteenth century in particularly is obviously one of the most hotly debated questions in the social
sciences and humanities. There are wide ranging disputes as to whether imperialism was primarily an
economic or political process, whether its origins can be traced primarily to impulses stemming from the
metropole verses the periphery, and whether it is a uniform phenomenon of whether it can be classified
into different distinct periods. 71 While the various theories of international relations have made few
direct comments on the subject of imperialism, one can extrapolate predictions from their main
assumptions. Thus, offensive realism predicts that a great power will establish imperial rule over
67
For overviews of the British Empire, see Robinson and Gallagher 1953. Robinson and Gallagher 1968. Porter 1975. Porter
1983. Hyam 1976. Chamberlain 1988. Bourne 1970. Howard 1967. Howard 1974. Low 1973. Lowe 1972. Lowe 1967.
Porter 1998. Morrell 1966. Morrell 1969.
68
On the heterogeneity of the British Empire, see Fieldhouse 1973. Eldridge 1983. Although the pace of British expansion
varied across the nineteenth century, at no point did the British completely abandon imperial rule as a strategy.
69
On overstretch, see Gilpin 1984. Kennedy 1987.
70
On American Empire, see Ferguson 2003. Ferguson 2004.
71
On the political verses economic foundations of empire, see Robinson and Gallagher 1968. Robinson and Gallagher 1982.
Newbury 1962. Hopkins 1986. Darwin 1997. Cain and Hopkins 1993. Cf. Eldridge 1978, 122-146. Louis 1976, 7-14. On the
metropolitan verses peripheral aspects of empire and debates over periodization, see Robinson and Gallagher 1953. Galbraith
1960. Fieldhouse 1973. Robinson 1972. Platt 1968. Platt 1971. Macdonagh 1961. Cf. Elridge 1978, 74-81. Louis 1976, 5-7.
Kennedy 1984, 21-22.
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valuable yet vulnerable pieces of territory in an effort to maximize power. Liberal institutionalism
predicts that a great power will establish imperial rule in order to foster security cooperation when it is
particularly vulnerable to disruption by opportunistic behavior. According to the hierarchic realist
approach introduced in this paper, a great power will establish imperial rule to enhance its security
through control when social and political ties provide it with institutional access points in subordinate
polities.
In order to evaluate these competing predictions, two examples of the imposition of imperial rule
will be considered – India between 1798 and 1805 and Nigeria between 1884 and 1903. These two cases
have been selected for their wide variation across time and space. In India, for example, a mercantile
British trading company expanded at the expense of successor states of a great Muslim empire during a
time of continental war. In Nigeria, the British expanded at the expense of small trading houses,
militaristic Yoruba kingdoms, and vast Muslim emirates at a time of frenzied European political activity
across Africa. Despite these varied circumstances, the underlying motives of the British were similar in
both of these cases and the institutions of imperial rule tailored similarly to local social ties.
Imperial Rule in India. Prior to 1756, Great Britain had primarily advanced its commercial
interests in India through the instrument of the East India Company (EIC) 72 and by means of a strategy of
commercial hegemony. 73 The goal, according to the Company’s directors in 1694, was to “make our
garrisoned ports in India marts for nations, which will n a few years aggrandize our revenue, and with that
our strength.” 74 There was little incentive for the EIC to penetrate into the interior of India or to establish
72
East India Company had been granted a royal charter by Queen Elizabeth I in 1600. Although it remained an independent
trading company, the British Government increasingly interfered in its operations and directed its activities during the eighteenth
century. In an agreement signed in 1767, the Company recognized that its possessions in India were property of the Crown. In
1773, Lord North’s Regulating Act established that the Company itself was under the control of Parliament and the Crown.
When this act was renewed in 1781, the power of the Crown over the Company was extended to include the right of the
government to see all dispatches and amend any orders sent to India. The Pitt India Act of 1784 specified that the government
was to “superintend, direct and controul, all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military
government or revenues.” Printed in Madden and Fieldhouse 1987, 183-191. A six member Board of Control was established in
London to facilitate this oversight. Cf. Bowen 1988, 155-176. Spear 1981, 519-520. Roberts 1929, 188-201. Marshall 1968,
38-39.
73
For overviews of this period, see Spear 1981. Moon 1989. Marshall 1998. Stein 1998. Metcalf and Metcalf 2002.
74
Quoted in Watson 1980, 86.
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more elaborate forms of imperial rule. The EIC possessed few resources to affect a push into the interior
– it employed just 645 white male civilians and mortality among company servants was quite high. 75 In
addition, in the interior, the Mughal Empire stood as a check to any British ambitions of territorial gain.
The British position, however, began to change during the mid-eighteenth century. The
increasingly energetic activities of the French posed a direct threat to the British trading position. 76 At
the same time, the erosion of the strength of the Mughal Empire created instability in the interior that
invited British political intervention to restore stability and to recruit sympathetic princes to counter the
French. 77 As a result, the British position began to transform from one of commercial hegemony into one
of political hegemony. In the northeast in Bengal, Robert Clive defeated the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-uddaula at the Battle of Plassey on 23 June 1757 and installed a more pliant successor. 78 The British
became further embroiled in the politics of Bengal as a series weak and ineffective Nawabs failed to
protect Bengal from military predation and local unrest. 79 On October 1764, the British defeated the
Nawab of Bengal and his allies, the Wazir of Awadh and Emperor Shah Alam, at the Battle of Buxar. By
the subsequent treaty, the British assumed responsibility both for maintaining troops to protect Bengal
and for overseeing and administering revenue collection. Although a new Nawab was installed, Warren
75
Marshall 1976, 217-218.
The Compagnie des Indes Orientales had been formed in 1664 and secured a base at Pondicherry in the Carnatic in 1674. The
true base of French activities in the Indian Ocean region, however, lay in the French naval bases at Mauritius (Isle de France) and
Réunion (isle de Bourbon). The French Company was significantly smaller in size and influence than the EIC; in 1740, for
example, the British exported £1,795,000 worth of goods compared with £880,000 for the French. Cf. Dodwell 1967. Spear
1981, 456-457.
77
The Mughals were the fifth and most enduring Muslim conquerors of India. They had established power in 1526, the high
point of their rule being the reign of Aurangzeb (1659-1707). In 1700, the Mughal Empire had a population of 180 million
people, approximately 20% of the population of the entire world. By the eighteenth century, however, the authority of the
Mughal Empire had begun to erode. Historians have offered a number of diverse explanations for the decline of the Mughal
Empire. Some point to tensions between the various elements of the regime – including the military, nobles, landholders, and
peasants – which were exacerbated by foreign invasions, such as those by the Persians in the 1730s and by the Afghans in the
1750s and 1760s. Other authors emphasize the alienation of banking houses and newswriters in the Mughal imperial system.
