Kennedy School of Government
Case Program
C14-04-1722.0
Robust Web of Corruption:
Peru’s Intelligence Chief Vladimiro Montesinos
In September 2000, Vladimiro Ilych Lenin Montesinos Torres was exposed as one of the
most skillful corrupt politicians in Peru’s history. The de facto head of the Servicio de Inteligencia
Nacional (SIN: the national intelligence service) operated at the center of a wide-ranging web of
reciprocal relationships and well-placed bribes which even his most fervent detractors could
hardly have imagined. Those beholden to him included judges, legislators, media barons, drug
traffickers, captains of industry and military leaders.
Montesinos’ unmasking came, ironically, only weeks after his greatest triumph: the
successful reelection to an unconstitutional third term of President Alberto Fujimori. As evidence
of his misdoings grew, it also became apparent that Montesinos fell thanks to his own
machinations. Without the incriminating evidence of thousands of videotapes made by
Montesinos himself of illegal transactions conducted in his office, his power had been such that no
one could touch him.1
The record created by Montesinos’ videotapes (dubbed the Vladivideos) provides a rare and
dramatic snapshot of corruption in action, of the management and protocols of bribery and fraud.
This account, while not comprehensive, draws on the historical record and those videos to offer a
glimpse into just how someone like Montesinos managed to build and maintain an empire built on
money and secrets.
1
It is unclear how many videotapes exist. The prosecutor trying Montesinos has 720 tapes in custody. Press
accounts give the number at anywhere from 1,500-2,500. Montesinos himself claimed there are 30,000.
This case was written by Kirsten Lundberg for Professor. Philip Heymann, Harvard Law School and the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The case was based on the work of HLS 2003 Robert Kennedy
Visiting Professor Luis Moreno Ocampo, who also produced the chart. Guillermo Jorge (HLS LLM 2003) assisted with
research. Funding was provided by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, the Public Policy
Program of the National University of Singapore, the Open Society Institute, and the Project on Justice in Times of
Transition. (1103)
Copyright © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. No part of this publication may be
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Who was Montesinos?
Montesinos was born May 20, 1945, in Arequipa, a southern colonial city nestled at the
foot of the 7,500-foot Misti volcano.2 His family was poor but respectable—his uncle had been
mayor and two cousins were left-wing local congressmen. Politically, the extended Montesinos
family was divided among Communists and conservative Catholics. But Montesinos’ parents were
communists and therefore named their son after the founder of the Soviet state. Montesinos’ father
was also renowned as a local drunk who once held a mock wake to hear what mourners would say
about him. Don Pancho, as the father was known, committed suicide when Montesinos was a
young man. Anecdote has it that Montesinos called a mentor to say: ““Do you think this son of a
bitch’s death is going to affect my career?”3 Whether true or not, this story made it into the
Montesinos mythology as illustration of his essential callousness.
Montesinos went into the army because his father thought it would offer a stable career.
He graduated from the Escuela Militar in Chorrillos (south of the capital, Lima) in 1966. He was
known as an ardent leftist, a bright, capable, and somewhat effeminate officer. After graduation he
took a number of courses, including public relations (earning a master’s degree in 1970), the
organization of international conferences, and tax issues. In 1972, according to some accounts, he
earned a law degree from the National University of San Marcos.4 On a personal note, in 1971 he
apparently married a woman named Trinidad Becerra.
In 1973, Montesinos was promoted to captain of artillery and became an advisor to
General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, then-prime minister, minister of war and commander-in-chief of
the army. On May 1, 1973, Montesinos was appointed Mercado’s chief of staff. Montesinos was
considered exceptionally adept at organization; he never forgot a name or face. Mercado relied
heavily on his adjutant, especially for advice on the sensitive business of promotions. Montesinos
became unpopular among his fellow officers once it became known that he reviewed promotion
lists for Mercado.
Mercado Jarrin served President General Juan Velasco Alvarado who, in 1968, had led the
armed forces in overthrowing a democratically-elected government. Unusually for military
regimes, Velasco’s had adopted a leftist radical reform agenda, expelled the US military mission
and, in the early 1970s, decided to turn to the Soviet Union for weaponry. Among his other duties,
2
Arequipa was home also to writer Mario Vargas Llosa, with whom Montesinos would later cross paths, and to
Shining Path terrorist leader Abimael Guzman. Source: Gorriti article.
3
Thomas Catan, “The sins of Montesinos,” Financial Times, July 26, 2003, p.15. The mentor was Francisco
Loayza.
4
State Department cable, “FY-76 IV nomination,” January 8, 1976. The State Department later contradicted itself,
saying in a dispatch of August 16, 1990 (“The man behind Fujimori’s throne”), that Montesinos earned his law
degree after leaving prison. The earlier dispatch would seem more reliable as it was written closer to the events.
But other sources (f. ex. http://stucchi.tripod.com/politica/vmt.htm) also say he earned his law degree after jail.
2
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Montesinos carried Mercado’s black briefcase, which contained details of Peru’s arms purchases
from the Soviet Union.
Even at this early stage in his career, rumors began to circulate that Montesinos was a US
intelligence agent. The presidential weekly agenda apparently arrived at the US Embassy shortly
after Velasco approved it, and suspicion fell on Montesinos.5 He may also at this time have worked
for SIN, the Peruvian intelligence agency, as an agent provocateur. Professor Julio Cotler, a social
scientist, remembers an approach from Montesinos to join a band (whether it existed or not is
unknown) of disenchanted young military officers hoping to overthrow the corrupt generals in the
high command. Professor Cotler threw him out of his office.6
Mercado retired on January 31, 1975. Monesinos transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture
as advisor to Minister General Enrique Gallegos Venero. From there, he became in 1976 an aide to
leftist Prime Minister General Jorge Fernandez Maldonado. When Fernandez Maldonado was
removed in July 1976, Montesinos moved briefly to the staff of his successor, the politically
moderate General Guillermo Arbulu Galliani.7 There are conflicting accounts of why, only a month
later, Montesinos found himself assigned to an artillery position in the remote town of Sullana on
the border with Ecuador.8 What is not in question is that Montesinos did not stay long.
