Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner
Author(s): Janice Gross Stein
Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 155-183
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706929 .
Accessed: 16/03/2013 18:26
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International
Organization.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Politicallearningbydoing:
thinker
Gorbachevas uncommitted
and motivatedlearner
JaniceGrossStein
thefirst
is notnecessarily
experience
has turned,
At a momentwhenhistory
policies
betweenbeinglockedintoforeign
Thereare differences
qualification.
policiesdeforeign
thethinking
ofthelastdecade andpromoting
thatreflect
signedforthenextdecade.
-Anthony Lake
The dramaticchangesin SovietforeignpolicyinitiatedbyMikhailGorbachev
markedthebeginningof the end of the cold war. Some analystslook largelyto
of power to explain the changes in
changes in the internationaldistribution
Sovietforeignpolicywhileothersgiveprimacyto domesticpolitics.I arguethat
explanaand thata satisfactory
boththese explanationsare underdetermined
tionof the change in Soviet foreignpolicymustinclude individualas well as
and domesticvariables.'Althoughtherewas widespreadrecogniinternational
and
Organization
This and the otherarticlesin thisSymposiumwere preparedforInternational
RelationsTheoryand the
forRichardNed Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds., International
I would like to acknowledgethe helpfulcommentsof Richard
End of theCold War,forthcoming.
and David
Ned Lebow,JackLevy,Thomas Risse-Kappen,JackSnyder,Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger,
Welch. I am gratefulto the United States Instituteof Peace, the ConnaughtCommitteeof the
of Toronto,and the Social Science and HumanitiesResearch Council of Canada for
University
theirgeneroussupportof thisresearch.The epigraphis taken fromAdam Clymer,"Bush and
ClintonOpen Fire on theForeignPolicyFront,"TheNew YorkTimes,2 August1992,p. E3.
1. Explanationsof foreignpolicychange are less extensivethan explanationsof stabilityand
obstaclesto change.Most analysesofchangeare focusedat thesystemlevel.See, forexample,R. J.
BarryJones,"Concepts and Models of Change in InternationalRelations,"in BarryBuzan and
Relations:The Evaded Dimension(New
BarryJones,eds., Changeand theStudyof International
York: St. Martin's,1981),pp. 11-29; RobertGilpin,Warand Changein WorldPolitics(New York:
Press, 1981); JohnLewis Gaddis, "Tectonics,History,and the End of the
CambridgeUniversity
Cold War," in JohnLewis Gaddis,ed., The UnitedStatesand theEnd oftheCold War:Implications,
Press, 1992), pp. 155-67; and John
Provocations(New York: OxfordUniversity
Reconsiderations,
in the InternationalPolity:Toward a Neorealist
Gerard Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation
Synthesis,"in Robert0. Keohane, ed.,Neorealismand Its Critics(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
on directedforeignpolicychange and
Press, 1986), pp. 131-57. Hermannfocusesmostexplicitly
argues for a multilevel,multivariateexplanation.See Charles F. Hermann,"ChangingCourse:
34 (March
StudiesQuarterly
Choose to RedirectForeignPolicy,"International
WhenGovernments
1990),pp. 3-21.
48, 2, Spring1994,pp. 155-83
Organization
International
?31994byThe 10 Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
156 InternationalOrganization
tionoftheneed forchangeamongSovietleadersbythemid-1980s,thedirection
and scope ofthechangethattookplace cannotbe explainedwithoutreference
to theimpactofGorbachevand hisrepresentation
oftheSovietsecurity
problem.
There is no obviousexplanationof how and whyGorbachevdeveloped his
representation
of theissuesthatwere centralto thecold war. Severaldifferent
hypothesesare plausible.Gorbachev'scognitiveconstructs,
different
fromthose
ofhispredecessors,mayhavebeen an embeddedpartofhiscognitivestructure
fora considerableperiodof time.His cognitiveconstructsdid not change,but
the man came to power. Under these conditions,a political explanationof
generationalchangeand new eliteswouldcapturemostofwhatis important.
Two otherexplanationsare also possible.These explanationsare relatedbut
distinct.First,Gorbachev may have changed his cognitiveconstructsas he
approached the senior leadership position in the Soviet Union. Cognitive
conceptsofschematachangeare thenan obviouscandidateexplanationforthe
change.Theories of cognitivechange,however,are insufficiently
specifiedto
predict the conditions and processes that would provoke the change in
of the securitydilemma.In thissense, theyshare
Gorbachev'srepresentation
ofstructural
thelimitations
explanationsofpoliticalchange.
A secondpossibility
is thatGorbachevdid nothavewell-developedcognitive
constructsabout securityuntilfairlylate in his career. As he approachedthe
leadership,he developed new constructsabout securityand international
relations.Theoriesof learningmayprovidea more satisfactory
explanationof
the developmentof Gorbachev's cognitiveconstructs.Here too the analyst
There is no unifiedtheoryoflearning,and conceptsare
encountersdifficulties.
and measures.
open to multipleinterpretations
Anyattemptto explainthedevelopmentof Gorbachev'scognitiveconstructs
confronts
theoriesand verylimitedempiricalevidence.For the
underspecified
moment,we can at best choose the explanationthatmostplausiblyinterprets
the available data. I argue that throughinductivetrial-and-error
learning
stimulatedby failure,Gorbachev developed a new representationof the
"ill-structured"
Sovietsecurityproblem.Learningbydoingmustbe embedded
within the broader social and political context to provide a convincing
explanationofhow and whyGorbachevwas able to learn.
This explanationof the developmentof Gorbachev'scognitiveconstructsis
onlyone piece, albeit an importantone, of the largerpuzzle of the changesin
Sovietforeignpolicy.I concludewithsome observationsabout how important
politicallearningwas as a componentof a broaderexplanationof the changes
in Sovietforeignpolicythatended the cold war and sketchthe outlinesof the
richresearchagendathatgrowsoutoftheanalysisoflearningand policychange.
Internationaland domesticexplanationsofchange
ShortlyafterGorbachevbecame General Secretaryof theCommunistpartyof
the Soviet Union in March 1985, he began to emphasize the importanceof
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 157
"new thinking"that challenged long-standingSoviet concepts of security.2
Over the nextfewyears,Gorbachev,some of his colleagues,and theiradvisers
the basic axiomsand strategicprinciplesof Soviet securityand
reformulated
defense.3Change was disorderlyand ad hoc but encompassedthe fundamentalsof Sovietconceptsof security.
and
had led himto a far-reaching
By the end of 1988,Gorbachev'sthinking
fundamentalassault on establishedSoviet concepts of security.Gorbachev
relationsthathad dominatedSoviet
repudiatedthe class basis of international
thinkingsince its inception.He spoke of the need for"all humanvalues" that
musttake precedenceover the narrowerinterestsof the class strugglein the
nuclearage.4This rejectionof class-basedcompetitionwithincoexistencewas
heresyto any Marxist-Leninistand a sharp departurefromthinkingabout
securityunder Nikita Khrushchevand Leonid Brezhnev. Closely related,
Gorbachevemphasizedthe interdependenceof capitalismand socialismin a
commonhumancivilization.National and internationalsecurity,he insisted,
linked.Securitywas mutual,and politicalsolutions,rather
were inextricably
ofpolicy.5
shouldbe attheforefront
thanmilitary
technology,
One obvious explanationof these changes in Gorbachev's cognitiveconof capabilistructsis the unfavorablechange in the internationaldistribution
capability,thefocusofrealisttheories,did notdecline.
ties.Yet, Sovietmilitary
On thecontrary,
manyWesternanalystsworriedabout a relativeimprovement
in Soviet nuclear capabilityand the power to project conventionalforces
abroad at thebeginningof the 1980s.6The Sovieteconomy,however,thathad
grownat ratesof 5 percentor moreuntilthe early1970s,grewat a rateof only
2.5 percentby 1984. When the worldeconomybegan to shiftaway fromthe
traditionalheavy industriestoward high value-added and knowledge-based
less able to compete.7
the Sovieteconomyseemed increasingly
manufacturing,
If thechangesin Gorbachev'sconceptsthatspilledoverintoSovietdoctrine
response to relativeeconomic decline,
and behaviorwere a straightforward
was firstused byforeignpolicyspecialistsAnatoliyGromykoand
2. The phrase"new thinking"
Policy,
VladimirLomeiko. See R. Craig Nation,Black Earth,Red Star:A Historyof SovietSecurity
Press,1992),p. 288.
1917-1991(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
3. Bruce Parrott,"Soviet National SecurityUnder Gorbachev,"Problemsof Communism6
(November-December1988),pp. 1-36.
4. See Pravda, 21 October 1986; and Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations General
Assembly,7 December 1988,as quoted inPravda,8 December 1988.
5. VitalyZhurkin,Sergei Karaganov,and Andrei Kortunovarguedthatrelyingexclusivelyon
was to setSovietsecurityagainstthesecurityofothers."Reasonable
instruments
military-technical
Sufficiency-OrHow to Break theVicious Circle,"New Times40 (12 October1987),pp. 13-15.
6. A recentlydeclassifiedCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA) National IntelligenceEstimateof
ofSoviet
theextensivemodernizationand deployment
capabilityin 1983highlighted
Sovietmilitary
strategicforces.It emphasized the growingcapabilityof a forceof land-based intercontinental
ballisticmissiles(SLBMs),
SS-20s, submarine-launched
ballisticmissiles,the intermediate-range
long-rangecruise missiles,and strategicbombers.The CIA estimatedthattherewas significant
potentialforan increasein the size and capabilityof the forces,and thatpoliticaland economic
theexpansionof Sovietforces.
factorswouldnotplaymuchofa role in restraining
Century(New York: HarperCollins,1993), p.
for the Twenty-First
7. Paul Kennedy,Preparing
231.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
158 InternationalOrganization
then"new thinking"is an epiphenomenaland unnecessarycomponentof an
explanationof thechangein Sovietforeignpolicy.The data do notsustainthis
in the way realisttheoriesexpect.The decline in growthrates
interpretation
duringthe 1970sand 1980swas notunique to the SovietUnion. Growthin the
United States,the obviouspointof reference,also slowed.The U.S. economy
grew at an average rate of 4 percentthroughoutthe 1960s,but the rate of
growthdeclinedto about 2.7 percentin the 1970sand 1980s.8The data do not
showthekindofrelativedeclinein Sovieteconomiccapabilitiesthatis thefocus
ofrealistexplanations.
The evidencedoes suggest,however,that Gorbachevwas concernedabout
theabsoluteeconomicdeclineand stagnationof the SovietUnion. Even before
his election as General Secretary,Gorbachev warned, "Only an intensive,
ofthecountry'sposition
economycan ensurethestrengthening
fast-developing
in the internationalarena, enablingit to enterthe new millenniumappropriwhetherhe knew
ately,as a greatand prosperouspower."9When asked directly
before he became General Secretarythat the economic status quo was
untenableand thatradicalchangewouldbe required,Gorbachevreplied:
Like manyothers,I had knownthatour societyneeded radicalchange.
That reallywas not some kindof revelationforme because afterthedeath
of Stalin,therewere manyattemptsto do it. Khrushchevtriedit.Kosygin
triedit,and some otherreformers....
reformers
triedit. Some agricultural
If I had notunderstoodthat,I would nothave acceptedthepositionof
General Secretary.10
Althoughtherewas widespreadconcernwithinthe leadershipabout Soviet
economic performanceand a general recognitionthat change was required,
therewas a wide variationof possible responsesto economicdecline.Robert
Gilpin arguesthatin periodsof unevenshiftsin relativepower,eitherrising
challengersor statusquo greatpowersgo to war to establisha new equilibA second possibleresponseto economicstagnationwas a neo-Stalinist
rium.1"
witheconomicchangedirectedfromabove. A thirdoptionwas
retrenchment,
in theSoviet
an accommodationwiththeWestto freeresourcesforinvestment
economy. Since the variation across these responses is fairlywide, the
structural
explanationofthechangesin Sovietforeignpolicytowardaccommodationis underdetermined.12
The limitsof a structuralexplanationbecome clear when we look at the
responseof Yuri Andropovand KonstantinChernenko,Gorbachev'simmedi8. Ibid.,p. 295.