See Bayly 1988, 7. Ali 1966, 107-111. Leonard 1979, 165. Bayly 1993, 17-19. Bayly 1988, 14-15. Stein 1977, 9-10. Cf.
Grean and Deasy 1985, 18-19.
78
The Nawab had raised the ire of the British when he sacked Calcutta on 20 June 1756 to protest increased British fortifications
in Calcutta. Cf. Moon 1989, 41-42. Stokes 1973, 142-143. After Plassey, Siraj-ud-daula’s rival, Mir Jafar, was established as
Nawab. The Bengal Select Committee viewed the unseating of Siraj-ud-daula as consisting with the existing policy of hegemony
designed to “effectually traverse the designs of the French and possibly keep them entirely out of these dominions” Quoted in
Dodwell 1929, 148.
79
Initially, Robert Clive hoped to avoid further intervention, admitting that “so large a sovereignty may possibly be an object too
extensive for a mercantile company; and it is to be feared they are not of themselves able without the nation’s assistance to
maintain so wide a dominion” (Printed in Madden and Fieldhouse 1987, 148-149). Bengal was invaded, however, by a Mughal
army in 1759 and by both Mughal and Maratha forces in 1760. When Mir Jafar refused to cede portions of his revenue to pay for
Company expenses incurred repelling these invasions, he was deposed in favor of Mir Kasim.
76
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Hastings declared that “the Company is Master of the power and may be Master of the Government and it
is out of the Nabobs power to controul them.” 80
Similarly, in southeast India, clashes with the French embroiled the British in local politics.
During the War of Austrian Succession, the French captured Madras and helped install a sympathetic
Nizam in Hyderabad. 81 During the Seven Years War, the French again laid siege to Madras and clashed
with British forces in Hyderabad and at the French fort of Pondicherry. In order to solidify their political
position and forestall the return of the French, the British signed separate agreements with the Nawab of
Arcot (1763) and the Nizam of Hyderabad (1766) in which these princes assigned revenue to the British
in exchange for the placement of Company garrisons in their territories. 82
By the mid-eighteenth century, therefore, the EIC had transformed from a primarily commercial
company into a significant political and military power in India. Facing increased risks to its security
from the activities of French traders and from local instability generated by the erosion of the Mughal
Empire, the British adopted a strategy of control through hegemony in order to protect their commercial
position. Their military capabilities were increased significantly. In 1744, the EIC employed 2,500
European soldiers. By 1778, the number of EIC and British forces in India had risen to approximately
67,000 men. 83 Politically, the Company’s subsidiary alliances with the Nawab of Arcot and the Nizam of
Hyderabad, for example, provided them with the ability to shape and guide the foreign policies of these
states. In Bengal, where the Company was responsible for defense of the territory and for overseeing
revenue collection, it had established a position closest to imperial rule.
While these transformations were significant, there is substantial evidence that both the British
government and Company officials wished to keep their commitments in India limited. While hegemony
was sought to secure existing interests, there was little desire to aggressively extend imperial rule. The
80
Quoted in Marshall 1999, 13.
The British helped the Nawab of Arcot, Mahomed Ali Wallajah, deafeat French supported political rival Chanda Sahib. Under
the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Madras was restored as a British possession. Cf. Dodwell 1967.
82
The Nawab of Arcot assigned the Company collection rights, known as a jagir, to districts around Madras. Irschick 1989, 466475. Cf. Bayly 1989, 58-60. Arasaratnam 1979, 26-33. The Nizam of Hyderabad, Ali Khan transferred the Northern Sirkars,
which had been ceded to the French, to the British. Ramusack, 2004, 25-27. Leonard 1971, 570-571.
83
Colley 2002, 257. Cf. Bryant 1978.
81
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
diwani had granted the Company significant sovereign rights in Bengal, yet officials vowed that in order
to preserve “the Ancient form of Government” their sovereignty “should extend to nothing beyond the
superintending, the collection of the Revenues, and the receiving the Money from the Nabob’s Treasury
to that of the Dewanee or the Company.” 84 The Secretary of the EIC assured the House of Commons in
1767 that “the general tenor of the Company’s orders were not to act offensively…We don’t want
conquest and power; it is commercial interest only we look for.” 85 In 1784, Parliament passed the East
India Company Act, which established a Board of Control to oversee the Company. In addition, the act
explicitly forbid the EIC from engaging in expansionist policies that might be injurious to British
interests, stating that “to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in Indian are measures
repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation…it shall not be lawful for the GovernorGeneral and Council …either to declare war or commence hostilities or entering into any treaty for
making war, against any of the country Princes or States in India.” 86 Successive governors vowed to
avoid expansion. Warren Hastings pledged to “to cultivate the arts of Peace” and “to prune [Company
expenses] as much as possible from remote wars and foreign connections. 87
At the turn of the nineteenth century, however, the EIC once again transformed its position in
India – this time from one of primarily political hegemony into one of imperial rule. Under GovernorGeneral Richard Wellesley (1797-1805), the EIC extended its control over Indian polities in the interior
through what became known as the subsidiary alliance system, defeated Mysore (1799) and the Maratha
polities of Sindhia and Berar (1803) in separate military actions, 88 and annexed a variety of territories
including Canara, Wayanad and Coimbatore in the south and the Ganges-Jumna Doab and Delhi itself in
84
Reprinted in Madden and Fieldhouse 1987, 156-157.
Quoted in Marshall 1968, 17.
86
Quoted in Fisher 1991, p.55.
87
Quoted in Moon 1989, 149.
88
The Maratha polity was a curious amalgamation of powerful families, each with particular rights and responsibilities. As the
Mughal Empire declined in power, the Marathas had emerged as a powerful challenger to their authority in central India.
Maratha power was organized around three centers – Sindhia, Holkar, and Poona, the seat of the Peshwa, the nominal Maratha
paramount. Gordon 1993, 178-179.
