The Anti-Activist Mobilization in Hong Kong: A Case Study of the Anti-FLG Protests
Cheris Shun-ching Chan
University of Hong Kong
[email protected]
Andrew Junker
Valparaiso University
[email protected]
*This paper is prepared for the Mobilized Contention Conference to be held at University of
Hong Kong, January, 2017. Please do not cite or circulate this draft without the authors’
permission.
On the fourth Sunday of April every year, the Falungong (FLG) holds their annual forum and
parade in Hong Kong to mark the anniversary of their mass sit-in in Beijing in 1999 that resulted
in its crackdown in mainland China. We observed this annual event in 2011 and 2012 by
attending its forum and walking along with the parade. The forum, held in a public park in North
Point on Hong Kong island, was opened to the public and we were free to take photos. When we
arrived in the park this year (2016), however, the forum was enclosed by barricades and banners.
We could only peek at the forum through a crack between the banners. Right outside the
enclosed forum there were loud speakers broadcasting chants of “Eliminate the evil cult FLG”
alternating in Cantonese and Mandarin. The anti-FLG chant was so loud that we could barely
hear FLG’s speeches at the forum while standing outside the barricades. We were not allowed to
go into the forum because it was no longer opened to the public. Why was not it opened? “Some
people came to disrupt our events on purpose,” a FLG member who was in charge of the forum
explained. Although the anti-FLG demonstrations seem faux and premeditated, they still create
“troubles” for the FLG, leading FLG to be suspicious of outsiders that further leads to their loss
of public support.
More than a dozen pro-government bodies have suddenly appeared in Hong Kong since
2012 with their pro-Beijing position made clear to the public. They have been staging collective
actions whenever there are pro-democratic and/or anti-government protests. They appear to be
activists, but their actions are what we term “anti-activism”: government-backed and supported
counter-protest. Anti-activism is different from genuine counter-protests, in which counterprotestors are volunteer and autonomously organized; whereas counter-protestors belong to civil
society, anti-activists are acting some way that appears to be coordinated with or by a state.
1
In this paper, we describe this pro-government/anti-activist mobilization and use the antiFLG protests as a case to illustrate their common strategies and analyze their possible impacts on
Hong Kong’s social movements and civil society. Our analysis draws upon the concept of
“tactical dispositions” of protest groups (Junker 2014). Tactical dispositions are defined as the
relational patterns between protesters, audiences, and protest targets that are expressed and
performed through a movement’s observed collective actions. Conventional social movements
activism garners force by making public performances (Tilly 2008) that persuade the wider
public of the validity and urgency of the movement’s aims. Movements become more powerful
the more audience (, i.e. public), support they can win. Even when a movement does not direct
claims against specific authorities but instead targets cultural change, like the cultural destigmatization of homosexuality (Gamson 1989), these movements too can be described as
successful if the effects of their efforts are realized through change in public opinion. In all cases,
social movements work through persuading publics and thereby applying pressure to their targets,
typically being those who wield power. However, we note that, in the case of anti-FLG activism,
state-mobilized anti-activists are much less focused on influencing public opinion directly than
are conventional protest groups. Instead, anti-activists focus efforts on disrupting and
discrediting self-organized, voluntary activists. Their efforts operate according to a logic quite
distinct from conventional protest activism. Even, because even if their own efforts are discredit
themselves in the eyes of the public, as we observed in the anti-FLG case, their efforts may still
achieve desired results by simultaneously discrediting their targets. Furthermore, such apparently
state-mobilized pro-government movements may, in spite of not appealing to the general public,
impede the success of their opponents (, such as the pro-democratic movement,) by stifling
rational discourse, polarizing debate, and stigmatizing moderate voices in the center.
2
Consequently, we hypothesize that anti-activism may be undermining the integrity of civil
society in Hong Kong and weakening the credibility of social movement activism. In the sections
that follow, we first give a brief overall description of activism in Hong Kong and describe the
appearance of various pro-government bodies. Then, we use the anti-FLG protestsmovement as a
case to examine the common strategies of these groups and analyze their impacts.
“The Pearl of the Orient” as “A City of Protests”
Hong Kong as a British colony (1841 to 1997) experienced rapid economic growth from the
1970s and became an international financial center since the 1980s. As a city filled with soaring
skyscrapers, spectacular night views, and energetic nightlife, it earns the fame of “the pearl of the
orient.” This sleepless city, at the same time, is full of numerous social and political protests
every year, ranging from ad hoc worker strikes to annual mass demonstrations for political
democratization. According to scholars of Hong Kong studies, a “social movement industry”
began to emerge by the end of the 1970s and the proliferation of collective actions of different
types that broadened the scope of contentious politics was witnessed in the 1980s. An increasing
number of political groups emerged in the 1980s as a response to the new political environment
triggered by the Sino-British negotiations concerning the decolonization of Hong Kong (Lui and
Chiu 2000). However, the political system left little room for activists to fight for democracy,
and the public support for democratization was limited. Accordingly, only about 5,000 to 8,000
citizens participated in the largest pro-democracy rally in Hong Kong in the 1980s (Chan and
Lee 2007).
The 1989 pro-democracy student movement in China and the June 4 incident that year,
nonetheless, made a turning point in Hong Kong’s political culture. At least seven major public
3
rallies or protests were held in May-June 1989, and the numbers of participants ranged from
50,000 to more than one million (Wong 2000). Meanwhile, the choice between being pragmatic
(by accepting the parameters prescribed by China) and being an oppositional force (by fighting
for an “internationally recognized” democratic system) began to divide the activists (Lui and
Chiu 2000). Those who chose to continue to play the role of opposition became very active in
staging protests and petitions in the 1990s. A march and a candlelight vigil have been held on the
last Sunday of May and on June 4 respectively every year as commemoration events for the June
4 incident and a continuous fight for democratization in mainland China. With Britain loosened
the colony’s long-stringent regulations of public protests after 1989, the frequency of protests in
the city jumped substantially in the first half of 1990s due to the expanded space for civil
liberties (Chen 2009). For instance, protests outside China’s de facto consulate in the colony
Xinhua News Agency, mostly for fighting against political suppression in mainland China,
increased from 100 in 1993 to 175 in 1996. The number of marches throughout the city sprung
from 285 in 1993 to 405 in 1995. In other words, there was at least one protest each day on
average in 1995.1
The protests for social and economy issues were on the rise after the sovereignty
handover in 1997 due to the downturn of the economy. With the outbreak of the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic that demonstrated the incompetence of the government
in crisis management, together with the launch of the national security legislation (so-called
Article 23 legislation), large-scale political demonstrations reappeared again. On the sixth
anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to the PRC on July 1, 2003, more than half a million
citizens took to the streets to protest against the Article 23 legislation and the government’s
1
Bruce Gilley, “Region – Hong Kong – Jumping the Gun,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 6, 1997.
