The Second Death of Ayatollah Khomeini
The Second Death
of Ayatollah Khomeini
FEREYDOUN HOVEYDA
Senior Fellow
National Committee on American Foreign Policy
O
n 11 September 2001, while many Arab streets filled with dancing
crowds hailing the attacks on New York and Washington, thousands
of young Iranians demonstrated in support of the United States. One
year later, almost to the day, Iran’s National Institute for Opinion Polls and
Research found that 74 percent of Iranians favored good relations with
America—Khomeini’s “Great Satan”—and more than half of the population
approved of American criticism of Iran’s government. The official pollsters
also discovered that Ayatollah Khamenei, the powerful “Supreme Leader,” was
the most unpopular figure in the country. The head of the institute and the editor
of the newspaper that published the story were naturally accused of “spreading
false information ” and thrown in jail. Such government action has been common
for more than a decade.
The opposition movement started long ago, almost immediately after
Khomeini’s demise in 1989. Indeed, in 1990, Ayatollah Montazeri, formerly
Khomeini’s heir-designate, accused his colleagues of betraying Islam and was
put under house arrest. Civil conflict has intensified in the years since the 1999
student revolt; skirmishes and demonstrations occur almost daily in cities across
Iran and the regime routinely employs massive and brutal repression to confront
mounting dissent. Common practice includes public hangings, floggings and
stonings as punishment for dissent. In July 2002, the senior cleric of Isfahan,
Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri, resigned and declared that the regime’s policies
were jeopardizing the future of Islam in Iran.
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Two Parallel Reformist Movements
Western analysts first noticed signs of change in the Islamic Republic in 1997,
when reformer Mohammad Khatami—a mid-rank cleric of Khomeinist
obedience who advocated the repeal of some of the harshest regulations imposed
by the Iranian authorities—won the presidential election by a landslide. Dubbed
a “reformist,” Khatami’s program was nonetheless limited to modifying existing
laws without challenging the basic tenets of the regime, namely the rule of the
mullahs and the post of “Supreme leader” with the authority of voiding
parliament’s decisions. Despite the superficial nature of his program, Western
observers spoke of a real and deep reformist movement set in motion by Khatami
and his supporters.
Years have passed and Khatami has failed to deliver on even his modest
promises. Not a single significant reform has been implemented. He promised,
for instance, freedom of the press but could not fight the closing of many reformist
newspapers and the arrest and prosecution of journalists. In fact the ultraconservative mullahs around Khamenei have reinforced the repressive character
of the Islamic regime through the “Guardian Council,” a constitutional watchdog
that vets all legislation and electoral candidates. Despite his inability to follow
through with reforms, Western powers continue to back Khatami and his
government. British, German and French officials continue to pay visits to Tehran
and continue to call the president a “moderate” and a “reformist.” They uphold
their policy of so-called “constructive dialogue.” While Khatami’s reform agenda
is not as progressive as many outside observers believe it to be, many Iranians
think Khatami is unwilling, not unable, to push for reform. Some in Iran even
suspect a secret complicity with hardliners.
Most Western analysts and journalists are mistaken when they discuss
the reformist movement in Iran. There is not one, unified Iranian reform
movement, but two separate ones. The first of these that operates inside ruling
circles revolves around Khatami and aims to create a relatively free press under
the control of the government. Yet the movement does not challenge the principle
of the “discretionary tutelage by the Supreme leader” (velayat-e faqih) introduced
in the 1979 Constitution by Khomeini himself. Aware of the mounting discontent
of the population, Khatami and his minions believe softening the application
of “Islamic law” can save the regime from total collapse. Rather than questioning
the nature of velayat-e faqih or examining its anti-democratic tendencies, they
continue to uphold its place in Iranian society.
The second reform movement in Iran is a popular movement that
demands deep democratic change. The membership of this reformist movement
is made up of a loose association of several different layers of Iranian society:
the middle-class, shopkeepers, merchants, industrialists, and members of the
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“liberal professions” including writers, intellectuals, and students. In contrast to
Khatami’s limited reforms, this movement aims at more sweeping changes.