US Trip Debacle
From August 1976, Montesinos’ fortunes declined. Much of the trouble was of his own
making. Accounts differ as to just what happened, but clearly the young officer wanted to spend
some time in the US. In 1965, he had reportedly been a cadet at the US Army School of the
Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia.9 In 1974, the US Embassy had offered to send him to the US as
a guest of the State Department’s International Visitors Program, but the press of work kept him
home.10 By August 1976, however, he was ready to accept. So on August 27, Montesinos stole a
5
Gustavo Gorriti, “Fujimori’s Svengali; Vladimiro Montesinos: The Betrayal of Peruvian Democracy,” Covert
Action Quarterly, Summer 1994. For an online version, see:
http://fortunecity.de/olympia/beckenbauer/30/gorriti.html
6
Gorriti.
7
State Department cable, “Detention of Vladimiro Montesinos,” April 4, 1977.
8
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts on a powerful, behind-the-scenes player,” January 7,
1992. One source said Montesinos was involved in a plot of young, leftist officers the summer of 1975 to make a
candidate they favored president. The plot was discovered. This was a full year, however, before Montesinos’
banishment so does not explain it. A number of declassified State Department cables are available at:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB72/
9
It seems likely that Montesinos did attend this course, as several websites refer to his presence there. One report
whose reliability cannot be vouched for is: http://www.csrp.org/pan/soa.html. The School of the Americas is now
closed and its website has no data.
10
The IVP program brought to the US current or potential leaders in government, politics, the media, education, and
other fields. IVP visitors included many who subsequently became heads of state, cabinet-level ministers or private
sector leaders. See: http://exchanges.state.gov/education/ivp/
3
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blank army travel form and apparently forged the president’s signature. He went to the American
Embassy in Lima to get his US travel papers and, on September 5, flew to the States—returning on
September 21.
This visit did much to fuel persistent reports for the rest of Montesinos’ career that he was
an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—reports Montesinos eventually confirmed.11
During his brief but busy stay, Montesinos met with State Department Policy Planning Staff
official Luigi Einaudi, as well as with CIA Office of Current Intelligence officer Robert Hawkins.12
He visited the Pentagon and the National Security Council.13 He also spent time with academics in
Connecticut and Washington, and gave a talk at the Inter-American Defense College. There he was
spotted by a Peruvian general, who reported Montesinos’ presence in the US back to Lima.
On his return to Peru, Montesinos was arrested and his house searched. There
investigators found a number of confidential documents, which apparently confirmed that during
his time as Prime Minister Mercado Jarrin’s aide, Montesinos had fed the US Embassy lists of
Peru’s Soviet weapons purchases.14 Montesinos was dishonorably discharged from the army on
September 28, 1976, and ordered confined to a military prison. Military Prosecutor General Alberto
Vargas Ruiz de Somocurcio, who termed Montesinos a “danger to national security,”
recommended charging the young officer with high treason, which carried a mandatory death
sentence. No army officer within memory had been convicted of such a crime. Montesinos denied
that he had passed documents to the Americans.
This was not the first time Montesinos stood accused of stealing classified documents.
Such charges had also surfaced in 1975, when he still worked for Mercado Jarrin. At that time,
Mercado had intervened to protect his aide.15 This time, too, Montesinos found protection—in the
military’s fear of embarrassment. By the time his case went to trial in early 1977, the treason
charges had been dropped—reportedly because a conviction would have discomfited his military
mentors.
11
Catan. Montesinos told prosecutors in closed-door testimony that he had been a CIA operative. At his most active,
he said he met with the CIA station chief in Lima “two or three times a week,” while CIA officers visited his SIN
office daily.
12
In the US, Montesinos was inaccurately introduced as an aide to Prime Minister General Guillermo Arbulu (who in
fact had ordered Montesinos sent to Sullana). Source: Gorriti.
13
Catan.
14
The US Embassy, clearly embarrassed, officially regretted any concern caused by Montesinos’ State Departmentsponsored trip to the US. For one account of the documents found at Montesinos’ house, see the State Department
cable, “The man behind Fujimori’s throne,” August 16, 1990.
15
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992. Years later, in an TV interview,
Mercado Jarrin said documents Montesinos removed from Mercado’s office in 1975 were in fact lists of army
officers asked to retire because of suspicion they were plotting against the president. They were not list of weapons
purchases. Please see Agencia Peru, January 21, 2002, at
http://www.agenciaperu.com/investigacion/2002/ene/vladitraicion.htm
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Jail time. Nonetheless, Montesinos was convicted on May 31, 1977, of “perjury and
military disobedience” for leaving his post without permission, and sentenced to five years in jail.16
He had fallen ill with hepatitis, however, during his detention by the military and his attorney
succeeded in getting the sentence reduced to two years. In the end, Montesinos served 16 months
and was released in early 1978 on supervised liberty.17
But life remained complicated for Montesinos. By one account, in the late 1970s he
survived an assassination attempt and fled to Argentina.18 Then in October 1983, the old treason
charges were resurrected. The military high command reportedly was furious at the publication in
the newspaper Kausachum, run by Montesinos’ friend Augusto Zimmermann, of opinion pieces
Montesinos had written vilifying high-ranking army officers. The military command ordered a
prosecutor to revive the treason charge.
This time, charges were filed in military court that Montesinos had sold documents to the
US and passed military secrets to SIN, the Peruvian intelligence service. In response, Montesinos
fled to Ecuador. The treason charge was dismissed in 1984 and Montesinos returned to Peru in
1985. But the military clearly continued to harbor suspicions of Montesinos: the high command in
July 1985 issued an order banning him from any military installation in the country.19
Friend to the Narcos
From that point on, Montesinos embarked on a campaign both to regain the confidence of
the military and to make his own position so legally and politically impregnable that never again
would he be forced to flee his country or fear jail. In either 1978 or 1985, Montesinos had taken a
position with the Witembury law firm.20 He carved out a niche for himself defending mostly nonPeruvians accused of drug trafficking. In 1978, he represented the Colombian drug trafficker
Evaristo Porras Ardilla; in 1979 he defended Colombian Jaime Tamallo. His practice flourished
because he had hundreds of contacts from his days in the Velasco government. He knew who to
bribe to get a client out of jail, and which judges took payment for a quick trial or an acquittal. “He
offered a complete service,” says journalist Gustavo Gorriti, who followed Montesinos’ career.
