Women and the Olympics
Amanda N. Schweinbenz
Diplomats in Tracksuits or Simply Olympic Athletes?
Eastern European Female Oarswomen
at the Olympic Games During the Cold War
Amanda N. Schweinbenz
Canada
Since the introduction of women’s events to the international racing program in 1954, Eastern Bloc oarswomen dominated the sport, winning the majority of medals available. The racing course, as other sporting venues, had become a platform to publicly display communist political ideologies and national
supremacy over democratic nations such as the United States of America. In 1976, women’s rowing was
entered for the first time on the Olympic program at the Games in Montréal. Women from fifteen different nations competed in six events during the week-long regatta. Eastern European nations dominated
the medal podium, capturing fifteen of eighteen medals, with East Germany (GDR) and Bulgaria sweeping the gold medal positions, winning four and two respectively. However, the experiences of the oarswomen at these, and subsequent, Olympic Games were not solely focussed on winning medals and
promoting communist ideology. Like their Western counterparts, Eastern Bloc oarswomen had a greater
appreciation for the Games that went beyond their roles as ‘diplomats in tracksuits.’
❖
Introduction
F
ormer International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Avery Brundage was renowned for his
unwavering belief that politics had no place in the Olympic Games. However, during Brundage’s presidency, the Olympic movement was bombarded with political crises, and the effects
of the Cold War were at the forefront. Alfred E. Senn has argued that “with the Soviet entry into the
Olympic family in 1951, the IOC became a Cold War arena in which the superpowers competed
directly.”1 The Games became the stage upon which communist and democratic political ideologies
were played out.
Although socialist leaders originally rejected bourgeois sport and the Olympic Games, the potential to use international sporting achievement as a vehicle to communicate state ideology at home and
on an international basis took precedence.2 Communist leaders regarded international sport competition as a spotlight of world attention to demonstrate the superiority of their ideology over leading capitalist nations, particularly the United States.3 Soviet journalists indicated, “Each new victory is a
victory for the Soviet form of society and the socialist sports system; it provides irrefutable proof of the
superiority of socialist culture over the decaying culture of the capitalist states.”4
Talented young girls and women were central to the development of the Eastern Bloc sporting
machine and women’s rowing was a sport in which communist female athletes excelled. These
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women not only dominated international rowing championships, but also provided evidence of the
expectation of athletic equality of the sexes during a time when that was not apparent in the West.
German sport historian Gertrud Pfister has argued that “above all it was the top performances
achieved by women, ‘the diplomats in tracksuits,’ that brought to [nations like] the GDR the prestige
of a world-class sports nation.”5
However, while these ‘diplomats in tracksuits’ were expected to perform on the water and embody
their nation’s political ideologies, their Olympic experiences were not solely focussed on these tasks. Eastern European oarswomen had similar experiences at the Olympic Games to their Western competitors
including, for example, the excitement of travelling to a foreign nation, the exhilaration of walking in the
opening ceremonies, a sense of interest in meeting and speaking with other competitors, and the awe of living in the athletes’ village. These women were not naive about their responsibilities, the expectation of success, the political motivations of their sporting administrators, or the political significance of their success.
However for many, the Games were about more than winning medals or the politics that surrounded them.