Specifically they call for a separation of government and mosque, an end to the
economic “monopoly” of the ruling mullahs, a serious fight against widespread
corruption, and a free market. Furthermore, they call for policy that is in line
with the tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More radically,
some of its youngest members aim to dismantle the Islamic Republic altogether.
Though this movement is loosely formed and virtually without structure, it is
certainly a separate phenomenon from Khatami’s reform movement.
These two reformist movements sometimes intersect, as they did during
the presidential elections, but they do not mix. As one student who was involved
in the 1999 revolt against the regime told an interviewer, “Twenty million Iranians
voted for Khatami in order to achieve real freedom and a secular form of
government…and to create a constitution that embraces everyone, a state in
which the individual and social rights of the people are respected.” He added,
“Our society is more than ever ready to enter the twenty-first century and I
believe that, with individual freedom, we will achieve the goals we have set
forth.”1
A number of Western experts have viewed the widespread dissatisfaction
with the regime as a sign of the coming revolution in Iran. Yet despite the
ongoing struggles and riots, the twenty-three year old regime still seems solidly
in place. Indeed, the situation is reminiscent of a French polemicist’s phrase
about a politician of the 1930s whom he dubbed “a cadaver forgotten in a
standing position by a listless assassin.”2 In other words, the Islamic Republic is
dead but still stands on its feet, frightening both Iranians and the West.
Several factors explain why the regime remains in power. Iran’s Islamic
regime has been given an economic boost by a number of Western governments
who continue to do business with it. German and British foreign ministers
regularly visit Tehran, and as a whole the European Union favors what it calls a
“constructive dialogue” with the mullahs. Even the United States seems wary
of the Islamic regime’s demise; for years during the Clinton administration, and
even until very recently, American diplomats and politicians were looking for a
“moderate” mullah (an oxymoron) with whom to do business. Yielding to the
“mullah lobby” in Washington, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
loosened the sanctions and allowed the export of goods such as Persian carpets
and pistachio nuts in 1998.
Mythology in Action
More than the West’s delusions and economic greed, it is the Iranian mind-set
that accounts for the survival of the spiritually bankrupt Islamic Republic.
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Analysis of Iran’s history shows that changes of regimes have always followed
a particular pattern, rooted in the mythological story of the legendary king
Jamshid. In this tale, Iranian leaders begin their reigns with justice but inevitably
turn arrogant and self-involved, allowing repression and evil to overtake the
realm. Looking to remedy the situation, disillusioned people pray to heaven to
send them a savior who can rescue the people from their corrupt ruler. This
indeed comes to pass, but after a period of harmony the new leader falls into
the old groove of corruption as well. Iran’s history ironically falls into the same
pattern; with the people suffering every time the cycle reaches its repressive
phase.
Another legend offers a model of the father-savior-tyrant in the
personality of mythical hero Rostam, a Superman-like figure who inadvertently
kills his son.3 All Iranian rulers have been stern dictators who have presented
themselves as benevolent saviors at the start of their tenure, only to engage
later in killing their subjects—“sons,” as it were. In this way they can be compared
to harsh “fathers” who exercise absolute authority over their “children.” Shah
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Khomeini were no exceptions. In a
book published in 1978, just one year before his flight from Iran, the Shah
called himself “the father, leader and teacher” of all Iranians.4 As for Khomeini,
while drinking from “the poisoned chalice of cease-fire” after the eight years of
bloody war with Iraq, he felt “ashamed” because of the many sacrifices imposed
on Iranians, and added, “but then, is this not hard for your old father?”5
In contrast to the Western Oedipus myth, Iranian sons do not kill their
fathers. It is the opposite in Iranian lore; fathers do not hesitate to put sons to
death whenever it seems necessary. I have coined the phrase “Rostam syndrome,”
after the above-mentioned legendary hero who killed his son Sohrab, to
characterize this peculiarity of the Iranian mind-set and society.
Extending the metaphor, I would add that when “children” find a father
they hurry to “submit” to him. Thus, Mehdi Bazargan and some leaders of the
“National Front”—like many other secular leaders and intellectuals—rushed
to Paris where Khomeini had fled after his expulsion from Iraq in September
1978, in order to offer their services and/or seek instructions.6 Yet, until the
Ayatollah moved to France in September 1978, these secular politicians and
intellectuals were the main active contestants of the Shah’s regime. Therefore,
as soon as the bearded old “father” appeared at the forefront, they unconsciously
followed the Rostam syndrome and yielded to him.
