Environment and Planning A 2011, volume 43, pages 410 ^ 430
doi:10.1068/a43125
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism
in Beijing's outer suburbs
Fulong Wu
School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3WA, Wales;
e-mail: [email protected]
Nicholas A Phelps
Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, 22 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0QB,
England; e-mail: [email protected]
Received 7 March 2010; in revised form 11 October 2010
Abstract. Chinese cities are experiencing rapid urban expansion and rampant land conversions in
periurban areas. Has China's suburban growth gone beyond commonly noted `suburbanisation'?
To what extent does fast metropolitan growth reflect state entrepreneurialism after economic
reform? The authors seek to elaborate further and contextualise Chinese suburban and postsuburban
development and examine the underlying dynamics of state entrepreneurialism in the process of
metropolitan development. The empirical basis of this research is a case study of the historical
development of Yizhuang, an outer suburban new town of Beijing. The city originates from the
establishment of the Beijing Economic and Technological Development Zone in 1992, but has passed
rapidly through several phases of growth. The pattern of growth reveals both the complexities of
adequately defining and delimiting such a growth node within the metropolitan fabric and of the
state's intimate involvement in its development and evolution.
Introduction
The outward expansion and growing economic and social complexity of metropolitan
regions raise important questions concerning received models of urban structure and
taken-for-granted categoriesösuch as `city' and `suburb' (Beauregard, 2006). Some of
these important questions have been posed by the diverse writings given the label of the
`Los Angeles School' (Dear, 2004). For Soja (2000) the city has been turned inside out
such that the periphery of urban regions now organises the centre, raising associated
questions of whether we have entered a new era of distinctly postsuburban growth. For
Gottdiener and Kephart (1995) and for Dear and Dahmann (2008) we are witnessing
the emergence of a new settlement space. In addition, the development of the outer
reaches of heavily urbanised metropolitan regions raises questions of the mix of actors
involved in the production and governance of what Knox (2008) calls `metroburbia'.
Many terms have been used to capture the growing complexity of urban regions
and constituent settlements: for example, terms such as `technoburb' (Fishman, 1987),
`edge city' (Garreau, 1991), and `edgeless city' (Lang, 2003) have been used to depict the
emerging geography of employment and economic activity in the suburbs and outer
suburbs which, nevertheless, does not conform to existing governmental jurisdictions.
These terms are invested with many of the specificities of the United States context and
there remain limits to their wider application despite their exploratory use to depict
contemporary urbanisation in Europe (Bontje and Burdack, 2005) and East Asia (Dick
and Rimmer, 1998; Laquian, 2005). Among the terms that have been generated within
the ostensibly US literature, the term `postsuburbia' is one that we believe holds some
promise in being sufficiently broad to (a) encapsulate the variety of specific pieces of
terminology on offer and (b) offer some potential for comparative study. The term has
in fact been used in rather different ways in the extant literature and leads on to a
composite definition of a class of settlements (Phelps et al, 2010). The breadth of such
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
411
a composite definition necessarily entails that it be used more as a heuristic device
than as a definitive theoretical category with which important open questions can be
explored regarding contemporary urbanisation (Phelps et al, 2010).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the character of contemporary outer suburban development in China. Some of the multiple meanings of the term `postsuburbia'
may not be entirely applicable to China, but various aspects of the phenomenal urban
expansion and the emergence of new settlements in China's large metropolises
have been widely noted (Deng and Huang, 2004; Ding, 2004; Feng and Zhou, 2005;
Feng et al, 2008; 2009; Lin and Ho, 2005; Wu and Phelps, 2008; Zhou and Ma, 2000)
as signalling something more than mass suburbanisation.
The paper begins by briefly defining the terms `suburbia' and `postsuburbia'.
We then pass on to contextualise our study of the growth of Yizhuang, at the edge
of the Beijing metropolitan area, with a brief review of the history of suburbanisation
in China. The empirical material relating to the case of Yizhuang, Beijing draws on
research which is part of a major comparative study of the politics and planning
of postsuburban growth, and we explain in the next section the methods used to collect
that material. We then go on to consider how the development of Yizhuang compares
with our thematic definition of postsuburbia. China cannot be said to have entered
an era of postsuburbanisation. However, of note is the way in which contemporary
urbanisation in China, like that in the US, is indeed throwing up examples of settlement space, such as Yizhuang, which are difficult to define. Notable too is the exclusive
role of the state, in contrast to the situation in the US and Europe, in making but also
remaking or retrofitting this particular settlement. Corresponding to the postsuburbia
notion, the empirical case includes the examination of three aspects of postsuburban
development: spatial features, the economic structure, and governance.
Suburbia and postsuburbia considered
The term `suburb' has a long history and has become accepted despite lacking an
adequate definition. It has come to stand for a class of settlements which have become
the subject of significant conceptual simplificationönotably in terms of their predominantly residential complexion, their social homogeneity, and associated stasis öwhich
misrepresents some of the variety of suburbs both historically and today (Harris and
Lewis, 1998). Definition of the `suburbs' in geographical terms is also subject to some
ambiguity, although the assumption has tended to be that these settlements are located
within a concentric and/or radial city-region structure and are integrated with central
city areas by virtue of fixed infrastructure networks.
Inevitably, these misrecognitions and ambiguities spill over into attempted definitions of postsuburbs. In a previous paper we considered three aspects of a composite
definition of a category of settlements that could be considered to be postsuburban
(Phelps et al, 2010). First, there is the suggestion that postsuburbia represents an era
distinct from that which produced widespread suburbanisation. This line of thought
has been developed by several authors charting the rise of seemingly new settlements,
observing aggregate population and economic dynamics across metropolitan regions,
and considering the ideological content of contemporary urbanisation. Thus, for Fishman
(1987, page 17), for example, ``With the rise of the technoburb, the history of suburbia
comes to an end''. For Lucy and Philips (1997) the postsuburban era is one in which
there is ``inner suburban population loss and relative income decline, suburban employment increase, suburban out commuting reduction, exurban population and income
increase and farmland conversion'' (page 259). Teaford (1997) instead identifies the
changed ideological content of suburbia that attends the accretion of a greater mixture
of nonresidential land uses.
412
F Wu, N A Phelps
In all of this, there is a problem of what we might term a `temporal disparity'öthat
is, differences in the pace and timing at which such postsuburban settlements have
emerged in different settings (Phelps et al, 2006). Evidence of this temporal disparity
comes from Nuissl and Rink's (2005) observation of the heavy involvement of realestate companies and anonymous investment funds in the production of urban sprawl
in the postsocialist context of former East Germany, and its partial similarities with
Fordist-style residential suburbanization in the US (at a time when most commentators
are highlighting the post-Fordist nature of urbanization), and in Dick and Rimmer's
(1998) suggestion of periods of convergence on, and divergence from, patterns of
Western urbanisation apparent in East Asian cities, including the likes of edge cities.
The issue of `temporal disparity' can be seen from a comparison of Chinese suburbanisation with that in the US. China is experiencing suburbanisation while the level
of urbanisation is only around 40% to 50% (in 2009 the percentage of nationwide
urbanisation was 46.6%). In addition, its postsuburban development is occurring within
the context of simultaneous population movement towards the suburbs, while the same
stage happened in the US much earlier than postsuburban growth.
A definition of postsuburbia in temporal terms is exposed to the vagaries of
geography, since the outward expansion of metropolitan regions implies that today's
exurbs and outer suburbs are tomorrow's suburbs and are destined to decline in the
same way that inner suburbs are currently doing. Inevitably, then, any new postsuburban era is less of a clean break with the past since ``the period of mature suburbs
blends with the post-suburban era'' (Lucy and Phillips, 1997, page 261). Finally, focusing on a temporal dimension defining postsuburbia also raises the largely unexplored
``question of a single suburban place changing character over time'' (McManus and
Ethington, 2007, page 325).