Using data collected from interviews with previous international oarswomen from former Eastern
Bloc nations as well as Western nations, this paper examines their experiences as Olympians. I argue
that while success and winning were priorities for all of the participants, that was only a small aspect
of their Olympic experiences. Much has been written about the role of Eastern Bloc female athletes in
the promotion of Communist superiority, and the women articulated what was important to them, and
winning medals as a tool to promote political ideology was not their priority.6
Women’s Competitive International Rowing
In 1954, the international rowing federation (FISA), hosted its first-ever women’s European Rowing
Championships.7 This introduction of women’s events to the international racing program was fraught
with issues and controversies regarding the appropriateness of women’s participation in the sport of
rowing, as well as the physical limitations of the female body. Many male rowing administrators were
unsupportive of women’s rowing on the international racing program, citing medical and social reasons to prevent women from gaining access. Yet, the increased number of women participating in
rowing prompted several female and male rowing administrators to work for the introduction of
women’s events at FISA-regulated international regattas. Despite this resistance from many administrators, throughout the international rowing community, oarswomen did gain access to the European
championships in 1954, albeit on a limited basis. Yet, Hargreaves has suggested that we must critically examine the class-based implications of generalized increased access. 8 For example, the
women’s regatta was to be held the week prior to the men’s events and was in no way to be associated
with the men’s championships. It was decided that women would race over a distance of 1000 metres
rather than racing the 2000 metres distance the men rowed (argued to be an appropriate distance for
the delicate nature of oarswomen).9 As well, oarswomen were limited in the events that were available
to them since FISA delegates decided that women would only be permitted to race in the single sculls,
double sculls, quadruple sculls with coxswain, four with coxswain, and eight with coxswain.10
After FISA took control of the regulation of women’s competitive international rowing, the sport
began to grow internationally, with an increased importance placed on women’s success. The introduction of women’s international competitions prompted more national rowing federations to introduce women’s national rowing championships and to send women’s crews to international
competitions. Between 1954 and 1973, the number of countries competing at the women’s European
championships rose from fourteen to nineteen, and the number of entries increased from thirty-four to
fifty-three.11 This increased interest in women’s international rowing supported the FISA proposal to
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361
the IOC that women’s rowing should be introduced to the program of the Olympic Games. However,
the international sport governing body had yet to complete one element that the IOC required for
introduction into the Olympic Games—the establishment of a women’s world rowing championship.
In 1971, FISA President Thomas Keller encouraged the rowing federation’s Ordinary Annual Congress
to agree to the introduction of a 1974 world championship regatta for women.12 The Congress agreed
and, thus, FISA had fulfilled its obligation to the IOC. In 1974, the IOC Executive Board recommended
that women’s rowing events be included at the 1976 Olympic Games and also amended rule twentynine of the IOC Olympic Charter to include women’s rowing on the list of sports on the Olympic program and oarswomen raced for the first time at the 1976 Olympic Games in Montréal, Canada.13
Women’s Competitive Rowing Behind the Iron Curtain
After the introduction of women’s events at the 1954 European championships, international rowing
administrators took a step back to allow affiliated rowing nations time to adjust. In Eastern Bloc nations,
women’s competitive rowing flourished. Eastern European sporting administrators were unconcerned
with aesthetic dogma that plagued the progress of women’s competitive sport in Western nations, which
helped Eastern European athletes dominate women’s international rowing throughout the Cold War.
Rowing in Eastern Europe had steadily increased in popularity throughout most of the twentieth
century and especially after the introduction of women’s events to the international racing program.