4
capability in containing the epidemic. This protest successfully forced the Chief Executive, Tung
Chee Hwa, to step down. It empowered the citizens, giving them a sense of collective efficacy to
believe in the capacity of the public as a collective actor in politics and public affairs (Chan and
Lee 2007). Since then, mass demonstrations organized by the pan-democratic camp for
democratization and for various other causes have been held every year on July 1, and
subsequently also on other festivals that are supposed to be celebrative, such as the National Day
on October 1, and the New Year on January 1. The FLG group in Hong Kong has been among
the regular participants of these demonstrations. In addition, they have been staging their own
petitions on the fourth Sunday of April, the second week of May, and the third week of July
annually to mark the anniversaries of their own history. For more than two decades for the prodemocratic protests and for more than a decade for the FLG petitions, they took place in peaceful
and highly civil manners and rarely faced any direct opposition to their collective actions. During
this period, Hong Kong’s widely contentious repertoire – that small set of conventions by which
actors in a given regime learn to express opposition through collective action (e.g., Tilly 1995;
Tilly 2008), could be characterized as civil, orderly, and generally non-confrontational.
Since 2012, however, a new wave of protests against mainland tourists by the young
locals has appeared on the scene. The causes behind this new wave of anti-mainlander, localism
movement are beyond the scope of this paper. Our concern is that the form of these protests
marked a salient departure from the civility nature of the pro-democratic movement. The
activists at first only protested against an Italian brand, D&G, in Canton Road in Tsim Sha Tsui
which disallowed photo-taking by local residents in front of the shop but allowed mainland
tourists to do so. Perhaps even to the organizers’ surprise, over a thousand local residents joined
5
the protest in response to a call for action posted online the day before.2 This incident seemed
resonated with what local residents felt about being marginalized in the city with the increasing
volume of mainland tourists. It was the prelude of an intensive six-month period of antimainland tourist protests that took an ill-mannered form in early 2014. The protesters called the
mainland tourists “locusts” in their face, yelled at them to get out of Hong Kong. They
proclaimed their protests as a “locust-expelling action” (驅蝗行動).This offensive style of
protests has not only been adopted by the anti-mainlander localist groups. Ironically, it has also
been the common tactic deployed by the pro-mainland, pro-government groups in their collective
actions.
The Anti-Activist Mobilization in Hong Kong
A number of pro-government, anti-activist bodies appeared in Hong Kong in 2012 – 2013.
Unlike the so-called pro-establishment political parties, which normally exercise their power
within the official political structure, the pro-government groups present themselves as “ordinary
citizens” outside the establishment. Many of them were founded to stage protests to counteract
the pro-democratic, anti-government, or localist activism. Some of which appeared more often in
the media include Caring Hong Kong Power (愛護香港力量), Defend Hong Kong Campaign (保
衛香港運動), Voice of Loving Hong Kong (愛港之聲), Hong Kong Youth Care Association
Limited (HKYCAL, 香港青年關愛協會), Silent Majority for Hong Kong (幫港出聲), Justice
Alliance (正義聯盟), Voice of Harmony (和諧之聲), and Sounds of Silence Hong Kong (沉默
2
Qianren Weidu D&G: Wuyi Maofan Gangren Fa Shengming Huiying Jinpai Zhi Fei Gai Gongsi Yuangong[Over a
Thousand People Encircled D&G: No Intention of Offending Hong Kong People; The Statement Claims that the
Ban on Photo Shooting was for Non-employees],”Ming Pao, January 9, 2012.
6
之聲), etc. One of the common strategies of these organizations is staging protests side by side
with the pro-democratic demonstrations, holding flags of the PRC and HKSAR and banners of
nationalist slogans. They chant slogans such as “We are Chinese,” “We love Hong Kong,”
“Protecting our home Hong Kong,” “supporting Chun Ying Leung (CY Leung, the current Chief
Executive of Hong Kong), reproaching the pro-democrats as “traitors,” and urging them to “Get
out of Hong Kong.” Their protests are usually small in scale, ranging from a dozen to a hundred
of participants who appear to be coming from the working class and new immigrants. There are
always rumors circulating among the general public that participants of these protests are paid to
come out and they simply do their “job” for money. We will elaborate this point in our case
study of the anti-FLG protests in the next section.
We do not have sufficient empirical data to explain why these pro-government, antiactivist bodies suddenly sprung in 2012-13. The general impression by the general public is that
they were sponsored by the PRC and they have appeared after CY Leung assumed office as the
Chief Executive on July 1, 2012. At least one of them, the Caring Hong Kong Power, was set up
in June 2011, a year before CY Leung took office. This group first appeared to protest against
the Civic Party whose members fought for the right of abode for the South East Asian domestic
helpers in Hong Kong. A pro-government carnival was also held on July 1, 2011 and thousands
of elderly and middle-age men and women were said “bribed” to be present.3 Small-scale
protests against pro-democratic Civic Party and League of Social Democrats staged by the
Caring Hong Kong Power were seen in the second half of 2011. The next year on June 30 and
July 1, 2012, a march and a rally took place respectively with the slogans “New government;
3
“Qing Huigui Tuan, 50 Yuan Chi Zizhu Can [Celebrating National Day Group, 50 Dollars for a Buffet],” Ming
Pao, July 2, 2011.
7
New hope; Securing livelihood; Supporting Hong Kong.” There were about 60-100 participants
in each of these events, though they did not draw much attention from the media.4 This was the
first collective action taken in the form of demonstration on July 1 to counter the annual
demonstration organized by the pan-democratic camp. Since then, whenever there were antigovernment protests, there were pro-government protests, and participants from both camps
often shouted and swore at each other. Such confrontations mark a shift from the more civil
contentious repertoire that generally prevailed in Hong Kong prior to 2012.
These pro-government, anti-activist bodies were active in organizing rallies and protests
against the Occupy Central Movement (OMC, also called Umbrella Movement) that last for 79
days from September to December 2014. The Silent Majority for Hong Kong, which was
founded in August 2013 by a small group of pro-mainland scholars, entrepreneurs, and
professionals, was the very first group to stage mass opposition against the OCM. It initiated the
formation of The Alliance for Peace and Democracy (The Alliance, 保普選反佔中 ) with other
pro-mainland organizations in July 2014. The Alliance staged a signature campaign and a mass
rally in July-August 2014 to support the government proposal for the chief executive election
and to oppose the OCM. The organizers claimed that they gathered 1.5 million of signatures in a
month from July 19 to August 17, 2014 and more than 190,000 citizens participated in the rally
on August 7, 2014.5 It was the largest anti-OCM demonstration, though there were reports that
some participants were recruited from Guangdong and paid to join the demonstration.6 In any
4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQuxJNQdXZI; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onjPQW_IzRQ.
Assessed on May 4, 2016.