85
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the north. 89 By 1805, these combined actions had “confirmed the British as inheritors of the old Mughal
supremacy and extinguished all hopes of a native hegemony in the subcontinent.” 90
What can explain the dramatic shift from a strategy of political hegemony to one of imperial rule
during this crucial period? An offensive realist theory would predict that the EIC should have been
looking to use its dominant position in Bengal as a springboard to maximize its power over wealthy, weak
Indian states as part of a general strategy of power-maximization. Such offensive intentions seem to be
absent from Governor-General Wellesley’s own description of his policy. On his arrival, he assured the
President of the Board of Control that he would “endeavour as nearly as possible to preserve the balance
off power between the native princes.” 91 Wellesley described with contempt “commercial prejudice and
the eager desire of temporary mercantile advantage,” arguing instead that the “duties of sovereignty must
be deemed paramount to…mercantile interests, prejudices and profits.” 92 Nor were the Indian polities
that Wellesley confronted weak and vulnerable. As a result of the modernizing policies of Haider Ali and
his son Tipu Sultan, the armies of Mysore were among the most formidable in India, comprising not just
cavalry but European trained and equipped mobile infantry and artillery.93 Similarly, employing the help
of French mercenaries, the Maratha chieftain Mahadji Sindhia established a 27,000 man force consisting
of three brigades, each with infantry and artillery battalions. 94 Facing a brigade of this force at the Battle
of Assaye, the British suffered 1,500 casualties out of a force of 13,500 and were secured victory by the
enterprising command of Arthur Wellesley. 95
A liberal institutionalist perspective would predict that the EIC should have been seeking to
impose imperial rule in Indian states where the benefits from security cooperation were high and
opportunism likely. At first glance, Wellesley’s use of the subsidiary alliance, in which the British
committed forces to defend Indian polities in exchange for payments of tribute or cessation of land, might
89
For a list of annexations by date, see Fischer 1993.
Pemble 1976, 375.
91
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 29.
92
Quoted in Marshall 1985, 168.
93
Haider Ali amassed forces in 1767 consisting of an estimated 18,000 cavalry, 8,000 mercenary cavalry, 20,000 infantry, 750
Europeans, and 250 artillerymen. Cf. Barua 1994. 601.
94
Barua 1994, 607. On Maratha military organization more generally, see Gordon 1993, 191-193.
95
Cf. Pemble 1976, 379. Boyce 1999, 645.
90
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
seem to be a strategy designed to foster cooperation with unreliable Indian polities. 96 But the goal of the
subsidiary alliance system was not to foster a defensive cooperative security system, but rather to deprive
Indian states of any capacity to provide for their own security in the first place. In a dispatch to the
Resident of Hyderabad in February 1804, Wellesley explained that the “irremediable principles of Asiatic
policy” were “adverse to the establishment of such a balance of power among the several states of India
as would effectually restrain the views of aggrandisement and ambition and promote general tranquility.”
Rather than through cooperation, therefore, Wellesley argued that only “the operation of a general
control over the principal states of India” could provide peace. The subsidiary alliance, therefore, was
designed not to share the burdens of providing security, but rather “to place [the principal states of India]
in such a degree of dependence on the British power as may deprive them of the means of prosecuting
any measures or of forming any confederacy hazardous to the security of the British Empire.” 97 In
Awadh, for example, rather than help work with Indian Princes to protect British interests, Wellesley
ordered the the Nawab-Wazir to disband his military forces, replace them with a contingent of Company
troops, 98 and “to make a cession to the Company in perpetual sovereignty of such a portion of his territory
as shall be fully adequate, in their present impoverished condition, to repay the expenses of the troops.” 99
In this way, British security would be guaranteed without having to “[depend] on the precarious power,
and imperfect administration of an Indian government.” 100 Similarly, with regards to Hyderabad,
Wellesley viewed the arrangement as particularly one sided – “a body of our own troops, receiving the
pay of the Nizam, would tend to strengthen him for our purposes only, and would give him no additional
means, but rather waken him, in any contest with us.” 101
A hierarchic realist theory would predict that the EIC would turn to a strategy of imperial rule
when it faced new threats to its security that other strategies of control, such as hegemony, could not
solve. Moreover, following from the logic of social ties, a hierarchic realist approach predicts that the
96
For descriptions of the subsidiary alliance system, see Fisher 1991, 196. Fischer 1993. Spear 1981, 552. Ramusack 2004.
Quoted in Ramusack 2004, 62. Italics added.
98
Reprinted in Heras 1974, 57-577. Cf. Barnett 1980, 145-146.
99
Quoted in Winchester 1929, 353.
100
Quoted in Marshall 1985, 168.
101
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 21. Emphasis in original.
97
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EIC would turn to a strategy of imperial rule in Indian states with which it had substantial social ties and
which were politically fragmented. As to its security, the Company found its position increasingly
imperiled by two factors. First, the fragmentation of the Mughal Empire into successor states, which
competed militarily for spoils, continued to undermine the British goal of fostering a workable balance of
power system in central India. Efforts to create such a system as part of a strategy of hegemony had
failed – the Treaty of Seringapatam that had ended the last Mysore War had failed to prevent the threat
from Tipu Sultan from reemerging, 102 the Maratha invasion of Hyderabad in 1795 had destroyed the
Company’s alliance with the Nizam, and the power vacuum in the northwest had invited Afghan ruler
Zaman Shah to invade in 1798 thus imperiling the Company’s valuable trade routes along the Ganges. 103
Given the instability in the interior, one Company administrator quipped that “there is no such thing as a
Balance of Power amongst these nations…their relative power is constantly fluctuating according to the
character of their rulers.” 104
Second, the outbreak of war with Napoleon had raised the threat that the French might intervene
politically in India. French agents were active in Hyderabad, Sindhia and Berar. Most alarming, from the
point of view of the Company, Tipu Sultan of Mysore had reportedly dispatched ambassadors to
Mauritius to negotiate an “offensive and defensive alliance with the French for the express purpose of
attempting the subversion of the British power in India.” 105 Both in India and in Britain, policymakers
looked with alarm on the possibility of losing the foothold in India. President of the Board of Control
declared that the loss of India would be a “death-wound.” 106 Wellesley believed nothing less then the
British position in India to be at stake, arguing that “the French officers with their several corps in the
respective services of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and of Tippoo, might establish the power of France in India
upon the ruin of the states of Poonah and of the Deccan.” 107 In October 1798, Wellesley learned about
102
Spear 1981, 541-542.
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 30-38.
104
Quoted in Peers 1995, 56.
105
Reprinted in Heras 1974, 407-408.
106
Quoted in Bayly 2005.
107
Quoted in Butler 1973, 157-159.
103
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
the landing of General Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt, 108 and he urged the Company to strike “a sudden
blow against Tippoo before he can receive foreign aid.” 109
Faced with these urgent threats, Wellesley decided to abandon the previous strategy of
maintaining political hegemony and impose instead “a general control over the principal states of
India” 110 through the concerted expansion of British imperial rule. He dismissed political hegemony,
emphasizing that “there can be no doubt that the inefficient state of our alliances has been one main
ground of Tipu’s late proceedings.” 111 To remove the threat from Mysore, Wellesley authorized the war.
To establish British power in central India, he forced a series of new unequal, subsidiary alliance treaties
on Hyderabad (1798), the newly installed Raja of Mysore (1799), the Raja of Tanjore (1799), Awadh
(1801), and the Nawab of Arcot (1801). 112 Finally, Wellesley, convinced that “confusion now prevailing
among the Mahratta powers cannot terminate in any event unfavourable to the security of the honourable
Company or of its allies,” 113 negotiated a subsidiary alliance agreement with the nominal Maratha
paramount, the Peshwa of Poona 114 which made the Peshwa “in effect [a] subsidized vassal of the
Company.” 115 When other Maratha chieftains intervened to protest the treaty, the Company declared war.
