Chapter 19
AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERSTATE TRUCKING
LITIGATION IN
MASSACHUSETTS
EDWARD C. BASSETT, JR., ESQ.
Mirick, O’Connell, DeMallie & Lougee LLP, Westborough
Scope Note
This chapter addresses interstate trucking litigation. It begins
with a review of safety regulations promulgated by the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration. It then discusses a number of issues arising in litigation, including potential defendants,
theories of recovery, and steps to take in undertaking an investigation. The chapter concludes by addressing the role of product liability claims in cases arising out of trucking accidents.
§ 19.1
INTRODUCTION
Accidents involving large trucks and heavy commercial vehicles are among the
most serious and deadly in the United States. An automobile does not stand a
chance against an eighteen-wheel tractor trailer weighing up to 80,000 lbs.
(twenty-five to thirty times the weight of most passenger cars). The most recent
statistics reveal that approximately 5,000 people are killed each year in truck
accidents and another 105,000 people are injured. Large trucks are nearly twice
as likely as automobiles to be involved in a fatal accident. The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates that up to
40 percent of accidents involving large trucks may be the result of driver fatigue
and up to 30 percent of all large trucks on the highway exceed allowable weight
limits.
Practice Note
Sources of information on truck safety include National Safety Transportation Administration Traffic Safety Facts, the Insurance Institute
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
2nd Edition, 2nd Supplement 2010
19–1
§ 19.1
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
for Highway Safety, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
and the Association of Plaintiff Interstate Trucking Lawyers of America
(APITLA), http://www.apitlamerica.com.
Accidents involving large trucks are not simply personal injury cases involving
large vehicles. Specific statutes and regulations govern the safe operation of
heavy commercial vehicles, and civil cases involving heavy commercial vehicles involve unique and complex issues that require a thorough understanding
of the federal regulations. Edward J. Hershewe, Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Caused By Trucking Accidents (APITLA Oct. 24, 2008).
§ 19.2
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION AND FEDERAL MOTOR
CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov, is charged with reducing
crashes, fatalities, and injuries involving large trucks and buses. The FMCSA’s
primary tool for improving highway safety is the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSR). The FMCSR are contained in Title 49, Subtitle B, Chapter III, Subchapter B of the Code of Federal Regulations. See also 49 C.F.R. pts.
40, 303, 325.
Practice Note
These regulations are constantly changing. A good way to keep up
to date on the regulations is a subscription to The Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations Pocketbook, which is updated monthly
and published by J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc., Neenah, Wisconsin,
http://www.jjkeller.com.
These regulations govern all “commercial motor vehicles” engaged in “interstate
commerce.” In general, a “commercial motor vehicle” is a vehicle that is used as
part of a business and fits any of the following descriptions:
weighs 10,001 pounds or more,
is designed or used to transport sixteen or more passengers (including the driver) not for compensation,
is designed or used to transport nine or more passengers (including the driver) for compensation, or
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.2
is involved in interstate or intrastate commerce and is transporting
hazardous materials in a quantity requiring placards.
There are two kinds of commercial motor vehicles: interstate carriers and intrastate carriers. An interstate carrier operates across state borders, while an intrastate carrier operates entirely within one state.
Interstate motor carriers are required to register with the Secretary of Transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 13901, and each interstate carrier must designate a resident
agent for each state in which it is authorized to operate, 49 C.F.R. §§ 366.3–.4(a).
Practice Note
If your client is injured in a trucking accident, you can obtain the
identity of the motor carrier’s Massachusetts registered agent by
going online at http://www.safersys.org. The FMCSA possesses extensive information that is not posted on http://www.safersys.org; the
FMCSA FOIA Web site is available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/foia/
index.htm.
The FMCSR govern all interstate carriers. Furthermore, many states, including
Massachusetts, have adopted most, if not all, of the FMCSR for intrastate carriers.
In Massachusetts, intrastate carriers are subject to
49 C.F.R. pt. 382 (Controlled Substances and Alcohol Use and
Testing);
49 C.F.R. pt. 390 (General Applicability and Definitions);
49 C.F.R. pt. 391 (Qualification of Drivers);
49 C.F.R. pt. 392 (Operating Rules for Commercial Drivers);
49 C.F.R. pt. 393 (Safety Equipment, Brakes and Equipment);
49 C.F.R. pt. 395 (Hours of Service);
49 C.F.R. pt. 396 (Inspection, Repair and Maintenance); and
49 C.F.R. pt. 397 (Transportation of Hazardous Materials).
Specific exceptions and limitations are expressly set forth in 540 C.M.R.
§ 14.04.
Part 382 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations covers “Controlled Substances and Alcohol Use and Testing.” This part mandates preemployment testing
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.2
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
for drugs and permits preemployment testing for alcohol. See 49 C.F.R. § 382.301.
Postaccident testing is required in the following situations:
any person dies in an accident;
the driver receives a traffic citation and any person is injured in the
accident; or
the driver receives a citation and any vehicle is towed from the
accident scene.
See 49 C.F.R. § 382.303.
In addition, a trucking company must conduct random drug and alcohol testing,
and drivers can be tested if the employer has “reasonable suspicion” that the
driver is using drugs or alcohol. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 382.305, 382.307. Under the
federal regulations a trucking company is not allowed to permit a driver to operate a vehicle if the driver has “any measured alcohol concentration or detected
presence of alcohol.” 49 C.F.R. § 392.5. Therefore, even if a truck driver may
not be “intoxicated” under G.L. c. 90, § 24 (a blood alcohol level of .08), you
should always request any postaccident alcohol test results because presence of
any alcohol may show a clear violation of the federal safety regulations. These
regulations mandate strict record retention policies for up to five years.