5
It is a norm in Hong Kong for the organizers of any mass demonstrations to inflate the number of participants. For
this particular event, the police estimated that there were about 110,000 participants and the Public Opinion
Programme of the University of Hong Kong estimated that there were about 80,000 – 90,000 participants.
6
Da Lianmeng Wanyuan Sungong Bian Rixin 330 Yuan Qijie; Neway Yuangong Tousu Beibi Qianming Fan
Zhanzhong [The Payments Offered by the Alliance Has Changed from over 10,000 Dollars a Month to 330 Dollars a
Day; Neway Employees Complained that They Were Forced to Sign the anti-OCM Campaign],”Apple Daily, July
8
case, the mass rally was considered as a successful one in drawing support from a wide range of
interest groups to express opposition to the proposed OCM. In September 2014, however, the
spokesman of The Alliance, Chow Yung, launched another anti-activist action that was seen as
creating “white terror” in high schools and offended the educated population at large. Soon after
the organizers of OCM set September 22, 2014 as the commence of students’ strike, Chow
announced that The Alliance had set up a telephone hotline for the public, including the high
school students and teachers, to (secretly) report the names of the students and teachers who join
the strike and the subsequent occupation. He proposed that The Alliance might then publicize
these names to shame those joining the civil disobedience (which was supposed to be unlawful).
His call apparently bore a shadow of the Cultural Revolution. It was severely criticized by high
school teachers and other professionals and it failed to earn any support from the pro-mainland
politicians and media.7 Instead, politicians and professionals began to distance themselves from
The Alliance, which eventually lost its leading role in the anti-activist mobilization during the
OCM. Instead, another group named Occupy Central Not Representing Me (佔中不代表我),
also known as Blue Ribbon, emerged in October 2014 during the OCM. This group seemed to
appear on an ad hoc base to organize mass demonstrations to counteract the OCM. As “yellow
ribbon” was the emblem of the OCM, this group used “blue ribbon” to signify its opposition to
25, 2014; see also “Tuanti Beijie Xiang Youxingzhe Pai 250 Chema Fei [The Group was Found Giving 250 Dollars
as Allowance for the Demonstrators],” Cable TV, August 17, 2014.
7
See “Jiaoxie Qianze Jubao Bake Xuesheng, Chi Zhizao Baise Kongbu [Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union
Condemn Reporting Students Who Joined the Strike, Criticizing Chow for Creating White Terror] ,” Hong Kong
Economic Journal, September 8, 2014.; “Nanba Xiaozhang Anpi Jubao Rexian: “Zhou”bianren Buyong Caoxin
[The Principal of Diocesan Boys’ School Criticized the Reporting Hotline: Chow’s People Don’t Have to Worry
(about our Students)],” Apple Daily, September 11, 2014; “Jiang Renhong: Jubao Shu Shiyong Taren Ziliao [Chiang
Yam-wang: Reporting One’s Action is the Same as Using One’s Personal Data,” Wenweipo, September 12, 1014.
9
the occupation and its support for the police force to clear the occupation. The first author once
participated in a Blue Ribbon demonstration in October 2014 as a researcher and observed that
there were about 1500 participants. Some of them looked like retired police officers. The
majority of the participants were local citizens, though some appeared to come from Guangdong
in mainland. Most of the participants aged around 50s-60s, and appeared to be coming from the
working class. Many other pro-government bodies, such as Voice of Loving Hong Kong, Justice
Alliance, and Defend Hong Kong Campaign, were also active in staging small-scale protests
against the OCM.
The pro-government bodies and their protests, though multiplied over the past few years,
are normally small in scale. They all share the same position of pro-mainland, pro-government
and supporting the Chief Executive, and stage very similar actions with slogans resembling each
other that outsiders can hardly distinguish one from another. However, there is no sign that they
have united with each other to enhance their power and influence. Instead, they are conscious to
draw boundaries from one another and at times they enter into conflicts with each other.8 So far
we do not see that these groups have gained support from the general public. The rumors that
participants of the pro-mainland protests get paid have undermined their credibility.
Many of the pro-government, anti-activist protests operate on an ad hoc basis, contingent
on the activities of the pro-democratic or anti-government activists. Nonetheless, as the FLG
followers in Hong Kong have been active in staging protests and setting up booths on the streets
for their campaign against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the anti-FLG demonstrations
have been held in parallel with the FLG everywhere. They are the most conspicuous pro-PRC
exercise at the street level in Hong Kong that we now turn to.
8
“Tingliang Tuanti Neihong, Wangshang Huma [The Internal Conflict and Online Fighting of the Pro-CY Leung
Groups],” Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 27, 2012.
10
The Case of Anti-FLG Protests
The data presented in this section come from our observations of FLG and anti-FLG activities
and informal interviews with the participants primarily in Hong Kong. Our field observations
stretched from 2010 to 2016, though the informal interviews with FLG and anti-FLG participants
were conducted mainly in 2011 and 2015-16. Two student research assistants were recruited to
conduct intensive observations of the anti-FLG activities and interview the participants
informally in March – May, 2016.9 We also talked to “the public,” such as onlookers of their
events, local pedestrians, tourists, shop owners and shopkeepers to get their views on these two
opposing camps. As members from the anti-FLG camp were relatively reluctant to tell us about
their organizations, we also rely on local newspapers as the source of data.
The FLG has been active in staging protests and petitions in Hong Kong since its
crackdown in the PRC in 1999. Besides holding annual rallies and parades, FLG followers set up
over two dozen booths in the areas where most mainland tourists are found in Hong Kong. They
display banners and posters showing the suppression of the FLG in mainland China and accusing
former President of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, and his associates of committing crimes. They role
play “live organ harvesting” in the streets to signify CCP’s illegal treatment of the FLG
followers in mainland China. They have explicitly launched an anti-CCP campaign with the
slogan “Withdraw from the Party for your own good; Heaven will destroy the CCP” by verbally
convincing the public, particularly the mainland Chinese, to resign from the CCP if they are
currently members. Their booths did draw attention from some mainland tourists. Although they
were occasionally confronted with staff from the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department
9
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful research assistance from Ms. Molly Jiang and Ms. Xiaoting Lu.
11
and being charged of “blocking the walkway,” they were, to a large extent, free of formal or
informal intrusion for more than a decade in Hong Kong. In June 2012, however, seas of antiFLG banners and posters suddenly appeared wherever the FLG was present. Since then, antiFLG demonstrators have set up their booths next to the FLG’s and confronted the FLG face to
face.