He was connected to the court secretary, he had corrupt judges, corrupt
prosecutors, police. And he was good: fast on his feet, a workaholic,
audacious, unscrupulous. Where others wouldn’t dare, he would. And
he’d win.21
16
State Department, “The man behind Fujimori’s throne,” August 16, 2000.
17
State Department, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992.
18
State Department, “Man behind Fujimori’s throne,” August 16, 2000.
19
State Department, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992. Also Gorriti.
20
Ibid State Department.
21
Catan.
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Montesinos grew wealthy but also, according to a friend, bitter, cynical and avaricious.
Villa Coca. One of Montesinos’ 1980s cases illustrates the young lawyer’s evolving legal
tactics. In what was known as the Villa Coca case, Montesinos in 1986 took on the defense of two
police generals accused of impeding an investigation into the activities of one Reynaldo Rodriguez
Lopez, whose drug organization was accused of infiltrating the state (especially the police).22
Montesinos derailed the investigation by suing (in military court) the police general leading the
investigation. While the suit failed, it successfully delayed matters until, in March 1987, Hugo
Denegri Cornejo was appointed attorney general (fiscal de la nacion). Denegri, a Montesinos
associate from earlier days, killed the investigation and, in an ingenious twist, accused the case
prosecutor of drug trafficking.23
Cayara massacre. Another case demonstrates how Montesinos went about assembling a
network of people who owed him favors. Not coincidentally, this case also helped him worm his
way back into military good graces. In May 1988, seven army patrols had massacred peasants near
the site of a terrorist ambush. Army General Jose Valdivia Duenas stood accused of orchestrating
the Cayara massacre. Attorney General Denegri, who had been so helpful to Montesinos in the
Villa Coca case, now suggested that the beleaguered Valdivia consult Montesinos.
Valdivia did so and Montesinos advised him to stonewall. While Valdivia played for time,
Montesinos obtained Denegri’s help in arranging a meeting among Denegri, Montesinos and
Minister of Defense Enrique Lopez Albujar.24 Montesinos’ growing influence was visible in a
related small, but key, incident—in order to meet with the defense minister, Montesinos had to be
admitted to a military facility despite the 1985 order banning him. Under the circumstances, the
military let Montesinos in and the ban was, effectively, rescinded.
The meeting results were swift. Although Prosecutor Carlos Escobar had witnesses and
evidence, and even produced a preliminary report in November 1988 indicting the military, his
case fell apart.25 Three witnesses were assassinated in December 1988 by hooded men at a
roadblock; another died in September 1989. Escobar himself was harassed and threatened,
ordered to hand over all his documents and eventually removed from the case. Escobar, fearing for
22
No hard proof exists that Montesinos knew Lopez. A letter Rodriguez purportedly sent to Montesinos on
November 17, 1988, mentions money the lawyer was supposed to pay unnamed individuals. But Rodriguez denied
he ever had any dealings with Montesinos. Source: State Department dispatch, January 7, 1992.
23
No information is available on how Denegri and Montesinos knew one another, but accounts agree they worked
together from this point on. For additional details on the Villa Coca case, see:
http://stucchi.tripod.com/politica/vmt.htm
24
Gorriti. Also State Department cable, December 19, 1990.
25
Gorriti says Montesinos stole Escobar’s file on the case, and allowed Valdivia’s staff to alter and copy it, giving
them ammunition for their counter-attack.
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his life, fled to the US (where he was granted political asylum), and the case was closed.26 Valdivia,
for one, was grateful—to Montesinos.
During this period Montesinos also, according to numerous reports, renewed his ties to
the CIA (if they had ever lapsed). While not everyone at the US Embassy approved of the
collaboration, Montesinos reportedly met regularly—as often as every two weeks—with the CIA
station chief.27 Meanwhile, as Montesinos was earning his stripes as a lawyer and informer, Peru
itself was going through a turbulent, often violent, period of history.
Peru—Struggling Democracy
In 1980, Peru had emerged from 12 years of military dictatorship with the election of
President Fernando Belaunde Terry, leader of the Accion Popular political party. He was succeeded
in 1985 by President Alan Garcia Perez, head of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
(APRA) party. Under these two administrations, both Peru’s security and its economy deteriorated
dramatically. Inflation went into a frenzied spiral, pushing ever larger numbers of Peruvians into
dire poverty and causing even the well-to-do to suffer. Terrorists seemed to operate with
impunity, terrorizing both peasant communities and upper class Lima neighborhoods.
The first of the revolutionary groups to emerge was Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a
communist splinter group of Maoist persuasion. In May 1980, Shining Path began a lengthy
campaign of death and terror among urban and rural citizens alike. Between 1980 and 1990,
reports put the number of violent incidents at 20,465.28 The number of casualties was estimated at
anywhere from 25,000 to 40,000.29 Some of those killed were subversives, many were civilians,
some were members of the police or military and a few were suspected members of the drug
world. A few years later, a second terror group surfaced—the Movimiento Revolucionorio Tupac
Amaru (MRTA, or Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). MRTA’s goal was to overthrow the
government and diminish US influence in Peru. The middle- and upper-class Marxist-Leninist
group burst onto the national scene with a 1983 bombing of the US marine security guard
residence in Lima.
The government’s response to this upsurge in violence only contributed to the general
public’s feelings of insecurity and danger. Those military and police forces deployed to protect the
public and defeat the guerrillas adopted their own inhumane and illegal (by international
26
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992, and Gorriti.
27
Gorriti.
28
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), “Report on the situation of human rights in Peru,”
Organization of American States, March 12, 1993. See:
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/93PeruS&E/index.peru.htm
29
Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported on August 28, 2003, in its Final Report that 69,280 had died
from 1980 to 2000. See http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/pagina01.php
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standards) methods of warfare. By 1989, numerous charges—of assassination, forced
disappearances, summary executions, torture—had been lodged against Peru’s security forces.
Some 5,000 Peruvians had “disappeared,” presumably at the hands of the military.30 Arresting
officials—themselves frequently masked and unidentifiable—failed to inform those detained of the
charges against them or of their rights under the law, and did not let family members know of
their whereabouts. As a 1978 signatory of the American Convention on Human Rights, this put
Peru in contravention of international law. As of 1990, no member of the security forces had been
tried and punished for human rights crimes.