A second definition in the extant literature focuses on postsuburbia as a new form
of settlement space (Gottdiener and Kephart, 1995, page 51). Other writing stresses the
manner in which the past modernist logic of growth and change proceeding from
the centre to the periphery has been reversed in postmodernity (Dear and Dahmann,
2008; Soja, 2000). Compared with their suburban counterparts, postsuburban settlements seem likely to be significantly more detached from the spatial hierarchies
associated with fixed infrastructure networks and service provision as well as existing
governmental jurisdictions. Thus, Fishman compares the traditional suburb with what
he terms the `technoburb', arguing that the technoburb is ``at first ... impossible to
comprehend. It has no clear boundaries'' (1987, page 203). Garreau's (1991) `edge cities'
are rarely formed as separate governmental units, or may straddle them, whereas
Lang's (2003) `edgeless cities' are ``not even easy to locate'' because they ``spread almost
imperceptibly throughout metropolitan areas, filling out central cities, occupying much
of the space between more concentrated suburban business districts, and ringing the
metropolitan areas' built-up periphery'' (pages 1 ^ 2).
One irony is that the problem of adequately placing postsuburbia is part of its
analytical attraction and a distinctive element of it when compared with established
notions of cities, suburbs, and the rural. Here one ``difference between the North
American and European city seems to be one of proportions than of substance;
in the USA ... changes have been much more extreme and extensive'' (Mazierska and
Rascaroli, 2003, page 18). What Mazierska and Rascaroli term a `dimensional disparity'
may be apparent when comparing settlement types in different continental and
national settings. There is a case for arguing that this dimensional disparity, along
with the temporal disparity noted above, obscures valid points of comparison between
the form of urbanisation in different settings. The issue of `dimensional disparity' is
relevant to Chinese suburban and postsuburban development. While a large proportion
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
413
of residential developments still take the form of high-rise apartmentsösimilar to the
earlier stage but with relatively high design standards önew gated and packaged
suburbia (Wu, 2010) has begun to emerge, taking an ostentatiously luxury form in
villa compounds. The `neotraditional design' is allegedly borrowed to form a Chinese
version of `neourbanism', to differentiate it from the standard and monotonous residential
form of the past (Wu, 2009).
Finally, is it possible to distinguish postsuburban settlements in terms of the
constellations of actors involved? Some of the misrecognitions of suburbs have left
the term closely associated with private residential preferences and associated landowning, developing, and housebuilding interests as the key driving forces, despite
evidence of suburbs having been diverse in functional and social terms. There is a
danger that commentaries on postsuburbia artificially distinguish a new category of
settlements from suburbs when pointing to the manner in which they have been `born'
postsuburban or else have become so with the accretion of employment and other
functions. Nevertheless, this suggestion that postsuburbs represent cities in function
implies a greater role for organised business interests in local politics than has been
assumed (Phelps et al, 2006).
The shifting ideological and political content of suburbia compared with postsuburbia, along with variable roles of business interests in suburban and postsuburban
politics, is also inextricably interlinked with the involvement of the state in facilitating
development and in ameliorating the subsequent implications of these interventionsö
and yet the role of the state in the production of post-suburbia has barely begun to be
explored. Seen over the longer term, local and national state involvement in suburbanisation can be seen to represent both a discrete contemporary moment (spanning the
last 100 ^ 150 years or so) and a relatively unique condensation both of certain individually held values and of collective (corporatist) interests. The role of US federal and
state government housing and infrastructure programmes in promoting employment
and residential decentralisation has been widely invoked in the literature (Beauregard,
2006; Walker, 1981). In Europe examples of the state instigating (post)suburbanisation
are yet more pronounced (Bontje and Burdack, 2005; Nuissl and Rink, 2005) while in
postsocialist nations and in some East Asian developmental states the state in all its
forms is currently perhaps the most important direct and indirect force driving (post)suburban development. Arguably, in terms of politics, China sees the continuation of
state control. However, the development of suburban space is no longer state planned
nor is it solely driven by the government agenda. The land market is becoming a major
source of capital and investment. Now the politics of development are a mixture of the
state initiative and market conditions. The Chinese case shows some change from
the previous state-led modernisation through industrialisation to a more mixed method
of development, which necessarily places an emphasis on demand and consumption.
Moreover, there are important continuities in the pattern of state intervention.
Much suburbanisation (postwar mass suburbanisation in the US would be a case in
point) was driven by modernist state interventions which systematically transformed the
distribution of locational advantages available to developers, residents and industry
(Scott and Roweis, 1977). Today, the contradictions of these interventionsöusually cast
in terms of concern over the sustainability of suburbanisationöhave become politicised
(Beck et al, 2003) and may be having their recursive effects in a distinctly postsuburban
politics of retrofit. For example, more balanced postsuburban communities with some
sense of place are being fashioned from the placeless state-created suburbia of high
modernity (Phelps and Parsons, 2003; Phelps et al, 2006) in Europe. There is also
currently interest in the possibilities for retrofitting suburbia in the US (Dunham-Jones
and Williamson, 2009). Some of this retrofitting might be regarded as insubstantial
414
F Wu, N A Phelps
(Dear, 2004); nevertheless, such examples highlight the state's role within a continuity
between suburbia and postsuburbia. The involvement of the state is clear in Chinese suburban development, which makes our case more relevant to the study of changing
suburban politics.
Mass suburbanisation and after in China
The traditional Chinese city was very compact. In the planned economy, cities were
governed by a unique spatial system (Ma and Cui, 1987), in which the rural and urban
areas were divided into separate systems. The lowest tier of urban settlements are
represented by the so-called `officially designated towns' ( jian zhi zhen) which may
be located in rural counties. The status of `city' was officially given to an urban
administrative entity that met certain minimum criteria of population size and nonagricultural production (Ma, 2005, page 482; Zhang and Zhao, 1998). Under the `city'
are districts; these are unofficially distinguished as urban and suburban districts, but
administratively these are under the governance of the city government. Suburban
districts are district units subordinated to cities; that is, their administrative statutes
cannot be distinguished from each other in official terms. Below the districts, there are
`street' offices which are not a base level of government but, rather, the agencies of the
district governments which are in charge of social management and control (Wu,
2002). For thousands of years the `county' was considered the basic administrative
unit. The implementation of the so-called `city leading county system', since 1984, has
begun to form municipalities.
In terms of labour administration, urban and rural populations are strictly divided
by their household registration (hukou) status (see Chan, 2009). They can be located in
the cities and the counties, and this gives rise to difficulties when estimating the actual
urban population, or estimating the level of urbanisation, depending on whether the
spatial term (city versus county areas) or the hukou status of population (rural versus
urban) is used (Zhou and Ma, 2003). The matter is further complicated in that the cities
can belong to different administrative ranks and thus govern different jurisdiction units
(Ma, 2005).
In short, there has been a significant divide between the urban and rural populations
and their space of living. Outside the core built-up area were vast suburban and
rural areas predominately used for agricultural production. Because of so-called `selfcontained development', the city proper and suburbs existed separately and there was
little commuting between them. The Chinese suburbs saw only limited industrial
development. Many suburban industrial activities were concentrated in satellite towns
in the 1980s. However, since then, Chinese cities have seen mass suburbanisation (Feng
et al, 2008).
