SAFETY SE R IE S No. 50-SG-S1 (Rev.1) This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Earthquakes and Associated Topics in Relation to Nuclear Power Plant Siting A Safety Guide A PUBLICATION WITHIN THE N U SS PRO G RAM M E INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1991 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ CATEGORIES IN THE IAEA SAFETY SERIES A new hierarchical categorization scheme has been introduced, according to which the publications in the IAEA Safety Series are grouped as follows: Safety Fundamentals (silver cover) Basic objectives, concepts and principles to ensure safety. Safety Standards (red cover) Basic requirements which must be satisfied to ensure adequate safety for particular activities or application areas. Safety Guides (green cover) Recommendations, on the basis of international experience, relating to the ful filment of basic requirements. Safety Practices (blue cover) Practical examples and detailed methods which can be used for the application of Safety Standards or Safety Guides. Safety Fundamentals and Safety Standards are issued with the approval of the IAEA Board of Governors; Safety Guides and Safety Practices are issued under the authority of the Director General of the IAEA. An additional category, Safety Reports (purple cover), comprises independent reports of expert groups on safety matters, including the development of new princi ples, advanced concepts and major issues and events. These reports are issued under the authority of the Director General of the IAEA. There are other publications of the IAEA which also contain information important to safety, in particular in the Proceedings Series (papers presented at symposia and conferences), the Technical Reports Series (emphasis on technological aspects) and the IAEA-TECDOC Series (information usually in a preliminary form). This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ EARTHQUAKES AND ASSOCIATED TOPICS IN RELATION TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING A Safety Guide This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency: AFGHANISTAN HOLY SEE PERU ALBANIA HUNGARY PHILIPPINES ALGERIA ICELAND POLAND ARGENTINA INDIA PORTUGAL AUSTRALIA INDONESIA QATAR AUSTRIA IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA BANGLADESH IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA BELGIUM IRELAND SENEGAL BOLIVIA ISRAEL SIERRA LEONE BRAZIL ITALY SINGAPORE BULGARIA JAMAICA SOUTH AFRICA BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET JAPAN SPAIN JORDAN SRI LANKA CAMEROON KENYA SUDAN CANADA KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SWEDEN CHILE KUWAIT SWITZERLAND CHINA LEBANON SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC COLOMBIA LIBERIA THAILAND COSTA RICA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TUNISIA COTE D'IVOIRE LIECHTENSTEIN TURKEY CUBA LUXEMBOURG UGANDA CYPRUS MADAGASCAR UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA MALAYSIA DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA MALI DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’ S MAURITIUS SOCIALIST REPUBLIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA REPUBLIC UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MEXICO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES DENMARK MONACO UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MONGOLIA ECUADOR MOROCCO EGYPT M YANMAR EL SALVADOR NAMIBIA ETHIOPIA NETHERLANDS BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FINLAND NEW ZEALAND URUGUAY FRANCE NICARAGUA VENEZUELA GABON NIGER VIET NAM GERMANY NIGERIA YUGOSLAVIA GHANA NORWAY ZAIRE GREECE PAKISTAN ZAMBIA GUATEMALA PANAMA ZIMBABWE HAITI PARAGUAY The A g e n c y ’ s Statute was approved on 23 O ctob er 1956 b y the C on fe re n ce on the Statute o f the IA E A held at United N ations Headquarters, N ew Y o r k ; it entered into fo rce on 29 July 1957. T h e H ead quarters o f the A g en cy are situated in V ienna. Its principal o b je ctiv e is “ to accelerate and enlarge the contribution o f atom ic energy to p ea ce, health and prosperity throughout the w o r ld ” . © IA E A , 1991 Perm ission to reproduce o r translate the inform ation contained in this publication m ay be obtained by writing to the International A tom ic Energy A g e n c y , W agram erstrasse 5 , P .O . B ox 100, A - 1400 V ien na, Austria. Printed by the IA E A in Austria M ay 1991 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ SAFETY SERIES No. 50-SG-S1 (Rev. 1) EARTHQUAKES AND ASSOCIATED TOPICS IN RELATION TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING A Safety Guide INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 1991 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ THIS SAFETY GUIDE IS ALSO PUBLISHED IN FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH EARTHQUAKES AND ASSOCIATED TOPICS IN RELATION TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING: A SAFETY GUIDE IAEA, VIENNA, 1991 STI/PUB/871 ISBN 92-0-123191-1 ISSN 0074-1892 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ FOREWORD by the Director General Nuclear power is well established and can be expected to become an even more significant part of the energy programmes of many countries, provided that its safe use can be ensured and be perceived to be so ensured. Although accidents have occurred, the nuclear power industry has generally maintained a good safety record. However, improvements are always possible and necessary. Safety is not a static concept. The International Atomic Energy Agency, recognizing the importance of the safety of the industry and desiring to promote an improving safety record, set up a programme in 1974 to give guidance to its Member States on the many aspects of the safety of nuclear power reactors. Under this Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme, some 60 Codes and Safety Guides dealing with radiological safety were published in the IAEA Safety Series between 1978 and 1986. The NUSS programme was developed for land based stationary plants with thermal neutron reactors designed for the production of power but the provisions may be appropriate to a wider range of nuclear applications. In order to take account of lessons learned since the first publication of the NUSS programme was issued, it was decided in 1986 to revise and reissue the Codes and Safety Guides. During the original development of these publications, as well as during the revision process, care was taken to ensure that all Member States, in particular those with active nuclear power programmes, could provide their input. Several independent reviews took place including a final one by the Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory Group (NUSSAG). The revised Codes were approved by the Board of Governors in June 1988. In the revision process new developments in technology and methods of analysis have been incorporated on the basis of interna tional consensus. It is hoped that the revised Codes will be used, and that they will be accepted and respected by Member States as a basis for regulation of the safety of power reactors within the national legal and regulatory framework. Any Member State wishing to enter into an agreement with the IAEA for its assistance in connection with the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear power plant will be required to follow those parts of the Codes and Safety Guides that pertain to the activities to be covered by the agreement. However, it is recognized that the final decisions and legal responsibilities in any licensing procedures rest with the Member States. The Codes and Safety Guides are presented in such a form as to enable a Member State, should it so desire, to make their contents directly applicable to activities under its jurisdiction. Therefore, consistent with the accepted practice for codes and guides, and in accordance with a proposal of the Senior Advisory Group, This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ ‘shall’ and ‘should’ are used to distinguish for the user between strict requirements and desirable options respectively. The five Codes deal with the following topics: — Governmental organization — Siting — Design — Operation — Quality assurance. These five Codes establish the objectives and basic requirements that must be met to ensure adequate safety in the operation of nuclear power plants. The Safety Guides are issued to describe to Member States acceptable methods of implementing particular parts of the relevant Codes. Methods and solutions other than those set out in these Guides may be acceptable, provided that they give at least equivalent assurance that nuclear power plants can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the general public and site personnel. Although these Codes and Safety Guides establish an essential basis for safety, they may require the incorporation of more detailed requirements in accordance with national practice. Moreover, there will be special aspects that need to be assessed by experts on a case by case basis. These publications are intended for use, as appropriate, by regulatory bodies and others concerned in Member States. In order to comprehend the contents of any of them fully, it is essential that the other relevant Codes and Safety Guides be taken into account. Other safety publications of the IAEA should be consulted as necessary. The physical security of fissile and radioactive materials and of nuclear power plants as a whole is mentioned where appropriate but is not treated in detail. Non-radiological aspects of industrial safety and environmental protection are also not explicitly considered. The requirements and recommendations set forth in the NUSS publications may not be fully satisfied by older plants. The decision of whether to apply them to such plants must be made on a case by case basis according to national circumstances. This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ CONTENTS DEFINITIONS 1 NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT ................................. 5 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 7 Background (101-103) ................................................................................. Objective (104) ...........................................................................................7 Scope (105-106) ............................................................................................ Structure (107-108) ..................................................................................... 7 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS (201-206) ............ ..................................... 8 3. REQUIRED INFORMATION AND INVESTIGATIONS (DATABASE) ................................................................................................. 9 7 8 Overview (301-303) ....................................................................................... 9 Scales of study (304-316) ................... ...................................................... . 9 Seismological database (317-324) ............................................................... 11 Geological database (325-333) ........ ............................................................ 12 4. CONSTRUCTION OF A REGIONAL SEISMOTECTONIC MODEL .......................................................................................................... 15 Introduction (401-408) .......................... ......... ............................................ 15 Identification of seismogenic structures (409-422) ................................... 16 Identification of zones of diffuse seismicity (423-428) ........................... 17 5. EVALUATION OF DESIGN BASIS GROUND MOTIONS .................. 18 Introduction (501) ......................................................................... ............... 18 Levels of design basis ground motion (502-508) .................................... 19 Methods for determination of design basis ground motion (509-540) ......................................................................................................... 20 6. POTENTIAL FOR SURFACE FAULTING AT THE SITE .................. 26 Objective (601) ............................................................................................... 26 Capable faults (602-603) .............................................................................. 26 Investigations required to determine capability (604-608) ...................... 27 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 7. SEISMICALLY GENERATED WATER WAVES .................................. 28 Objective (701-702) ....................................................................................... Tsunamis (703-707) ....................................................................................... Seiches (708-711) .......................................................................................... Seismically induced dam failures (712-713) ............................................. 8. 28 28 30 30 POTENTIAL FOR PERMANENT GROUND DISPLACEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH EARTHQUAKES AND GEOLOGICAL PHENOMENA ............................................................................................... 31 Objective (801-802) ....................................................................................... Liquefaction (803-806) ................................................................................. Slope instability (807-811) ............................................................................ Subsidence (812-813) .................................................................................... Collapse (814-815) ........................................................................................ 31 31 32 33 33 APPENDIX: SEISMIC INTENSITY SCALES .................................................. 34 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 41 CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ......................................... 45 LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLES ........................................................... 51 SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ..................................................... 