According to Iranian tradition, as long as the father retains his position—
no matter how weakened—nobody threatens him. For instance in 1978, the
demonstrators did not march towards the monarch’s palace. Only after
Khomeini’s move to the forefront did they begin to use the slogan “Death to the
Shah.” Moreover, the old Ayatollah himself refused to return to Iran as long as
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the Shah remained on his throne. Indeed, only after his nemesis had fled the
country did Khomeini return. Only then did he demand that the former Shah be
delivered to his custody for trial and retribution. Khomeini knew all too well
that it would be difficult to overthrow the Shah—the father of the people—
while he remained on his throne.
History bears witness to the fact that, until now, in every critical period
a “strong” man arose, as if from nowhere, and took power with the backing of
the people. Thus, for instance, in the early decades of the twentieth century, an
obscure soldier—Reza Shah Pahlavi—took the throne after only four years as
minister of war and prime minister.
Curiously enough, these mythological patterns have repeated themselves,
with only slight variations, in the course of the several attempts at modernizing
Iran during the twentieth century. In the 1920s, for instance, “reformers” joined
the strongman Reza Khan who soon became king and turned rapidly into a
dictator who killed some of his own “sons.” Similarly, in the 1960s, a large
number of young “technocrats” began to cooperate with Muhammad Reza Shah,
who himself followed the pattern of legend and ultimately brought Iran under
autocratic rule. Once again the reformers had rapidly lost sight of their initial
democratic goals and became the children of the “father-ruler.”
A few months before Khomeini’s demise, I wrote that by referring to
Iranian mythology and history, one can predict that, following the death of an
Ayatollah, there will be a fairly long spell of time before the emergence of a
leader who can establish a stable and durable regime.7 I added that, in the
meantime, one or several of his underlings will try to continue his rule in the
midst of an unremitting and always intensifying power struggle among the
officials of the Islamic theocracy. The current situation seems to follow this
pattern. The self-appointed “Ayatollah” Khamenei managed to prevail over his
competitors in replacing his master as “Supreme Leader.” At a lower level,
Rafsanjani retained his presidency for two terms. After him, a group of supposed
reformers succeeded in imposing Khatami, a second rank pro-Khomeinist cleric,
against the hard-liner conservative candidate. The interim spell of time seems to
stretch on, however. No “strong -father-ruler” has yet appeared on the political
horizon. Perhaps this is why many Iranians are making overtures to the United
States, hoping that it will intervene and overthrow the mullahs for them. Shall
one conclude that Iranians are doomed to repeat the same old mythological
“scenario” forever? Not necessarily. Twentieth-century Iran has experienced a
number of changes that have influenced the mindset and conduct of the Iranian
people.
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Changes in Iranian Society
Since the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi in the mid-1920s, Iranian society has
undergone—and continues to undergo—profound transformations. First, in the
1930s, modern institutions developed despite the mullahs’ efforts to keep Iran’s
medieval institutions. Secular schools and universities were built, hospitals were
constructed, municipalities were
and a modern army and
Conditions for gradual created,
police force insured security in
democratization are ripe in even the remotest parts of the
Iran. The leader of a post- country. Moreover, compulsory
service mixed young
theocracy Iran will have to military
recruits from all parts of the
take them into account.
country, increasing the prevalence
of “farsi” to the detriment of local
dialects, and strengthening a sense of Iranian national identity. Similarly, the
introduction of radio and other means of communication also helped to bind
together the different ethnic and cultural elements of the general population.
In the 1960s, land reform, despite its flaws, removed feudal landowners
from government for the first time in Iran’s history. Replacing such feudal lords
were “technocrats” who were able to build—in only about fifteen years—an
economic infrastructure for Iran. Indeed, without this economic infrastructure,
Iran would have rapidly collapsed in the Iran-Iraq war. In the 1980s, new layers
of the population rose to administrative positions and the eight-year war with
Iraq created a huge mass of veterans. In this way, a new and unprecedented
coalition of people formed, whose influence in the political life of the country
would certainly grow.
