Nationalism in China’s Security Strategies This thesis examines how nationalism constrains China’s security strategies. It argues that political instability in China challenges regime security and the Communist Party therefore uses nationalism for unifying the people around a common identity from which the regime can draw legitimacy for preserving communism and the authoritative state. The thesis uses neoclassical realism to analyse the interaction between international‐level variables and nationalism as an intervening variable in the regime’s strategic choices. It firstly analyses strategic contingencies for China at the international level, then examines what constitutes Chinese nationalism and how it constrains decision‐makers. Next, the conclusions are applied to two case studies regarding security strategies in the Xinjiang region and in the territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea. The thesis concludes that nationalism is not an ends in the regime’s strategies, however, it does constrain the strategies to particular ways and means. This is partly because the national sentiment prefers some ways and means to others, and partly because choosing ways and means in accordance with the nationalist agenda further strengthens the regime’s domestic authority. Master’s thesis at the Joint Senior Staff Course (Master of Military Strategic Studies) 2010/2011 at the Royal Danish Defence College Student: Captain Nicolai Meulengracht, Danish Army Thesis title: Nationalism and China’s Security Strategies Date: 9 May 2011 Word count: 21,000 (chapters 1‐7, all included) Tutor: Liselotte Odgaard, Institute of Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College Examiner: Prof. Michael Yahuda i Summary China’s economic development over the past decades has significantly increased its power capabilities in Central Asia, the Asia‐Pacific and the global system. While China emphasises peaceful coexistence, the ambiguity in its behaviour concerns its neighbours and the world’s other great powers. For the past two decades, China has increased its military expenditure every year, while maintaining an authoritative communist regime that applies oppressive measures to control the population. It has also regularly articulated a strong nationalist discourse, making historically‐based claims to territories and criticising the West and, in particular, Japan. This thesis seeks to explain China’s behaviour by analysing its security strategies and determining how nationalism constrains them. It works from the assumption that the political elite, the Chinese Communist Party, uses nationalism as an instrument to strengthen the social cohesion in China and to promote its own legitimacy. The thesis therefore examines whether Chinese security strategies pursue a nationalist agenda and to what extent nationalism constrains these strategies to particular ends, ways, or means. The thesis uses neoclassical realist theory to analyse nationalism’s influence on security strategies. Neoclassical realism’s central prediction is that a state seeks to strengthen its power capabilities in order to ensure its freedom to pursue its national goals and ultimately its own survival. The state’s behaviour, such as policies and strategies, is dependent on the distribution of power in the international system, but also on various domestic‐level factors that may act as intervening variables to its choices. The thesis therefore first analyses China’s power capabilities in the international system in order to make conclusions to what contingencies this presents for China. It concludes that there are two overall strategies that China could pursue. It can support US hegemony and become the US’ most important partner in the region, thereby becoming the region’s most powerful state. Or, it can seek to erode US regional influence and promote multi‐polarity. The thesis then analyses nationalism to make conclusions on what constitutes Chinese nationalism and how these nationalist elements may influence security strategies. It concludes that the national sentiment is influenced by historical narratives of China’s superior culture, which historically has always been threatened by ‘barbarians’ on its frontiers and ‘Western encroachment’, and that the nation’s territory is that of the Greater China about two hundred years ago. The political nationalism places the Communist Party at the centre as the guardian of Chinese civilisation, and the popular nationalism in return demands the nationalist agenda be fulfilled. These factors influence security strategies by giving preference to certain ways and means over others, and they constrain the regime to following nationalist goals if regime security is threatened. The conclusions from the international‐level and the nationalism analysis are applied to two different case studies of China’s security strategies: the first regards controlling the Xinjiang region and the second involves negotiating with Japan over the territorial dispute in the East China Sea. The case studies conclude that both territories are important to China’s energy security and its ability to balance against the US alliance system, but the ways and means for achieving this are constrained by ii nationalism. The Chinese regime prefers hard‐handed methods to control Xinjiang because it agrees with the national sentiment of how to handle the barbarian threat, and it strengthens the regime’s authority domestically and China’s position in Central Asia. In the East China Sea, the regime could pursue cooperative strategies with Japan, thereby gaining access to the undersea energy resources and increasing its international prestige. The regime, however, chooses to keep the status quo and a confrontational course with Japan in order not to undermine its authority domestically and because the dispute can be used for coercing Japan in other issues. The thesis concludes that nationalism constrains China’s security strategies to ways and means that strengthen the regime’s authority and legitimacy domestically. Nationalism is not an end in itself, but is rather a means for keeping the regime in power. The regime will compromise the nationalist agenda, but only if the regime security does not come under pressure. iii Contents 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................1 The rising China .........................................................................................................................................1 Thesis statement .......................................................................................................................................2 Analytical framework ................................................................................................................................2 Structure of thesis .....................................................................................................................................3 Scope of thesis ..........................................................................................................................................5 2 Theory ...................................................................................................................................................7 Neoclassical realist theory ........................................................................................................................7 International level .................................................................................................................................8 Domestic level .......................................................................................................................................9 Criticism of neoclassical realism..........................................................................................................10 Theory on nationalism ............................................................................................................................10 3 China and the international system ....................................................................................................12 General trends in China’s behaviour in the international system ..........................................................12 Diplomatic ...........................................................................................................................................12 Economic .............................................................................................................................................13 Military ................................................................................................................................................13 Variables at the international level .........................................................................................................15 Relative capabilities.............................................................................................................................15 Position................................................................................................................................................16 Contingencies for China’s security strategies .........................................................................................17 4 Nationalism .........................................................................................................................................19 The shaping of China’s national sentiment.............................................................................................19 The Dynasties and the People’s Republic of China .............................................................................19 Political Instability and Regime Insecurity ..........................................................................................20 The ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ in Chinese nationalism.....................................................................................21 The definition of territory in Chinese nationalism ..................................................................................22 The nationalist political agenda ..............................................................................................................23 The rise of popular nationalism ..............................................................................................................24 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................25 iv Nationalism and domestic political stability .......................................................................................25 Nationalism as an intervening variable in international strategies ....................................................26 5 Nationalism and security strategies for Xinjiang.................................................................................27 Xinjiang until the end of the Cold War....................................................................................................27 Xinjiang’s strategic importance to China today ......................................................................................28 Relative Capabilities ............................................................................................................................28 Position................................................................................................................................................29 Political instability in Xinjiang today........................................................................................................29 Root causes to political instability.......................................................................................................29 Ethnic violence and insurgency...........................................................................................................30 Security strategies for countering political instability in Xinjiang...........................................................31 Domestic strategies.............................................................................................................................31 Regional strategies ..............................................................................................................................32 Global strategies..................................................................................................................................32 Nationalism in Xinjiang security strategies .............................................................................................33 The Chinese and the ‘barbarians’........................................................................................................33 Separatism and the authoritative regime ...........................................................................................34 The nationalist agenda of the Greater China ......................................................................................34 Safeguarding against Western Encroachment....................................................................................34 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................35 6 Nationalism and the East China Sea dispute.......................................................................................36 Background .............................................................................................................................................36 Strategic Importance of the East China Sea ...............................................................................................i Relative Capabilities ............................................................................................................................38 Position................................................................................................................................................39 Chinese Nationalism in the East China Sea Dispute................................................................................40 The Greater China ...............................................................................................................................40 Anti‐Japanese sentiment.....................................................................................................................40 Western Encroachment ......................................................................................................................41 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................41 7 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................43 v vi 1 Introduction The rising China The economic achievements of the People’s Republic of China over the past few decades have consolidated its position as a significant world power. In less than thirty years, half a billion Chinese people have been lifted out of poverty. In the international system, its GDP, foreign trade and currency reserve place have made it one of the biggest economies, and its growth rate is one of the most important powerhouses driving the world economy (Hækkerup, 2009, pp. 38‐39). While on its rise, China has continually made claims to Taiwan and territory far from its mainland in both the East China Sea and South China Sea. Although China has not repeated the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait, where it conducted a series of weapon tests to deter Taiwanese moves toward independence, it has still regularly made minor demonstrations with naval vessels in both the East and South China Sea. Arguably, the US alliance system 1 in the Asia‐Pacific and China’s economic inter‐dependency with these countries restrain it from repeating the 1996 crisis. Instead of making overt displays of military force, China now regularly uses a strong anti‐Western and anti‐Japanese discourse in international affairs to show its discontent for Western capitalism and Japan’s war crimes from World War II. The economic growth has enabled China to increase its power capabilities. Its military expenditure, for example, has increased by an average of thirteen per cent annually over the past two decades. There is, however, little transparency in the official defence budgets, with analysts indicating that the total spending on military is probably twice as high (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). Altogether, it gives reason for some to be concerned that China will eventually threaten regional stability and try to redeem the territories it claims. Others argue that China’s economic inter‐dependency and integration into international system will restrain it from using force to pursue such ends. Another concern is the domestic unrest within China itself. There are regular demonstrations that sometimes escalate into violence with consequent security crackdowns. To begin with, ethnic violence and terrorism are occurring more frequently, often stemming from separatist movements in the frontier areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang. In return, widespread nationalist demonstrations demand the regime takes harder measures to enforce security. Other nationalist demonstrations demand the regime takes a stern approach towards the US or Japan in international affairs to keep out Western or Japanese 1
In this thesis the term ‘US alliance system’ covers US allies and partners in the Asia‐Pacific. Significant partners include Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, who each have different bilateral agreements with the US. 1 influence. Finally, there are also political demonstrations demanding reform and liberalisation, although these are often subdued by the regime. Despite China’s growing middle classes, market‐oriented reform, and opening to the global community, China maintains its ‘democratic dictatorship’ and a state‐system based on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (CCP, 2007). Despite international criticism of its authoritative regime and disregard for human rights, China insists that tight control is necessary for keeping the country together. Tight control, and isolating the public from outside influence through censorship, was recently seen when, in February 2011, the official censorship blocked internet search results for ‘Egypt’ and ‘Mubarak’ in Chinese. These actions suggest an anxiety about maintaining political stability so that the regime does not suffer the same consequences as the regimes of the East European states in 1989 or those of the current Middle East. Or, as a prominent Chinese human rights activist wrote on Twitter as a comment to the events in Egypt: ‘It only took 18 days for the collapse of a military regime which was in power for 30 years and looked harmonious and stable. This thing [the Chinese government] that has been in place for 60 years may take several months’ (Hartcher, 2011). The nationalist discourse both in the international system and at the domestic level, backed by public nationalist demonstrations, suggests that it is a political instrument for upholding the regime’s authority. The nationalism instils in the people a joint identity that revolves around the Communist Party, and a sense of mission for China that distracts them from political discontent. This gives reason to consider to what extent nationalism influences China’s strategies. Is China’s behaviour in the international system directed by a nationalist agenda? Or is this simply regime security? An analysis of the situation using neoclassical realist theory can help to answer these questions. It seeks to explain a state’s behaviour in the international system by examining the relationship between international‐level and domestic‐level variables. An analysis in this perspective suggests that China’s strategic choices are not only dependent on the distribution of power in the international system, but also, to some extent, constrained by the nationalism that is used as an instrument to maintain political stability and regime security. Thesis statement This thesis will use neoclassical realist theory to analyse how China’s security strategies are not only dependent on the distribution of power in the international system, but also constrained by nationalism as an intervening variable. Analytical framework This thesis uses the analytical framework of neoclassical realist theory because it focuses on the behaviour of states in the international system as explained with a two‐level analysis: the international level and the domestic level. In the neoclassical realist perspective, the international system is inherently anarchic and therefore states are concerned primarily with their own security and strive to consolidate their positions in order to preserve flexibility to pursue their own ends. The ends a state defines, and the ways and means it utilises to pursue them, are dependent on the distribution of power in the system. Power distribution, or the balance of power, in a system of states, is defined namely by two independent variables: the state’s material capabilities relative to that of the others and the state’s position in the system. 2 The strategic choices of a state, however, are not determined merely by the power distribution in the international system. For example, decisions are influenced by leaders, politicians, and interest groups at various levels within the state. Leaders’ perceptions of the international system and the state’s domestic policies and issues, conflicting interests, values and more, can either enable or limit a state’s strategies as well as its ability to extract and mobilise resources for them. Neoclassical realism therefore introduces domestic‐level variables, which are called intervening variables, that will to a greater or lesser degree influence a state’s behaviour in the international system. As an instrument, political nationalism is a social and political construction that is mainly directed by the political elite and is therefore inseparably connected with the activities of the state. It must, however, have some basis in popular national sentiment in order to have effect. Nationalism in this thesis therefore includes firstly political nationalism, but also the response the regime receives from popular nationalism. Altogether, nationalism is introduced as an intervening variable that constrains China’s security strategies, either by constraining the regime to define particular ends, or by giving preference to pursuing the ends in particular ways and with particular means. Level