55 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ DEFINITIONS The following definitions are intendedfor use in the NUSS programme and may not necessarily conform to definitions adopted elsewhere for international use. Active Crustal Volume A term used to characterize a three dimensional portion of the Earth’s crust for which a diffuse pattern of seismicity exists both spatially and temporally. Baserock (Basement) A well consolidated geological formation which can be considered as homogeneous with respect to seismic wave transmission and response. Bedrock The uppermost strongly consolidated geological formation, above the baserock, which exhibits contrast in mechanical properties to overlying deposits and is homogeneous. Generally, bedrock exhibits shear wave velocities greater than 700 m/s. Capable Fault A fault which has a significant potential for relative displacement at or near the ground surface. Design Basis External Events The parameter values associated with, and characterizing, an external event or combinations of external events selected for design of all or any part of the nuclear power plant (see Design Basis Natural Events). Design Basis Natural Events Natural events selected for deriving design bases (see Design Basis External Events). Free Field Ground Motion The motion which appears at a given point of the ground due to an earthquake when vibratory characteristics are not affected by structures and facilities. 1 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Ground Motion Intensity A general expression characterizing the level of ground motion at a given point. It may refer to acceleration, velocity, displacement, macroseismic intensity or spectral intensity. Ground Response The behaviour of a rock or soil column at a site under a prescribed ground motion load. Intensity A set of numerical indices describing the physical effects of an earthquake on man, or structures built by man, and on the Earth’s surface. The indices are based on subjective judgements, not instrumental records. Isoseismal Map A contour map showing geographic areas that experienced the same level of intensity during an earthquake. Karstic Phenomena Formation of sinks or caverns in soluble rocks by the action of water. Liquefaction Sudden loss of shear strength and rigidity of saturated, cohesionless soils, due to vibratory ground motion. Macroseismicity Seismicity of a level such that it implies significant, coherent, sustained tectonic activity.1 1 Macroseismicity usually refers to the seismicity of larger earthquakes as opposed to microearthquakes. However, such seismicity might have different aspects in different areas. A determination o f what level of seismicity constitutes macroseismicity in a given region must be made after consideration o f the seismicity o f that region. 2 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Magnitude A numerical quantity derived from instrumental records that is characteristic of total energy released by an earthquake. Microearthquakes and Macroearthquakes Microearthquakes have magnitudes less than 3.0, whereas macroearthquakes have magnitudes equal to or greater than 3.0.2 Microtremor An ambient ground vibration with extremely small amplitude (of a few micrometres). This vibration can be produced by natural and/or artificial causes such as wind, sea waves and traffic disturbances. Microtremors are sometimes called microseisms. Neotectonics Tectonics related to the most recent movement of faults. For seismic regions, the tectonics of the Quaternary era. Region A geographical area, surrounding and including the Site, sufficiently large to contain all the features related to a phenomenon or to the effects of a particular event. Response Spectrum A plot of the maximum response of a family of oscillators, each having a single degree of freedom with fixed damping, as a function of natural frequencies of the oscillators when subjected to vibratory motion input at their supports. Seismic Wave Attenuation A decrease in the amplitude of seismic waves during transmission from the earthquake source to a Site. 2 Although this magnitude division is not precise and different scales are used in different parts o f the world, this general characterization is sufficient for the purposes o f this Guide. 3 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Seismogenic Structure Structures that display earthquake activity, or that manifest historical surface rupture, or effects of palaeoseismicity. Seismogenic structures are those considered likely to generate Macroearthquakes within a period of concern. Seismotectonic Province A geographic area characterized by similarity of geological structure and seismicity. Site The area containing the plant, defined by a boundary and under effective control of the plant management. Site Area The immediate area of the Site on which the structures of the nuclear power plant are situated, and for which detailed field and laboratory geotechnical investiga tions are required. Siting3 The process of selecting a suitable Site for a nuclear power plant, including appropriate assessment and definition of the related design bases. Subsidence scale. The settlement or sinking of surficial geological materials on a regional or local Surface Faulting The permanent offset or tearing of the ground surface by differential move ment across a fault during an earthquake. 3 The terms Siting, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decommissioning are used to delineate the five major stages of the licensing process. Several of the stages may coexist; for example, Construction and Commissioning, or Commissioning and Operation. 4 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Tectonics A branch of geology dealing with the broad architecture of the upper part of the Earth’s crust in terms of the origin and historical evolution of regional structural or deformational features. Tsunami Long period seismic sea waves generated in a sea or ocean by an impulsive disturbance such as an abrupt bottom displacement caused by an earthquake, a vol canic eruption or a submarine landslide. NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT When an appendix is included it is considered to be an integral part of the docu ment and to have the same status as the main text of the document. However, annexes, footnotes and bibliographies are only included to provide additional information or practical examples that might be helpful to the user. In several cases phrases may use the wording ‘shall consider...’ or ‘shall... as far as practicable’. In these cases it is essential to give the matter in question careful attention, and the decision must be made in consideration of the circumstances of each case. However, the final decision must be rational and justifiable and its techni cal grounds must be documented. Another special use of language is to be noted: “ ‘a’ or ‘b’ ” is used to indicate that either ‘a’ or ‘b’, but also the combination of both ‘a’ and ‘b’, would fulfil the requirement. If alternatives are intended to be mutually exclusive, “ either... or... ” is used. 5 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 1. INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND 101. This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency’s programme, referred to as the NUSS programme, for establishing Codes and Safety Guides relating to nuclear power plants. It supplements the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting (50-C-S (Rev. 1)) and provides guidelines and recommends procedures to adopt in the consideration of earthquakes and associated topics for nuclear power plant siting. 102. In the siting of a nuclear power plant, engineering solutions are generally avail able to mitigate the potential vibratory effects of earthquakes through design. However, such solutions cannot always be demonstrated as being adequate for miti gation of the effects of permanent ground displacement phenomena such as surface faulting, subsidence, ground collapse or fault creep. For this reason, it may be pru dent to select an alternative site when the potential for permanent ground displace ment exists at the site. 103. In the various phases of site survey leading to the selection of a site, particular attention should be paid to two categories of features related to earthquakes: (1) Features that can have direct influence on the acceptability of the site (2) Features that can substantially influence the severity of the design basis earthquakes. Information related to investigations during a site survey may be found in Safety Guide 50-SG-S9. OBJECTIVE 104. The main purpose of the present text is to provide guidance on the determina tion of the design basis ground motions for a nuclear power plant at a chosen site and on the determination of the potential for surface faulting at that site. Addition ally, the Guide discusses other permanent displacement phenomena (liquefaction, slope instability, subsidence and collapse) and introduces the topic of seismically induced flooding. Volcanic activity is not dealt with except in connection with tsunamis. SCOPE 105. This document is applicable to new nuclear power plant sites. It does not address the complex issue of the seismic re-evaluation of existing nuclear power 7 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ plant sites, nor does it address the safe siting problems of advanced reactors, although it contains general information useful for those purposes. 106. The guidelines and procedures discussed in this Guide can appropriately be used as the basis for the design of seismically safe nuclear power plants in different seismotectonic environments. STRUCTURE 107. Since the first edition of this Guide there have been advances in all aspects of the topic. This has required some restructuring of the text. In particular, the collec tion of information has been separated from the carrying out of investigations, i.e. the acquisition of the database (Section 3) is separated from the use of that database to construct a seismotectonic model (Section 4) and to evaluate the design basis ground motions (Section 5). Evaluations related to surface faulting, seismically induced water waves and the potential for permanent ground displacements are treated in Sections 6, 7 and 8, respectively. Requirements of a general nature are summarized in Section 2. 108. Further guidance related to subjects covered in Sections 7 and 8 can be found in Safety Guides 50-SG-S2, 50-SG-S8 and 50-SG-S10B. 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 201. The phenomena of ground motion, faulting, seismically generated water waves and permanent ground deformations associated with earthquakes and geological phenomena shall be investigated for every nuclear power plant site. These investiga tions, which form the basis for technical judgements on siting and design concerning each phenomenon, are treated in this Guide for all levels of seismic hazard exposure. 202. The geological, geophysical and seismological characteristics of the region which surrounds the site shall be investigated, together with the geotechnical charac teristics of the site area, all as described in this Guide. 203. However, the size of the region to be investigated, the type of information to be collected and the scope and detail of the investigations shall be determined by the nature and complexity of the seismotectonic environment. 204. In all cases, the scope and detail of the information to be collected and the investigations to be undertaken should be sufficient to determine the design basis ground motions, to define the characteristics of faulting at or near the site, to deter mine the potential for seismically induced flooding, to establish the foundation 8 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ properties of the site area and to define seismic and geological hazards at or near the site, so that the engineering design bases can be established. 205. Regardless of any lower apparent exposure to seismic hazard, it is recom mended that every nuclear power plant adopt a minimum value of 0.1 g peak ground acceleration corresponding to the safety level SL-2 earthquake, as defined in Sec tion 5. 206. A quality assurance programme shall be established and implemented to cover all the data collection, data processing, field and laboratory investigations, desk studies and evaluations which are within the scope of this Guide. 3. REQUIRED INFORMATION AND INVESTIGATIONS (DATABASE) OVERVIEW 301. Experience has shown that it is necessary to acquire an integrated database which coherently incorporates the information needed to evaluate and resolve all hazards associated with earthquakes [1]. 302. In order that rational decisions can be made, it is important to ensure that each element of any practical database has been investigated as fully as possible before integration of the various elements is attempted. The total database should include all the relevant information, i.e. not only geological and seismological data but also any other information which reveals the pattern of current geodynamics. 303. The elements of the database should be studied most intensively close to the site. In this connection, four scales of investigation are appropriate: regional; near regional; site vicinity and site area. SCALES OF STUDY Regional scale 304. The regional study shall investigate a geographical area sufficiently large to contain all the evidence which potentially affects the seismic hazard at the site. The size of this area will vary depending on the geological and seismological setting and its shape may need to be asymmetric, particularly in the case where there is a distant source of earthquakes. Its radial extent is typically 150 km or more. 9 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 305. In the particular case of investigations into the potential for tsunamis (see Section 6), the study may need to consider sources at great distances from the site. 306. In most cases, an appropriate database can be obtained from either published or unpublished sources. However, where existing data are deficient for the purpose of delineating seismogenic structures, it may be necessary to verify and complete the database by acquiring new geological, geophysical and seismological data at the appropriate scale. 307. The data are typically presented on maps at a scale of 1:500 000, or smaller. Near regional scale 308. Near regional studies should investigate a geographical area typically up to 25 km in radius, although this dimension should be adjusted to reflect local condi tions. The objective is to define the seismotectonic characteristics of the near region on the basis of a more detailed database than that collected for the regional study. 309. The data are obtained from existing published and unpublished sources, aug mented by specific remote sensing, geological, geophysical, geodetic and seismolog ical studies designed to acquire new information on critical parameters. 