TOWARD A NON-DEFINITION OF SPORT
Frank McBride
Associate Professor of Physical Education
Wayne State University
What I propose to do here is assemble some reminders for a particular
purpose. 1 The reminders concern the nature and limitations of definition
in general and definition of Isportl in particular. The purpose is to discourage attempts at defining the concept of sport. I shall discuss the
following claims:
A. Neither the intension nor the extension of the con~
cept sport is concise.
B. Attempts to limit concisely the intension of the con~
cept sport will either fail or end up as stipulative.
C. The concept sport is ordinarily employed in a wide variety of ways, i.e. has a wide variety of usages, or
meani ngs.
D.
Philosophers of sport ought not waste their time attempting to define Isport.1
You will note that the first three of these claims are descriptive while
the fourth is normative. I take the descriptive claim statements to be true,
although I don't expect to establish this in each case in an incontrovertible
manner. And further, if claim statements A, B, and C, taken together, are
true, I take this to be strong support for the normative claim, claim D.
One final note before considering the claims. Most of what I have to
say here concerns lexical or conventional definition, i.e. reports of how
words are and have been employed. This can be contrasted with the stipulative or contrived definition. I have no quarrel with those who ~ define
in the latter manner, for example, the scientist in a description of research
or the logician in the interpretation of a system of propositional calculus.
By all means let '1ogica1 connection ' mean what the behaviorist wants it to
mean and let I~I stand for anything at all or nothing. What I do quarrel
with is for the stipu1ative definition to be masqueraded as conventional.
It may satisfy someone's compulsion for precision or order but is at best
misleading and at worst deceitful.
Claim A: Neither thedIntension·,nor 'he Ex1:ens3.on of the Concept Sport is
Concise
Let me stipulate what I mean by "intension" and l 'extension." The
intension of a word consists of the property or properties a thinQ must
possess to belong to the class of things designated by that word (more simply,
the criteria for inclusion in the set). The extension of a word consists of
the class of things to which that word refers (more simply, the members of
the set). (7:pp. 90-91) The intension of 'triang1e ' for example, consists of
the properties of a) having three sides, and b) havinQ three interior angles
5
equal to 180 degrees. The extension of 'triangle' consists of the class of
all geometric figures possessing these properties. I do not wish to defend
the integrity of this distinction. I merely find it useful.
In the above cited example we also find a classic example of a concept
whose boundaries are concisely drawn and whose membership is clearly limited.
There are, for example (if we are willing to remain for a few more minutes
in a pre-Einsteinian world), no borderline cases . .Every conceivable geometric figure either is or is not a triangle, and we have accepted ways of
determining which individuals are members of the set and which are not. That
is to' say, both the intension and the extension of the concept triangle are
concise.
A concept may be thought of as vague when either the intension or the
extension cannot be concisely limited. The four possibilities for a concept
being vague and/or concise are as follows:
1. The extension is concisely limited but the intension is vague,
e.g. Ihuman. I (7:p. 94)
2. The intension is clearly limited but the extension is vague,
e.g. 'identical. I (Examples are hard to come by here. Certain
ethical expressions might qualify, e.g. 'justice.')
3.
Both the extension and intension are concisely limited, e.g.
'triangle. '
4.
Neither the extension nor the intension are concisely
e.g. Igames. '2
limite~
The claim with respect to 'sport' is thus the stronger possibility, that
both the intension and the extension of the concept are vague. For the moment
I shall content myself with presenting examples of two ways in which this
vagueness occurs. Later on consideration of claim B will center around the
difficulties of specifying the intension of Isport. , The factual data mentioned in the consideration of claim C will direct further attention to the
extensional vagueness difficulties.
Fishing, fencing, skiing, wrestling, track and field, swimming, auto
racing, scuba diving, rock climbing, and thoroughbred racing are sports
they are not games. Badminton, football, curling, baseball, golf, tennis,
field hockey, bowling, and basketball are sports and they are, also, games.
An anthropologist or an ordinary language analyst would not find this to be
particularly interesting, let alone perplexing. This just happens to be the
way it is, and that is that. For the neo-Aristotelian, the essentialist,
however, a problem is set. The question that must be answered is of course
~? Why are some sports games and some sports not games? The question
would eventuate in a search for the common and peculiar features that define
the concept sport, or games, or both. But this leads us into consideration
of claim B. What I want to do here, painful as it may be is stop, to resist
the compulsion to pursue the ~ question; to recognize that the why question
is vain. As we have seen, the instances of the extension of 'sport' are varied in at least two fundamental ways, some are games and some are not games.