System: China in the international system
Unit: China's domestic realm
Aim
Preserve flexibility to pursue national
objectives
Safeguard the regime and China’s territorial
integrity
Behavioural
dynamics
Power distribution in the international
system
Political stability, regime security
Variables
Relative capabilities
Position in the international system
Nationalism – political and popular
Figure 1: Overview of theoretical variables The focus on ‘security strategies’ is not a narrow scope. Security strategies in this thesis are merely considered as the ends, ways, and means that a state defines in order to pursue its national visions while ensuring its own security – whether that is to safeguard it from internal or external threats. In realist thinking the principal ends in security strategies are the survival of the state. The ways are typically context changing strategies, such as power balancing and deterrence. The means are principally the state’s economic, military, and diplomatic/political capabilities. Structure of thesis The thesis uses the two‐level analysis from neoclassical realism to conclude firstly how China’s security strategies may depend on the distribution of power in the international system, and secondly how nationalism at the domestic level may constrain them. The conclusions from the two levels are put to test in two case studies that demonstrate different contexts for the security strategies. The first case study examines China’s security strategies for maintaining political stability in the Xinjiang region and how nationalism constrains its domestic approach for countering separatism, which again defines both its regional and global level strategies. The second case study examines the Sino‐Japanese dispute over the small, unpopulated Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and how Chinese nationalism constrains China’s choices and makes a peaceful settlement seemingly unattainable. 3 The two case studies have been chosen, because the contexts are significantly different and therefore interesting when comparing how nationalism constrains the security strategies. The Xinjiang case is complex, because the security strategies for maintaining control of the region operate at a domestic and a regional level where the threat gives China leverage for multilateral cooperation. In the East China Sea case, the perception of an external threat is driven by nationalism while vital strategic interests are at stake, and it restrains China from cooperating with Japan. The remaining chapters are organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theory of neoclassical realism and the theory of nationalism that are used to analyse the security strategies of China. Neoclassical realism is not limited to one single recognised theory with a complete analytical framework, particularly in regard to defining the domestic‐level variables and what weight they should be given in comparison to the system‐level variables. The chapter therefore discusses two of the most influential models for domestic‐level variables and how they interact with nationalism. Likewise, there are several theories on nationalism and various kinds of nationalism. The chapter thus defines nationalism in general terms and explains what is distinct about political nationalism as an instrument applied by a state’s elite, as well as setting forth the variables within nationalism that will be used to analyse Chinese nationalism. Chapter 3 analyses China’s relative power capabilities at the international level in order to define contingencies for China’s security strategies if it, as neoclassical realism presumes, desires to enhance its competitive advantage, increase its probability of survival, and preserve its flexibility to pursue national objectives. The chapter concludes that while China is benefitting from the current world order and the regional stability that US hegemony in part provides, it still needs to balance its capabilities and position against the US alliance system’s influence in the region. The chapter outlines two overall strategies that China could pursue in order to balance against the US alliance system: it could either pursue an equal status and partnership with the US by cooperating and increasing its prestige and legitimacy; or it could seek to maintain its own position while seeking to erode that of others thereby increasing its own relative power. Chapter 4 analyses the elements of China’s nationalism and how historical narratives are used instrumentally by the regime to promote social cohesion and reinforce the regime’s legitimacy. The chapter also briefly examines the significant anti‐Japanese sentiment and how popular nationalism interacts with political nationalism. The main conclusion from the chapter is that while nationalism is a means rather than an ends, to the regime it is also a double‐edged sword that must be balanced delicately in international affairs. Nationalism is effective in mobilising the population by instilling a common sense of mission and purpose, which strengthens the regime authority and legitimacy. However, nationalism also obligates the regime to be consistent with this mission and purpose in its security strategies, or it may undermine its own credibility. Chapter 5 is a case study of how nationalism constrains China’s security strategies in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, where ethnic unrest and separatist movements regularly cause political instability. The chapter first examines how Xinjiang is strategically important to China’s power capabilities in the international system, and then how nationalism constrains the strategies that the Chinese regime utilises in order to control the Xinjiang region. It concludes that while the nationalist agenda is part of the reason why Xinjiang is being controlled by China, the region’s military and economic importance outweighs the nationalist definition of the territory. China is therefore willing to compromise its 4 territorial claims along the borders to the neighbouring countries. Nationalism, however, constrains the ways and means chosen in the security strategies for Xinjiang. The national sentiment that defines the Chinese people and culture vis‐à‐vis non‐Chinese ethnicities, or what traditionally would be considered barbarian tribes, gives preference to hard‐handed methods rather than comprehensive and minority inclusive strategies. Chapter 6 is a case study of how Chinese nationalism constrains Sino‐Japanese relations in the dispute over the Daioyu Islands in the East China Sea. The islands have internationally been recognised as part of Japanese territory since 1895, but China claims them to have been part of China since the fifteenth century. Like the Xinjiang case study, the chapter first analyses the strategic importance of the islands and the adjoining sea territory and then how nationalism constrains China’s strategies in the dispute. The chapter concludes that while China is making a historical claim to the islands, thereby making it appear to be a matter of principle, it is really the need for the rich undersea energy resources that drives its desire to claim the territory. The dispute over the islands with Japan, however, has fuelled Chinese popular nationalism and has become a useful instrument for the regime both for mobilising the population and for coercing Japan. The Chinese regime is thus constrained by nationalism to remain confrontational in the dispute, as concessions would undermine its popular credibility, even though mutually beneficial strategies in cooperation with Japan are tangible and could strengthen China’s power capabilities. Chapter 7 is the final summary and sums up the conclusions from the analysis of China’s power capabilities, nationalism as an intervening variable in security strategies, and the conclusions from the two case studies. The chapter concludes that nationalism is not in itself an end in China’s security strategies, but it still does become a constraint when ways and means are defined. The Chinese regime’s main concerns appear to be internal political stability and the maintenance of the Communist Party in power, and it utilises nationalism as an instrument to appease the population and strengthen its legitimacy. If the regime therefore deviates from its nationalist agenda, it will undermine its own credibility, threatening the regime security it was meant to safeguard. Scope of thesis The thesis is therefore concerned with how China’s security strategies deviate from what contingencies in the international system would suggest, because they are constrained by a nationalist agenda. Arguably, there will be other issues at the domestic level that will act as intervening variables, such as conflicting perceptions and interests within the elite. However, while these should not be ignored, they are outside the scope of this thesis. The thesis focuses on contemporary China and examines current trends in its domestic and international affairs, but will give a brief historical account when explaining Chinese nationalism as well as when investigating the present issues in the two case studies. China’s behaviour in the international system has changed noticeably over the past two decades, but appears to have steadied on its current course since 1997‐98, when China introduced its ‘New Security Concept’ emphasising peaceful coexistence. When examining trends in China’s strategies and nationalism, the thesis therefore focuses on sources that present or analyse these factors from 1998 until the time of writing in April 2011. The sources used are mainly scholarly works on China’s international politics and nationalism, articles from reviews on 5 international security and international relations, unclassified intelligence analysis and analysis of Chinese affairs in internationally recognised newspapers accessible by internet. The sources are mostly of American, Australian, and European origin – some are by Chinese authors who live and work overseas – and consequently the conclusions in this thesis represent an outside view of China. 6 2 Theory This chapter gives an introduction to neoclassical realism and its fundamental assumptions about states, the international system, and the variables that influence the behaviour of states. It also briefly presents a theory of what constitutes nationalism and how nationalism can be used as a political instrument by a state’s ruling elite. Neoclassical realist theory Realist theories date back as far as Greek classical civilisation, where philosophers sought to describe the relations and power plays between the city states. Through the evolution of civilisation, realist thinking has been refined, but the principal assumption about states and the system of states remains almost unchanged: it is fundamentally an anarchic system where every state is concerned with and always fighting for its own survival. Theories of foreign policy (such as realism) seek to explain what states try to achieve in the system of states and what determines their choices in defining their objectives and how to pursue them. In realist thinking the scope and ambition of a state’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the distribution of power in the international system. In simple terms, the more powerful a state is relative to that of others, the better its ability to pursue its own goals. If less powerful, it will have to adapt to the premises set by others. Or, as Thucydides described the dynamics between city states in ancient Greece: ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’ (Rose, 1998, pp. 145‐6). The term neoclassical realism first appeared in Gideon Rose’s 1998 article Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy in which he presented a new school of realist thinking that was appearing in the 1990s. Neoclassical realism, as the name implies, seeks to update classical realist thinking by incorporating what has been learned from the neorealist school over the past decades. Neoclassical realism maintains that a state’s foreign policies are driven by its relative power capabilities in the international system. The impact of such power capabilities, however, is indirect and complex, and how they are translated into foreign policies or security strategies may depend on various intervening factors within the state itself (Rose, 1998, p. 146). Neoclassical realist theory therefore proposes a two‐level analysis. The two levels are the system‐level and the unit‐level. The system level is the system of states, which can be a regional system of states or the global system of states. In this thesis, the system‐level will be referred to as the international level, and if necessary, it will be specified whether it is the global international system or a specific regional 7 system, such as Central Asia or the Asia‐Pacific. The unit level is the state at any given level depending on which variables are being examined. In this thesis it will be referred to as the domestic level, and since it is nationalism that will be examined, it will be specified whether it is nationalism at the governing level (the regime) or in the population. International level The power of a state, or its relative power capabilities, is defined by two interrelated variables: its relative material capabilities and its relative position in the international system. The relative material capabilities of a state (or simply relative capabilities) are those that enable it to allocate the necessary resources to pursuing its goals in the international system, or which it can use to exert power over other states. These capabilities include military capabilities, but can also be economic capacity (financial, natural resources, infrastructure, technology, and human resources) or even diplomatic capabilities (an efficient diplomatic corps). While China a few decades ago had a large territory and population, and a large military, its relative capability was still minor in the international system. The majority of its population was living in poverty, it had a poorly developed industrial and infrastructural capacity, and while its military was great in numbers it was relatively low‐tech and of limited use outside China’s own territory. Also, China did not significantly engage itself in multilateral relations and it had a small, almost insignificant diplomatic corps. China therefore had a limited economic, military, or diplomatic capability which again would, in part, limit its level of ambition for what strategies to pursue in the international system. The relative position (or simply position) of a state is its ability to influence the norms and agendas in the international system. While a state may not have military or economic capabilities that are superior to others, it may still have a substantial influence in the international system that it can use to sway other states to support its own agenda. A state may hold important positions in international institutions, where it can influence the agenda and shape the international norms. It may be part of an alliance system that protects it against greater powers, or it may be able to influence greater powers by being their allies. A state’s legitimacy and prestige are important aspects when defining a state’s position, and these are determined by the state’s achievements, the consistency in its behaviour, and the norms and values it articulates. In an anarchic system, authority in international relations is by definition horizontal rather than vertical. International norms and institutions are sources and expressions of authority (Donnelly, 2000, p. 154), and if a state is not complying with these, it may come under pressure from the other states. The position of a state is closely linked to the relative material capabilities because economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities can give access to international forums. China’s economic rise has increased its material capabilities and overseas trade and therefore increased its interest for asserting influence in regional and global forums. For the past four decades, China has been a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has also more recently become a member of the World Trade Organisation. These are two global institutions where China has significant influence, and it can utilise them to promote its own interests. However, the spread of human rights norms undermines the Chinese regime’s legitimacy in the international system, and may therefore weaken its position on certain issues. 8 Neoclassical realism presumes that the state responds to the uncertainties of the international system by seeking control of and shaping its external environment. It is therefore the central prediction that the state’s relative capabilities and position will shape the magnitude and ambition of its foreign policies (Rose, 1998, p. 152). The overarching aim of a state will be to continuously seek to strengthen its capabilities and position in order to preserve its own freedom of action to pursue its national goals and ultimately its own survival. The same presumption is made about China in this thesis, and by analysing China’s relative capabilities and position in the international system some general conclusions are made about what priorities and contingencies there are for China’s strategies. Domestic level In his work, Rose emphasises that there is no perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. He argues that since foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders, the first intervening variable that must be analysed is the ‘policymakers’ perceptions of relative power’ and threats and opportunities to the state. Secondly, Rose argues that since these leaders do not always have complete freedom to extract and direct the state’s resources as they wish, a power analysis must also examine the strength and structure of the state relative to its society. The third intervening variable Rose proposes is the nature of a state’s goals and interests. This is operationalized as the degree to which the state is ‘status quo or revisionist’ by nature and ‘satisfied or dissatisfied’ with the distribution of power and principles of the international system (Rose, 1998, pp. 157‐64). In relation to Rose’s first intervening variable, ‘policymakers’ perceptions’, China’s strategies over the past decade suggest that its leaders have generally perceived that there have been no immediate threats to its survival in its external environment. After the Cold War, China has held a strong position in its region which has been relatively stable due to the US alliance system. China has therefore been able to make short‐term trade‐offs in military capabilities and invest in its economic development in order to strengthen its relative capabilities and position in the long‐term. When considering the nature of a state’s goals and interests, it would be natural to conclude that this could be influenced by nationalism within the state. When China, for example, uses an official nationalist discourse of ’national unity‘ and ’one China‘, often with reference to Taiwan, it appears that China is not satisfied with the status quo. Had China been unchallenged in the international system, it is possible that it would have pursued its nationalist agenda without hesitation. However, since this is not the case, it must be assumed that China must balance its nationalist goals with what is achievable in the international system. In his book Unanswered Threats, Randall Schweller presents a theory of four overall intervening variables that are related to Rose’s variables; particularly the second: ‘strength and structure of the state relative to its society’. Schweller’s intervening variables are: elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability (Schweller, 2006, pp. 47‐55). This thesis works from the hypothesis that nationalism is intermingled with three of these domestic‐level variables: regime vulnerability, social cohesion, and elite consensus. The Chinese Communist Party is anxious about preserving its position in power, its authoritative state‐model and control over Chinese territory. Maintaining its political power and the regime is therefore the state’s priority in all its affairs. The regime is vulnerable to both external and internal pressure to reform, and to cultural