On the cultural level, the opposition of most of the ayatollahs to
Khomeini’s theories of governance has triggered an ongoing theological debate,
which will undoubtedly spill over to other non-Shiite Muslim countries as well.
Moreover, the poor—if not disastrous—performance of the regime in all domains
since 1979 is disillusioning to many Iranians. At the beginning of his rule,
Khomeini contended that Islam had not been correctly implemented after the
assassination in 661 AD of Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad). At
the time, many Iranians believed that Khomeini’s ostensibly “true” Islam would
bring them paradise on earth. Instead they have experienced much hardship and
suffering. At this point, many people are openly questioning if what they are
submitted to is really Islam. Today’s Iran is witnessing a public discussion about
religion, with a degree of openness not seen in the Muslim world since the
twelfth century.
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Another element of deep transformation is reflected in the fact that
since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the population of Iran has more than
doubled. Additionally, the demographic composition is very different compared
to 20 years ago. Today, two thirds of Iranians are under the age of 30. Many
among them are totally indifferent to both the Shah’s regime and the 1979 Islamic
Revolution. The Information Revolution of the past twenty years, including
the internet and satellite television, has made the theocratic regime’s censorship
more difficult. Young people listen to foreign broadcasts and view foreign films
and television programs, especially American ones. Last, but not least, the
proclamation of a republic in a country in which absolute monarchy had been
the only political regime is by itself of tremendous importance. Indeed, it shows
that the most deeply rooted traditions can be changed.
These transformations sug gest that conditions for gradual
democratization are ripe in Iran. The leader of a post-theocracy Iran will have
to take them into account. He will need the support of the majority of the
people in order to perform the formidable tasks confronting the country: restoring
the economy, persuading expatriate Iranian experts to return, disarming
paramilitary groups, strengthening internal security, and reestablishing Iran’s
international image tarnished by years of fanaticism and terrorism. Additionally,
this new leader must resume family planning, and upgrade both primary and
secondary education. All this being said, what kind of a democracy could function
in a post-Islamic Iran?
An Iranian Democracy?
When it comes to democratic reform, Iran’s history is mixed. Iran was the first
Muslim country to adopt a modern constitution in 1905 and put an end to
absolutism, at least on paper. But with the exception of a few brief periods, the
constitution was never adhered to. Successive generations of educated Iranians
tried to introduce liberal reforms and modernize their society during the twentieth
century, but one after another failed in this endeavor.
It is not possible to address all of the causes here. But it seems the
problem throughout is that Iranian reformers ignored the fact that most Iranians
were still steeped in the Middle Ages and traditional beliefs that directly
contradicted modernity. In this way, both reformers and leaders fell into the
pre-determined cultural patterns of Iran’s ancient mythology. In a relatively
short period of time the “technocrats” introduced a cascade of technical, social,
economic, and cultural innovations, without first preparing the masses for the
ongoing scientific and technological revolutions. Indeed, to the people at large,
the novelties seemed somehow magical while to the devout they appeared almost
satanic.
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Modernization was a shock. To be sure, the reformers did not ignore the
possibility of a cultural boomerang, but in their haste to bring Iran into the
twentieth century they became overconfident in their ability to apply Western
methods and thinking in order to produce “antidotes.” Some of them warned
the Shah of the necessity of a vast program of information and a slower pace
of transformation, but the monarch was himself beset by many contradictions.
In the hubris that overtook him—again conforming to Iranian legend—he
thought that he could change society by edicts from above. He forgot that the
success of modernization depends, above all else, on the people being convinced
of the necessity of deep change.
Looking back at Iran’s experience during the twentieth century, it seems
that an open, public debate among intellectuals, specialists and private groups
about proposed reforms must take place before they are implemented. Moreover,
a large education campaign should be undertaken in order to inform and, ideally,
convince the people in cities as well as in rural areas of the efficacy of proposed
reforms.