The ability of the EIC to impose imperial rule during this period was greatly facilitated by the
social ties connecting it to subordinate politics. As hierarchic realism predicts, because it possessed dense
ties with local Indian polities and because many of the Indian polities it encountered were fragmented, the
EIC was able to impose direct imperial rule over much of the subcontinent. On the one hand, the dense
economic and political ties the EIC possessed with many Indian polities provided it with institutional
resources to construct imperial rule. The ability of the British to forge ties with local Indian actors was
108
On the 31 October 1798, Wellesley learned of Nelson’s victory at Aboukir Bay. Despite the victory, Wellesley remained
concerned at the prospect of a French advance, and even after the fall of Seringapatam, he wrote privately of the possibility of the
“arrival of a French force in India.” Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 149-150.
109
Quoted in Moon 1989, 279.
110
Quoted in Ramusack 2004, 62.
111
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 58.
112
Ingram 1995, 18-19.
113
Quoted in Butler 1973, 302-303.
114
The Treaty of Bassein pledged to agree to finance a force of not less than six battalions of Company forces, to exclude all
Europeans from his service, and to abstain from hostilities or negotiations with any states without British permission. Edwardes
1929, 373.
115
Moon 1989, 315. These terms included a payment to the Company, relations with other states controlled by the Company, no
Europeans into his service without British permission.
p. 28 / 52
MacDonald • Imperial Rule
facilitated, in part, by the erosion of the Mughal Empire. The leaders of the various post-Mughal
successor states faced an insecure environment and sought to enhance their positions through the creation
of larger standing armies. In order extract more resources from their populations, the leaders of successor
states both developed more centralized revenue collection systems and turned to new intermediaries who
could help in the collection of revenue. 116 Commercial classes (jains) organized trade and helped an
important source of revenue for local rulers. Landed elites (zamindars) began to tax markets and trade,
taking advantage of literate Muslim administrators. 117 Moneylenders financed loans for military activities
or to finance revenue collection. The EIC took advantage of these transformations to form strong
connections with local actors – commercial classes became commercial allies in up-country trade, 118
landed elites became collaborative partners, 119 and moneylenders helped finance Company wars. By
“inserting its agents into provincial hierarchies,” the Company was able to turn these classes into “the
foundation of the British colonial regime.” 120 In Hyderabad, for example, the British courted the support
of Azim-ul-Omrah, the chief minister of Hyderabad, whose party was “made up largely of minority Shia
Muslims and north Indian Hindus” and thus “tended to look to the British for support in internal factions
and for protection against the Marathas.” 121
In addition, the Company took advantage of political fragmentation in Indian polities in order to
extend its imperial control. Succession disputes between rival princes proved useful to the Company,
because they could court various parties and extract favorable treaties. In the Caranatic, for example,
Wellesley took advantage of the death of the Nawab Umdat-ul Umra and pledged to support a particular
claimant in exchange for the transfer of civil administration to the Company. 122 Similarly, in Hyderabad,
116
Washbrook 1988, 68-70. Washbrook 1981, 711-713. Stein has identified parallels in these developments similar forms of
‘military-fiscalism’ that developed in Europe during the sixteenth century. Stein 1985, 391-393.
117
Bayly 1988, 9-11. Bayly 1983. Washbrook 1988, 70-72.
118
Marshall 1999, 4.
119
Washbrook 1988, 75-77.
120
Newbury 2000, 233-235. Bayly 1988, 9-11.
121
Bayly 1989, 94-95. Cf. Butler 1973, 156-157.
122
Ingram 1995, 18-19.
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
the British courted Secunder Jah, the Nizam’s older son, against his rivals, notably his younger brother
Ali Jah, who was sympathetic to the French. 123
Further evidence illustrating the importance of social ties can be seen in cases where the British
failed to completely push their military victories. In the Treaty of Surji Arjungaon, signed 30 December
1803, which ended the initial phase of war with the Marathas, for example, the Company imposed a
subsidiary alliance on Sindhia. But because the leadership of Sindhia remained relatively unified and the
British did not possess many avenues of influence within the regime, the terms of the subsidiary alliance
were minimal – the force was not stationed in Sindhia’s territories and the subsidy payment was made in
one-time cessions of territory rather than annual payments. 124 Similarly, following the Company’s
victory in Mysore, Wellesley opted to install a young member of Wadyar family, the Hindu dynasty that
had been ousted from power in Mysore by Haider Ali, rather than impose direct rule. 125 Wellesley
recognized that the British had few social ties with Mysore, 126 the imposition of direct rule would prove
costly 127 and thus a hands-off strategy could “preclude…the embarrassments which have occasioned so
much distress in the Carnatic, Oudh, and Tanjore” 128 and allow the British to slowly cultivate
collaborators and political allies. 129
Rather than seek to maximize their political power, therefore, the British in India reacted
defensively to emerging security threats and extended imperial rule over polities in where they possessed
extensive social ties and where they could take advantage of political fragmentation. The extension of
imperial rule, moreover, was not undertaken as part of an effort to share security burdens with Indian
princes, but rather to impose British control over the subcontinent.
123
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 58-60.
Cf. Butler 1973, 320-321.
125
Fisher 1991, 404-405.
126
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 157. Cf. Fisher 1991, 404-405.
127
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 131, also 132-136.
128
Reprinted in Ingram 1970, 159.
129
For example, to administer the territory of the young Raja, Wellelsey restored a finance minister, who had previously been
languishing in jail, thus ensuring a grateful and pliant client.
124
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Imperial Rule in Nigeria. For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the interests of the
British in the West Coast of Africa were commercial. In 1807, the British Parliament abolished the slave
trade, 130 and the interests of British traders on the coast turned to “legitimate commerce” in goods such as
palm oil, 131 timber, ivory and other products. In order to increase the effectiveness of anti-slaving
activities, the British increasingly turned to political mechanisms. Existing colonial ports and posts were
fortified, and British agents sought to secure treaties of friendship with interior chiefdoms and back them
up through the use of naval power and the payment of bribes. 132 In 1827, the British acquired rights from
Spain to use Fernando Po as a naval base in their anti-slaving activities. The British negotiated antislaving treaties with Old Calabar (1833) and Brass (1834), and in 1837, intervened with a naval force in
order to ensure the succession of their candidate, William Dappa Pepple, as King of Bonny. 133 By 1865,
an estimated 107 treaties had been signed between Britain and chiefs across West Africa with the goal of
suppressing slavery and promoting “amity and commerce.” 134
The formal extension of British political hegemony came in June 1849 with the appointment of
John Beecroft as Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra. Prime Minister Palmerston informed
Beecfort that the government had “no intention to seek to gain Possession… of any portion of the African
Continent in those parts” but only “to encourage and extend British Commerce, and thereby to displace
the Slave Trade.” 135 Successive consuls were not averse to using British military power to back up and
protect British commercial interests. In 1850, Beecroft ordered the West African squadron to blockade
the port of Whydah in order to force the King of Dahomey to open negotiations over an anti-slaving treaty.