and political fragmentation within its large, diverse population. It therefore utilises nationalism to strengthen the 9 social cohesion by promoting a joint cause and identity from which it can draw its legitimacy. The Party also uses nationalism to strengthen elite consensus by defining a shared perception within the Party of what the problems are and what ends should be pursued, in what ways, and with what means. When examining nationalism as an intervening variable, this thesis therefore analyses to what extent nationalism constrains the regime’s perception of what the problems are, their definition of the ends required, and their preferences for ways of pursuing them and means to use. Criticism of neoclassical realism A main criticism of neoclassical realism is that it lacks a clear analytical framework for analysing the domestic level and how the variables intervene with the international level variables. As this chapter discussed earlier, there are different theories on which domestic level variables to include, but they do not point out which variables play the most important roles. The various intervening variables lack generalizability and therefore require an ad‐hoc method when choosing and employing them (He, 2006, pp. 7‐9). In comparison to other theories that have their strengths in being simple and universal to apply, such as classical realism, neoclassical realism present a complex list of variables that, as some would argue, may not explain more about a state’s behaviour. Another problem with the two‐level analysis is that it assumes that the domestic and international variables are easily separable and can be treated in an additive or linear manner. As Benjamin Fordham argues in The limits of neoclassical realism: ‘The nature of international threats is determined to a great extent by the interests of the domestic coalition that governs the state, and domestic political and economic interests are affected by international circumstances’ (Fordham, 2009, p. 251). This argument can be extended into also considering that the variables at each level also affect one another, such as ‘relative capabilities’ that may shape ‘position’, or ‘nationalism’ that may be shaped by ‘elite consensus’. The interaction between variables must therefore be taken into account, which again requires an ad‐hoc method when structuring the analysis. It is out of the scope of this thesis to make a comprehensive analysis of all the domestic‐level variables and to asses to what extent each of them intervenes in China’s strategic choices. The analysis makes conclusions on how nationalism alone may constrain China’s strategies, which is then applied to two distinctly different case studies. However, when analysing nationalism it also necessary to take into account that nationalism as an intervening variable is inter‐linked to other factors such as international pressures, political stability, and regime security. Theory on nationalism There are several theories on nationalism with different views on whether it is, indeed, the cause or consequence of nation as well as the relative importance of culture, economic and politics, and how nationalism is defined by internal or external factors. They all agree, however, that nationalism claims that the ‘nation’ exists and should form the basis of the political order. Also, it is impossible to define a ‘nation‐state’ in objective terms without accepting the assumptions of nationalism. A nation‐state is therefore defined largely in terms of its self‐description and its exterior environment. A nation is formed over time as the consequence of historical processes. All nations have a history and while it is not necessarily completely factual, nor objective, it is perceived by all as part of the ’national 10 consciousness’ and how the nation understands itself. It is not only history that defines the nation. Social relations, language, and geography, for example, define people and where they belong. This creates an inherent understanding of ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’, and the geographical area that the people identify themselves with becomes a ‘territory’ (Grosby, 2005, pp. 7‐14). Nationalism can take form as ethnic or civic, it can be elite or popular, and it can strengthen or weaken an existing state (Breuilly, 2008, p. 404). This thesis examines how China’s elite utilises nationalism to strengthen the state by reinforcing the national sentiment. The starting point is therefore a ‘political nationalism’, which is based on the assumption that nationalism is not a given, but a social and political construction, and therefore also a phenomenon that is inseparably connected with the activities of the state, its political elite, and its institutions (Brass, 1991, pp. 13‐16). In order to be effective as an instrument, however, political nationalism has to have some basis in the national sentiment of the population. The interaction between political and popular nationalism therefore becomes a relevant parameter when determining how nationalism constrains policymaking. The variables within nationalism to be examined are therefore: how the elite define China and its national sentiment through historical narratives; how they utilise an ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ typology; how the nation defines its territory; and how political nationalism interacts with popular nationalism. 11 3 China and the international system In the neoclassical realist thinking the anarchic nature of the international system compels the state to be concerned with its own survival. The distribution of power among states presents the state with threats and opportunities and thereby shapes its foreign policies. It is assumed that the state desires to enhance its competitive advantage and probability of survival. The state does this both by influencing and by adapting to the system. The ways to achieve this can be through behaviour changing strategies, such as balancing or deterrence, and by achieving a position from where it can influence the norms of the international system. The principal means by which the state pursues these strategies are diplomatic, economic, and military. This chapter will briefly present the general trends in China’s strategic choices since the mid‐1990s and analyse the two international‐level variables: China’s relative capabilities and China’s position in the international system. Based on this, the chapter will make conclusions about which contingencies there are for China’s security strategies to achieve the ends of enhancing its competitive advantage. General trends in China’s behaviour in the international system Diplomatic Since the early 1990s, China has emerged as an active player in the international system. China has taken a less confrontational, more sophisticated and, at times, more constructive approach toward regional and global affairs. It has embraced international institutions and norms as a means to promote its own interests and even sought to shape parts of this system in limited ways (Fravel & Medeiros, 2003, p. 22). In 1998, China introduced a new security doctrine that has been significant to China’s diplomatic behaviour in the international system. This ‘New Security Concept’ emphasises Peaceful Coexistence 2 based on ‘mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect, non‐
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and resolution of conflicts through dialogue’ (Saunders, 2008, p. 131). Whereas China earlier was reluctant to participate in multilateral forums, it has notably increased its participation in both international institutions and regional forums. A significant example is how up 2
The concept is a reformulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which originate from an agreement between China and India over Tibet back in 1954. The principles were: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; Mutual non‐aggression against anyone; Mutual non‐interference in each other's internal affairs; Equality and mutual benefit; Peaceful co‐existence. 12 through the 1990s and 2000s China has developed strong links to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although not a member, China still takes active part in its various annual meetings and forums. China’s coexistence principles match well with the agreed norms of the so‐called ’ASEAN way‘ of diplomacy, which also emphasises sovereignty, non‐interference, quiet diplomacy, and mutual respect and tolerance (Dosch, 2004, p. 81). By giving ASEAN status equal to its partnership with other major powers, and by being willing to negotiate, for example, on regional security issues within its framework, China has offered some reassurance that it is pursuing peaceful coexistence (Saunders, 2008, p. 131). China’s engagement with the UN Security Council has also developed accordingly. Until the mid‐1990s, China would regularly abstain from voting for or against resolutions that authorised the use of force because it conflicted with the principles of sovereignty and non‐interference in the internal affairs of other countries. During the 2000s, however, China began to back these measures as well as increase its own participation in or support to peacekeeping operations both in the Asia‐Pacific and in Africa (Fravel & Medeiros, 2003, p. 27). Economic China’s growing economy and integration into the world economy has given it a significant source of power in the international system. China has, for example, become a key player in both the G20 meetings and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which gives it significant leverage to influence the international system. Integration into the world economy, however, has also made China dependent upon foreign direct investments. For example, China now depends heavily upon the US market for its exports, and Japan has become its most important source of imports followed by Taiwan, the US, South Korea, and Germany (Davison, 2004, pp. 55‐56). China is increasingly making use of its growing wealth in bilateral relations through economic cooperation and financial incentives. Even though China has not given up its claims to Taiwan, it now seems interested in seducing Taiwan with economic opportunities rather than military coercion (Fravel & Medeiros, 2003, p. 29). China is also actively engaged in a number of third world countries, where its investments and aid offered without political preconditions are much welcomed and give China prestige. Another significant aspect of China’s economy is its dependency on energy. China relies on coal for approximately 70% of its energy needs and is the largest consumer of coal in the world. Its dependency on oil is also increasing, but so are the other dynamic economies of Asia, which creates a natural competition for energy resources. China is therefore investing heavily in developing its capacity to extract energy resources and reducing its dependency on imported coal, oil, and gas. It is also investing in other countries’ developments of energy resources, such as oil drilling in Sudan (IHS Jane's, 2011). Military Another indicator of China behaving in accordance with its principles of peaceful coexistence is how it has shown restraint in its use of military force. On several issues, China has shown patience and moderation and made use of multilateral diplomacy and economic cooperation. Most significantly, China has with diplomatic means settled a number of territorial disputes that have historically caused tension with its neighbours. Through diplomacy, China has settled border conflicts with Kazakhstan, 13 Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, and in several of these disputes it has compromised and settled with retaining less than half of the contested territory (Fravel & Medeiros, 2003, p. 26). On the other hand, Chinese military expenditure has accelerated in the years following 1996 and increased nearly five‐fold by 2009 3. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was traditionally a large land force with limited offensive capability. Over the past decade, China has focused on modernising its military, which has included the development and procurement of modern weapon systems as well as the development of new war‐fighting doctrines and institutional reform to improve the professionalism and quality of personnel (Saunders, 2008, pp. 135‐6). Since the end of the Cold War, the PLA has been heavily focused on potential conflict scenarios with Taiwan, and therefore the development of amphibious capabilities to invade, subdue, and secure the island. In more recent years, however, the PLA has examined roles and capabilities with a broader focus such as peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and joint operations with other nations. The PLA has, however, also emphasised the development of power projection and area denial capabilities such as long‐range bombers, cruise missiles, anti‐ship ballistic missiles, and modern destroyers and submarines. These capabilities remain limited in both equipment and doctrine, but demonstrate an interest in protecting interests off the Chinese mainland (Cozad, 2009, pp. 289‐91). 100
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In recent years, the Chinese military has been increasingly employed internationally in non‐coercive roles, such as in UN peacekeeping operations and in military‐to‐military cooperation. For example, in 2008 China supported eleven UN missions and ranked as the second largest contributor among the permanent members of the Security Council (Gill & Huang, 2009, p. 108). China has also been conducting multinational exercises with neighbouring countries’ armies, including major air‐land‐sea 3
It should be noted that the percentage of the gross domestic product has remained stable around 2% the past decade, which is comparable to that of France or Australia and only half of that of the US. 14 exercises with Russia and counterterrorism operations within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In 2007, China proposed the idea of holding multilateral military exercises with the ASEAN countries and a Chinese frigate participated in a naval exercise hosted by Singapore (IHS Jane's, 2010). Under the current PLA policy called ’exchange programmes with friendly militaries‘, China has also established stronger ties with South American armies through bilateral agreements with Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, and Peru on various arms sales and military cooperation (IHS Jane's, 2007). Variables at the international level Relative capabilities Over the past two decades China has significantly strengthened its diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities. This effort has consolidated China’s status as a great power capable of influencing its exterior environment and promoting or defending its interests through balancing, deterrence and incentives. The most significant rivals to China in its region are Russia, India, and Japan (with whom it is competing over energy resources and historically has had or still has several territorial disputes). While China’s economic cooperation with all of these countries has developed, they are still very different in their state structures, and traditional security issues still exist. The US also has a strong influence in the region and is a significant partner to Japan, India, and several other countries. While the US is also an important economic partner to China, it does not eliminate the rivalry in Sino‐Indian or Sino‐Japanese relations. The US alliance system provides a security framework that has made the region around China stable, but also restrains China from pursuing coercive tactics or even using force in bilateral relations. China, however, is well‐balanced against Russia, whom it has made a strategic partner on both economic and security issues in their joint border areas, and they share the interest of keeping out US influence and thus both promote multi‐polarity. This regional stability has enabled China to make short‐term trade‐offs in its military capabilities while still maintaining the necessary capability for defending against invasion. In this respect, China is adequately balanced against its neighbours and the US alliance system. China’s sea lines of communication, however, are vulnerable and vital to its trade and energy supply. In times of crisis, blocking these lines could be used to coerce China; the US alliance system has this capability and therefore restrains China’s freedom of action. Now that China’s economy is growing, it is investing heavily in increasing its military capability, which suggests that China is beginning to attempt to balance against the US alliance system’s capability in the Asia‐Pacific. As for economic capabilities, China’s dependence on the Japanese, American, and other markets also restrains it from attempting to make decisive changes in the balance of power. Furthermore, China’s economic capabilities are dependent on strategic resources, and in particular energy such as coal, oil, and gas. China is not fully self‐sufficient, but relies on imports of these resources, most of which are transported by sea. Increasing dependency on energy imports, rising oil prices and general competition for fossil fuels is therefore an increasing concern for China. It has strengthened its cooperation on energy in the SCO and is developing its own infrastructures, thereby not only strengthening its position through the SCO, but also increasing its own capabilities. It is also investing in energy infrastructures in the third world, likewise strengthening its position there, while reducing its dependency on, for 15 example, the US or the Middle East. These investments suggest that part of China’s security strategy is to reduce its dependency on energy imports by spreading the risk over more suppliers so that energy supply cannot be used to coerce it. Position Influence on international agendas While relative capabilities give material advantages and are a significant source of power, so is a state’s position in the international system. An advantageous position gives access to, for example, shaping the rules and the norms of the system, thereby creating more favourable conditions for one’s own existence. Over the past two decades, China has significantly strengthened its position in the international system through the use of diplomacy, its economic capability, and even military diplomacy. Through its active involvement in various global and regional institutions, China has increased its influence on agenda‐setting in the international system. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is in a significant position to influence the global agenda either by proposing, supporting or opposing decisions. In the realist perspective, China is using this influence to promote or protect its own interests. In the Security Council, China has used its veto to oppose decisions on very few occasions; however it has regularly abstained from voting on a number of resolutions. China’s membership in the WTO has increased its access to foreign markets – particularly in the US – thus further promoting its own economic growth. Its cooperation with ASEAN has made it possible to promote its interests within regional trade and security. Another example is China’s initiative to establish the SCO to settle long‐standing territorial disputes and to demilitarise the borders on its north‐western frontier. China is using the SCO to promote its interests within security and trade, and the SCO now emphasises cooperation on counter‐terrorism and regional trade (Fravel & Medeiros, 2003, p. 25). All these can be seen as examples to how China is strengthening its position in the international system, through diplomacy, economic and military cooperation, which gives it access to influencing, at times even setting, the agenda in its own interests. Prestige and legitimacy Much of China’s access to influential positions, as seen above, is based on its increasing capabilities. Prestige and legitimacy are equally important when utilising a position to influence the behaviour of other states. Prestige is gained through conduct in the international system or by having an advantage that is attractive to others, such as a state‐model that other countries desire to copy or an alliance system that they want to join. Legitimacy is gained through complying with the norms in the international system, whether they have been defined in treaties, set forth by international institutions, or are merely considered common practice. China has generally conducted itself peacefully and with restraint since the mid‐1990s, and it has increasingly been complying with the norms in the international system. It has gained much prestige by introducing and maintaining its peaceful coexistence doctrine as well as by its willingness to engage constructively in multilateral negotiations and support UN peacekeeping operations. China emphasises the principles of sovereignty and non‐intervention, which are also the basis of the UN Charter, even though it can be argued that China does this in order to hedge against outside criticism of its own regime. 