Volume 5 | Issue 5 | Number 0 | May 02, 2007
The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus
Bombs Over Cambodia: New Light on US Air War
Taylor Owen, Ben Kiernan
Bombs Over Cambodia: New Light on US Air
US–South Vietnam ground invasion of Cambodia
War
in May and June of 1970 had failed to root out
Vietnamese Communists, and Nixon now
Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan
wanted to covertly escalate the air attacks, which
Cambodian bombing survivor, Kampong Thom
were aimed at destroying the mobile
headquarters of the Viet Cong and the North
The Kampong Thom Bombings
Vietnamese Army (vc/nva) in the Cambodian
jungle. After telling Kissinger that the US Air
Maps showing bombing pattern created by Taylor
Force was being unimaginative, Nixon
Owen
demanded more bombing, deeper into the
On December 9, 1970, US President Richard
country: “They have got to go in there and I
Nixon telephoned his national-security adviser,
mean really go in . . . I want everything that can
Henry Kissinger, to discuss the ongoing bombing
fly to go in there and crack the hell out of them.
of Cambodia. This sideshow to the war in
There is no limitation on mileage and there is no
Vietnam, begun in 1965 under the Johnson
limitation on budget. Is that clear?”
administration, had already seen 475,515 tons of
Kissinger knew that this order ignored Nixon’s
ordnance dropped on Cambodia, which had been
promise to Congress that US planes would
a neutral kingdom until nine months before the
remain within thirty kilometres of the
phone call, when pro-US General Lon Nol seized
Vietnamese border, his own assurances to the
power. The first intense series of bombings, the
public that bombing would not take place within
Menu campaign on Vietnamese targets in
a kilometre of any village, and military
Cambodia’s border areas — which American
assessments stating that air strikes were like
commanders labeled Breakfast, Lunch, Supper,
poking a beehive with a stick. He responded
Dinner, Dessert, and Snack — had concluded in
hesitantly: “The problem is, Mr. President, the
May, 1970 shortly after the coup.
Air Force is designed to fight an air battle against
Nixon was facing growing congressional
the Soviet Union. They are not designed for this
opposition to his Indochina policy. A joint
war . . . in fact, they are not designed for any war
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we are likely to have to fight.”
Congress cut funding for the war and imposed
an end to the bombing on August 15, 1973, amid
“Anything that flies, on anything that moves”
calls for Nixon’s impeachment for his deceit in
escalating the campaign.
Five minutes after his conversation with Nixon
ended, Kissinger called General Alexander Haig
The Secret Bombing of 1965
to relay the new orders from the president: “He
wants a massive bombing campaign in
Thanks to the Air Force database, we now know
Cambodia. He doesn’t want to hear anything. It’s
that the US bombardment started three-and-a-
an order, it’s to be done. Anything that flies, on
half years earlier, in 1965, under the Johnson
anything that moves. You got that?” The
administration. What happened in 1969 was not
response from Haig, barely audible on tape,
the start of bombings in Cambodia but the
sounds like laughter.
escalation into carpetbombing. From 1965 to
The US bombing of Cambodia remains a divisive
1968, 2,565 sorties took place over Cambodia,
with 214 tons of bombs dropped. These early
and iconic topic. It was a mobilizing issue for the
strikes were likely designed to support the nearly
antiwar movement and is still cited regularly as
two thousand secret ground incursions
an example of American war crimes. Writers
conducted by the CIA and US Special Forces
such as Noam Chomsky, Christopher Hitchens,
during that period. B-52s — long range bombers
and William Shawcross condemned the bombing
capable of carrying very heavy loads — were not
and the foreign policy it symbolized.
deployed, whether out of concern for Cambodian
In the years since the Vietnam War, something of
lives or the country’s neutrality, or because
a consensus has emerged on the extent of US
carpet bombing was believed to be of limited
involvement in Cambodia. The details are
strategic value.
controversial, but the narrative begins on March
18, 1969, when the United States launched the
Nixon decided on a different course, and
Menu campaign. The joint US–South Vietnam
beginning in 1969 the Air Force deployed B-52s
ground offensive followed. For the next three
over Cambodia. The new rationale for the
years, the United States continued with air strikes
bombings was that they would keep enemy
under Nixon’s orders, hitting deep inside
forces at bay long enough to allow the United
Cambodia’s borders, first to root out the Viet
States to withdraw from Vietnam. Former US
Cong (VC)/North Vietnam Army (NVA) and
General Theodore Mataxis depicted the move as
later to protect the Lon Nol regime from growing
“a holding action . . . . The troika’s going down
numbers of Cambodian Communist forces.