Although socialist leaders originally rejected bourgeois sport, the potential to use international sporting achievement as a vehicle to communicate state ideology at home and on an international basis
prevailed.14 As Dennis observed:
Sport was expected…to contribute…to the development of key characteristics of the
socialist personality such as discipline, honesty, a collective spirit and a willingness to
defend the homeland. Furthermore, the successes in international competition and a
high level of popular participation in sport were intended to demonstrate the superiority
of the socialist system over capitalism.15
Specifically, communist leaders regarded sport as a spotlight of world attention to demonstrate their
superiority, particularly over the United States.16 The regulation of sport received high priority in Eastern Bloc nations and federal governments took it upon themselves to amply fund competitive sport
during the Cold War. For example, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) developed a centralised
governmental bureaucracy that invested two billion American dollars a year into sport.17 This was a
staggering amount compared to its Western counterpart, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRD), a
country that was four times the size of the GDR and spent a mere seventy million on sport each year.18
The support Eastern Bloc athletes received went beyond finances alone. Elite and potentially elite athletes became part of the Eastern Bloc sporting machines and were privileged to a significantly better
life than those who were not involved in international sport. Athletes and their families were provided
with cars, better homes, education, and access to international travel, something that was not available to the general population. Rowing historian Christopher Dodd has indicated:
…athletes and coaches would receive cars and apartments in exchange for medals,
with first—second—and third-place finishes earning much higher rewards than fourth—
through sixth-place finishes. While average East German citizens waited five years for
an apartment and 15 years for a car, athletes and coaches found themselves receiving
new keys to jangle after only one or two years.19
The development and maintenance of these Eastern Bloc sporting machines were meticulously implemented by each nation’s sport organizations. For example, the Deutscher Turnund Sportbund (DTSB),
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the GDR’s most important national sport organisation, “provided sport for the masses through nationally
organized clubs with branches at workplaces.”20 Tara Magdalinski has suggested that physical activity in
East Germany was important “for inculcating socialist values in the GDR and thus [it] provided opportunities to make young people into ideal socialist and East German citizens.”21 Yet, Allen Guttmann and
Dennis have argued that the DTSB’s mandate failed to provide opportunities for those outside of the elite
sport system.22 Sport participation for the working class and the “peasants” was severely neglected and
“east German women … rarely found time for sports participation.”23 Despite the DTSB’s neglect of
those without the potential for international sport achievement, this program was phenomenally successful in producing elite athletes who competed at the Olympic Games and international championships.24
Athletes were recruited through a formalized process in which state sport representatives visited
schools and performed a series of anthropometric tests and measurements on potential athletes. Sport
historian Arndt Krüger has indicated that the scientific processes of talent identification that were used
in the GDR as well as other former Eastern Bloc nations were “the same anthropometric procedures
developed by the [Nazi] racial scientists prior to 1945.”25 Dodd has explained that, “students who met
the exacting standards laid down by the men with the tape-measures were invited to attend one of the
twenty-seven sports’ boarding schools.”26 Former Bulgarian oarswoman Svetla Otzetova remembered
how she was first introduced to the sport of rowing: “…the system in my country (Bulgaria), at the time
was coaches were going to schools and talking to the peoples and asking, explaining [to] them…
about the sport and… [asked if] they would be interested to come and try.”27
Sporting officials looked for certain criteria in children that would ensure their future sporting success. Otzetova remembered that the coaches were initially uninterested in her becoming a rower and
stated: “I was too small and they just didn't want me, they [originally] thought there was no potential
with me. And they were openly telling me this, ‘What should we do with this mouse?’.”28
Once athletes had been identified, children spent numerous hours a week participating in sport.
After the initial development phase, young athletes began to specialize in their respective sports and it
was at this point that educational programs were specifically tailored for the needs of the individual
athletes. For example, rowing in East Germany required thirty hours of practice per week, and sport
schools ensured that time was allotted for athletes to attend training camps that were held prior to
major competitions.29 Dodd has explained that elite athletes in socialist nations, especially the former
GDR, were expected to log between 1300 and 1600 training hours each year.