16 In response to international criticism, particularly a mounting pressure from the US and Japan, China agreed in 2007 to take part in the UN Budget Transparency System. The following years, however, China only reported the minimum information required by the UN. Much secrecy remains surrounding its total military figures, which the US Defense Department estimates to be twice as much as the official budget declares (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). In this case, it appears that China is doing the minimum necessary to uphold its legitimacy on other issues, even though it may weaken its prestige. China does not have a state‐model that is attractive to the first world. Its authoritative regime, communist label, and repression of human rights are continuously criticised, which undermines both its prestige and legitimacy. On the other hand, China enjoys great prestige among several third world countries, partly because, as opposed to the first world, it makes investments and gives financial aid without political preconditions. China has also risen out of poverty while maintaining an authoritative regime, which can be an attractive model to many developing countries that are not keen on reforming to the state‐models provided by the West. China cannot present its region with an alternative alliance system to that of the US. The SCO may serve to balance against Russian or US influence in Central Asia, but it is limited to this particular region. The participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and its counterpart, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific, gives China influence on the security agenda, but the forums are tied in with the US, Japan, and other countries of the US alliance system. As prestige and legitimacy influence how strong a position China holds in its international affairs, it appears that China may be relatively weak in comparison to first world powers. In affairs where China does not have economic or military leverage, it may therefore mean that it will have difficulties influencing other states to support its own interests. Contingencies for China’s security strategies The neoclassical realist presumption is that China will seek to expand its influence regionally and globally. This prediction is very much in line with the general trends over the past two decades. China is benefitting from the existing world order and its current position as the regional stability and economic possibilities have perhaps never been more favourable. However, China is also restrained, particularly by the US alliance system, and in order to ensure its own freedom of action and survival it will, at a minimum, need to balance against this by strengthening both its capabilities and its position. China is already increasing its capabilities to balance against the US alliance system in the region while also mitigating its vulnerabilities in energy security. Nonetheless, if China uses coercive means in its claims for Taiwan or in territorial disputes, or if human rights are violated within its own borders in order to keep the regime in power, it will undermine further its legitimacy and prestige. Such setbacks can weaken its position to influence other states and restrain its economic development, and will therefore jeopardise its ability to balance against the US alliance system. As challenging the distribution of power with coercive means or force will only lead to a weakened position, China will therefore have to seek other ways of strengthening its position. There appears to be two overall strategies that China can pursue to achieve a stronger position, at least in Asia and the Asia‐
Pacific region. 17 In the first strategy, China could pursue the ends of becoming the most important partner to the US in its region – instead of Japan or India. China would thereby be the regional power in concert with the US and able to exert influence over other powers either through cooperation or coercion. The ways for achieving this would be to increase its prestige and legitimacy by complying fully with international norms and promoting cooperation and partnerships on, for example, trade, energy, and security. The means necessary would be military force projection capabilities, particularly for peacekeeping operations, and economic inter‐dependencies and energy cooperation. In the second strategy, China could instead seek to slowly erode the position of other powers in regional affairs and promote multi‐polarity over time. China would thereby remain reasonably influential in regional as well as global affairs, while others would be in a weaker position to set an agenda that works against the interests of China. The ways for achieving this would be to maintain the minimum necessary legitimacy and prestige, while emphasising the flaws of others. It would also be to promote the differences in norms and cultures, and the notion that the Chinese way may be as good as any other. The means necessary would be military force projection capabilities that can deter the US alliance system from coercing it, and to create economic dependencies in its own favour while reducing its dependencies on others. 18 4 Nationalism This chapter first examines what ideas and values (or ideology and philosophy) define Chinese nationalism and what political narratives it derives from history’s myths and legends of the people’s collective struggles. It also examines how Chinese nationalism defines its ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ typology, particularly in relation to ethnic minorities, Japan and the Western world, as well as how it defines the territory the people feels belongs to its nation. The chapter then examines how the Chinese elite, or regime, traditionally has used nationalism as an instrument to control the people, how it uses nationalism today and how it interacts with the popular nationalism. The shaping of China’s national sentiment The Dynasties and the People’s Republic of China China’s history is over 5000 years long and contains recorded and verifiable dates that go back as far as the ninth century BC. The Chinese have almost consistently recorded their history in great chronological detail, where the focus has been mainly on the greatness of the dynasties and important figures, but with little detail about economy or political intrigue (Keay, 2009, pp. 15, 21). Over the past millennia, and through several dynasties, the Chinese empire grew in size and population, claiming territories around it through military conquest. At the height of the last ruling dynasty, the Qing Dynasty from 1622 to 1912, China’s borders expanded into current day Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and included most of Mongolia. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Qing Dynasty was struggling with rebellions and wars, and was losing territory and control over regions. After the Opium Wars (1839‐42 and 1856‐60), also known as the Anglo‐Chinese Wars, the Qing Dynasty was forced into opening China’s trade ports to the West, legalising opium trade, and establishing free religion. The peace treaties after these wars later became known as the ‘unequal treaties’ in Chinese history. Towards the end of the century, the Qing Dynasty also suffered a humiliating defeat to Japan in the First Sino‐Japanese War (1894‐95), which consolidated Japan as the new regional great power. 19 Figure 3: China's border under the Qing Dynasty in 1820 Open source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Qing_China_1820.png#globalusage The defeats and territorial losses, or ‘foreign encroachment’, made foreign resentment and agitation grow and undermined the legitimacy of the regime. It culminated in the Boxer Rebellion against foreigners, then the Xinhai Revolution, and consequently the fall of the Dynasty in 1912. The Qing Dynasty was succeeded by the Republic of China, which was later thrown into the Second Sino‐Japanese War (1937‐1945) in which Japan invaded and seized control of the eastern part of China. In the Chinese language, this war is commonly known as the ‘War of Resistance’ against Japan as local Chinese resistance forces played a significant role in disrupting Japanese activities in the occupied territories. Much of this resistance was formed by irregular Communist armies among which was PLA that had since 1927 fought in the countryside under Mao Zedong for a Marxist revolution. After the war, the Communist Party and PLA continued fighting for revolution until the People’s Republic of China was officially proclaimed in 1949. The Nationalist government fled to Taiwan and continued to rule the Republic of China from there (Keay, 2009, pp. 506‐7, 515‐6), while the new communist state, the People’s Republic of China, was not recognised by the UN. The Republic of China, in Taiwan, remained the ‘official’ China in the UN, and retained the permanent membership of the Security Council. In 1971, the Republic of China was replaced in the UN by the People’s Republic of China, which was supported by US President Nixon in a balancing act against the Soviet Union (Dosch, 2004, p. 52). Political Instability and Regime Insecurity Up until the end of the Cold War, the communist regime faced increased political instability as a consequence of the difficulties of the past decades. In the 1950s and 1960s, Mao launched an ambitious 20 economic development programme called the ‘Great Leap Forward’. It failed to produce the economic growth it had envisioned and left millions of people in poverty and starvation. In order to root out the rising political opposition of the late 1960s, Mao started the ‘Cultural Revolution’ – a movement meant to consolidate socialism and remove capitalist elements. It resulted in millions of people being persecuted or forcibly displaced to rural areas as well as the destruction of historical and cultural relics. The regime had been facing revolts in Tibet and regular political unrest in other regions since the late 1950s, and these continued to grow. The culmination point was in 1989, when a series of week‐long demonstrations in Beijing, that were spreading to other cities in China, were eventually countered with force at Tiananmen Square. In the post‐Cold War years the Communist Party was under pressure both from the outside and the inside to reform to democratic and liberal values. The Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideologies were gradually losing their abilities to legitimate the communist rule, particularly as China was also beginning to implement market‐oriented economic reforms undercutting the claim that China was a socialist country. The Communist Party began to stake its legitimacy through economic growth bolstered by selective use of nationalism and political repression. The economic growth has been successful but paradoxically its consequences have presented new challenges more difficult to control. Steadily improving incomes and exposure to global media have led to increasing demands for better welfare and freedom of speech. The economic growth has also caused a significant and increasing wealth gap between rural and urban populations, causing a massive rural‐urban migration and creating social tension. Increased corruption within the Party and state administration, and especially among local officials, has resulted in a series of public protests undermining the regime legitimacy. Altogether, it has weakened central control over the provinces and strengthened regionalisation, which has led to fears of fragmentation and concerns for regime security within the central government (IHS Jane's, 2011). The ‘Us vis­à­vis Others’ in Chinese nationalism The Chinese and the barbarians For more than 2000 years and up throughout the Qing era, a Chinese national sentiment, also called ‘traditional culturalism’, dominated the Chinese approach to foreign relations. This culturalism was based on the assumption that Chinese culture was supreme and China was the centre of the universe (Zhimin, 2005, p. 38). It also made a clear distinction between Chinese and non‐Chinese on which Chen Zhimin writes: As the twentieth century Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan observed, ‘what the Chinese were always concerned
about was the continuation and integrity of the Chinese culture and civilization. . . from the early Qin dynasty
onwards, Chinese had clearly made a distinction between the “China”, or “Huaxia”, with the “Barbarians (Yidi)”’. Feng
argued that ‘such a distinction was made according to a cultural criteria rather than racial differences’ [quotes from
Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue jianshi (A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy) (Beijing: Beijing daxue
chubanshe, 1985), pp. 211–222.] (Zhimin, 2005, p. 36)
What is particular about this is the ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ typology of Chinese and ‘barbarians’ – a view forged through thousands of years of wars against barbarian tribes surrounding China. It did not regard the borders between the Chinese and barbarians as fixed, as Chinese civilisation was expanding. When barbarians adopted Chinese culture, they became Chinese (Zhimin, 2005, p. 37) – a view distinctly different from the race criterion that has dominated many Western cultures. 21 Western encroachment and anti­Japanese sentiment In the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, the traditional culturalism came under pressure from Western powers and then Japan. The ‘new barbarians from the sea’ not only defeated the Qing militarily, but also attacked the foundation of Chinese culture. China was no longer the centre of the universe, but had become partly colonised and heavily influenced by European culture (Zhimin, 2005, p. 38). In response, the succeeding regime, the Republic of China, used nationalism in an attempt to gather the Chinese nationalities around the superior Chinese culture. It had an anti‐imperialistic agenda of reducing the privileges enjoyed by foreign powers in China while increasing the diplomatic status of China in the international system of the time. The regime lost its monopoly on nationalism when it failed to repel the Japanese invasion of the Second Sino‐Japanese War. Mao Zedong responded by immediately raising the anti‐Japanese banner and the Communist Party’s short‐term mission became ‘to make China an independent, free and territorially‐integrated state’ (Zhimin, 2005, p. 40). He continued utilising political nationalism to rally the Chinese people, though it was under the name of ‘patriotism’, which contained strong elements of Marxist thinking and class struggle among nations. Even today, the national sentiment is still imbued with the Marxist ideas, or Mao’s ideas, of class struggle in the international system, where China is the weak power that must struggle against encroachment from an imperialistic outside world, which is represented by the first world. The relationship between China and Japan in a nationalist perspective also requires particular attention. The two Sino‐Japanese wars were not only a humiliation to China, but the occupation in the late 1930s also resulted in severe atrocities upon the Chinese population including massacres of millions of civilians (Keay, 2009, p. 513). As stated above, the Communist Party mobilised the masses against the Japanese occupation, and the Party and the army therefore played a significant part in resisting the Japanese occupation and liberating China. In contemporary Chinese nationalism and political discourse these two themes have become key points: the Japanese atrocities and how the Communists resisted and defeated the invasion. Japan is therefore depicted as the evil ‘others’, whom China must remain wary of, and both the Party and the PLA utilise this to support their continuing authority. Anti‐Western and anti‐Japanese sentiment is noticeable in present day political discourse, even in international affairs. Occasionally, the regime will overtly criticise Western capitalism or Japan’s imperialistic past. However, in the case of Japan, the anti‐Japanese discourse is a more recent phenomenon. During the Cold War, in the 1970s and 1980s when both China and Japan perceived the Soviet Union as the main threat, the Chinese regime did not often assume a strong anti‐Japanese posture or demand concessions for the war atrocities (Samuels, 2007, pp. 136‐7). The definition of territory in Chinese nationalism In today’s political discourse the term ‘Greater China’ is frequently used. It contains great ambiguity, as it can mean both a bigger China or a better China – or both (Callahan, 2005, p. 272). It refers to Chinese civilisation as a superior concept and geographically it is often related to the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty. Contemporary Chinese history texts state the glories of Chinese civilisation and its long history. The history also recounts how sovereignty was lost, territory dismembered and the Chinese people humiliated in what is called the ‘Century of National Humiliation’ (Callahan, 2005, p. 278). The narrative is both cultural and political. Culturally, it tells a story of victimisation, over which Chinese culture prevailed, and is closely linked with the ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ typology. Politically, the narrative sets the 22 long‐term objectives of reuniting the lost territories under the current leadership and avenging the humiliation (Callahan, 2005, p. 278). When China today makes claims to territories, it does this with reference to the boundaries of the Qing Dynasty. While internationally making such claims is uncommon practice, they are domestically met with a strong feeling of righteousness, because the territories were stolen from China due to encroachment and ‘unequal treaties’. The notion of the vast territory and conversion of the ‘barbarians’ implies that the nation’s success rests upon the ability to keep the provinces together, despite being under constant attack by barbarians. ‘Separatism’ is therefore perceived as the main cause of instability and has to be rooted out (Hughes, 2006, p. 123). The Communist Party’s nationalist agenda of unity and independence is therefore not only aimed at, for example, reuniting Taiwan with China, but also at maintaining control over frontier areas with ethnic unrest, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. The national sentiment of Greater China gives the Chinese people a mission and a sense of purpose: to reinstall China to its former greatness while always guarding its cultural, political, and territorial sovereignty against threats from the outside and within. The nationalist political agenda When Deng Xiaoping (in office from 1978 to 1992) assumed leadership of China, he reformed China towards ‘socialist market economy’ while using political nationalism as an instrument for unifying the nation. Many of Deng’s theories still form the basis of much of today’s political nationalism. Deng linked the task of national unification with ‘reform and opening’. He argued that ‘any compromise on the issue of national unification will imply that China has not actually achieved independence’ and appealed to ‘all descendants of the Chinese nation in the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and among the overseas Chinese to “struggle together”’. But Deng also downplayed the existence of internal ethnic problems, emphasising that with only 8% of the Chinese population being non‐Han, China was free of ethnic friction. Deng pursued a market‐oriented strategy under socialism to win over the unruly provinces, while maintaining the ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ as the means to ‘prevent “contradictions” between nationalities, regions, classes and central and local governments from leading to social polarisation’ (Hughes, 2006, pp. 122‐3). Since the late 1980s, the regime has therefore utilised economic growth to legitimate itself, while political repression and an ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ typology have maintained a tight control over the many differences among the Han‐Chinese. It has, however, also effectively disenfranchised non‐Han populations – particularly in provinces like Tibet and Xinjiang. Today, the Chinese Communist Party’s three key nationalist agendas are: economic development, national unity and independence, and greater international status. Economic development is the key to realising other national missions, and by being internationally oriented it has facilitated a greater international status. It has also ‘secured the smooth turnover of Hong Kong and Macao, and raised the economic cost of Taiwan independence, thus greatly serving the course of national unification’ (Zhimin, 2005, p. 52). China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation, the hosting of the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo all brand China and Chinese culture both nationally and globally. By raising national pride at home it restores the national sentiment of being, if not the superior culture, then at least a world culture equal to that of any other. 23 An expression often used is ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. The term originates from Deng Xiaoping and is still used, for example, in the Constitution of the Communist Party: The Communist Party of China is the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and the
Chinese nation. It is the core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the
development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The realization of communism is the
highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party.