49 C.F.R. § 382.401. The regulations specify that “in personal injury litigation,”
the trucking company can release the results of the drug and alcohol tests if a
court determines that a postaccident test result is relevant to determining whether the driver was negligent. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.323.
If an interstate carrier is operating in Massachusetts, the driver and trucking
company are also subject to 49 C.F.R. pt. 383 (Commercial Drivers License
(CDL) Standards) and 49 C.F.R. pt. 387 (Minimum Levels of Insurance). (In
1990, Massachusetts came into line with 49 C.F.R. pt. 383 by adopting the Uniform Operation of Commercial Motor Vehicles Act, G.L. c. 90F.) Under
49 C.F.R. § 387.9, an interstate carrier that operates a vehicle weighing 10,001
pounds or more must carry minimum insurance of $750,000. Commercial carriers hauling “hazardous materials” must carry between $1 million and $5 million.
49 C.F.R. § 387.9. A chart describing the minimum levels of insurance is included on the CD as Exhibit 19A.
The FMCSR mandate that interstate truck drivers be at least twenty-one years
old and able to read and speak the English language fluently. 49 C.F.R.
§ 391.11(b)(1)–(2). However, an intrastate truck driver in Massachusetts can
obtain a commercial drivers license (CDL) at age eighteen, and the intrastate
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.2
driver in Massachusetts does not need to fluently read and speak English. See
540 C.M.R. § 14.04.
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is required to perform annual
reviews of every interstate carrier and give it a safety rating. See 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.9. The FMCSA notifies each carrier of the rating and provides the carrier
with a list of deficiencies that the carrier must correct. See 49 C.F.R. § 385.11. A
carrier rated “unsatisfactory” is prohibited from operating its vehicles. 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.13(a). Safety ratings for interstate carriers may be found at
http://www.safersys.org.
§ 19.3
POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS AND
THEORIES OF RECOVERY
§ 19.3.1 Driver
The truck driver is an obvious target in almost every truck accident case. However, the trucking company may claim that the driver is an independent contractor, and the truck driver may not have adequate insurance to fairly compensate
your injured client. Furthermore, although some people may have prejudices
against “truckers” and assume that the trucker in your case was a “scoundrel”
who was operating an overweight and unsafe truck at an unsafe speed, there is
also a large segment of the population (and potential jury pool) who view the
truck driver as a “folk hero,” working long hours for minimal pay just to support
himself or herself and his or her family. Therefore, in most truck accident cases,
even if the driver is the “easiest” target, the plaintiff’s attorney may want to focus the attack on the profit-driven “trucking company” that may have pressured
the driver to violate speed limits or “hours of service” regulations so that the
carrier’s shipment would arrive on time at its final destination.
§ 19.3.2 Trucking Company (Owner-Employer)
When the negligent driver is the trucking company’s “employee,” the trucking
company’s liability is governed by traditional common law agency theories such
as master-servant, respondeat superior, and vicarious liability.
As a general rule, the owner of the truck will be held responsible for the negligence of the driver if the driver was the owner’s employee or agent and if the
driver was acting within the scope of his or her employment. See Dias v. Brigham Med. Assocs., Inc., 438 Mass. 317, 319–20 (2002). Proving that a truck
driver is an employee may be difficult. See 1 David N. Nissenberg, The Law of
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.3
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
Commercial Trucking: Damages to Persons and Property 350 (Michie 3d ed.
2005) [hereinafter Nissenberg, The Law of Commercial Trucking]. Factors that
may establish the existence of an employer/employee relations include the following:
the party for whom the work is being done must have
the right to control the manner and method of doing
the work;
compensation must be paid on a periodic basis with
appropriate deductions for social security and taxes
rather than in lump sum after the completion of a
specific job;
the right to hire, fire and discipline the worker must
be maintained; and
the performance of the worker’s duties must be carried out as an integral part of the business of the party
for whom the work is being done.
1 Nissenberg, The Law of Commercial Trucking, at 350; see also 1 Nissenberg,
The Law of Commercial Trucking, at 351 (where the issue is whether the driver
is an agent rather than an employee, factors “may include not only the degree of
control exercised over the driver, but also the indicia of ownership over the truck
demonstrating that the vehicle is operating on behalf of the owner,” such as registration, displays on the vehicle, insurance arrangements, and the handling of
permits).
Practice Note
David N. Nissenberg’s two-volume treatise, The Law of Commercial
Trucking: Damages to Persons and Property, is the Bible for understanding commercial trucking litigation. His treatise provides a scholarly analysis of the applicable statutes and case law. The treatise is a
must for any litigator involved in a truck accident case.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) sets forth the following standard
for determining whether and employee was acting within the “scope of his employment.”
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he was employed to perform;
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.3
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve
the master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against
another, the use of force is not unacceptable by the
master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits,
or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
As applied to injuries caused by an employee’s negligence while driving the
employer’s vehicle,
every case must be decided on its own facts. The important considerations which bear on the result are
whether the vehicle was being used in such a manner
as to benefit the employer; whether the employee was
subject to the employer’s control at the time of the
accident; whether the employee’s use of the vehicle
was authorized by the employer; and whether the
employee’s motives arose from personal objectives
or, instead, from his employer’s concerns.
Williams v. Markel Lumber Co., 566 So. 2d 446, 450 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
Section 85A of G.L. c. 231 addresses the significance of evidence indicating that
a motor vehicle was registered in the name of the defendant-owner:
In all actions to recover damages for injuries to the
person or to property or for the death of a person,
arising out of an accident or collision in which a motor vehicle was involved, evidence that at the time of
such accident or collision it was registered in the name
of the defendant as owner shall be prima facie evidence that it was then being operated by and under the
control of a person for whose conduct the defendant
was legally responsible, and absence of such responsibility shall be an affirmative defence to be set up in
the answer and proved by the defendant.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.3
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
At least one legal treatise has concluded that “all other evidence on the matter
may be disbelieved and the defendant’s legal responsibility may be established
solely on the basis of the statutory prima facie evidence.” Raymond J. Kenney,
Jr. & Teresa J. Farris, Motor Vehicle Law and Practice (11–12 Massachusetts
Practice) 175–76 (West 3d ed. 1998). However, if a jury determines that the
operator was not acting within the scope of his or her employment, the statute
does not apply, and a verdict against the defendant-owner is unwarranted. See
Fitiles v. Umlah, 322 Mass. 325, 327 (1948).