Although several of the former socialist nations adopted similar recruitment, training, and educational programs for athletes, Dodd has argued that with the exception of the Romanian women’s rowing program, no other country was able to achieve the success that East Germans did through their
programs in Leipzig and Berlin: “For the system required not just money and thoroughness, but a
structure backed by a political will to ensure that it was carried out. The background to this is the German tradition of linking sport and physical education to nationalism and political organization.”30
It was this system that helped the GDR women’s rowing team win one-hundred and twenty-one
medals (of a possible one-hundred and forty-two), seventy gold, thirty-four silver, and seventeen
bronze, at FISA regulated European, world, and Olympic championships between 1966 and 1990.31
From the beginning of women’s inclusion in the 1954 European championships, Eastern Bloc
crews dominated women’s competitive international rowing and won almost eighty-two percent of
the available medals between 1954 and 1984.32 British Amateur Rowing Association President Di Ellis
indicated that during the Cold War it was common to have “five Eastern Bloc countries [racing]
against” one boat from the West in the final.33 Tricia Smith, Canada’s most successful female rower
during the 1970s and 1980s, concurred with Ellis and added:
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363
…[there] was always this force [from the Eastern Bloc countries], the Romanians, the
Bulgarians, East Germans…Russians, Poles. Most finals that…[my pair partner] and I
were in were all Eastern Bloc countries except us. There were occasionally good crews
in our event from Great Britain, the Netherlands, or the United States, but the norm was
all Eastern Bloc, except us [in the finals].34
Eastern European nations, like their Western counterparts, focussed their training programs to achieve success
at the Olympic Games. They structured their competitive sport system to align with the specific sports offered
in the Olympic Games. This strategy was designed to focus their efforts on a limited number of sports in order
to win and, ultimately, receive recognition for this success. The amount of media attention that had grown to
be part of the Games assured that winning on this stage garnered international attention. What better place to
display a nation’s athletic superiority and in turn, political ideology? — Soviets were originally uninterested in
participation in the Olympic Games. Riordan has explained that the Soviets were opposed:
…to Olympism on the grounds that the Olympics were run by capitalists and aristocrats, that workers had little chance of competing, that racial discrimination against
Jews and Blacks had occurred in Berlin in 1936 and would be applied against East Europeans who, in any case, might well be corrupted and recruited as spies.35
So strong was their distaste for the Olympic movement that individuals who supported the Games
were arrested, jailed, and some executed. They were accused of being “anti-patriotic, “anti-scientific,”
and “cosmopolitan” deviants.”36 However, despite original disinterest, Communist sport leaders and
politicians saw the political potential in the Olympic Games. As Torres and Dyerson have indicated,
after the Second World War, “the new superpowers quickly discovered that the Olympic Games provided a significant symbolic forum for measuring their enemies.”37 In 1951, the USSR entered the
Olympic family, and other Eastern European nations soon followed suit.
As with other forms of international sport competition, Eastern Bloc female athletes became an
important part of the contingent sent to the Games. Not only were there significantly more female athletes attending the Games from these nations; they also made an impressive contribution to the overall
medal count for their own nations. James Riordan has noted:
At the 1976 Olympics in Montreal, for example, Soviet sportswomen made up over a
third (35%) of the Soviet team (overall women comprised 20.58% of all competitors)
and contributed 36 of the 125 Soviet medals (almost 30%). The women of East Germany made up 40% of the GDR team and won more than half their team’s gold and
silver medals. By contrast, women comprised just over a quarter (26%) of the United
States contingent, or 112 out of 425 competitors. British and West German women
comprised slightly over a fifth (20.6% and 21% respectively) of their nation’s teams;
and French women less than a fifth (18.3%) of theirs.38
Although the Eastern Bloc athletes did win an impressive number of medals at the Olympic Games, as
well as other international sport competitions, throughout the Cold War, we now know that many of
these victories were artificially achieved because of the use of performance-enhancing substances.
The most documented perpetrators were the East Germans who, as Hoberman has indicated, “mobilized over a thousand scientists, physicians and trainers in its programme to develop successful athletes by means of anabolic steroids.”39
Olympic Experiences
Undoubtedly, Eastern Bloc female athletes knew the importance of their success at the Olympic
Games. Athletes were keenly aware that monetary prizes were awarded for medal winning performances; the higher the medal the higher the prize. They also knew that in order to be part of their
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national team and retain the funding and privileges available to successful international athletes, they
were required to win at the Olympic Games. However, the pressure to win was not solely on the
minds of Eastern Bloc athletes during their participation in the Olympic Games.
