Civilian Control and
Parliamentary Oversight
TEODORA FUIOR
Visiting expert, DCAF
Why Civilian Control?
“War is too serious a matter to entrust to
military men” – Clemenceau
Political character of war
Major impact on the citizens
How?
Civilian commander in chief
Power to declare war belongs to civilian
authorities
Why a Role for Parliament?
Civilian Control
z Democratic
→ Democratic Control
Legitimacy
z Space for opposition’s proposals
z No taxation without representation
z Accountability and transparency
Democratic accountability
Civil Society
Judiciary
Parliament
Executive
Security
Forces
What is accountability?
REVEAL, EXPLAIN, JUSTIFY
1. What powers have you got?
2. Where did you get it from?
3. In whose interests do you exercise it?
4. To whom are you held responsible?
5. How do we get rid of you?
Parliament’s Functions
1. Representation
2. Legislation
3. Oversight
Plenary session –
the power to legislate
Security
policy
Legislation
Top
appointments
¾ Approval of National Security Strategy,
Defence Policy,
¾ Motions on security and defence issues
¾ Votes of non confidence
¾ Size, structure, organization, functioning
and tasks of security sector agencies
¾ Budget
¾ Missions abroad, war, emergency, siege
¾ Ratify treaties
¾ Ministers, Directors of intelligence
services and other security institutions,
Ombudsman, National Prosecutor, National
Audit Office
Approve the
budget
–with significant
changes
–with minor
changes
–without
changes
Country
Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, US.
Austria, Finland, France,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey.
Canada, UK , Greece.
Parliamenta
ry
involvement
military op.
High – power
of prior
approval
Medium –
important
exceptions from
prior approval
Low – no
prior approval
Country
Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Finland, Ireland,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden.
Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Romania.
Belgium, France, Greece,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, UK.
Committees –
the power to control
¾ Recommendations, reports
Advise the
plenary
Exercise
Oversight
¾ Hold hearings or inquiries
¾ Summon military personnel, civil
servants or experts to testify
¾ Request documents
¾ Examine petitions
¾ Visit and inspect security services
premises
DEFENCE
COMMITTEES
Members
Members
reelected
Staff
Chairman
opposition?
Meetings
Budget
Canada
12
5
3
O
1/ week
-
Czech Republic
19
10
4
X
2/month
-
Denmark
17
9
2
O
1-2/ month
-
France
72
32
11
O
1/ week
-
Germany
38
-
8
O
1/week
Hungary
15
10
2
X
3/month
4,000
Macedonia
12
4
3
O
1-2/month
-
Netherlands
30
15
5
O
1/ week
25,000
Poland
25
5
2
X
3/month
-
Romania
22
5
6
O
2/week
-
Spain
40
12
4
O
1-2/month
-
Sweden
17
8
5
X
2/week
500,000
Switzerland
25
16
4
O
1-2/month
-
Turkey
25
10
3
O
1-2/month
-
United Kingdom
14
3
8
X
Min. 1/week
£ 273,804
United States
25
17
50
X
Min. 1/week
$ 5,800,000
Members of Parliament –
the power to represent
Initiate and
amend laws
Questions
Interpellations
¾ Request
information from
the executive
¾ Collect information
from their electors
“A
parliament can do any thing but
make a man a woman and a
woman a man.”
Lord Pembroke, 1648
Challenges for keeping
security accountable
•
•
•
•
Complexity
Secrecy
Prone to corruption
Lack of political will
1. Complexity
Diversity of
security
agencies
Reform and
adaptation
Long term
planning
Need for
Permanent
Specialized
Committees
2. Secrecy
MPs usually
rely only on
information
given by the
Executive
Tendency to
over-classify
information
Two essential laws are
needed:
Freedom of
Information Act
Protection of
Classified Information
Act
→ vetting and
clearing procedures
Appointed
CLASSIFIED
INFO ACCESS positions
Members of Parliament
Legitimacy
Professional
Political
Accountability
Hierarchical
Legal
To electors
Immunity
Access
Personal / nominal Collective - committees
Use
decision making
1. PSOs, budgets, procrmt
2. Oversight – check legality
Vulnerability
Secrecy culture
1. More prone to disclosure
2. More vulnerable to
blackmail
Criteria of
vetting
Based on conduct,
not ideology.
Should ideology disqualify?
Scope of vetting Wide:
responsibility for
misconduct
Narrow (if not
complemented by lustration)
3. Prone to corruption
Defence
procurement
Clear
legislation and
tender
procedures
Committee
investigations
DEFENCE
PROCUREMNT
Right to
disapprove
contracts
MOD obliged
to inform
Specify needs
of equipment
Select
producers
Select off set
beneficiaries
Canada
O
O
X
O
O
Czech Republic
O
O
X
X
X
Denmark
O
O
O
O
O
France
O
O
X
O
O
Germany
X (+€ 25mill.)
X (+ € 25mill.)
X
X
X
Hungary
O
X
O
O
O
Macedonia
O
O
O
O
O
Netherlands
X (+ €25 mil)
X (+ €25 mil)
X
X
X
Poland
X
X
O
O
O
Romania
O
O
O
O
O
Spain
O
O
O
O
O
Sweden
O
O
X
O
O
Switzerland
-
X
X
O
O
Turkey
O
O
O
O
O
United Kingdom
O
X
O
O
O
United States
X
X
X
X
X
4. No political will
Party
Discipline
Political
Courage
Lack of
interest
Institutional
Awareness
Involving
opposition