Population decentralisation started in the 1980s, when the government began to
relocate factories and residents away from the central areas to the suburbs, but
residential relocation was largely passive and driven by state-funded housing programmes. Since the 1990s suburbanisation has shifted from a passive government-led
process to an active market-oriented process (Feng et al, 2008). `Commodity housing'
development has become a driving force, in addition to a series of suburban infrastructure and industrial projects. As housing tenure has shifted from predominantly
public rental to owner-occupied, increasing residential mobility has led to out-migration
of urban dwellers in search of greater housing spaceöwhich constitutes the major
source of suburbanisation (Li, 2004). In some areas, large gated communities are being
built with club amenities to meet the demand for high-quality living space (Wu and
Webber, 2004), forming a landscape of packaged suburbia (Wu, 2010).
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
415
The establishment of land and housing markets stimulated suburban growth,
because the land market gives local government the capacity and incentive to sell
land in the suburbs to attract investors and to generate revenue (Yeh and Wu, 1996;
Zhang, 2000). Development zones have been established (Cartier, 2001); and rampant
land development has led to a Chinese version of urban sprawl (Deng and Huang,
2004; Li and Yeh, 2004). City governments are keen to prepare ambitious growth plans
to facilitate urban expansion (Wu, 2007; Zhang, 2000). The construction of outer ring
roads dramatically enhances the accessibility of the outer suburbs and there are plans
identifying strategic locations for new growth poles in metropolitan regions. Through
`administrative annexation', which converts the counties adjacent to large cities into
urban districts, the territories of municipalities have been significantly extended
(Zhang and Wu, 2006). The restructuring of the administrative system has opened up
the suburbs to a range of investment projects.
The literature in Chinese also indicates the growing complexity of suburbanisation,
including the kinds of functional specialisation long familiar in North America. For
example, Feng et al (2007) described the change in shopping behaviour with the
evolution of multiple centres; Song et al (2007) described the disparity or mismatch
between population and employment locations in the suburbs. Most established city
jurisdictions in China have, either by themselves or in conjunction with central government, designated new districts as a means of developing what are essentially large
suburban employment nodes in the form of industrial parks or zones. In addition,
a new generation of new towns is appearing: this third generation of Beijing new towns,
such as Yizhuang, differ from previous generations in aiming to achieve a greater
population ^ employment balance (Wang and Fan, 2007).
In sum, Chinese suburban development has experienced several stages, evolving
from self-contained places separated from the central city, to industrial relocation and
suburban housing programmes, and finally to a more recent phase which may include
some elements which may be regarded as postsuburban within wider metropolitan
regions. Feng et al (2009) find that the structure of Beijing municipal region is evolving
towards a polycentric one: the essential feature of this latest development is that cities
and towns are becoming integrated to form urban clusters (chengshiqun) within densely
urbanised regions (chengshi miji qu). This growth of suburban areas thus goes beyond
the passive relocation of population to suburbs and involves both intraurban and
intercity relations. Although it would seem premature to suggest that China is experiencing postsuburban growth defined as an era separated from that producing mass
suburbanistion, there clearly is a complex mix of elements emerging in suburban and
outer suburban space that are commonly associated with postsuburbia öemployment
activities and luxury residential developments, civic functions and amenities, associated
both with intraurban and with intercity developments. As we noted earlier, it is rarely
possible to distinguish suburban and postsuburban eras, and the unique signature
of postsuburban China may be the product of just such a blending of suburban
and postsuburban elements due to the nature of the urban transition in China. This
transition is so rapid and so large in terms of the absolute numbers involved, and is
occurring at a time of intense international economic integration (with the associated
export of residential, industrial, and commercial development `models'), that Chinese
city-regions seemingly are experiencing elements of city-centre redevelopment and
gentrification, mass suburbanisation, and postsuburbanisation simultaneouslyöin contrast to the US and Europe where these elements are commonly considered to be
distinct and to have occurred sequentially over time. So, in what sense can we refer
to the suburban growth of Chinese cities as `postsuburban development'? We can
broadly summarise three aspects: first, new and mixed development beyond factory
416
F Wu, N A Phelps
relocation and state housing programmes; second, a mix of `gated suburbia' with
more industrial development zones; and third, a combination of state initiative and
market-driven development, especially through the land market.
Research methods
The original research presented in this paper was conducted during 2008 ^ 10 as part
of a larger comparative study of the politics and planning of postsuburban growth.
The central element of this research was face-to-face semistructured interviews which
sought to (a) investigate the main constellations of private, public, and voluntary sector
actors driving growth in case-study localities; and (b) explore three significant governance tensions regarding postsuburban growth önamely, the pursuit of population and
economic growth when set against conservation of the natural and built environment,
the pursuit of population and economic growth and adequate provision for social and
physical infrastructure, and the appropriate definition and redefinition of governmental
jurisdictions.
In the case of Yizhuang thirty-three interviews were conducted with a range of academic
experts, journalists, and organisations, including several bureaus of the Beijing Economic
and Technological Development Zone, and real-estate brokerage and investment
companies. Access to groups which could adequately reflect the collective interests
of residents or conservation was extremely limited. However, wider reflection on
these issues was possible by following newspaper and web-based discussion forums.
We supplemented this material with the collection of key documents such as the
Beijing Master Plan, the Yizhuang New Town Plan, the Beijing ETDZ Ordinance,
the Beijing 11th Five-Year Plan (Beijing DRC, 2005), the consultancy report made
by the Chinese Academy of Urban Planning and Design on the Beijing Strategic Plan,
and the 2004 Yizhuang Census of Basic Economic Units.
Complex spaces formed under postsuburban development
In contrast to a neatly defined urban ^ suburban dichotomy in the era of suburbanisation,
in the postsuburban stage, complex spaces are formedöoften across different government
jurisdiction areas. Perhaps the most interesting analytical question regarding the emergence of postsuburban forms concerns how to interpret them geographically. Yizhuang
is an interesting case that speaks powerfully to the sense of postsuburbia as new
settlement space reviewed earlier. At first glace it is not at all apparent where it is:
where the centre of Yizhuang is; where its boundaries lie; or whether it has any
morphological elements that might be considered urban as opposed to suburban. The
name `Yizhuang' appears in different spatial entities (see figures 1 and 2): `Yizhuang
Town', `Yizhuang Development Zone', and `Yizhuang New Town'. These are very
different spatial concepts: from a designated town in a rural county (Yizhuang Town);
to an industrial zone in the outer suburbs (Yizhuang Development Zone, officially Beijing
ETDZ); to a new town with a significant hinterland within the Beijing metropolitan
region (Yizhuang New Town).
First, Yizhuang Town can be considered the point of origin of subsequent development, even if it is now detached from the bulk of it. Before October 1992 Yizhuang
had been a typical rural area under the jurisdiction of Daxing District; since then the
land has largely been acquired by the Beijing ETDZ and the town redeveloped.
Second, the Yizhuang Development Zone is an unofficial name of Beijing ETDZ,
which is also known as the Beijing Development Area (BDA). Created in 1992,
Yizhuang Industrial Area, with an area of 3.8 km2, formed the original base of Beijing
ETDZ, which was subsequently expanded in 1994 and 2002. The development of
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
417
Figure 1. The location of Yizhuang in the municipality of Beijing.
Beijing ETDZ started the transformation of Yizhuang into a suburban growth area
of Beijing. The current jurisdiction area of Beijing ETDZ is 46.8 km2.(1)
Third, Yizhuang New Town, covering 212.7 km2, is the core of a new town designated in the Beijing Master Plan and Yizhuang New Town Plan. Yizhuang is one of
three such new towns (the others being Tongzhou and Shunyi) recently planned in the
surroundings of Beijing. However, spatially it includes parts of the jurisdictions of
different governments: 46.8 km2 area in Beijing ETDZ, 81 km2 in Daxing District,
and 131.5 km2 in Tongzhou District.