Participants spoke about the excitement they experienced during the weeks and months leading
up to the Olympic Games that had no relationship to their actual performances. For example, many of
the women discussed their anticipation of receiving their new uniforms specifically designed for the
Games and as well as the increased media attention they received, “there is a lot going on, everything
is in motion right before you go to the Olympics…you…get new clothing, … the press is very interested [in] who is [on] the team for [East] Germany and so, it's very exciting.”40 Even after arriving at
the village and during the preparation for the Games, there was an overwhelming feeling of excitement and euphoria, “I mean it was fantastic atmosphere. We could go out on the town and people
were happy to see us.”41
The place that the women spoke most fondly about was the Olympic village. Former American
international oarswoman Anita DeFrantz explained:
Tell you what struck me most, was being in the village, because that’s also something
that’s unique to the Olympic Games. Where a sport, I forget how many nations were
competing there, but it was wonderful to live in a village where everyone was successful. They’ve all been selected to represent their country, and there was mutual respect
for one another. The racing was, you know, it’s racing.42
Debby DeAngelis, also from the United States, added: ”I felt that the Olympics were a completely
non-political arena and it was having been in the village, it was the closest thing I’d ever seen to world
peace and that it was a really stupid thing that the Americans did and I just didn’t want to have anything to do.43 Otzetova agreed with DeFrantz’s and DeAngelis’ statements and added that she felt an
extra amount of freedom in the village to speak with those not from Eastern European nations:
… and even [in] the Olympic village with all these other sports and athletes and speaking and eating and talking and at that time politically things were not so tense any more
as they used to be in the ’60s so, I mean we could talk freely and have a nice conversation and discuss whatever we wanted to discuss, which was not the case [elsewhere].44
Participants also spoke about the pleasure they experienced seeing and speaking with their own sporting idols, “we lived in the Olympic village, so I … [saw] Carl Lewis and other sports greats, great
sports people … I have seen many interested and famous sports athletes besides me [in the athletes’
village].”45
Interestingly, Soviet and other Eastern Bloc officials originally wanted no part of a common Olympic Village. For example, at the 1952 Games in Helsinki, Soviet authorities considered commuting
athletes from the Soviet side of the border to their competition venue each day.46 When this idea was
defeated by the IOC, officials then arranged for Eastern Bloc athletes to stay in separate housing where
they could live amongst their Eastern European allies.
Athletes did speak about the pressure they felt to win, especially those who we already Olympic
and world champions:
I was three time world champion, one time Olympic champion, it was not so easy and not
so light for me to go to the second Olympic regatta. It was very hard [because of] the expectations and the pressure, being at the Olympics for the second time and going in as Olympic
champion, was much higher and harder to deal with than the first time in Montréal.47
Yet this pressure to win was not uncommon among all of the athletes. Participants, from the East and
the West, explained that if they had previously won medals at the world championships and/or the
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365
Olympic Games, they felt an incredible amount of pressure to achieve the same success. With the
increased media attention placed on the Olympic Games, the expectations were raised. Not only did
national rowing federations anticipate medal-winning performances, but now the public, which knew
little about rowing because of the little media coverage allotted to this sport, were looking for success
on the water. Oarswomen knew that “failure” at the Games, which included not winning a medal,
resulted in consequences, which were relative depending on where you lived. Federal financial funding, sponsorship deals, and media coverage was granted to “winners.”
Racing was an important part of the Olympic experience. Athletes had prepared for four years for
this one regatta and an optimal performance was desired. Yet, the race itself did not play a significant
role in the participants’ memories. Rather, the preparation, anticipation, and exhilaration of winning
or achieving one’s best were highlighted.
