Volume 2. From Absolutism to Napoleon, 1648-1815
Archduke Joseph II, "Political Daydreams" [Rêveries politiques] (1763)
Originally written in French, the following is an early confidential essay by the future Emperor
Joseph II (ruled in co-regency with his mother Maria Theresa, 1765-80, and as emperor alone,
1780-90). He expresses his robust “absolutist” conception of state power, especially above and
against the interests of the “great” or magnate aristocracy. Yet he also advocates negotiations
with the elite-dominated provincial estates and monarchical rule through a structured
bureaucracy and ministerial cabinet.
The two fundamental principles according to which one should act are unlimited power [in order]
for the state to be able to do everything good, and the means to support this state without
foreign help. To accomplish both of these goals, I would advocate:
1. Demoting and reducing the wealth of the “great ones” [i.e. the magnate aristocracy], because
I do not find it very useful that there are small kings and rich subjects who live in prosperity,
without worrying about what will become of the state. I see it as an axiom that every person in
his capacity as a subject of the state, which supports and protects him and guarantees his rights,
owes his service through the tasks that the state, whose spokesman is the ruler, holds him
capable of, not according to his own convenience or pleasure. However, because people are no
longer made for the offices, one must fit the people to them. That smacks of despotism, but
without the aforementioned absolute power to do everything, one is hindered by regulations,
statutes, and oaths, which the territories think are for their own protection, but which, viewed
rationally, only work to their disadvantage — without this unlimited power it is neither possible
for a state to be fortunate, nor for a ruler to accomplish anything great. I consider it a principle
that the steering of the giant machine by a single head, even a mediocre one, is better than ten
excellent ones, if they all must reach an agreement about every action. God save me from
violating the oaths that I have sworn, but I believe that one must try to convince the territories
and make them understand the extent to which a limited monarchy, as I suggest, would be
useful to them. Therefore, I would propose to make an agreement with the territories, in that I
would ask them for ten years for unconstrained power, to do everything for their benefit without
seeking their consent. To accomplish this would demand great effort, but I think that the
moment is favorable at this hour, and experience will show them the benefit. Many individuals
will be unhappy about it, but the majority of the nation is to be given preference over this group.
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As soon as I have accomplished this, I will attack the feudal lords. I will impose on them the
double land tax [Dominikalsteuer], along with taxes that have already been suggested in the
finance system. I am in favor of them all, because they burden the lords as they do the subjects,
and because one can always grant the latter tax reductions. In contrast to this [tax] relief, the
subjects must tolerate the quartering of troops, because I believe that troops should remain
outside of the barracks, for the advantage of the military as well as for use, which means a profit
for the lords, and also for the promotion of the military spirit that all of this imparts to the entire
nation.
Because I reduce the revenues of the nobles, I can neither demand nor expect to have a
splendid court — but what use is this, anyway? Inner strength, laws, strict attention to the law,
orderly finances, a respectable military, blooming commerce, an esteemed ruler — all of that
characterizes one of the most significant courts in Europe better than banquets, feast days,
sumptuous fabric, diamonds, gilded halls, dishes of gold, sleigh rides, etc. It follows that the one
cannot be without the other, and I will no longer require this pageantry of my subjects, no richly
set tables, no costly clothing made outside of the country — at most, local embroidery. I will
require nothing that could cause the least expense, because to do so would be a folly and an
injustice, because one would take away their revenues.
Through the following suggested reduction of the wealth and earnings of the “great,” one will
find that the people perform their duties with greater assiduousness; everyone would try to enter
the service and therefore put forth greater effort. The young people who know that they will have
adequate property at their disposal for their entire lifetimes, meaning that they don’t need to
serve the state, are of no use at all; they aspire to do nothing, spend insane sums, make debts,
which, because they do not repay them, ruin the poor and the craftsmen who pay taxes.
However, if one knew that the only means for living in prosperity was the attainment of an office,
namely through one's own industriousness and through actual performance alone, without
consideration to recommendations, relatives, and not even the merits of forefathers, because
one rewarded the father who served the state well — nothing were more just — but this reward
should not burden the state with ne'er-do-wells who have nothing of their fathers but their
names. Base everything on individual merit! If this rule were followed without exception, what
geniuses would appear, [ones] who are hidden at this hour, either from laziness or because they
have been suppressed by the great ones. Everyone would make an effort, because, knowing
this, he would have had the goal, since birth, of gaining the possibility of living in prosperity,
which he could only accomplish with a salary from his ruler.
I would employ few people, but the selection would be exceedingly rigorous. After their
probationary year, their salaries would rise every five years. Once they left the service, they
would go back to their initial salary, but certainly not the lazy, negligent, or incompetent ones;
they could expect nothing more. Malicious errors would be punished with the utmost severity,
even without regard to birthright, because I do not see how it is just that a person who
possesses old papers of nobility and is a rogue goes unpunished, while in the same case
another, who does not have such scraps of paper, would be immediately hanged.
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In order for a nobleman to serve the state, and in a most mediocre way at that, one must pay
him in gold; for a president to make his name available, without even working in the office
himself, and to sit there three times a week for three hours, in order to allow his secretary to
write, one must pay him ten or twelve thousand Gulden. If he didn’t need any expensive robes,
if his wife and his daughters required no diamonds, and if he didn’t require six horses, then he
could easily be content with four thousand. For a councilor to serve the state, to let his scribe
write while he walks in the park (Prater) and goes to comedies and beer gardens, he requires
six thousand, or at least four thousand. On his own, the president whose salary was reduced
would downgrade all the others himself, for those who now do the work are the poorest, the
chancellors who only receive four or five hundred. As soon as the state paid them better, they
would feel entitled to idleness themselves.