9. Gorbachevis quoted in Robert G. Kaiser, WhyGorbachevHappened:His Triumphand His
Failure(New York: Simonand Schuster,1991),p. 76.
withMikhailGorbachev,Toronto,1 April1993.
10. Personalinterview
11. Gilpin,Warand Changein WorldPolitics,pp. 15,33, 42-43, 187,and 197-201.
12. For an examinationof the limitsof structuralexplanationsforthe end of the cold war,see
RichardNed Lebow, "The Long Peace, theEnd oftheCold War,and theFailureof Realism,"this
Organization.
issue ofInternational
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 159
the same set of internationalconditions.
ate predecessors,to fundamentally
oftheUnitedStatesin the early
Theirinitialresponseto theincreasedhostility
was to reiteratetradi1980s,undersimilarconditionsof economicstringency,
policy.13
tionalSovietconceptsof securityand to adopt a moreconfrontational
nuclear forces(INF) talks
Andropovwithdrewfromthe intermediate-range
of
aftertheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO) began itsdeployment
PershingII missiles and Chernenkoagreed to returnto the table only in
January1985,twomonthsbeforeGorbachevsucceededto theleadership.Little
capabilitiesin those
of economicand military
had changedin the distribution
verydifferent.
were
and
policy
both
concepts
Gorbachev,
threeyears.Under
the
"new thinking"
as
the
Soviet
leadership
The serious divisionwithin
of structural
the
indeterminacy
evidence
of
further
to
is
develop
began
could have
leadership
within
the
Soviet
debate
This
intense
explanations.
reflecteddecision making in an environmentof imperfector incomplete
Politicianscan disagree over the likelyconsequences of policy
information.
Therewereundoubtedly
to clarifyuncertainty.
optionsand debate alternatives
problemsSovietleaders
in thekindsof ill-structured
highlevelsof uncertainty
of
representations
led to different
These highlevelsofuncertainty
confronted.
The debate was about
the dilemmasof securityin a changingenvironment.
ratherthansimplyabout the uncertainconsequences
problemrepresentation,
ofoptions.
Almost all the fundamentalcomponentsof Gorbachev's so-called "new
thinking"on securitywere politicallycontested.Analystsof Soviet politics,
writingin late 1989, argued that"new thinking"was limitedto a fewcentral
Soviet leaders and advisers.14Preventionof war and protectionagainst
accidentalwar were the least controversial.Long before Gorbachevbecame
General Secretaryin 1985, the Soviet militaryhad institutedproceduresto
Brezhnevhad insistedthatitwouldbe suicidalto
reducetheriskof accident.15
in its doctrineand in itsjournals,
starta nuclearwar,but the Sovietmilitary,
neverthelesscontinuedto emphasizethe importanceof preparingto fightand
had perpetuatedWesternsuspicionof Soviet
win a war. This discontinuity
intentions.
Gorbachev rejected out of hand any militaryplanning based on the
assumptionthateitherthe United States or the Soviet Union would deliberately attack the other.He did not believe that intentionalnuclear war was
to stopbringinghimanyplans that
officials
possible.He toldhis seniormilitary
presumeda war withthe United States. "Don't put any such programs,"he
13. Parrott,"SovietNationalSecurityUnder Gorbachev,"p. 35.
Outlook:IntellectualOriginsand PoliticalConsequences,
14. A. Lynch,Gorbachev'sInternational
InstituteforEast-West SecurityStudiesOccasional Paper no. 9 (Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,
1989),p. 53.
programs,
15. These includedmechanicaland electroniccontrolsystems,personnelreliability
and changesin methodsof deployment.See Stephen M. Meyer,"The Sources and Prospectsof
13 (Fall 1988),pp. 124-63,and note 33,
Security
New PoliticalThinkingon Security,"International
p. 137 in particular.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
160 InternationalOrganization
ordered,"on mydesk."16 Influentialfiguresin the defenseestablishmentlike
Ministerof Defense DmitriYazov and DmitriVolkogonov,directorof the
ofDefense,neverthelesscontinued
MilitaryHistoricalInstitutein theMinistry
to insistthatthe threatof an intentionalattackagainstthe Soviet Union was
real. Theycitedas evidenceongoingWesterndevelopmentand deploymentof
strategicweapons. They and others also challengedthe heavy emphasis on
political solutions to securityproblems, arguing that the United States
Evidence of U.S.
remained committedto achievingmilitarysuperiority.17
intentionswas the failureof the United States to join the unilateralSoviet
on nucleartestingand past duplicityon armscontrol.
moratorium
Criticsalso challenged the fundamentalpolitical logic that underpinned
"new thinking"on security.In August 1988, for example,three years after
Gorbachevhad come to power,Yegor Ligachevreiteratedthe importanceof
class struggleand arguedthattherewas not and could notbe
theinternational
any contradictionbetween peace and socialism."Active involvementin the
solutionof generalhumanproblems,"he insisted,"by no means signifiesany
18
artificial
'braking'ofthesocial and nationalliberationstruggle."
and policyanalystsin the GorbaInsofaras seniorSoviet leaders,officials,
about the appropriatedirectionof Soviet
chev era disagreedfundamentally
foreignand defensepolicy,changes in internationalstructurescould not be
to explain
of the changein conceptsof security.It is unsatisfying
determining
the changes in Soviet thinkingabout securityas a rational adaptation to
unambiguousfeedbackfromtheenvironment.19
Cognitivevariables are epiphenomenalin realistmodels that assume that
changesin internationalcapabilitiesare obviouslyand easilyread by rational
The evidencesuggeststhatfeedback
leaderswho adapt to changingstructures.
and that
interpretations,
was notobvious,thatitwas open to radicallydifferent
by Soviet leaders withina short
its meaningwas construedverydifferently
ofmeaningbecomes
periodoftime.Insofaras thisis thecase, theconstruction
a criticalratherthanan epiphenomenalfactorin anyexplanationfortheend of
thecold war.
A second candidate explanationforthe change in Soviet foreignpolicyis
domesticpolitics.The strongversionholds that leaders are put in place by
to change. Gorbachev
powerfulconstituenciesbecause of theircommitment
because ofhis commitwouldhave had to be chosenbythePolitburoprimarily
mentto a new approach to Soviet defenseand security.His "new thinking"
could thenbe understoodas a calculatedresponseto the demandsof his conand couldbe nicelyexplainedas a rationalresponseto interestpolitics.
stituency
withGorbachev.
16. Personalinterview
17. Meyer,"The Sources and ProspectsofNew PoliticalThinkingon Security,"pp. 135-38.
18. Pravda,6 August1988.
19. Steven Weber argues this point cogentlyin "InteractiveLearning in U.S.-Soviet Arms
Control,"in George W. Breslauerand PhilipE. Tetlock,eds., Learningin U.S. and SovietForeign
Policy(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1991),pp. 784-824.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 161
Historically,periods of succession in the Soviet Union have promoted
in policyuntilthenewleader consolidateshis
logrollingand politicaltrade-offs
AndropovsucceededBrezhnevin November1982butbecame ill in
authority.20
the summerof 1983 and died in February1984. Chernenko,also in failing
butwiththetacitunderstandhealth,was chosenas thenewGeneralSecretary,
In thislongperiod
ingthatGorbachevwouldbe consideredtheheirapparent.21
of successionafterBrezhnev,a coalitionin favorof radical change in Soviet
foreignpolicycould have formedbehindGorbachevas thesuccessor.
The evidence does not suggestthat Gorbachevwas chosen because of his
to change Sovietforeignpolicy.Rather,he was acknowledgedas
commitment
one oftheleadingproponentsofdomesticreform.The limitedevidencethatis
availablesuggeststhathe was chosento end theperiodof"stagnation"at home
and begin the revitalizationof Soviet society.Domestic politicsand political
succession do explain why Gorbachev came to power. They are also an
importantpart of the explanationof whyhis thinkingon securitymattered,
In a state-centeredsociety,the
once he had become General Secretary.22
influenceof even a new General Secretarywas considerable.Domesticpolitics
cannot adequately explain,however,why Gorbachevchanged or developed
oftheSovietUnion's securityproblem.
new representations
A weakervariantof a domesticpoliticsexplanationdoes provideimportant
of domesticpoliticscan help to explain
pieces of thepuzzle. The configuration
the directionand scope of changeonce Gorbachevbegan to thinkdifferently
about and to reorientSoviet foreignpolicy. In the firstinstance,some of
Gorbachev'sactionswere designedto fracturealliances amongthoseopposed
to thenew directionin policy.Gorbachev,forexample,was reluctantto extend
supportto repressiveleaders in Eastern Europe in part because theywere
allies ofthoseat homewho opposed reformbothat home and abroad.23In this
sense,domesticpoliticshelped to accelerateratherthanto initiatechange.
Domesticpoliticsis also helpfulin explaininghow Gorbachevdeepened his
to policychange.The strandsof domesticpoliticswerewovenin
commitment
complexways. I will argue that Gorbachev drew on institutionalexpertise
withinthe political systemto develop and refineideas and policy.He also
crafteda political coalition in an effortto build political supportfor new
policies that threatenedestablishedinterests.In both these ways,domestic
politics was an importantcomponentof foreignpolicy change. Domestic
politics,however,cannot address the importantquestion of whyGorbachev
in Soviet
and Brezhnevas Leaders:BuildingAuthority
20. See George W. Breslauer,Khrushchev
Politics(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); and Richard D. Anderson,Jr.,"Why Competitive
PoliticsInhibitsLearningin SovietForeignPolicy,"in Breslauerand Tetlock,Learningin U.S. and
SovietForeignPolicy,pp. 100-131.
21. Nation,Black Earth,Red Star,p. 286.
22. Shiftsin social structureand politicalpowerdeterminewhose learningmatters.See Joseph
41
Organization
S. Nye,Jr.,"Nuclear Learningand U.S.-Soviet SecurityRegimes,"International
(Summer1987),pp. 371-402 and especiallyp. 381.
withGorbachev.
23. Personalinterview
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
162 InternationalOrganization
about security,whyhe rejected the conventional
began to thinkdifferently
wisdomof the time,and how and whyhe developednew conceptsto organize
about foreignand defensepolicy.
histhinking
answersto
nor domesticvariablesprovidesatisfactory
Neitherinternational
these questions. Recognition of the need for change among the Soviet
leadershippermitteda widevariationin response,and domesticpoliticsdid not
determinethe vectorof policythat emerged.To explain the shiftin Soviet
foreignpolicy,we mustlook to theroleofindividualswithintheparametersset
thatpressedtheSovietleadership.
byan environment
Generationalsuccessionand foreignpolicychange
Generationalchangeprovidesa moreconvincingexplanationof the changein
Sovietforeignpolicy.It incorporatespoliticaland cognitivevariablesto suggest
that cohorts learn collectivelyfromshared formativeexperiences.As one
experiences
generationof leaders succeeds another,it bringswithit different
conceptionsof policy.Leaders do not change their
and thereforedifferent
concepts.At first
concepts; rathera new generationbringswithit different
of "new thinking."
glance,thisexplanationprovidesa plausibleinterpretation
Gorbachevwas a generationyoungerthanBrezhnevand his colleagues.He
was nineteenyearsyoungerthan Chernenkoand thirteenyearsyoungerthan
and fullvotingmembersof the Politburo.
the averageage of the ten surviving
Most ofthemembersofBrezhnev'sPolitburowerebornaround1910 and lived
years. They were young adults duringthe
throughthe early revolutionary
underStalin and fullyresponsibleadults duringWorld
forcedcollectivization
War II. Theirformative
experienceswere thecreationoftheSovietUnion,the
surpriseattackby Hitler's Germany,and the traumaof the "Great Patriotic
War."