[…] The highest ideal of communism pursued by the Chinese Communists can be realized only when the socialist
society is fully developed and highly advanced. The development and improvement of the socialist system is a long
historical process. So long as the Chinese Communists uphold the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and follow the
road suited to China's specific conditions and chosen by the Chinese people of their own accord, the socialist cause
in China will be crowned with final victory. (CCP, 2007, p. 1)
The Constitution draws legitimacy from a long historical struggle and the principles of Marxism and Mao’s global class struggle. It is an example of how the Chinese see their present day struggle as a continuation of history, and how the Party stages itself and the communist ideology as the core of the Chinese nation. Arguably, the necessity for maintaining the communist ideology is not only an agenda for keeping itself in power, but also a genuine belief and respect for China’s history within the political elite. After all, abandoning the communist idea would dishonour the millions of people who, since the struggle of resistance against Japanese occupation, have sacrificed their lives for the cause. The rise of popular nationalism A political nationalism, which is largely directed by the political elite, has to appeal to the majority of the population. While the Communist Party has generally been able to decide the content and political agenda of Chinese nationalism, and adjust it according to national policy needs, there still appears to be a significant ‘bottom‐up form of nationalism’ (Zhimin, 2005, p. 50). The popular nationalism influences the political elite, and vice versa, and therefore it is the interaction between political elite and popular nationalists that, as a whole, influences China’s security strategies. There are different trends within the popular nationalism ranging from traditional views on Chinese tradition and philosophy and their function in maintaining order, to neo‐conservative views that emphasise strong state control based on the values of the traditional culturalism, to an anti‐Western sentiment that ‘put[s] forward a nationalistic and robust view of China’s foreign relations’ (Zhimin, 2005, p. 50). Aside from these nationalists that either out of pragmatism contend with or actively promote the regime’s nationalist agendas, there are also nationalists who hold human rights and democratic values at the core. These believe that the glory of the Greater China is best pursued by liberating people’s minds and safeguarding ‘the country’s integrity through recognition of the integrity of each individual and ethnic group’ (Jianli, 2008). The latter human‐rights oriented nationalists are, however, those in direct opposition to the elite’s political agenda and therefore often oppressed and with little influence on policies. The anti‐Western nationalists are perhaps the most significant in relation to the political nationalism. It is also called ‘Say No’ism’ with reference to a nationalist book published in 1996, shortly after the military confrontation with the US in the Taiwan Strait. China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post‐Cold War Era became a bestseller in China, and it urged the government to just ‘Say 24 No’ in relations with the US and Japan (Zhimin, 2005, p. 51). More publications within the Say No’ism movement followed in the years after, and on several occasions there have been anti‐Western and particularly anti‐Japanese, demonstrations in response to events abroad and in acts of foreign policy. An example of this was when, in April 2005, an outburst of anti‐Japanese sentiment turned into nationwide demonstrations and attacks on Japanese consulates, restaurants, shops, and cars. This unrest was in response both to new school textbooks in Japan, which supposedly glossed over the wartime atrocities, and to Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. While some argue that anti‐Western demonstrations may have been instigated by the political elite, there are also indications of repressive measures being taken to prevent these demonstrations. Such measures were taken when the Japanese Foreign Minister visited Beijing the month after the demonstrations in April 2005 (Hughes, 2006, pp. 151‐2). Conclusions Nationalism and domestic political stability Economic growth has given credibility to the regime’s performance, but has also created a wealth gap between urban and rural populations and caused corruption among local government officials. The economic growth has opened up China to the West, increasing the number of, for example, Japanese and American owned companies within China. Altogether, it is a turn away from both the communist ideology and the safeguarding against Western ‘encroachment’, which brings the legitimacy of the regime into question. The political elite therefore also derive their legitimacy from nationalism to create a collective idea that prevails over other issues. The narrative is therefore that it was the Communist Party and the PLA that liberated China from Japanese occupation and led a weakened China towards a new uprising in an unequal world. Communism is not abandoned, but it is a model that is unique to China and which is independent from Westernised democracy. The authoritative regime is necessary if economic growth and wealth for the people is to continue without compromising territorial integrity or Chinese culture. The political nationalism instils a sense of purpose in the struggle to restore China to its former greatness in the modern world, while placing the party at the centre. Chinese history is a narrative of a superior and independent Chinese culture as well as a territory that has continuously been under threat by ‘barbarians’. Separatism is seen as one of the evils that threatens Chinese sovereignty. In the Chinese tradition, the always present threats of political and ethnic unrest call for central control. This sentiment suggests a low tolerance for separatism and demands security strategies that will use hard measures to suppress unrest. In the Chinese traditional thinking, however, ‘barbarians’ can be converted. By adopting Chinese culture they become Chinese. It is therefore not a national sentiment that calls for genocide or displacement of non‐Chinese, but for assimilation. This sentiment calls for strategies that seek to win over non‐Chinese people living on Chinese territory with the aim of creating cultural homogeneity in the population – and not for embracing different cultures. 25 Nationalism as an intervening variable in international strategies The influence of Chinese nationalism at the system‐level can be seen as a double‐edged sword. It is not a nationalism that calls for world revolution, but seeks mainly to maintain internal order and the current regime. This is partly done with reference to a history of greatness, victimization and uprising, and partly by identifying threats to Chinese sovereignty that can ‘rally the people around the flag’ and legitimate tight political control. The mission of restoring greatness and reuniting China gives this sense of purpose, but if pursued aggressively, it could cause a direct threat to regional security – particularly if it also develops into an agenda of avenging past humiliation. Since the stance with the US over Taiwan in 1996, the Chinese regime has been careful to balance reunification with its regional security strategies – seeking and reassuring of peaceful coexistence – while putting more emphasis on achieving greater international status. Possessing greater international status, and appealing to Chinese nationals abroad, can also be a way to, over time, reunite China. Although the elite exert overall control of the nationalist discourse, the rise of popular nationalism suggests that it cannot monopolise it. The regime may desire to pursue strategies of friendly cooperation with the West in order to strengthen its international position. However, if such moves are met with public unrest due to popular anti‐Western or anti‐Japanese nationalism, it could threaten political stability and thereby regime security. This suggests that policy‐makers will, to some extent, remain restrained in their approach to the West and Japan, or will have to maintain secrecy around agreements made on affairs that compromise the nationalist agenda. 26 5 Nationalism and security strategies for Xinjiang The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is China’s most westerly region, bordering Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Mongolia. The region has long been marked by separatist movements and clashes, mainly between the largest ethnic group, the Muslim, Turkic‐
speaking Uighurs, and the Han‐Chinese. The Chinese security strategies aimed at maintaining control of Xinjiang are not only domestic strategies, but are also supported by regional security strategies as well as foreign policies at the global level. This chapter examines how nationalism influences these strategies by constraining them to particular ends, ways, and means. The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the historical background of Xinjiang and its strategic importance today for China’s power capabilities in the international system. It then examines the political instability of the region and the security strategies that China, in response, has employed both domestically and internationally. Finally, the chapter examines how nationalism constrains the security strategies by using the conclusions from the analysis of Chinese nationalism. Xinjiang until the end of the Cold War The area of today’s Xinjiang has been dominated by the Chinese dynasties since more than 2000 years ago in their efforts to secure the Silk Road. Parts of the area were under protectorate in the fifth and sixth centuries in order to pacify the barbarians in the west, but were later lost to Turkic tribes in the tenth century. Over the following centuries the area was contested by other empires, including the Mongols. The Chinese military conquests from 1620 to 1760 against the Mongols extended into the regions of today’s Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Tibet and Xinjiang, which came under the rule of the Qing Dynasty. The regions then were known to the Chinese merely as the ‘the Western Regions’. The name Xinjiang, meaning ‘the New Territories’, was given when it became a province under Qing rule (Keay, 2009, pp. 12; 262‐5; 437‐41). In the early 1930s, insurgencies broke out in the region among Turkic and Muslim Hui‐Chinese groups. In 1933, they proclaimed the East Turkistan Republic in south‐western Xinjiang. The Turkic army, however, was destroyed the year after by units from the Chinese National Revolutionary Army and in 1937 the region was invaded by the Soviet Army. The following years, Xinjiang was ruled by a Chinese warlord backed by the Soviets. A second East Turkistan Republic rose from insurgency in 1944, this time in three northern districts of Xinjiang backed by the Soviet Union. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the new communist regime strived to exert sovereignty over the old Qing territory. The PLA ‘liberated’ Xinjiang in 1949 and re‐established it as a Chinese province. In the years after, the 27 province was settled by disbanded PLA personnel to prevent the Soviet Union from seizing control of the area again (Fravel, 2008, pp. 42‐3). During the Cold War, Xinjiang served mainly as China’s buffer zone towards Russia. In the early 1950s, the province lacked political institutions through which the central government could exert its power. It was largely isolated from central China due to little infrastructure and the long borders to the neighbouring Soviet states were thinly guarded. Culturally, politically, and economically Xinjiang had more relations to its neighbouring countries that to the rest of China and a great part of its population was Soviet Union citizens, many of which were Kazakhs and Muslims. Following the failure of the ‘Great Leap’ in the early 1960s, large numbers of Kazakhs began to flee to the Soviet Union. This caused the failure of crops from abandoned farmland, the loss of thousands of livestock and led to demonstrations and general unrest in the province. China blamed the Soviet Union for instigating this large‐scale migration and attempting to destabilise the western regions of China. In order to consolidate its authority, China therefore moved to strengthen the borders by establishing the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. This corps was a paramilitary organisation that established agricultural farms and industry while serving as a police and border control force. In order to reduce the regional tension with the neighbouring countries, China began to settle the disputes over the delineation of the borders, first with Mongolia and later with the Soviet Union (Fravel, 2008, pp. 101‐5). The history of the area and the peoples of today’s Xinjiang are marked by changing powers, occupation by a far‐away central government, and a struggle for autonomy by different ethnicities. For the first dynasties, controlling Xinjiang was a matter of protecting the core of China and securing trade routes. For the People’s Republic of China, controlling Xinjiang became a matter of re‐establishing the territory of the Greater China as part of their nationalist agenda, but, it was also an area of strategic interest to defend the country on its western frontier. But despite the Communist Party’s nationalist agenda, concerns over internal stability took priority in the 1960s, and China compromised greatly in order to reach settlements over the border disputes with its neighbours. As Taylor Fravel puts it: ‘Whatever territorial gains China sought in this region paled in comparison to the challenge of maintaining internal control over a restive ethnic minority population far from Beijing.’ (Fravel, 2008, p. 104) Xinjiang’s strategic importance to China today Relative Capabilities In the mid‐twentieth century, Xinjiang was of little economic importance to China and served mainly as the strategic buffer zone to the west. Until the end of the Cold War, Xinjiang was generally an underdeveloped and thinly populated region with little industry and infrastructure. In the 2000s, the economic investments and discovery of large oil and gas reserves have made it significant to China’s regional trade and energy security. Since 2002, China has extended the network of pipelines linking the region’s fields and refineries to Shanghai and abroad to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Eventually, this infrastructure will link China to Central Asia all the way to the Caspian Sea. In 2007, Xinjiang had become China’s primary source of energy, comprising a third of its total oil and gas resources and 40% of its coal resources (IHS Jane's, 2010). Aside from strengthening the economy, Xinjiang makes China less dependent on overseas deliveries. China thereby becomes less vulnerable both to changes in energy prices or blockade of its sea lines of communication in case of conflict. 28 As during the Cold War, Xinjiang’s geography is still a strategic buffer zone to the west – not only against Russia, but now also against the current US military presence in the region. The quality and numbers of PLA forces in the area continue to be increased. Eight new airbases have been built or enhanced and the development of Xinjiang’s southern railway network can now support large‐scale military movements from central China to the western frontier (IHS Jane's, 2010). The new military infrastructure in Xinjiang therefore makes it possible for China to counter a build‐up of US air forces in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan, and to build up land and air forces at the border to India with whom China still has border disputes. This enables China to balance against any potential adversary in the region in case of a crisis situation, and Xinjiang has thereby again become an important strategic buffer zone. Position In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan were struggling to consolidate their independence while still being weak in military and diplomatic capabilities. This could have been an opportunity for China to regain some of the territory it claims on its western border – a total area of about 34,500 square kilometres. Instead, China offered concessions in a total of thirteen disputes and signed boundary agreements with all three countries, securing only a total of about 3,000 square kilometres for itself (Fravel, 2008, pp. 47, 150‐1). The Chinese regime therefore did not pursue its nationalistic agenda of fully re‐establishing the territory of the Greater China, but compromised in order to focus on stability in the region and strengthen its diplomatic position. These compromises increased China’s prestige and set the conditions for further multilateral relations in the region. In 1996, China held meetings with the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which led to the creation of the Shanghai Five. The objective was to create confidence‐building measures in Central Asia and reduce military tension. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined, and the group became the SCO, which then also aimed to include cooperation on energy agreements (IHS Jane's, 2010). The energy network, increased trade and peaceful settlement of disputes with neighbouring countries have strengthened China’s position in Central Asian affairs, enabling it to influence the regional agenda on economic and security matters. Xinjiang’s resources and location have enabled China to take a lead position, or at a minimum a position equal to Russia’s, in Central Asian affairs. Political instability in Xinjiang today As the Soviet Union was falling apart, ethnic‐based separatist movements rose anew. In 1990, the Xinjiang government put new restrictions on the building of mosques, which triggered rioting with more than two thousand people calling for ‘holy war’, expulsion of Han‐Chinese, and the establishment of an East Turkestan state (Fravel, 2008, p. 152). Separatist movements, demonstrations, and violent riots have continued at regular intervals until the present day. The unrest affects political stability in the rest of China, and is presenting the most serious threat to the central control of the provinces and thereby challenging regime security itself. Root causes to political instability The Chinese government’s strategy for controlling unruly provinces has in summary, been to win over the discontented people with economic development. Economic development would improve the standard of living and integrate the ethnic groups into Chinese society and culture. Xinjiang is home to 29 several ethnic groups, where the majority of the population is Muslim Turkic peoples – including Uighurs as well as Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Tartars – but other ethnicities such as Mongols, Machus, Hui‐