310. The data are typically presented on maps at a scale of 1:50 000 or smaller. The aim is to show the seismotectonic details of the near region. Site vicinity scale 311. Site vicinity studies should investigate a geographical area typically up to 5 km in radius. In addition to providing a yet more detailed database for this smaller area, the objective of this investigation is to understand the potential for permanent ground deformation, including surface faulting, in the area which immediately surrounds the site. 312. In most cases, additional techniques such as boreholes, trenching and geologi cal mapping are likely to be required in order to obtain a database that is more detailed than that developed from the regional and near regional studies. 313. The data are typically presented on maps at a scale of 1:5000 or smaller. Site area scale 314. Site area studies shall investigate the area covered by the plant, which is typi cally 1 km2 or more. The primary objective for this investigation is to add detailed 10 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ knowledge on the potential for permanent displacement and to provide information on the geotechnical properties of the foundation materials. 315. The database is developed from detailed geological, geophysical and geo technical studies augmented by in situ and laboratory testing. 316. The data are typically presented on maps of 1:500 or smaller. SEISMOLOGICAL DATABASE 317. Data shall be collected for all the recorded earthquakes that have occurred in the region. 318. In addition to catalogues maintained by individual Member States, it may be noted that worldwide instrumental earthquake catalogues are maintained by various organizations such as the International Seismological Centre, the United States National Earthquake Information Center and Le Centre Sismologique EuroMediterraneen. Historical earthquake data 319. All available historical earthquake data (i.e. events for which no instrumental recording exists) shall be collected, extending as far back in time as possible [2], 320. The information to be obtained for each earthquake includes: (1) Date and time of earthquake; (2) Isoseismal contours; (3) Location of the macroseismic epicentre; (4) Maximum intensity and intensity at the macroseismic epicentre, when they differ, with a description of local conditions; (5) Estimated magnitude; (6) Estimated focal depth; (7) Estimates of uncertainty for each of the above parameters; (8) Intensity at the site, accompanied by any available details on soil effects (9) An assessment of the quality and quantity of data from which the above parameters have been estimated. The magnitude and depth estimated for such earthquakes should be based on relevant empirical relationships between instrumental and macroseismic information which may be developed from the data described in para. 321. When the catalogue of rele vant historical earthquakes has been compiled, estimates should be made of its completeness. 11 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Instrumental earthquake data 321. All available instrumental earthquake data shall be collected. The information to be obtained for each earthquake includes: (1) Time of origin; (2) Locations of epicentre and hypocentre; (3) All magnitude determinations, including those on different scales, and any information on seismic moment; (4) Dimensions and geometry of the aftershock zone; (5) Other information that may be helpful in understanding the seismotec tonic regime, such as focal mechanism and other source parameters; (6) Estimates of uncertainty for each of the above parameters; (7) Macroseismic details as discussed in para. 320. When the catalogue of relevant instrumental earthquakes has been compiled, esti mates should be made of its completeness. Site specific instrumental data 322. To supplement the available data on earthquakes with more detailed informa tion on seismic sources, it may be useful to operate a network of sensitive seismo graphs having microearthquake recording capability. 323. Earthquakes recorded within and near such a network should be carefully analysed in connection with seismotectonic studies of the near region. The minimum monitoring period required to obtain meaningful data for seismotectonic interpreta tions is several years. 324. Wherever possible, regional strong motion recordings shall be collected and used for deriving appropriate seismic wave attenuation functions [3] and in develop ing the design response spectra [4-7] for the proposed nuclear power plant, as dis cussed in Section 5. The value of the investigation may be enhanced by having strong motion accelerographs installed within the site, area for as long as possible. GEOLOGICAL DATABASE Regional investigations 325. The main purpose of the regional studies is to provide knowledge of the geo logical and tectonic framework of the region and its general geodynamic setting and to identify those geological features that may influence or relate to the seismic hazard at the site. The data will usually be obtained from published and other existing geo12 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ logical and geophysical sources and should be presented on a map with cross-sections and a commentary. 326. However, it may be necessary to conduct additional geological and geophysical studies on some structures identified in the regional investigations in order to obtain the desired detail. Near region investigations 327. Data from the investigations described in para. 328 are used to provide the final refinement of the geological map before the seismotectonic model for the region is developed and the results should be presented on a map with cross-sections and a commentary. 328. Investigations to amplify the published and existing information should typi cally include: (1) Geological mapping to define the stratigraphy, structural geology and tectonic history of the near region. Subsurface information derived from geophysical investigations using seismic, gravimetric and magnetic tech niques is needed in the preparation of the geological map. Use should be made of remote sensing data, such as those derived from satellite imagery, side scan radar, aerial photographs, aeromagnetics and gravimetrics. In areas of unusual geological complexity, it may be necessary to perform specific field investigations, such as boring, trenching and seismic (reflection and refraction) surveys. (2) Neotectonic studies to determine the latest movements of faults. To reach this goal, geomorphology, boring, trenching, pedology, studies of the Quaternary deposits and age dating may be necessary, as well as palaeoseismicity, geophysics, geochemistry, geodesy and in situ stress measurements. Site vicinity investigations 329. Investigations of the site vicinity shall be conducted to define in greater detail the neotectonic history of faults and to identify sources of potential instability. 330. The investigations should provide the following: (1) A geological map with cross-sections and a commentary. (2) A neotectonic history showing the age and amount of fault displacement based on trenching and age dating, as appropriate. (3) A characterization of the seismic stability of slopes, soils and strata with emphasis on geomorphic, physiographic and hydrogeological data (e.g. 13 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ drainage, vegetation, soil, acclivity, water table) and of locations exhibiting potential geological hazards such as differential erosion, karstic phenomena, fractures, fault creep and unstable materials (e.g. expan sive soils). (4) The identification and characterization of locations exhibiting potential geological hazards induced by human activities. Special attention should be given to the potential for induced seismicity, particularly that resulting from large dams or reservoirs or from extensive fluid injection into or extraction from the ground. Site area investigations 331. Investigations at the site area should extend and add further detail to the data bases developed in the studies described above. In addition to geological mapping, the emphasis is on defining the physical properties of the foundation materials and determining their stability and response under dynamic earthquake loading. 332. The following investigations shall be performed, using geological, geophysi cal, seismological and geotechnical techniques: (1) Geological and geotechnical investigations Investigations using boreholes or test excavations (including in situ test ing), geophysical techniques and laboratory tests should be conducted to clarify the stratigraphy and structure of the site area and to determine the thickness, depth, dip and static and dynamic properties of the different subsurface layers as might be required by engineering models (Poisson’s ratio, Young’s modulus, shear modulus, density, relative density, shear strength, consolidation and swelling characteristics, grain size distribu tion, etc.). (2) Hydrogeological investigations Investigations using boreholes and other techniques should be conducted to define the physical and chemical properties and steady state behaviour (recharge, transmissivity) of all aquifers in the site area, with emphasis on determining how they interact with the foundation. (3) Site effects investigations The dynamic behaviour of the rock and soil at the site should be assessed using available historical and instrumental data as a guide. 333. All the data required for the dynamic soil-structure interaction (see Safety Guide 50-SG-S8) should be acquired in the course of these investigations. 14 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 4. CONSTRUCTION OF A REGIONAL SEISMOTECTONIC MODEL INTRODUCTION 401. The bridge between the database and any calculation model for deriving hazard levels is a regional seismotectonic model. Such a model should be based on a coher ent merging of the total regional database. In its construction, all existing interpreta tions of the seismotectonics of the region that may be found in the available literature should be taken into account [4, 8-10]. 402. The standard procedure is to integrate the elements of the seismological and geological database (Section 3) and any additional data, in particular stress or strain information, in order to construct a model consisting of a discrete set of seismogenic structures [11, 12]. 403. However, even in highly active areas, it is possible that some seismogenic structures may not be identified by the total available database. This is because seis mogenic structures may exist without recognized surface or subsurface manifesta tions and because of the time-scales involved, e.g. fault displacements may have long recurrence intervals with respect to seismological observation periods. 404. Consequently, any seismotectonic model consists, to a greater or lesser extent, of two types of elements: — those seismogenic structures which can be identified using the available database, and — diffuse seismicity (consisting usually, but not always, of small to moderate earthquakes) which cannot be attributed to specific structures using the available database. 405. The identification of seismogenic structures is dealt with in paras 309-317. The second type of element, diffuse seismicity, is a particularly complex problem in seismic hazard assessment because the sources of the earthquakes are not understood. 406. Whilst it is important that attempts are made to define all the parameters of each element in a seismotectonic model, the construction of the model should be data driven, and any tendency to intrepret data only in a manner which supports some preconception should be avoided. 407. When it is possible to construct alternative models which explain the observed seismological, geophysical and geological data equally well and the differences can not be resolved through additional investigations in the time available, the final haz ard assessment should take into consideration all such models. 15 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 408. The most important of the parameters which have to be evaluated is the maxi mum earthquake potential that can be associated with either a seismogenic structure or a zone of diffuse seismicity [1, 13, 14]. Guidance as to its assessment is provided below. IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMOGENIC STRUCTURES 409. The need to identify seismogenic structures is ultimately linked to their sig nificance for the ground motion or surface faulting hazard at the site. 410. In the case of the ground motion hazard, the concern is with those seismogenic structures where the combination of location and earthquake potential would affect ground motion levels at the site. 411. In the case of the surface faulting hazard, the concern is with those seismogenic structures close to the site which have a potential for relative displacement at or near the ground surface (i.e. capable faults, see Section 6). 412. The identification of seismogenic structures is made on the basis of geological, geophysical or seismological data providing direct or indirect evidence that the struc tures have been the source of earthquakes under current tectonic conditions. 413. The correlation (or lack of correlation) of historical and instrumental earth quakes with geological and geophysical features can be particularly important in identifying seismogenic structures. 414. Whenever the investigations described in Section 3 show that an earthquake hypocentre or a group of earthquake hypocentres can be potentially associated with a geological feature, the rationale for the association should be developed and con sideration given to the characteristics of the feature, its geometry and geographical extent, and its structural relationship to the regional tectonic framework. 415. Other available seismological information such as locational uncertainties, focal mechanisms, stress environments and aftershock distributions should also be used in considering any such association. 416. A detailed comparison of such features with others in the region, in terms of their age of origin, sense of movement and history of movement, is essential. Geo logical features with which seismicity is reliably correlated should then be considered seismogenic structures. 417. The incorporation of seismogenic structures into a seismotectonic model should be firmly based on the available data and their uncertainties. In areas of res tricted data it is not necessarily conservative to make assumptions as to associations 16 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ between earthquakes and geological features, particularly when the feature is distant from the site. Maximum earthquake potential associated with identified seismogenic structures 418. For seismogenic structures which have been identified to be pertinent to deter mining the exposure of the site to earthquake hazards, as discussed above, the associated maximum earthquake potential shall be determined. If possible, the dimensions of the structure, amount and direction of displacement, maximum histor ical earthquake, palaeoseismological data, earthquake frequency and comparisons with similar structures having historical data should be used in this determination. 