The narcotics trade was another poison in the Peruvian system. Its heart was the Huallaga
Valley, one of the largest coca-producing regions in the world (coca is the basis for cocaine).
Experts estimated that 60 percent of world supply came from Peru.31 Drug trafficking had become
a critical component of the rural economy: it was thought to support 250,000 poor farmers, while
thousands more found work in drugs transportation or protection services. Not surprisingly, in a
country where police sergeants earned $55 a month, and an army private $7 a month, corruption
flourished.32 The army and police ran the Huallaga Valley as a fiefdom, each extracting tribute in
the form of bribes. Traffickers paid primarily for protection of airports and safe passage. The police
tended to operate as individual freelancers, while the military took a more organized approach.
Sometimes the drug money paid for food for the miserably-kept troops.
The justice system failed utterly to keep up with the drug trade; convictions were rare.
Narcotics permeated Peru’s political elite, its most powerful law firms, and its wealthiest families.
Both the senator and deputy from Huallaga Valley had open links to the drug world.33 As for the
legitimate economy, it was moribund. President Garcia had run up huge public debts; inflation
stood at 7,650 percent; output had shrunk by one-third. The central bank reserves had sunk to $175
million, and many foreign banks had refused to lend Peru money since President Garcia restricted
debt payments in 1985.34
Given this state of affairs, Peruvians were excited by the possibility of change promised by
the election of 1990. The front-runners were prize-winning author and national hero Mario Vargas
Llosa and Alberto Kenyo Fujimori, an unknown academic of Japanese background.
30
Isabel Hilton, “Letter from Peru: The government is missing,” New Yorker, March 5, 2001, p.58.
31
“Peru. Coca curiosities,” The Economist, August 31, 1996, p.39.
32
State Department cable, “Narcotics corruption in Peru: several shades of black,” May 22, 1991.
33
Ibid.
34
Holger Jensen and Kathryn Leger, “Victory amid violence,” Maclean’s, June 25, 1990, p.16.
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Fujimori—Unexpected President
Fujimori, born in 1938 to immigrant parents, earned a bachelor’s degree in agricultural
science before heading to the University of Wisconsin for a master’s in mathematics (1972). For
nine years, 1975-1984, he taught math at the National Agrarian University in Peru. He later became
rector of the Lima Agricultural University, where he also headed a milk production research
program and was head of the National Rectors Assembly.35 In 1989, Fujimori decided to run for
president as head of the unknown center-right party, Cambio90 (Change90). His actual aim was to
win a seat in congress. Under Peruvian law, candidates could run simultaneously for president
and congress. By launching a presidential campaign, Fujimori would increase his visibility and
hence his chances of winning a congressional seat.
Fujimori’s platform was change. He promised to turn around the economy so Peruvians
could plan again for their future without the threat of inflation consuming all they had saved. He
pledged to bring the insurgents under control so people in cities and villages could walk outside
without fear of ambush or kidnappers. The international community, insomuch as it took any
notice of Fujimori, was impressed to learn that the candidate had considerable international
experience, speaking, besides English and Spanish, Japanese, French and German.
To universal surprise, the Japanese-Peruvian in a second-round poll in June 1990 captured
57 percent of the vote to Vargas Llosa’s 34 percent—including the votes of many Peruvian
peasants who thought Fujimoro, whose campaign included the slogan “a president like you,” was
one of their own. He also capitalized on the nearly-universal Peruvian disgust with politics and
politicians after 10 years of economically ruinous civilian rule. Economist Hernando de Soto (a
campaign advisor to Vargas Llosa who later joined Fujimori’s government) was one of those who
saw hope in Fujimori’s election: “I thought here at last was someone who could break the ties that
established families have inside the government.”36 It would take some time before it became
apparent that Fujimori—elected among other promises to root out corruption—harbored in his
inner sanctum one of the most corrupt individuals Peruvians had yet seen.
Montesinos Meets Fujimori
Advocate Montesinos saw promise in the dark-horse candidate, Fujimori. Montesinos
made it his business to meet the math professor while he was still a candidate. Fujimori had come
to political prominence essentially without a network or a cohesive power base. According to
several accounts, he was autocratic by nature and virtually friendless in Lima. Montesinos stepped
into this vacuum. Montesinos knew Fujimori’s advisor on intelligence, Francisco Loayza, because
35
“Alberto Fujimori, president-elect of Peru,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, July 1990, p.48.
36
Hilton.
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both had worked for Mercado Jarrin.37 In 1989, Loayza had introduced Montesinos to the head of
SIN, General Edwin Diaz Zevallos. Diaz quickly grew to appreciate Montesinos, who was able
among other services to produce copious files from the attorney general’s office. Diaz put him on
the SIN payroll.
Now Loayza introduced the lawyer to the Fujimori family. At first, Montesinos dealt
chiefly with Fujimori’s wife, Susana Higuchi. An architect by training, the enterprising Mrs.
Fujimori had built and sold dozens of buildings—allowing her among other things to help finance
her husband’s campaign. After the first and before the second round of voting in the election,
Montesinos approached Loayza with something of keen interest to Fujimori: transcripts from a
SIN wiretap which revealed that Congressman Fernando Olivera of the Frente Independientie
Moralizador (FIM, or Independent Moralizing Front) was planning to institute legal proceedings
against the candidate for property-related tax fraud.38 Alerted to this, Fujimori grew thoroughly
alarmed. He was correspondingly relieved and appreciative when, three days later, Montesinos
delivered a court resolution that postponed the case until after the election.39 Montesinos became
Fujimori’s personal legal advisor.
Fujimori was inaugurated on July 28, 1990, for a five-year term. At his side from the start
was Montesinos. Almost immediately, Fujimori appointed Montesinos deputy director of SIN. SIN
Director General Diaz objected to the appointment because Montesinos was only a captain, had
been cashiered from the military and been accused of treason. So Montesinos by December 1990
stepped down as SIN deputy director—but it hardly mattered.40 Before long, Montesinos was
secretly appointed chair of SIN’s Advisory Committee (COASIN) from which position he wielded
tremendous influence over the intelligence service—and over Fujimori. As for General Diaz, he
resigned after Congress discovered his involvement with an illegal wiretap network.41
For the rest of Fujimori’s time in office, Montesinos never held an official government
position—one that might have required confirmation or allowed legislative oversight. Up to June
1991, Fujimori continued to pretend that Montesinos was simply his lawyer; only in March 1992
did he concede that Montesinos worked for SIN.42 Vice President Maximo San Roman tried to warn
Fujimori against Montesinos, but the only result was to drive the two men to an ever more
clandestine relationship.