Chinese, and Russians are also represented. Concurrent with the recent infrastructural development of Xinjiang, however, there has been a massive migration of Han‐Chinese to Xinjiang, whom the regime has encouraged westwards with economic opportunity and better tax rates. This has significantly changed the demography of the region and led to fears that Uighur culture is being overwhelmed by a flood of Han‐Chinese (IHS Jane's, 2010). Today, the ethnic division is estimated to be 45% Uighur, 40% Han‐
Chinese, and 15% others (BBC, 2010). The economic development and increased trade in Xinjiang have favoured mostly the Han‐Chinese population, causing a substantial economic gap between ethnicities. In 2007, some 80% of the Uighurs lived below the official poverty line, and the average income of urban inhabitants (mostly Han) was almost four times that of rural people (mostly Uighurs and other minorities). Access to running water, health care, social services and education differ substantially between ethnic groups, which again reinforces the social division between Han‐Chinese and indigenous Turkic populations (IHS Jane's, 2010). The Uighur population is a concern to the Chinese regime, because it generally prefers autonomy rather than assimilation into Chinese culture. Over the years, the regime has attempted to limit the development of cultural differences by restricting the building of mosques and cultural sites, prohibiting certain Muslim cultural organisations, and removing the Uighur language from the educational syllabi and official correspondence (IHS Jane's, 2010). As in Chinese nationalism, the Turkic populations may in their national sentiment believe that the territory belongs to them and desire autonomy free from Chinese rule. Aside from the national sentiment, however, economic and social differences, as well as cultural repression, may therefore also be considered to be some of the major root causes to the political instability in Xinjiang today. Ethnic violence and insurgency In response to the root causes, demonstrations, riots, and even acts of terrorism have occurred regularly in Xinjiang. Recently, in 2009, a factory brawl in Southern China caused the death of two Uighurs. This triggered bloody clashes in Xinjiang’s main city, Urumqi, between Uighurs and Han‐Chinese killing nearly 200 people. More than 1500 people were arrested in connection with the riots, and 12 were sentenced to death (BBC, 2010). Later that year, there was a series of 531 syringe attacks on civilian Han‐Chinese, which led to several days of demonstrations and the deaths of five people (IHS Jane's, 2010). Separate from the ethnic driven violence, there is also a growing separatist insurgency in Xinjiang. While small in scale, the insurgency has become more evident in its propaganda and anti‐regime activities. The propaganda is being driven abroad by the exiled Turkistan Islamic Party, and in 2009 Al‐Qaeda mentioned China as a target for the first time. Minor terrorist attacks have occurred within China’s borders over the past few years, including attacks on government buildings and officials and a failed attempt to sabotage a Chinese Southern Airlines plane in flight (IHS Jane's, 2010). Chinese authorities have generally responded to unrest in a direct and hard way. Police and military are often deployed in response to demonstrations, and it has been reported that they use hard‐handed methods and have fired on civilians (BBC, 2009). Following riots, hundreds of demonstrators are often 30 arrested, many given long prison sentences or even executed. The authorities have since 2001 employed an official ‘Strike Hard and Rectify’ campaign, and security crackdowns are frequently deployed by targeting known separatist and Turkic organisations (IHS Jane's, 2010). It can be argued that even though the hard‐handed methods reduce the immediate threat from violent elements, it also increases the general pressure on the Muslim Turkic populations thereby deepening the core grievances. Security strategies for countering political instability in Xinjiang As Xinjiang over the past decade has become important to China’s power in the international system, it has become increasingly important to maintain control of the province and contain separatist movements. Since the early 1990s, China has developed security strategies to counter political instability in Xinjiang at both the domestic and the regional level, and both levels are again affecting China’s overall foreign policies at the global level. Domestic strategies In the China Investigation Report 2000‐2001: Studies of Contradictions among the People under New Conditions, it was emphasised to the Communist Party that national and religious contradictions in Xinjiang were of the highest importance and had to be addressed comprehensively. The Party’s approach to the problems, however, still emphasises economic development and advancement of China’s culture. Religion is understood as the product of poverty and ignorance, which can be cured through economic development and more interaction with the outside world (Hughes, 2006, p. 124). The strategies of infrastructural and economic development as well as a flooding with Han‐Chinese migrants reflect this ideology very well. Local politics of the Xinjiang region are dominated by the Communist Party and no other political parties are permitted. The regional government and Party Committee are the primary governing institutions and work strictly in line with the central government. Most office holders are Han‐Chinese, and the few Uighurs who hold office are usually among the most assimilated and loyal to the regime (IHS Jane's, 2010). While the central government acknowledges the ethnic differences in the region, for example when promoting that Xinjiang is not merely a province but an autonomous region, these differences are not reflected in the ethnic representation in the regional government. China’s security forces, such as the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and even the PLA are some of the significant means in the domestic security strategies. It is particularly noteworthy how the PLA’s internal security mission has been emphasised over the past decade. In its ‘Historic Mission’ the first task is ‘providing a powerful guarantee to stabilize the Party’s grip on governance’ (Tanner, 2009, p. 40). In the past decade, the Party has issued several documents reminding the PLA of this mission. The 1996 Martial Law Law identifies the circumstances in which martial law will be declared – including turmoil, riots, and disturbances – as well as the PLA’s role in either supporting the police or enforcing martial law itself. Since 1998, China’s National Defence White Papers have gradually elaborated more on the domestic security situation and the related missions of the armed forces in general. The 2002 White Paper elaborates further on the armed forces commitment to supporting the regime’s development of China’s ‘restive western regions’ – a task that includes much more than traditional military operations, such as supporting forestation and infrastructure development programmes (Tanner, 2009, pp. 49‐52). 31 The 2006 White Paper defined religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and religious terrorism as the ‘Three Evil Forces’ threatening China’s security. Since then, the internal security has noticeably transformed the armed forces’ tasks, organisation, doctrine, and procurements. The mission of the PLA and the PAP in China’s ‘frontier security’ strategy has been extended from the traditional tasks of border control and defence against invasion to include counterterrorism operations and ‘support to local authorities’ efforts to promote and maintain social stability. The PLA has accordingly trained its various special operations groups, and the PAP has formed Special Police Units at the municipal level as well as an elite unit, the ‘Snow Leopards’, at the national level (Modarelli, 2009, pp. 132‐4, 147‐8). The partial transformation of the military’s mission and tasks are therefore in line with the official ‘Strike Hard’ campaign that has been employed over the past decade. Regional strategies By compromising its nationalist agenda of re‐establishing the borders of the Greater China, the Chinese regime established closer cooperation with the neighbouring countries to Xinjiang. The establishment of the Shanghai Five was an agreement that set out measures of military restraint and transparency along the mutual borders, and it was supported by bilateral agreements on frontier delineation, trade, and cooperation. When Uzbekistan joined in 2001, and the SCO was formed, the agenda, beside cooperation on energy, also promoted the cooperation on security matters ‐ namely the threat from terrorism and Islamic extremism from Turkic groups with the goal of establishing an East Turkestan anew (Odgaard, 2009, p. 182). The SCO has enabled China to reinforce its efforts in controlling Xinjiang by countering the threats at the regional level in cooperation with neighbouring countries, who also desire internal political stability, territorial integrity, and regime security. The agenda is not only in line with China’s National Security Concept, which stipulates peaceful coexistence, but also strengthens China’s position in the international system by balancing against, for example, Russian or US regional influence. It can be argued that the joint threat from separatism and terrorism has given China leverage to influence the region. Global strategies One of the main issues at the global level in relation to China’s employed means and methods in Xinjiang is that of human rights and the violation of these. The human rights issue delegitimises China’s authoritative regime in the international system and is regularly on the agenda in the UN and in bilateral relations with Western powers. In the international system, China therefore consistently applies hedging strategies to defend its legitimacy and preserve its freedom of action to employ its domestic strategies. During the riots in Xinjiang in 2009, the European Union (EU) worked closely with exiled Uighur groups, and afterwards the EU Human Rights Commission began an investigation. The European Parliament expressed its deep concern at the way Chinese authorities responded to the protests and over the lack of transparency in the following trials as well as the use of the death penalty. The Parliament also called for the Chinese authorities to ‘develop a genuine Han‐Uighur dialogue and adopt more inclusive and comprehensive economic policies in Xinjiang aimed at strengthening local ownership and to protect the cultural identity of the Uighur population’. The EU also noted that it is China’s biggest trading partner and investor and that ‘trade and economic relations have overshadowed the question of democratic reforms, respect for human rights and the rule of law’ (EU, 2009). Beijing was critical of what it called meddling in internal affairs, and during a press conference in November 2009, the Chinese Ministry of 32 Foreign Affairs demanded that ‘the European side stop making the same mistakes again and again, earnestly respect the principles of equality and mutual respect, and do more to benefit the healthy and stable development of China‐EU relations’ (IHS Jane's, 2010). However, neither the EU’s expression of concern or Beijing’s response have led to any changes in the trade between the two powers. In Sino‐American relations, the agenda has been somewhat different. Arguably, the US‐led ‘Global War on Terror’ has given some legitimacy to fighting terrorism with all means necessary. China has therefore not been hesitant to label separatist movements as religious (i.e. Islamic) extremists and terrorists. China is not only an important partner in trade, but also in the war on terrorism, and the events in Xinjiang remain a low priority for Washington (IHS Jane's, 2010). During the US president’s visit to the Chinese president in November 2009, Obama and Hu spoke frankly on issues such as human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan. Following the meeting, they released a joint statement reflecting the growing depth and breadth in Sino‐American relations. China was welcoming the US role in maintaining peace and security in the Asia‐Pacific, but most important for China was the sentence that read: ‘Respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in US‐China relations’. For China, ‘core interests’ refers to sovereignty, non‐interference, and territorial integrity such as in Xinjiang (IISS, 2010, p. 336). The two examples in bilateral relations following the 2009 events demonstrate how internal stability affects international relations, which China must hedge against in the international system. China utilises a discourse of the principles of sovereignty and non‐interference as well as terrorism to legitimate its domestic security strategies, while common economic and security interests give China significant leverage in bilateral relations. Nationalism in Xinjiang security strategies The ‘Us vis‐à‐vis Others’ typology in Chinese nationalism is linked to the narrative of China’s historical struggle of keeping barbarians out of China and the need for assimilating them into its superior culture. Another fundamental element in the national sentiment is that separatism and uprising are evils that threat Chinese sovereignty and therefore must be countered with tight, central control and rectification. The regime instils a popular sense of mission in re‐establishing the old borders of the Greater China, but it is a political instrument rather than a goal in itself. The regime therefore has to balance this nationalist agenda with its agendas in the international system, so that one thing does not undermine the other. Finally, the regime gains popular legitimacy by safeguarding China against ‘Western encroachment’, which historically has threatened China’s political system, culture, and sovereignty. All of these nationalist characteristics can be identified in the security strategies for Xinjiang. The Chinese and the ‘barbarians’ The economic development strategies have been a way of raising the living standard and making incentives for integration and assimilation. The strategies, however, have benefitted mainly the Han‐