419. When sufficient information about the seismological and geological history of movement on a fault or structure is available so as to allow estimates of the maximum rupture dimensions and/or displacement of a future earthquake to be made, existing methods can be used for evaluating the maximum magnitude potential associated with these structures [8]. 420. In the absence of suitable local data, the maximum earthquake potential for a seismogenic structure fault can be estimated from its total dimensions [9, 10, 15, 16]. However, to use these estimates the fraction of the total length of the structure which can move in a single earthquake has to be defined. 421. In the application of either of the above methodologies, it should be remem bered that earthquake magnitude is a regionally varying function of both source dimensions and stress drop. Stress drop usually will not be known, but reasonable upper bound estimates based on available published studies may be used [17, 18]. 422. Other methods based on the statistical analysis of the magnitude/frequency recurrence relationship for earthquakes associated with the structure are avail able [2]. These methods assume association between the structure and all the earth quake data used. IDENTIFICATION OF ZONES OF DIFFUSE SEISMICITY 423. The concept of ‘seismotectonic province’ has been used to represent diffuse seismicity for the purpose of seismic hazard assessment, with each seismotectonic province assumed to encompass an area of equal seismic potential. 424. Because the understanding of diffuse seismicity is evolving, it is important that those who perform seismic hazard assessments keep aware of new advances such as 17 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ the concept of ‘active crustal volumes’. In this concept [19], earthquakes are consid ered to originate in the brittle-ductile transition in the crust. It is anticipated that such physically based concepts will acquire a firmer scientific foundation as data improve and the overall understanding of the earthquake generating process evolves. 425. Caution should be exercised in defining the boundaries of zones of diffuse seis micity so that they enclose, to the extent possible, a contiguous area which experiences diffuse seismicity of a consistent frequency and style. 426. Significant differences in rates of seismicity may suggest different tectonic conditions that can be used in defining boundaries, provided the time interval for which historical data are available is long enough to demonstrate that conclusions based on these data are reasonable. However, significant differences in hypocentral depth (e.g. 10-30 km versus 200-400 km) may alone justify differentiation between zones. 427. In some areas of the world the boundaries of lithospheric plates present a special problem. For example, where the mode of plate interaction is subduction, the lower (subducting) plate will generally be considered separate from the upper plate. It has been demonstrated [18] that different sectors of plates have different maximum earthquake potentials. Maximum earthquake potential associated with zones of diffuse seismicity 428. The maximum earthquake potential not associated with identified seismogenic structures should be evaluated on the basis of historical data and the seismotectonic characteristics of the zone, including rate of strain release. Comparison with similar regions where extensive historical data exist may be useful, but considerable judge ment is needed for this evaluation [8, 11, 20]. 5. DETERMINATION OF DESIGN BASIS GROUND MOTIONS 501. This section presents guidelines and procedures regarding the levels and characteristics of the design basis ground motions. Guidance on the appropriate level of ground motion (SL-1 or SL-2) to be used for the design of each particular item of the nuclear power plant is given in Safety Guide 50-SG-S2, which also recom mends the loading combinations applicable for the design basis ground motion levels. Determination of the design basis ground motion shall be based on the seismotectonic model derived as described in Section 4. 18 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ LEVELS OF DESIGN BASIS GROUND MOTION 502. At least two levels (SL-1 and SL-2) of design basis ground motion are evalu ated for each plant.1 The application of these levels in design is clarified in Safety Guide 50-SG-S2. 503. The SL-2 level corresponds directly to ultimate safety requirements. This level of extreme ground motion shall have a very low probability2 of being exceeded during the lifetime of the plant and represents the maximum level of ground motion to be used for design purposes. Its evaluation shall be based on the seismotectonic model and a detailed knowledge of the geology and engineering parameters of the strata beneath the site area. 504. Regardless of the exposure to seismic hazard, it is recommended that a design basis ground motion corresponding to the safety level SL-2 earthquake be adopted for every nuclear power plant. The recommended minimum level is a peak ground acceleration of O.lg (zero period of the design response spectrum). 505. The SL-1 level corresponds to a less severe, more likely3 earthquake load condition which has different safety implications than SL-2. The factors which may influence decisions on the level of ground motion chosen to represent SL-1 are: Seismotectonic setting: the relative exposure of the site to multiple sources of seismicity; the frequency of earth quakes from each such source with respect to the lifetime of the plant. Design considerations: the safety implications of the required loading combinations and stress limits; the plant type. Post-earthquake situation: the implications of the agreed required action fol lowing SL-1; the need for the plant to continue to operate safely. Plant inspection considerations: the cost and safety implications of design/con struction of the plant to a higher level of SL-1 versus the possibility of more frequent inspec tions for a lower level. 506. A level of ground motion other than SL-1 is sometimes used for inspection. 1 In some Member States, licensing authorities require only level SL-2. 2 In some Member States, SL-2 corresponds to a level with a probability o f 10'4 per year of being exceeded. 3 In some Member States, SL-1 corresponds to a level with a probability of 10”2 per year o f being exceeded. 19 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 507. For both SL-1 and SL-2, the characteristics of the ground motion should be defined to allow calculation of the behaviour of the plant according to the methods chosen for the design. Ground motions having different characteristics may need to be defined, according to the various types of earthquakes which can affect the site. 508. Regardless of the method used to evaluate the ground motion hazard, both SL-1 and SL-2 should be defined by appropriate response spectra4 and time histo ries as input to the design process. The motion is defined in free field conditions at the surface of the ground, at the level of the foundation or on bedrock. METHODS FOR DETERMINATION OF DESIGN BASIS GROUND MOTION 509. At present, the design basis ground motions are usually characterized by time histories and response spectra for several damping values. When sufficient data are available, a site specific response spectrum is calculated directly for both SL-1 and SL-2. However, more typical current practice is to choose a standard spectrum shape which is scaled to a prescribed level of free field acceleration (or velocity or displacement). 510. This section describes methods [7, 21-25] for determining appropriate levels and characteristics of the design basis ground motions, as defined above. 511. Appropriate ground motion levels can be assessed from analyses which express earthquake size in terms of intensity or magnitude and ground motion in terms of intensity or free field acceleration (or velocity or displacement). 512. The method used in any region should reflect the parameters associated with the seismotectonic model as provided by the available database (e.g. relative predominance of historical earthquake data or strong motion recordings). 513. The assessment of appropriate ground motion levels for SL-2 and SL-1 may involve analyses based on deterministic and/or probabilistic considerations. Current licensing practice in most Member States favours the use of deterministic methods for the derivation of SL-2. 514. However SL-1 and SL-2 are derived, they should be expressed for the purpose of design by several variables describing level, frequency content and duration of the ground motion. These variables may be estimated using actual data and models regarding source parameters, propagation path characteristics and site conditions [1]. 515. In addition to these factors, consideration should be given to the fact that differ ent earthquakes may produce the largest response in different frequency ranges. Low 4 In some Member States additional spectral representations such as power spectral density functions are also used. 20 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ frequency effects of distant earthquakes should be considered in the context of the frequency range of engineering interest at the site. Use of intensity and magnitude data 516. In addition to providing seismotectonic information related to the seismogenic sources in the region, intensity and magnitude data are relevant for estimating the characteristics of the design basis ground motions: attenuation, response spectra and duration. 517. Intensity data may be used to estimate the magnitudes of earthquakes that occurred before seismological instruments were operating systematically. They can also be used to estimate ground motion attenuation relations in those regions of the world where strong motion instruments have not been in operation for a sufficiently long period of time to provide instrumental attenuation data. Three different seismic intensity scales are provided in the Appendix. 518. By comparing such attenuation relations with those obtained in regions where intensities and strong ground motion records are available, improved relations can be derived for ground accelerations, velocities and ordinates of response spectra. 519. Intensity based calculations may be appropriate when the database is rich in historical and macroseismic information. In this approach, attenuation relationships (in terms of intensity) are preferably derived from isoseismal maps of past earth quakes in the region. 520. After the design basis intensity at the site has been established, the correspond ing maximum ground acceleration or velocity should be obtained using relevant empirical relationships. In the derivation or selection of such an empirical relation ship, it is recommended that the dispersion of the data, which can be very large, be taken into consideration [26]. 521. Magnitude based calculations may be appropriate when the database is rich in instrumental information or when sufficient data exist to convert reliably from inten sity to magnitude. In the selection or generation of an appropriate relationship it is recommended that the dispersion of the data be taken into consideration. 522. In this approach, it is necessary to have attenuation relationships which express the ground motion parameter (usually peak ground acceleration or peak ground velocity) as a function of magnitude and distance from the site to the seismogenic source and site conditions. It is also important to ensure that the relationship draws upon the large quantity of strong motion data now available worldwide. 21 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Deterministic techniques 523. As applied to the evaluation of SL-2, deterministic techniques involve [1, 27]: (1) Reducing the seismotectonic model into seismotectonic provinces (cor responding to the active crustal volumes and representing zones of diffuse seismicity) and seismogenic structures. (2) Identifying the maximum earthquake potential associated with each seis mogenic structure and the maximum earthquake potential associated with each seismotectonic province. (3) Performing the evaluation as follows: (a) For each seismogenic structure the maximum potential earthquake should be assumed to occur at the point on the structure closest to the site area with account taken of the physical dimensions of the source. When the site is within the boundaries of a seismogenic structure, the maximum potential earthquake shall be assumed to occur under the site. In this case special care should be taken to demonstrate that the seismogenic structure is not capable (Section 6). (b) The maximum potential earthquake not associated with specific seismogenic structures in the seismotectonic province which includes the site should be assumed to occur at some agreed specific distance from the site. In some Member States this dis tance may be accepted by the regulatory body on the basis of studies and investigations which ensure that within this distance there are no seismogenic structures and, therefore, that the related probability of earthquakes occurring therein is very low. This dis tance may be in the range of a few to tens of kilometres and depends on the best estimate of the focal depth of the earthquakes in the province. In the selection of a suitable distance the physical dimensions of the source should be taken into account [28]. (c) The maximum potential earthquake not associated with specific seismogenic structures in each adjoining seismotectonic province should be assumed to occur at the point on the province boundary closest to the site. (d) An appropriate attenuation relation should be used to determine the ground motion level which each of these earthquakes would cause at the site, with consideration of the local site conditions. Probabilistic techniques 524. Probabilistic techniques [11, 12, 18, 29-33] may be used to determine design basis ground motions. They can also be used to put a deterministically derived SL-2 22 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ ground motion in perspective. They are necessary when it is anticipated that probabilistic risk analyses will be conducted at a future date. 525. Probabilistic techniques should utilize all the details and parameters of the seis motectonic model. Zones of diffuse seismicity (active crustal volumes) are modelled as sources of uniform seismicity and allowance is made for the full range of earth quake magnitudes associated with each seismogenic source, i.e. zone or structure. The latest techniques allow uncertainties in the parameters of the seismotectonic model to be explicitly included in the analysis [34]. 