37
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992.
38
Hilton.
39
Catan. Gorriti gives a slightly different story. He says SIN Director General Diaz ordered Montesinos to help
Fujimori.
40
United States Army Intelligence Agency, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Army Country Profile: Peru,
May 1992.
41
IACHR. Diaz did not suffer unduly; he was subsequently made deputy special military attache to the Peruvian
embassy in Argentina.
42
Gorriti.
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Fujimori proved suspicious by nature, a condition made only worse by the real dangers he
confronted as president of Peru. He rarely slept in the presidential palace sleeping quarters, for
example, preferring instead to take his family (including his four children) with him to SIN
headquarters where makeshift provision was made for them. Montesinos typically visited
Fujimori’s bedroom late at night for exclusive consultations. In another sign of his importance,
Montesinos attended most meetings between the minister of defense and the joint chiefs of staff as
Fujimori’s representative.
Intelligence Service. Montesinos’ de facto control of SIN gave him access to information—a
powerful weapon. The Peruvian National Intelligence Service was directly subordinate to the
president. Its functions—on paper—included planning, directing and producing finished strategic
intelligence for the president and senior-level policymakers; providing guidance to the intelligence
community; maintaining a central repository of intelligence information; directing
counterintelligence; overseeing political action operations and maintaining liaison with foreign
intelligence services.43 SIN’s functions in practice were pretty much whatever the president wanted
them to be—including keeping close tabs on the political opposition.
But Montesinos was emerging as someone far more important than chair of COASIN. As
early as August 1990, the US Embassy assessed Montesinos as “the single most influential advisor
to President Alberto Fujimori on security-related matters.”44 Fujimori had made reform of the
military and the police—both deeply involved in the two Peruvian scourges of drugs and
terrorism—a cornerstone of his administration’s policy program. Montesinos, it became clear,
would be Fujimori’s principal instrument in carrying out a reorganization of the military and a
purge of the national police. Armed with the twin justifications of anti-terrorism and antinarcotics, there was little Montesinos could not do. Within two years, he had made significant
changes to the police, the military, the judiciary and the intelligence service. His method was not
sophisticated, but highly effective: eliminate the competition, and put friends in high places.
Picking the Right People
Fujimori took early aim at the judicial system, particularly what he dubbed the “Ministry
of Injustice.” Under a new Supreme Court chief, several judges were fired, a number of court
workers arrested, and signs were posted warning against paying fees for which no receipt was
available.45 But major judicial changes came later. First in line for a thorough overhaul was the
police.
43
US Army Intelligence Agency.
44
State Department cable, “Man behind Fujimori’s throne,” August 16, 1990.
45
State Department cable, “Narcotics corruption in Peru,” May 22, 1991.
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Police. In the second half of 1990 alone, Fujimori’s administration dismissed 1,500 police
officers in 1990 for “unethical conduct”; another 400 followed in the first half of 1991.46 While many
of the dismissals were undoubtedly justified, observers discerned the hand of Montesinos in
others. A number of the police who had investigated drug dealer Rodriguez Lopez, for example,
were fired, as was one of the most efficient anti-drug police operatives, General Juan Zarate
Gambini.47 Montesinos also had a governing say in choosing replacements. Montesinos had
defended, for example, then-Police Colonel Antonio Vidal after he was fired from the national
police in 1985. Vidal was reinstated, with back pay, in 1989. In 1990, with the Fujimori
reorganization, Vidal was made police representative to SIN and, in 1991, he went to the
antiterrorism police DIRCOTE as deputy director, becoming director in November 1991.48
Military. A similar process took place within the military. Purging the ranks must have
been particularly satisfying for Montesinos coming 13 years after his dishonorable discharge and
incarceration. From 1990-1992, he set out to replace the military leadership with people he knew,
preferably people who owed him favors. One of the first new appointments was Pablo Cordova
Salvador—a longtime crony—as president of the National Commission on Pardons (indultos). In
1991, Montesinos helped prepare a list of 20 senior officers asked to retire at the end of the year.
Montesinos also promoted Lieutenant General Valdivia—the same one he had successfully
advised a year earlier to stonewall—to commander of the important Military Region II around
Lima, Peru’s most powerful field command.49 The Senate in December 2000 rejected Valdivia’s
promotion, but gave in on a second vote after Fujimori exerted pressure. Barely a year later, in
January 1992, Valdivia moved up the ranks again to the position of chief of staff of the Armed
Forces’ joint command.50
Intelligence. On the intelligence front, Montesinos ensured that SIN would take orders
from him—despite his removal as deputy director. He sensed too much competition from his
erstwhile partner Loayza, Fujimori’s intelligence advisor during the campaign, so engineered his
departure. According to Loayza, Montesinos arranged for the creation of a fake intelligence report
on a plot to assassinate Loayza. Loayza left the country to protect himself and, in his absence, was
dropped from Fujimori’s inner circle.51 Montesinos then secured the allegiance of the SIN
leadership. After General Diaz’s dismissal, the nominee to replace him was Army [artillery] officer
Julio Salazar Monroe—handpicked by Montesinos. Artillery officers were also appointed as SIN
46
Ibid.
47
Gorriti
48
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992.
49
State Department cable, “[Deleted] on Montesinos,” December 19, 1990.
50
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992.
51
Ibid.
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deputy chief and secretary-general.52 As for Army intelligence, Montesinos early on had achieved
the dismissal of Army intelligence chief Colonel Rafael Cordova, who despised Montesinos.53 His
replacement, Colonel Alberto Pinto Cardenas, had served as an artillery officer with Montesinos.54
Montesinos played a similar role in promoting Lieutenant General Victor Malca
Villanueva in April 1991 from minister of the interior to minister of defense. Malca was not
respected as interior minister, where he was considered Fumijori’s weakest cabinet member.