In response to complains from British traders and missionaries that King Kosoko of Lagos was supporting
piracy, smuggling palm oil, and engaging in the slave trade, Consul Beecroft authorized the use of force
130
See Fyfe 1973, 35-36. For an international politics perspective, see Kaufmann and Pape 1999.
Palm oil was attractive because of its ability to be used in the production of industrial lubricants, soap, and lighting fuel.
Crowder 1978, 97-100.
132
Newbury 1999, 636.
133
Diké 1956, 66-74. Cf. Bonny Trade Regulations. Reprinted in Newbury 1865, 375.
134
Quoted in Newbury 1965, 25.
135
Reprinted in Newbury 1975, 384-385. Cf. Burns 1972, 114.
131
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
in 1851 to remove him from his throne to and place his uncle Akitoye installed as King. 136 Ten years
later, the British coerced the Akitoye’s successor, Dosumu, to sign treaty that effectively granted the
British sovereignty over the city. 137 Similarly, in November 1853, Consul Beecroft deposed King
William Dappa Pepple after it became known that he sought to make war on neighboring New Calabar. 138
Despite these activities, however, the ultimate goals of the British remained minimal. There was
little desire to see the imposition of imperial rule. James Stephen, permanent member of the Colonial
Office, for example, argued that “even if we could acquire the Dominion of the whole continent it would
be but a worthless possession.” 139 Another Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Fredric Rogers, described
Britain’s West Africa possessions as “expensive and troublesome.” 140 In 1865, a Parliamentary Select
Committee on West African Settlements declared “that all further extensions of territory or assumption of
government or new treaties offering protection to native tribes would be inexpedient” and therefore
recommended Great Britain completely abandon its possessions in West Africa except for the naval base
at Sierra Leone. 141 Thus, British policymakers viewed Africa mainly as “a base for action against the
slave trade, an entrepot for resources, a staging post to India and the East.” 142
Around the turn of the century, however, the British strategy in Nigeria changed from one that
favored commercial and political hegemony to one of imperial rule. In May 1884, the British Consul
Edward Hewett began a tour of the coast in order to secure treaties of protection with local chiefs, and
following the Berlin Conference, the British government formally declared the Oil Rivers Protectorate in
June 1885. 143 In May 1892, the Governor of Lagos, Gilbert Carter, dispatched a military expedition to
the Yoruba kingdom of Ijebu, which signaled the beginning of British imperial rule into Yorubaland. 144
Finally, between 1895 and 1903, Frederick Lugard, working first as commander of the West African
136
Crowder 1978, 126.
Burns 1972, 128-129. McIntyer 1963, 59-61.
138
Reprinted in Newbury 1865, 391-392. Cf. Anene 1966, 33-35.
139
Quoted in Bodelson 1924, 201-202.
140
Quoted in Hargreaves 1963, 39.
141
Parliamentary Papers 1865, Vol 1. The recommendations of the committee were never completely implemented.
142
Newbury 1999, 624.
143
In 1893, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was expanded to become the Niger Coast Protectorate. In 1900, it was expanded once
again to become the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1914, it was amalgamated with the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria to
form Nigeria. Cf. Flint 1960, 59-60.
144
Smith 1971, 180-194.
137
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Frontier Force and then as the Governor of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, led military operations
designed to establish imperial rule over the northern Muslim emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. 145
What can explain this gradual but determined shift from a strategy of political hegemony into one
of imperial rule? An offensive realist theory would predict that the British should have been looking to
use its foothold in Lagos in order to extend control over vulnerable states with abundant palm-oil
resources as part of a general strategy of resource extraction and power-maximization. There was little
enthusiasm for such a forward policy, however. Prime Minister Palmerston famously referred to Lagos as
“that deadly gift from the Foreign Office.” 146 In March 1867, the Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon
ruled out a strategy of using Lagos as a staging ground for offensive interference in Yorubaland,
contending that a “policy of non-interference should still be adhered to unless the settlement of the
dispute in question shall appear to be of essential importance to the safety and well being of the
Colony.” 147 The Colonial Secretary Kimberly argued that the British government should “be satisfied as
a rule with cultivating friendly relations with all the surrounding tribes” and not “attempt to force on such
intercourse by coercive measures. 148 Moreover, imperial institutions were not designed to maximize
resource extraction from valuable territories. The first British Consuls of the Niger Coast Protectorate
had to make do without a regular source of revenue and without either a constabulary or police force. 149
In northern Nigeria, Lugard had to rely upon indigenous elites to collect revenue, and while reforms were
attempted, 150 his protectorate ran significant deficits and was fiscally dependent on imperial grants in aid
averaging more than £314,500 per annum. 151
A liberal institutionalist perspective would predict that the British Government should have been
seeking to introduce imperial rule into situations where Nigerian polities were potentially useful security
145
See Perham 1960a. Perham 1960b. Flint 1960.
Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher 1961, 36.
147
Reprinted in Newbury 1965, 365-366. Similarly, Colonial Secretary Lord Kimberly believed that the British Government
“could not approve any measures involving direct interference with the inland tribes” Quoted in Flint 1969, 230. Cf. McIntyre
1963. Ajayi 1974, 159-166. Ayandele 1966, 332-34. Person 1985, 234-235.
148
Reprinted in Newbury 1965, 370-371.
149
Geary 1927, 96-9.
150
For example, under the Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906, British residents were instructed to asses the taxability of
people, appoint village headmen and district chiefs. Hailey 1951, 76, cf. 76-77. Perham 1962, 70-72.
151
Hailey 1951, 2.
146
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
cooperators but where such cooperation had been found particularly difficult to achieve. If there was any
situation where security cooperation would have proven particularly useful, it was the coastal trading
polities where the authority of chiefs stemmed from their ability to successfully organize foreign trade. 152
Rather than working with local chiefs to promote trade, however, the British consistently acted in ways
inimical to their interests. In February 1872, the British granted its Consul the authority to enforce
treaties and administer laws in African states through Courts of Equity 153 – which had been established at
Bonny, New Calabar, Akassa, Old Calabar, and Brass – essentially bypassing the authority of local chiefs.