The second example speaks more to the intensional vagueness claim. Most
of us are familiar with the expression, "I do not consider that a sport." I
would, for example, be ready at any moment to say this, and with sincerity,
6
regarding dog fighting, cock fighting, bull fighting, and a number of forms of
hunting and fishing. There are times when I would want to say it with respect
to boxing, football, and field hockey. Once again the wby question would seem
legitimate and in this case it is. Someone who takes one of these to be the
sport of sports might, for example, legitimately request a reason and get one
in response. My response, or anyone1s would most likely be something like:
liThe elements of cruelt.¥ or sadism go beyond the limits of sport. 1I More precisely what is being sa,d is that the elements of cruelty or sadism go beyond
the limits of sport as I or someone else conceives of them. The point I wish
to make is this: in at least a limited number of cases the boundaries of
sport are both logical and psychological. What is sport for one may not be for
another. What is sport for some may not be for others. I would contend that
this discrepancy extends into the culture itself, into the language, into the
employment of the expression IIsport.1I We might be able to achieve unanimity
with respect to certain clearcut examples of what is and what is not sport.
I would doubt, however, that the borderline between would be empty.
Claim B: Attempts to Limit Concisely the Intension of the Concept Sport
Will Either Failor End Up as Stipulative
The kind of failure I have in mind here is being too narrow or too broad.
A definition is too narrow if it excludes instances that would ordinarily (conventionally) be included. A definition is too broad if it includes instances
that would ordinarily (conventionally) not be included. To illustrate I take
the example of 1games. 1. If we restrict the definition to lactivities played
with a ball l we have excluded badminton, curling, and ice hockey, to mention
only a few activities that are ordinarily included. If, on the other hand, our
definition includes only Ihaving rules and player (S)I we have included the
stock market, the symphony orchestra, the local thespian group,-:and . perha~s other
instances that would not ordinarily be included. It should be pointed out that
a definition may, at one and the same time, be both too narrow and too broad.
For example, the first definition of games, above, allows for the inclusion of
any random ball playing by dog, man, or cat. I do not think that all of this
would ordinarily be admitted.
The strategy ernplQYed here will be as follows: 1) suggest a defining
property or properties of sport, 2) test for narrowness (abbreviated as tn),
3) test for broadness (abbreviated as tb). A single counter-example will
be sufficient to invalidate a definition. The exercise will not be (could not
bel exhaustive.
Definition '1:
tn:
having rules.
I am not certain that the practical mandates,~the sort of rules of thumb,
associated with fishing, skiing, and rock climbing would count as rules;
at least not in the same sense as the rules for ball sports, for example.
tb: The tn difficulty may be ignored. Quite obviously as a single defining
feature "having rules" is too broad. After all, hospitals, armies,
jails, and schools also have rules, and we wouldn1t want to include
these, or the activities ordinarily associated with them, as sports.
For the sake of argtlllent let us admit IIhaving rules" as a cOl1111on property
of sports. We found that as a single defining feature the definition was
too broad. Let us attempt now to find another property that, when combined
7
with this first property, will provide a statement of the intension of
•sport • that will stand the test of counter-example. Let us try the
following:
Definition #2: voluntary and having
ru1e~
tn: No exclusion, although it would still probably be thought of as sport
if Jack Nicklaus were ordered by the PGA to play in the Sioux City Open.
tb: The tn difficulty may be ignored. A number of valid counte~examples
can be conjured up, e.g. an all volunteer army. The definition is too
broad.
For the sake of further argument let us admit II vo1untary and having
rules as properties comnon to all sports. These properties may be common but, a·s we found above, they are not peculiar to sport, i.e. the
definition was too broad. Let us add a third feature to our definition:
ll
Definition #3: voluntary, having rules, and involving a test of how
bodily excellent a person can be. 3
tn: Certain forms of fishing and hunting could hardly be said to test how
bodily excellent a person can be. Nor do the owners or players. at the
race track test themselves in this way. The definition is too narrow.
tb: The volunteer army activity might well provide such a test. The circus
acrobat or the stunt man must also be included. The definition is also
too broad.