When we walked by one of the busiest street corners in Mongkok on April 2, 2013, we
saw a FLG booth completely surrounded by banners accusing FLG as an “evil cult,” their
charismatic leader Li Hongzhi as “shameless,” and “causing damage to people’s life in Hong
Kong.” Two FLG members holding a big banner “Falun Dafa is Good” were standing in between
two sets of anti-FLG banners, one in the front and one at the back. One big anti-FLG banner and
a dozen small ones were placed right in front of the FLG booth, almost completely blocking out
FLG’s big banner. The FLG and anti-FLG banners were placed so close to each other that they
looked like one group to any outsiders who were not familiar with the FLG. There were only
three members in each camp. The anti-FLG members, all women in their 40s, wore green T-shirt
and green jacket with a logo signifying Hong Kong’s symbol, the bauhinia flower, and the
Chinese name of HKYCAL on them. They were standing there chatting with each other rather
than approaching the pedestrians. On the other hand, a woman in her 50s from the FLG camp
was distributing The Epoch Times and attempting to persuade the onlookers to resign from the
CCP. We asked the FLG members how they felt to be surrounded by the HKYCAL and why
they did not move to another location, they said they felt “helpless,” as the HKYCAL had
followed them wherever they went and so it would be futile to move.
Although there are other pro-government bodies staging protests against the FLG in Hong
Kong, HKYCAL has been the dominant player in the anti-FLG campaign. It was officially
12
registered as a limited company on June 8, 2012.10 Its name is rather tricky. It resembles closely
an existing NGO, Hong Kong Youth Care Association (香港亙助青年協會), which is a welfare
organization. HKYCAL’s name is exactly the same as this organization except that it is a limited
company and so it is called Hong Kong Youth Care Association Limited. This confused the
media and even South China Morning Post misreported HKYCAL as HKYCA.11 The FLGassociated newspaper Epoch Times reports that the founder of this organization, Hong Weicheng, is the general manager of Beijing Yanjing Brewery (Hong Kong).12 As the core members
of the HKYCAL were reluctant to be interviewed and we do not feel that we can rely on Epoch
Times for empirical data, we know very little about the background of this organization. We
have observed that members of this organization mostly aged around 40s-50s, and some of them
carry a mainland accent. They appear to be from the working class and some look like new
immigrants. Up to 60-70 percent of them are women. Green T-shirts, green jackets, and green
vests are their uniforms. We estimate that there are about 200 members working full-time or
part-time for HKYCAL as of April 2016. This estimate comes from our interview with one of
the HKYCAL member in their anti-FLG demonstration on April 24, 2016. We were told that
members were divided into 15 teams and each team had a leader and 10-12 members. We saw
that each member had a number attached in their green vest to which she/he belonged. Besides
HKYCAL, we saw slightly more than a hundred people from five different bodies protesting
against FLG’s parade on April 24, 2016. About 40-50 participants (aged ranging from 4 or 5 to
10
“Guanai Xiehui 6 Yue Chengli [HKYCAL was established in June],” Hong Kong Daily News, August 18, 2012.
“Man beaten for aiding Falun Gong: Four men attack person who tried to stop harassment of the movement's
members,” South China Morning Post, June 13, 2013.
12
“Fating Bao Dao Wangyang Yuxian Xiongtu Shenfen Guzhu Wei Xianggang Qingguanhui Zhuxi [The Court
Confirmed that the Attacker of the Supporter of Li Wangyang is the President of HKYCAL ,”The Epoch Times
(Hong Kong), June 17, 2013.
11
13
50s) came from “The Association of Caring for the Grassroots in Hong Kong” (香港關注基層市
民協會, authors’ translation of its name into English as no information is found about this group),
more than 20 (aged 40s-60s) from the Community (新思維力量, founded in March 2013), more
than a dozen (aged 40s-50s) from Anti-Cult Association (香港加僑反邪教協會, founded in
2012), about a dozen (aged 20s-50s) from Proud & Wonderful Hong Kong Company Limited
(同心護港大聯盟, founded in March 2015), and another dozen (aged 20s-50s) from “Loving
Hong Kong Citizens Alliance” (愛港市民聯盟, authors’ translation of its name into English as
no information is found about this group).
The members of HKYCAL were generally reluctant to be interviewed, though few were
willing to talk to our student research assistants. When asked what drove them to come out to
protest against the FLG, they all gave a common narrative that FLG followers refused to receive
medical treatment when they were sick and hence FLG was harmful to people and to the society.
When asked if they personally knew anyone practicing FLG, most of them did not except two
who mentioned about their distant relatives in China joining FLG and turning insane. They
accused Li Hongzhi of receiving financial support from the United States and causing harm to
his followers. We did not ask directly if they got payment to come out but they got quite
sensitive to our question about what they do for a living. They often reacted by saying “We are
doing this voluntarily.” They admitted that they received a lunch allowance. Nonetheless, when
we chatted with two participants from “The Association of Caring for the Grassroots in Hong
Kong” and one participant from the Community on April 24, 2016 during their action against
FLG’s parade, they admitted that each of them would get money for joining the protest. The
participant from the Community is an elderly woman in her 70s. She said she was retired and had
a lot of free time and so she joined this action as recommended by a friend. She was given a
14
lunch that day and the payment of HK$500 would be made the next day or so. She reiterated that
she did it voluntarily. The two participants from “The Association of Caring for the Grassroots in
Hong Kong” were couple in their 40s. Like the old lady, they said they were volunteers though
they admitted that each of them would receive HK$500- HK$600 as an “allowance.” This
explains why we saw young kids there with their parents even though it was raining terribly hard
on April 24, 2016. A family of four might receive HK$2000 for simply standing there making
some noises based on a head count. While participants of these two groups appeared to be from
the lower working class, the physical appearance of the participants of Proud & Wonderful HK
Co. Ltd. and of “Loving Hong Kong Citizens Alliance” looked like associated with the Triads or
some interest groups in the New Territories. FLG’s parade lasted for about 4 hours. The Proud &
Wonderful HK Co. Ltd. was present only at the beginning of the parade, and the “Loving Hong
Kong Citizens Alliance” showed up only at the end. These two groups seemed sharing some
participants, and the leader of The Proud & Wonderful HK Co. Ltd. joined “Loving Hong Kong
Citizens Alliance” toward the end of the parade.
As for the strategies of the anti-FLG demonstrations, it seems to us that there have been
two phases. HKYCAL’s attacks on the FLG were rather aggressive in 2012 – 2014 and intense
conflicts between them were frequent. Since 2015, HKYCAL has appeared to be less aggressive
and no longer enclosed FLG’s booths. Instead, they set their booths at a certain distant from
FLG’s in the same areas. We now turn to some concrete examples to illustrate their strategies.