Manyof the membersof the PolitburounderGorbachevwere bornaround
politicalexperiencewas Khrushchev'sdenunciation
1930,and theirformative
of Stalin in 1956. Those who came of political age duringthis period were
heavilyinfluencedby Khrushchev'sattemptto liberalizethe politicalprocess,
to freeSovietsocietyof theStalinistlegacy,and to reformSovietpolitics.They
describedthemselvesas "children"oftheTwentiethPartyCongress,and many
emergedas colleagues or advisersto Gorbachevin the firstfewyearsof his
Some of Gorbachev's adviserslived throughthe "years of
administration.24
isolationand were receptiveto reformand change.
stagnation"in frustrated
explanation.As we
Yet generationalchange is not an entirelysatisfactory
have seen, many in Gorbachev's cohort did not change their fundamental
constructs."New thinking"was contestednot only by those of Brezhnev's
networkbut also bymembersof
generationentrenchedwithintheinstitutional
24. Jerry
F. Hough,Russiaand theWest:Gorbachevand thePoliticsofReforn(New York: Simon
and Schuster,1988),pp. 18-32.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 163
Gorbachev'scohort,who challengedbothitsvalidityand itsconsequences.The
predispositionto reformof Soviet societywas a powerfulincentiveto change
amongGorbachev'sgeneration,but not all the leaders of thisgenerationdrew
nordid theyagreeon therepresentathesame conclusionsfromSoviethistory;
tion of the problemof Soviet securityor the directionof change. Insofaras
by membersof Gorbachev's
Soviet historycould be and was read differently
explanationof"newthinking."
generation,
generationalchangeis an insufficient
The individualinterpretationby the senior leader in a highlycentralized
politicalsystembecomes the startingpointin anyexplanationof the changein
the Sovietconceptof security.In the Sovietpoliticalsystemfrom1985 to 1989,
mattered.
Gorbachev'spoliticalthinking
Explainingcognitivechange
is the defaultpositionand change
suggestthatstability
Cognitivepsychologists
the exception. People use schemata-cognitive structuresthat represent
knowledgeabout a concept,person,role, group,or event-to organizetheir
and developscriptsforaction.Theoriesof
interpretation
of theirenvironment
schemata explore the impact of these cognitiveconstructionson problem
representation,memory,and informationprocessing.They postulate that
The
schemata are generallyresistantto change once theyare established.25
well-establishedtendencyto discount informationthat is discrepantwith
to cognitivestability.26
The cognitive
significantly
existingschematacontributes
25. For a definitionof schemata,see Susan Fiske and ShelleyTaylor,Social Cognition(New
see Robert Jervis,
York: Random House, 1984), p. 140. For argumentsabout cognitivestability,
Press,
Relations(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
in Intemational
Perception
and Misperception
and
Processing,
Cognition,
1976); Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger,The Worldin TheirMinds:Information
Press,1990); and
(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversity
Perception
inForeignPolicyDecisionmaking
Richard R. Lau and David 0. Sears, "Social Cognitionand Political Cognition:The Past, the
Present, and the Future," in Richard R. Lau and David 0. Sears, eds., Political Cognition
(Hillsdale, N.J.:Lawrence Erlbaum,1986), pp. 347-66. For a discussionof cognitivepsychology
Carter,
and foreignpolicychange,see RichardNed Lebow and JaniceGross Stein,"Afghanistan,
and ForeignPolicyChange: The Limitsof CognitiveModels," in TimothyJ. McKeown and Dan
Essaysin HonorofAlexanderL. George(Boulder,
Caldwell,eds.,Force,Diplomacy,and Statecraft:
Colo.: WestviewPress,1993).
26. Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper, and Michael Hubbard, "Perseverancein Self Perceptionand
Social Perception: Biased AttributionalProcesses in the DebriefingParadigm," Joumal of
32 (November1975),pp. 880-92. The postulatethatschemataare
Personality
and Social Psychology
resistantto change can be interpretedas consistentwithstatisticallogic if people assign a low
variance estimate to their expectations.Psychologicalresearch contradictsthis interpretation
ratherthan
strengthens
throughrepeated observationsthat exposureto discrepantinformation
underminesexistingschemata.See Craig A. Anderson,Mark R. Lepper, and Lee Ross, "Perseveranceof Social Theories:The Role of Explanationin the Persistenceof DiscreditedInformaand Social Psychology
39 (December 1980), pp. 1037-49; Craig A.
tion,"Joumalof Personality
Anderson,"Abstractand ConcreteData in thePerseveranceofSocial Theories:WhenWeak Data
19 (March 1983), pp.
and Social Psychology
Lead to UnshakableBeliefs,"JoumalofExperimental
93-108; and Edward R. Hirtand StevenJ.Sherman,"The Role of PriorKnowledgein Explaining
and Social Psychology21 (November 1985), pp.
HypotheticalEvents,"Joumalof Experimental
resultsfrom
information
of schemataafterexposureto contradictory
519-43. The strengthening
the processes of reasoningpeople use to explain the apparent inconsistency.Reasoning may
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
164 InternationalOrganization
economyofschemataprecludestheirreevaluationin thefaceofsmallamounts
of discrepantinformation.
Generally,schemata change
Conservatismdoes not hold unconditionally.
conversion.
graduallyover time ratherthan undergoquick and far-reaching
People will
Change is mostlikelyto occur at the peripheryand incrementally.
also make the smallest possible change; they will change their schemata
allow a largenumberof exceptionsand special cases, and make
incrementally,
superficialalterationsrather than reject existingschemata. Dramatic and
changeoccursrarely.
far-reaching
Schema theoryhas notyetdevelopedan integratedset ofpropositionsabout
the diagofschemata,theirrefutability,
whyschematachange.27The centrality
and cognitive
the patternof attribution,
nosticityof discrepantinformation,
all have been identifiedas predictorsofthelikelihoodofchange.
complexity
Change is in part a functionof the rate at which discrepantinformation
Contradictoryevidence dispersed across many
occurs and its diagnosticity.
instances should have a greater impact on schemata than a few isolated
inconsistent
withpreviousknowlAs people considerinformation
examples.28
edge, they incorporateinto their schema the conditionsunder which the
schemadoes nothold; thiskindof processpermitsgradualchangeand adjustment.29
Importantschemataare challengedonlywhenthereis no otherwayto
account for contradictorydata that people consider diagnostic.Even the
strongestschema cannot withstandthe challenge of stronglyincongruent
informationor a competingschema that fitsthe data better.30Cognitive
transformthe inconsistentinformationto make it consistentwith the schema. See Jennifer
Bulletin90 (March 1981),
of CovariationbySocial Perceivers,"Psychological
Crocker,"Judgment
Attributionand the Perpetuationof Social Beliefs,"
pp. 272-92; JamesA. Kulik,"Confirmatory
44 (June1983),pp. 1171-81;Thomas K. Srull,"Person
and Social Psychology
JoumalofPersonality
Memory:Some Tests of Associative Storage and Retrieval Models," Joumal of Experimental
7 (November1981),pp. 440-63; RobertS. Wyer,Jr.,and Sallie E. Gordon,"The Recall
Psychology
and Social Psychology18
of InformationAbout Persons and Groups," Joumalof Experimental
(March 1982), pp. 128-64; and Chris S. O'Sullivan and Francis T. Durso, "Effectof Schemaand Social
JoumalofPersonality
Attributes,"
on MemoryforStereotypical
Information
incongruent
47 (July1984),pp. 55-70.
Psychology
static.For
27. In largepartbecause schematheoriesfocuson wholeschemata,theyare relatively
a criticalreviewof the staticqualityof schematheory,see JamesH. Kuklinski,RobertC. Luskin,
and JohnBolland, "Where Is the Schema: Going Beyondthe 'S' Word in PoliticalPsychology,"
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview85 (December 1991),pp. 1341-56.
28. JenniferCrocker,Darlene B. Hannah, and Renee Weber, "Person Memoryand Causal
44 (January1983),pp. 55-66.
and Social Psychology
Attributions,"
JoumalofPersonality
29. E. ToryHigginsand JohnA. Bargh,"Social Cognitionand Social Perception,"in Mark R.
vol. 38 (Palo Alto, Calif.:
Rosenzweig and LarryW. Porter,eds., Annual Reviewof Psychology,
Annual Reviews,1987),pp. 369-425,and p. 386 in particular.
in
30. Hazel Markusand RobertB. Zajonc, "The CognitivePerspectivein Social Psychology,"
3d ed. (New York:Random
GardnerLindzeyandElliotAronson,eds.,HandbookofSocialPsychology,
House, 1985). Cognitivepsychologistswho studyprocesses of attributionare less explicitin
modelingprocesses of change. They note only that individualsmay varyin theirpropensityto
when theydo have
acquire schemataand in theirtendencyto use themto process information
them.See Susan Fiske, "Schema-basedVersus Piecemeal Politics:A PatchworkQuilt,but Not a
pp. 154-81.
Blanket,"in Fiske and Taylor,Social Cognition,
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 165
havenot,however,establishedthresholdsfor"strongly"
incongrupsychologists
entand diagnosticinformation.
Significantchange in one individual'sschema about another also occurs
and are persuadedthat
whensubjectsare exposed to incongruent
information
butreflectsthenatureofthetarget.Change occurs
thebehavioris notarbitrary
when inconsistentinformationis attributedto dispositional rather than
The general tendencyto prefersituationalratherthan
situationalfactors.31
forincongruent
behaviorexplainswhychangeoccurs
dispositionalattributions
It is not clear,however,when and whysuch uncharacteristic
so infrequently.32
to dispositionalfactorsare made.
attributions
Change is also a functionof cognitivecomplexity-thecomplexityof the
cognitiverules used to process informationabout objects and situations.
Cognitivecomplexityrefersto the structureor the organizationof cognition
ratherthanto the contentof thought.Complexityhas a somewhatcontradictoryimpacton schema change. The more complexthe cognitivesystem,the
when
more capable the decisionmakerof makingnew or subtle distinctions
confrontedwith new information.33
Experts with highlycomplex cognitive
thannoviceswithlowcognitive
schemataare moresensitiveto newinformation
whose schemataare likelyto be fixed.34
On theotherhand,because
complexity
they can more easily incorporate
expertshave more relevantinformation,
inconsistentinformationas exceptionsand special cases. Incongruentdata
thereforehave less impacton theirschematathantheywouldhave on thoseof
p. 65.
31. Crocker,Hannah, and Weber,"Person Memoryand Causal Attributions,"
32. See Edward E. Jones and Richard E. Nisbett,"The Actor and Observer: Divergent
Perceptionsof the Causes of Behavior,"in Edward E. Jones,David E. Knouse,Harold H. Kelley,
Perceiving
theCauses of
RichardE. Nisbett,StuartValins, and BernardWeiner,eds.,Attribution:
N.J.:General LearningPress,1971), pp. 79-95; H. H. Kelley,"Attribution
Behavior(Morristown,
Theoryin Social Psychology,"in D. Levine, ed., NebraskaSymposiumon Motivation(Lincoln:
of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 192-240; Lee Ross, "The IntuitivePsychologistand His
University
Shortcomings:Distortionsin the AttributionProcess," in Leonard Berkowitz,ed., Advancesin
vol. 10 (New York:AcademicPress,1977),pp. 174-77;and Lee
and Social Psychology,
Experimental
Ross and Craig A. Anderson,"Shortcomingsin the AttributionProcess: On the Originsand
Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments,"in Daniel Kahneman,Paul Slovic, and Amos
Under Uncertainty:
Heuristicsand Biases (New York: CambridgeUniversity
Tversky,Judgment
Press,1986),pp. 129-52.
33. See Peter Suedfeldand A. Dennis Rank, "RevolutionaryLeaders: Long-termSuccess as a
34
and Social Psychology
JoumalofPersonality
Functionof Changes in Conceptual Complexity,"
(August 1976), pp. 169-78; Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock, "IntegrativeComplexityof
Communicationin InternationalCrisis," Joumal of ConflictResolution21 (March 1977), pp.
168-84; and Philip Tetlock, "IntegrativeComplexityof American and Soviet Foreign Policy
49 (December
and Social Psychology
Rhetorics:A Time-SeriesAnalysis,"Joumalof Personality
1985),pp. 1565-85.