§ 19.3.3 Lessor-Lessee
Under well-established common law principles, when the owner of a vehicle
leases the vehicle and a driver to a third party, the owner-lessor remains liable
for injuries caused by the driver even though the driver was performing services
for the third party. See Shepard v. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 110, 111 (1910).
The case of Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. 674 (1945) presents a typical set of
facts in a commercial trucking case. The defendant, D&W Line, Inc. (D&W)
was the owner of a tractor trailer involved in a collision that caused significant
personal injuries. See Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. at 677. D&W leased the tractor trailer and its employee—Smith—to Old Colony Motor Lines (Old Colony)
because Old Colony had more business than it could handle. See Garfield v.
Smith, 317 Mass. at 677. Old Colony hired the tractor trailer and Smith from
D&W so that Smith could transport Old Colony’s products to New York. See
Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. at 677–78. Old Colony, not D&W, held a permit
from the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing Old Colony to transport
goods from Boston to New York. See Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. at 678. The
Interstate Commerce regulations specified that a carrier (such as Old Colony)
hiring a tractor trailer and operator (such as D&W) should do so by a lease specifying that “exclusive control of the vehicle and the operator would be transferred to the lessee” (in this case Old Colony). Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. at
678. Despite the ICC regulations, the court held that Smith, the operator, was
still a D&W employee, even though the accident occurred while hauling goods
for Old Colony. See Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. at 679–80. The court reasoned
that “[w]hatever force and effect” the ICC ruling “might have in its appropriate
field, it did not supersede G.L. c. 231, § 85A.” See Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass.
at 678. The court held that the statute was “designed to protect the safety of travellers upon our public ways and it was not rendered inapplicable or in any way
affected by the so called [ICC] ruling in instances where the traveller was injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle engaged in interstate commerce.” Garfield v. Smith, 317 Mass. at 678.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.3
The Garfield case was decided sixty-five years ago. It is now generally recognized that the ICC/Department of Transportation regulations (FMCSR) are given
the same effect as statutory federal law and therefore preempt conflicting state
law. Stewart Trucking, Inc. v. PBX, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Neb. 1991); see
Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d 857, 865–66 (5th Cir. 1973). In Simmons, the court
noted that by Department of Transportation regulations the lessee was responsible for the negligence of the lessor-operator. See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d at
867. However, the court also noted that under Louisiana common law, the lessor
could also be liable. See Simmons v. King, 478 F.2d at 867. Similarly, if the Garfield case was decided today, it is likely that Old Colony could be held liable for
Smith’s negligence under the Department of Transportation regulations
(FMCSR) and D&W could also be held liable for Smith’s negligence pursuant to
G.L. c. 231, § 85K.
Since many tractor trailer accidents involve some type of a lease arrangement, it
is important to understand the regulations that apply to leased vehicles.
Typically, the owner-operator is paid a percentage of
the amount received by the carrier-lessee from the
shipper for moving the cargo. Out of this amount, he
pays for his costs of operation. Under this arrangement, the independent owner-operator operates under
the ICC or DOT authority granted to the carrierlessee and performs the duties of picking up and delivering cargo which had been agreed to by the carrierlessee and shipper as set forth in the freight bill or bill
of lading covering the movement of a particular load.
The vehicle lease arrangement, which often covers a
trailer as well, is carried out under the provisions of
written leases, the terms of which have been mandated
by the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, still in effect notwithstanding the
abolition of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
These rules and regulations are given the same effect
as statutory federal law, and, therefore, preempt conflicting state law. They are not applicable, however,
to arrangements involving the transportation of exempt commodities or to private carriage. . . .
These DOT leasing regulations place full responsibility for the control of the leased vehicles, equipment,
and drivers on the carrier-lessee and is an obligation
which may not be contracted away or delegated to
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.3
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
another party. This has the effect of making the owner-lessor and his driver or other employees the “statutory employees” of the carrier-lessee during the term
of the lease. The carrier-lessee then becomes vicariously liable as a matter of law for the actions of its
statutory employees in the operation of the truck. Examined from a different perspective, but one which
has the same end result, the DOT regulations create
an irrebuttable presumption of an employment relationship between the carrier-lessee and the ownerlessor and his driver when the leased vehicle displays
the carrier-lessee’s permit and identifying numbers.
1 Nissenberg, The Law of Commercial Trucking, at 401–04.
The majority of jurisdictions hold that the carrier-lessee is liable for the driver’s
negligence “even if the driver embark[ed] on an undertaking of his or her own
while using the carrier-lessee’s I.C.C. authority.” Wyckoff Trucking, Inc. v.
Marsh Bros. Trucking Serv., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (Ohio 1991). Therefore, the carrier-lessee will be held responsible for the lessor-driver’s negligence
even if the accident did not occur in the course and scope of the driver’s employment. See Wyckoff Trucking, Inc. v. Marsh Bros. Trucking Serv., Inc., 569 N.E.2d
at 1053.