We observed that HKYCAL first appeared with banners and posters attacking FLG
outside Hung Hom train station in June 2012 (exactly on June 10, 2012, according to a FLG
follower). Hung Hom train station is where most mainland tourists arrive in Hong Kong and thus
FLG has set up a booth and hung up a number of banners and posters condemning the CCP at the
15
taxi stand there for many years. In June 2012, the HKYCAL put up more than 30 banners and
posters interweaving with FLG’s. Wherever there was a FLG banner, there were at least one or
two anti-FLG banners next to it. These banners were printed with Chinese and English texts in
black and red colors, such as “Boycott Falun Gong evil cult, Build a harmonious Hong Kong,”
“Taiwan Falun Gong get out of Hong Kong,” “Li Hongzhi is a wanted person. Bring to justice Li
Hongzhi,” “Cherish your life. Stay away from the evil cult – Falun Gong.” HKYCAL’s name
and logo was on each banner and poster. The posters were printed with pictures and texts
explaining why the general public (including the mainland tourists) should stay away from the
FLG. Li Hongzhi was said to be like Shoko Asahara and Jim Jones, and the FLG was presented
as an evil cult comparable to Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and Peoples Temple in California. Other
examples of cults causing death of innocents in Texas, the Philippines, and South Korea were
shown in the posters. These banners and posters seem to suggest that HKYCAL’s target
audience was the general public, and their objective was to warn the public away from the FLG
in order to counteract FLG’s self-promotion and condemnation of the CCP.
Using banners and posters to enclose FLG’s was quite a common tactic of HKYCAL in
2012 – 2014. Not surprisingly, conflicts between FLG and HKYCAL demonstrators were
frequent. In July 2012, members of HKYCAL once replaced FLG’s banner saying “The Heaven
will destroy the CCP” and with one saying “The Heaven will destroy the evil cult” at the border
between Hong Kong and Lok Ma Chau around midnight in the absence of FLG members.13 Two
months later, more than 20 banners and posters of HKYCAL were vandalized overnight.14 Both
the FLG and the HKYCAL reported to the police for property damage. A FLG member was
13
“Shinai Daishou Weijiao Falungong [A Housewife Held a Knife to Encircle FLG],” Next Magazine, vol.1170,
August 9, 2012.
14
“Fan Falungong Henge Beihui Zaigua [The Anti-FLG Banners were Put Up Again after They were Vandalized,”
Daily News, September 6, 2012.
16
arrested and fined at court.15 When the FLG played music for their qigong exercise and broadcast
the bad deeds of the CCP, HKYCAL broadcast stories accusing FLG of being an evil cult right
next to it in a high volume to drown out the FLG’s broadcast. Their noises got louder due to
competition and police officers were called upon many times to settle the conflicts.16
In April 2014, we saw a FLG counter dramatizing live organ harvesting at the busiest
street in Causeway Bay. It was surrounded by half a dozen HKYCAL demonstrators holding
flags and banners. Two loudspeakers from HKYCAL broadcasting FLG as an evil cult were
placed right next to the FLG followers who were meditating next to their booth. While a FLG
demonstrator was distributing The Epoch Times and a small book entitled Nine Criticisms on the
CCP to the pedestrians, the HKYCAL demonstrators simply stood there holding the flags
without actively approaching the public. It appeared that the primary objective of the
HKYCAL’s action was to interfere with FLG’s activities rather than targeting the public.
Since 2015, it has become even more obvious that the HKYCAL was more interested in
disrupting FLG’s activities than reaching out to the public. When we approached the HKYCAL
at their booth in Hung Hom in July 2015 to ask for flyers, we were told that there were no
materials for distribution. Then, on July 17 and 18, 2015, we observed two days of FLG parades
marking the 16th anniversary of the FLG being banned in China. The Saturday parade on July 17
followed a six kilometer route passing through the densely populated Kowloon Peninsula from a
community park called Cheung Sha Wan Playground to the Star Ferry Perry in Tsim Sha Tsui.
The Sunday parade on July 18 was longer, starting in North Point in east Hong Kong island and
15
“Jianlan Guanai Xiehui Duozhang Henge, Falungong Xinghui Beipan Zuiming Chengli [Vandalized Some
Banners of HKYCAL, A Member of FLG was Charged of Guilty],” Daily News, September 13, 2012.
16
“Bei Fenge 10 Mi Yuan, Changmao Aniu Shengyuan, Guanai Xiehui Dazhan Falungong [Being Separated for 10
Meters, Long Hair and Tsang Kin-shing Came to Support (FLG), the Battle between HKYCAL and FLG],” Daily
News, November 30, 2012. Also from the first author’s observation in Causeway in April 2014 and her research
assistant’s interviews with shopkeepers in North Point in April 2016.
17
ending in west Hong Kong island at the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in
the Hong Kong S.A.R. (Liaison Office). Saturday’s parade included about 600 Falun Gong
participants and Sunday’s was somewhat larger. According to our interviews, the total Falun
Gong community in Hong Kong is quite small, probably between 100 and 300 members. The
majority of participants in the parade, therefore, had travelled to join the parades from outside of
Hong Kong. Of these, most were from Taiwan; there were also some mainland practitioners who
had visited Hong Kong expressly to join in the parade.
Anti-FLG mobilization at the two parades was vigorous throughout. To appreciate the
scale of the contentious repertoire that has taken shape between FLG and the pro-government
demonstrators, it helps to picture the entire scene. For the Saturday parade, both FLG and antiFLG groups had reserved space in the playground, which was effectively divided up into two
corrals each about the size of half of a football field. One was for use by FLG and other anti-FLG
groups. Four rows of barricades separated the two sides. The anti-FLG demonstrators installed
seven vertical banners, each towering about 10 meters high, with slogans such as, “Li Hongzhi is
a demon. Falun Gong is an evil cult” and “Let’s make a harmonious Hong Kong. Stay away
from Falun Gong.” “Demand the Hong Kong government stop Falun Gong destroying Hong
Kong.” These signs were free standing, installed with apparently professional quality materials
and skill. The signs faced the Falun Gong preparation area and not, as one might otherwise
expect, the street where passing members of the public might read them. Behind the banners and
floating in the air about 30 meters above the fray were a half dozen enormous helium balloons,
like small green zeppelins emblazoned with FLG’s logo being crossed out. From each green orb
dangled a black banner saying “Bring Li Hongzhi to Justice” and showing a picture of Li
Hongzhi with his faced crossed out and fangs drawn into his mouth. The anti-FLG demonstrators
18
spread themselves along the steel barricades facing the FLG parade preparation area, with at
least two different sections for different organizations. The largest group, perhaps 200 in number,
was from HKYCAL – identifiable by their matching green shirts and yellow sashes. They were
lined in columns behind the banners, and were loitering in the heat, giving off an air of either
discomfort or disinterest. In contrast to their flaccid appearance, loud, constant chanting blared
across the park from their handheld megaphones. Chanting frequently followed a call and
response form, with one voice calling out “Down with Falun Gong” and then the whole groups
replying with the same call. The incongruity between the boisterous chanting and the flaccidlooking activists was resolved upon closer inspection: the call and response chanting was prerecorded and simply broadcast over and over again. We observed this pattern throughout the two
days of events. Given that the orientation of signs and sounds were all targeted at FLG’s
preparation area rather than the surrounding community, the effect of the anti-activist
mobilization in this setting was primarily to distract and disturb FLG.