Through my plan, which would greatly reduce the number of documents and at the same time
simplify the machine considerably, I can certainly cut the expenses of each department by half,
in that I would remove the incompetent as well as the lazy. I believe that to lead this machine
one head making decisions is sufficient, though advised by a committee like the privy council
[Staatsrat]. The procedure that I intend to suggest is, as far as I know, unique: instead of
separating the issues from each other, one must combine them.
I am convinced that in the entire monarchy there are only two organs that are well organized:
the war council [Kriegsrat], as it currently exists, and the superior court of justice. Regarding
their responsibilities, I would free both from all reports to the privy council. A ruler must trust in
the judiciary, after he has selected capable subjects for it. Regarding the military, the generals
understand more than we do, and one has seen unequivocal evidence of their righteousness
and ability.
I believe that one chancellery is sufficient for each territory, if it makes an effort. If it does not
make an effort, then one should restructure it. Regarding the finances, I must admit that the
mass of big words, which one does not understand, but whose effects have produced no
positive result, has not convinced me of the good state of our policies. I would like to assume
that the regiment of accountants, whose infallibility is not proven and whom one must
reverentially believe, would be much weakened by a financial department in which the other
three are combined. One chief, one head, but an excellent one and granted all authority, would
better bring affairs in order than this entire complicated mechanism, which is based on book
learning and its application and only shows its vanity. I am no great expert in financial matters,
but fewer words and greater results would impress me. I would lead the machine with four
divisions (including all the territories except Hungary). The finances of Italy and the Netherlands,
I am convinced, cannot be administered by only one head doing the work, and by one single
minister, who, being too busy, only touches on the matters once a month, and the ruler would
be less informed about them than about the government of France. I believe that a chancellery
would not be too much for the political affairs of these two lands.
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For foreign affairs, above all for secrecy, I believe it is better to allow one intelligent head, upon
whose righteousness one can rely, to act, as long as there is a combined conference like this.
For Hungary, the chancellery is to be retained, but even the reports from Italy and the
Netherlands would go to the privy council. I assume that one must work to make this land
[Hungary] happy, before one can reasonably demand something additional. [ . . . ]
One says that the commerce of Hungary affects the territories of Austria negatively, but if
Hungary delivers taxes like these for the next while, which I do not doubt, then we would have
found our Peru; to accomplish this goal one may not demand an increase [in taxes] at the first
Imperial Diet, because the little that one would gain would hinder the domestic disposition
through the embitterment of feelings. By gaining a million, one would lose the chance to make
six or seven [million] in profit over several years.
The upper nobility must be kept down either through honors or through fear. The lower nobility
should be supported against the upper nobility and won over through the granting of any offices
that are controlled by the ruler. One should defend the subjects against the tyrannical rule of the
nobles, in that everyone should be given the right to sell their foodstuffs without difficulties. Thus
one would easily reach my goal. [ . . . ]
2. To get the state in working order immediately, I would suggest dealing a great blow to the
most useless elements of the polity, namely those who live from their capital. I would announce
that from now on no one would pay a higher interest rate than three percent, without exception
for any accounts or any debtors, because the state is not in the position to continue to pile debts
upon debts. [ . . . ]
Private citizens will invest their money in commerce and in agriculture in order to profit from the
greater return from their capital. [ . . . ]
Through these measures, the monarchy would find itself in a splendid situation, some
individuals and above all the powerful would suffer under them, but the very bad state of affairs
demands drastic measures. I still view these measures as the simplest way to accomplish the
great goal of supporting the monarchy in the present and maintaining it in the future. I cannot
believe that one would be found guilty of having committed misconduct by God or man in
following these principles and intentions, but these are only preliminary ideas, and only the
fundamental principles that one should have in mind in all matters. Now is the right moment.
Everyone expects to be charged, credit is beginning to disappear, and no one will complain, or
not very much, about these taxes that I suggest, because one recognizes their sense and the
hope that they give.
To demotion of the great ones, which I find most useful and most necessary, is an objective that
one should hardly admit to having, but an objective that one must always have in mind in all his
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dealings. Even the privy council must know nothing of this, the decisions made by the ruler must
come from this. [ . . . ]
Reward the good, dismiss the incompetent, punish the bad — I believe that with this concept
the state would be happy and respected in the present as well as in the future. Once the
decision is made, then one must hold fast to all points against all opposition, because if one part
is excluded, then the entirety is flawed.
Source of the original French text: Derek Beales: Joseph II’s »Rêveries«, in Mitteilungen des
Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, vol. 33, Vienna/Horn: 1980, pp. 155-60.
Source of German translation: Der Josephinismus. Ausgewählte Quellen zur Geschichte der
theresianischen Reformen [Der Josephinismus. Selected Sources on the History of Reform in
the Era of Maria Theresa], edited by Harm Klueting. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1995, pp. 78-84.
Reprinted in Helmut Neuhaus, ed., Zeitalter des Absolutismus 1648-1789 [The Era of
Absolutism, 1648-1789]. Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung, edited by Rainer A.
Müller, volume 5. Stuttgart: P. Reclam, 1997, pp. 213-22.
Translation from German into English: Benjamin Marschke
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