526. The probabilistic technique involves the following steps: (1) Idealization of the seismotectonic model in terms of source type (e.g. volume, area, linear, point sources), geometry and depth. (2) For each source, identification of the following parameters (including their uncertainties): — magnitude-frequency or intensity-frequency (recurrence) relation ships — maximum (or cut-off) magnitude or maximum intensity — attenuation relationships. (3) Choice of appropriate stochastic models (e.g. Poisson, Markov, cluster, renewal). (4) Evaluation of the best estimate hazard curve with appropriate confidence intervals, illustrating the dispersion. (5) Use, for design basis, of those levels of ground motion where probabili ties of being exceeded meet the safety standards set by the Member State. In the specification of the input parameters, the uncertainties should be considered. Design basis ground motion characteristics 527. The characteristics of the design basis ground motions for SL-1 and SL-2 shall be expressed in terms of response spectra having a range of damping values and compatible time histories. Response spectra 528. The spectral characteristics of the ground motion are determined according to the relative influences of the seismogenic source characteristics and the attenuation characteristics of the geological strata which transmit the seismic waves from the hypocentres to the site area. In strata above the baserock the seismic waves in the free field are modified according to the response characteristics of those strata as a function of the strain level [35, 36]. 23 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 529. Several methods can be used to generate response spectra: Standard response spectrum A standard response spectrum may be used when the contribution of multiple seismic sources may be represented by an envelope. The prescribed shape of the standard response spectra is to be obtained from many response spectra derived using earthquake records. This standard response spectrum is scaled to the relevant site specific value of ground acceleration, velocity and/or dis placement [5-7]. In many cases it is possible to have low to moderate magni tude near field earthquakes having a relatively rich high frequency content and short duration which may produce peak accelerations exceeding the zero period anchor value of the standard response spectrum. In such cases it is recommended that these response spectra be separated for design purposes. Site specific response spectrum A site specific response spectrum may be developed from strong motion time histories recorded at the site. Usually, however, an adequate sample of strong motion time histories cannot be obtained at the site on a practical time-scale. Therefore, response spectra obtained at places having similar seismic, geologi cal and soil characteristics and experiencing similar types of ground motion are required in order to establish a response spectrum appropriate to the site [4, 37], Uniform confidence response spectrum The uniform confidence approach makes use of the results of regression studies of the attenuation of the ordinates of response spectra corresponding to differ ent vibration periods for the purpose of obtaining a response spectrum having ordinates which possess the same confidence values for all periods considered. Depending on the level of information available, the spectra can be either general or site specific [27, 38]. 530. In the selection of the damping values to be used for the design response spec tra for SL-1 and SL-2, it is important to bear in mind both the damping values associated with structures for which the response spectra will be used and the level of strain which will be induced in these structures. The subject of damping is dealt with more fully in Safety Guide 50-SG-S2. 531. Regardless of which approach is adopted for specifying the design response spectrum, account must be taken of the uncertainties associated with the spectral ordinates5 [21, 38, 39]. 5 In most Member States the specified ordinates are taken equal to their median plus one standard deviation. 24 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Time histories 532. Time histories corresponding to both SL-1 and SL-2 shall be developed because of their use in applications such as studies of non-linear behaviour of struc tures, soil-structure interaction and equipment response. These time histories should satisfactorily reflect all of the prescribed design ground motion parameters including duration. The number of time histories to be used in the detailed analyses and the procedure used to generate these time histories depend on the type of analysis to be performed. 533. The duration of earthquake ground motion is determined mainly by the length and velocity of the fault rupture. Duration can also be correlated with magnitude. It is very important that a consistent definition of duration be used throughout the evaluation. For example, the duration of acceleration may be defined in several ways such as: — the time interval between the onset of motion and the time when the acceleration has declined to 5% of the peak [1, 21] — the time interval between the 95th and 5th percentiles of the integral of the mean square value of the acceleration [40] — the time interval for which the acceleration exceeds 5% of g [41]. 534. In the consideration of the duration of the time history, due weight should be given to any empirical evidence provided by the regional database. Furthermore, when the time histories are used for liquefaction analysis, a different duration may be necessary. 535. The generation of design time histories may have a variety of bases such as: (1) Calculational models simulating earthquake ground motion [42]. (2) Strong motion records obtained in the site vicinity or adequate modifica tions thereof, obtained by adjusting the peak acceleration, applying appropriate frequency filters or combining records. (3) Strong motion records obtained at other places having similar seismic, geological and soil characteristics. In some cases, these records may also need amplitude and frequency modifications to make them appropriate. 536. Regardless of the procedure used to generate the time histories, the design response spectra and time histories should be compatible. Ratio o f motion in vertical and horizontal directions 537. If no specific information is available on the peak acceleration of vertical ground motion in the site vicinity, it may be reasonable to assume a prescribed ratio 25 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ between peak acceleration in the vertical and horizontal directions (e.g. 2/3). Empir ical evidence has shown that this ratio typically varies from 1/2 to 1 and may be largest in the near field, depending on the source and site characteristics as well as other factors [6]. 538. It is recommended that response spectra and time histories corresponding to vertical ground motion be evaluated using the same procedure as for the horizontal spectra and time histories. When available, records of vertical time histories should form the basis for this evaluation. 539. An alternative method [24] establishes standard vertical response spectra based on a statistical analysis of the ordinates of vertical and horizontal response spectra of the same frequency. Ratios are derived at each frequency. Time histories for base isolated structures 540. The methodology for deriving the design basis ground motion (SL-1 and SL-2) has been developed for fixed base nuclear power plant structures. For structures which may utilize base isolation systems for seismic protection, additional considera tions may be necessary. These involve especially the long period effects which may cause excessive or possible residual displacements in the elements of the base isola tion system. Therefore, for power plant structures for which a base isolation system is envisaged, design time histories should be modified to take these effects into consideration. 6. POTENTIAL FOR SURFACE FAULTING AT THE SITE OBJECTIVE 601. This section gives guidelines and procedures for assessing the potential for sur face faulting (i.e. capability) which may jeopardize the safety of the nuclear power plant. It also describes the scope of the investigations that are required to permit such an assessment to be made. CAPABLE FAULTS 602. The main question to be answered is whether a fault at or near the site is capa ble. The basis for answering such a question should be the database (see Section 3), as incorporated in the seismotectonic model (see Section 4), together with such addi tional specific data as may be required [43-45]. 26 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 603. On the basis of geological, geophysical, geodetic or seismological data, a fault shall be considered capable if: (1) It shows evidence of past movement or movements of a recurring nature within such a period that it is reasonable to infer that further movement at or near the surface can occur. (In highly active areas, where both earthquake and geological data consistently reveal short earthquake recurrence intervals, periods of the order of tens of thousands of years may be appropriate for the assessment of capable faults. In less active areas, it is likely that much longer periods may be required.) (2) A structural relationship has been demonstrated to a known capable fault such that movement of the one may cause movement of the other at or near the surface. (3) The maximum potential earthquake associated with a seismogenic struc ture, as determined in Section 4, is sufficiently large and at such a depth that it is reasonable to infer that movement at or near the surface can occur. INVESTIGATIONS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE CAPABILITY 604. Sufficient surface and subsurface data should be obtained from the investiga tions in the region, the near region, the site vicinity and the site area (see Section 3) to show the absence of faults at or near the site, or, if faulting is present, to describe the direction, extent and history of movements on them and to estimate reliably the age of the youngest movement. 605. As noted in Section 3, particular attention should be given to those geological and geomorphological features at or near the site which may be particularly useful for distinguishing faulting and which may be useful in ascertaining the age of move ment of faults. 606. When faulting is known or suspected, investigations should be made which include stratigraphical and topographical analyses, geodetic and geophysical sur veys, trenching, boreholes, age dating of sediments or fault rocks, local seismo logical investigations and any other appropriate techniques to ascertain when move ment last occurred. Linear topographical features seen on photographs or on remote sensing imagery should be investigated in sufficient detail to explain their cause. 607. The use of more than one technique for estimating the age of movement of faults will improve the reliability of the assessment. In addition, consideration should be given to the possibility that faults which have not demonstrated recent near surface movement may be reactivated by large reservoir loading [46, 47], fluid injection, fluid withdrawal or other phenomena. 27 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 608. Where reliable evidence shows that there may be a capable fault which has the potential to affect the safety of the nuclear power plant it is recommended that an alternative site be considered. 7. SEISMICALLY GENERATED WATER WAVES OBJECTIVE 701. This section gives guidelines and procedures for addressing seismically gener ated water waves (tsunamis, seiches) and dam failures. It also describes the scope and detail of the investigations that are required to define the design basis. The design basis for the site of a nuclear power plant shall include a realistic assessment of seis mically generated water waves. 702. The potential for flooding as a result of seismically generated water waves shall be evaluated during the site investigations described in Section 3. In certain cases, it may be evident that there is no potential for flooding, e.g. because of location or elevation (Safety Guide 50-SG-S 1OB should be consulted for further details). TSUNAMIS 703. A tsunami is a sea or ocean wave or system of waves generated by a sudden dislocation of the sea floor as a result of surface faulting, or a volcanic eruption and/or a submarine landslide. When the tsunami approaches the continental shelf and coastline, its height is sometimes substantially modified owing to transformation of the wave form by the continental slope, continental shelf, bays, harbours and other bathymetric features. A detailed discussion of the hydraulic effects of seismically generated water waves is given in IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-S10B. Required information and investigations 704. Every proposed coastal or estuarine site shall be examined for flooding from potential tsunamis [48]. In the context of the investigations described in Section 3, the following analyses should be performed: (1) Evaluation o f historical records for indications o f past tsunamis [49]. Records of tsunami occurrence and intensity should be collected in the 28 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ region and in other coastal locations having topography and bathymetry similar to the site vicinity and site area. Tsunami intensity information should be gathered, together with data on tides, storm waves, storm surges and other phenomena that might affect the sea level in the site vicinity. (2) A search for indications o f off-shore seismic or volcanic activity. Geo logical and seismological data should be collected and analysed to deter mine the most severe distant potential tsunami generator and the most severe local potential tsunami generator (i.e. sources of seismic or vol canic activity or of slope instability). These data should include informa tion such as the maximum magnitude, hypocentral depths, vertical dislocations and frequency of seismic or volcanic activity and other perti nent geological data. (3) An evaluation o f the site vulnerability to potential tsunamis emanating from seismogenic sources. Even if a historical tsunami record is absent, data should be collected on the topography and bathymetry of the coastal region out to the edge of the continental shelf. Appropriate analytical and physical models should be developed for the purpose of evaluating poten tial tsunami behaviour within the site vicinity, taking into account local topography, bathymetry and man-made structures. 