The FLG side of the contentious formations in some ways mirrored the assault it was
experiencing. Like anti-FLG demonstrators, they too had large 10-meter tall signs, with
messages like “Bring Jiang Zemin to Justice” and “Heaven will Destroy the CCP.” In response to
the noise and disruption of the anti-FLG, FLG made a wall around their preparation grounds with
these signs. Unlike the signs of the anti-FLG, however, the FLG signs were designed to be hand
held while marching. At least two people had to stand and hold the sign posts. Their volunteers
stood facing inwards, with their backs turned toward the rest of the park. In the interior “privacy”
created by the wall of signs, FLG’s marching band, dressed in blue and white uniforms,
rehearsed its performance. This created enough noise, at least when one walked close, to drown
the anti-FLG megaphone chanting.
19
Along the entire six kilometer march to the Star Ferry pier, small teams of anti-FLG
groups occupied every single intersection and also, for long city blocks, every half-block interval.
We observed the HKYCAL teams used the subway to leap frog the FLG parade, so that one team
was always present at these established intervals for the entire parade. At the final destination,
anti-activists repeated what they had accomplished at the playground: they installed a wall of
banners, megaphones, and what appeared to be two bus-loads of college-age new recruits. FLG
participants shared a rumor that these students had been bussed in from Shenzhen. The FLG
parade ended with a drum and dance performance, which occurred again within the makeshift
privacy of using FLG banners to form a barrier against the better equipped and refreshed antiactivist forces. FLG participants expressed fatigue and resignation when speaking with us.
Sunday’s events on July 18, 2015, followed the same patterns, as the anti-FLG demonstrators
doggedly accompanied the FLG parade as it wound its long way from North Point to the Liaison
Office.
Given the interactive and even mirroring nature of the contentious repertoire that has
taken shape between the FLG and the anti-FLG, one difference is striking. FLG consistently
oriented their public messaging during the parades to the bystander publics. Walking the
sidewalks on both sides of the march were a handful of FLG members handing out free copies of
their newspapers, The Epoch Times and Minghui. By contrast, the anti-FLG demonstrators lined
the parade route yelling (or pre-recorded yelling) slogans at the FLG marchers, booing them and
holding out their hands with thumbs pointed down in disgust. These too were performances
intended for the surrounding public audiences, but they did not make the additional effort to
distribute information.
20
On April 24, 2016, we observed another large scale anti-FLG campaign jointly staged by
HKYCAL and five other groups as mentioned above. There were about 700 FLG and 300 antiFLG demonstrators. Apart from two of the small groups (Proud & Wonderful Hong Kong
Company Limited and “Loving Hong Kong Citizens Alliance”) which seemed to share some
common members, all other groups did not seem to be coordinating with one another and
sometimes their noises from chanting slogans interfered with one another. The HKYCAL, with
about 200 participants, took a leading role. It set up a huge façade facing the park where FLG
was holding their forum. A giant piece of black cloth with Li Hongzhi’s portrait was hung on the
façade signifying that it was the funeral for Li Hongzhi. The words, white in color, “Sinner
Forever” and “Li Hongzhi’s Funerary Photo” were printed right above and underneath Li’s
portrait respectively. Bunches of white flowers surrounded Li’s portrait with a pair of Chinese
idioms meaning “corrupted cheater” and “doggie traitor” on its sides. Loud Chinese mourning
music was played. When FLG started the parade, a loud male voice accompanied by funeral
music announced “Three bows please! Li Hongzhi is having his funeral! Li Hongzhi is having
his funeral!” This announcement was chanted many times, along with other comments like “Li
Hongzhi is a sinner. He deserves it! You guys don’t be too sad. I feel sorry for you. But I am
very happy!” Five members of HKYCAL wore pieces of white sackcloth over white shirts and
pants with white sackcloth cone-shaped hats (which are wore by the family members of the
deceased) to dramatize paying the last respects to Li. The FLG demonstrators marched as if they
did not hear anything. HKYCAL’s drama was in fact quite entertaining to the outsiders. By
wearing the white sackcloth to pay respects to Li, HKYCAL members actually acted as if they
were Li’s family members. Demonstrators from other anti-FLG groups simply held posters and
cardboards and chanting anti-FLG slogans. The FLG demonstrators marched from 2PM to 6PM
21
from North Point in east Hong Kong Island to Sai Ying Pun in west Hong Kong Island. The antiFLG members, again, used the subway to leap frog the FLG parade in a few spots, such as Wan
Chai, Causeway Bay, and Sai Ying Pun. They stood on the sidewalks and broadcast or shouted
anti-FLG slogans. The final stop of FLG’s parade is the Liaison Office of the Central People’s
Government in the Hong Kong S.A.R. (Liaison Office) where FLG followers read out their
petitions to the Beijing government. Three anti-FLG groups arrived early outside the Liaison
Office standing in the demonstration zone separated from one another by barricades set up by the
police. It was raining very hard and even though the demonstrators wore rain coats and held
umbrellas, they were all wet. Some small kids from “The Association of Caring for the
Grassroots in Hong Kong” were taken by their parents to shelter in the footbridge nearby. The
FLG petition team, which was composed of about 20 followers, arrived at about 5:45PM. They
stood in a small strip of demonstration zone right in front of the Liaison Office, turned their back
against the Office. Surprisingly, the anti-FLG groups all left by 6PM right before the FLG
members read out their petitions. It was surprising because it would be the best moment to
disturb the FLG by playing music or chanting slogans so that FLG’s petitions could not be heard.
It appeared to us that that the anti-FLG participants were hired up to 6PM and so they were
dismissed right before the most critical moment of FLG’s protest.17
Although HKYCAL’s booths appear in wherever FLG is present and there are normally
two to three members stationing at the booths, they seem passive and non-engaging compared to
the FLG members in interacting with the public. Members of the HKYCAL usually hold a stack
of flyers (which accuses the FLG of being an evil cult) to be distributed to the passers-by.
17
We observed a similar pattern at a protest against HKU Council on July 28, 2015. The anti-activists showed up
with loud, full volume bullhorns to drown out the press conference of the HKU alumni association working group,
However, after precisely 60 minutes, they all magically disappeared. We guessed that they were paid for one hour of
protest to disturb the activists’ events.
22
However, from our observation in some weekday and weekend afternoons in March-April in
Tsim Sha Tsui where many tourists and local shoppers walked by, they attempted merely 8 – 10
times in an hour on average to give out the flyers, and yet only about two to three of those being
approached took their flyers. Furthermore, unlike what we saw in 2013 – 2014 when HKYCAL
enclosed FLG’s booths and intense conflicts between them were frequent, now members of
HKYCAL rarely interact with FLG members and both camps seem to be kept in their place
rather peacefully in their daily campaigns.