Fourth, Yizhuang New Town Area (YNTA) is the largest spatial expression:
treating Yizhuang New Town as a city, YNTA is the functional metropolitan region
of the new town, except that there is no overarching jurisdictional body. YNTA
dramatically expands Yizhuang to include the area along the eastern development
corridor of Beijing and extends further up to Beijing's jurisdiction boundary which is
adjacent to the city of Langfang and Tianjin municipality. The total area of YNTA
is 508.5 km2, including 46.8 km2 of BDA, 282.7 km2 in Daxing District, and 225.6 km2
in Tongzhou District.
(1) A further complication here is that, within the BDA area, the Yizhuang offshoot of the
Zhongguancun Science Park was demarcated in 1999 as covering 7 km2 and now extends to an
area of 36.78 km2 (ZMB, 2009, page 148). We suggest that this high technology park is a `virtual
policy space' because, although benefiting from national level status of Zhongguancun, there is no
separate management body. The management organisation is combined within the management
board of BDA (heshu bangong öliterally `sharing the combined office').
418
F Wu, N A Phelps
Beijing Economic and Technology
Development Zone (ETDZ)
Yizhuang New Town (YNT)
Yizhuang New
Town Area
(YNTA)
Figure 2. Complex spaces developed in the postsuburban development on the outer suburbs
of Beijing, showing that while Beijing ETDZ has an administration like a `development agency',
the boundaries of YNT and YNTA are superimposed on the existing administrative structure
of different districts and have no unified local governments in the area.
To summarise, Yizhuang Development Zone is different from Yizhuang Town; the
Town is only a small town in the district of Daxing in Beijing's suburbs, but Yizhuang
Development Zone (also known as BDA) is a development zone under the administration of Beijing Municipality. Yizhuang New Town is a third-generation new town,
planned under Beijing's polycentric development and extending to the outer suburb
of Beijing.
To some extent, the governance of Yizhuang is established through the landacquisition process. Once the land has been acquired from the nearby rural area,
Yizhuang can then execute full control over the acquired land. Thus the boundary of
governance is dynamic and being rolled out with the growth of the new town.
Although growth spills over into the wider new town region, Yizhuang is only allowed
to acquire land within the designated area of Beijing ETDZ. Nevertheless, eager to
leverage upon such growth, Daxing and Tongzhou Districts have acquired land near
Yizhuang in order to resell it on the land market.
No single administration is in charge of YNT or YNTA. In 2007 the municipality
of Beijing approved the Yizhuang New Town Plan (2005 ^ 20). However, there is no
unified government body responsible for YNT; the official Yizhuang New Town
Plan approval letter, issued by the Beijing municipal government in 2007, had to be
simultaneously addressed to the Management Committee of Beijing ETDZ and the
governments of Daxing and Tongzhou Districts. Within the area, there are two
district governments and one municipal government agency. As a result, the boundary
of YNT is not a jurisdiction boundary at all öit does not appear on the base map of the
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
419
Beijing metropolitan area which is officially issued by the Beijing municipal planning
commission. As one interviewee commented:
``Yizhuang used to have land from Tongzhou and Daixing districts. So Yizhuang was
not an independent government it was just a kind of industry development zone.
But now Beijing government intends to set up this new Yizhuang district ... I think
it will help ... Yizhuang to become a really good new town, otherwise if the land
belongs to two other districts it cannot self manage itself ''
önotably in the sphere of social infrastructure and public services for the new town
(interview, general manager, Atkins Beijing, June 2009).(2)
In terms of administrative structure, YNT is a `stealth city', very much like American
edge cities (Knox, 1993). According to Knox, these edge cities do not coincide neatly
with jurisdictional boundaries; they are often de facto business clusters and service
areas. As functional subcentres of employment, there is no specific government body
for them. These cities are not demarcated as separate government entities but, rather,
combined with several parts adjacent to different jurisdictions. The boundaries
of Yizhuang New Town as indicated by this fragmented and multilayered pattern of
governance are unclear and call to mind one of the defining features of postsuburbia.
Postsuburban economic transformation
To understand the extent to which the outer suburbs of Beijing began to accommodate
new elements of `postsuburban' development, in this section we examine economic
structure in terms of suburban office development and industrial parks. In the period
of suburbanisation, suburban areas witnessed population decentralisation and the
development of manufacturing industries. In the postsuburban era in the US, employment in service sectors began to be concentrated in `edge cities'. We tried to understand
whether, in the outer suburbs of Beijing, there are developments outside the traditional
suburban industries and new `out-of-town' economic developments.
The economy of Yizhuang is more globally oriented than that of other nearby
counties, with foreign investment from thirty countries. Among the Global 500 companies, sixty firms invested in seventy-five projects in Yizhuang; total investment had
reached US $15 billion, among which foreign investment accounts for 70%. The major
industries of Yizhuang include ITC, biotechnology and new medicine, and automobile
and equipment production. Yizhuang has been active in searching for new opportunities: according to the planning bureau of Yizhuang (interview, the Chief Planner,
April 2009), new growth areas have been identified to enhance future competiveness,
including digital television production, green energy (windfarm equipment and solar
energy devices), cultural and creative industry, aerospace, and producer services.
Despite emerging new sectors, according to 2004 Census of Basic Economic Units
conducted nationwide (Beijing ETDZ, 2005), the composition of its GDP shows that
Yizhuang is still predominately engaged in industrial production rather than in the
tertiary sector (table 1): in 2004 the secondary sector accounted for 84% in Yizhuang
compared with 30.6% for Beijing. Even in Daixing and Tongzhou Districts (neighbouring
districts from which parts of Yizhuang have been annexed), the secondary sector accounts
for only 44.7% and 49.6%, respectively. Compared with 12.1% from the communications,
computer service, and software sector, and 11.2% from the education sector in Haidian
District, the respective figures for Yizhuang are 5.3% and 0.3% (Beijing ETDZ, 2005).
(2)
Another subsequent interviewee indicated that the most recent discussions within the Beijing
municipal government had considered returning the entirety of the Yizhuang New Town area
(including that portion within Tongzhou) to Daixing district in order for Daixing and Yizhuang
to provide a counterweight to the faster growing Tongzhou new town (interview, senior manager,
Business Development Department, Sino-Ocean Land Beijing Division, August 2010).
420
F Wu, N A Phelps
Table 1. The composition of GDP in Beijing and various districts, 2004 (source: Beijing Basic
Unit Census, 2004).
Beijing
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Industry
Construction
Tertiary sector
Transport, logistics, and postal services
Communication, computer, and software
Wholesale and retail
Hotel and catering
Finance
Real estate
Leasing and commercial services
Scientific research, technological service,
and geological survey
Water management, environment,
and public utility management
Residential service and others
Education
Public health, social security, and
social welfare
Culture, sports, and recreation
Public management and social
organisation
Total
Haidian
Daxing
Tongzhou Yizhuang
1.6
30.6
25.7
4.9
67.8
5.9
7.4
9.7
2.7
11.8
7.2
4.6
4.6
0.1
21.8
16.6
5.2
78.1
1.9
12.1
9.3
3.0
9.9
7.3
4.5
9.6
9.7
44.7
37.1
7.6
45.5
2.0
0.0
4.3
1.8
6.8
12.3
1.2
0.8
9.0
49.6
40.2
9.4
41.4
1.3
0.1
5.6
2.5
5.4
9.5
1.6
0.6
84.0
83.5
0.5
16.0
4.1
5.3
2.1
0.2
0.1
2.1
0.5
0.9
0.6
0.9
0.6
1.1
0.1
1.3
4.7
1.7
1.2
11.2
1.3
1.6
5.9
1.6
1.7
4.7
1.7
0.1
0.3
0.0
2.3
3.3
4.3
1.6
0.2
6.4
0.2
5.4
0.1
0.1
100.0
100.0
99.9
100.0
100.0
These figures confirm the role of Yizhuang as a production base with a relatively weak
position in services.