705. Procedures for locating potential tsunami sources and for evaluating tsunami effects are undergoing continuous development and the analytical techniques used for modelling tsunamis and their effects should incorporate the latest developments appropriate to the region [50, 51], Design tsunamis 706. Identification of those distant and local tsunami source areas which may cause the most severe consequences at the site is essential. For each of these source areas, tsunami intensity data should be gathered. The maximum tsunami should be defined on the basis of the earthquake magnitude, hypocentre depth, vertical displacement component and frequency of occurrence. Normally it will be necessary to analyse data from extremely large regions (oceanic in size) in order to make the above evaluations. For some sites it may be possible to determine from the available histori cal information the tsunamigenic areas that cause the most severe consequences at the site. For other sites it may be necessary to model the design basis tsunamis from all potential source areas to determine which causes the most severe consequences at the site. 29 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Run-up and draw-down 707. Evaluation of run-up and draw-down at the shore line close to the site is based on three major factors: (1) The tsunami energy reaching the edge of the continental shelf or some definite water depth selected on the basis of local bathymetry; (2) The amplification factor caused by the topographic characteristics of the near shore, including consideration of resonance effects; (3) Tidal and wave conditions, which may modify the severity of effects of the tsunami. The data described in para. 704 are the basis for the evaluation of run-up and draw-down. SEICHES 708. A seiche is an oscillatory movement of water in confined bodies such as lakes, reservoirs or coastal embayments which may be caused by the vibrational effects of earthquakes, landslides or volcanic eruptions. Although meteorological disturbances such as storms, hurricanes or moving pressure variations may also cause seiches, the scope of this section is limited to seiches produced by earthquakes and landslides. Required information and investigations for defining the maximum surge 709. In conjunction with the investigations described in para. 704, the following additional data are needed to define the potential maximum surge from a seiche: — Amplitude and duration of long period seismic waves — Shoreline topography and bathymetry — Dimensions of the water body — Size and velocity of the landslide falling into the water body — Historical record of surges. 710. Analyses of these data will provide realistic estimates of the resonance effects between the natural period of the water body and the natural period of the vibratory source. It will also show the mechanism of each historical surge. Tidal and wave con ditions which may modify the effect of the seiche should also be considered. 711. It should be noted that the potential for seiches at a site can be significant even if the region is not characterized by a high level of seismicity. SEISMICALLY INDUCED DAM FAILURES 712. Every proposed site shall be evaluated for the potential consequences of flood ing arising from a seismically induced failure of any dam upstream or nearby down 30 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ stream of the site area. If the evaluation shows that the consequences of failure of the dam are acceptable, then no further action is required. Alternatively, if the conse quences are unacceptable and viable engineering solutions are not available, the site should be rejected. 713. The potential for seismic dam failure shall be assessed by using the techniques established in Sections 5-7 to define design bases for the dam. 8. POTENTIAL FOR PERMANENT GROUND DISPLACEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH EARTHQUAKES AND GEOLOGICAL PHENOMENA OBJECTIVES 801. This section gives guidelines and procedures for assessing the potential for permanent ground displacements from liquefaction, slope instability, subsidence and collapse. Safety Guide 50-SG-S8 provides comprehensive guidance on all aspects of the problem, including bearing capacity and settlement. 802. At any site, the potential for each such phenomenon shall be assessed and, where appropriate, be incorporated in the overall design basis for the site so as to ensure safety. LIQUEFACTION 803. Evaluation of the liquefaction potential of any soil deposit at the site is an important part of the overall assessment of the hazards posed by earthquakes [52-54], Sites shown to have a high liquefaction potential and limited alternatives for engineering solutions may be unacceptable. 804. The physical parameters controlling liquefaction phenomena are: the lithology of the soil at the site, the groundwater conditions, the behaviour of the soil under dynamic earthquake loading and the potential severity of the vibratory ground motion. Therefore, the following data, which can be deterministic or probabilistic, should be acquired for the analyses: — Grain size distribution, density, relative density, static and dynamic undrained shear strength, stress history, thickness and age of the sediments — Groundwater conditions — Penetration resistance of the soil — Shear wave velocity of the soil 31 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ — Evidence of past liquefaction at the site or in the site vicinity — Level of earthquake ground acceleration at the surface and duration of ground motion. 805. A detailed discussion of the techniques for liquefaction analysis and possible engineering solutions are given in Safety Guide 50-SG-S8. Before the acceptability of a site is judged on the basis of the liquefaction potential of the soil, the conse quence of such liquefaction should be determined. 806. Techniques for analysing liquefaction are continuously being improved. There fore, any evaluation of liquefaction potential must consider the latest advances, espe cially those relating to the bearing capacity and settlement performance of the foundation. SLOPE INSTABILITY 807. Slope instability under earthquake loading should always be evaluated [55], Lack of stability of any earth, rock, snow or ice slope, whether natural or man-made (e.g. cuts, fills, embankments, pits and dams) can adversely affect safety at the site. 808. In addition to the stability of slopes, the magnitude of seismically induced per manent displacement of dams and embankments associated with nuclear power plants should also be evaluated. Sites having severe slope stability problems and limited alternatives for engineering solutions may be unacceptable. 809. Details for evaluating slope stability can be found in Safety Guides 50-SG-S2 and 50-SG-S8. 810. In conjunction with the basic data acquired in the investigations described in Section 3, the following data are needed for deterministic and/or probabilistic slope instability analyses: (1) The geometry, extent and distribution of soil layers (or rock formations) within, adjacent to, and beneath the slope; (2) For rock slopes, the details of form andfeatures, such as zones of frac turing, the orientation of the strata and their localized weathering, which might affect their stability; (3) The static and dynamic characteristics of thesoils (or rocks); (4) The groundwater conditions; (5) Any evidence of past slope failure. 811. Techniques for evaluating slope stability are continuously being improved and any evaluation of potential slope failure must consider the latest advances. 32 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ SUBSIDENCE 812. Conditions such as the existence of a thick aquifer beneath the site vicinity, the extraction of fluids or the existence of mining activities (past, present or foreseen) in the vicinity may indicate a potential for subsidence. If the consequences of poten tial subsidence cannot be mitigated by engineering solutions, the site may be unacceptable. 813. In addition to the basic data acquired in the investigations (see Section 3), the following specific factors should be evaluated: (1) The total reduction of the groundwater level that could occur during the operating life of the nuclear power plant; (2) The differential change in groundwater level that could develop across the site; (3) The pertinent physical parameters of the aquifer, such as consolidation coefficient and degree of lateral homogeneity; (4) Such data as will allow a full analysis of potential consequences based on empirical evidence, whenever possible. COLLAPSE 814. Subsurface features due to geological/geochemical processes and/or human activities may create a condition for collapse, which can adversely affect the safety of the site. If adequate engineering solutions are not available, the site may be unacceptable. 815. In the acquisition of the basic data in the various investigations in the region (see Section 2), attention should be paid to: (1) Geological/geochemical processes — existence of caverns or karstic networks in calcareous deposits — potential for solution phenomena in salt formations — joint and fracture patterns — spatial extent and slope of strata, especially aquifers; (2) Human activities (past and present) — existence of tunnels — existence of mine galleries or cavities in or out of operation — mineral extraction (for instance by dissolution techniques) — withdrawal of subsurface fluids. 33 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Appendix SEISMIC INTENSITY SCALES SEISMIC INTENSITY SCALE OF JAPAN METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY (JMA) The intensity of the shock is estimated on a scale of 0-VII, as follows: 0 Not felt. Shocks not felt by human beings and registered only by a seis mograph, but special symbol (X) is used when shocks are felt by some neighbours, but not by observer. 1 Slight. Extremely feeble shocks felt only by persons at rest or by those who are sensitive to an earthquake. II Weak. Shocks felt by most persons, slight shaking of doors and Japanese latticed sliding doors (shoji). III Rather strong. Slight shaking of houses and buildings; rattling of doors, electric lamps; moving of liquids in vessels. IV Strong. Strong shaking of houses and buildings, overturning of unstable objects, spilling of liquids out of vessels. V Very strong. Cracks in the walls, overturning of gravestones, stone lanterns, etc., damage to chimneys and mud-and-plaster warehouses. VI Disastrous. Demolition of houses by less than 30%, intense landslides, etc. VII Very disastrous. Demolition of houses by more than 30%, intense land slides, large fissures in the ground, faults. SEISMIC INTENSITY SCALE, MEDVEDEV, SPONHEUER AND KARNIK (MSK) VERSION, 1964 Classification o f the scale Types o f structures (buildings not antiseismic) Structure A: Buildings in field-stone, rural structures, adobe houses, clay houses. B: Ordinary brick buildings, buildings of the large block and prefabri cated type, half-timbered structures, buildings in natural hewn stone. C: Reinforced buildings, well built wooden structures. 34 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Definition of quantity Single, a few: Many: Most: about 5 % about 50% about 75% Classification o f damage to buildings: Grade 1: Slight damage Grade 2: Moderate damage Grade 3: Heavy damage Grade 4: Destruction Grade 5: Total damage Fine cracks in plaster; fall of small pieces of plaster. Small cracks in walls; fall of fairly large pieces of plaster; pantiles slip off; cracks in chimneys; parts of chimneys fall down. Large and deep cracks in walls; fall of chimneys. Gaps in walls; parts of buildings may col lapse; separate parts of the building lose their cohesion; inner walls and filled-in walls of the frame collapse. Total collapse of buildings Arrangement o f the scale (a) Persons and surroundings (b) Structures of all kinds (c) Nature Intensity grades I. Not noticeable The intensity of the vibration is below the sensitivity limit; the tremor is detected and recorded by seismographs only. II. Scarcely noticeable (very slight) Vibration is felt only by individual people at rest in house, especially on the upper floors of buildings. III. Weak, partially observed only The earthquake is felt indoors by a few people, outdoors only in favourable circumstances. The vibration is like that due to the passing of a light truck. Attentive 35 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ observers notice a slight swinging of hanging objects, somewhat more heavily on upper floors. IV. Largely observed The earthquake is felt indoors by many people, outdoors by a few. Here and there people awake, but no one is frightened. The vibration is like that due to the passing of a heavily loaded truck. Windows, doors and dishes rattle. Floors and walls creak. Furniture begins to shake. Hanging objects swing slightly. Liquids in open vessels are slightly disturbed. In stationary cars the shock is noticeable. V. Awakening (a) The earthquake is felt indoors by all, outdoors by many. Many sleeping people awake. A few run outside. Animals become uneasy. Buildings tremble throughout. Hanging objects swing considerably. Pictures knock against walls or swing out of place. Occasionally pendulum clocks stop. Unstable objects may be overturned or shifted. Open doors and windows are thrust open and slam back again. Liquids spill in small amounts from well filled open containers. The sensation of vibration is like that due to a heavy object falling inside the buildings. (b) Slight damage of grade 1 in buildings of type A is possible. (c) Sometimes change in flow of springs. VI. Frightening (a) Felt by most, indoors and outdoors. Many people in buildings are frightened and run outdoors. A few persons lose their balance. Domestic animals run out of their stalls. In a few instances dishes and glassware may break, books fall down. Heavy furniture may possibly move and small steeple bells may ring. (b) Damage of grade 1 is sustained in single buildings of type B and in many of type A. Damage in a few buildings of type A is of grade 2. (c) In a few cases cracks up to widths of 1 cm possible in wet ground; in mountains occasional landslides; changes in flow of springs and in level of well water are observed. VII. Damage to buildings (a) Most people are frightened and run outdoors. Many find it difficult to stand. The vibration is noticed by persons driving cars. Large bells ring. (b)In many buildings of type C damage of grade 1 is caused; in many buildings of type B damage is of grade 2. Many buildings of type A suffer damage of grade 3, a few of grade 4. In single instances landslips of roadway on steep slopes; cracks in roads; seams of pipelines damaged; cracks in stone walls. 