Nonetheless, Montesinos’ endorsement was apparently enough to earn him the defense portfolio.
Montesinos also had a hand in appointing the head of customs, the chief tax collector and the chief
of naval intelligence.55 By early 1991, the first question the public asked when informed of a new
government appointment was: What is the official’s connection to Montesinos?
Drug War. Using his proliferating contacts, Montesinos moved to take control of the
Peruvian side of the war against drugs. In September 1991, SIN added an anti-drug unit to its evergrowing responsibilities.56 The unit would liaise with the CIA. This was a slap in the face to the US
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which had traditionally managed the US-Peru anti-drug
program. But ever since its involvement in the arrest and trial of drug dealer Rodriguez Lopez,
DEA had not trusted Montesinos—and the feeling was apparently mutual. Now DEA, as well as
the State Department’s Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU), was shocked to be upstaged by CIA. The
CIA proved a generous partner, funding training and equipment for SIN’s anti-drug operations, as
well as some counter-insurgency efforts.57
As evidence of Montesinos’ influence grew, it was only natural that the press would take
an interest in him. His only rivals as presidential advisors were Hernando de Soto, in charge of
drug policy, and Fujimori’s brother Santiago, who served as liaison to the business community.58
“In Peru,” reported the US embassy, “Montesinos is almost universally viewed as corrupt” and
involved with the drug trade—and the media was bound to investigate.59 But Montesinos, as the
media would soon learn to its pain, had very little interest in press coverage in general, and none
at all in critical press coverage.
52
State Department cable, “Does Fujimori’s unofficial advisor control the Peruvian national intelligence
community?” July 27, 1991. See http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB37/02-02.htm
53
Gorriti
54
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992. Also Gorriti.
55
David Asman, “Peru’s Man Behind the Throne Gets Unwelcome Limelight,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1992,
p.A9. The list was compiled by Fujimori’s vice president, Maximo San Roman, and confirmed by former Interior
Minister and Army Chief of Staff General Luis Cisneros.
56
Gorriti. Also rest of paragraph.
57
Catan.
58
Asman.
59
State Department cable, “Montesinos: Rumors and facts,” January 7, 1992.
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Caretas article. On August 13, 1990, the respected news magazine Caretas ran a cover
story on Montesinos. Titled “A New Rasputin,” it described his behind-the-scenes influence over
President Fujimori. Montesinos took exception to the article and filed suit, charging the magazine
with defamation. On June 12, 1991, Caretas publisher Enrique Zileri appeared in court to defend
the magazine. The expectation among other media was that Caretas would prevail easily. But to
general surprise, Judge Mercedes Tello Piniero in July ruled against Caretas, allegedly due to the
use of the word “Rasputin.” The judge ordered the magazine to pay $40,000 in damages. She told
Zileri not to leave the country. An appeal failed. Montesinos’ message was loud and clear: no
defamatory press, and don’t look to the judiciary for help.
War on Terrorism
While some attorneys and journalists may have been dismayed by what they saw as an
erosion of judicial independence and press freedom, Fujimori and Montesinos were just getting
started. In their view, they were simply taking control. A top political priority for Fujimori was the
elimination of Peru’s two insurgencies: Shining Path and MRTA. An end to terror was worth any
price—or so his actions seemed to say. At the time, the population supported that view. In October
1991 alone, a record 422 people were killed. In the year as a whole, 3,180 died from terrorist
attacks.60 The government had already placed half the population and 47 percent of Peru’s territory
under a state of emergency.
Barrios Altos Massacre. But the Fujimori/Montesinos approach to fighting terror became
more controversial after November 3, 1991. That night, men armed with silencer-equipped
submachine guns massacred 15 people in less than a minute at a barbecue in the poor and
crowded Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima. One victim was an 8-year-old child. The shooting
took place near the police intelligence directorate headquarters and a police station—but no police
officials apparently heard anything amiss.
Rumors surfaced immediately that the government, specifically a SIN death squad, was
behind the killing.61 The government denied any involvement, blaming the shootout on drug
dealers or internecine terrorist quarrels. There was some evidence that a couple of people at the
barbecue were Shining Path sympathizers: a Shining Path newspaper was found in the apartment
of one victim; another had been formally accused of links to terrorists.62 Nonetheless, the scale and
manner of the carnage appalled many Peruvians. The outraged congress appointed a commission
of inquiry and a prosecutor went to work.
60
US Army Intelligence Agency.
61
Some observers speculated that the operation was intended to identify the weak-willed in Fujimori’s entourage:
those who did not support the killing would stand out. Source: Gorriti. In fact, as became known only much later,
the death squad had gone to the wrong address.
62
Eugene Robinson, “Peruvians look for answers in massacre of 16,” Washington Post, November 20, 1991, p.A29.
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But the investigation did not get far. The congress did not yet know it, but Fujimori had
not finished with his plan to consolidate power. Now he perceived new urgency in doing so if he
was to win the war on terror. Fujimori had placed Montesinos firmly in charge of the antiterrorism campaign, but the two of them were frustrated—particularly by the intransigence of the
congress. By November 1991, Montesinos had drafted and Fujimori had promulgated 123 decrees
on terrorism and drug trafficking. But the congress had repealed the executive decrees. Then the
Senate rejected as not credible the results of a military inquiry into the Barrios Altos massacre—
which blamed Shining Path or other leftist groups.63 Finally, the congress in December 1991
disapproved the promotion to lieutenant general of SIN Director Salazar Monroe because, it said,
Montesinos had exerted undue influence.
Fujimori and Montesinos found this kind of opposition intolerable. In their view, as
Montesinos later explained, the congress posed “an obstacle to national pacification.”64 In response,
Fujimori and Montesinos plotted to gain control of congress, a plot they put into action in the
spring of 1992. On April 5, 1992, Fujimori surprised domestic and international observers by
staging an auto golpe—a self-coup.