34. Pamela J. Conover and StanleyFeldman, "How People Organize the PoliticalWorld: A
SchematicModel," AmericanJoumalof PoliticalScience 28 (February1984), pp. 95-126. Those
who possess multiplejudgmentdimensionsalso tendto possess rulesof abstractionthatfacilitate
of
theintegration
and comparisonofinformation.
Theytendto producealternativeinterpretations
are able to resolve
but,by usingtheircapacityforabstractionand integration,
new information
tendto produceabsolute,fixedjudgments.
theseambiguities.People withlow cognitivecomplexity
(Lexington,Mass.: Lexington
See W. L. Bennett,ThePoliticalMind and thePoliticalEnvironment
The Worldin TheirMinds,pp. 134-37.
Books, 1975),pp. 33-35; and Vertzberger,
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
166 InternationalOrganization
novices.35An individual'slevel of cognitivecomplexityis not unchangingbut
responds to situational,socializing,and role factors.Crisis-inducedstress
valuesand politicalresponsibilwhilepluralistic
decreasescognitivecomplexity,
itysocializepeople to theneed to balance competinggoals.36
Cognitiveexplanationsof"newthinking"
in
How helpfulare thesesets of propositionsdrawnfromcognitivepsychology
A fairtestofthesepropositionswould
explainingGorbachev's"new thinking?"
require that Gorbachev's schematabefore he became General Secretaryin
1985 be comparedwithhis schematasome timeafterhe tookoffice.Onlythen
could the extentof change be assessed and the likelyimpact of different
of
conditionsthat stimulatedchange be estimated.No such reconstruction
Gorbachev'sschemataexists,and it could not be validlydone afterthe fact.
Indeed, whetherand when Gorbachev'sschematachangedare stillempirical
questions.A fair evaluationof the explanatorypower of theoriesof social
cognitionmust await the opening of the records of partyand leadership
deliberations.Reliable and valid evidenceto testthesepropositionsabout the
schema change of a leader in a closed political systemis at present not
available.37Nevertheless,we can, throughthe logic of eliminationand some
assessmentoftheirutility.
availableevidence,makesome preliminary
currently
thatGorbaof discrepantinformation
The volume,rate, and diagnosticity
chevreceivedare notveryhelpfulin explainingthe emergenceof "new thinkabout the economicperformanceof the
ing." As we have seen, information
in Afghanistan,
the impassein armscontrol,and
SovietUnion,the difficulties
the heightenedtensionwiththe United Stateswas available to Andropovand
Chernenkoas well as to membersof Gorbachev'sPolitburo,yet it led to no
Neither qualitative nor
significantchange in their cognitiveconstructs.38
35. E. Tory Higgins and John A. Bargh, "Social Cognition and Social Perception," in
pp. 369-425.
Rosenzweigand Porter,AnnualReviewofPsychology,
36. See ArielLevi and PhilipTetlock,"A CognitiveAnalysisofJapan's1941Decision forWar,"
Joumalof ConflictResolution24 (June 1980), pp. 195-211; Philip Tetlock,"CognitiveStyleand
45 (July1983), pp. 118-26; Philip
and Social Psychology
PoliticalIdeology,"JoumalofPersonality
Tetlock,"Contentand Structurein PoliticalBelief Systems,"in Donald Sylvanand Steve Chan,
(New York:
Intelligence
Cognition,and Artificial
eds., ForeignPolicyDecision Making:Perception,
Praeger,1984), pp. 107-28; and PhilipTetlock and RichardBoettger,"Cognitiveand Rhetorical
Stylesof Traditionalistand ReformistSoviet Politicians:A ContentAnalysisStudy,"Political
10 (June1989),pp. 209-32.
Psychology
37. RichardHerrmann,"The EmpiricalChallengeof the CognitiveRevolution,"Intemational
32 (June1988),pp. 175-204.
StudiesQuarterly
to drawdefinitive
conclusionsabout Andropov,givenhis shorttenurein office.
38. It is difficult
In his fifteenmonthsin office,Andropovwithdrewfromthe INF talks afterNATO began its
during
deploymentof PershingIls. Andropovwas also thepatronof manyof theyoungreformers
theBrezhnevyearsand was well-placedto tap newideas. A policyreviewofthewarin Afghanistan
was conductedwhilehe was General Secretary,and Arbatov,the directorof the Instituteof the
U.S.A. and Canada, suggeststhatAndropovconcluded thatno militarysolutionwas possible in
Afghanistan.However, Arbatov maintains that the review was limited to the problem of
Afghanistanand did not touch more fundamentalaspects of Soviet security.Personal interview
withGeorgiiArbatov,Moscow,19 May 1989.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 167
quantitativechanges in discrepant informationcan help to explain why
Gorbachevbut not Andropov,Chernenko,or Ligachevdeveloped new representationsof the Soviet securityproblem.Even thoughthere are significant
schema theory
in receptivity
to discrepantinformation,
individualdifferences
informaincongruent
suggeststhatchangeoccursin theface ofunambiguously
tion. In foreignpolicymaking,informationis frequentlyambiguous, and
Even were adequate longitudinalevidence availproblemsare ill-structured.
able about Gorbachev's schemata, the volume, rate, and diagnosticityof
explanation.
do notprovidea satisfactory
discrepantinformation
The complexityof Gorbachev's thinkingis somewhat more helpful in
explainingthe developmentof "new thinking."Complexitycan be assessed
or the number of logicallydistinct
along two dimensions-differentiation,
amongtheidea elementswithin
thatare considered,and integration
arguments
One
a schema,or the developmentof principlesforcopingwithtrade-offs.39
way to assess the relationshipbetween complexityand schema change is to
aboutpeacefulcoexistence,a centralconceptin
compareGorbachev'sthinking
Soviet thinkingabout security,to that of a predecessorwho exhibitedlittle
propensityforcognitivechange. Brezhnev's"peace platform"speech to the
PartyCongressin March 1971and Gorbachev'sPoliticalReport
Twenty-fourth
PartyCongressin February
of the CentralCommitteeto the Twenty-seventh
The two speeches were selected because they
1986 were content-analyzed.
signaled new initiativesby each of the leaders. These initiativeswere announcedbeforeconceptsand programsthatfollowedwere fullydeveloped.In
both cases, however,as with almost all major speeches, the speeches went
throughmanydraftsand thereforeare not completelyvalid indicatorsof the
thinkingof the two general secretaries.Coders were instructedto map the
logical argumentsconnectedwithpeaceful coexistenceand to search forany
connectedwiththeissue.
discussionoftrade-offs
Differencesin the number of logical argumentsconnected to peaceful
coexistence are apparent. Brezhnev made only two argumentsabout the
of nuclear war as
destructiveness
of nuclear weapons and the impossibility
imperativesfor peaceful coexistence.Gorbachev's thinkingabout peaceful
greatercomplexityin the numberof
coexistencedemonstratedsignificantly
he
logicallydistinctargumentsthat considered.
aspirations"of the
Gorbachevrepeatedlyassertedthe "hegemonic-seeking
not
the
earlier
Soviet
States.
He
did
conceptof the "imperialist
United
reject
ambitions"of the UnitedStates.Rather,he located theconceptof the United
evaluative
cognitivecomplexity;
dimensionsof complexity:
39. Tetlockidentifiesfourstructural
tension,or dissonancethat existsamongthe various
or the degree of inconsistency,
complexity,
cognitions;cognitiveinteraction;and metacognition.Tetlock argues that increasingcognitive
increasesthe likelihoodboth of pursuingpolicies thatlead to importantgoals and of
complexity
is highlycomplexand rapidlychanging.See
settingrealisticgoals,especiallywhentheenvironment
PhilipTetlock,"Learningin U.S. and SovietForeignPolicy:In Search of an Elusive Concept,"in
Breslauer and Tetlock,Leamingin U.S. and SovietForeignPolicy,pp. 20-61, and especiallypp.
32-35 and 40; and Tetlock and Boettger,"Cognitiveand RhetoricalStylesof Traditionalistand
ReformistSovietPoliticians."
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
168 InternationalOrganization
States as an imperialenemywithina more complexcognitivestructurethat
includedan analysisofthesituationand integratedthetwoconceptswithinhis
schema of peaceful coexistence.The dimensionsthat Gorbachevconsidered
were far more elaborate than those consideredby Brezhnev,who focused
on thenuclearthreatto survival.Gorbachevspoke ofglobal
almostexclusively
threatsto survivalthatemanatednotonlyfromnuclearweapons and the arms
of the ecosystem,thewideninggap betweenthe
race but also fromthefragility
richand thepoor,and thetightlinkagesacrossthosedimensions.The urgency
of the situation,Gorbachev concluded, overwhelmedthe narrowlydefined
kindof peacefulcoexistence
interestsof nation-statesand requireda different
appropriateforan "interdependent"and "integral"world.40
in their
The differences
were even greaterin the recognitionof trade-offs
scriptsforaction.Brezhnevarguedthatpeacefulcoexistencewould requireno
movementsand progressive
compromisein Soviet supportof revolutionary
forcesin the Third World. His schema did not include any recognitionof
trade-offs.
Gorbachev,on the other hand, acknowledgedtrade-offsand the
necessityforcompromise.The fundamentalquestion,Gorbachevargued,was
"to be or not to be?" The answerwas not the competitivecoexistenceof the
Brezhnevyearsbut cooperativecoexistencewherestatesaccommodatedeach
other'sneeds and interests.41
Cognitivepsychologistswho work with the affectiveconcept of attitude
decisions,or
ratherthanthe conceptof schemahave notedthatturning-point
fromthe patternof priordecisions,depend
decisionsthatdeviatesignificantly
on resolvingthe contradictionbetweenthe attitudetowardan object and the
Gorbachevintegratedhis
attitudetowarda situationin favorofthesituation.42
morecomplexschemaof
attitudetowardtheUnitedStateswithina structurally
an interdependent
globalsystem.
The higherlevel of cognitivecomplexitycharacteristicof Gorbachevcertainlyis consistentwiththechangessubsequentlyembodiedin "new thinking."
It is difficult,
however,to disentanglethe causal dynamicsof cognitivechange
inherentin the levels of developmentof causal schemata or theircognitive
40. Gorbachevdeveloped these argumentsin moredetail laterin his career: "This can onlybe
achieved by learningto live together,to cohabit side by side on thissmall planet threatenedby
artof takinginto accounteach
degradation,masteringthe difficult
ecologicaland environmental
other'smutualinterests.This is whatwe meanbypeacefulcoexistence."See MikhailS. Gorbachev,
rechii stat'i(Selected speeches and articles),7 vols. (Moscow: 1987-90),vol. 2, p. 461.
Izbrannye
between
in complexity
differences
41. In relatedresearch,Tetlockand Boettgerfindsignificant
and reformers.See "Cognitiveand RhetoricalStylesof Traditionalistand
Soviet traditionalists
ReformistSoviet Politicians."Other scholars have compared Gorbachev with previousSoviet
leaders and foundthat he scored higheron conceptual complexity.He is able to differentiate
among alternativeprinciplesand policies and then integratedisparate elementsinto complex
generalizations.See David G. Winter,MargaretG. Hermann,WalterWeintraub,and
higher-order
Stephen G. Walker,"Theoryand Predictionsin PoliticalPsychology:The Personalitiesof Bush
12
and GorbachevMeasured at a Distance: Procedures,Portraits,and Policy,"PoliticalPsychology
(June1991),pp. 215-46.
Decisions: A Cognitive-DissonanceAnalysisof Conflict
42. Yudit Auerbach, "Turning-point
7 (September1986),pp. 533-50.