36 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ (c) Waves are formed on water, and water is made turbid by mud stirred up. Water levels in wells change, and the flow of springs changes. In a few cases dry springs have their flow restored and existing springs stop flowing. In isolated instances parts of sandy or gravelly banks slip off. VIII. Destruction o f buildings (a) Fright and panic; also persons driving cars are disturbed. Here and there branches of trees break off. Even heavy furniture moves and partly overturns. Hang ing lamps are in part damaged. (b) Many buildings of type C suffer damage of grade 2, a few of grade 3. Many buildings of type B suffer damage of grade 3 and a few of grade 4, and many build ings of type A suffer damage of grade 4 and a few of grade 5. Occasional breakage of pipe seams. Memorials and monuments move and twist. Tombstones overturn. Stone walls collapse. IX. General damage to buildings (a) General panic; considerable damage to furniture. Animals run to and fro in confusion and cry. (b) Many buildings of type C suffer damage of grade 3, a few of grade 4. Many buildings of type B show damage of grade 4, a few of grade 5. Many buildings of type A suffer damage of grade 5. Monuments and columns fall. Considerable damage to reservoirs; underground pipes partly broken. In individual cases railway lines are bent and roadways damaged. (c) On flat land, overflow of water, sand and mud is often observed. Ground cracks to widths of up to 10 cm, on slopes and river banks more than 10 cm; further more a large number of slight cracks in ground; falls of rock, many landslides and earth flows; large waves on water. Dry wells renew their flow and existing wells dry up. X. General destruction o f buildings (b) Many buildings of type C suffer damage of grade 4, a few of grade 5. Many buildings of type B show damage of grade 5; most of type A have destruction category 5; critical damage to dams and dykes and severe damage to bridges. Rail way lines are bent slightly. Underground pipes are broken or bent. Road paving and asphalt show waves. (c) In the ground, cracks up to widths of more than 10 cm, sometimes up to 1 m. Broad fissures occur parallel to water courses. Loose ground slides from steep slopes. From river banks and steep coasts considerable landslides are possible. In coastal areas displacement of sand and mud; change of water level in wells; water from canals, lakes, rivers, etc., thrown on land. New lakes occur. 37 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ XI. Catastrophe (b) Severe damage even to well built buildings, bridges, water dams and railway lines; highways become useless; underground pipes destroyed. (c) Ground considerably distorted by broad cracks and fissures, as well as by movement in horizontal and vertical directions; numerous land slips and falls of rock. The intensity of the earthquake requires investigation in a special way. XII. Landscape changes (b) Practically all structures above and below ground are greatly damaged or destroyed. (c) The surface of the ground is radically changed. Considerable ground cracks with extensive vertical and horizontal movements are observed. Fall of rock and slumping of river banks over wide areas; lakes are damned; waterfalls appear and rivers are deflected. The intensity of the earthquake requires investigation in a special way. MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY SCALE, 1956 VERSION Classification o f masonry To avoid ambiguity, the quality of masonry, brick or otherwise, is specified by the following lettering (which has no connection with the conventional Class A, B, C construction). Good workmanship, mortar and design; reinforced, especially later ally, and bound together by using steel, concrete, etc.; designed to resist lateral forces. Masonry A. Good workmanship and mortar, reinforced, but not designed in detail to resist lateral forces. Masonry B. Ordinary workmanship and mortar; no extreme weaknesses like failing to tie in at corners, but neither reinforced nor designed against horizontal forces. Masonry C. Weak materials, such as adobe; poor mortar; low standards of work manship; weak horizontally. Masonry D. 38 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Intensity grades I. Not felt. Marginal and long period of large earthquakes. II. Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors or favourably placed. III. Felt indoors. Hanging objects swing. Vibration like passing of light trucks. Duration estimated. May not be recognized as an earthquake. IV. Hanging objects swing. Vibration like passing of heavy trucks; or sensation of a jolt like a heavy ball striking the walls. Standing motorcars rock. Windows, dishes, doors rattle. Glasses clink. Crockery clashes. In the upper range of grade IV, wooden walls and frames crack. V. Felt outdoors; direction estimated. Sleepers wakened. Liquids disturbed, some spilled. Small unstable objects displaced or upset. Doors swing, close, open. Shutters, pictures move. Pendulum clocks stop, start, change rate. VI. Felt by all. Many frightened and run outdoors. Persons walk unsteadily. Win dows, dishes, glassware broken. Knick-knacks, books and so on, off shelves. Pictures off walls. Furniture moved or overturned. Weak plaster and masonry D cracked. Small bells ring (church, school). Trees, bushes shaken visibly, or heard to rustle. VII. Difficult to stand. Noticed by drivers of cars. Hanging objects quiver. Furni ture broken. Damage to masonry D including cracks. Weak chimneys broken at roof line. Fall of plaster, loose bricks, stones, tiles, cornices, unbraced parapets and architectural ornaments. Some cracks in masonry C. Waves on ponds; water turbid with mud. Small slides and caving in along sand or gravel banks. Large bells ring. Concrete irrigation ditches damaged. VIII. Steering of cars affected. Damage to masonry C; partial collapse. Some damage to masonry B; none to masonry A. Fall of stucco and some masonry walls. Twisting, fall of chimneys, factory stacks, monuments, towers, elevated tanks. Frame houses moved on foundations if not bolted down; loose panel walls thrown out. Decayed piling broken off. Branches broken from trees. Changes in flow or temperature of springs and wells. Cracks in wet ground and on steep slopes. IX. General panic. Masonry D destroyed; masonry C heavily damaged, sometimes with complete collapse; masonry B seriously damaged. General damage to foundations. Frame structures, if not bolted, shifted off foundations. Frames racked. Conspicuous cracks in ground. In alluviated areas sand and mud ejected, earthquake fountains, sand craters. X. Most masonry and frame structures destroyed with their foundations. Some well built wooden structures and bridges destroyed. Serious damage to dams, 39 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ dikes, embankments. Large landslides. Water thrown on banks of canals, rivers, lakes, etc., and mud shifted horizontally on beaches and flat land. Rails bent slightly. XI. Rails bent greatly. Underground pipelines completely out of service. XII. Damage nearly total. Large rock masses displaced. Lines of sight and level dis torted. Objects thrown into the air. 40 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ REFERENCES [1] H AYS, W .W ., Procedures for Estimating Earthquake Ground Motions, Professional Paper 1114, United States Geological Survey, Washington, DC (1980). [2] MARGOTTINI, C ., SERVA, L. (Eds), “ Historical seismicity of central-eastern Mediterranean region” , paper presented at EN EA-IAEA Workshop, Rome, 1987. [3] CAMPBELL, K .W ., Strong ground motion attenuation relations: a ten-year perspec tive, Earthquake Spectra 1 (1984) 759. [4] BENREUTER, D .L ., CHEN, J .C ., S A V Y , J.B., Development of Site Specific Response Spectra, Rep. NUREG/CR-4861, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis sion, Washington, DC (1987). [5] N EW M AR K , N .M ., BLUM E, J .A ., KAPUR, K .K ., Seismic design spectra for nuclear power plants, Am. Soc. Civ. Eng., Power Div. J. 89 (1973) 287. 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INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON SEISMIC SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION, Tsunamis, hazard definition and effects on facilities, Open File Rep. 85-5 33 , United States Geological Survey, Washington, DC (1985). [51] RIKITAKE, T ., A ID A , I., Tsunamic hazard probability in Japan, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. [52] 78 3 (1988) 1268-1278. ATKINSON, G .M ., FINN, W .D .L ., CH ARLW O O D, R .C ., Simple computation of liquefaction probability for seismic hazard application, Earthquake Spectra 1 (1984) 107-119. 43 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ [53] SEED, H .B ., IDRISS, I.M ., Ground Motion and Soil Liquefaction during Earth quakes, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, El Cerrito, C A (1982). [54] TINSLEY, J .C ., Y O U D , T .L ., PERKINS, D .M ., CHEN, A .T .F ., “ Evaluating liquefaction potential” , Evaluating Earthquake Hazards in the Los Angeles Region — An Earth Sciences Perspective, Professional Paper 1360, United States Geological Survey, Washington, DC (1985). [55] W ILSON, R .C ., KEEFER, D .K ., “ Predicting areal limits of earthquake-induced landsliding” , Evaluating Earthquake Hazards in the Los Angeles region — An Earth Science Perspective, Professional Paper 1360, United States Geological Survey, Washington, DC (1985). 44 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW During the development phase the following experts participated in one or more of the meetings (1975-1978) Akino, K. Japan Barbreau, A. France Beare, J.W. Canada Becker, K. International Organization for Standardization Bennett, T.J. United States o f America Burkhardt, W . Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Candes, P. France Carmona, J. Agentina Clement, B. France Dlouhy, Z . Czechoslovakia Franzen, L.F. Germany Gammill, W .P . United States of America Ganguly, A .K . India Gausden, R. United Kingdom Giuliani, P. Italy Gronow, W .S . United Kingdom Hedgran, A. Sweden Heimgartner, E. Switzerland Hendrie, J. United States o f America Hurst, D. Canada 45 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Iansiti, E. International Atomic Energy Agency Ilari, O. Nuclear Energy Agency o f the OECD Jeschki, W . Switzerland Karbassioun, A. International Atomic Energy Agency Klik, F. Czechoslovakia Konstantinov, L. International Atomic Energy Agency Kovalevich, O .M . Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics Kriz, Z. Czechoslovakia Mattson, R.J. United States o f America Messiah, A. France Minogue, B. United States of America Mochizuki, K. Japan Nilson, R. International Organization for Standardization Omote, S. Japan Pele, J. Commission of the European Communities Roberts, I. Craig United States o f America Sanchez Gutierrez, J Mexico Schwarz, G. Canada Sevcik, A. Czechoslovakia Soman, S.D. India Stadie, K. Nuclear Energy Agency o f the OECD Stepp, J.C. United States o f America Tildsey, F.C.J. United Kingdom 46 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Uchida, H. Japan Van Reijen, G. Commission of the European Communities V61ez, C. Mexico Watabe, M. Japan Witulski, H. Germany Zuber, J.F. Switzerland During the revision phase the following experts participated in one or more of the meetings (1987-1989): WORKING GROUP AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE Baumgartner, G. Switzerland Bugaev, V. Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics Esteva Maraboto, L. Mexico Fujimoto, O. Japan Giuliani, P. International Atomic Energy Agency Giirpinar, A. International Atomic Energy Agency Hays, W . United States of America Karpunin, I. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Koenig, I. Germany Krishna Singh, S. Mexico Mallard, D. United Kingdom Mohammadioun, B. France Patchett, M . United Kingdom Reiter, L. United States o f America 47 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Serva, L. Italy Steinberg, V. Union of Soviet Socialists Republics Watabe, M . Japan NUCLEAR SAFETY STANDARDS ADVISORY GROUP (NUSSAG) Becker, K. International Organization for Standardization Brooks, G. Canada Denton, H. United States of America Dong, Bainian China Gast, K. Germany Giirpinar, A. International Atomic Energy Agency Hauber, R. United States o f America Havel, S. Czechoslovakia Hirayama, H. Japan Hohlefelder, W . Germany Isaev, A. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Ishikawa, M. Japan Kovalevich, O .M . Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics Laverie, M. France Lopez-Menchero, M. Commission of the European Communities Reed, J. United Kigdom Reisch, F. Sweden Rho, Chae-Shik Korea, Republic of 48 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Ryder, E. United Kingdom Sajaroff, P. Argentina Sarma, M .R .S India Versteeg, J. Netherlands 49 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLES It should be noted that some books in the series may be revised in the near future. Those that have already been revised are indicated by the addition o f ‘ (Rev. 1)’ to the number. 1. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 50-C -G (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Governmental 1988 organization Safety Guides 50-SG-G1 Qualifications and training o f staff of the regulatory body 1979 for nuclear power plants Information to be submitted in support of licensing 50-SG-G2 1979 applications for nuclear power plants 50-SG-G3 Conduct of regulatory review and assessment during the 1980 licensing process for nuclear power plants 50-SG-G4 Inspection and enforcement by the regulatory body for 1980 nuclear power plants Preparedness o f public authorities for emergencies at 50-SG-G6 1982 nuclear power plants 50-SG-G8 Licences for nuclear power plants: content, format and 1982 legal considerations 50-SG-G9 Regulations and guides for nuclear power plants 1984 Code on safety of nuclear power plants: Siting 1988 2. SITING 50-C-S (Rev. 1) Safety Guides 50-SG-S 1 (Rev. 1) Earthquakes and associated topics in relation to nuclear 1991 power plant siting 50-SG-S2 Seismic analysis and testing of nuclear power plants 1979 50-SG-S3 Atmospheric dispersion in nuclear power plant siting 1980 50-SG-S4 Site selection and evaluation for nuclear power plants 1980 with respect to population distribution 51 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 50-SG-S5 External man-induced events in relation to nuclear power 1981 plant siting 50-SG-S6 Hydrological dispersion of radioactive material in relation 1985 to nuclear power plant siting 50-SG-S7 Nuclear power plant siting: hydrogeological aspects 1984 50-SG-S8 Safety aspects o f the foundations of nuclear power plants 1986 50-SG-S9 Site survey for nuclear power plants 1984 50-SG-S 10A Design basis flood for nuclear power plants on river sites 1983 50-SG-S 10B Design basis flood for nuclear power plants on coastal 1983 sites 50-SG-S11A Extreme meteorological events in nuclear power plant 1981 siting, excluding tropical cyclones 50-SG-S11B Design basis tropical cyclone for nuclear power plants 1984 Code on the safety o f nuclear power plants: Design 1988 3. DESIGN 50-C -D (Rev. 1) Safety Guides 50-SG-D 1 Safety functions and component classification for 1979 B W R, PWR and PTR 50-SG-D2 Fire protection in nuclear power plants 1979 50-SG-D3 Protection system and related features in nuclear 1980 power plants 50-SG-D4 Protection against internally generated missiles and 1980 their secondary effects in nuclear power plants 50-SG-D5 External man-induced events in relation to nuclear 1982 power plant design 50-SG-D6 Ultimate heat sink and directly associated heat transport 1981 systems for nuclear power plants 50-SG-D7 Emergency power systems at nuclear power plants 1982 50-SG-D8 Safety-related instrumentation and control systems for 1984 nuclear power plants 50-SG-D9 Design aspects o f radiation protection for nuclear power plants 52 1985 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 50-SG-D10 Fuel handling and storage systems in nuclear power plants 1984 50-SG-D 11 General design safety principles for nuclear power plants 1986 50-SG-D 12 Design of the reactor containment systems in nuclear 1985 power plants 50-SG-D13 Reactor cooling systems in nuclear power plants 1986 50-SG-D 14 Design for reactor core safety in nuclear power plants 1986 50-P -l Application o f the single failure criterion 1990 Code on the safety o f nuclear power plants: Operation 1988 4. OPERATION 5 0 -C -0 (Rev. 1) Safety Guides 50-S G -01 Staffing o f nuclear power plants and the recruitment, 1979 training and authorization o f operating personnel 50 -S G -02 In-service inspection for nuclear power plants 1980 50-S G -03 Operational limits and conditions for nuclear power plants 1979 50 -S G -04 Commissioning procedures for nuclear power plants 1980 50 -S G -05 Radiation protection during operation of nuclear 1983 power plants 5 0 -S G -06 Preparedness o f the operating organization (licensee) 1982 for emergencies at nuclear power plants 50 -S G -07 (Rev. 1) Maintenance of nuclear power plants 1990 50 -S G -08 (Rev. 1) Surveillance o f items important to safety in nuclear 1990 power plants 5 0 -S G -09 Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation 1984 50-S G -010 Core management and fuel handling for nuclear 1985 power plants 50-SG -011 Operational management o f radioactive effluents and 1986 wastes arising in nuclear power plants 5. QUALITY ASSURANCE 50-C -Q A (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: 1988 Quality assurance 53 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ Safety Guides 50-SG-QA1 Establishing of the quality assurance programme for a 1984 nuclear power plant project 50-SG-QA2 Quality assurance records system for nuclear 1979 power plants 50-SG-QA3 Quality assurance in the procurement of items and 1979 services for nuclear power plants 50-SG-Q A4 Quality assurance during site construction o f nuclear 1981 power plants 50-SG-QA5 (Rev. 1) Quality assurance during commissioning and operation 1986 of nuclear power plants 50-SG -Q A6 Quality assurance in the design of nuclear power plants 1981 50-SG-Q A7 Quality assurance organization for nuclear power plants 1983 50-SG-Q A8 Quality assurance in the manufacture o f items for 1981 nuclear power plants 50-SG-Q A10 Quality assurance auditing for nuclear power plants 1980 50-SG-Q A 11 Quality assurance in the procurement, design and 1983 manufacture of nuclear fuel assemblies 54 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SAFETY SERIES 9 Basic safety standards for radiation protection: 1982 1982 edition 49 Radiological surveillance of airborne contaminants 1979 in the working environment 52 Factors relevant to the decommissioning of land-based 1980 nuclear reactor plants 55 Planning for off-site response to radiation 1981 accidents in nuclear facilities 57 Generic models and parameters for assessing 1982 the environmental transfer of radionuclides from routine releases: Exposures of critical groups 67 Assigning a value to transboundary radiation exposure 1985 69 Management of radioactive wastes from nuclear 1985 power plants 72 Principles for establishing intervention levels for the 1985 protection o f the public in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency 73 Emergency preparedness exercises for nuclear 1985 facilities: Preparation, conduct and evaluation 75-IN SA G -l Summary report on the post-accident review meeting 1986 on the Chernobyl accident 75-INSAG-2 Radionuclide source terms from severe accidents to 1987 nuclear power plants with light water reactors 75-INSAG-3 Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants 1988 77 Principles for limiting releases of radioactive 1986 effluents into the environment 79 Design of radioactive waste management systems 1986 at nuclear power plants 81 Derived intervention levels for application in 1986 controlling radiation doses to the public in the event o f a nuclear accident or radiological emergency: Principles, procedures and data 55 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 84 Basic principles for occupational radiation monitoring 1987 86 Techniques and decision making in the assessment 1987 o f off-site consequences o f an accident in a nuclear facility 93 Systems for reporting unusual events in 1990 nuclear power plants 94 Response to a radioactive materials release 1989 having a transboundary impact 97 Principles and techniques for post-accident 1989 assessment and recovery in a contaminated environment o f a nuclear facility 98 On-site habitability in the event of an 1989 accident at a nuclear facility: Guidance for assessment and improvement 101 Operational radiation protection: A guide to optimization 1990 103 Provision of operational radiation protection 1990 services at nuclear power plants 104 Extension o f the principles o f radiation protection 1990 to sources of potential exposure TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES 155 Thermal discharges at nuclear power stations 1974 163 Neutron irradiation embrittlement o f reactor pressure 1975 vessel steels (being revised) 189 Storage, handling and movement o f fuel and 1979 related components at nuclear power plants 198 Guide to the safe handling of radioactive wastes at 1980 nuclear power plants 200 Manpower development for nuclear power: 1980 A guidebook 202 Environmental effects o f cooling systems 1980 217 Guidebook on the introduction o f nuclear power 1982 224 Interaction of grid characteristics with design and 1983 performance o f nuclear power plants: A guidebook 230 Decommissioning o f nuclear facilities: Decontamination, disassembly and waste management 56 1983 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 237 239 Manual on quality assurance programme auditing Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control: 1984 1984 A guidebook 242 Qualification of nuclear power plant operations 1984 personnel: A guidebook 249 Decontamination of nuclear facilities to permit 1985 operation, inspection, maintenance, modification or plant decommissioning 262 Manual on training, qualification and certification 1986 o f quality assurance personnel 267 Methodology and technology o f decommissioning 1986 nuclear facilities 268 Manual on maintenance of systems and components 1986 important to safety 271 Introducing nuclear power plants into electrical power 1987 systems o f limited capacity: Problems and remedial measures 274 Design of off-gas and air cleaning systems at nuclear 1987 power plants 282 Manual on quality assurance for computer software 1988 related to the safety of nuclear power plants 292 Design and operation o f off-gas cleaning and 1989 ventilation systems in facilities handling low and intermediate level radioactive material 294 Options for the treatment and solidification 1989 o f organic radioactive wastes 296 Regulatory inspection of the implementation 1989 o f quality assurance programmes: A manual 299 Review o f fuel element developments for water cooled 1989 nuclear power reactors 300 Cleanup o f large areas contaminated as a result 1989 o f a nuclear accident 301 Manual on quality assurance for installation and 1989 commissioning o f instrumentation, control and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants 306 Guidebook on the education and training o f technicians 1989 for nuclear power 57 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 307 Management of. abnormal radioactive wastes 1989 at nuclear power plants IAEA-TECDOC 225 SERIES Planning for off-site response to radiation accidents 1980 in nuclear facilities 238 Management of spent ion-exchange resins from 1981 nuclear power plants 248 276 Decontamination o f operational nuclear power plants Management of radioactive waste from nuclear 1981 1983 power plants 294 International experience in the implementation of 1983 lessons learned from the Three Mile Island accident 303 Manual on the selection o f appropriate quality assurance 1984 programmes for items and services o f a nuclear power plant 308 Survey of probabilistic methods in safety and risk 1984 assessment for nuclear power plant licensing 332 341 Safety aspects of station blackout at nuclear power plants Developments in the preparation o f operating 1985 1985 procedures for emergency conditions at nuclear power plants 348 Earthquake resistant design of nuclear facilities with 1985 limited radioactive inventory 355 Comparison of high efficiency particulate filter testing 1985 methods 377 379 Safety aspects o f unplanned shutdowns and trips Atmospheric dispersion models for application in 1986 1986 relation to radionuclide releases 387 390 Combining risk analysis and operating experience Safety assessment of emergency electric power systems 1986 for nuclear power plants 416 Manual on quality assurance for the survey, evaluation and 1987 confirmation o f nuclear power plant sites 424 Identification o f failure sequences sensitive to human error 58 1987 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 425 Simulation of a loss of coolant accident 1987 443 Experience with simulator training for emergency 1987 conditions 444 Improving nuclear power plant safety through 1987 operator aids 450 451 Dose assessments in NPP siting Some practical implications o f source term 1988 1988 reassessment 458 497 498 OSART results OSART results II Good practices for improved nuclear power plant performance 499 508 Models and data requirements for human reliability analysis Survey o f ranges o f component reliability data 1988 1989 1989 1989 1989 for use in probabilistic safety assessment 510 Status o f advanced technology and design for 1989 water cooled reactors: Heavy water reactors 522 A probabilistic safety assessment peer review: 1989 Case study on the use o f probabilistic safety assessment for safety decisions 523 Probabilistic safety criteria at the 1989 safety function/system level 525 Guidebook on training to establish and maintain 1989 the qualification and competence o f nuclear power plant operations personnel 529 User requirements for decision support systems 1989 used for nuclear power plant accident prevention and mitigation 540 542 543 Safety aspects o f nuclear power plant ageing Use o f expert systems in nuclear safety Procedures for conducting independent peer reviews of 1990 1990 1990 probabilistic safety assessment 547 The use o f probabilistic safety assessment in the 1990 relicensing o f nuclear power plants for extended lifetimes 550 Safety of nuclear installations: Future directions 1990 59 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ 553 Computer codes for level 1 probabilistic safety 1990 assessment 561 Reviewing computer capabilities in nuclear power plants 570 OSART mission highlights, 1990 1988-1989 PROCEEDINGS SERIES STI/PUB/566 Current nuclear power plant safety issues 1981 STI/PUB/593 Quality assurance for nuclear power plants 1982 STI/PUB/628 Nuclear power plant control and instrumentation 1983 STI/PUB/645 Reliability of reactor pressure components 1983 STI/PUB/673 IAEA safety codes and guides (NUSS) in the light o f 1985 current safety issues STI/PUB/700 Source term evaluation for accident conditions 1986 STI/PUB/701 Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear 1986 facilities STI/PUB/716 Optimization o f radiation protection 1986 STI/PUB/759 Safety aspects of the ageing and maintenance of 1988 nuclear power plants STI/PUB/761 Nuclear power performance and safety 1988 STI/PUB/782 Severe accidents in nuclear power plants 1988 STI/PUB/783 Radiation protection in nuclear energy 1988 STI/PUB/785 Feedback of operational safety experience 1989 from nuclear power plants STI/PUB/803 Regulatory practices and safety standards 1989 for nuclear power plants STI/PUB/824 Fire protection and fire fighting in nuclear installations 1989 STI/PUB/825 Environmental contamination following a 1990 major nuclear accident STI/PUB/826 Recovery operations in the event o f a nuclear accident or 1990 radiological emergency o S> 60 This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ HOW TO ORDER IAEA PUBLICATIONS An exclusive sales agent for IAEA publications, to whom all orders 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Hovbokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, P.O. Box 16356, S-103 27 Stockholm HMSO, Publications Centre, Agency Section, 51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5 D R Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga,Smolenskaya-Sennaya 32-34, Moscow G-200 Jugoslovenska Knjiga,Terazije 27, P.O. Box 36, YU-11001 Belgrade Orders from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed and requests for information should be addressed directly to: $ division of Publications todSpM International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ IN T ER N A T IO N A L A T O M IC E N E R G Y A G E N C Y VIEN N A , 1991
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