the road and the wolves are closing in, and so
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you throw them something off and let them chew
stated at the time, “We had been told, as had
it.” The result was that Cambodians essentially
everybody . . . that those carpetbombing attacks
became cannon fodder to protect American lives.
by B-52s were totally devastating, that nothing
could survive.” Previously, it was estimated that
The last phase of the bombing, from February to
between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodian civilians
August 1973, was designed to stop the Khmer
were killed by the bombing. Given the fivefold
Rouge’s advance on the Cambodian capital,
increase in tonnage revealed by the database, the
Phnom Penh. The United States, fearing that the
number of casualties is surely higher.
first Southeast Asian domino was about to fall,
began a massive escalation of the air war — an
The Cambodian bombing campaign had two
unprecedented B-52 bombardment that focused
unintended side effects that ultimately combined
on the heavily populated area around Phnom
to produce the very domino effect that the
Penh but left few regions of the country
Vietnam War was supposed to prevent. First, the
untouched. The extent of this bombardment has
bombing forced the Vietnamese Communists
only now come to light.
deeper and deeper into Cambodia, bringing them
into greater contact with Khmer Rouge
Exceeding the World War II Payload
insurgents. Second, the bombs drove ordinary
The data released by Clinton shows the total
Cambodians into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, a
payload dropped during these years to be nearly
group that seemed initially to have slim
five times greater than the generally accepted
prospects of revolutionary success.
figure. To put the revised total of 2,756,941 tons
Pol Pot himself described the Khmer Rouge
into perspective, the Allies dropped just over 2
during that period as “fewer than five thousand
million tons of bombs during all of World War II,
poorly armed guerrillas . . . scattered across the
including the bombs that struck Hiroshima and
Cambodian landscape, uncertain about their
Nagasaki: 15,000 and 20,000 tons, respectively.
strategy, tactics, loyalty, and leaders.”
Cambodia may well be the most heavily bombed
Years after the war ended, journalist Bruce
country in history.
Palling asked Chhit Do, a former Khmer Rouge
A single B-52d “Big Belly” payload consists of up
officer, if his forces had used the bombing as anti-
to 108 225-kilogram or 42 340-kilogram bombs,
American propaganda. Chhit Do replied:
which are dropped on a target area of
approximately 500 by 1,500 metres. In many
“Every time after there had been bombing, they
cases, Cambodian villages were hit with dozens
would take the people to see the craters, to see
of payloads over the course of several hours. The
how big and deep the craters were, to see how
result was near-total destruction. One US official
the earth had been gouged out and scorched . . . .
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registered as a primary strategic U.S. concern.
The ordinary people sometimes literally shit in
their pants when the big bombs and shells came.
“They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let
Their minds just froze up and they would
that stand in our way”
wander around mute for three or four days.
The Nixon administration kept the air war secret
Terrified and half crazy, the people were ready to
for so long that debate over its impact came far
believe what they were told. It was because of
too late. It wasn’t until 1973 that Congress,
their dissatisfaction with the bombing that they
angered by the destruction the campaign had
kept on co-operating with the Khmer Rouge,
caused and the systematic deception that had
joining up with the Khmer Rouge, sending their
masked it, legislated a halt to the bombing of
children off to go with them. . . . Sometimes the
Cambodia. By then, the political as well as the
bombs fell and hit little children, and their fathers
social damage was already done. Having grown
would be all for the Khmer Rouge.”
to more than two hundred thousand troops and
A Cambodian witness responded to an earlier
militia forces by 1973, the Khmer Rouge captured
publication of this article by writing:
Phnom Penh two years later. They went on to
“I could not agree with you more based
subject Cambodia to a Maoist agrarian revolution
on my experiences during the bombing in
and a genocide in which 1.7 million people
Takeo around 1972. The bombings were
perished. Now the burgeoning US-China alliance
[spreading] further into towns and
led Washington to quietly support the Khmer
villages. My parents’ house was hit by
Rouge regime. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
the bombs, and we had to move to the
told Thailand’s foreign minister on November 26,
opposite side of the country. We had
1975, “You should also tell the Cambodians that
known [that] almost the entire village
we will be friends with them. They are
that survived from the bombings had
murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in
joined forces with the Khmer Rouge.”
our way.”