We observed that the local public generally lacked interest in both FLG and anti-FLG
booths and posters. Some tourists, mostly those from mainland China, did stop by to watch the
posters of either side. Nonetheless, they usually walked away when they were approached by
members of either side who attempted to sell their campaign. During FLG’s parade in April 2016,
we informally interviewed 27 onlookers, pedestrians, tourists, shopkeepers, and taxi drivers
about their reception to the FLG and anti-FLG actions. The overwhelming majority expressed no
interest in either of them. Some local onlookers even could not tell the difference between the
FLG and the anti-FLG. Some commented that “there has been too much politics in Hong Kong”
and so they supported neither FLG nor anti-FLG. Others said what both camps have been doing
was “nonsense” and they simply treated them as dramas. The mainland tourists, on the other
hand, seemed quite curious about what was going on. They did not know what FLG and antiFLG were, but they appreciated the political freedom in Hong Kong, commenting that Hong
Kong is “much more open than the mainland for allowing this kind of protests to take place.”
Although the phony manners of the anti-FLG groups as a whole fail to gain public
support, they have created some negative impacts on the FLG. First, as anti-FLG used
loudspeakers to broadcast anti-FLG messages, FLG turned up the volume of their anti-CCP
23
messages. Many shopkeepers complained that both FLG and anti-FLG were too noisy and
disturbing and one of them said it was the presence of the FLG that led to the appearance of the
anti-FLG and, therefore, the FLG was the root of the problem. Taxi drivers complained that they
blocked the traffic and again the FLG was the one to be blamed because they held the
demonstrations way before the anti-FLG did. If FLG disappeared, then naturally the anti-FLG
would disappear too. Second, when FLG and anti-FLG accused each other of getting paid to
come out and yet no sound evidence was provided by either party, the public tended to believe
that both camps received payments “to perform.” A shop owner and an onlooker commented that
what the anti-FLG did appeared faux to them and, at the same time, they wondered how FLG
could afford organizing the parade so often with hundreds of participants flew in from Taiwan.
Lastly, the anti-FLG demonstrations have effectively intimidated the FLG, causing the FLG
members to be suspicious of outsiders. FLG’s exclusion of outsiders from attending their forum
in their commemorative events has further turned FLG into a clique and lost public support.
Conclusion: The Impacts of the Anti-Activist Mobilization
The anti-FLG campaign takes place not only in Hong Kong but also in Taiwan and North
America, wherever the FLG has been active in campaigning against the CCP. The global scale of
the anti-FLG protests suggests that this effort is unlikely mobilized by the local government in
Hong Kong, but more likely orchestrated and sponsored by the CCP and/or Beijing government.
Pro-government actions taken in the form of popular protests, likewise, appear not only in Hong
Kong, and not all the pro-government collective actions are necessarily state-mobilized. In this
paper, however, we focus on the contentious actions that appear to be state-mobilized. In this
concluding section, we would like to discuss the implications and possible impacts of the
24
proliferation of these state-mobilized pro-government, anti-activist groups and their collective
actions on social movements and civil society in Hong Kong.
Our analysis is based on the concept of tactical dispositions (Junker 2014) to draw
attention to the social relations between activist groups, audiences, and authorities manifest in
the collective actions we observed. The FLG tactics observed above replicated a tactical
disposition consistent with conventional social movement activism: protesters attempted to
garner public support through collective demonstrations of “worthiness, unity, numbers, and
commitment” (or, “WUNC,” see (Tilly and Wood 2013)) and ultimately hope to advance their
political cause through the moral pressure via public opinion. However, Iit is ambiguous whether
anti-FLG protestsactivism operates on this same principle and if they rely/or relies upon an
analogous set of dispositional relations between protestors, publics and authorities. First, we
observe a reversal of the protestors-s/authoritiesy relation: for anti-activism, assuming that
protestors are ultimately acting as agents of Chinese authorities, then pressuring authorities to act
against prior policy or interests is not the objective. This difference is a fundamental break with
conventional protest. Second, we also observe an alternation in the relation between protestors
and publics. On one hand, anti-FLG activism clearly takes the form of communicating messages
to the public, as in conventional protest. Nevertheless, much of the evidence presented here
suggests that persuading public opinion was only a superficial objective for anti-FLG
protestactivists. For example, HKYCAL “volunteers” rarely made efforts to reach out to the
bystander public; whereas FLG activists much more consistently attempted to persuade the
bystander public. Furthermore, by holding the flags of the PRC in their protests, these progovernment groups are destined to have a very small market in this post-colonial city, especially
when resistance to mainlandization is evident under the current political cultural context.
25
Nonetheless, we also noted that the audience most inclined to view the spectacle of the
competing protestors in a positive light was, ironically, the tourists visiting from mainland China.
This suggests that the anti-FLG protestsactivism wereas drawing greater attention from PRC
tourists to the civil liberties protected in Hong Kong, as in contrast to China, and therefore may
be having the unintended effect of increasing admiration among PRC visitors of the social
virtues of free speech and association. Furthermore, by holding the flags of the PRC in their
protests, these pro-government groups are destined to have a very small market in this postcolonial city, especially when resistance to mainlandization is evident under the current political
cultural context. Given these observations, we conclude that the effects of anti-activism
mobilization are not primarily to be measured by winning public support. Instead, s; thus, statemobilized anti-activism may represent something somewhat distinct from conventional social
movement activism.
What are the aims and effects, then, of anti-activism? We suggest that it primarily aims to
disrupt, discredit, and distract “true” social movements as they attempt to influence public
opinion. The key social relation in the tactical disposition of the anti-FLG groups is not that
between protestors and publics but is that between the state-mobilized anti-activists and their
targets: self-organized, voluntary activists. Furthermore, we hypothesize that such anti-activism,
intentionally or unintentionally, undermines the public sphere more generally by (1) fomenting
distrust in the reliability of protest as a way to observe and measure different public opinions and
by (2) polarizing public debates.
One of the indicators of way to observe the emphasis of anti-activism on interference
rather than communication can be seen in the use of noise and banners by anti-FLG groups.
Anti-activists emphasized the noise volume of communication over the content of
26
communication: drowning out the sound of FLG or pro-democracy protests is a major tactic of
anti-activists we frequently observed. In the first phase of confrontation between HKYCAL and
FLG, HKYCAL emphasized physically obstructing of Falun Gong signs, rather than only
making counter-claims more persuasive for on-looking audiences. The constant loud-speaker
blared, pre-recorded anti-FLG messages witnessed at the FLG parades and booths, even when no
bystander public was present, demonstrates how anti-activism tactics aimed to disrupt and
distract their opponents, rather than counter-perform a persuasive message to the bystander
public. Similarly, in the Cheung Sha Wan Playground event described above, anti-FLG banners,
speakers, and demonstrating were all disruptively targeted at FLG activists as they prepared to
march; members of the bystander public were not the audience for such banners and audio
assaults. The relational disposition expressed through this disruptive tactic emphasized the statemobilized anti-activists interfering with the capacity of self-organized, voluntary activists to
perform their own claims to the public.