§ 19.3.4 Negligent Hiring or Retention
Negligent hiring involves a claim that the trucking company should not have
hired the driver because the company should have known that the driver was
incompetent at the time of his or her employment. The focus is primarily on the
employer’s preemployment investigation. The FMCSR specify a carrier’s responsibilities to obtain background information on a driver before hiring the
driver, and a failure to comply with these regulations will subject a carrier to a
claim for negligent hiring if compliance would have identified the driver as incompetent. See Wallen v. Allen, 343 S.E.2d 73, 78 (Va. 1986). A driver applying
for employment must complete an application listing any moving violations or
accidents for the three-year period prior to the date of application and identifying each motor carrier that the driver has been employed by for the past ten
years. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.21. The employer must obtain a moving violations
report (MVR) from any state issuing a license to the driver and a list of accidents and violations of alcohol or controlled substances regulations, as well as
test results. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.23. The employer must confirm that the driver is
physically able to operate a commercial vehicle by obtaining a medical examiner’s certificate. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.41, 391.43.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.3
Some relatively common medical conditions are identified as disqualifying in 49
C.F.R. § 391.41(b). Applicants are not qualified to drive an interstate carrier if
they have lost a foot, leg, hand, or arm, or have
an impairment of the foot, leg, hand, or arm that interferes with
the ability to drive;
diabetes mellitus requiring insulin for control;
a serious heart condition;
a history of respiratory dysfunction;
high blood pressure or joint or muscular problems that interfere
with the ability to drive;
epilepsy or any other condition that might cause a loss of consciousness;
a mental or psychiatric disorder that interferes with the ability to
drive;
less than 20/40 vision with corrective lenses;
significant hearing loss;
use of a controlled substance that interferes with the ability to
drive; or
a clinical diagnosis of alcoholism.
49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b).
After the driver is hired, the trucking company must maintain a driver qualification file containing the following materials:
the driver’s application for employment,
a written record of inquiries to prior employers and any responses
received from them,
the preemployment MVR on the driver,
the results of any road test or a copy of the driver’s CDL,
the driver’s annual review,
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.3
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
the MVR on the driver related to the annual review,
the driver’s certified list of moving violations and accidents provided in conjunction with the annual review, and
the medical examiner’s certificate of physical qualification.
See 49 C.F.R. § 391.51(a)–(b).
The documents in the driver’s qualification file must be kept by the company for
as long as the driver is employed by the company and for an additional three-year
period. 49 C.F.R. § 391.51(c).
Negligent retention and negligent entrustment cases involve claims against
trucking companies that allow drivers to operate their trucks even after the
trucking company has learned that the driver is unlicensed, incompetent, or unsafe. Theories of “negligent hiring” or “negligent retention” are recognized by a
number of jurisdictions, including Massachusetts. See Foster v. Loft, Inc., 26
Mass. App. Ct. 289, 290 (1988) (citing Carson v. Canning, 180 Mass. 461
(1902)). (The employer in Foster failed to make any attempt to check the employee’s background, failed to request references, and did not require an application. The Appeals Court affirmed a judgment against the employer, holding that
an employer whose employees are brought in contact with members of the public in the course of the employer’s business has a duty to exercise reasonable
care in employee selection and retention. Foster v. Loft, Inc., 26 Mass. App. Ct.
at 290–91.)
Liability for negligent hiring or retention occurs when the employer becomes
aware or should have become aware of problems with an employee that indicate
unfitness and the employer fails to take further action such as investigation, discharge, or reassignment. The liability is entirely independent of the employer’s
liability under the principles of respondeat superior. Therefore, if your trucking
case may involve a claim of negligent hiring or negligent retention, it is important to plead separate counts. If you do not prevail on a claim for respondeat
superior, because the driver was not acting within the scope of employment, the
counts for negligent hiring and/or retention may preserve your claim against the
trucking company. “[W]hether the employee’s wrongful conduct was within the
scope of his or her employment is generally not an issue in a negligent hiring or
negligent retention action.” Foster v. Loft, Inc., 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 291 n.4.
A slight variant on the negligent retention case is the tort of negligent entrustment. To prove negligent entrustment, the plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the defendant-driver had control of the vehicle and the owner had actual
knowledge that the driver was unfit or incompetent to drive. See Peters v. Hay{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.3
market Leasing, Inc., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 771 (2005). Even in cases in which
the driver of a truck is an independent contractor, the owner can be held responsible for the act of entrusting a truck to an unfit or incompetent driver. The case
of Zarski v. Creamer, 317 Mass. 744 (1945) may be particularly helpful in a
truck accident case where there is evidence that the driver’s violation of the
hours-of-service regulations or general “fatigue” were contributing factors for
the crash. In Zarski, the court noted that if properly pleaded, negligent entrustment might be a viable theory if the owner knew that the driver had worked seventeen hours on the preceding day and needed sleep and that the crash occurred
because the driver’s fatigue caused him to be “wanting in alertness.” See Zarski
v. Creamer, 317 Mass. at 746.
§ 19.3.5 Actions Against Insurers for Negligent Hiring
In some states the plaintiff has a direct cause of action against the insurer for the
insured’s negligence. In Oklahoma, for example, the key defendant in a commercial trucking case is the liability insurance carrier. See 47 Okla. Stat.
§ 230.30 (“the liability and property damage insurance policy or bond shall bind
the obligor thereunder to make compensation for injuries to, or death of, persons, and loss or damage to property, resulting from the operation of any carrier
for which the carrier is legally liable . . . [and] the injured party may maintain an
action upon the policy or bond to recover the same, and shall be a proper party
to maintain such action”); see also Dechand v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732 F. Supp. 1120
(D. Kan. 1990); Dunn v. Jones, 53 P.2d 918 (Kan. 1936); Martinez v. Reid, 46
P.3d 1237 (N.M. 2002).