The Nixon administration knew that the Khmer
The Nixon Doctrine had relied on the notion that
Rouge was winning over peasants. The CIA’s
the United States could supply an allied regime
Directorate of Operations, after investigations
with the resources needed to withstand internal
south of Phnom Penh, reported in May 1973 that
or external challenges while the US withdrew its
the Communists were “using damage caused by
ground troops or, in some cases, simply
B-52 strikes as the main theme of their
remained at arm’s length. In Vietnam, this meant
propaganda,” and that such propaganda was
building up the ground-fighting capability of
“effective.” But this does not seem to have
South Vietnamese forces while American units
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slowly disengaged. In Cambodia, Washington
Critics argue that a shift to air power will cause
gave military aid to prop up Lon Nol’s regime
even greater numbers of civilian casualties,
from 1970 to 1975 while the US Air Force
which in turn will benefit the insurgency in Iraq.
conducted its massive aerial bombardment.
Andrew Brookes, the former director of air
power studies at the Royal Air Force’s advanced
nd
Kissinger’s 2 ‘Rule of Engagement’ for the bombing
of Cambodia:“No strikes within one kilometre of astaff college, told Hersh, “Don’t believe that air
power is a solution to the problems inside Iraq at
village”:
all. Replacing boots on the ground with air
The Bombing of Trapeang Veng
power didn’t work in Vietnam, did it? ”
It’s true that air strikes are generally more
accurate now than they were during the war in
Indochina, so in theory, at least, unidentified
targets should be hit less frequently and civilian
casualties should be lower. In addition, many of
the indiscriminate bombardment tactics used in
the past, such as those that destroyed much of
Tokyo and killed 100,000 of its citizens in a single
night, are no longer deemed morally acceptable.
Maps showing bombing pattern created by Taylor
Yet lessons from Cambodia’s agony remain
Owen
unlearned. Civilian deaths have been the norm
Bombing Iraq
during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, as
US policy in Iraq may yet undergo a similar shift.
they were during the bombing of Lebanon by
Bombing is likely to play a key role in a
Israeli forces over the summer. As in Cambodia,
continued U.S. occupation. Moreover, as
insurgencies are the likely beneficiaries. To cite
Seymour Hersh reported in the New Yorker in
one example, on January 13, 2006, an aerial strike
December 2005, a key element of any drawdown
by a US Predator drone on a village in a border
of American troops will be their replacement
area of Pakistan killed eighteen civilians,
with air power. “We just want to change the mix
including five women and five children. The
of the forces doing the fighting — Iraqi infantry
deaths undermined the positive sentiments that
with American support and greater use of air
may have been created by the billions of dollars
power,” said Patrick Clawson, the deputy
in aid that had flowed into that part of Pakistan
director of the Washington Institute for Near East
after the massive earthquake months earlier. A
Policy. [2]
key question remains: along with its
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humanitarian and moral hazards, is bombing
visiting fellow in the Yale Genocide Studies Program.
worth the strategic risk?
Daily writings and published work can be found at
If the Cambodian experience teaches us anything,
www.taylorowen.com
(http://apjjf.org/../Local%20Settings/Temp/www.taylo
it is that miscalculation of the consequences of
rowen.com)
civilian casualties stems partly from a failure to
understand how insurgencies thrive. The motives
Ben Kiernan, professor of history and director of the
that lead locals to help such movements don’t fit
Genocide Studies Program (http://www.yale.edu/gsp)
, is
into strategic rationales like the ones set forth by
the author ofHow Pol Pot Came to Power
and The Pol Pot
Kissinger and Nixon. Those whose lives have
Regime.
been ruined don’t care about the geopolitics
behind bomb attacks; they tend to blame the
This is a revised and expanded version of an article that
attackers. The failure of the American campaign
appeared inThe Walrus(Canada), October 2006. Posted
in Cambodia lay not only in the civilian death toll
at Japan Focus on May 12, 2007.
during the unprecedented bombing, but also in
its aftermath, when the Khmer Rouge regime
Notes:
rose up from the bomb craters, with tragic
results. The dynamics in Iraq, or even
[1] The New York Times
, May 3 and 10, 2007.
Afghanistan, could be similar.
[2] Seymour Hersh, “Up in the Air. Where is the
Iraq war headed next?” The New Yorker
, Dec 5,
Taylor Owen is a doctoral candidate and Trudeau
Scholar at the University of Oxford. In 2004, he was a2005.
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