Resolutionin Israel-WestGermanRelations,"PoliticalPsychology
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 169
There is a serious risk of tautologicalinference:evidence of
complexity.43
Gorbachev'shigherlevel of cognitivecomplexitycomes fromanalysisof his
"new thinking"and thereforecannotbe used to explainhisnewrepresentation
of the Sovietsecurityproblem.44
The contentof schematacan changewithout
structuralchange,cognitivestructureand contentcan change simultaneously,
or changesin cognitivestructurecan lead to changesin cognitivecontent.At
best, the evidence suggeststhat increased cognitivecomplexityis associated
withchange in the contentof schema; it does not explainthe change in that
content.45
Not only"cold" cognitionbut also "hot" emotionsaffectthe likelihoodof
schemachange.Not all schemataare equivalent;people varyin theircommitment to differentschemata.46The greater the intensityof the emotional
commitment
to a schema,the more resistantit is to change by disconfirming
evidence.47
The intensity
ofcommitment
does nothelpverymuchin thepuzzle
ofthechangein Gorbachev'sconstructs.
his commitment
to the
Gorbachevwas a committedsocialistwho reaffirmed
validityofthesocialistexperimentand itsgoals evenas he began to articulatea
new concept of peaceful coexistence. "We are looking withinsocialism,"
Gorbachevargued,"ratherthanoutsideit,forthe answersto all thequestions
that arise."48In his commitmentto socialism, Gorbachev did not differ
43. See Kuklinski,Luskin, and Bolland, "Where Is the Schema," p. 1345, for the essential
equivalencebetweenlevelsof developmentof cognitiveschemaand cognitivecomplexity.
44. An analysisof Gorbachev'sspeeches beforeand afterhe became General Secretaryclassithereafter.
See Tetlock
fiesGorbachevas a traditionalist
untilMarch 1985 and an ardentreformer
SovietPoliticians."
and Boettger,"Cognitiveand RhetoricalStylesofTraditionalistand Reformist
The speeches Gorbachevdeliveredbeforehe became General Secretarycannotprovidevaliddata
because oftheconstraints
operatingon Sovietleaders.
to assess his cognitivecomplexity
45. Tetlock argues that whereas beliefs (or content) can shiftwithoutentailingstructural
change,a change in structurenecessarilyleads to a change in beliefs.See Tetlock,"Learningin
is in parta
complexity
U.S. and SovietForeignPolicy."Tetlockand Boettgerarguethatintegrative
functionof role and ideology;see their"Cognitiveand RhetoricalStylesof Traditionalistand
ReformistSoviet Politicians." Liberals are far more likely than conservativesto become
integratively
complexwhentheyassumeoffice.
46. Cognitivepsychologists
identify
a varietyof different
typesof expectanciesor schemata.See
Cube: A
Edward E. Jonesand Daniel McGillis,"CorrespondentInferencesand the Attribution
ComparativeReappraisal," in JohnH. Harvey,WilliamJ. Ickes, and Robert F. Kidd, eds., New
Directionsin Attribution
Research,vol. 1 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum,1976), pp. 389-420;
ProcessesArisingin the Social
JohnM. Darley and Russell H. Fazio, "ExpectancyConfirmation
35 (October 1980),pp. 867-81; E. ToryHigginsand
InteractionSequence," AmericanPsychologist
Consequences of IndiGillian King,"Accessibilityof Social Constructs:Information-processing
vidual and ContextualVariability,"in Nancy Cantor and JohnF. Kihlstrom,eds., Personality,
S.
Cognition,
and Social Interaction
(Hillsdale, N.J.:LawrenceErlbaum,1981), pp. 69-121; Jeffrey
Berman,Stephen J. Read, and David A. Kenny,"ProcessingInconsistentSocial Information,"
and Social Psychology
45 (December 1983), pp. 1211-24; and JohnA. Bargh
JoumalofPersonality
and Roman D. Thein, "Individual ConstructAccessibility,Person Memory,and the Recalland Social Psychology
49
Overload,"JoumalofPersonality
judgmentLink:The Case ofInformation
(November1985),pp. 1129-43.
47. Vertzberger,
The Worldin TheirMinds,
p. 136.
48. MikhailGorbachev,Perestroika:
"New Thinking"for
Our Country
and theWorld(New York:
Harper and Row, 1987),pp. 10 and 36.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
170 InternationalOrganization
to
fromhis predecessors.Change did notoccurin his commitment
significantly
the mostfundamentalconceptsat the core of his cognitiveconstructsbut did
hiscognitive
occurin moreperipheralareas. Gorbachevwas able to reconstruct
betweenhis core conceptsand his
systemso thattherewere no inconsistencies
new conceptof peacefulcoexistence.It is surprisingthathis intensecommitmentto core conceptsdid notprecludechangein closelyrelatedschemata.49
Theories of social cognitionalso do not specifythe externalconditionsor
contendthattheneglectofcontext
mediatingcauses ofchange.50Criticsrightly
is disturbing;the social dimensionof cognitionresearchis largelyabsent.51
stimuli
the processesthatlinkenvironmental
Theoriesdo notmodel explicitly
they
Until
change.
and thatexplainhowtheseconstructs
to cognitiveconstructs
in
the
analysis
a
theoretical
tool
as
do, social cognitionwillremainincomplete
of changein politicalschemata.To extendthe analysis,I build on propositions
fromsocial cognitionand organizationalpsychologyto develop a concept of
trial-and-error
learningfromfailurethat examineswhyand how Gorbachev
changedhisconcepts.
Learningin context
The conceptof learningmaybe more helpfulin explainingthe emergenceof
Gorbachev's"new thinking."Learningis a subsetof cognitivechange:not all
change is learning,but all learningis change. Theories of learning,unlike
normative
schematheory,are inherently
dynamic.Learningis also an explicitly
concept.It measurescognitivechangeagainstsome set of explicitcriteria.
has not identiThere is as yetno unifiedtheoryof learning,and psychology
formsof learning
fiedthe conditionsor thresholdsthatpredictwhen different
are likelyto occur.Most psychologicaltheoriesof learningare notveryuseful
in specifying
thedynamicsoflearning,in largepartbecause theyanalyzelearnLearningtheoristsin educational
ing withinhighlystructuredenvironments.
are associationist.Theytreatlearningas a change
and experimental
psychology
in the probabilityof a specifiedresponsein the face of changingrewardconwhere
This conceptof learningis not helpfulin an environment
tingencies.52
or disputed.
responsesareunknown
appropriate
49. See Vertzberger,The Worldin TheirMinds,pp. 123-25, fora discussionof relativevalue
stability
in thefaceofbeliefchange.
50. Exceptionsare Tetlockand Boettger,"Cognitiveand RhetoricalStylesofTraditionalistand
ReformistSovietPoliticians";and Ralph Erber and Susan T. Fiske,"Outcome Dependencyand
47 (October
and Social Psychology
Joumalof Personality
Attentionto InconsistentInformation,"
1984), pp. 709-26. Erber and Fiske findthatoutcomedependencyincreasespeople's attentionto
inconsistentinformation.
They hypothesizethatwhen the perceiver'soutcomesdepend on the
otherperson,the perceivermay be more motivatedto have a sense of predictionand control,
ratherthanmotivatedonlyto maintainan expectation.
51. Kuklinski,Luskin,and Bolland,"Where Is the Schema?" p. 1346.
A RealisticApproach(New
52. Thomas L. Good and JereE. Brophy,EducationalPsychology:
York: Longman,1990). Developmentalpsychologyis more helpful,but it too workslargelywith
knownresponses.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 171
Political psychologistsdistinguishbetween simple and complex learning.
Learningis simplewhenmeans are betteradjustedto ends. Complexlearning
occurswhen a person develops a more differentiated
schema and when this
schema is integratedinto a higher-orderstructurethat highlightsdifficult
trade-offs.53
Learning can be causal, an analysis of causal paths, and/or
diagnostic,an examinationof the conditionsunderwhichcausal generalizationsapply.54
Complexlearning,at itshighestlevel,maylead to a reordering
or
a redefinitionof goals. From this perspective,learningmust include the
developmentofmorecomplexstructures
as well as changesin content.55
These conceptsof learningare a usefulfirstcut at explainingchangesin a
leader's schema that then shape new directionsin policy,but theyfail to
distinguishchange from learning. Without some evaluative criteria,any
cognitivechange can be considered learning,and the concept of learning
becomes redundant.Change in cognitivecontentor structuredoes not always
constitutelearning.Saddam Hussein, forexample,in the year precedinghis
decisionto invadeKuwait,extendedhisschemaand developeda differentiated
analysisof a changinginternational
system.He thenconcludedthattheUnited
States, the sole remainingsuperpower,was engaged in a conspiracyto
underminehis regime.The United States had no intentionwhatsoeverof
undermininghis regime and took no action to do so; on the contrary,it
attemptedto reinforceits relationshipwithIraq. These changesin Saddam's
schemaprovidea powerfulexplanationof his foreignpolicybehavior.56
They
cannot, however,be characterizedas learningbut rather,as pathological
thinking.57
Inescapably built into the concept of political learning is an
evaluationof the structureand contentof cognitivechange.58These kindsof
evaluativejudgmentsinevitably
are and willbe essentiallycontested.59
More helpfulare severalstrandsoftheoryand researchaboutthesolutionof
ill-structured
problemsand learningfromfailure.A problemis well-structured
whenit has a well-establishedgoal, knownconstraints,
and identifiedpossible
53. Haas describesthis dimensionof politicallearningas "nested problemsets." See Ernest
Haas, WhenKnowledgeIs Power(Berkeley:University
of CaliforniaPress,1990),p. 84.
54. JackLevy,"Learningand ForeignPolicy:Sweepinga Conceptual Minefield,"thisissue of
IntemationalOrganization.
55. See especiallyTetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy,p. 40; Haas, hen
KnowledgeIs Power;and Breslauerand Tetlock,Leamingin U.S. and SovietForeignPolicy.An early
studyof Sovietand Americanlearningon securityissues is AlexanderL. George,PhilipJ.Farley,
and AlexanderDallin, U.S.-SovietSecurity
Cooperation(New York: OxfordUniversity
Press,1988).
56. See JaniceGross Stein,"Deterrenceand Compellencein the Gulf:A Failed or Impossible
Task?" IntemationalSecurity
17 (Autumn1992),pp. 147-79.
57. In an effort
to deal withtheproblemofevaluation,analystsreferto pathologicallearning,or
changesthatimpedefuturecognitivegrowth.See JamesClay Moltz,"DivergentLearningand the
Failed Politicsof SovietEconomic Reform,"WorldPolitics45 (January1993), pp. 301-25, and p.
303 in particular.
58. For a similar argument,see George W. Breslauer, "What Have We Learned About
Learning?"in Breslauerand Tetlock,Leamingin U.S. and SovietForeignPolicy,pp. 825-56.
59. Levyarguesthatan "efficiency"
conceptoflearning,or one thatemphasizesthematchingof
means to ends,can be assessed onlyagainstempirically
lawsof social behavior.In their
confirmed
absence,he concludes,it is preferableto excludeefficiency
fromconceptsof learningand include
onlychangesin beliefs.See Levy,"Learningand ForeignPolicy."
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
172 InternationalOrganization
solutions.Sometimeseven the solutionto the problemis established.GenerGoals are oftenmultipleand
ally,problemsin foreignpolicyare ill-structured.
is ambiguous
vaguelydefined,one or more constraintsare open, information
and incomplete,and littlemaybe knownabout the solutionto the problem.
Learning is the constructionof new representationsof the problem,the
developmentof causal relations among the factors,the identificationof
constraints,and the organization of relevant knowledge.60Initially illduringthe representationprostructuredproblemsbecome well-structured
cess, whichlargelydeterminesthe solution.Learningis consideredsuccessful
when the solution can be explained so that it is largelyacceptable to the
ofproblemsolvers.61
relevantcommunity
A second strandof research examines the liabilitiesof success and the
benefitsof failure in promotingorganizationallearning.62When failure
challengesthe statusquo, it can drawattentionto problemsand stimulatethe
search for solutions.Only certainkinds of failurespromotelearning:highly
but unanticipatedfailures
predictablefailuresprovide no new information,
problemsare morelikelyto stimulate
thatchallengeold waysof representing
new formulations.Responding to failure,leaders can "learn throughexratherthanthroughmoretraditionalpatternsofavoidance.63
perimentation"
that
Learningthroughfailurecan provokea seriesofsequentialexperiments
experigeneratequick feedbackand allow fora new roundof trial-and-error
model of learning captures the
mentation.64This kind of trial-and-error
than the staticsof schema
dynamicsof social cognitionfar more effectively
theorywhere the perceiveris a "passive onlooker,who ... doesn't do anything-doesn'tmixitup withthefolkshe's watching,nevertestshisjudgments
60. See Walter Reitman,Cognitionand Thought(New York: Wiley,1965); Alan Newell and
HerbertA. Simon,Human ProblemSolving(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1972); Herbert
Intelligence
4 (October 1973), pp.