Even in those states that do not have direct action statutes (such as Massachusetts), it is important to note that when dealing with “smaller” trucking companies, insurers may play a significant role in the hiring of new drivers. If an insurance company gets involved in the insured’s hiring practices and the insured
reasonably relies on the insurer to properly assess a new driver’s qualifications,
it is conceivable that an injured third party might have a claim directly against
the insurer for negligent hiring. This is an emerging theory of liability analogous
to cases holding that a parent corporation can be held responsible to a subsidiary’s employee if the parent assumed responsibility for workplace inspections
and negligently performed it. See Johnson v. Abbe Eng’g Co., 749 F.2d 1131,
1132 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984) (relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A
(1966)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1966) provides as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.3
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
person for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases
the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the
other or the third person upon the undertaking.
§ 19.3.6 Negligent Inspection, Maintenance, or Repair
Many truck accidents are attributable to mechanical failures. Federal regulations
require motor carriers to conduct systematic inspections and maintenance.
49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a).
A trucking company must maintain a record of all inspections, repairs, and
maintenance performed on each truck. 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(b). A motor carrier
may be held responsible for any injury caused by its failure to properly inspect,
maintain, or repair its trucks. These records must be maintained for at least one
year. 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(c). However, if a truck is involved in an accident and the
trucking company sells or disposes of the truck, the trucking company is required to keep these records for only six months. 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(c). This is
one reason why a plaintiff’s attorney should send out a spoliation letter to the
trucking company as soon as possible after being retained. Furthermore, if you
determine that the defective truck was recently purchased from another carrier,
you should request maintenance, inspection, and repair records from the prior
owner. A prior owner can be held liable if its failure to comply with inspection
and maintenance regulations was responsible for the unsafe truck. See Bailey v.
Lewis Farm, Inc., 171 P.3d 336 (Or. 2007).
All of the inspection, maintenance, and repair requirements are set forth in the
FMCSR. A trucking company will be held liable for any violation of these regulations. If your client is involved in a crash with an interstate carrier, evidence
concerning violation of these inspection, maintenance, and repair regulations
will be “evidence” of negligence. See Thurston v. Ballou, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 737,
739–40 (1987).
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.3
§ 19.3.7 Driving in Hazardous Conditions
If your case involves an accident where weather was a factor, it is important to
determine if the driver complied with 49 C.F.R. § 392.14. Section 392.14 specifies
that
[e]xtreme caution in the operation of a commercial
motor vehicle shall be exercised when hazardous conditions, such as those caused by snow, ice, sleet, fog,
mist, rain, dust, or smoke, adversely affect visibility
or traction. Speed shall be reduced when such conditions exist. If conditions become sufficiently dangerous, the operation of the commercial motor vehicle
shall be discontinued and shall not be resumed until
the commercial motor vehicle can be safely operated.
Whenever compliance with the foregoing provisions of
this rule increases hazard to passengers, the commercial motor vehicle may be operated to the nearest point
at which the safety of passengers is assured.
This regulation clearly specifies that the operator should reduce speed when
driving in rain, sleet, or snow. 49 C.F.R. § 392.14. If the accident report indicates that the driver was operating at the speed limit, it can be argued that driving at the speed limit, under hazardous conditions, is some evidence of negligence. Some courts have held that if an accident occurs in hazardous weather
conditions, the driver is held to a standard of extreme care. See Fisher v. Swift
Transp. Co., 181 P.3d 601, 607 (Mont. 2008). Although the federal regulations
do not specify the actual speeds to travel in rain, sleet, or snow, the Massachusetts Commercial Drivers License (CDL) Manual states as follows:
Wet roads can double stopping distance. Reduce
Speed by about one third (e.g. slow from 55 to about
35 mph) on a wet road. On packed snow, reduce
speed by a half or more. If the surface is icy, reduce
speed to a crawl and stop driving as soon as you can
safely do so.
Massachusetts Commercial Drivers License Manual, at 2–25.
Each state has its own CDL manual outlining the proper manner in which to
drive a commercial vehicle. These manuals are remarkably similar from state to
state. Commercial drivers should be familiar with the requirements contained in
the CDL Manual.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.3
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
Practice Note
The CDL manual is a great tool to use at trial. The driver will have to
admit familiarity with the manual and cannot deny being required to
study the manual in order to obtain a CDL.
§ 19.4
HANDLING A TRUCKING CASE
§ 19.4.1 Spoliation of Evidence
Federal regulations require interstate carriers to maintain and preserve records
for various lengths of time. After an accident, a carrier will often destroy pertinent records, either purposefully or in the ordinary course of its document retention procedures. The destruction of documents, often referred to as spoliation,
can lead to sanctions against the trucking company. See J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v.
Bentley, 427 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1992).
Probably the most important thing for a plaintiff’s attorney to do after meeting
with a truck accident victim is to send out a spoliation letter by certified mail to
the trucking company, the truck driver, and the company’s insurer. The spoliation letter should refer specifically to each and every category of documents
required by the FMCSR. It is important to itemize all of the documents, data,
and evidence that should be preserved. While the trucking company may later
object to the production of certain documents, the client is best protected if the
letter includes an exhaustive list of all documents required by the FMCSR. A
sample spoliation letter prepared by Daniel T. Ramsdell, Esq., the national director of the Association of Plaintiff Interstate Trucking Lawyers of America, is
included on the CD as Exhibit 19B.
If the case involves a blown tire, or some other manufacturing defect, it is critical to include in your letter a demand that the defective part be preserved. Your
letter should demand that the truck be preserved and that nothing should be
touched, including the “black box” (EMC) until you have an opportunity to have
your experts inspect the vehicle. In a recent policy statement, the FMCSA referred to an EMC as any “electronic mobile communication/tracking technology”
used in assessing a motor carrier’s and driver’s compliance with the hours-ofservice regulations (see FMCSA-2010-0168). The “black box” records data concerning operation of the truck, including speed, brake system operation, and engine controls. The recorded information in the black box can be vital in determining the mechanical condition of the truck at the time of the accident. If the trucking company will not agree to preserve the truck and “black box” so that your
experts can conduct an inspection, you should consider filing suit immediately,
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.4
accompanied by an emergency motion to preserve evidence. A sample motion to
preserve the truck and its component parts is included on the CD as Exhibit 19C.