Bloodless Coup
With his coup, Fujimori abolished the Peruvian government as it existed and established a
Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction. He dissolved the congress (which he
termed “irresponsible, sterile, anti-historical and antipatriotic”) and the judiciary, suspended the
1979 constitution, purged the Supreme Court, and placed the press under censorship.65 The
Legislative Palace and the Palace of Justice were taken over and closed. The chairmen of both
houses of congress, as well as other parliamentarians, were placed under house arrest. Private
homes were searched. Well-known opposition leaders, as well as a journalist, were arrested. Two
news agencies were closed down and military personnel were dispatched to other media offices.66
Fujimori would rule by decree. Only on May 18, 1992, after intense international pressure, did he
pledge to call new elections for a constitutional congress (one whose primary job was to rewrite
the constitution) by November 1992 and to leave office himself at the end of his term in 1995.67
Fujimori claimed he was driven to stage a coup by the concerted opposition of Peruvian
institutions to his efforts to combat corruption, fight the insurgents and control narcotics
trafficking. Such was the state of public disillusion with the political system that Fujimori’s actions
63
Ibid.
64
Declaration of Vladimiro Montesino Torres before the investigations subcommittee of the Peruvian congress,
December 20, 2001, available at www.agenciaperu.com.pe
65
US Army Intelligence Agency.
66
IACHR.
67
Ibid.
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were widely applauded by citizens; some 75 percent supported him. The military also stood
behind Fujimori—although not necessarily behind Montesinos. General Luis Cisneros, a former
interior minister and army chief of staff, was one of those who admired the president but not his
advisor.
The president is honest and he’s the tough leader we need to fight the war.
But he doesn’t need Montesinos. In fact, Fujimori doesn’t seem to realize
that few in the army respect Montesinos—except those who now owe him
for their jobs.68
The United States responded by canceling $120 million in aid (all but humanitarian) and
withdrawing all but essential personnel from the embassy.69 A US government report, however,
betrayed considerable sympathy for Fujimori, describing the situation pre-coup as follows:
“Widespread corruption, intimidation of judges, cumbersome prosecution procedures, extremely
low salaries for judges and prosecutors alike, and serious budgetary constraints all contribute to
making the system a major impediment to effective counterinsurgency programs.”70
On September 12, 1992, Fujimori’s draconian approach appeared fully vindicated. In a day
of triumph, the government announced the capture of the most feared man in the country, Shining
Path guerilla leader Abimael Guzman. This victory no doubt contributed to the failure on
November 12 and 13 of an attempted coup by senior government officials, including Vice
President Máximo San Román.71 The group claimed it was acting legally in overthrowing an
unconstitutional regime. Turning on Montesinos with special venom, it repeated earlier charges
that the intelligence advisor was involved in drugs, and made public a document alleging that
Montesinos had planned and authorized the Barrios Altos massacre. Montesinos, San Roman told
a visiting mission from the Organization of American States (OAS), was the president in the
shadows. But the coup succeeded only in briefly embarrassing Fujimori—who fled at its height to
the Japanese embassy for protection.72 The coup plotters either took refuge abroad or were
sentenced and imprisoned.
Ratings High. Ten days later, on November 22, 1992, Peruvians turned out to vote for a
new constitutional congress to replace the one Fujimori had dissolved. The president’s ratings
were high—his government had broken the back of Shining Path and restored hope of a normal
existence to millions of people. Fujimori’s policies had also driven inflation down from a rampant
60 percent a month in mid-1990 to a manageable 3.6 percent in October 1992—a significant
68
Asman. A group of younger military officers also regarded Montesinos as corrupt.
69
Nathaniel C. Nash, “Peruvian election free of fraud, US officials say,” New York Times, November 24, 1992, p.A5.
70
US Army Intelligence Agency.
71
State Department cable, “The November 12/13 coup,” December 2, 1992.
72
Perpetrators of the coup later described being hit in the face, stuck with needles and otherwise tortured by
Montesinos himself. Source: Gorriti.
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achievement over barely two years.73 The Economist dubbed Fujimori “Peru’s benevolent dictator,”
commenting that while his country did not enjoy democracy, “a lot of Peruvians do not seem to
mind” thanks to the economic and security improvements. The international business community
lionized Fujimori because he adhered to a firm program of privatization, steadfastly paid the
national debt, and opened the economy to foreign investment in mining, fishing and farming.
The traditional political parties refused to participate in the constitutional congress
elections because the government, since April 5, controlled the entire electoral apparatus. They
urged voters to either boycott the election or spoil their ballots. But these tactics enjoyed little
success. In the end, Fujimori’s party won a solid majority in the 80-seat congress. The body opened
officially at the end of 1992 and would run until presidential elections in 1995.
Meanwhile, Fujimori leapt to the defense of his maligned intelligence advisor, telling the
conservative daily Expreso that “if the former army captain had ties to narcotics traffickers, the CIA
would not continue its close working relationship with Peru’s National Intelligence Service which
is headed by Montesinos.”74 It was peculiar that Fujimori would consider an association with the
Central Intelligence Agency a validation of Montesinos’ integrity.
Expanding the Net
The new political alignment of April 5, 1992, which many said he designed, gave broad
scope for Montesinos’ activities. The first step was to “clean up” judicial files. Between April 5 and
10, the Palacio de Justicia and the Fiscal de la Nacion (attorney general) offices were closed.75 Soldiers
stood guard while military intelligence agents went in by night and systematically ransacked the
files. By the time they were done, one-third of the nearly 30,000 files of active court cases had been
removed, including those concerning Montesinos and Fujimori. In addition, files that could be
useful for future blackmail were missing.
A second step was to clean out the corrupt judiciary. This clearly needed doing. At the
same time, many of the steps taken allowed the government to take control of the justice
administration system. Judges and prosecutors were removed en masse, starting with the
dismissal of a majority of the Supreme Court judges. On April 9, every member of the
Constitutional Tribunal as well as members of the National Council of the Judiciary, the attorney
general and 134 magistrate judges were dismissed. The executive appointed their replacements. A
number of the dismissals benefited the government at the expense of reputable officials. For
73
“Peru’s benevolent dictator,” The Economist, November 14, 1992.
74
State Department cable, “Media reaction: Fujimori on his advisor’s ‘connection’ with the CIA,” November 17,
1992.
75
Gorriti.
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example, the prosecutor in the Barrios Altos proceeding, Pablo Livia, was taken off the case.76 Livia
was later expelled from the judiciary.