Problems,"Artificial
A. Simon,"The Structureof Ill-structured
181-201; JamesF. Voss, TerryR. Greene, TimothyA. Post, and Barbara C. Penner,"Problemof Leamingand
solvingSkill in the Social Sciences," in Gordon H. Bower, ed., The Psychology
Motivation:Advancesin Researchand Theory(New York: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 165-215;
Problems,"in MicheleneH.
JamesF. Voss and TimothyA. Post,"On the Solvingof Ill-structured
Chi, RobertGlaser,and MarshallJ.Farr,eds., TheNatureofExpertise(Hillsdale, N.J.:Lawrence
Erlbaum,1988),pp. 261-85; and JamesF. Voss, ChristopherR. Wolfe,JeanetteA. Lawrence,and
Randi A. Engle, "From Representationto Decision: An Analysis of Problem Solving in
InternationalRelations," in Robert J. Sternbergand Peter A. Frensch,eds., ComplexProblem
and Mechanisms(Hillsdale,N.J.:LawrenceErlbaum,1991),pp. 119-58.
Solving:Principles
Problems,"pp. 281-82.
61. Voss and Post,"On theSolvingof Ill-structured
62. Sim B. Sitkin,"Learning ThroughFailure: The Strategyof Small Losses," in LarryL.
Behavior,vol. 14 (New York: JAI
Cummingsand BarryH. Straw,eds.,Researchin Organizational
Press,1992),pp. 231-66.
24 (January
63. See Donald T. Campbell, "Reform as Experiments,"AmericanPsychologist
1969),pp. 409-29; B. Hedberg,"How OrganizationsLearn and Unlearn,"in Paul C. Nystromand
Design,vol.1 (New York: OxfordUniversity
WilliamH. Starbuck,eds.,HandbookofOrganizational
Press,1981),pp. 3-27.
64. See Chris Argyrisand Donald A. Schon, OrganizationalLeaming (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley,1978) for a discussionof the importanceof "theoryin action"; and Thomas
Petersand RobertH. Waterman,In SearchofExcellence(New York: Harperand Row, 1982) foran
analysisof"actionbias."
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium173
inactionor interaction."65
It doesnotrepresent
as a neatlinearprolearning
cesswithclearcausalantecedents
butas a messy,
interactive
dynamic,
process.
Drawingon modelsofthesolutionofill-structured
and learning
problems
through
failure,
I arguethatGorbachev,
stimulated
byfailure,
learnedthrough
trial-and-error
and constructed
a newrepresentation
ofthe
experimentation
ill-structured
Sovietsecurity
From1986to1988,Gorbachev
problem.
andsome
ofhiscolleaguesacknowledged
themutuality
inthenuclearage,the
ofsecurity
interdependence
ofstatesin an integrated
system,
thedangerofinadvertent
in thesecurity
war,therisksinherent
theimportance
of"defensive
dilemma,
defense"in ameliorating
the security
dilemma,and some of the difficult
trade-offs
in thisrepresentation
inherent
of theproblemof security.
These
to a fargreaterdegreetheconsensusofexperts,
changesreflected
within
the
SovietUnionand abroad,on therepresentation
oftheproblemofsecurity
in
the nuclearage than did earlierSoviet concepts.Once the changesin
Gorbachev's
representation
oftheSovietsecurity
problemare designated
as
theimportant
arewhyandhowGorbachev
learning,
learned.
analytic
questions
WhyGorbachevlearned
Politicalpsychology
offers
somesuggestive
aboutwhyGorbachev
hypotheses
learned.It is plausiblethatGorbachevmayhavebeen a relatively
"uncommitted"
thinker
on security
issues.Bornin 1931,hisearlyyearswerespentin
He receivedhisdegreein law fromMoscowStateUniversity
Stavropol.
and
traveled
intheWestduring
the1970s.In 1978he waselectedsecretary
ofthe
CentralCommittee,
andin1980hebecametheyoungest
ofthe
member
voting
Politburo.
UntilhejoinedthePolitburo,
hisexposureto issuesofsecurity
was
limited.Onlyin 1982,afterBrezhnevdied,did he becomea memberof the
innercircle.He thenchairedtheForeignAffairs
Commission
ofthePolitburo,
andbymid-1984
he frequently
chairedmeetings
ofthePolitburo
itself.
Hisprimary
interest
andresponsibility
beforehe becameGeneralSecretary,
werein thedomestic
nevertheless,
He was in contactwithmanyof
economy.
thescholarsanddirectors
oftheprincipal
economic
institutes
forseveralyears,
and hiscommitment
to reform
oftheeconomy
grewoutofhisstudyoflocal,
notinternational,
policy.66
UnlikeAndropov,
whosecareerwasspentlargely
on
issueslongbeforehe becameGeneralSecretary,
security
in all likelihood
Gorbachev
lessdeeplyinterested
joinedthePolitburo
inissuesofsecurity
than
someofhispredecessors.
65. Ulric Neisser,"On 'Social Knowing,'"Personalityand Social Psychology
Bulletin6 (December 1980),pp. 601-5, especiallypp. 603-4, citedin Kuklinski,Luskin,and Bolland, "Where Is the
Schema,"p. 1346.
66. Sarah Mendelson,"InternalBattles and ExternalWars: Politics,Learning,and the Soviet
WithdrawalfromAfghanistan,"WorldPolitics45 (April 1993), pp. 327-60 and especiallyp. 344.
Gorbachevreferredto a broad-basedcanvasof reportsfromspecialistson the need forchangein
the SovietUnion thathe conductedwiththe assistanceof Nikolai Ryzhkov,thenthe head of the
Economic Departmentof the Central Committee,before he became General Secretary.See
Pravda,7 January1989.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
174 InternationalOrganization
Eduard Shevardnadzeassertsthatduringthe early1980s,Gorbachevknew
the kindof foreignpolicythathe did not wantbut had fewclear ideas about
whathe did want.In 1979,he noted,Gorbachev'sideas on foreignpolicyhad
AleksandrYakovlevrecalledthathe firsttalkedopenlywith
not crystallized.67
Gorbachevabout securityin 1983. He was then ambassador to Ottawa, and
Gorbachevwas on a visitto Canada. In thefewhourstheyhad alone together,
Yakovlevrecountedthat"We began to talkopenly.We were surprisedbyhow
muchwe agreed. We agreed that it was necessaryto do something.Mikhail
Sergeevich[Gorbachev]did notknowwhathe wantedto do butour idea was to
stop the cold war before it led to catastrophe.We had to do something."68
ValentinFalin, who subsequentlybecame chiefof the InternationalDepartment of the Central Committee,described Gorbachev as "not an expertin
foreignpolicyat all," butunusuallywillingto listento whatothershad to say.69
butstruggling
to definetheproblem,he wouldbe
If Gorbachevwas dissatisfied
a primecandidateforlearning.The absence of well-developedschemataand
would makelearningeasier.
deep commitments
thinkeron secuThe propositionthatGorbachevwas a largelyuncommitted
inthe
ritygetssome supportfromhisheavyemphasison domesticrestructuring
In a speech to the Frenchparliamentin
earlymonthsof his administration.
was ecoOctober 1985, Gorbachevexplainedthatthe highestSoviet priority
nomicreformand renewal.Sovietforeignpolicy,he continued,"like the foris determinedfirstofall byinternaldemands."70
eignpolicyofanygovernment,
Some analystsof Soviet politicsunder Gorbachevhave speculatedthathis
that he was attempting
initialinterestin securitywas largelyinstrumental,
above all to seize controlof the Sovietdefenseagenda in orderto rebuildthe
base.71Gorbachevquicklylearned at the tactical
Soviet economic-industrial
implicitin the threatassessmentsof
level thatfutureresourcecommitments
at home.
would seriouslyconstraineconomicrestructuring
traditionalthinkers
His interestin "new thinking"about securitygrewout of his strongcommitmentto perestroikaat home.72
The argumentthat "new thinking"was more a productof "instrumental
enlightenment"is a false dichotomy.73
necessitythan of military-strategic
67. Eduard Shevardnadze,TheFutureBelongstoFreedom,trans.CatherineA. Fitzpatrick(New
York: Free Press,1991),p. 26.
withAleksandrYakovlev,Toronto,27 September1993.
68. Personalinterview
69. Falin is quoted in Don Oberdorfer,The TumfromtheCold Warto a New Era: The United
Statesand theSovietUnion,1983-1990(New York: Poseidon Press,1991), p. 113.
rechii stat'i,vol. 2, pp. 459-60.
70. Gorbachev,Izbrannye
71. Meyer,"The Sources and Prospectsof Gorbachev'sNew PoliticalThinkingon Security,"
p. 125.
withseniorGorbachevadvisers.Shevardnadze
72. See ibid,pp. 126-29,whichcites interviews
purposeofforeignpolicywas "to createthemaximumfavorable
observedthatthemostimportant
externalconditionsneeded in orderto conductinternalreform."See Shevardnadze,The Future
BelongstoFreedom,p. xi.
73. Meyer,"The Sources and Prospectsof SovietNew PoliticalThinkingon Security,"p. 129,
makesthisargument.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 175
Learningis theproductof cognitiveprocessesand emotionalfactors.Learning
as a
model enlightenment
theoristsin educationaland behavioralpsychology
response to incentives.Gorbachev's commitmentto fundamentalchange at
home, along withan absence of deeply embedded constructsabout security,
bothmotivatedand permittedhimto learnabout security.
Motivatedand relativelyfreeto learn,Gorbachevwas farmorereceptiveto
ofthesecurityproblemin thefaceofcommonevidenceof
newrepresentations
blockageand failurethanmanyof his cohort.Evidence of his unusualinterest
in acquiringrelevantknowledgeis verystrong.AnatoliyDobrynin,then the
Soviet ambassador to Washington,recalled a visitto Moscow shortlyafter
PresidentReagan was elected:
I walkedaroundto meettheleaders of the Politburoand almostno one
asked me anyquestions.Theysaid, "How was life?"I said, "Well, it's
okay,"and thatwas it.There was one man,just one manwho asked me
thirty
questions.His name was Gorbachev.He was so interested.
twenty,
he had read so manybooks about the UnitedStates.
And what'ssurprising,
Gorbachevtookall thebooks he could findabout theUnitedStatesand
read themall.74
Gorbachevbegan byaskingnew questionsand was open to a broaderrange
ofanswersthanhispredecessorsand manyofhiscohort.He was also motivated
to search activelyfornew ideas and new representationsof an ill-structured
adviserto Brezhnev,Chernenko,and
problem.AndreiAleksandrov-Agentov,
Gorbachevon securityissues,observedthatGorbachevfeltthatSovietforeign
to change.75Cognizantof the need for
policyhad become rigidand difficult
ofold
change,Gorbachevsearchedactivelyfornewideas and newformulations
securityproblems.
The "failure" in Afghanistanwas a powerfulincentiveto learn. With no
forthewar,Gorbachevconcludedas soon as he heard
personalresponsibility
Even beforehe became General
about the invasionthatitwas a costlyerror.76
Secretary,he invitedspecialistsfor private discussionsabout Afghanistan.
Convincedof theneed forchangeand motivatedto learn,Gorbachevbegan to
oftheproblemof Sovietsecurity.
searchfornewrepresentations
Learningbydoing
If the propositionthatGorbachevwas highlymotivatedto learn but a largely
thinkerabout securityis correct,the obviousquestionis how he
uncommitted
withAnatoliyDobrynin,formerSovietambassadorto theUnitedStates,
74. Personalinterview
Moscow,17 December 1992.
formerSoviet securityadviser,
75. Personal interviewwith Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov,
Moscow,12 August1993.