Here concerns over the economic complexion of Yizhuang parallel those over the
the long-term economic sustainability of large edge cities in the US (Lang, 2003) due
to the lack of agglomeration economies. Certainly, despite the presence of clusters of
suppliers centred on individual companies such as Nokia (Yeung et al, 2006), Yizhuang
does not have the gravitas of a significant cluster of interrelated industries because of
the diversity of manufacturing industry there at present. Thus, while acknowledging the
success of the BDA in investment promotion, one complaint centres on the attempt
to include all types of development within Yizhuang, as illustrated by the desire to
promote a `motor city' based on attracting Mercedes-Benz (interview, administrative
assistant, New World China Land, August 2010). In this respect, Yizhuang's origin as a
development zone may parallel some of the diversity of the economy of edge cities
(Bingham and Kimble, 1995).
In other respects, the long-term strength of the Yizhuang economy may rest on the
BDA promotional concept of encouraging companies to colocate and accommodate
different corporate functions ömanufacturing, R&D, and headquartersöthere (interview, national director, Strategic Consulting, Jones Lang LaSalle China, June 2009).
Recently, the BDA has striven to attract new office development given the recent
decentralisation of office employment in Beijing. One major developer is Beijing
Jingkai Investment and Development Co. Ltd, which is a state-owned real estate
development company established under the BDA Corporation in 2000. It specialises
in industrial estates, and has developed a new concept of office development: dudong
bangong, translated as customised `independent office building' for headquarters
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
421
(interview, sales director, Beijing Jingkai, April 2009). In this concept, each firm has its
own office building instead of sharing a larger building with other tenants. The
building is named for and labelled with the corporate name, thus creating a strong
corporate image and identity. Since 2003, as land leasing in Beijing has been tightening
up, new firms have begun to face difficulties in acquiring land for their own business
estates: they have had to turn to office buildings in industrial and business parks,
including those in the International Business Park in Yizhuang. These premises have
been part of an attempt of many small and medium-sized companies to create an
image for themselvesöas new business addresses have similarly been fashioned in
Battery Park City in New York or Docklands in London (Fainstein, 2001).
Part B of the International Business Park is designed for a low-density campus-like
environment with an area of 12 ha and an average plot ratio of 0.77. Green-space
coverage is 44% and there are more than 700 parking spaces. There are 43 low-rise
office buildings, each with 1000 to 4000 m2 floor space (interview, director of marketing department, April 2009). Each enterprise has its own outdoor spaces. The careful
landscaping creates a park-like feeling (figure 3). This area has successfully attracted
enterprises such as the Technology Centre of 3M China Ltd, Shiseido China's R&D
Research Centre Ltd, and White-Collar Ltd; the White-Collar Ltd fashion company
bought three buildings in the park, and proudly presents its headquarter address in the
BDA.
Part A of the park consists of a land area of 54 000 m2, and a total floor space of
190 000 m2 in five blocks. There are 16 buildings of between 7 to 18 floors, each with a
floor space between 3000 and 12 000 m2. There is a grandiose clubhouse serving these
Figure 3. [In colour online, see http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/a43125] Park-like low-density environment
for `customized' independent office building' in Yizhuang International Business Park (photograph
by the author).
422
F Wu, N A Phelps
office buildings. The selling point for a subcentre like Yizhuang is that it can provide a
headquarters location for those firms that do not necessarily need their front office
in a central business district (CBD) location. The sheer volume of office space in
Yizhuang indicates that it is becoming an office subcentre in Beijing's metropolitan
region (figure 4).
Increasingly, the role of Yizhuang has departed from its earlier one of receiving
relocated industrial enterprises from central Beijing to becoming something of
a growing subcentre of employment in its own right. As the strategic node along
Beijing ^ Tianjin growth corridor, the importance of Yizhuang goes beyond its being
an industrial satellite town: it is becoming a comprehensive high-tech and new-tech
industrial growth pole.
The evolution of Yizhuang from a suburban industrial zone to a comprehensive
new town can be seen from its projected land-use changes. The new town plan proposes
a more balanced spatial structure, with ``two industrial growth corridors, seven clusters, and multiple service centres'' (Yizhuang New Town Plan, June 2008 and April
2009). Along both sides of the Beijing ^ Tianjin highway, two industrial corridors
are being developed; residential areas are planned to be built parallel to industrial
corridors so that commuting distance can be minimised.
What we see here is an evolution in a single settlement over time. Yizhuang has
evolved from a rural village/town to a development zone dominated by employment
land uses, and most recently it is planned to evolve toward an integrated new town
with increasing residential, urban service, amenity, and public transportation land uses.
This transformation, including the conversion of a large monofunctional economic
zone into a more functionally mixed employment and commercial centre, represents a
key planning challenge (interview, general manager, Atkins Beijing, June 2009) and one
Figure 4. [In colour online.] The emerging office building cluster in Yizhuang.
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
423
which promises to be significantöas we describe further below. It is in this last phase
of development that the postsuburban nature of Yizhuang perhaps becomes most
apparent, in ways that are manifold and also different from the US case. Whilst
Chinese metropolitan regions continue to be subject to mass suburbanisation, we see
in individual outer suburban cases, such as Yizhuang, the beginnings of the greater
employment ^ residential balance associated with post-suburbia in the US (Teaford,
1997). However, in contrast to the US, some of this entails public transport connected
mass suburban housing appearing after employment and niche-market housing. More
curious, given the significant redrawing of local government boundaries apparent in
China recently, are the similarities in fragmented governance of postsuburbia between
this Chinese case and those in the US. Despite the possibilities for postsuburban
growth in Yizhuang to be catered for by a single reorganised local government jurisdiction, we see a government body established specifically to promote industrial
development struggling to assume the enlarged roles of developer and service provider
more traditionally associated with new town development corporations and local
governments, and attempting to engage with several neighbouring local governments
while doing so.
Governance of postsuburban development
We have already described some elements of change in the composition of the private
sector in Yizhuang. However, the most notable feature of Yizhuang as an instance of
Chinese outer-suburbanisation-cum-postsuburbanisation is the predominant, almost
exclusive, role of the state. Here there are important continuities since national and
local state bodies are grappling with the unfolding contradictions of rapid evolution
in the designated role for Yizhuang.
Unlike with other district governments, Yizhuang is governed by the management
board of the BDA, which is a streamlined agency of the Beijing municipality geared
toward (industrial) development and promotion. Mr Zhang Boxu, a director of the
BDA, describes the management structure as the model of `combined government and
business' (zhengqi heyi). As Guo and Zhang elaborate:
``The management board undertakes a dual function of manager and developer,
usually combining the management board with a development corporation. At
present, most development zones adopt such a model. This kind of development
zone does not set up a level of government. Instead, the management board performs quasi-government administration. That is, as the subsidiary agency of the
local (municipal) government, the board executes basic administrative functions
and carries out comprehensive management of socioeconomic, population and
resources within the region'' (2007, page 7, authors' translation).(3)
At the core is the Production Promotion Bureau (formerly the Investment Promotion Bureau), in charge of attracting investment and organising development. In most
development zones the bureau of investment promotion is usually the driver of capital
investment. The bureau consists of several `project offices'; the main function of these
offices is for project managers to look after individual investment projects. Project
managers act like real estate agents who accompany the client to search for a property.