A major obstacle facing reform is the lack of coordinated protest and
organization. Most, if not all, the demonstrations and riots against the present
Islamic regime have been spontaneous and unorganized. As Potkin Azarmehr, a
member of the MPG (Marze Por Gowhar) opposition party remarked recently,
“Sadly, a fundamental flaw in our Iranian characteristics is our inability in carrying
out team work…[Thus] in the fields of politics, we have hundreds of statesmen
and people writing fantastic articles and reports but the vast majority shun getting
involved in a political party…[As the saying goes], when two of us come together
we become a (political) party and when there are three, the party splits!…We
have to learn how to get organized.”8
Notwithstanding all the obstacles, however, things are bound to change
in Iran—for the country is on the brink of disaster. Human rights violations,
brutal repression, and corruption have reached unheard of levels. The economy
is in shambles: inflation and unemployment have climbed to astronomical figures,
and the government is completely bankrupt. Moreover, in international and
domestic politics there is no such thing as “Chapter 11” bankruptcy law to
alleviate the burdens of a state.
I am often asked to make prognostications about the future of Iran. Will
the mullahs remain in power? Will a democratic society develop? Should the
United States intervene? I have no crystal ball, but to the extent that the present
always contains some seeds of the future, the following seems clear: when
Khatami’s second presidential term comes to a close in three years, the regime—
if still in place—will need to find a replacement. Also clear is that whomever
the Supreme Leader chooses as a candidate would be unacceptable to the bulk
of real reformers; experience shows the electorate is likely to be unimpressed
with half-hearted reformers.
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The 1979 Revolution shows that long-standing traditions can be changed
overnight. Iranians should stop yearning for a “father-savior” and instead choose
a civilian leader. Only the internal opposition can challenge the theocracy. The
Iranian diaspora might help
indirectly but lack the means for
playing a decisive role. In any case, Iranians should stop yearning
it is hopelessly divided. The for a “father-savior” and
monarchists live in a state of choose a civilian leader.
nostalgia. The National Front
created at the time of Mossadegh’s
premiership (early 1950s) continues to look at its own past. The diverse leftist
groups have not yet come to terms with the demise of their twentieth century
models. The so-called Mujahiddins are compromised by their association with
Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
Many Iranians inside and outside the country call on Washington to
intervene. This would be a grave mistake. In the past 25 or 30 years the United
States has committed many blunders. First, in 1979, when a limited use of force
would have nipped Khomeini’s regime in the bud, President Carter chose to
support the Ayatollah against the Shah. When Khatami was elected, Washington’s
pundits believed erroneously that there could be a government of “moderate
mullahs.” President Clinton and his Secretary of State Madeleine Albright saluted
Khatami and his “voice of moderation.” They misread the student revolt of
July 1999 and failed to condemn the ensuing bloody repression.
The slightest utterances and gestures from the United States are
scrutinized by Muslims who consider them fraught with political implications
and intentions. I shall recall here only two examples among many hundreds.
President Clinton’s visit to Syria during Haffez Al-Assad’s reign was construed
by Arab leaders, and their opponents, as support for autocratic regimes. It stole
the momentum from the Syrian opposition. Similarly, when, a few weeks after
11 September 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell shook hands with the Iran’s
Foreign Minister, the Iranian opposition both inside and outside the country
was deeply demoralized. That is why I prefer Washington stay out of Iran’s
internal politics.
America can nevertheless influence Iran by other means. By firmly
reaffirming and defending its democratic values vis-à-vis Iran and constantly
encouraging the democratic aspirations of Iranian youth, American foreign policy
can help Iranians to hasten the second and final death of Khomeini and
Khomeinism, of which elements still linger today. This can also help the United
States in its war against terrorism unleashed by militant Islamic fundamentalism
in other parts of the world. WA
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Notes
1. The Iranian online, 6 March 2001.
2. Leon Daudet (son of the novelist Alphonse Daudet).
3. The Rostam legend is the reverse of the Oedipus story.
4. Toward the Great Civilization (unpublished English translation).
5. Youssef Ibrahim, “A Chastened Ayatollah Calls Off His Holy War,” New York Times, 24 July
1988.
6. A political party created in the 1950s in support of Dr. Mossadegh whose government was
overthrown in august 1953 by CIA-inspired coup.
7. American Foreign Policy Interests, December 1989.
8. Letter to this writer, dated 4 November 2002.
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