§ 19.4.2 Accident Investigation
Even if the accident has been investigated by the police or other government
agencies, it is important to retain your own accident reconstructionist to investigate the accident, take measurements, and photograph the accident scene and the
vehicles. The reconstruction expert can recreate the accident and estimate speeds
and paths of the vehicles. In any truck case, you should consider retaining an
expert mechanic to determine if any mechanical problems were responsible for
the crash. If the truck rear-ended your client’s vehicle, you want the mechanic to
carefully inspect the braking system. Other experts routinely retained include
experts on compliance with the FMCSR and in the area of driver fatigue and
violation of the “hours of service” regulations.
Your experts will review all of the driver’s inspection reports as well as the carrier’s inspection documents. Drivers cannot operate a commercial motor vehicle
without inspecting the following parts and satisfying themselves that the parts
are in good working order:
service brakes including trailer brakes,
parking brakes,
steering mechanism,
lighting devices and reflectors,
tires,
horn,
windshield wipers,
rear vision mirrors, and
coupling devices.
49 C.F.R. § 392.7.
Drivers must also inspect all emergency equipment and be satisfied that it is
working properly. 49 C.F.R. § 392.8. Before operating a vehicle, drivers must be
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.4
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
satisfied that the vehicle is in safe operating condition, review the last driver
vehicle inspection report, and, if defects were noted and repaired, sign the report.
49 C.F.R. § 396.13.
Every driver must prepare a report at the end of each day concerning the condition of the same parts and accessories examined during the pretrip inspection.
49 C.F.R. § 396.11(a).
The original driver inspection report and the certification of any repairs performed to correct the defects must be retained for three months from the date the
report was prepared. 49 C.F.R. § 396.11(c)(2).
Practice Note
If your case involves defective equipment, faulty repairs, and/or an
inadequate pretrip inspection, it is important that your spoliation letter be sent out before the expiration of this three-month period and
that you refer specifically to any pretrip inspections, posttrip inspections, and the annual inspection report. See 49 C.F.R. § 396.17(c). If
your case involves faulty brakes, it is important to note that all brake
inspections performed for a trucking company should have been
performed by a “qualified specialist” as defined by the regulations.
49 C.F.R. § 396.25.
§ 19.5
REVIEW OF LOGBOOKS
Because accidents caused by driver fatigue have become so prevalent, you
should always consider retaining an expert to review the driver’s logbooks. Drivers must record their duty status in a daily log for each twenty-four-hour period,
and the daily log must be forwarded to the trucking company within thirteen
days following completion of the form. 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(a)(1), (i).
The trucking company must maintain these logbooks only for a period of six
months. 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(k). Therefore, if you receive a call from the victim of
a truck accident, be certain to send out a spoliation letter well before the expiration of this six-month period so that the logbooks are not destroyed in the ordinary course of business. The spoliation letter should also request the “supporting
documents” referred to in the regulations so that the logbook expert can verify
the truth and accuracy of the logbook. Although the term “supporting documents” is not defined in the regulations, the Department of Transportation has
issued various policy memorandums defining these documents. The most recent
such memorandum was issued on July 10, 2010. Supporting documents are defined as
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.5
[b]ills of lading, carrier pros, freight bills, dispatch
records, electronic mobile communication/tracking
records, gate record receipts, weight/scale tickets,
fuel receipts, fuel billing statements, toll receipts, toll
billing statements, port of entry receipts, delivery receipts, lumper receipts, interchange and inspection
reports, lessor settlement sheets, over/short and damage reports, agricultural inspection reports, driver and
vehicle examination reports, telephone billing statements, credit card receipts, border crossing reports,
customs declarations, traffic citations and overweight/ oversize reports and citations.
See Docket No. FMCSA-2010-0168.
Any records that are maintained in the ordinary course of business that are used
by a carrier to verify the accuracy of the driver’s “hours of service” records are
supporting documents that must be preserved for the required six-month period.
Practice Note
The 2010 FMCSA policy memorandum did eliminate certain retention requirements for carriers using approved “electronic mobile
communication/tracking technology.” For each vehicle for which the
motor carrier can produce acceptable electronic mobile communication/tracking records, the motor carrier is no longer required to maintain or produce the following driver documentation pursuant to
49 C.F.R. § 395.8(k)(1): gate record receipts, weight/scale tickets,
port of entry receipts, delivery receipts, toll receipts, agricultural inspection reports, over/short and damage reports, driver and vehicle
examination reports, traffic citations, overweight/oversize reports
and citations, carrier pros, credit card receipts, border crossing reports, customs declarations, and telephone billing statements. Motor
carriers that take advantage of these less burdensome document retention requirements are precluded in hours-of-service enforcement
proceedings from challenging the accuracy of their own electronic
mobile communication/tracking records.
Although the regulations specify a six-month retention period, it has been suggested that “[r]eliance on a policy of destroying logs after the mandatory six
month retention period may not withstand judicial scrutiny and likely will result
in a claim of spoliation of evidence.” Motor Carrier Liability § 961 (Post Accident Document Retention) (CCH, Inc. 2010). A carrier’s destruction of driver’s
logs or related documents may give rise to a presumption that the evidence was
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.5
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
not preserved because it was unfavorable to the carrier and, therefore, that the
driver must have violated the federal regulations.