Besides these functional bureaus under the management board, there are also subsidiary agencies of the municipality, such as a branch of Bureau of Land Administration
and the Taxation Bureau, which are not under the direct control of the Yizhuang
(3)
Such a combined model is considered efficient (Guo and Zhang, 2007). The number of officials
in the administration of a development zone is usually one tenth of that in a county or district
government. In Beijing ETDZ, about 200 officials work in nine functional bureaus under the
management board.
424
F Wu, N A Phelps
management board. The separation of vertically directed bureaus from the board
strengthens the municipal government's control over land and taxation. The board has
to negotiate the revenue returned and land-development quotas with the municipal
government.
The composition of the management board reflects its corporate style of management. The official website of the BDA provides a list of thirteen `leaders' who consist
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader, the director of the board, the director of
the development and reform commission (DRC), and the CEOs of the BDA Development Corporation and its two subsidiary companies, and the chief accountant of the
Corporation. It is interesting to see how business, party, and the planning profession
are tightly integrated into a quango (quasi-autonomous, nongovernmental organisation) whose entrepreneurial orientation is also signalled in the background of its
director.(4)
Elements of Chinese entrepreneurial urban governance have been widely noted in
the literature (Duckett, 1998; Wu, 2003; Xu and Yeh, 2005) as providing an effective
growth momentum which transcends local politics, such as the significant antigrowth
interests which can exist in developed states of the West. In Yizhuang, this entrepreneurial governance is, if anything, more pronounced in that a specific government
agency has been inserted into the local sphere and invested with significant national
economic development objectives. Thus developers indicated the advantages of a streamlined and speedier process for their projects in Yizhuang compared with elsewhere
(interview, senior manager, Business Development Department, Sino-Ocean Land
Beijing Division, August 2010).
Nevertheless, with Yizhuang's designation as a `new town', the streamlined government represented by the BDA faces new challenges of social management and service
provision as some of the contradictions of its past actions unfold. First, the shortage of
land for residential development also reflects a fundamental contradiction between the
historic aims of the BDA in relation to the former identity of Yizhuang as a development zone and its assumed role as government of a new town. There are several
contradictory pressures here. Under the current land-use system, the incentives are
for local government to release land for industrial and not residential uses. Since there
is no property tax in China, land for residential use only brings a once and for all
lump-sum land premium, in contrast to industrial land uses which generate sustained
taxes to local governments. Yizhuang has been considered a safe prospect for property
developers due to the lack of speculation in land prices and property development
[interview, analyst, Savills Property Services (Beijing) Co Ltd, August 2010]. However,
more recently, this relative shortage of land allocated for residential development,
coupled with the attractions of Yizhuang as an accessible location with assured prospects as a result of its various designations, has begun to fuel significant competition
for development sites and significant inflation of land and property prices (interview,
senior manager, Business Development Department, Sino-Ocean Land Beijing Division
August 2010).(5)
(4)
The board is directed by Mr Zhang Boxu, previously a deputy CEO of Beijing Electronic Group
Ltd, with a PhD in physics. A technocrat, he became a member of the `doctoral service team' under
the CCP Going West mission in 2003, and has since acted as a vice mayor of Huhehot in inner
Mongolia. His appointment reflects a new dynamism and open competitive process of appointing
government officials in China.
(5) The same interviewee reported a doubling of prices for units in some residential developments,
and as many as fifteen developers competing for purchase by public auction of the final tranche of
land to be allocated for residential development in Yizhuang until further notice (interview, senior
manager, Business Development Department, Sino-Ocean Land Beijing Division, August 2010).
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
425
Second, and as a result of such inflationary pressures, there are major issues
regarding the scale, mix, and affordability of housing provision and associated urban
amenities in Yizhuang which threaten its original economic function as a development
zone. The existing housing in Yizhuang is skewed towards the more expensive end of
the market and includes gated residential communities which are well out of the
financial reach of those working in the development zone; doubtless, these developments have in part been driven by what is perceived as inadequate provision for
management and technical staff working at the international businesses attracted to
Yizhuang (interview, CEO, ZY Biotech firm, April 2009). However, provision for other
social classes necessarily finds expression in other ways to create its own contradictions: for example, informal development is rampant in the vast area surrounding the
core of Yizhuang where villagers and residents of rural towns benefit from the rental
business. This kind of informal development is complementary to other housing provision since the remaining 10 km2 of vacant land within the BDA boundary must go
through land leasing and is destined for commodity housing which may be out of reach
of many lower paid workers. The supply of private rentals is mostly in Majuqiao,
a designated rural town in the south of Yizhuang. The land in rural areas still belongs
to local farmers (under collective ownership); farmers rent out their spare rooms and
houses, but also develop new properties specifically for private rental. These properties
are built on land that is under collective ownership without premiums being paid to the
land authority and, as such, are called `partial property rights housing' (xiao chanquan
fang) and are ineligible for deeds of title from the land authority. In the longer term the
orderly redevelopment of places like Majuqiao would be difficult for the BDA as a new
town authority because of the price of land.
The lack of affordable housing within Yizhuang also constrains the development of
some enterprises.(6) One biotech firm in Yizhuang has had to find accommodation with
rental contracts signed with numerous landlords in scattered locations outside the core
area of Yizhuang (interview, marketing director of ZY biotech firm, April 2009).
Another solution comes in the form of provision through `affiliated construction'
( peitao jianshe). The term `affiliated construction' reflects the necessary but secondary
nature of housing provision compared with the primary task of industrial production
and, as such, the likely limited provision from the private development industry (interview, Chairman of the board of a major development company, April 2009). There is a
tradition of affiliated housing in Chinese development zones in the form of `blue-collar
apartments' (lanling gongyu). In Yizhuang two major staff apartment estates have been
builtöYouth Apartment and Yongkang Apartmentöto accommodate about 20 000
staff. However, rents in lanling gongyu are higher than for informal housing in nearby
villages and beyond the means of cost-sensitive migrant workers. Here, neither the market
nor the BDA is effective in providing adequate affordable housing within the development
zone; as a result companies have to play the role of `work units'öironically reverting to a
model more akin to the state-owned enterprises of the socialist era.
Third, the competing demands of several expanding segments of society locally,
coupled with the continuing but altered investment opportunities associated with major
infrastructure improvements, appear to be pushing the BDA towards a more comprehensive role akin to a local government or new town development corporation. When
asked in what way Yizhuang remained suburban, interviewees highlighted the lack of
social infrastructure and amenities (interviews, Senior Manager, Business Development
Department, Sino-Ocean Land Beijing Division, August 2010; Administrative Assistant,
(6)
Reports put the commuting cost for Nokia staff in 2007 at 340 Yuan per person per month,
costing the company 3 million Yuan per year, and entailing an average commute of 30 km and
90 minutes for those staff working in Yizhuang (Zhen, 2007, page 14).
426
F Wu, N A Phelps
New World China Land, August 2010). The land within Yizhuang has been extensively
developed for industrial use so that new residential land and services have been
squeezed outside the boundary of the BDA, creating significant commuting flows
and congestion on lesser roads and bridges such that these are now in need of improvement. Yizhuang also has to rely on the cooperation of other districts when developing
services for its local populationöwhich has proved problematic.(7) In the case of the
provision of schools, a senior planner described how:
``we cannot trust them [nearby suburban district governments]. In the past we gave
funds to Daxing and Tongzhou and hoped they would help with the schools near
our place. However, they put the money into the schools in their central towns
[rather than schools nearby which would serve the children living in Yizhuang]''
(interview, senior planner, Yizhuang, April 2009).