76. Shevardnadze,TheFutureBelongstoFreedom,p. 26.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
176 InternationalOrganization
learned.How did he acquiretheschemathatwas at thecore of"new thinking"
aboutsecurity?The evidencesuggeststhatbeginningin theearly1980s,several
yearsbeforehe became General Secretary,Gorbachevbegan to look forideas
fromcivilianand academic specialistsinside and outside the government.77
Afterhe became a full memberof the Politburo,he began to consultwith
membersof the specialistcommunity
on issues of foreignas well as domestic
policy.78
Immediatelyafterhe became General Secretary,Gorbachevordereda series
of criticalexaminationsof securityissues. His predecessorhad commissioned
hundredsof studies of economic and social problemsbut almost none on
foreignpolicy and securityissues other than Afghanistan.Gorbachev requested studiesfromtheForeignMinistry,
theDefense Ministry,
and theState
SecurityCommittee(KGB). Gorbachev had arranged for Yakovlev to be
broughtback fromCanada to head the Instituteof World Economy and
InternationalRelations;Yakovlevdrewon specialiststhereto providea flowof
to theGeneral Secretary.79
expertadvicedirectly
Gorbachevalso asked Georgii
Arbatov,thedirectoroftheInstituteoftheU.S.A. and Canada, forpapers and
advice.80Oleg Grinevsky,the chief Soviet negotiatorat the Conferenceon
Confidenceand SecurityBuildingMeasures,was invitedto Gorbachev'soffice
forconfidential
discussions.81
Many of those Gorbachevconsultedworkedin the policyinstitutesof the
SovietAcademyof Sciences in Moscow and in journalismand had long been
criticalof establishedSoviet conceptsof defense.82Partiallyshelteredin the
institutesfrombroader politicalrepercussions,these policyintellectualsin a
slow,cumulativeprocesshad foryearscritically
examinedthe failureof Soviet
concepts of securityto realize Soviet goals. Much of the analysis and
commentaryby the policy analystsreferredto the failuresof policy under
Brezhnev.83
Long beforeGorbachevbecame General Secretary,analystshad
writtenabout the irrelevanceof superiorityand victoryin nuclear war, the
77. An analysisof Gorbachev'spersonality
scoredhimlow on "creativity"
and predictedthathe
would be especially receptiveto others' ideas and to solutionsto problemssuggestedby his
advisers.See Winter,Hermann,Weintraub,and Walker,"Theory and Predictionsin Political
Psychology,"
p. 235.
78. Mendelson,"InternalBattlesand ExternalWars,"p. 344.
79. Personal interviewwithAleksandrYakovlev,Toronto,27 September1993. Also see Jeff
and the GorbachevForeignPolicy Revolution,"WorldPolitics45
Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions,
(January1993),pp. 242-70.
withArbatov.
80. Personalinterview
81. See Oberdorfer,The Tum,p. 113; and personalinterview
withOleg Grinevsky,
Stockholm,
16 October1992.
82. See Thomas Risse-Kappen,"Ideas Do Not Float Freely:TransnationalCoalitions,Domestic Structures,and the End of the Cold War," in this issue of International
Organization;and
Mendelson,"InternalBattlesand ExternalWars."
83. Yevgenii Primakov,"Novaia filosofiiavneshnei politiki" (New philosophies of foreign
policy),Pravda,11 July1987.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 177
growingriskof inadvertent
war,the dangersof the securitydilemma,and the
importanceoftranscending
theclass factorin the searchforsecurity.84
Policyscientistsworkingin theinstitutes
had access to Westernjournalsand
scholarlyarticlesthatcritically
analyzedbothSovietand Americanconceptsof
security.Fromthelate 1960s,academic specialistsand journalistshad come to
knowspecialistsin the WesternEuropean and U.S. armscontrolcommunity,
both throughtheirwork and personally.They met at Pugwash meetings,at
seminarsorganizedby the AmericanAcademyof Arts and Sciences withthe
SovietAcademyofSciences,at international
scientific
and through
conferences,
These internationalcontactsfacilitatedthe exchangeof
exchangeprograms.85
ideas and the developmentof mutuallyunderstandablevocabulariesand conceptsbetweentransnational
communities.
In theGorbachevyears,some senior
Soviet militaryofficersacknowledgedthat their"new" idea of unacceptable
damage in nuclear war could be traced to the thinkingof U.S. Secretaryof
Defense Robert McNamara.86Expertlearningwas a long, slow process,but
particularly
importantwere the acknowledgment
of the growingcosts of the
in Afghanistanand the recognitionthatAfghanistanwas
Soviet intervention
the Soviet "Vietnam."87Yakovlev and Arbatovagreed in early1985 thatthe
Soviet Union had to withdrawfromAfghanistan.88
They, along with other
analysts,argued as well thatNATO's deploymentof PershingII missileswas
provoked by Moscow's deploymentof highlyaccurate intermediate-range
nuclear systems.89
Yakovlev termedthe deploymenta "stupid and strange"
policy.90These were the kinds of unexpectedpolicyfailuresthat stimulated
learning.
The size and strength
ofthepolicycommunity
thatpromoted"new thinking"
84. See, forexample,OlegovichBogomolov,"Afghanistanas Seen in 1980,"MoscowNews30,30
July-6August 1988. For a detailed examinationof the impactof policyscientistsas an epistemic
community,see Stephen Shenfield,The Nuclear Predicament:Explorationsin Soviet Ideology
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987); Allen Lynch, The Soviet Studyof Intemational
Relations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1987); Bruce Parrott,"SovietNationalSecurity
Under Gorbachev"; and Robert Herman, "Soviet New Thinking:Ideas, Interests,and the
Redefinition
of Security,"Ph.D diss.,Departmentof Government,
in progress.
CornellUniversity,
85. See Emanuel Adler, "The Emergenceof Cooperation: National EpistemicCommunities
and the InternationalEvolutionof the Idea of NuclearArmsControl,"IntemationalOrganization
46 (Winter1992),pp. 101-46and especiallypp. 137-40;Michael Mandelbaum,"WesternInfluence
on the SovietUnion," in SewerynBialer and Michael Mandelbaum,eds., Gorbachev'sRussia and
AmericanForeignPolicy(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1988); and Mendelson,"InternalBattles
and ExternalWars."
86. EdwardL. WarnerIII, "New PoliticalThinkingand Old Realitiesin SovietDefence Policy,"
Survival31 (January-February
1989),pp. 18-20.
87. Personalinterview
withVadim Zagladin,formerly
head of theDepartmentof International
Relationsof the CentralCommitteeand subsequentlya policyadviserto Gorbachev,Moscow, 18
May 1989.
88. Personalinterview
withYakovlevand withArbatov.
89. InterviewswithAmbassadorLeonid Zamyatin,who subsequentlyheaded TASS, Moscow,
16 December 1991; and withDobrynin.See also Herman,"SovietNew Thinking."
withYakovlev.
90. Personalinterview
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
178 InternationalOrganization
What is importantfor
by others.91
on securityhave been studiedextensively
of policyintellectuals-deeply
purposesof thisargumentis thata community
criticalof past failuresof policyunder Brezhnevand aware of analysesby
Western colleagues-was prepared and accessible to Gorbachev when he
proposednewways
This community
beganto look fornewideas about security.
of representingthe problemof security,identifiednew causal relationships,
trade-offs
explicit.These "policyentrepreneurs"
and made someofthedifficult
were readyto teach when Gorbachev,anxious to learn,gave thema "policy
window."92What theyhad to teach was new to Gorbachev,but not to some
membersoftheSovietpolicycommunity.93
Finally,the evidence suggeststhat Gorbachevdid not learn in an orderly
linearfashionor throughdeductivereasoning.The developmentand articularelationship
byGorbachevsuggesta complexinteractive
tionof"new thinking"
betweenpoliticallearningand actionthatprovidedquickfeedback.Througha
processoftrialand error,Gorbachevlearnedthroughexperimentation.94
91. See Herman,"Soviet New Thinking";Mendelson,"InternalBattles and ExternalWars";
and the GorbachevForeignPolicyRevolution."For a broader
and Checkel,"Ideas, Institutions,
studyof epistemiccommunities,or networksof knowledge-basedexperts,see the collectionof
essays in Peter M. Haas, ed., "Knowledge, Power, and InternationalPolicy Coordination,"
46 (Winter1992).
IntemationalOrganization
see MatthewEvangelista,"Sources ofModeration
92. On theconceptof"policyentrepreneur,"
in SovietSecurityPolicy,"in PhilipE. Tetlock,JoL. Husbands,RobertJervis,Paul C. Stern,and
Press,
CharlesTilly,eds.,Behavior,Society,and NuclearWar,vol. 2 (New York: OxfordUniversity
1991), pp. 254-355, especiallypp. 275-77. On the concept of a "policywindow,"see JohnW.
and PublicPolicies(Boston: Little,Brown,1984).
Kingdon,Agendas,Altematives,
an informaladvisorysystemthatprovideda widerflowof
93. Gorbachevalso institutionalized
ideas and criticaladvice on securityissues. AlthoughAndropov,and at times Brezhnev,had
occasionallyengaged in privatediscussionswithinstituteofficials,Gorbachevcreated bodies of
to ask theiradvice and
and metfrequently
thepress,and theministries
expertsfromtheinstitutes,
opinions.He made almostno major decisionwithoutexpertadvice. Based on personalinterview
Toronto,1 April1993.
interpreter,
withPavel Palazchenko,Gorbachev'slong-standing
streamof evidence,researchin cognitivepsychologysuggeststhat at
94. In a complementary
timesbehaviorleads to changesin schema as people make inferencesfromtheirbehaviorabout
theirconvictions.See Gerald R. Salanickand MaryConway,"AttitudeInferencefromSalientand
32
and Social Psychology
Relevant CognitiveContentAbout Behavior,"Joumal of Personality
(November 1975), pp. 829-40; and Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson, and Ralph H. Fazio,
and
Consistency:An IndividualDifferencePerspective,"JoumalofPersonality
"Attitude-Behavior
38 (March 1980),pp. 432-40. Once people are convincedthattheirbehaviorhas
Social Psychology
been shaped by theirpriorbeliefs,those beliefsbecome even more importantin shapingfuture
behavior. Inferencefrombehavior is a dominantcognitivemechanismin the early stages of
developmentof beliefsand attitudes.See J. Daryl Bem, "Self-PerceptionTheory,"in Leonard
vol. 6 (New York: Academic Press,
Social Psychology,
Berkowitz,ed., Advancesin Experimental
An
1972),pp. 1-61; R. H. Fazio, M. P. Zanna, and JoelCooper, "Dissonance and Self-Perception:
Social
IntegrativeView of Each Theory'sProperDomain of Application,"JoumalofExperimental
13 (September1977),pp. 464-79; RichardE. Nisbettand StuartValins,"Perceivingthe
Psychology
Causes of One's Own Behavior," in Edward E. Jones, David E. Knouse, Harold H. Kelley,
theCauses of
Perceiving
RichardE. Nisbett,StuartValins, and BernardWeiner,eds.,Attribution:
The World
N.J.:General LearningPress,1971),pp. 63-78; and Vertzberger,
Behavior(Morristown,
in TheirMinds,p. 169. Decision makerswho have littlepriorexperiencedeveloptheirbeliefswhile
on thejob; theirbeliefsand attitudescan changeas a resultof the inferencestheydrawfromtheir
behavior.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 179
began longbefore"new thinking"was whollyin place. On
Experimentation
7 April 1985,barelya monthafterGorbachevbecame General Secretary,he
announced the suspension of Soviet countermeasuresin response to INF
of SS-20s.In
on further
deployments
byNATO and a moratorium
deployments
on
a
unilateral
moratorium
of
that
same
Gorbachev
proclaimed
year,
August
nucleartesting.The SovietUnion also paid itsback dues to theUnitedNations
forpeacekeeping,began to cooperate withthe InternationalAtomic Energy
Agency, and reworkedits position in the strategicarms reduction talks
(START) in October 1985. In January1986, Gorbachevurged a programof
to be achievedin threestagesbytheyear2000.
completenucleardisarmament
Committedto change, yet frustratedby the initiallyslow U.S. response,
Gorbachevgraduallyexpandedhisschemaand his scriptsforaction.