§ 19.6
DRIVER FATIGUE
Some experts believe that driver fatigue is the number one safety problem in the
trucking industry. Until proven otherwise, an attorney investigating a serious
truck accident should assume that the case involves a fatigued trucker. See Jeffrey A. Burns, “The Plaintiff’s Perspective: Handling a Plaintiff’s Truck Crash
Case—What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You. . . and Your Client,” in Truck Accident Litigation 345–46 (Laura Ruhl Genson & Anita M. Kerezman eds., 2d ed.
2006).
Driver fatigue and the violation of the FMCSA’s hours-of-service (HOS) regulations provide powerful ammunition for your trucking case. If you can prove that
a driver violated the HOS regulations and that the driver’s fatigue was a factor in
causing the crash, you should be well on your way to a successful result against
the driver and the trucking company. If a trucking company fails to monitor its
drivers’ “hours of service,” this is a violation of the regulations. See Department
of Transportation Interpretations § 395.3, Question 7, published in J.J. Keller &
Assocs., Inc., Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations Handbook, Apr. 6,
2009, at 516. “Neither intent to commit, nor actual knowledge of, a violation is a
necessary element of [this] liability. Carriers ‘permit’ violations of the hours of
service regulations by their employees if they fail to have in place management
systems that effectively prevent such violations.” Department of Transportation
Interpretations § 395.3, Question 8, published in J.J. Keller & Assocs., Inc.,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations Handbook, Apr. 6, 2009, at 516.
However, even if the driver’s logbook shows strict compliance with the HOS
regulations, you should still investigate the very real possibility that fatigue
played a critical role in the crash. Mere compliance with the HOS regulations
does not mean that the driver was not fatigued or otherwise impaired. The
FMCSR specify that a trucking company must not allow a driver to operate a
truck while the driver’s alertness is impaired by fatigue or illness. 49 C.F.R.
§ 392.3. Therefore, in every case you should request a driver’s medical records
to see if there is evidence of any illnesses at or about the time of the accident or
any evidence of a history of sleep apnea.
As a general principle, it is usually held that mere
compliance with governmental regulations is not a
bar to an action of negligence, but in most cases
compliance with federal regulations is at least strong
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.6
evidence of due care. In contrast, mere compliance
with the federal hours-of-service regulations is nearly
meaningless in a case based on driver fatigue, because the rules are not adequate to prevent fatigue.
And, it must be said, all authorities agree that a high
percentage of logbooks are falsified, so claims of
compliance with the regulations are not necessarily to
be accepted.
David Polin, Cause of Action Against Trucker or Truck Driver for Injuries
Caused by Driver Fatigue § 16, 17 Causes of Action 2d 105 (2008).
Obviously, the strongest cases of driver fatigue involve clear violations of the
HOS regulations and falsified logbooks. If your case involves a violation of the
regulations and there is evidence that fatigue was a substantial contributing factor, the specific violation of the HOS regulations will provide solid evidence that
the violation exposed the plaintiff to an unnecessary danger. In Massachusetts,
the violation of a federal safety statute can be used as “some evidence of negligence.” Thurston v. Ballou, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739–40 (1987). In some
states, the violation of a safety statute constitutes “negligence per se.”
Plaintiff’s attorneys are not alone in identifying driver fatigue as a national crisis. The National Association of Independent Insurers has made the following
statement:
We know that tired commercial motor vehicle (CMV)
drivers are a menace on the highways. They inadvertently kill or severely injure innocent victims, they
contribute to their own death or injury, they damage
or destroy vehicles and other property, and hazardous
material haulers release pollutants into the environment when material containment is compromised.
The ideal solution therefore is an HOS rulemaking
that mitigates these life, safety, environmental, and
infrastructure damage threats. There is a wealth of information that has been published about the consequences of driver fatigue. Researchers, safety advocates, and government agencies, relying upon studies
and a body of data generally oppose any “solution”
that allows tired drivers more road time or that further disrupts a natural circadian rhythm. Trucking interests however, seem to dispute reputable findings
and recommendations in order to advance selfserving economic agendas. NAII advocates caution.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
§ 19.6
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
Driver fatigue is a killer. Safety issues must not be
compromised in any way in order to earn the support
of various motor carrier voices regarding a proposed
“solution” to the hours-of-service issue.
A driver does not need to fall asleep to have his or her driving impaired by fatigue. Fatigue impairs drivers in the same way alcohol intoxication does; a driver’s ability to perceive and react becomes increasingly diminished as the level of
fatigue increases. “Indeed, even ‘relatively moderate levels of fatigue impair
performance to an extent equivalent to or greater than is currently acceptable for
alcohol intoxication.’” Jeffrey A. Burns, “Truck Driver Fatigue—A Primer,” in
Truck Accident Litigation 120 (Laura Ruhl Genson & Anita M. Kerezman eds.,
2d ed. 2006).
Because hours-of-service regulations can play such a significant role in a case of
driver fatigue, it is important to have a general understanding of these complex
regulations. The following is a brief summary.
Drivers carrying property cannot drive more than 11 hours following 10 consecutive hours off-duty.
Drivers cannot operate a commercial vehicle for any period after
having been on duty 14 hours following 10 consecutive hours offduty.
Drivers carrying passengers cannot drive more than 10 hours following 8 consecutive hours off-duty or operate a commercial vehicle for any period after having been on duty 15 hours following
8 consecutive hours off-duty.
Drivers cannot operate a commercial vehicle after having been on
duty 60 hours in any 7 consecutive days if the employing motor
carrier does not operate commercial motor vehicles every day of
the week and cannot operate a commercial vehicle after having
been on duty 70 hours in any consecutive 8 days if the employing
motor carrier operates commercial vehicles every day.
Any period of 34 consecutive off duty hours will reset the 7 or 8
consecutive days.