Providing housing, services, urban amenities, and undertaking social management ö
and not simply industry recruitment ö will become the major issues for the new
government in this stage of postsuburban growth.
Fourth, as Yizhuang begins to see a rounding out of its functionöformally recognised in its designation as a new town öthe BDA faces a challenge of accommodating
an element of local antigrowth politics to its own and national government growth
aspirations. According to a senior planner (interview, official in the planning division,
April 2009),
``because in earlier days Yizhuang attracted self-employed social elites [such as
journalists and media reporters] in the villa area, they are now resisting new
[industrial] development; one even managed to hand in a complaining letter to a
director of State Environment Bureau. Now things won't be easier.''
Responding to the slogan Making Yizhuang a Liveable and Workable City put
forward by the management board, some residents challenge whether these twin
objectives can be met. This is exactly the sort of balanceöbetween suburban ideals
and economic realitiesöthat has gradually been struck in postsuburban communities
in the US since the 1950s (Teaford, 1997), though it remains to be seen how exactly
such a balance will be mediated in the case of Chinese state entrepreneurialism.
Conclusion
Yizhuang began life as a new outer suburban concentration of employment, with some
potential parallels to the historic industrial suburbs in North American cities and
contemporary similarities with edge cities (Garreau, 1991) or technoburbs (Fishman,
1987), with recruitment of sectors such as biotechnology, ICT, automobile production,
and logistic centres. In functional terms, Yizhuang is destined to become a city in its
own right and a significant growth centre along Beijing ^ Tianjin urban corridor.
It provides an example of some elements of postsuburban development and governance
challenges in what nevertheless remains an era of mass suburbanisation in Chinese
cities.
In contrast to the few isolated examples of US suburbs and edge cities which are
only belatedly being retrofitted after forty to fifty years (Dunham-Jones and Williamson,
2009), Yizhuang has passed through these incarnations in something less than twenty
years. Now, when Yizhuang is mentioned in Beijing's spatial plan, it is no longer
referred to as a `designated rural town called Yizhuang'. It is not a suburban district,
nor is it simply a development zone. Yizhuang is a planned `new town' without a
(7) In its reliance on the cooperation of Daixing and Tongzhou districts, the governance structure is
different from that of Shanghai's Zhangjiang High-tech Park, for example, which is located inside
the jurisdiction of Pudong new district. The government of Pudong can implement comprehensive
development control over its jurisdiction area.
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
427
corresponding coterminous government of its own but, rather, is expedited by
entrepreneurial agencies and means superimposed upon a fragmented existing local
government arena. Yizhuang is an instance of territorial development which does not
fit neatly into the dichotomous distinction between city and suburb, but is closer to
the sort of cities in function, if not in form, which constitute the heavily urbanised
metropolitan regions of North America which have been considered to be a new
postsuburban form of settlement space.
By inserting a metropolitan development branch (a development zone) bolstered by
national economic development objectives into suburban space, China's `post'suburban
growth is driven by extending entrepreneurial urban governance into the outer rural
reaches of the metropolitan area. This might be referred to as `territorialisation' of the
municipal state in its city-region. In this outer suburban space, the relationship
between the municipal government, district governments, town, and townships is not
only hierarchical but also horizontal: they are part of a patchwork upon which elements
of postsuburban growth are taking shape.
We suggest that such elements of postsuburban growth that exist in China are not
evidence of a `spontaneous' process led by private residential, industrial, and commercial sectors which has turned inside out the growth dynamic of metropolitan regions
(Dear and Dahmann, 2008; Soja, 2000). Rather, they have originated from the strategic
restructuring of a municipal region and its governance. This is significantly different
from the progrowth local politics in the US, which is largely driven by the local
(suburban) private sector dominated `growth machine' (Molotch, 1976), and even
from the postsocialist growth machine of Central and Eastern European nations
(Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005) where the state's grip on the development process is
often inconsistent and punctured by oligarchic economic and political interests such
that growth is rarely the subject of the mature politics of place implied in the `growth
machine'.
In the Chinese global city-region, postsuburban development is orchestrated by
entrepreneurial arms of the state which aim to invent growth poles as a means of
further promoting the international economic role of a polycentric Beijing metropolitan economy. The political economy of Chinese municipal entrepreneurialism has,
on the whole, been altogether more complete in terms of the state's control of the
land-development process, and strategic in terms of promotion, the supporting infrastructure, and, as a consequence, the location of that growth. Nevertheless, questions
remain over the economic, social, and environmental sustainability of such new centres
of growth. If the Yizhuang case is anything to judge by, such municipal entrepreneurialism faces important challengesösuch as the retrofitting of public transportation and
social infrastructure öwhich have been emerging in the postsuburban settings of North
America, albeit that they remain to be resolved, for the time being, almost exclusively
by and within the national and local government bureaucratic machinery.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No.
RES-062-23-0924) for funding the research entitled `Governing post-suburban growth: planning
and politics of post-suburbia'. We thank Yanwei Chai, Jian Feng, Qianjun Zhou, Xiaoxia Xu, Jin
Ma for their help and thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. The usual
disclaimer applies.
References
Beauregard R, 2006, ``The radical break in late twentieth-century urbanization'' Area 38 218 ^ 220
Beck U, Bonss W, Lau C, 2003, ``The theory of reflexive modernization: problematic, hypotheses
and research programme'' Theory, Culture and Society 20 1 ^ 33
Beijing DRC, 2005 Beijing 11th Five Year Plan Beijing Development and Reform Commission,
Beijing
428
F Wu, N A Phelps
Beijing ETDZ, 2005 Beijing Basic Economic Unit Census: The Volumes of Yizhuang (I and II)
(Beijing ETDZ, Beijing) (in Chinese)
Bingham R, Kimble D, 1995, ``The industrial composition of edge cities and downtowns: the new
urban reality'' Economic Development Quarterly 9 259 ^ 272
Bontje M, Burdack J, 2005, ``Edge cities, European-style: examples from Paris and the Randstad''
Cities 22 317 ^ 330
Cartier C, 2001, `` `Zone fever', the arable land debate, and real estate speculation: China's evolving
land use regime and its geographical contradictions Journal of Contemporary China 10(28)
445 ^ 469
Chan K W, 2009, ``The Chinese Hukou system at 50'' Eurasian Geography and Economics 50
197 ^ 221
Dear M, 2004, ``The Los Angeles school of urbanism: an intellectual history'' Urban Geography
24 493 ^ 509
Dear M, Dahmann N, 2008, ``Urban politics and the Los Angeles School of urbanism'' Urban
Affairs Review 44 266 ^ 279
Deng F F, Huang Y, 2004, ``Uneven land reform and urban sprawl in China: the case of Beijing''
Progress in Planning 61 211 ^ 236
Dick H W, Rimmer P J, 1998,``Beyond the Third World City: the new urban geography of South-East
Asia'' Urban Studies 35 2303 ^ 2321
Ding C, 2004, ``Urban spatial development in the land policy reform era: evidence from Beijing''