Chinese, even changed the demography, and therefore marginalised the Uighurs and other ethnicities. Meanwhile, Uighur cultural sites and language have been restrained through government policies, and the non‐Han representation in the region’s government is limited to the few assimilated people, who are loyal to the Party. Altogether, it reflects the view that the non‐Han‐Chinese are merely inferior barbarians of the frontier areas, who must be controlled through resolute means. The long‐term 33 approach against the barbarians is to assimilate them into Chinese culture so that the differences that cause unrest disappear. Separatism and the authoritative regime Resolute measures are generally applied when the regime’s authority is challenged by demonstrations and riots. The instruments to control unrest are the use of martial law as well as a police and a military, which are organised, trained, and equipped specifically for that mission. The regular security crackdowns under the official ‘Strike Hard’ campaign and, what appears to be an indiscriminate naming of Turkic civil‐society organisations as separatists, religious extremists, or terrorists witnesses a low tolerance against any group that may pose a potential threat. This is further emphasised when the perpetrators are brought to justice, where hard sentences are applied. The popular response among Han‐Chinese has been to make protest demonstrations demanding that the authorities take hard measures against the ethnic violence. This is not surprising, as the Han‐Chinese feel threatened and demand their (largely Han‐Chinese) government to protect them. In response to these protests, the regime must demonstrate its capability to counter the unrest or it its legitimacy will suffer internally. It does, however, also legitimate the hard‐handed approach and underlines the political agenda of the authoritative regime as a necessity to cope with a very real internal threat to China. The nationalist agenda of the Greater China China compromised in the settlements of the Xinjiang borders with Mongolia and Russia in the 1960s in order to maintain regional peace and focus on internal stability. At the time, Xinjiang political stability was in part challenged by Soviet citizens and the territory itself was mainly of military strategic importance. China compromised again in the 1990s with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, which again was to secure regional stability and internal stability. At this time, Xinjiang was becoming of economic and diplomatic importance to China and the trade‐offs made therefore won China far more in terms of relative capabilities and position in the internal system. What it lost in terms of territorial quantity or its nationalist agenda of establishing the borders of Greater China was relatively little. There is no indication that these territorial settlements ever caused any significant public reaction or that they have been linked to the discourse of the Greater China. Then again, the disputed areas were not vital to the economy and would only have increased the total territory of Xinjiang less than 2%. Altogether, this suggests that the regime will compromise its nationalist agenda when it is a worthwhile trade‐off that will strengthen China’s international position, and thereby also the regime’s authority, as long as it does not undermine its popular legitimacy and regime security. Safeguarding against Western Encroachment When the Chinese regime makes harsh statements in the global media against Western powers meddling with China’s internal affairs, it may just as much be targeted at China’s internal audience. It can be used to demonstrate how the regime is safeguarding China’s politics and culture from Western encroachment and is a reminder to the public of the ‘Century of Humiliation’. Therefore, the aggressive discourse de‐legitimates the Western statements within China and strengthens the authority of the regime. The regime can utilise this, as long as it does not damage, for example, the economic cooperation. 34 Conclusions The Xinjiang region today is of significant importance to China’s regional and global‐level security strategies. It comprises a third of China’s energy reserves as well as an energy infrastructure and trade that create strong links with the countries of Central Asia. Xinjiang’s central location and resources therefore give China significant leverage in regional affairs and also significantly increase China’s relative capabilities in the international system. Maintaining control over Xinjiang, and preventing movements towards the formation of an East Turkistan state, must therefore be an indisputable end in the Chinese regime’s strategies for this region. Elements of nationalism, and the Chinese national sentiment, however, dominate the approach taken towards the security issues in Xinjiang. The approach is based on economic development strategies, cultural restraints on ethnicities, migration of Han‐Chinese, little minority representation in local governance, and hard security crackdowns. This suggests that the strategies are based on the fundamental view that the ethnic groups are ‘barbarians’ in the frontier lands who must be subdued and assimilated into Chinese culture. The national sentiment therefore constrains the central and the regional governments to these hard‐handed strategies, instead of allowing it to commit to strategies that would address root causes of the ethnic unrest by, for example, promoting minority rights, multiculturalism, and social development. The hard approach also both emphasises the existence of the historical threat from separatism as well as demonstrates to the Han‐Chinese that the regime is capable of responding to the threat. This supports the narratives of the political nationalism and legitimates the need an authoritative regime. The Xinjiang case supports the argument that the nationalist agenda of re‐establishing the borders of the Greater China is mostly a political tool for rallying the people around the regime. The trade‐off made by compromising in the territorial settlements underlines that the gains in the international system can outweigh nationalism. China’s domestic security strategies in Xinjiang are being criticised in the international system, but not enough to be a restraint for China’s influence or trade in the international system. China continues to emphasise the principles of sovereignty and non‐interference, which can, at least in part, be considered hedging strategies. They defend the regime’s legitimacy to choose its own methods in domestic affairs, but more importantly, demonstrate the regime’s capability to safeguard China against ‘Western encroachment’ – again consolidating its authority. In this respect, China merely seeks to sustain the minimum necessary legitimacy and prestige in the global system so that it can pursue its domestic strategies in order to maintain regime security. 35 6 Nationalism and the East China Sea dispute For decades a historical dispute over the delineation of the borders between China and Japan has revolved around the Diaoyu Islands (known as Senkaku Islands in Japanese) in the East China Sea. Japan claims that the small uninhabited islands were occupied by Japan in 1895, while China maintains that they were discovered by China in the fifteenth century and have since been part of the Greater China. The dispute remained dormant until the late 1960s, when under‐sea natural gas reserves were discovered in the East China Sea. Since then, diplomatic and military tension has periodically arisen over the territorial claims. Over the past decade, tension has further increased as both powers have moved to explore and drill for oil and gas close to the disputed region. The territorial dispute regularly triggers strong popular responses, both in China and in Japan. It therefore appears that there is a strong nationalist agenda in the bilateral negotiations, which over the past few years has provoked several incidents and interrupted bilateral negations over various incidents. This chapter examines the Chinese nationalist agenda in the East China Sea territorial dispute with Japan and how it constrains Chinese security strategies in the region. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the contents and recent events in the dispute. It then examines the disputed area’s strategic importance for China’s relative capabilities and position in the international system and what it means to China’s security strategies. The chapter then moves on to examine how nationalism intervenes with the international strategies and to what extent it constrains the Chinese regime from committing to a final settlement in dispute. Background Japan first acquired the Diaoyu islands as part of the surrounding islands of Formosa (Taiwan) with the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 after the first Sino‐Japanese War. In 1953, the US took over administration rights of the islands as a result of post‐World War II Peace Treaty with Japan. In 1969, surveys indicated that it was probable that that large oil reserves existed on the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan, following which Taiwan made claims to the Diaoyu islands. In response, the Japanese government made a diplomatic note to the Taiwanese government stating that its oil concession plot was illegal, and claimed ownership based on a marker that Japan had placed on the islands (Manicom, 2008, p. 378). Administration rights were returned to Japan with the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, and six months later China made its formal claim on the basis that they had part of China’s territory since the fifteenth century (Wiegand, 2009, p. 172). In the Chinese national newspaper, the People’s Daily, the regime emphasised that it was encroachment on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. In the following years, Japan attempted to establish a basis for its claim by exploiting the 36 resources. China, which did not have the offshore drilling capability and opposed arrangements with foreign powers, attempted to deter Japanese drilling through a strong discourse. The Chinese attitude created an uneasy status quo in which both sides attempted to manage the dispute so that it did not distract them from the more important task of containing the threat from the Soviet Union. The status quo was regularly challenged, first in 1978, when policymakers in Japan pressed for negotiating ownership of the islands with China. This was met by a strong nationalist demonstration by a hundred Chinese fishing vessels – an event that was likely instigated by the regime. Eventually negotiations were shelved for, as Deng Xiaoping put it, ‘future, wiser generations to solve’, so that the two sides could focus on joint economic development. In the years to follow, this kind of diplomatic exchange, accompanied by public demonstrations, became custom whenever the dispute was on the agenda (Manicom, 2008, pp. 378‐80). In 1996, both China and Japan ratified the third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This law, however, required them to delimit overlapping maritime zones and renegotiate the fisheries agreement in the East China itself based on its principles. Japan divided the East China Sea in a median line between the two countries, i.e. the Chinese mainland and the Okinawa islands, which marked the boundary between the two’s Exclusive Economic Zones. The use of a median line is in accordance with the maritime law, but Japan thereby also implicitly denied the existence of the islands dispute. China, however, claimed jurisdiction over the entire East China Sea based on the natural prolongation of its continental shelf, which extends to the Okinawa Trough and includes the Diaoyu islands. Maritime delimitation using the continental shelf is also in accordance with the law, but rarely used anymore. The overlapping area remains disputed today, but in 1997 the two countries compromised and established a jointly managed Provisional Maritime Zone, where traditional mutual fishing quotas applies in the area around the Diaoyu islands (Manicom, 2008, pp. 382‐3). The dispute over the islands became a sensitive topic again in 2004. Development of Chinese gas fields was moving close to the median line, which angered the Japanese government. Seven Chinese nationalist activists attempted a landing on the Diaoyu Islands and were arrested by Japanese authorities, which in return triggered popular protests in Beijing. To mitigate the effects of the intensifying dispute, bilateral negotiations began in October 2004. During the third round of negotiations, a year later, Japan proposed joint exploration and development of the fields. In January 2006, the two countries reached an agreement in principle, and at the twelfth round in June 2008, they agreed to encourage joint investment and exploitation of the gas resources. The agreements, however, have not included any suggestion of demarcation of the border and little progress has been achieved since then (IHS Jane's, 2011). While diplomatic negotiations have been on‐going since October 2004, several incidents have occurred both in the waters and at home in the two countries. In February 2005, Japan decided to take ownership of a lighthouse which had been built on one of the islands by Japanese activists in 1978. This move by Japan angered the Chinese government, which called it a ‘serious provocation and violation of China's territorial sovereignty’. In 2005, Japan announced that the two Chinese gas fields, Chunxiao and Duanqiao, were linked to Japanese fields and initiated procedures to grant drilling rights within the disputed area to Japanese gas companies. Japan’s move triggered protest demonstrations outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing, and China responded by granting rights to China National Offshore Oil 37 Corporation close to the disputed region. During the past decade, naval vessels and aircraft have regularly engaged in a game of brinkmanship, with both countries trying to assert their claims to the territory. In September 2005, China announced that it was creating an East China Sea reserve fleet, which Japan in the following months tracked twice within the disputed area (IHS Jane's, 2011). In September 2010, the dispute peaked again with the detention of a Chinese trawler captain, who had rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel near the disputed islands. Japan later released the captain, but the Chinese government demanded an apology and compensation. The incident triggered anti‐Japanese demonstrations in several Chinese cities, as well as in Japan, and China cancelled a visit by a thousand Japanese students to the World Expo in Shanghai and a popular Japanese band. The negotiations Figure 4: Disputed area (EIA, 2010) scheduled for September 2010 were suspended indefinitely awaiting the diplomatic fallout (BBC, 2010). Strategic Importance of the East China Sea The small volcanic, uninhabited Daioyu Islands themselves and the surrounding water are of little military strategic importance to China and Japan. However, sovereignty over the islands can decide the territorial delineation between the Chinese mainland, Japan and its Okinawa Islands, and Taiwan, and therefore also the ownership of the undersea gas resources. The Daioyu Islands are therefore important to both countries’ national energy security strategies. Relative Capabilities Japan relies on energy imports for approximately 80% of its energy needs and has virtually no oil or gas resources of its own. China relies on imports for approximately 50% of its oil consumption and therefore aims to increase its reliance on natural gas. The Chinese gas production today, however, barely breaks even with its consumption. Access to oil and gas resources within the disputed area alone would significantly reduce China’s dependency on oil imports, and enable it to produce more gas than it consumes for decades ahead (EIA, 2010). 