Discrediting seems to be another objective of the anti-activist mobilization. What makes
this form of discrediting distinctive, we suggest, is that anti-activists succeed even if they
discredit themselves in the process. That is, whereas conventional social movements aim to
appear “worthy” and have “standing” in the eyes of the public, – anti-activists are tolerant of
being dismissed and viewed negatively, as long as their efforts simultaneously discredit those of
the opposition by casting doubt on all participants in the conflict. If one side is faux, the public
is likely to conclude that the other side is also faux, as in the case of the FLG. Similarly, Dduring
the OCM, rumors circulated all over the city that both OCM participants and anti-OCM
participants received payments. There were rumors that some participants of the Yellow Ribbon
got paid to sit in and sleep overnight in Mongkok’s occupation zone and some participants of the
27
Blue Ribbon got paid to disturb the public forums and make mischief to discredit the
movement.18 These rumors, regardless of their veracity, discredited the OCM to some extent.
They also led to mutual suspicion and distrust between activists and the general public. For
instance, some participants of the OCM were increasingly guarded when they interacted with
outsiders and observers due to the rumors that some anti-OCM might come to stir up trouble.19
Furthermore, discrediting opponents by generating a loud, disruptive, rancorous, and sometimes
violent atmosphere at protests may be especially effective in the densely populated space of
Hong Kong, which maintains relatively stringent and widely shared norms of public civility.
The more general, ominous effect of anti-activism may be undermining the integrity of
the civil sphere and of protest as a form of legitimate democratic practice. This effect appears to
have different sources. Partly, it is the effect of discrediting as described above: if one side is
faux, the other side may be too and all of protest becomes something unreliable, inauthentic, and
worthy of suspicion. Another undermining effect comes from provoking the radicalization of
tactics used by the political dissidents. The FLG case demonstrates one aspect of this process.
Between 2000 and 2012, FLG had been quietly and on a daily basis managing stalls on a daily
basis distributing information, displaying banners, and collecting signatures in about two dozen
locations in Hong Kong. During that period, there were very few complaints against FLG.20 Only
after HKYCAL mounted an aggressive campaign against FLG, did FLG activists respond more
aggressively, by turning up the volume of their speakers and , engaging in banner hanging battles,
and so forth. The over-all level of public nuisance increased drastically as the contentious
repertoire evolved between both groups, asbut prompted by HKYCAL’s initial aggressive tactics.
18
From the first author’s field observation in October - November 2014.
From the first author’s field observation in November 2014.
20
“Removing Falun Gong Banners ‘Breached Right to Free Speech’,” South China Morning Post, April 4, 2014.
19
28
Eventually, these events discredited FLG at least as much as HKYCAL. As HKCYAL does not
need to be concerned about its public standing, the reputational cost disproportionately fell to
FLG. And more generally, a cumulative effect of the experience was to encourage the bystander
public to see minority voices engaged in protest as a nuisance and as the ultimate cause of social
disorder. Such were the comments of the interviewees who saw FLG as the “root” cause of the
problem. Given that a democratic civil sphere can be judged by its capacity to protect the rights
of minority voices, as majority voices rarely need protection, this effect of the anti-FLG
mobilization has ominous implications.
The final general effect of anti-activism we hypothesize is the polarization of public
debates, which pushes out moderate and centrist voices. The sudden emergence of the progovernment collective actions, which appeared to be sponsored by the PRC, is interpreted by
many in Hong Kong as one sign among many of Hong Kong losing its autonomy. Anti-activism
is frequently interpreted as evidence of PRC encroachment and increasingly repressive
governance. In response, and further fueled by the failure of OCM to win any concessions after a
largely peaceful 79-day occupation, anti-government and anti-mainland sentiments have
intensified and fueled more radical anti-mainland activism, as advocated for by some newly
emerged “localist groups” (本土派). Certainly, some of the radicalization in localist ideology
and tactics is motivated by the fear that mainland Chinese authorities are not following the spirit
of the laws that institutionalize civil society protests in Hong Kong, and that the end game
outcome from such corrosive operation will ultimately stifle civil society all together.
Polarization is amplified further by the fact that pro-government groups not only stage
protests against pro-democratic activism but also enthusiastically show support to the
government and the police force. This, unintentionally or deliberately, puts the government and
29
police force in opposition to the pro-democratic camp. Similarly, any criticism on the prodemocratic camp may be appropriated by the pro-government groups to justify their cause. For
instance, when a columnist, Wat Wing-yin, was vilified and even threatened by some radical
members of the Yellow Ribbon for her criticisms on the OCM and her support for the police
force, the Silent Majority for Hong Kong launched a “silent rally” to support Wat, labeled the
radical members of the OCM as “yellow mobs” and accused them of destroying Hong Kong’s
freedom of speech.21 As the public sphere became polarized, the space for criticisms and debates
between the poles greatly shrank. Many educated members of the public who were critical of
OCM methods but sympathetic to the cause remained silent rather than be associated with the
Blue Ribbon pole. Open, civil public discourse was subsequently curtailed during the OCM.
Likewise, any positive comments on the police force were taken by the localism activists as
“supporting the repressive government against the people.” As polarization has occurred, fights
between localism and pro-government groups have been intensified in the absence of voices
from those in the center.
The localism activists feel strong resentment against Hong Kong government and the
police force, as seen in the Chinese New Year riots of February 2016. Localists have recently
advocated independent sovereignty that touched the nerve of the PRC. Consequently, Beijing’s
encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy is likely to expand in the near future, which bodes ill
for the legal and institutional integrity of Hong Kong’s current civil society. Obviously,
polarization cannot be solely blamed on the anti-activism mobilization or even on progovernment forces; all sides of the conflict are responsible for their contributions to escalation.
21
Yu Qianren Moxing Cheng Qu Yingyan Zhourong Pi Jixie Wuying [Over a Thousand People Took Part in a
“Silent Walk” to Support Wat Wing-yin; Chow Yung Criticized the Journalists Association for Not Reporting the
Event], Wenweipo, May 25, 2015.
30
Nevertheless, to the extent that some very visible anti-activism mobilization is state supported
rather than volunteer, then the forces of polarization emanating from state provocation should be
identified and challenged in the interests of preserve the civil sphere’s institutional integrity. Our
case study illustrates
In conclusion, our examination of pro-government/anti-activist mobilization in Hong
Kong, and the case of anti-FLG protests in particular, suggests that anti-activism represents
something quite different from ordinary social movement activism. It takes the outward
appearance of conventional protest activism but follows a different operational logic. It aims to
disrupt, discredit, and distract voluntary, self-organized protesting groups. The discrediting and
polarizing effects of anti-activism can be fully accomplished without the state-mobilized groups
in fact wining public support. Overall, we conclude that this form of state-mobilized
contentionprotest may be undermining the integrity of civil society, although further research is
necessary to test such a hypothesis.
31
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Double
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