Urban Studies 41(10) 1889 ^ 1907
Duckett J, 1998 The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce Departments in
Reform Era Tianjin (Routledge, London)
Dunham-Jones E,Williamson J, 2009 Retrofitting Suburbia: Urban Design Solutions for Redesigning
Suburbs (John Wiley, Chichester, Sussex)
Fainstein S, 2001 The City Builders: Property Development in New York and London, 1980 ^ 2000
2nd edition (The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS)
Feng J, Zhou Y, 2005, ``Suburbanization and the changes of urban internal spatial structure in
Hangzhou, China'' Urban Geography 26 107 ^ 136
Feng J, Chen X, Lan Z, 2007,``The evolution of spatial structure of shopping behaviours of Beijing's
residents'' Acta Geographica Sinica 10 1083 ^ 1096 (in Chinese)
Feng J, Zhou Y,Wu F, 2008, New trends of suburbanization in Beijing since 1990: from governmentled to market-oriented Regional Studies 42 83 ^ 99
Feng J, Wang F, Zhou Y, 2009, ``The spatial restructuring of population in metropolitan Beijing:
towards polycentricity in the post-reform era'' Urban Geography 30 779 ^ 802
Fishman R, 1987 Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (Basic Books, New York)
Garreau J, 1991 Edge City: Life on the New Frontier (Doubleday, New York)
Gottdiener M, Kephart G, 1995, ``The multinucleated region: a comparative analysis'',
in Postsuburban California: The Transformation of Orange County Since World War Two
Eds R Kling, S Olin, M Poster (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA) pp 31 ^ 54
Guo X P, Zhang B X, 2007, ``Thinking and suggestions on the management system of development
zones'' Macro Economic Studies 10 1 ^ 7 (in Chinese)
Harris R, Lewis R, 1998, ``Constructing a fault(y) zone: misrepresentations of American cities
and suburbs, 1900 ^ 1950'' Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88 622 ^ 639
Knox P (Ed.), 1993 The Restless Urban Landscape (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ)
Knox P L, 2008 Metroburbia, USA (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ)
Kulcsar L J, Domokos T, 2005, ``The post-socialist growth machine: the case of Hungary''
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29 550 ^ 563
Laquian A A, 2005 Beyond Metropolis: The Planning and Governance of Asia's Mega-urban
Regions (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC, and Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, MD)
Lang E, 2003 Edgeless Cities: Exploring the Elusive Metropolis (Brookings Institution Press,
Washington, DC)
Li S-M, 2004, ``Life course and residential mobility in Beijing, China'' Environment and Planning A
36 27 ^ 43
Li X, Yeh A G O, 2004, ``Analyzing spatial restructuring of land use patterns in a fast growing
region using remote sensing and GIS'' Landscape and Urban Planning 69 335 ^ 354
Lin G C S, Ho S, 2005, ``The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary
China'' Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 411 ^ 436
(Post)suburban development and state entrepreneurialism in Beijing
429
Lucy W H, Philips D L, 1997, ``The post-suburban era comes to Richmond: city decline, suburban
transition and exurban growth'' Landscape and Urban Planning 36 259 ^ 275
Ma L J C, 2005, ``Urban administrative restructuring, changing scale relations and local economic
development in China'' Political Geography 24 477 ^ 497
Ma L J C, Cui G, 1987, ``Administrative changes and urban population in China'' Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 77 373 ^ 395
McManus R, Ethington P, 2007, ``Suburbs in transition: new approaches to suburban history''
Urban History 34 317 ^ 337
Mazierska E, Rascaroli L, 2003 From Moscow to Madrid: Postmodern Cities, European Cinema
(I B Tauris, London)
Molotch H, 1976, ``City as a growth machineötoward a political-economy of place'' American
Journal of Sociology 82 309 ^ 322
Nuissl H, Rink D, 2005, ``The `production' of urban sprawl in eastern Germany as a phenomenon
of post-socialist transition'' Cities 22 123 ^ 134
Phelps N A, Parsons N, 2003, ``Edge urban geographies: notes from the margins of Europe's
capital cities'' Urban Studies 40 1725 ^ 1749
Phelps N A, Parsons N, Ballas D, Dowling A, 2006 Post-suburban Europe: Planning and Politics
at the Margins of Europe's Capital Cities (Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hants)
Phelps N A, Wood A M, Valler D C, 2010, ``A postsuburban world? An outline of a research
agenda'' Environment and Planning A 42 366 ^ 383
Scott A J, Roweis S J, 1977, ``Urban planning in theory and in practice: a reappraisal'' Environment
and Planning A 9 1097 ^ 1119
Soja E W, 2000 Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford)
Song J, Wang E, Zhang W X, Peng P, 2007, ``Housing suburbanization and employment spatial
mismatch in Beijing'' Acta Geographica Sinica 62 387 ^ 396 (in Chinese)
Teaford J, 1997 Post-suburbia:Government and Politics in the Edge Cities (Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, MD)
Walker R, 1981, ``A theory of suburbanization: capitalism and the construction of urban space
in the US'', in Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Societies Eds M Dear, A Scott
(Methuen, London) pp 383 ^ 429
Wang H Y, Fan J, 2007, ``The impact of urban development stages on new town development in
Beijing'' City Planning Review 31(3) pp 20 ^ 24 (in Chinese)
Wu F, 2002, ``China's changing urban governance in the transition towards a more market-oriented
economy'' Urban Studies 39 1071 ^ 1093
Wu F, 2003, ``The (post-)socialist entrepreneurial city as a state project: Shanghai's reglobalisation
in question'' Urban Studies 40 1673 ^ 1698
Wu F, 2007, ``Re-orientation of the city plan: strategic planning and design competition in China''
Geoforum 38 379 ^ 392
Wu F, 2009, ``Neo-urbanism in the making under China's market transition'' City 13 414 ^ 427
Wu F, 2010, ``Gated and packaged suburbia: packaging and branding Chinese suburban residential
development.'' Cities 27 385 ^ 396
Wu F, Phelps N A, 2008, ``From suburbia to post-suburbia in China? Aspects of the transformation
of the Beijing and Shanghai global city regions'' Built Environment 34 464 ^ 481
Wu F. Webber K, 2004, ``The rise of `foreign gated communities' in Beijing: between economic
globalization and local institutions'' Cities 21 203 ^ 213
Xu J, Yeh A G-O, 2005, ``City repositioning and competitiveness building in regional development:
new development strategies in Guangzhou, China'' International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research 29 283 ^ 308
Yeh A G O, Wu F, 1996, ``The new land development process and urban development in Chinese
cities'' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20 330 ^ 353
Yeung, H W-C, Liu W, Dicken P, 2006, ``Transnational corporations and network effects in a local
manufacturing cluster in mobile telecommunications equipment in China'' World Development
34 520 ^ 540
Zhang J X, Wu F, 2006, ``China's changing economic governance: administrative annexation and
the reorganization of local governments in the Yangtze River Delta'' Regional Studies 40
3 ^ 21
Zhang L, Zhao X B, 1998, ``Re-examining China's `urban' concept and the level of urbanization''
The China Quarterly 154 330 ^ 381
Zhang T, 2000, ``Land market forces and government's role in sprawl'' Cities 17 123 ^ 135
430
F Wu, N A Phelps
Zhen G, 2007, ``The problem of working and living separation and solution measures'' Urban
Problem 140(3) 12 ^ 15 (in Chinese)
Zhou Y, Ma L J C, 2000,``Economic restructuring and suburbanization in China'' Urban Geography
21(3) 205 ^ 236
Zhou Y, Ma L J C, 2003, ``China's urbanization levels: reconstructing a baseline from the fifth
population census'' The China Quarterly 173 176 ^ 196
ZMB, 2009 Almanac of Zhongguancun Science Park 2008 Zhongguancun Management Board
(Jinghua Publishers, Beijing) in Chinese
ß 2011 Pion Ltd and its Licensors
Conditions of use. This article may be downloaded from the E&P website for personal research
by members of subscribing organisations. This PDF may not be placed on any website (or other
online distribution system) without permission of the publisher.