In addition, the British actively promoted commercial penetration of the interior. 154 In order to assist the
activities traders in the interior, the British government granted a subsidy to Scottish trader Macgregor
Laird in 1857, dispatched the H.M.S. Espoir in 1861 and the H.M.S. Investigator in 1867 to protect
trading hulks along the Niger, and in July 1886, granted a Royal Charter to Sir George Goldie’s Royal
Niger Company (RNC) to conduct trade upriver. 155 Because these activities threatened to undermine
their position, they antagonized local African traders, who responded by engaging in piracy, smuggling,
and aggression towards European traders. In 1859, a British steamer, the Rainbow, was sacked and
trading hulks at Aboh and Ontisha were plundered. In 1895, the Brassmen overran a RNC trading outpost
at Akassa. In sum, rather than work in cooperation with local chiefs and traders, the British often worked
very much in opposition to their interests.
A hierarchic realist theory would predict that the British government would turn to a strategy of
imperial rule in Nigeria when it faced new threats to the security of its trading activities that other
strategies of control, such as hegemony, could not solve. Furthermore, a hierarchic realist theory predicts
that the British government would turn to imperial rule in places where it had substantial social ties and
where indigenous polities were politically fragmented. In terms of its security, two developments
threatened to undermine the British commercial and political position in Nigeria. First, activities of
152
For overviews of pre-colonial polities the Niger Delta, see Crowder 1978, 51-68. Anene 1966, 1-25. Diké 1956, 32-37.
Afigbo 1972, 14-22.
153
Anene 1966, 37-38. Person 1985, 236.
154
By 1878, four different British trading companies were engaging in commercial activities along the Niger, shipping an
estimated 5,000 tons of palm oil, valued at approximately £195,000 shipped. Cf. Flint 1960, 20-25.
155
Cf. Crowder 1968, 27-28. Burns 1972 78-102. Flint 1969
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
French traders and politicians were increasingly imperiling the British position. Of course, the French
had competed with the British over coastal trade in West Africa for some time. In 1863, for example, the
French had founded Porto Novo in Dahomey “with the sole purpose of securing…substantial imports of
spirits an entry into Yorubaland free of the heavy duties levied at Lagos.” 156 As penetration of interior
increased, the French rushed to compete with British firms – the French Minister of the Marine and
Colonies declared that the object of French policy was to “make sure of the freedom of our trade” along
the Niger. 157 In May 1881, the Compte de Semellé led a French delegation to Nupe to secure a
commercial agreement with the Emir and established a rival, trading conglomerate. 158 The French
Foreign Ministry granted a military officer, Commandant Mattei, the status of agent consulaire and
dispatched him to the Niger to direct the Company’s operations on behalf of the French government. In
May 1883, the British Admiralty reported that French gunboats had been dispatched to both Bonny and
New Calabar. The activities of the French appeared even more alarming in January 1883 when French
Prime Minsiter Jules Ferry approved the annexations of series of forts in Dahomey, including Porto Novo.
The head of the African Department, Percy Anderson, worried that “If we remain passive, we shall see
our trade stifled, we shall find our traders furious.” 159
Second, British traders increasingly clashed with both coastal middlemen and polities in the
interior. The situation along the coast has already been described. In the interior, the British encountered
powerful Fulani Emirates who jealously guarded their sovereignty. In November 1887, for example, the
Emir of Bida ordered the RNC to vacate his territory after he discovered company agents were levying
duties on traders within his territory. 160 Similarly, along the Benue River, the Emir of Muri, who had
clashed with the RNC on two previous occasions, ordered the RNC to abandon their factories at Kunini
and Lau. The Emir of Yola proved greatly hostile to the RNC, refusing entry to Company traders in 1882,
1884, and 1886. In an attempt to forestall the French via diplomacy, the RNC dispatched
156
Hargreaves 1960, 102.
Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher 1968, 166.
158
The Compagnie Francaise de l’Afrique Equatoriale. Flint 1960, 38-39.
159
Quoted in Louis 1971, 189.
160
Adeleye 1971, 137-138.
157
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
plenipotentiaries to the Sokoto Caliphate on three separate occasions – 1885, 1890, and 1894 – and in
each case, the company’s representatives returned with treaties of dubious validity and little legal
value. 161
A strategy of political hegemony, therefore, was breaking down. Diplomatic moves both in
Europe and with African polities had failed to forestall the French, and the British were forced to rely on
costly punitive expeditions. In order to secure their commercial (and therefore political) position, the
British turned to imperial rule. After the establishment of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885, for
example, the British worked to use imperial rule to provide them with more effective control over restive
coastal traders. According to the acting consul, H.H. Johnson, argued that although “our policy may for
the present chiefly assume a negative character,” recent events had “impressed on me the necessity of
backing up the chief courses of English trade, existent and about to exist, by English political control.” 162
The Foreign Office similarly argued that the primary goal of policy with regards to native polities was
“ensuring the peaceful development of trade and facilitating their intercourse with Europeans” and that no
chief “who may happen to occupy a territory on the coast should obstruct this policy in order to benefit
himself.” 163 With this in mind, Consul Hewett moved to have King Ja Ja of Opobo – a former slave, who
had successfully established the state of Opobo after a long war of cession (1869-1873) with Bonny –
removed by force 164 after he antagonized British supercargoes by charging relatively high rates of
customs duties for access to his lucrative markets. 165 Similarly, in July 1894, acting Consul-General
Moor ordered the blockade and capture of the Itsekiri chief Nana 166 who had been blocking trade along
the Benin River and thus acting as if he were the “the paramount power in the land” rather than subject to
161
For example, the 1890 Treaties lacked signatures although both Emir and Caliph were literate. Similarly, the 1894 the Treaty
with Sokoto did not bear the Caliph’s seal. Cf Flint 1960, 163.
162
Quoted in Oliver 1957, 101. Italics added.
163
Quoted in Anene 1966, 74.
164
Johnston sailed to Opobo aboard the H.M.S. Goshawk, threatened to bombard the city, and then arrested Ja Ja after he came
aboard to negotiate. Oliver 1967, 107-117.
165
Ja Ja also considered shipping his oil directly on British mailpackets, thus bypassing British supercargoes altogether. Diké
1956, 118-122.
166
Ikime 1971, 210-212.