Conclusion
Many have argued that, during the Cold War, international sport success was a tool not only for international prestige, but also to display national superiority; Cold War politics were played out on the
fields, on the court, on the ice, and on the water. However, these arguments neglect to recognize the
experiences of individual athletes. Women’s perceptions and interpretations of their experiences as
athletes are vital to understanding women’s sporting history. It is imperative to emphasize the importance of agency and encourage “individuals to explain how they viewed their circumstances.”48 As
such, we must place women’s voices at the centre of history and allow for women to articulate “what
is of importance to them,” thus creating an opportunity for women to “use their own words to describe
and interpret events in which they participated.”49
Through the use of interview methodology, we come to understand that former female Eastern
Bloc athletes did interpret their participation at the Olympic Games as more than athletic vehicles that
promoted Communist political ideology. In addition to their desire to win, oarswomen experienced
feelings of exhilaration, anticipation, and unity during their quest for Olympic success. They were
aware of their responsibility to win and did feel pressure to achieve; however their Olympic experiences were much more diverse.
I do not suggest that all oarswomen had the same experiences at the Olympic Games during the
Cold War. I do, as Hargreaves has argued, recognize that there is a sense of difference which is related to
mechanisms of power and oppression that influence each woman’s experiences.50 We know that the
KGB and the Stasi followed athletes, hired spies to pose as their friends, kept wire taps on their phones,
and worked feverishly to prevent individuals from defecting. However, we must recognize that former
Eastern Bloc athletes, and not solely female oarswomen, did exert agency. Their experiences at the
Olympic Games, while potentially compromised by their “keepers,” was similar to other competitors
from the West. These athletes did experience joy and fulfillment beyond simply winning a gold medal.
Endnotes
1
Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, and Controversies that
Shaped the Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999), 98.
2
Tara Magdalinski, “Sports History and East German National Identity,” Peace Review 11, no.4 (1999), 539-545.
3
James Riordan, “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Sporting Women in Russia and the USSR,” Journal of Sport History 18,
no. 1 (Spring, 1991), 194.
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4
Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, and Controversies that Shaped
the Game (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999), 90.
5
Gertrud Pfister, “Sport for Women,” in Sport and Physical Education in Germany, ed. Roland Naul and Ken Hardman,
International Society for Comparative Physical Education and Sport Series, (London: Routledge, 2002),172.
6
The data collected for this article is part of my doctoral research on the history of women’s competitive international rowing
from 1954 to 2003. In order to obtain knowledge of the history of women’s international rowing, I interviewed thirteen women
who, combined, have been involved in one form or another over the entire period of women’s competitive international racing,
1954-2003. The selection criteria for these participants was as follows: current or former female national team athlete who has
competed for her country for a minimum of five years and has raced at one major international regatta each year during those
five years, including the Olympic Games, European championships, and the world championships; current or former female
international coach who has been working as an international coach for a minimum of five years and has coached at least one
crew that has raced at the world championships, European championships, or Olympic Games; current or former female rowing administrator who has served as a member of the FISA’s executive committee or specialist commissions for a minimum of
five years. Interviews lasted between one and three hours, were conducted on a one to one basis, had a semi-structured format,
and were audio tape-recorded. The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed and analysed at a later date. Interview questions focussed on the participant detailing her/his personal history in the sport of rowing. Participants were encouraged to be
spontaneous and interactive, focussing on their personal experiences. Participants were asked to analyse their experiences in
the sport of rowing and asked to examine how gender and power relations impacted these experiences.
7
For a full discussion on the introduction of women’s events to the international racing program, see Amanda N. Schweinbenz, “Paddling Against the Current: An Analysis of Oarswomen’s Entrance into the 1954 European Rowing Championships.” Journal of Sport History vol. 33, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 401-420.
8
Jennifer Hargreaves, Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology of Women’s Sports (London: Routledge, 1994), 10.
9
Procès-verbal du Premier Congrès Extraordinaire à Montreux les Jeudi 28 et Vendredi 29 mai 1953, 41. FISA Historical
Archives, FISA Head Office, Lausanne Switzerland, 42.
10 Ibid., 42.
11 Jean-Louis Meuret, FISA: 1892-1992: The FISA Centenary Book (Switzerland: FISA, 1992), 107 and 163.
12 Minutes of the Ordinary Annual Congress held on the occasion of the 1971 European Championships on Tuesday, 17th
August at 9.00 a.m. in the Hotel Lyngby, Lyngby, Copenhagen, Denmark. FISA Historical Archives, FISA Head Office,
Lausanne, Switzerland.