38 It is arguable that during the Cold War, the threat from the Soviet Union maintained calm relations between China and Japan. Neither of the countries would then risk unfreezing the conflict over what at the time could be considered minor disputes. Neither country, however, moved to settle the territorial dispute, as China had done in various other disputes along its land borders. Rather, both maintained the status quo. In the post‐Cold War years, it was arguably both power balance and developing economic relations that helped continue this status quo. Aside from being part of the US alliance system in the Asia‐Pacific, Japan had a large and vastly superior naval capability, and still does. However, in order to minimise the chances of escalation, Japan has up to present only enforced its sovereignty in the region with its coast guard. Nevertheless, China has in the recent years been increasingly willing to demonstrate its naval power in the region while also increasing and modernising its military (IHS Jane's, 2011). For China it would still be dangerous, if not reckless, to attempt to coerce Japan into a favourable settlement by using military means. It would be equally dangerous for Japan to enforce its sovereignty with actual force in response to minor provocations. As for other coercive means, both countries are economically interdependent and both rely heavily on imports for covering their energy needs, and are therefore also equally balanced. The balance in relative capabilities therefore suggests that coercing each other would be equally risky and the costs would outweigh the gains. Maintaining the status quo is preferable to confrontation for both sides. However, the equal need for the oil and gas resources suggests that China and Japan would benefit mutually from the joint investment and energy exploitation in the region, which they have already agreed upon ‘in principle’. The two countries could therefore achieve a win‐win situation rather than venturing on a zero‐sum game, which could in the end cause a war. Position Both Japan and China are seeking to legitimise their claims to the Daioyu Islands based on the maritime law which they both ratified in 1996. This indicates that China is complying with norms in the international system in order to preserve its legitimacy. The use of continental plates to define sea borders, however, is outmoded. In fact, claiming territory based on historical rights nearly a century later is an unusual practice in the international system. In a norm perspective, China’s claims to the islands are based on frayed arguments. Should China attempt to use force, it is therefore more likely that Japan would be considered in its legitimate right to defend the territory and be backed up by the international community. This suggests that it would be worthwhile for China to pursue the joint investment and exploitation strategy, whereby it would gain something rather than nothing. It would be in line with China’s National Security Concept and would reassure the region of China’s peaceful intentions and willingness to compromise. After all, China has already demonstrated its ability to compromise in the western land border disputes, which gave it diplomatic leverage in that region. Compromising in the island dispute would likely increase China’s prestige and strengthen its position in the regional system, which would be a way of balancing against the US alliance system. While relative military and economic capabilities as well as legitimacy and prestige suggest that China should compromise in the island dispute, the dispute itself can also be used to bolster China’s position in other negotiations by weakening its adversary’s position. In the article China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, Krista Wiegand argues that China uses the dispute to compel Japan to change its behaviour or policy on other issues. Since 1990, there have been 25 incidents where Chinese 39 threats and provocations in the island dispute can be linked to other issues. These incidents have either been in response to Japanese actions or attempts to shape the environment prior to negotiations. Early Chinese actions included mostly the deploying of naval vessels to the disputed area and government‐
backed activists attempting to land on the islands. These actions can be linked with issues such as when Japan announced a reduction of its aid to China, Japan‐US talks on their security alliance, Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and several occasions where China demanded concessions for Japan’s war atrocities in the 1937‐45 Sino‐Japanese War (Wiegand, 2009). The issue linkage suggests that China is benefitting from the enduring dispute as a means of compelling Japan instead of pursuing a ‘win‐win’ solution. It does, however, only offer an explanation in part as what China gains from this dispute does not necessarily outweigh what China could otherwise have gained from a settlement. Chinese Nationalism in the East China Sea Dispute Some of the characteristics of the Chinese political nationalism system that can be identified in the East China Sea dispute include the territory of the Greater China, the strong anti‐Japanese sentiment, and the necessity of safeguarding China against Western encroachment. The Greater China The argument that the Daioyu Islands were part of the Qing Dynasty encourages the idea in the Chinese population that the territory is rightfully theirs. This idea gives the regime legitimacy to allocate at least some resources for pursuing the objective of claiming the territory. It is, however, the anti‐Japanese sentiment and xenophobia of Western encroachment that drive the nationalist agenda. Anti­Japanese sentiment The Communist Party has been fuelling anti‐Japanese sentiment in order to create the image of an enemy that could, potentially, be a threat to China again. Japan has twice waged war on China and China must therefore be wary of Japan’s expansionist and aggressive schemes. It was the Party that effectively resisted the Japanese occupation and thereby brought the ‘Century of Humiliation’ to an end. This is but one narrative that the Party uses to demonstrate why China needed its regime and will need it in the future also. When the Chinese regime defies Japanese claims to the sea territory and enters the area with naval vessels, it demonstrates to the Chinese public that the Party and the PLA will continue to resist Japanese occupation. Likewise, when (government‐backed) Chinese activists attempt landing on the islands, it demonstrates that it is a struggle for the Chinese people as a whole. The Chinese regime thereby demonstrates to its people that China will continue to dispute Japanese claims to the territory, which was unrightfully taken through military aggression. If China cannot reclaim the islands in the present, then it will in the future by another generation, as Deng Xiaoping implied. It is a harmonious construction that paints Japan as the aggressor and the Chinese culture as both infinite and defensive by nature, which is more civilised. Wiegang argues that some of the Chinese provocations in the East China Sea have been in response to Chinese nationalists protests over Japan’s war atrocities, such as when new Japanese textbooks glossed over wartime atrocities, or when Japan’s president had planned to visit the Yasukuni Shrine (Wiegand, 2009) (a war memorial in Tokyo that houses one of the few museums dedicated to World War II). These actions demonstrate the regime’s ability to challenge Japan, particularly when it achieves some kind of 40 concession over the war atrocities, and thereby upholds its image as the defender of China in the population. Due to the power balance, Japan is unable to respond to the Chinese provocations by force. When Japan does enforce its claims, however, such as when a trawler captain was detained, there is a rise in popular nationalism that demands the regime to respond. Whether or not the countrywide, anti‐Japanese demonstrations are government‐backed, they are still rooted in the popular nationalism. It therefore also compels the regime to take measures accordingly in its foreign policies towards Japan. In this case, the Chinese regime has to restrain its cooperation with Japan, or lose prestige and legitimacy in the public. Western Encroachment When the Chinese regime uses a discourse of ‘encroachment’, it makes a parallel reference to the Western influence of the nineteenth century. It gives the impression that if China does not make a stance in this dispute, the intrusion of the West into Chinese territory will move closer until it has again penetrated the Chinese mainland and the people itself. The sentiment appears to have taken root in popular nationalism along with the anti‐Japanese sentiment. Regularly, there are demonstrations in the Chinese public that revolve around the themes to stop Western encroachment and that the Daioyu Islands are Chinese. The Chinese regime has therefore made its military demonstrations in the East China Sea both in response to US‐Japanese talks over security and to a Japanese held multinational maritime exercise with the US, Australia, and other allied nations (Wiegand, 2009, p. 187). The sentiment may also be supported by other nationalists outside the core of policymakers. Influential high‐ranking PLA officers, for example, may have genuine ideational attachments to the islands or to arming the nation against Western encroachment. Nationalist interest groups in the periphery may also challenge the regime’s core policymakers, such as when in 1992 the PLA lobbied to have the disputed islands included in the national Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone – a move that could severely have damaged Sino‐Japanese relations at the time (Manicom, 2008, p. 380). Popular nationalism therefore constrains the Chinese regime into taking action that challenges the West and into continuing making claims to the islands. If the regime makes concessions in the dispute, it would mean giving in to Western encroachment – much like the Qing had to do after the Opium Wars – and this would undermine the regime’s legitimacy. Conclusions The undersea resources are strategically important to both countries’ energy security, but cannot be exploited until a permanent settlement has been achieved. China’s claims to the Japanese owned islands are frail and China cannot use its position to coerce a settlement in its own favour. The power balance and economic interdependencies likewise deter China from backing up its claims with military or economic means. Instead of maintaining the status quo, however, China could pursue a cooperative strategy as already agreed upon ‘in principle’ with Japan. Such a settlement could strengthen both China’s relative capabilities and position, but would require compromising over claims that China has now been asserting for more than forty years. 41 The Chinese regime, however, appears to be gaining something from maintaining the status quo in the dispute. In China, the islands dispute stirs popular anti‐Japanese sentiment and aversion to Western encroachment. Popular nationalism bolsters the regime’s nationalist agenda by providing it with opportunities to demonstrate its capability to resist Japan. The Chinese regime can furthermore use the dispute to influence US‐Japan security talks or to win concessions for war atrocities from Japan, which may weaken Japan’s position in the international system and gain domestic prestige for the regime. While the dispute may support the sentiment of an exterior threat and divert political frustrations away from the Chinese regime, it is also a doubled‐edged sword. The regime needs to respond appropriately to the popular nationalist demands, or it will undermine its legitimacy. China is therefore constrained by nationalism to remain on a confrontational course with Japan over historical issues in order not to weaken the regime’s security. In the international system, it has therefore become a strategy of impeding Japan’s access to resources by keeping the status quo and attempting to undercut its prestige by continuously drawing in Japan’s history. 42 7 Conclusion This thesis set out to analyse how China’s security strategies are not only dependent on the distribution of power in the international system, but also how they are constrained by nationalism that acts as, what in neoclassical realist theory is called, an intervening variable. China is a significant and growing power in both global and regional affairs and it has since the mid‐
1990s promoted peaceful coexistence while developing its capabilities and strengthening its position. In its security strategies it seeks to balance against the US alliance system by promoting multi‐polarity and strengthening its relative power capabilities while safeguarding its vulnerabilities, such as its dependency on energy imports. China’s internal political stability is challenged by an increasing wealth gap between rich and poor, corruption in the state administration, separatist movements, ethnic violence, and demands for liberalisation of the authoritative regime. The regime itself is therefore under pressure and the Chinese Communist Party retains its power through tight state control while drawing its legitimacy from economic growth and nationalist values. Nationalism is used as a political instrument to unite the diverse people around a Chinese identity and struggle for preserving its historical culture and territorial integrity from internal and external threats. It revolves around the Party as the guardian of China, who will restore it to its former greatness and protect it from barbarians and Western encroachment. The political nationalism increasingly interacts with the popular nationalism. Regularly there are widespread demonstrations organised by nationalist movements who demand territories be reunited or protest against Western or Japanese influence. To the popular nationalists, nationalism therefore becomes a political agenda that they expect their regime to fulfil. The nationalist agenda that the Party articulates does not appear to be an end in itself. The regime compromises its nationalist agenda to the extent it benefits China’s power in the international system and does not threaten its legitimacy in the public. However, when strategic choices become nationalist issues in the public, nationalism becomes a constraint for the ends. This is seen in the dispute with Japan over the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, where compromises or cooperation with Japan result in strong nationalist demonstrations at home. It appears that keeping the dispute going strengthens the regime’s authority at home, which is why a status quo in the dispute is preferred to a mutually favourable settlement. 43 The applied ways and means in the regime’s security strategies also appear to be constrained by nationalism. This is in part because there is in national sentiment a certain perception of what the threats are and what solutions they require. It is also in part because choosing ways and means in accordance with this sentiment may be in accord with the public sentiment, thereby strengthening the regime’s authority, and it is therefore the concern for the regime’s security that takes priority. These constraints are seen in the security strategies for Xinjiang, where hard‐handed methods are preferred. This is partly because there is an inclination to regard the minorities as ‘barbarians’, who must be controlled and assimilated, and partly because it meets the public demands for security thus strengthening the regime’s authority. The regime’s security strategies indicate that China is seeking to balance against the US alliance system. It exploits the opportunities the security issues present for increasing its relative capabilities and promoting multi‐polarity by increasing its influence, such as Central Asia and among third world countries, while seeking to erode the legitimacy and prestige of both the US and Japan. It exploits the opportunities that arise for strengthening the regime’s authority and legitimacy in the Chinese population, and this is done within a framework guided by nationalism. The nationalist agenda therefore takes priority in China’s strategic choices, when it will otherwise undermine the regime’s domestic authority and legitimacy. In a neoclassical realist perspective, it can therefore be argued that nationalism acts an intervening variable to China’s strategic choices. It does not direct China’s security strategies, but it constrains them to particular ends, ways, and means. It does this, because it is an instrument for upholding regime security. These constraints compel China to mitigate their negative impact on its legitimacy in the international system through hedging strategies that safeguard its legitimacy and to build the necessary capabilities to deter outside intervention. Nationalism is not the only intervening variable, but it works in conjunction with other variables as suggested in the theory, such as regime security and social cohesion. Likewise, it can enforce or be enforced by other variables such as elite cohesion and their perceptions of threats and opportunities. 44 Bibliography BBC. »Q&A: China and the Uighurs.« BBC News. 8. July 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/‐
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