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
British rule. 167 Similar moves were made in the north to forestall French and establish control in northern
Nigeria. When the French dispatched Captian Decoeur from Dahomey to the contested territory of Borgu
to secure agreements from local chiefs in July 1894, the British authorized Captain Frederick Lugard to
travel to Borgu negotiate similar concessions. 168 Similarly, to clamp down on hostile emirates, the RNC
dispatched a military expedition to Nupe in January 1897 that successfully deposed the Emir of Bida from
his throne. 169 The newly installed Emir was forced to sign a treaty acknowledging that “all Nupe is
entirely under the power of the company, and under the British Flag.” 170
As argued by hierarchic realism, the ability of Great Britain to impose imperial rule during this
period was also facilitated by the social ties connecting it to the various Nigerian polities. Unlike the case
of the EIC in India, however, Great Britain did not possess as significant connections with many local
polities in Nigeria. For this reason, the British often had to rely in indirect, rather than direct rule, when
establishing their imperial institutions. Along the coast, British traders had extensive experience with
local polities and British politicians had experience enforcing legal and commercial agreements through
institutions such as the Courts of Equity and Governing Councils. 171 Similarly, British missionaries and
traders were active in the Yoruba polities neighboring Lagos. 172 But further in the interior, the British
presence was less extensive. After the French and the British signed a treaty in August 1890 demarcating
a line between the town of Say and Lake Chad, for example, Prime Minister Salisbury quipped “we have
been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot has ever trod.” 173 Nor was
European penetration of the north overwhelming. When Lugard arrived in 1900 charged with
establishing administration over the almost 250,000 mi2 of the Sokoto Caliphate, he was assisted by just
167
Quoted in Geary 1927, 111.
In April 1898, the newly created West African Frontier Force (WAFF) reached Lokoja and began to assist Lugard in
establishing more effective military control over contested territories. Cf. Perham 1960a.
169
Adeleye 1971, 179-184.
170
In February 1897, these same forces marched on the Emirate of Ilorin and forced an agreement on the Emir. Adeleye 1971,
185-188.
171
Cf. Anene 1966. Afigbo 1972. Tamuno 1972.
172
Cf. Ajayi 1965. Ayandele 1966. Newbury 1961.
173
Quoted in Flint 1960, 166. Hargreaves 1971, 275-276.
168
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
304 European administrators. 174 Given the limited ties connecting the British to Nigerian polities, it is not
surprising that British administrators focused on establishing collaborative relationships with existing
Nigerian leaders. In northern Nigeria, for example, the British relied heavily on the existing emirate
institutional structures – including their institutions of revenue collection, law enforcement, and legal
administration. 175
While the British had only sparse connections with most Nigerian polities, they were able to take
advantage of the fragmented nature of many Nigerian polities. Across Nigeria, social and political
transformations were underway that made polities vulnerable to impositions of Britain’s political will. 176
In Yorubaland, for example, tensions between the various successor states of the Old Oyo Empire, which
had collapsed in the early nineteenth century, 177 exploded in 1877 into civil war. 178 When the British
opted for a strategy of control, the conflict provided the British with an opportunity to court weaker
Yoruba leaders with promises of military assistance and commercial revenues. In the Niger Delta region,
European commercial activities introduced elements of fragmentation into coastal political structures.
Delta polities already exhibited a significant degree of segmentation, by village, ward, patrilineal
house. 179 Increased commercial activity and the struggle for access to resources and goods to barter, led
political authority in the Delta to become more dependent on personal skill and commercial talent than on
traditional, hereditary leadership. 180 Not only did frictions between traditional and new leaders often
create disturbances the British felt they had to respond to – such as the dispute between Ja Ja and King
Pepple in Bonny or between the Amakiri and Barboy factions in New Calabar – they provided the British
with opportunities to recruit allies and prevented Delta societies from organizing unified resistance to
174
Perham 1956, 144-145. Falola and Roberts 1999, 515. The size of the Sokoto Caliphate is taken from Last 1974, 4-13.
Paden 1970. Heussler 1968, 34-40. Perham 1956, 121-128. Bull 1963, 68-74.
176
Hargreaves has characterized as a great social upheaval, an “a radical reshaping of political structures and boundaries.”
Hargreaves 1969, 199.
177
The Old Oyo Empire collapsed after the loss of Dahomey and Ilorin and the subsequent invasion of Oyo by Ilorin. Cf. Ajayi
1974, 131-148. Awe 1973, 66-76. Crowder 1978, 84-97.
178
The immediate cause of the conflict was an attempt by the state of Ibadan to establish supremacy over the Yoruba people by
attacking the coastal polities of Egba and Ijebu. Person 1985, 234-235. Ajayi 1974, 159-166. Ayandele 1966, 332-34.
179
The peoples of the Delta region have often been described as a “stateless society.” Jones 1963, 51-72. Crowder 1978, 51-68.
Anene 1966, 1-25. Diké 1956, 32-37. Afigbo 1972, 14-22.
180
Many of these new leaders were former slaves. Cf. Jones 1963, 72-87, 177-205. Diké 1956, 30-35.
175
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
British encroachments. 181 In the north, the British exploited the fact that the Sokoto Caliphate was not a
centralized state but a decentralized collection of small emirates tenuously connected by a “supra-ethnic
ethos” of Islam. 182 Between 1893 to 1895, for example, the northern emirate of Kano was embroiled in a
civil war between royal factions whose disagreements included the size of tribute being paid to Sokoto.
When the British invaded Kano and expelled the existing emir in 1903, Sir Frederick Lugard took
advantage these divisions as a reason to keep the new Emir Muhammadu Abbas on “probation,” thus
increasing his dependence on the British. 183
In sum, the British in Nigeria did not seek to maximize their political power by using military
might to occupy economically valuable territories but rather reacted defensively to the threat of French
encroachment and extended imperial rule preemptively over polities where they could take advantage of
political fragmentation. The goal of imperial rule, moreover, was not the establishment of reliable
security cooperation, but rather the imposition of British imperial control through force.
Conclusion
For a significant period of time, international relations theorists have seemed content to heed the
advice of Lord Hailey that “empire is not a word for scholars.” 184 The importance of empire to both the
study of international history and contemporary politics, however, cannot be ignored. In this paper, I
have argued that international relations theory has not developed a satisfactory theory of imperial rule. I
proposed an alternative hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule that emphasized both the security seeking
motivations that can animate empire and the institutional qualities of empire that make it attractive to
great powers. In order to examine the plausibility of this approach, I examined three cases of the
expansion of imperial rule drawn from the British Empire. In each of these cases, I found that when the
British adopted imperial rule, they did so largely for security rather than power-maximization reasons and
181
Tamuno 1972, 5. Cf. Jones 1963, chapters eight and nine. Anene 1966, 42-46. Dike 1956, 219-220.
Adeleye 1974, 72-92. Last 1974, 13-34.
183
According to Fika, Lugard never seriously considered installing the rival Tukur faction, but his use of them to undermine the
position of his favored candidate, and thus increase his dependence on the British, was significant. Fika 1978, 88-100.
184
Quoted in Doyle 1986, 11.
182
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
that it was ability of the institutions of imperial rule to organize and mobilize power, not foster
cooperation, that made them both effective and efficient strategies for great powers. In addition, the
social ties connecting Great Britain to polities in the periphery proved particular important. In cases
where the British could take advantage of social ties, then they were more likely to be able to easily
impose imperial rule. Conversely, the limits of imperial expansion in these cases were the product of the
inability of the British to leverage social ties in order to install imperial rule, rather than the absence of
wealth or strategic value of particular territories.