13 Minutes of the Meetings of the IOC Executive Board, Munich 18-22 August, 1, 6-8, 10-11 September 1972, 7. IOC Historical Archives, Olympic Museum, Lausanne, Switzerland.
14 Tara Magdalinski, “Sports History and East German National Identity,” Peace Review 11, no.4 (1999), 539-545.
15 M. Dennis, “Sport: GDR,” in Encyclopaedia of Contemporary German Culture, ed. T. Dennis (London: Routledge, 1999), 576.
16 Riordan, “ Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Sporting Women,” 194.
17 Allen Guttmann, Sports: The First Five Millennia (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), 303.
18 Ibid., 302.
19 Christopher Dodd, “The Sun Sets on the East,” American Rowing 23, no.3 (May/June 1991), 25.
20 Guttmann, Sports, 304.
21 Magdalinski, “Sports History and East German National Identity,” 545.
22 Guttmann, Sports; Dennis, “Sport: GDR.”
23 Guttmann, Sports, 304.
24 Guttmann, Sports, 304; Dodd, The Story of World Rowing, 141.
25 Arnd Krüger, “Breeding, Rearing and Preparing the Aryan Body: Creating Superman the Nazi Way,” in Shaping the Superman: Fascist Body as Political Icon, ed. J. A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 44.
26 Dodd, The Story of World Rowing, 141.
27 Svetla Otzetova, interview by Amanda N. Schweinbenz, 15 August 2004, Schinias, Greece.
28 Ibid.
29 Dodd, The Story of World Rowing, 142.
30 Ibid., 143.
31 In 1966 the DDR and FDR both began sending separate teams to the European championships. Prior to this, both East
and West Germany raced together; See Meuret, FISA.
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32 Meuret, FISA.
33 Diana Ellis, interview by Amanda N. Schweinbenz, 19 August 2004, Schinias, Greece.
34 Tricia Smith, interview by Amanda N. Schweinbenz, 4 July 2005, Vancouver, Canada.
35 Jim Riordan, “Rewriting Soviet Sports History,” Journal of Sport History 20, no. 3 (Winter 1993), 249.
36 Ibid., 250.
37 Cesar R. Torres and Mark Dyerson, “The Cold War Games,” in Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of
the Modern Games, edited by Kevin Young and Kevin B. Wamsley. Amsterdam: Elsevier (2005), 59.
38 James Riordan, “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Sporting Women in Russia and the USSR,” Journal of Sport History 18,
no. 1 (Spring, 1991), 194.
39 John Hoberman, “Sport and Ideology in the post-Communist Aged,” in The Changing Politics of Sport, ed. L. Allison
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 19.
40 Jutta Lau, Interview by Amanda N. Schweinbenz, 8 June 2005, Potsdam, Germany.
41 Otzetova interview.
42 DeFrantz, interview.
43 Debby DeAngelis, interview by Amanda N. Schweinbenz, 26 July 2004, Banyolas, Spain.
44 Otzetova, interview.
45 Lau interview.
46 Senn, Power, Politics and the Olympic Games, 101.
47 Lau, Interview.
48 Gloria Holguín Cuádraz and Lynet Uttal, “Intersectionality and In-Depth Interviews: Methodological Strategies for Analyzing Race, Class, and Gender,” Race, Gender and Class 6, no. 3 (1999), 160.
49 Joan Sangster, “Telling Our Stories: Feminist Debates and the Use of Oral History,” in Rethinking Canada: The Promise
of Women’s History, 3rd ed., ed. Veronica Strong-Boag and Anita Clair Fellman (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press,
1997), 304-305.
50 Jennifer Hargreaves, Heroines of Sport: The Politics of Difference and Identity (London: Routledge, 2000), 6.