See 49 C.F.R. §§ 395.3, 395.5.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTRO TO INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION IN MA
§ 19.7
§ 19.6
IMPROPER LOADING
Improper loading of a tractor-trailer can increase the likelihood that it will jackknife or overturn. Drivers must be certain that the load is adequately secured
before beginning to drive and must examine the cargo within fifty miles of starting the trip and again within 150 miles after the trip commenced. 49 C.F.R.
§ 392.9(b)(1)–(3).
Oftentimes the shipper is responsible for loading the truck. In such a situation,
the plaintiff’s attorney should investigate the possibility of a claim against both
the motor carrier and the shipper.
When the shipper becomes involved in the loading
process, it risks liability for its negligence in either
providing improper instructions to the carrier on the
proper way to secure the load, by loading the cargo
itself in a haphazard manner, by taking on the responsibility of securing the load itself and then when
questioned by an inexperienced truck driver as to its
propriety giving assurances that it was done correctly,
by negligently securing the load, or by having loaded
the truck itself in such a manner that the defects in its
loading are latent and not obvious to the carrier upon
a reasonable inspection.
2 Nissenberg, The Law of Commercial Trucking, at 571.
If an accident was caused by shifting or falling cargo, you and your experts
should check the FMCSR for the “general” cargo securement requirements, 49
C.F.R. § 393 subpt. I, as well as the specific regulations for the particular cargo
on board. These regulations go into excruciating detail on the proper methods
for loading and securing particular items:
Logs. 49 C.F.R. § 393.116.
Lumber. 49 C.F.R. § 393.118.
Metal Coils. 49 C.F.R. § 393.120.
Paper Rolls. 49 C.F.R. § 393.122.
Concrete Pipe. 49 C.F.R. § 393.124.
Intermodal Containers. 49 C.F.R. § 393.126.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
2nd Edition, 2nd Supplement 2010
19–23
§ 19.7
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
Automobiles, Light Trucks and Vans. 49 C.F.R. § 393.128.
Heavy Vehicles, Equipment, and Machinery. 49 C.F.R. § 393.130.
Flattened or Crushed Vehicles. 49 C.F.R. § 393.132.
Large Boulders. 49 C.F.R. § 393.136.
§ 19.8
PRODUCT LIABILITY
“Liability for negligent driving and the improper maintenance of trucks, trailers
and other equipment lays squarely on the shoulders of truck owners and drivers.
But, when a defect in the vehicle or in a component part thereof causes an accident, liability under [strict products liability law] is that of the manufacturer,
seller, or other person in the distributive chain responsible for placing the product in the stream of commerce.” 2 Nissenberg, The Law of Commercial Trucking, at 587.
Practice Note
Massachusetts does not recognize strict liability in a products case.
The plaintiff must allege breach of warranty under Section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. However, the courts have held that
breach of warranty should be as fully comprehensive as the strict
liability theory. See Mason v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183,
189 (1986).
In every serious truck accident case, you and your experts need to determine if
the case may involve a products liability claim. In a trucking case in Massachusetts, a product liability claim can involve negligent design, negligent manufacture, negligent inspection, negligent testing, negligent failure to warn, and/or
breach of warranty claims. In most other jurisdictions, products liability claims
are strict liability claims.
If your case involves a defective tire, your expert should carefully review the
driver’s daily inspection reports to determine if there is any evidence of any tire
defects or any reports of underinflated tires. A tire manufacturer has a duty to
warn about the dangers of operating vehicles on underinflated tires. See Wolfe v.
Ford Motor Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 349 (1978).
A manufacturer has a duty to warn about the dangers
of operating vehicles on underinflated tires, mixing
radial and non radial tires, mixing different size components of a multi-piece truck rim, and putting old
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
§ 19.8
tubes in new truck tires. A claim that the accident was
caused by a defective bead of a tire, causing it to deflate, can be sustained where there is evidence that a
less dangerous design existed, but not where there
was no evidence that any defect existed or was
present at the time the vehicle left defendant’s control. A claim that tires were inadequate for a truck
was not sustained where the plaintiff’s expert testified that he would have installed heavier tires to reduce the possibility of sliding on a slippery road, but
the accident probably would have occurred even if the
truck had been provided with one of the defendant’s
heavier tires.
Mottla’s Proof of Cases in Massachusetts § 32:150 (Thomson/West 3d ed. 2009).
§ 19.9
CONCLUSION
An interstate trucking case can be extremely complex and challenging. If you do
not concentrate your practice on interstate trucking, handling one of these cases
on your own can sometimes feel like you are running blindfolded through a minefield. Fortunately, there are several professional organizations with seasoned
experts who are available to assist you with these cases. These organizations
provide expert assistance as well as educational seminars focused specifically on
the issues that you will encounter in an interstate trucking case. The Association
of Plaintiff Interstate Trucking Lawyers of America (APITLA) is a national organization of plaintiffs’ attorneys who have joined together to help eliminate
unsafe and illegal interstate trucking practices. Information about membership
and the benefits available from APITLA can be obtained at
http://www.apitlamerica.com.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
19–26
2nd Edition, 2nd Supplement 2010
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
EXHIBIT 19A—Minimum Levels of Financial
Responsibility for Property Motor Carriers Under 49
C.F.R. § 387.9
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
EXHIBIT 19B—Sample Spoliation Letter*
*
Reprinted with permission of the author.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
EXHIBIT 19C—Motion for Inspection and for an
Order Preserving Evidence*
*
This motion, which is reprinted with permission, was prepared by Scott A. Faultless, Esq., of Craig Kelly & Faultless in Indianapolis. Attorney Faultless reports
that the motion has been allowed in several of his firm’s trucking cases.
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
INTERSTATE TRUCKING LITIGATION
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}
MASSACHUSETTS MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS
{Administration/MKT/11-PROJ/MISC/A1766386.DOC}