What are some of the implications of a hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule? In terms of the
historical study of empires, a hierarchic realist approach sidesteps many of the longstanding debates that
have dominated the literature – such as the debate over whether empire is primarily an economic verses
political phenomenon and whether imperialism is driven by primarily metropolitan verses peripheral
concerns. 185 Because hierarchic realism sees imperial rule as primarily a strategy of international politics,
it emphasizes the political, and metropolitan, importance of empire. At the same time, by including social
ties, a hierarchic realist approach is able to show how economic activities – whether trade or investment –
provided great powers with important institutional access points into subordinate polities in the periphery.
Situated historically, a hierarchic realist account of provides a plausible account of how strategic and
economic factors combined to make imperial rule a more attractive strategy at the end of the nineteenth
century. Rising political competition among great powers in Europe, on the one hand, situated great
powers in a perilous security environment where they more frantically sought workable strategies of
control to protect their interests. The simultaneous economic expansion of Europe, on the other hand,
increased the social ties connecting European great powers with actors in the periphery, providing them
new channels of influence and control. For a hierarchic realist approach to empire, therefore, the
scramble of territories at the end of the nineteenth century can be explained as primarily a metropolitan
political phenomenon which was facilitated by economic transformations in the periphery which opened
up non-European societies to European political penetration.
185
See the citations in note 86. Cf. Doyle 1983, chapter one.
p. 40 / 52
MacDonald • Imperial Rule
In terms of international relations theory, a hierarchic realist theory of imperial rule demonstrates
the importance of international institutions, not just in fostering cooperation between states with mutual
interests, but also as instruments for imposing control by powerful states over less powerful states with
conflicting interests. Indeed, while imperial rule is a prominent transnational institution that great powers
utilize to maintain control, there are presumably other institutions, such as alliances and multilateral
organizations, which can also be used for such purposes. A hierarchic realist approach, for example,
sheds some light on why, historically, powerful states have negotiated constraining alliances with less
powerful neighbors in an effort to control their behavior. 186 In addition, it provides a different account for
why a rising great power, such as the United States, might seek to embed its political power through
multilateral institutions. 187
Finally, a hierarchic realist theory has implications for the debate over the existence of an
“American Empire.” 188 Prominent members of the administration have publicly assured that the United
States is and does not seek an empire. 189 Given the definition of imperial rule provided in this paper,
however, many of the policies adopted by the United States possess a quasi-imperial quality. The United
States has overseas basing arrangements, for example, with over 46 countries and maintains 860 military
instillations and stations approximately 350,000 active duty military personnel overseas. 190 In addition,
while it does not claim indefinite dominion, the United States does possess significant degree of de facto
sovereignty over both the internal and external policies of a number of states in which it has a significant
186
Schroeder 1976, 227-62. Cf. Gelpi 1999.
Cf. Ruggie 1982. Ikenberry 1989. Ikenberry 2001.
188
See, for example, Bacevich 2002. Rosen 2003. Cox 2004. Ferguson 2003. Ferguson 2004. Ikenberry 2004.
189
In February 2003, for example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that “We’re not a colonial power. We’ve never
been a colonial power. We don’t take our force and go around the world and try to take other people’s real estate or other
people’s resources, their oil. That’s just not what the United States does.” Interview with Al Jazeera, 02/25/03.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t02262003_t0225sdaljaz.html. Also see Colin Powell. Interview. 02/22/03.
http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/wwwh03022202.html.
190
Of the 350,000 active duty military personnel, 257,692 are deployed in non-NATO countries. Of the 860 military
instillations, 34 are considered large or medium sized. See Department of Defense. 31 March 2004. “Active Duty Military
Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A).” Directorate for Information Operations and Reports.
Department of Defense. 2004. “Base Structure Report: A Summary of the DoD’s Real Property Inventory.” Office for the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment.
187
p. 41 / 52
MacDonald • Imperial Rule
military and diplomatic presence, including Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 191 The question – from a
hierarchic realist perspective – is whether these unique sovereignty relationships will develop into more
permanent relations of imperial rule as the United States faces new security threats and altered social ties
in the twenty-first century. In terms of security, the Bush Administration has argued that traditional
strategies of deterrence are unable to contain threats from terrorist groups and regimes with weapons of
mass destruction, and that only aggressive action overseas can hope to contain such threats. 192 A number
of neoconservative commentators have argued that new non-traditional threats such as terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can only be contained through forceful imperial action
overseas. 193 In terms of social ties, many authors point to globalization as a powerful force that may
permanently alter the United States relations rest of the world – American goods and capital penetrate
vast new markets overseas while fragile third world regimes struggle to maintain political capacity in the
face of dynamic global economic transformations. Thus, while there may be many factors that may
inhibit empire – such as transnational norms against conquest, the widespread availability of military
weaponry, or the ambivalence of the American population towards overseas adventurism 194 – there are
also powerful structural incentives for the United States to consider imperial rule as a way to provide it
security against non-traditional threats in parts of the world where local governance structures are
fragmentary and failing. 195
191
For accounts of the changing relations of sovereignty between the United States and the Iraqi Government, see General
Account Office. “Iraq’s Transitional Law.” May 2004. General Accounting Office. “Rebuilding Iraq.” June 2004. Cf.
Diamond 2005. Phillips 2005.
192
White House. “The National Security Strategy of the United States.” September 2002. Cf. Jervis 2003a. Cox 2004.
193
Sebastian Mallaby, for example, argues that “the chaos of the world is too threatening to ignore” and that “existing methods
for dealing with that chaos have been tried and found wanting.” Mallaby 2002, 6. Boot 2001, 27. Cf. Cox 2004, 593-597.
194
On norms against conquest, see Simmons 2003, 41. Mann 2004, 647. On military capabilities, see Mann 2004, 641-642. Cf.
Jervis 1999, 99-104. On American ambivalence, see Kupchan 2002, 74-81. Ikenberry 2003, 381-382. Ferguson 2004.
195
For similar arguments, see Jervis 2003b.
p. 42 / 52
MacDonald • Imperial Rule
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MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Figure One – Strategies of Control
Degree of
Sovereignty
Claimed by
Great Power
Hegemony
Imperial Rule
Annexation
Figure Two – Social Ties Between Great Power and Subordinate Polity
Sparse
Dense
Figure Three – Social Ties within a Subordinate Polity
Fragmented
Integrated
p. 51 / 52
MacDonald • Imperial Rule
Figure Four – Forms of Imperial Rule
Integrated
Fragmented
Dense
Social
Ties
Sparse
Social
Ties
Federative Imperial Rule
Direct Imperial Rule
Indirect Imperial Rule
p. 52 / 52
Hegemony