Having eliminated the most recent additional property as neither common nor peculiar, we are now back to definition #2 which, as you will recall, requires a bit or shoring up. But I am weary of the who1e'dreary
business. What I want to s~~ is something like this: The whole undertaking
is in rinci le wron -headed. You cannot take a concept that 1S as a
matter of fact a matter of language, a matter of culture) vague and make
it precise by presenting an essentialist definition of the concept. As
Wittgenstein put it: "We do not know the boundaries because none have been
drawn. II (10: 69)
Finally, there is a difference between locating boundaries and drawing boundaries. The former is a descriptive task the latter normative.
What I am trying to show is that what boundary there is between what is and
what is not sport is blurred. Attempts to indicate it concisely fall under
the -category of drawing boundaries not locating them. I would call .such a
definition stipulative.
Claim C: The Concept Sport is Ordinarily Employed ina Wide Variety of
Ways, i.e. Has a Wide Variety of Usages, or Meanings
None of us need much reminding on this point. This job has been done· before, by many. (4:pp. vii-58) For openers, I would suggest a peek at In!
Oxford English Dictionary. (6:pp. 655-659) This report of usage·of the expression IIsportn and derivative concepts takes us back almost six centuries. It
requires almost five full pages, fine print, three columns to the page. All
in all· there are one-hundred-twenty-seven different usages reported: noun--26,
8
verb--31'4and 70 derivative usages (each of which incorporates the expression
IIsportll). Some of these ways of using the concept have faded into antiquity,
perhaps from a lack of use, but a great many continue in one way or another in
present usage. To illustrate, I have selected eight different noun usages
dating from 1617 to 1892 and have contrasted them with what might be considered
contemporary employments. The method of analysis of what I have taken to be
contemporary usages is, I think, quite similar to that employed by the lexicographers in putting together the OED. Essentially (if I dare use that expression), it involves two steps: 1) finding (or in my case conjuring up) a statement wherein the expression of interest appears, and 2) substituting another
expression (or other expression;) that will not change the meaning of the
statement in any important way. The only qualification for participation in
this game is to be a speaker of English. Let us take a dry run with the concept of IIdry" (as it happens to be handy):
0
a. Anyone for a dry martini?
b.
My throat is so dry, I can hardly swallow.
c. Smith has a rather dry sense of humor.
Acceptable substitutions might be as follows:
a.
tart, non-sweet
b.
parched, devoid of moisture
c.
unemotional, impersonal
And of course we have said nothing about land, league, or subject. The point
of this kind of ana1~sis is 1) to explicate the meaning of an expression in a
given context, and 2) to show that an expression has different meanings in different contexts. In the examples below I have inserted the substitutions for
'sport' inside the parentheses following the statements.
.Contemporary Employment:
Employment Cited in OED:
1.
2.
(la, 1821) IIgreat sport to
them was jumping in a sack.
(fun, entertainment)
1I
(lb, 1617) IIIta1 ians love a
fearful wench, that oftens
flies from Venus sport.
(amorous, daliance, or
intercourse)
She sure messed up his fancy sporting coat. (courting, amorous
pursuits) (from the folk song
IIMonongahela Sal ll )
(lc, 1787) liThe higher an
angler goes up the Thames~.t
the more sport, and the greater
Old Blue is an excellent sport dog.
(hunting)
1I
3.
It was great sport to watch the
kittens play. (fun, entertainment)
9
Employment Cited in OED (cont.):
Contemporary Employment (cont.):
variety of fish he will meet
with. 1I (fishing activity)
4.
(4, 1671) II0n th is t hey voted
it a libel, and to be burned
by the hangman. Which was done
but the sport was, the hangman
burned the Lord's order with it. 1I
(jest, joke)
It was just in sport.
S.
(Sa, 1780) liThe high sport was
to burn the jails,1I (pastime,
diversion)
Tennis, the sport of kings.
(pastime, diversion)
6.
(Sb, 1871) IIIn such a state of
things hunting might be a sport,
as war might be a sport. (game)
The sport of billiards ...
(game)
(7a, 1697) "But oh! Commit not
thy prophetic mind to flitting
leaves, the sport of ev'ry wind.
( play th i ng )
The wind sported with her gown.
(played)
{jest, play)
1I
7.
8.
II
(8a, 1892) lI'Unhappy, Mr. Collings,
the victim of a thousand sports,'
I murmured, americanizing my
language for the nonce. 1I (gamblers)
Give me a sporting chance.
(fair, as in gaming)
I do not hold any particular brief for the substitutions put forward here (although I and the lexicographers that compiled the QfQ agree on several of them).