At the same time,he was learningfromhis meetingswith U.S. officials,
particularlySecretaryof State George Shultz. He considered Shultz an
important"interlocutor"in discussionsof "big philosophicalquestions"about
the world and its futurein the next century."He helped me a great deal,"
Gorbachevsaid, "in developingmypolicies."95Ideas and actionwere synergisticallyrelated, as "new thinking"at firsttentativelyencouraged unilateral
action,and theresponseto Sovietbehaviorthenfedand expandedGorbachev's
"new thinking."
One finalfactoris worthnoting.When Gorbachevfirstrecognizedthe need
and
for"new thinking"about security,his motiveswere largelyinstrumental
of the domesticeconomy.As he
his interestfocused on the restructuring
learned, however,the importanceand autonomyof "new thinking"about
realitiesof the
securitygrew.By 1987,Gorbachevinsistedthattheunforgiving
nuclear age demanded new concepts and new policies, independent of
perestroikaat home:
Some people saythatthe ambitiousgoals set forthbythepolicyofperestroikain our countryhave promptedthepeace proposalswe have lately
arena. This is an oversimplification....True,we
made in theinternational
conditionsforour internalprogress.But we want
need normalinternational
a worldfreeofwar,withoutarmsraces,nuclearweapons,and violence;not
onlybecause thisis an optimalconditionforour internaldevelopment.It is
an objectiveglobal requirementthatstemsfromthe realitiesofthepresent
day.96
Gorbachev's commitmentto his representationof the problem of security
as he learned.
intensified
The answerto the questionof how Gorbachevlearned is thathe learnedin
about securityfora
partfromthosein theSovietUnion who had been thinking
abroad,and in
longtime,in partfromthemeetingshe heldwithseniorofficials
withGorbachev.
95. Personalinterview
p. 11.
96. Gorbachev,Perestroika,
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
180 InternationalOrganization
that he and his colleagues
experimentation
part throughthe trial-and-error
older
colleagueswithnew people
initiated.As he began to learn,he replaced
that he wanted to
representations
committedto the ideas and the problem
make change
would
that
coalition
the
political
promoteand began to build
as Foreign
Andrei
Gromyko
replaced
politicallypossible. Shevardnadze
of new
number
of
a
substantial
election
the
ensured
Minister,and Gorbachev
personnel
both
promoted
Learning
Committee.97
the
Central
membersto
Over
further.98
shiftsand politicalsupportthat,in turn,pushed"new thinking"
and
became
self-reinforcing
from
behavior
and
others
from
time, learning
self-amplifying.
Individuallearningand foreignpolicychange
No explanationof individuallearning,evenbya seniorleader in a hierarchical
system,can explainforeignpolicychange.Institutionaland politicalprocesses
individuallearning
mustinterveneto build the politicalsupportto transform
into changes in foreignpolicybehavior.To speak of "state learning"is to
anthropomorphizeindividualprocesses in ways that leave out the critical
political and organizationalvariables. I have examinedwhetherGorbachev
learned,but I have notexploredhowhis learningshaped thechangesin Soviet
foreignpolicy.That is a far more complexproblemthat requiressystematic
variables.The analysisof how Gorbachev
analysisof politicaland institutional
observationsabout the
learned is suggestive,however,of some preliminary
importanceofindividuallearningin policychange.
Analystsof learninghave identifiedseveralconditionsifindividuallearning
is to be translatedinto policy change. At a minimum,learningmust be
in thecentralpoliticalagencies,a dominantpoliticalcoalition
institutionalized
of problems,and new policies
mustbe committedto the new representations
witha stake in the old ordermustbe restaffed,
mustbe created. Institutions
reorganized,givennew missions,or otherwisemarginalized.Institutionalized
changes are most effectivewhen theyare preceded by a consensus among
policyexpertsin favorofchange.99
97. See Thane Gustafsonand Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and
Authority,"Problemsof Communism35 (May-June 1986), pp. 1-19; and JerryF. Hough,
36 (July-August
1987),pp. 169-70.
"GorbachevConsolidatingPower,"Problemsof Communism
1975-1990:Alternative
98. AndrewOwen Bennett,"PatternsofSovietMilitaryInterventionism
Explanationsand Their Implications,"in William Zimmerman,ed., Beyondthe Soviet Threat:
of MichiganPress,1992),pp. 105-27.
Policyin a NewEra (Ann Arbor:University
AmericanSecurity
99. See Haas, When KnowledgeIs Power; and Ernest Haas, "Collective Learning: Some
TheoreticalSpeculations,"in Breslauerand Tetlock,Learningin U.S. and SovietForeignPolicy,pp.
Learn? (New York: Pergamon,1985); and
62-99. See also Lloyd Etheredge,Can Governments
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Uncertaintyof the Past: OrganizationalLearning
Under Ambiguity,"in James G. March, ed., Decisions and Organizations(New York: Basil
Blackwell,1988),pp. 335-58.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 181
Onlysome oftheseconditionswerepresentin theSovietUnion from1985to
1989. Gorbachevchangedthe top leadershipin the ForeignMinistryand the
InternationalDepartmentoftheCentralCommittee,putcivilianswithdefense
expertiseon the staffof the CentralCommittee,and broughtpolicyintellectuof the foreignand
als onto his personalstaff.There was large-scalerestaffing
defense policymakingapparatus.100Despite these changes, no broad-based
consensusin favorof "new thinking"existed.As we have seen, almostall the
fundamentalconcepts of "new thinking"about securitywere politically
contested.
placed
powerfully
Even thoughno consensusexistedand traditionalthinkers
withinthe Soviet General Staffchallengedthe new conceptsof securitywith
increasingvigorfrommid-1987,policychange proceeded and, indeed, gathered momentum.The evidencesuggeststhata broad-basedexpertconsensus
change in the Soviet General Staffwere not necessary
and institutionalized
to translateindividual
conditionsof policychange. Some institutionalization
learninginto policy change was clearly necessary,as was a new political
were smallerin scope
and coalition-building
coalition,but institutionalization
thanmanyanalystsexpected.
This observationis open to challenge.A counterfactualargumentcan be
made thatthe forcesopposed to "new thinking"about securitythatgathered
momentumand organized politicallyin 1990-91 could have compelled a
retreat.In hislastyearin office,Gorbachevwas forcedto givegreaterpolitical
weightto traditionalthinkersand slow somewhatthe pace of policychange.
would have impededfurther
The propositionthatlimitedinstitutionalization
change or even partiallyreversedpolicycannot be put to the test because
in the
Gorbachevresignedin December 1991as theSovietUnion disintegrated
wake ofthefailedcoup attemptthatAugust.
The evidencefromthiscase suggeststhatthe relationshipamongindividual
and foreignpolicychangewas notlinear
learning,politicalinstitutionalization,
Individuallearningprovokedinitial,tentativechangesin
buthighlyinteractive.
policythatin turnled to morelearning,co-optationofintellectualand political
and further
and some institutionalization,
coalition-building
entrepreneurs,
of
policy change. The social cognition learning by doing captures these
dynamics.It suggestsan incrementalprocess wherebynew representations
abroad and politicsat home as theprocess
werereinforced
byexperimentation
learner-not thekindof
or data-driven,
escalated.Gorbachevwas an inductive,
deductivethinkerassumedbyrationalmodels.
Althoughindividuallearningby doingwas a necessaryconditionof foreign
explanation.It does not adequatelycapture
policychange,it is not a sufficient
the politicsof doing as Gorbachev developed a new representationof the
problemof Sovietsecurity.Gorbachev's"new thinking"ignitedthe engineof
100. Parrott,"SovietNationalSecurityUnder Gorbachev."
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
182 InternationalOrganization
policychange,but politicsdeterminedwhether,when,how far,and in what
waysforeignpolicychanged.Individuallearningmatteredin changingSoviet
foreignpolicy,but how,when,and whyit matteredcan onlybe explainedbya
politicsoflearningand change.
broaderanalysisof theinteractive
Politicallearningis not a necessaryconditionof policychange. Policycan
change as the result of shiftingdomestic coalitions or new patterns of
conditions,and itdoes
in thefaceofchanginginternational
institutionalization
so routinelyin large numbersof cases. That individuallearningis neither
necessary nor sufficientacross all cases of policy change should not be
It is unlikelythatthereis a singlepathto all kindsofpolicychange.
disturbing.
Multiple paths to single outcomes are part of the larger problem of
"equifinality,"where similaroutcomes are explained by the interactionof
differentfactorsunder differentconditions.Only the outlines of the rich
of politicallearningin
researchagenda that growsout of the conditionality
foreignpolicychangecan be drawn.
Analysisof the individualleader is thecriticalstartingpoint.Social learning
is createdonlyby individuals;organizations"learn" onlyby institutionalizing
individuallearning.Openness to new ideas and the capacityto create new
representationsof ill-definedproblemsare in part functionsof personality.
Research on the personalitiesof politicalleaders suggests,forexample,that
low cognitivecomplexityand intoleranceof ambiguityare associatedwithan
relatedto opennessto
however,is inversely
aggressivepoliticalstyle.Creativity,
We need muchbetterdeveloped theoriesof personality
the ideas of others.101
as traitsthatinfluenceindividualcapacity
thatexploreopennessand creativity
forpoliticallearning.
Political learningby individualsoccurs in context.Evidence suggeststhat
some leaders have learned fromunexpectedpolicyfailuresand fromcrisis,
whileothershave abstractedfrompast policysuccesses.We knowlittleabout
the political conditions,at home and abroad, that motivateand provoke
learning.Theoriesof social cognitionhave to build linkagesbetweendifferent
kindsofpoliticalcontextsand politicallearning.
Finally,the interactionbetweenlearningand politicsmustbe systematically
examinedto explainpolicychange.Gorbachevlearnedthroughtrial-and-error
and initiatedan incrementalprocessof policychange.Other
experimentation
analyses have found that policylearningis a spasmodic,jerkyprocess that
respondsto the creationof new intellectualconstructs,the creationof new
or a majorfailureofpastpolicy.In evolutionary
models,political
organizations,
representationsof the
These different
learningis occasional and erratic.102
and Walker,"Theoryand PredictionsinPoliticalPsychology."
101. Winter,Hermann,Weintraub,
Power,and Ideas as a Sourceof
Monetary
Policy:Markets,
102. See JohnOdell, U.S. International
Press,1982),pp. 367-76; and PeterHaas, "Towards
Change(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
paper presentedat the
Learning:Ideas and Structuration,"
Model of Institutional
an Evolutionary
annual meetingof theAmericanPoliticalScience Association,Washington,D.C., 1-4 September
1993.
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symposium 183
interactionbetween policylearningand change may be partlya functionof
of differentunits that
differencesin policy arenas, but more importantly,
"learn"-individuals or collectives-and ofthekindof learningtheydo.
about the kindsof interaction
Justbeneaththe surfaceof the controversies
between learningand politicsthat produce policychange lies an important
debate about the attributesof knowledge.Broadly speaking,for those who
politicsdeterminesknowledge
considerthatknowledgeis sociallyconstructed,
For those who conceive of knowledgeas reasoned truth,
and learning.103
learning shapes politics. The analysis of the interactionamong learning,
joined to a deep debate about
politics,and foreignpolicychangeis inextricably
It
is
a debate worthhaving.
ofknowledgein politicallife.
theconstruction
103. For an analysisof part of this debate, see Rey Koslowski and FriedrichKratochwil,
"UnderstandingChange in InternationalPolitics:The Soviet Empire's Demise and the InternaOrganization.
tionalSystem,"thisissue ofInternational
This content downloaded on Sat, 16 Mar 2013 18:26:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions