Rel. Stud. 27, pp.
353-370
THOMAS
D. SENOR
SUPERNATURAL
GOD,
KINDS,
AND
THE
INCARNATION
it has never
'God'. And
often leads to thinking about
word.
to understand
this little English
clear how best
'
'
a
a
or
name.
God
has been taken to be either
description
Traditionally,
a third option has recently captured
of philosophical
the attention
However,
about
Thinking
been
completely
God
that just as one should think of, say, 'humanity'
It is claimed
theologians.
as a kind
or perhaps
as a kind term, so one should think of'God',
'divinity',
if one is
and metaphysics,
semantics
term. But given the tight link between
'
'
'
'
one
as
or
will
then
to
kind
understand
terms,
divinity
humanity
tempted
as
to
kinds.
and
think
of
Characterizing
humanity
divinity
begin
naturally
is to give a
task of philosophical
theology
to consider
In this paper, I want
kind-essence.
as a kind-essence,
and argue
construed
is profitably
the claim that divinity
not
is
been understood
that this has typically
that the way
altogether
an
of
alternative
and
I
then
shall
understanding
present
develop
adequate.
of
kinds'
the
that
takes
this kind-essence
analogy
'supernatural
approach
a primary
this way,
divinity
of the divine
characterization
kinds much
and natural
more
seriously.
I will
conclude
by considering
some
objections.
I. THE
SEMANTICS
OF
'GOD'
as a kind-essence
to think of divinity
suggests that we think of
or even 'God', as a kind term, i.e. as a term that picks out a kind.
'divinity',
this sort
this comes to, let me contrast
In order to get a little clearer on what
'
'
'
'
or God
two more
with
traditional
of divinity
of the meaning
of account
of'God'.
views of the semantics
'
'
to understand
is to take it as a definite
the term God
One natural way
'
'
can be under?
; this idea is often expressed
by saying that God
description
in the traditional
definite descriptions
stood as a title. And if one understands
'
'
to mean
God exists
this will mean
Russellian
way,
taking the proposition
one being who
is omniscient,
omni
'There
exists exactly
omnipotent,
The
decision
of course the particular
that I just gave
etc' Now
benevolent,
description
seems
of
but
it
clear that if
does not fall out of Russell's
;
theory
descriptions
'
'
an
a
are
we
account
to
of
is
and if
God
definite
trying
give
description,
what
certain
the
theist means
to be
then
by 'God',
the core of the description.
those
three
'omni
properties'
are
A
D. SE?OR
THOMAS
354
'God'
is as a name.1 Of course,
if we
way of understanding
names
common
in the way Russell
understood
names,
proper
are back to thinking of'God'
as a description.
So I propose
that for
second
understand
then we
names according
our purposes we understand
call this view the 'causal-names'
henceforth
to the causal
theory and I will
to this view,
theory. According
act
in virtue of an original
baptismal
a name,
in which
e.g. 'Jones', gets its meaning
the person or object is dubbed
'Jones'.
so dubbed
successfully
pick out the individual
link between
causal
In contrast
mentioned
utterances
Future
if there
of'Jones'
is the right kind of
the current
utterance
and the original
baptism.
of these approaches,
is the kind-essence
As
approach.
we
as
a
think of'God'
this view suggests
that
kind term.
to both
above,
than describing
an individual
some
individual
(as the description
theory says) or
term 'God'
the
causal-names
is
the
(as
naming
theory says)
a kind
seen as designating
Of
it
well
that
this
be
course,
very
might
ofthing.
one
at
most
not incon?
kind is necessarily
but
that
is
exemplified ' by
being;
'
as a kind term and divinity
as a kind-essence.
of
God
sistent with
thinking
two caveats:
let me make
Before
first, the kind-essence
ap?
continuing,
Rather
or the semantics
as a strictly
to divinity,
is not intended
of'God',
use the term. Clearly,
the way that believers
it is
thesis reporting
descriptive
'
'
is used as a proper name, and possibly,
it is at times
often the case that God
an
So the kinds theorist
should be seen as offering
used as a description.
proach
account
of one of the uses of'God'
then claiming
that there is something
construal.
second caveat
this
The
is that
enlightening
'
'
as a kind
if in what follows I am limited to using God
it will be awkward
term since it is so often used as a name. Therefore,
let me establish
the
a proper
as
to
term
I
be
the
convention:
whenever
intend
using
following
or informative
and
about
(i.e. as 'GOD'). When
only
kind-term
understanding.
I will write
it in all capital
letters
is capitalized,
I am intending
the
arises :what kind
But now a question
of the various
here? That
is, to which
name,
letter
term are we
of kind
kinds
as analogous?
Our choices include
divinity
kinds
and chair),
artifactual
(automobile
of kinds
:functional
talking
the first
about
are we
of
thinking
mouse
trap
(e.g.
and natural
kinds
kinds
and house),
we
of
water
the lines of any of
think
and
Should
along
divinity
tiger).
(e.g.
a proponent
of the kind essence
these or as a sui generis kind? Thomas Morris,
on
Since
his
the most
view
this
is
below.
his
explicit
explains
approach,
I know
discussion
It does not
words...
than
1
like
such
See William
quote
at some
seem to be the case that both
least
At
of, I will
a
the
concept
P. Alston,
(November
1988), 113-28,
(Ithaca: Cornell University
term
seems
'humanity'
word
[as 'bachelor'].
length.
'divinity'
and
to be more
'humanity'
like
are concept
a natural-kind
term
to God', The International Journal for thePhilosophy of Religion, xxiv
'Referring
in Alston's
of essays Divine Nature and Human Language
and reprinted
collection
Press, 1989), pp. 103-17.
AND
GOD
one
to
According
account
standard
KINDS
SUPERNATURAL
natural
of
kinds,
355
kind
such
every
an
has
traits individually necessary and jointly
essence, a set of properties of underlying
in the kind. We can understand both human nature and
sufficient for membership
nature
in a parallel fashion. Human
and divinity,
divine nature, or humanity
comprises all those properties individually necessary and jointly sufficient for being
human. No individual can be human without having each and every one of the
properties essential to humanity. And likewise for divinity. For example, on the
traditional doctrine of God, properties essential for divinity include omnipotence,
omniscience,
aseity, eternality and the like. No individual can be God without
all
having
In most
constitute
are
which
nontrivial
such
properties.
cases,
of what
specifications
what
Stephen
true...
necessarily
kind-essential
but
known
to
essential
a
propositions
is, in most
That
posteriori.
to characterize
kinds
particular
'
-
stable generalizations
only
are known
properties
are
properties
'
has called
Swartz
cases,
few
a
kinds
particular
priori. In this respect divinity seems to differ quite a bit from standard natural kinds.
For the epistemic status of many if not all, of the known attributes essential to deity
can be argued to be known to be such a priori. To this extent, 'divinity' is like a
constructed
word.2
concept
it is not quite clear whether Morris
essence. Or
to a natural-kind
analogous
So
essence
of the divine
is thinking
as
the answer
is 'he is and he
perhaps
as
has in mind
kind-essences
looks as though Morris
It certainly
an
or
essences.
to
Yet
he
artifactual
functional
recognizes
important
opposed
a
are knowable
:many
features
of divinity
of the kind-essential
difference
of natural kinds are knowable
essential properties
the non-trivial
priori, while
isn't.'
recent
In a more
only a posteriori.
an
his view that there is
important
explicit
natural
:
kinds
or
Divinity,
belonging
to
omniscience,
I begin
from
presence,
the
for
thus
or
kind,
example,
holds
who
moral
in
to a natural
analogous
a cluster of properties
eternality,
individual
as
I construe
deity,
a kind-essence,
any
even more
essay, Morris makes
between
and
divinity
parallel
this
for
case,
that
properties
such
properties
perfection,
is divine
and
and must
as
I
divine.
being
essential
take
to deity...
ontological
independence
comprising
sufficient for
and
omnipotence
The
omnipotence,
be had with
as
thus
and jointly
necessary
individually
to be
and
kind,
picture
omniscience,
must
the strongest
of God
omni?
belong
to
possible modal
status.3
is like a natural-kind
view,
then, is that divinity
a
are
is collection
of properties
that
essential for anything
Morris's
Just as something must
if it is to count as water,
essence
in that
to count
as divine.
of two parts hydrogen
and one part oxygen
'
so any object must have all of the omni-properties
consist
if it is to be God.
begin the next part of this paper with a critical
as importantly
that we understand
suggestion
divinity
I will
2
3
Thomas
Thomas
Plantinga,
University
V. Morris,
V. Morris,
evaluation
analogous
of Morris's
to natural
The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press,
1986), pp. 22-3.
in Ronald
'The Metaphysics
of God
and Cornelius
Incarnate',
J. Feenstra
and Theological Essays
Jr., eds, Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement: Philosophical
(Notre Dame:
tne quotation
is on p. 114.
of Notre Dame
Press, 1989), pp. 110-27;
it
'
D. SE?OR
THOMAS
356
of applying
the natural
that his way
kind analogy
is
argue
to
it
that
would
be
desirable
take
and
the
with
natural
inadequate,
analogy
than Morris
kinds even more
does. As we shall see, the resulting
seriously
; I will
kinds
some
offers
position
very
for
possibilities
interesting
solving
Christological
problems.
II.
are we
How
to understand
that all depends
Well,
to understand
those?
the semantics
sidering
tells us about natural
understand
SUPERNATURAL
more
this claim
KINDS
that
the
thesis
that
there
and natural-kind
of natural-kind
the causal
theory
contemporary
slightly familiar with
cussion of it need not delay us long. As
the meaning
of a natural-kind
convincingly,
had argued,
its nominal
'
water
theory, the word
So it will follow
liquid'.
the
kind?
are we
is a kind-essence
in much
the
fully the thesis that divinity
is. Since it is clear that whatever
it
isn't
say, water
is,
divinity
even
under
how
some
natural kinds and the divine
parallel between
is a supernatural kind (I shall call this the 'SK
falls
kinds. And
light can be shed on this by con?
terms and then considering
of natural-kind
what
this
to
kinds
themselves. We will
then be in a position
I think
same way that,
a natural kind,
let's say that
the semantics of'God'
between
Since
is like a natural
that divinity
natural
on how we understand
'
important
parallel
terms, and a corresponding
kind, is the thesis that divinity
for short).
to anyone
is very familiar
our dis?
of language,
philosophy
Putnam
and Kripke
have argued
thesis'
terms
term like 'water'
is not, as Locke
to the Lockean
essence.4
According
descriptivist
'
a
means
clear,
odourless,
tasteless,
simply
potable
satisfies this description
that any substance which
of'water'.
extension
is an
However,
such
an
account
is demon
of the much-discussed
by means
strably wrong.
some?
'Twin Earth'
there is another
thought
experiment.
Suppose
planet
is so much
like this one. This planet
that is very much
where
(Twin Earth)
who looks, acts,
there is a Twin Earthling
like Earth that for every Earthling
between
the two
sounds, and thinks just like he does. The only difference
This
can
be appreciated
a word
by uttering
and XYZ
is not H20
look,
(however, H20
a
to
taste
I
So
while
the
faucet
and
and
the
pour myself
go
smell,
glass
same).
a glass of XYZ.
fur?
twin pours himself
of water
my
Suppose
(i.e. H20),
our
to
nature
is unknown
of the stuff in
thermore
that the chemical
glasses
is H20
and not
that it is not known by me that water
us; that is, suppose
is that the stuff
planets
that sounds like 'water'
that Twin
Earthlings
but XYZ
designate
dollar
Now
the sixty-four
is XYZ.
twin that twin water
by my
'
'
'
'
water
water
the
Do
and
Twin
word
word
the
is,
English
English
question
seem that they do not. For my
mean
it would
the same thing? Intuitively
known
4
See Saul Kripke, Naming andNecessity
Press,
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University
in the second volume
of Putnam's
of "Meaning"',
Putnam
'The Meaning
reprinted
entitled Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge
Press,
University
1975), pp. 215-71.
1972) and Hilary
collected
papers,
GOD AND
KINDS
SUPERNATURAL
357
But since XYZ
while my twin's refers to XYZ.
looks,
picks out H20,
to
will
be
committed
tastes
the
like
and
smells,
theory
descriptivist
just
H20,
seems
water
Hence
'water'
and that
is
that XYZ
clearly wrong.
claiming
word
cannot
be defined
A further
lesson
mean
qualities.
by its phenomenal
'
'
water
to be gleaned
does
from these cases is that what
'
'
the
is the same kind of stuff as this where
like whatever
is something
indexical
refers to an
of water.
instance
of its nominal
it is in virtue
Now
as a matter
of course,
or phenomenal
properties
liquids. But such properties
of
that
fact,
contingent
are
water
we commonly
from other
distinguish
a certain compound
not that in virtue of which
is water. And
the story is
an animal
makes
the same for other natural
kinds, as well. What
precisely
a tiger is not its having
; rather it is its having
stripes and being carnivorous
a
certain
With
back
above,
make-up.
genetic
this account
to what
Morris
Morris
omniscience,
terms
of natural-kind
thinks
says about
that the
As
divinity.
kind-essential
omnibenevolence
omnipotence,
And of course
we now go
in our minds,
is clear from the quotations
fresh
attributes
and
the
of
rest
there is a good reason for seeing
properties.
such as
that propositions
It has long been maintained
God
is omnipotent
are
divinity
of the omni
things
this way.
and
is good
God
are de dicto necessary
truths. Now one way of explaining
why such truths are
a
is
kind-essence
and
such
constitute
that
is that divinity
necessary
properties
'
'
essence. So it is not simply a matter
of conceptual
that God is good
necessity
is necessarily
true; rather it is a metaphysical
necessity.
as this way of construing
the divine kind-essence
As well motivated
may
can
seen
to
if one's working model
mistaken
be
be fundamentally
of a
be, it
a term like 'water'
kind-essence
is that of natural
kinds. Recall
that what
the class of properties
that we use
exemplify
nor anything with the set
similar substances,
that water will
of attributes
or, if other things are equal, always
typically
a
a certain
out
water
certain
kind of substance,
Rather
exemplify.
picks
seems
The application
of this to the case of divinity
chemical
compound.
might
picks out is not whatever
to distinguish
water from other
To think
straightforward.
omnibenevolent
omniscient,
Himself
is not
to think
'God' as meaning
'An omnipotent,
of everything
that exists other
than
as
a
to
term at all.
it
natural-kind
analogous
of the term
Creator
of
it is to accept a kind of descriptivism
about supernatural
kinds ; the
are
not
sort
serve
to
to
the
of
omni-properties
simply
right
properties
pick out
a supernatural
as
our
water
kind. Again,
of
the
kind
thinking
gets
example,
not by the other properties
that tend
constitution,
picked out by its material
to 'ride along' with that particular
Now of course God is
physical make-up.
Rather,
neither
physical
nor
composite
; so the supernatural
kind
of divinity
will
be
358
most
THOMAS
D. SE?OR
of'God'
any natural kind. But that does not stop the semantics
same
terms.
the
features
of
natural-kind
To
follow
exhibiting
general
unlike
from
to think
this line of thought further,
let's continue
the
Besides
essential
property
having
and one part oxygen, water
hydrogen
A standard
call 'standard attributes'.
of a particular
virtue of which
about
water.
of being
of
composed
has various other attributes
attribute
two parts
that I will
is a property
that an instance
is not that in
have, but which
kind will commonly
the object is an exemplar
ofthat kind.5 So standard properties
of water
include
the aforementioned
of odourlessness,
colour?
properties
etc.
a
those standard
of
lessness, tastlessness,
kind, some
Among
properties
are what
I will
call 'ceteris paribus properties'
and some are 'secondary
natural
ceteris paribus property
that
is, as one might
expect, a property
if other things are equal. So, for example,
of a kind will have
water
at 100 degrees Centigrade.
has the ceteris paribus property
of boiling
or
water
if
the
has
salt
added
is
in a high altitude,
However,
being heated
or if the laws of nature were different
in certain ways,
then this property
is
on
not exemplified.
a
A secondary-essential
other
the
is
property,
hand,
essential'.
an
A
instance
but which
that, necessarily,
any sample of a kind will have,
on the nature of the substance.
for
the
So,
property
example,
at 100 degrees
the ceteris paribus property
of boiling
having
Centigrade
I call a 'secondary-essential'
what
of water.
property
property
derivative
According
as constitutive
is
of
is
to the SK
of
is not
thesis, the way to think of the omni-properties
as
the divine
but
rather
standard
attributes
of
essence,
essence
as
a
to natural-kind
think of the divine
analogous
For if we
divinity.
then the essential properties
of divinity will be those properties
essence,
to think
the nature of the divine essence. Now
is it plausible
constitute
I do not believe
constitute
the nature of God?
that
the omni-properties
that
that
it is.
to say that it is in virtue of GOD's
the
having
or being
sort
the
is
of being
that He
is, that He
are not
the omni-properties
and all the rest. Hence
the theist will want
For
surely
nature
that He
omnipotent,
the lowest
does,
omniscient,
level properties
and so they are not well
of the divine
essence,
kind of divinity.
features of the supernatural
the identifying
as
are
of natural kinds, there are standard
there
standard attributes
So just
can be
kinds. The
traditional
divine
attributes
of supernatural
attributes
suited
to be
tend to be exemplified
this fashion ; they will
by any
thought of in exactly
we can say something
a divine nature.
But
with
stronger yet, if we
being
two sorts of standard
between
that we distinguished
choose. Recall
proper?
statement
that
attributes
ties : ceteris paribus and secondary-essential.
Any
a property
of the former
are possible
there
definition
of
by objects
exemplified
5
Logic
This
notion
type is clearly
circumstances
that
kind.
is similar
of a 'standard property'
calls a 'common property'.
of God Incarnate,
not
a necessary
truth since by
that property will not be
in which
However,
any
to, but
different
slightly
true
ascription
from what
Morris,
of a
in The
GOD AND
KINDS
SUPERNATURAL
359
truth. Now one might
very
property will be a necessary
secondary-essential
and
such as necessity,
that attributes
well argue
omnip?
eternality,
aseity,
otence are secondary-essential;
could
that is of the divine substance
nothing
'
'
essence
same
in the
that
the
fail to exemplify
way
them, they follow from
certain
THE
III.
SK
the nature
from
follow
properties
physical
THE
AND
THESIS
of H20.
INCARNATION
for the reasons
that have already
the SK thesis is attractive
a natural-kind
as
us
to
much
like
of
it
think
allows
;
very
divinity
'
'
'
'
are structurally
term ; and so the semantics
and humanity
of God
very
it seems to me that the Christian
close and that is as it should be. However,
I believe
that
surfaced
has
view.
a particularly
For it allows
very natural
and,
to
According
Christian
claim
for accepting
the doctrine
strong motivation
one to understand
it would
seem,
traditional
'
that GOD
For
relatively
understanding
became man
the supernatural
of the Incarnation
trouble-free
of God
way.
and
'
Let me
kinds
in a
explain.
the
humanity,
can appear very puzzling
if not
to engender
various logical difficulties
;
as follows:
that is human must
anything
it seems
contradictory.
downright
can be generated
such problems
is human,
He
P; thus, since Jesus Christ
property
exemplifies
exemplify
to Leibniz's
to
if
GOD
the
then
is
identical
P.
So
He
Son,
property
according
no divine being can
P too ; but necessarily,
the latter must
Law,
exemplify
exemplify P, so the identity claim must be false. For the property-term-place?
P, one can substitute
'being limited in
etc. Generally,
'existing contingently',
corruptible',
power',
'being morally
a
are such
to be
truth that humans
the problem
is that it is thought
necessary
that they are limited in various ways, and God is such that the divine nature
so any being who is both God and man
in virtually
is unlimited
every way;
would have to be both limited and unlimited
with respect to many
attributes
holder
'being
limited
in knowledge',
that is, of course,
and goodness).
And
power,
(e.g. knowledge,
impossible.
Thomas Morris
has done a great deal to dissolve
this apparent
Recently,
reason to think that
has argued
that there is no compelling
paradox. Morris
as knowledge,
in such attributes
limited
and
power,
being
essential
feature of humanity.6
Hence most of the Leibniz's
are solved because
one will not attribute
described
above
limitation
for His
to be essential
that might
initially have been thought
it is not my purpose here to explicate
the details
one
want
to
at
I
What
do instead
is look
of the
apologetics.
manoeuvre
that Morris's
does not resolve and see how the claim
properties
being human.
of Morris's
problems
that divinity
is interested
is an
goodness
Law problems
to Christ
the
Now
is a supernatural
kind can help the philosophical
in preserving
Christological
orthodoxy.
theologian
who
6
Swinburne
has recently taken
Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate, particularly
Chapter Three. Richard
in 'Could God Become Man?'
this same position
in Godfrey Vesey,
ed., The Philosophy in Christianity
Press, 1989), pp. 53-70.
(Cambridge University
THOMAS
360
The
D.
concerns
problem
that Morris
makes
does
recalcitrant
manoeuvre
problem
humanity
omniscience
SE?OR
the attribute
; for the orthodox
theologian
in knowledge
that one be limited
to Christ
the
and
so one
to attribute
is free
without
theologian
account
scriptural
would
ascribe omniscience
to Christ
Himself
with
claimed
For Christ
during His earthly ministry.
to
exact
the
time
of
the
Last
respect
Judge?
alone knew this. So the orthodox
Christologist
ignorance
ment; He said that the Father
who claims that Christ has to be omniscient
The
Now
the or?
However,
generating
inconsistency.
want
concur
to
will certainly
her Christology
with
the
of the life of Jesus; and this causes difficulties
for one who
thodox
just how
I want
of omniscience.
take away the standard Leibniz's
Law
can maintain
that it is not essential for
it can be that an omniscient
to be God must
in order
can fail
being
to know
two recent
to explore briefly
first will be Morris's
to deal with
attempts
and the second
is offered
explain
a proposition.
this dilemma.
solution
by Ronald
in his paper
Kenotic
After
'Reconsidering
looking at
Christology'.7
to
the way Morris
I
and Feenstra
resolve
this
will
try
difficulty,
explain how
one who adopts
can
handle
the SK thesis
it. I believe
that this comparison
Feenstra
will
of this latter position.
to
accounts
the
of Christ with
the tradi?
square
attempts
Gospel
:
two
of omniscience
tional divine
attribute
in Christ
minds
by postulating
one human and one divine. The human mind
is very limited in what
it knows
increase
the attractiveness
Morris
in first
be very much
like the mind
of a standard
human
being
an
to
Palestine.
Christ
is
also
said
have
omniscient
divine
However,
century
one most unlike that of any human.
In taking on human nature, Christ
mind,
and during his time on earth limits himself
almost
takes on a human mind
and will
to its contents. However,
Christ's divine mind,
exclusively
being omniscient,
access
to all of the states of the human mind,
the
has complete
although
own
no
access
to
the
divine
mind.
While
its
mind
has
human
accord)
(of
from
time to time,
accessing
Given
mind
relationship
this 'two-minds'
things to the human mind,
is asymmetric.
it is easy to see the nature
of Christ,
will
reveal
view
to the omniscience
problem.
to His
is omniscient
Christ
;with respect
mind,
does include knowledge
since His divine mind
Just
getic,
as it is not my purpose
so I shall not offer any
equacy
problems,
to His
human
respect
mind He
of all
true propositions,
of
divine
is not. But
His
to give
a detailed
account
of Morris's
apolo?
or
inad?
of
the
adequacy
general
let me point out some of its potential
view. However,
of the two-minds
The first dif?
himself
discusses.
with one that Morris
beginning
evaluation
can have
two
that a single person
cases of split personalities
and commissurotomy
patients might
two minds,
this interpret
of single persons with
to be actual examples
then,
ficulty,
minds. While
seem
With
intact.
remains
omniscience
the
the two
between
solution
Morris's
the divine
is that
it is not
7
In Feenstra
at all clear
and Plantinga,
op cit. pp.
128-52.
GOD
of these cases
AND
KINDS
SUPERNATURAL
361
one. A second
upon
problem,
pointed out
the
in
of
Morris's
is
Eleonore
her
review
that
two-minds
view
book,8
by
Stump
in defeating
the charge of the incoherence
does not succeed
of the doctrine
since it will be true of Christ
of the Incarnation
that he both knew and did
ation
not know
forced
of the Last Judgement.
to claim
it does little good
Since
the date
predication,
to his divine
respect
nature.
is hardly
nature
I do not mean
Now
able
however,
problems;
with
satisfied
completely
I turn now
and not
there
is a single subject of
with
omniscient
was
that Christ
to his human
omniscient
with
respect
to suggest that these are necessarily
to make
they are troubling
enough
the two-minds
view.
to the suggestion
of Ronald
As
'Kenotic'
Christology.
Feenstra.
insurmount?
one
less than
Feenstra
opts for what
them, such Christ
are distinguished
that they place on the biblical
by the emphasis
as
rather than seeing the Incarnation
of the Christ's
self-emptying;
is known
ologies
notion
as a
I understand
the Son's taking on, or adding
(namely, a human
nature),
something
as
status.
see
His
Such
it His giving up
exalted
view
they
theologies
naturally
Christ as not being omniscient
since this is a divine attribute
the Incarnate
God
Christ
of which
with
the claim
then
divinity,
himself
The problem,
of course,
is to square
emptied Himself.
is kind-essential
that Christ was God ; for if omniscience
of this divine attribute,
in emptying
Himself
and hence He is not 'fully God'.
Christ
this
to
emptied
of divinity
Feenstra's
way
omniscience
of dealing
with
this problem
is to distinguish
between
a
and
attribute
that God
Incarnate
simpliciter
slightly different
and then to claim
that it is this latter attribute
that is really
can satisfy
essential for divinity.9
What
is this other
attribute?
It is the property
of being
omniscient-unless-freely-and-temporarily-choosing-to-be-otherwise.
insists that God the Son freely and temporarily
since Christian
theology
took on our limitations,
Christ does have this property
and hence
is divine.
The obvious problem with this proposal
is that it is an absolutely
paradigm
And
case of an ad hoc adjustment.
To amend a kind-essential
attribute
of divinity
an
in an unnatural
for
the
of
sole purpose
is a very
way
avoiding
objection
to any theological
unattractive
solution
Of course,
this is not a
difficulty.
one
even
as
I
think
Feenstra
that
claim,
would,
devastating
difficulty;
might
a Christian
to
to
have
her
about
God
expect
theologian
ought
thinking
on the Incarnation.
formed and, if needed,
Never?
by reflecting
changed
the specific and detailed
alteration
of the doctrine
that Feenstra
has
the
feel
of a desperate,
suggests
to make
the doctrine
of the Incarnation
coherent.
theless,
of God
In contrast
would
to these positions,
seem relatively
the friend
unproblematic.
8
Faith and Philosophy, vi 2 (April, 1989), 218-23.
9
It should be noted, as Feenstra does, that Morris
see, he eventually
rejects.
And
of the SK
inmany
is the originator
of the omniscience
ad hoc manoeuvre
thesis has a solution
ways
that
it has close affinities
of this suggestion,
which,
as we
shall
with
D.
THOMAS
362
SE?OR
the Kenotic
of Feenstra;
what
it lacks, however,
is its ad hoc
Christology
see
can
to
us
how
the
SK
thesis
be helpful,
recall a
let
begin
distinction
that was made
i.e. that between
and
earlier,
secondary-essential
a
I
to
ceteris paribus properties.
said
that
natural
understand
the
Above,
way
character.
To
of the properties
that are in fact kind-essential
is to think of the latter as necessarily
omni-properties,
relation
and
former,
status of such
as secondary-essential.
as 'God is good'
statements
hence
That
would
and
'God
for divinity
derivative
and
the
on
the
the modal
preserve
is omnipotent'.10
that all of the traditional
reason to think
is there any compelling
However,
must
divine
attributes
be secondary-essential
rather
than simply
ceteris
some
That
of
could
the
traditional
be
such
that
is,
paribus?
omni-properties
a being who
or
is divine would
have
but
which
them,
naturally
standardly
are not
even
to divinity?
I do not see why not. In fact,
secondary-essential
one might
the attribute
of omniscience
that, properly
construed,
suppose
a
to
would
be quite plausibly
be
ceteris
of the divine
thought
paribus property
essence. But before we can see this we need to take a quick excursion
into the
attribute
of omniscience.
a
iff for every true
philosophers,
being S is omniscient
to
S
knows
that
P.
be
To
omniscient
is
know
P,
proposition
just
everything
there is to know. If it should turn out that propositions
about the future acts
of free agents
lack a truth value, S could still be omniscient.
their
Despite
are
reason
initial attractiveness,
such
The
for
however,
analyses
inadequate.
According
this ismade
Taliaferro
to many
clear
asks
in Charles
us
to
Taliaferro's
consider
two
paper
'Divine
Power'.11
Cognitive
and
Dennis.
Christopher
agents,
has immediate,
and infallible
incorrigible
Christopher
state of affairs ; the truth of propositions
about
actual
knowledge
those states
of every
of affairs
is
and infallibly
Christopher
registers with him. Hence
just automatically
tells Dennis
that he knows, which
Now Christopher
omniscient.
everything
is omniscient
and everything
that
task. So since Christopher
is no mean
to
too
the
omniscient
Dennis
is
Dennis
knows,
knows,
according
Christopher
true
asks
both
know
definition.
traditional
However,
every
They
proposition.
is epistemically
isn't it clear that Christopher
Taliaferro,
superior to Dennis?
to be the very best
is supposed
since omniscience
But this should be puzzling
that
what
is really fun?
then
Taliaferro
of epistemic
suggests
superlatives.
have unsur?
To
to
is
omniscience
damental
cognitive
power'.
'unsurpassable
power is to have the ability to have unmediated
knowledge
cognitive
has
but
Dennis
lacks
true
this
for
trait,
any
Christopher
that/?
proposition/?.
on Christopher
So Dennis,
for all of his information.
it since he depends
Taliaferro
is not omniscient.
he knows all true propositions,
grants
although
In
but it is not sufficient.
for omniscience,
is necessary
that such knowledge
passable
10
can still be seen as necessarily
While
such sentences
true, they will not express de dicto necessities.
on this below
in my reply to objection
More
4.
11
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, xvm
'Divine Cognitive
Charles Taliaferro,
Power',
I33-40.
(1985),
GOD AND
to be
order
cognitive
As we
thesis.
cannot
the best
power.
shall see
SUPERNATURAL
of possible
knowers
KINDS
one must
possess
363
unsurpassable
to the SK
is very congenial
analysis
all true propositions
It is also extremely
For knowing
compelling.
be what
is at the bottom of the attribute
of omniscience
; surely there
Taliaferro's
presently,
in virtue of which
is something
essence
to
of divinity.
closer
the
such knowledge
is had and it is this that is
And unsurpassable
is just
power
cognitive
such an attribute.
to see how to reconcile what
If all of this is right, we are at last in a position
of
certain
in the New
about Christ's
ignorance
propositions
Testament
with
the claim that Christ was God
the Son. The problem
has
one
was
if
claims
looked thorny indeed. For, as discussed
that
Christ
earlier,
is claimed
God,
one
and
then
divinity,
remain
we
thinks
one must
are kind-essential
that all of the omni-properties
was
claim that Christ
omniscient.
But if one
one
true to the Scriptures,
seem to have an embarrassing
for
is to
can not portray Christ as omniscient.
So
dilemma:
either claim Christ's
divinity
or accept what appears
to be a clear
of the Gospels
to Christ and
and deny an essential attribute
of divinity
teaching
scriptural
hence deny the credal assertion
that He was 'fully God '.Now
the SK solution
a being divine
is as follows :what makes
is not His exemplifying
the omni
and disregard
the witness
;what makes a being divine isHis being a certain kind of substance
properties
which
such properties. Now many of these omni-proper?
typically exemplifies
ties are secondary-essential
and so any being who
is divine will have them,
and have
them essentially.
the friend of the SK thesis claims, while
However,
be secondary-essential,
the Christian
is
power
might
unsurpassable
cognitive
much
within
her
in
that
full
the
of
exercise
that
very
power
rights
claiming
of divinity.
For just as God
only a ceteris paribus property
us
so
to give
restrains His causal power
He restrains his cognitive
free will,
to take on our condition.
in order
It seems that we have here the
power
of a significant
of Kenotic
; for it allows us to
makings
variety
Christology
sense of Christ's
make
Himself
divine
of
many
emptying
[ceteris paribus)
is not, but
attributes
ral kind
is rather
his divinity,
since the essence ofthat
maintaining
is the substance
from which
those properties
arise.
while
IV.
It seems
to me
that
Before
objections.
while
they are
insurmountable
OBJECTIONS
the SK
concluding,
undoubtedly
AND
supernatu?
REPLIES
is likely to be met with a whole
range of
some objections;
I would
like to discuss
for
not
of
do
discussion,
pose any
worthy
they
thesis
for this view of divinity.
problems
i
:
The
terms have the mean?
Objection
reference-fixing problem. Natural-kind
our
that
do
in
virtue
of
causal
relations
with
the things that
ing
they
having
such terms denote. However,
to think that the term 'God'
it isn't plausible
364
THOMAS
D. SE?OR
can get its meaning
that way because we do not even know that such a being
exists. But, of course, we do know
that there is such a thing as water
and
an
so
there
is
here
between
the
that
way
tigers;
important
disanalogy
terms
natural-kind
that their reference
get their meaning
(or the way
gets
and
the
that
'God'
its
way
gets
fixed)
meaning.
to this is, first, to distinguish
between
there being
response
X
of
and there being general agreement
that X; I do not see that
knowledge
to grant that it is highly
the first requires
I am willing
the second. So while
am
not
controversial
that God
I
to
that there is no
exists,
grant
willing
Reply. My
Now
does
the fact that people
the
about
knowledge.
disagree
'
'
of God provide
solid reason for thinking
that the term God
did
its reference fixed in much
the same way
terms
that natural-kind
religious
existence
not have
of the essence?
It is extremely
do, i.e. by causal contact with an instantiation
see
to
hard
how any such claim follows. And
the Christian
will have a story
a causal account
to tell that fits in rather nicely with
of the fixing of the
'
reference of God '.Any Christian
who thinks that the Old Testament
is even
will
think
that the various
founders
of the
correct,
partially
historically
some?
had veridical
of God. Way
back in history
experience
or
with
and
Eve
Adam
whoever
had
the
first
of
where,
say
God,
experience
was dubbed
the object of this experience
the Hebrew
of'God'.
equivalent
a good
And while
the believed
characteristics
of God seem to have changed
to the time of the Scholastics,
deal from, say the time of the writing
of Genesis
Jewish
faith
the referent was the same since the way
that Anselm,
Aquinas
'
'
was
and others used Deus
in the right way with the way
causally connected
term was used by the writer(s)
of the Pentateuch.
the corresponding
'
'
Now of course, none of this is a proof that the reference of God
gets fixed
in the way
that natural
kind terms do. All that I have done is argued
that
nevertheless
if what
Himself
Christians
believe
about
God
and
the way
that He has
that the word
'God'
revealed
in history
is right,
then the claim
(and its
and Latin cousins)
is used to denote
the object of religious
Greek,
'
'
water
in much
the same way that the word
is used to denote an
experience
of
is
indeed.
very plausible
object
perceptual
experience
Hebrew,
objection. There
Objection 2: The God-as-psychological-process
with
of the SK
other worries
associated
this causal element
are, however,
thesis. Here
is
true statement
is a (necessarily)
following
or
:
no
If
all or most of the omni-propertiess
there
who
has
is
[T]
being
no
at least something
God.
them, then there is
approximating
no
and
that what
with
such
attributes
that
is
indeed
there
suppose
being
one: The
But
mechanism
which
functions
is some psychological
religious experience
an 'ex?
one
one
us peace of mind.
when
has
So what
experiences
'
mechanism.
is simply the workings
of a psychological
of God
Then,
perience
on
to
causal
God.
the
that
is
the
SK
thesis,
process
theory
(Because
according
is just what
the extension
of'God'
that this account
of reference
presumes,
causes
to give
GOD AND
KINDS
SUPERNATURAL
365
; so if all
religious
experience
'
'
some
then
God
process
by
psychological
religious
experiences
in part at least,
But this is, of course, absurd,
just refers to such a process.)
even more certain
because
it violates
[T]. Of course it also violates
principles
ever has
of the cause
the nature
of the initial
are caused
like
[T*]
God.
:Nothing
that
is the product
of a human
psychological
is
process
the SK thesis is wrong.
and one that I do not know
that I can
This
is a serious objection
Reply.
to
note
to adequately.
that this problem
is
it is important
However,
respond
a difficulty
not merely
for this view about supernatural
kinds, but is a general
terms. For consider
for the Kripke/Putnam
theory of natural-kind
problem
Therefore,
the following
case, which
the things that we have
I borrow
from Peter Unger.12
that all of
Suppose
are
'cats'
inanimate
robots
called
really
always
on our planet
Martians.
This
the Putnam/
fact, together with
by
are
cats
that
thesis about natural-kind
terms, implies
really inanimate
we to learn
were
be claimed,
the proper response
But surely, itmight
placed
Kripke
objects.
this startling
feline
fact
is that
there
just
are not
cats,
any
but
cat
only
robots.
appearing
to the supernatural-kinds
view of divinity
is really an
So this objection
terms of the Kripke/Putnam
to all accounts
sort.
of natural-kind
objection
this result is to adopt
the suggestion
that Nicholas
One way of avoiding
Wolterstorff
terstorff
in his article,
'Are Concept-Users
World-Makers?'
not
that Putnam
need
draw the distinction
between
terms
and natural
concept
(e.g. 'bachelor')
that he does. Wolterstorff
suggests
Perhaps
be
of
that
So
the
that
Wol
makes
notes
for our application
the condition
same
nature
nature
be
the idea here
as
an
the paradigm
nature.
animal
is to amend
kind
of the word
examples
This
then
of
terms
'
'
tiger
the word's
would
in the very
be
to something
cluster
stark way
is that it
application?provided
a mixed
case.13
the Putnam/Kripke
line so that instead of a
'whatever
has the nature of that', we instead
so if it should turn
that has the nature ofthat';
term like 'tiger' meaning
that
it means
'the animal
say
out that it is not an animal at all, the term just does not refer. Similarly,
then
'
'
'
we could amend
the SK thesis so that it claims that God means
whatever
kind
supernatural being that has the nature of that'. One might wish to add more by
than 'supernatural
For instance,
it might
be
way of qualification
being'.
that nothing
that was not the creator of the universe
could possibly fall under
the
extension
particulars
primarily
12
of
'God'.
of this view.
an objection
to take a stand on the
is not my
intention
to have shown that (i) this objection
It is enough
is
It
to indexical
theories
of kind
terms generally
and
(ii)
Peter Unger,
of Minnesota
Press, 1984), pp. 84fr.
Philosophical Relativity
(Minneapolis:
University
13
'Are Concept-Users
Nicholas Wolterstorff,
World Makers?',
in James E. Tomberlin,
ed., Philo?
CA: Ridgeview
Pub. Co.,
sophical Perspectives, 1 :Metaphysics,
ig8y (Atascadero,
1987), p. 248.
THOMAS
366
there
about
appears
bizarre
to be room
D. SE?OR
to manoeuvre
counterfactual
situations
that will
save both
and
essence
the
of
our
intuitions
the
indexical
theory.
be thought
that were
reasonably
Objection 3: The mystery objection. It might
one ought
one to adopt
to stop
the position
that I am suggesting,
thereby
we
ever
the divine
theology. For how could
comprehend
doing philosophical
if we are to take the analogy with natural kinds in the deadly
essence? And
that we could
serious way
that I have been understanding
it, the only way
that
constitute
the
kind
of
is by
know
the properties
supernatural
deity
we are not ever
that is something
about
the essence of God. And
knowing
this suggestion
is right is akin to thinking
to
philosophical
theology as it is typically
point
we
were
learn from it what
to, namely,
supposed
likely to know. So thinking
that there really is not much
because we cannot
practised
that
the nature
of divinity.
to this is two-fold.
response
My
the essence
First, I completely
agree that on this view
to turn out to be unknowable.
But far from being
of God
is going
that seems exactly right to me. One should here recall
'
: My face you
where God
is said to have told Moses
a problem,
in Exodus,
the passage
cannot
see,
I do not think
may see me and live' (Exodus 33:20). However,
is not a worthwhile
that all of this entails that philosophical
theology
for no mortal
This
prise.
information
'
'
God
and
that we
by
conclusion
would
follow, however,
about divinity was by the analysis
scientific
research. And with more
can come
the
examining
to have
semantic
information
content
about
on
the
one
enter?
if the only way of deriving
term
of the supernatural-kind
standard
terms, the only way
them and what
is
they denote
hand,
and,
for
natural-kind
or empirical
would
research on the other. A Lockean
terms, doing
an
can
we
nature
water
of
learn
about
the
of
that
think
analysis
by giving
that to find out
thesis suggests
the Putnam/Kripke
the notion. However,
scientific
to do scientific
this
research. Now,
of water, we have
can
seen
to
to
this
thesis
be
be
kinds
the
making
point :
supernatural
objection
one
can
a
that
look
into
then
if you understand
definite
'God'
by
description
the results of the
and do philosophical
by examining
theology
description
about
the extension
kinds thesis rejects this
the supernatural
to it, you cannot
so, according
get at the
at a concept or the meaning
of a term. But with
semantic
However,
investigation.
and
of
divinity,
understanding
essence
of divinity
by looking
terms, you come to find out their extensions
by doing
respect to natural-kind
natures of the objects
But
denote.
into
the
scientific
research
they
empirical,
that we will never know the divine essence, and
it has already been admitted
this seems right since we can not do science on God. So since the two standard
ways of finding out the natures of such terms is ruled out on the supernatural
left to do.
kind terms thesis, there just is not anything
This
theology
is an
and since I believe
interesting
objection,
a
I had better
is good and profitable
enterprise,
that philosophical
have
something
to
GOD AND
SUPERNATURAL
KINDS
367
I do. While
it is true that there is a significant
and natural kinds,
kind
of divinity
the
disanalogy
supernatural
it turns out to be just the sort of divergence
that one would
expect given the
one
in the natures
of the two things. That
should not expect
difference
is,
say by way
of rebuttal.
And
here between
scientific
about God
is an
since, inter alia, He
this takes away one avenue
of knowledge,
it
to reveal himself
in a variety
has the ability
of
to reveal much
methodology
But while
immaterial
person.
For God
up another.
ways that physical
objects can not. So it seems to me that we can and should
so long as we believe
to do philosophical
that God has
continue
theology
us
to
talk
about.
And
of course
revealed Himself,
thereby giving
something
opens
for
do believe.
It might
well be argued,
is precisely
what Christians
as
to
is
in
the
the
think
of
God
He
revealed
that
best
way
example,
Scriptures
one might
is as an omniscient,
eternal
omnipotent,
Spirit. Furthermore,
in all post-biblical
and that
that God has not been absent
believe
theology
that
at least
the essential
right. This
creeds
of the Church
us with
provides
that we
all
core of Christian
and
to carry
need
on with
belief
are
traditional
philosophical
theology.
view is unorthodox. One might
think that
Objection 4: The supernatural-kinds
to be of much
the position
under discussion
is too radical or extreme
good
seem to be a particularly
to orthodox
Christian
And this might
philosophers.
since I have suggested
that thinking of divinity
important
objection
along
in preserving
these lines can be very useful
both
the two-natures
view of
Christ and the accuracy
of the biblical
record of the life of Christ.
Reply.
significant
falsehood
I do
way.
not
think
that
For
example,
in
the
lurking
Apostles'
the Reformation.
And
this
of
concerned.
of contemporary
while
However,
philosophical
I will concede
nothing
the Nicene
Creed,
Creed, or the confessions
to be
is the sort of orthodoxy
with which
is that it is unorthodox
theology, well,
that it might
it isworth
unorthodox,
sophically
from the mainline.
For example,
statements
are
[2] Necessarily,
[3] Necessarily,
if [1]?[3] are
are
14
deny
not
prevent
is much
the perspective
less worrisome.
in certain
seeing that it is hardly
it is generally
held
respects philo?
a radical
departure
that the following
is good.
is omnipotent.
God is the creator of everything
other than His nature.
read as analytic de dicto necessary
truths, as they frequently
the friend of the SK thesis is
philosophical
theology,
God
God
in contemporary
to denying
committed
little gets packed
into
does
that
be
from
true:
[1] Necessarily,
Now
is unorthodox
it does
if the objection
Now,
in any religiously
to suggest
that there is a
this view
them.14 For,
the definition
de re readings
If propositions
[i]-[3]
them. I am indebted
of
on
the view
or
[i]-[3]
intension
from
that I am
of
being
very
that
However,
true. And
it is very
suggesting,
'God'.
are read as synthetic de dicto necessities,
the SK advocate
to Jim Taylor
for demanding
that I recognize
this point.
has no reason
to
to note
important
and my
[i]-[3]
me explain.
here
D. SE?OR
THOMAS
368
there are
that
is consistent
position
de re readings
of each of
or
all of them being true. Let
any
two different
with
two interpretations
of religion have recognized
of
philosophers
can
to
such sentences
be thought
de dicto
First,
express
[i]-[3].
analytic
an
to
is
is
which
'It
truth
that
is
"God
necessities,
say, e.g.
analytic
good".'
if there is a being who exists there
[1] in effect says that in any possible world,
Typically,
that being
of this truth is not to be
is good. The ground
essence of God,
found in the individual
rather it is grounded
in the nature
of the concept God. The other standard
of
is that they
interpretation
[i]-[3]
who
is God,
then
de re necessities.
who
is God has
[1] says that the individual
or
at
at
every world
property,
goodness
slightly differently,
which
the being who
is God at the actual world
the
exists, He is good. Now
one to denying
SK thesis commits
the truth of [1]?[3] on the de dicto reading.
express
Thus,
as an essential
[i]-[3],
essence
one from accepting
to prevent
nothing
to do with
such readings
have
the Divine
it does
However,
since
and
the SK
thesis
is a thesis
about
a de re reading
of
individual
Being's
the kind-essence
that
that
indi?
vidual
exemplifies.
if the supernatural
kinds thesis is right, there is a third way of
a de re reading,
that
is
also
but in which
'God'
is
understanding
[i]-[3]
a super?
not as the name of an individual,
understood
but as designating
natural
kind. On this understanding,
of
says that because
[1], for example,
However,
the nature
of the kind-essence
of deity, any being who is divine
is good. Now
seem to be
like
that
and
argued
goodness
properties
omnipotence
a
for
candidates
since
there
will
be more
essence,
supernatural-kind
unlikely
'
'
as
level
facts in virtue of which
such properties
ground
apply. However,
are what
I have called
the de
'secondary-essential',
long as such properties
I have
re readings
of [i]-[3]
natural-kinds
theorist
and
the like will
is prevented
still
she
has open
these
sentences,
one of which pertains
be
from
to her
true. So even
the super?
though
de
dicto
of
the
rendering
accepting
re
two different
de
understandings,
isGod and one of which pertains
seems to capture what
de re reading
the de dicto interpretation
that
is important
about
;
is, it specifies conditions
met
to
must
So it seems to me that the
be
for any individual
be divine.
that
claims
SK thesis is consistent
with
the spirit of the modal
by
expressed
to what
to the individual
it is to be God.
And
who
this second
[i]-[3l
view is anti-anselmian
Objection 5: The supernatural-kinds
[the south bend objec?
and apparently
fruitful
trend in philosophical
theology
tion). A current
or
as
than
Anselmian
the
of
God
the
Perfect
involves
Being
Being,
thinking
can be conceived.
to this view, we can
greater
According
a
nature
the
divine
attributes.
But if
the
of
determine,
by
priori reflection,
on the concept
of God can tell us much more
this is right, then reflection
which
none
about
the nature
of God
than
the SK
thesis would
allow.
Indeed,
in the first
SUPERNATURAL
GOD AND
KINDS
369
from Thomas Morris,
he remarked
that
that I quoted
of the passages
one of the important
between
natural kinds and the divine
disanalogies
are Morris's
words:
These
this is
kind.
in most cases [of natural kinds], few nontrivial kind-essential properties are known
to characterize particular kinds a priori. In this respect divinity seems to differ quite
a bit from standard natural kinds. For the epistemic status of many, if not all, of the
known attributes essential to deity can be argued to be known to be such a priori.
To
this
Now
extent,
the
recognize
a constructed
is like
'divinity'
supernatural-kind
such a disanalogy.
word.
concept
I have
view
that
And
to that extent
not
been
does
developing
it is anti-Anselmian.
as charged. There
sense in which
is a significant
this view is
Reply. Guilty
cannot
that the
the
allow
anti-Anselmian;
supernatural-kinds
perspective
there are two
into the concept of God. However,
divine attributes
get packed
to
this
that
tend
minimize
consequence.
important
points
two sorts of a priori knowledge
First, we should be careful to distinguish
since my position
of the divine attributes,
requires rejecting only one of them.
a priori knowledge'.
call 'conceptual
The first category
is what we might
an unmarried
man or that a
a
bachelor
is
that
is a three
Knowing
triangle
If the concept
of God
angled figure are instances of this sort of knowledge.
is that of the greatest possible being, and if that concept contains
the concept
then it is what
I am calling conceptual
of that being's having
omnipotence,
a priori knowledge.
To be distinguished
from this innate, non-conceptual
sort of knowledge
is perhaps
the purest form of a priori
is
since
it
had
and not merely
is,
temporally,
logically,
This
knowledge.
that there
knowledge
prior to experience.
I take it that
Now
the idea
that we
an innate
have
of God
is
knowledge
one. So it would be a very bad consequence
of the SK thesis
to deny
this. Happily,
it has no such consequence.
The
'
can
a
we
theorist
that
know
God
grant
supernatural-kinds
priori that, say,
is good'
but maintain
that such knowledge
is not conceptual,
but merely
a
one
can
a
fair bit of theology
innate. So there might
be
that
do
priori and
clearly a biblical
if it forced one
this does make
investigation
science of standard
natural
ence has nothing
to do with
the divine
into
kind
to do
chosen
The
thesis
which
second
that
none
that
bone
indicates
greater
about,
e.g.
to throw
that
possible
as
from
the
this differ?
about Himself
of knowledge
and He
has
water.
the Anselmian
the individual
can be conceived.
being
that
However,
of the terms or the way that such
the difference
is just that God has chosen
long as one
one
also
Furthermore,
necessity.
might
essence. Thus,
the greatest
possible
greatest
different
notice
the semantics
terms get their meaning.
Rather
a certain amount
to plant in humans
not
kind-essence
essences.
is that there
who
is God
So one
can
is nothing
is not
claim
does
not misread
insist
that
the divine
in the SK
the being
that GOD
than
is the
this as a de dicto
kind-essence
is
370
THOMAS
D.
SE?OR
is the greatest
being
[4] God
possible
can be seen to express a de re necessity
about
the divine kind.
that there is one important
It must be admitted,
however,
disagreement
and the SK advocate.
between
the traditional Anselmian
The former thinks
can be done
that significant
theology
contents.
its
The
God and unpacking
simply by reflecting
SK advocate,
while
on the concept
of
perhaps
agreeing
some of our knowledge
of GOD
is innate, will tend not to think of her
but rather as explicating
what has been revealed
analysis,
job as conceptual
about the nature of GOD. To put the point rather differently,
the Anselmian
can be done from the top down ; that is,
thinks that a good deal of theology
that
none greater
can be conceived
of the being
than which
is a
on
our
GOD
about
and
the
kind-essence
of
thinking
significant
our
can
suggests that
concept of God
divinity. The SK thesis, however,
place
no
on
our
constraints
since
the
has
very little
concept
theology,
virtually
content. Thus,
in
and
in
intensional
theology
general,
Christology
particular,
'
'
look at the data of revelation
will be seen as bottom up enterprises
;we must
that
the notion
constraint
in order
to know
about
GOD.
and the supernatural-kinds
theorist
so, the theology of the Anselmian
is no good reason why
need not be that far apart. There
the God of the
can not be identical
to the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob.15
philosophers
Even
of Arkansas and Georgetown
University
of Philosophy
Department
Georgetown
Washington
15
Alston,
I have
and
University
University
DC 2005J
from
benefited
from electronic
conversations
'conversations'
on
these issues with Jim Taylor,
with Scott Sturgeon
and Dean
Richard
Lee
Zimmerman.
and William