What is important is that speakers of English in general agree. The matter
could be decided in minutes within any qualified group.
Claim D: Philosophers of Sport Ought Not Waste their Time Attempting
to Define 'Sport '
Claims A and B speak mainly to the question of vague-ness~ cla-im t io that
of ambiguity. Taken together the claim is that th& eonceptof s~r,t i's both
vague and ambiguous, and to a considerable extent. While the argument for this
claim, claim D, rests primarily on the vagueness problem, the ambiguity factor
enters the picture in a significant way. It would in principle be possible to
specify the intension and extension of each different employment of a highly
ambiguous concept provided each of those emplo~ents were conct~e. I have
tried to point out that this proviso is not app icahle to •sport. , But even
if it were applicable, imagine the immensity of the task of attempting to limIt
the one-hundred-twenty-seven different employments of the concept. Imagine
having to tryout as many counter-examples as you could conjure up for each of
those employments. And then of course the question arises as to whether we
could consider the result a definition. Certainly not in the usual sense.
10
I am reminded of the scene in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno Concluded
where Meine Herr tells of having constructed a map with'a scale of1:1, i.e.
one mile to one mile. (2:pp. 616-617) Would we want to call such a monstrosity a map? We might carry the analogy a step further: In Carroll's tale
the 8- map ' was Rever·' spread ·out. The farmers objected that it would shut out
the sunli~ht. I wonder if our multi-volumed IIdefinition of 'sport' would
ever be used as a definition? But we may forget all of this nonsense. The
concept of sport is, along with being highly ambiguous, also extremely vague.
It cannot be defined, at least not in the way we have been speaking of definition. I should point out that this is an analytic claim. I ~ saying
that it, 'sport,' cannot be defined because it is too arduous a task, i.e.
like the claim in the statement: IIDhaulagiri cannot be climbed. 1I What I am
saying is that it is logically impossible to define the concept. The problem
is one of logic not of logistics. Definition is fine for the precise concept,
but it will not fit the facts of the life of the imprecise concept.
ll
Epilogue
Perhaps we should rejoice that 'sport' is not a precise concept. If it
were, we would probably not be considering matters such as this and it is
highly unlikely that there would exist a society such as ours. As Michael
Scriven puts it:
when a precise definition is possible, one may be sure
the term defined is either a new technical term or one not of great importance
for scientific or philosophical issues ..• 11 (8:p. 8) Justus Hartnack, in
speaking of Wittgenstein's attack on essentialism, puts it even stronger when
he says, lilt is arguable that no concept of philosophical interest can be defined. II (5:p. 71)
But then, that too may be a waste of time. I am reminded of a poem by
Stephen Crane:
1I • • •
I Saw a Man
I saw a man purSUing the horizon
Round and round they sped.
I was disturbed at this;
I accosted the man.
-It is futile, II I said,
IIYou can never - - _II
IIYou 1ie,1I he cried.
And ran on. (3:p. 892)
11
NOTES
1This, according to Wittgenstein, is what the work of the philosopher consists in. (10:127)
2this was Wittgenstein's example; the concept at the focal point of his
criticism of essentialism. (10: 68-71)
31 have borrowed this feature from Weiss.
(9:p. 143)
4It may be of interest to the reader to note that 'play' and its derivative
forms outran~s 'sport' in different employments 176 to 127.
5A1ston (l:pp. 10-11) and Strawson, among others, have found this method of
analysis useful.
BIBLIOGRAPHy
1. Alston, William P. Philosophy of Language.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
2. Carroll, Lewis (pseud.). "Sylvie and Bruno Concluded," The Complete Works
of Lewis Carroll. Alexander Woolcott (ed.). New York: Random House, no
date.
3.
Ciardi~ John (ed.). An Introduction to Literature.
Mifflin, Inc., 1959.
4.
Gerber, Ellen W. (ed.). Sport and the Body: A Philosophical Symposium.
Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1972.
5.
Hartnack, Justus. Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy. Maurice Cranston
(trans.). Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965.
6. The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 10.
7.
Salmon, Wesley C.
1963.
Logic.
8.
Scriven, Michael.
Primary Philosophy.
Houghton
London: Clarendon Press, 1970.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966.
9. Weiss, Paul. Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry.
Illinois University Press, 1969.
10.
Boston:
~~--.~~~In=v~e~st~i
Carbondale, Ill.:
Southern
a~tl~·o~n~s.
Third edition.
The Macmillan Co., 1958.