As part of the judicial reform, the Public Ministry was made a dependable ally of the
executive.77 On May 20, 1992, Fujimori provisionally appointed Blanca Nelida Colan Maguino, a
Montesinos associate since 1987, as Public Prosecutor (attorney general). Nelida Colan would
serve in this capacity three times between 1992 and 2000. Finally, Fujimori’s administration
instituted summary tribunals—courts where anonymous judges, wearing masks, typically handed
down long prison sentences after very short trials. Other decrees allowed for use of evidence
obtained by torture, for trying civilians before military tribunals, and for the appointment of
provisional judges and prosecutors.78
Concurrently, Montesinos consolidated Peru’s intelligence agencies, widening the reach of
SIN and its efficiency. Some of the reorganization made sense: “The guy did a very good job in
reorganizing the intelligence forces, which were a mess before,” said a US expert on Peru.79 But
other measures made questionable incursions across legal and institutional boundaries. Decrees
895 and 897, for example, allowed SIN to participate fully in judicial investigations into terrorism.
Decree 904 granted full immunity to state agents participating in such investigations. In late 1992,
Montesinos weakened the DIRCOTE antiterrorism police—and strengthened SIN’s role—by
reassigning their chief officers. Other emergency decrees shifted responsibility for controlling the
nation’s drug zones from the police to the army and SIN.80 Montesinos also took care of personnel
issues. In June 1992, the recently-appointed SIN Director Salazar Monroe won the promotion to
lieutenant general which the former congress had vetoed. At Salazar’s request, Fujimori later
promoted several officers identified as participants at Barrios Altos.
But not all went Montesinos’ way. To his intense annoyance and despite his astonishing
accumulation of power, individual magazines and journalists continued to report on his
involvement with drugs and extra-judicial killing. More surprising, perhaps, individual members
of the military continued to speak out on the same topics. Even in a country as accustomed to
corruption as Peru unhappily was, the mode and extent of Montesinos’ operation drew scrutiny
and investigation.
76
Ibid.
77
The Public Ministry, also known as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, was in charge of criminal proceedings. It
served a purpose similar to that of the US Attorney General’s Office, but unlike in the US the Public Ministry was
autonomous, independent of the executive. Its prosecutors investigated a case, then filed an accusation with the
Judiciary. Its chair was the Fiscal de la Nacion (attorney general), elected by “supreme prosecutors.”
78
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev., June 2, 2000 (Original: Spanish), available at www.oas.org
79
Thomas T. Vogel Jr. and Matt Moffett, “Hostage crisis tarnishes Peru spymaster,” Wall Street Journal, January 28,
1997, p.A12. The speaker was Michael Radu at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.
80
“Peru. Coca curiosities,” The Economist, August 31, 1996, p.39.
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Stubborn Media
From time to time, Montesinos retaliated in a manner meant to be instructive for all who
might be tempted to make the mistake of criticizing him. On April 5, the day of the self-coup,
Caretas journalist Gustavo Gorriti was arrested. He recognized several of those who came for him
as members of SIN.81 Gorriti, author of a 1983 series profiling Montesinos, had been working on
another article alleging the intelligence advisor’s involvement in the Barrios Altos massacre, as
well as in the drug world.
While in detention at military intelligence headquarters, Gorriti’s computer was seized. He
refused to give his inquisitors the password, but when it was returned to him all files on
Montesinos had nonetheless been erased. Gorriti came to believe that, had he not been scheduled
to interview US Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson—who insisted on ascertaining
Gorriti’s whereabouts—he would have “disappeared” like thousands of others. Despite this
treatment, Gorriti remained in Peru reporting and writing. Only in 1996, after repeated harassment
and worried for the security of his wife and daughters, did Gorriti seek safe haven in Panama.
Meanwhile, others picked up where Gorriti had left off. In December 1992, Revista Sí
magazine quoted an anonymous army officer who said he was part of the army intelligence/SIN
unit that carried out the Barrios Altos massacre.82 The article identified the participants and chain
of command up to Montesinos.83 In response, the government instituted a lawsuit against Revista
Si.
La Cantuta. But the pressure intensified in early April 1993, when opposition
Congressman Henry Pease received a document from a group of disillusioned active duty officers
who styled themselves Leon Dormido (Sleeping Lion).84 The document described the abduction by
armed men on July 18, 1992, of a professor and nine “subversive” students from the Enrique
Guzman y Valle teachers’ college in La Cantuta who were never seen again. Like the Revista Si
article, the document named members of what it called Grupo Colina, a SIN/Army intelligence
death squad, and said it operated at the behest of Montesinos and Army Chief (plus head of the
joint chiefs of staff) General Nicolas de Bari Hermoza Rios. Grupo Colina, it said, had also carried
out the Barrios Altos massacre.
The Sleeping Lion document forced the constituent assembly—even with its Fujimori
majority—to appoint an investigative commission. The congress, however, was unable to maintain
81
Asman.
82
State Department cable, “Alleged witness to Barrios Altos massacre wants to speak out,” March 3, 1993.
83
Gorriti.
84
Another group of young officers unhappy with the Montesinos regime, and which sometimes reported on military
human rights abuses, called itself Comaca (Commanders, Majors and Captains). Source: “Who gives the orders in
Peru?,” Swiss Review of World Affairs, Die Neue Zuercher Zeitung, June 1, 1995.
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this mildly principled stand for long. During testimony on April 20, 1993, General Hermoza Rios
accused opposition members of the commission of collusion with terrorists. The next day, he sent
tank units rolling through the streets of Lima. The commission dropped its inquiry.
But the charges against Montesinos had a life of their own. Just one month later, in May
1993, General Rodolfo Robles, the third highest ranking general in the army, took refuge in the US
Embassy before his wife called a press conference to read an eight-page letter from Robles. Robles
accused Montesinos and Hermoza of sponsoring a “systematic violation of the human rights of the
Peruvian population” and, like the Sleeping Lion document, named members of Grupo Colina.85
General Robles was given political asylum in Argentina.86
In July 1993, Revista Sí magazine reinforced the Robles charges when it published a map
pointing to a grave allegedly containing the remains of those massacred at La Cantuta. When
remains indeed were found, Fujimori hurriedly announced the arrest of some army officers who
were subsequently tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to various jail terms.87
New Constitution. But Montesinos proved more than equal to the slings and arrows
hurled against him, able to neutralize even repeated accusations from credible sources coupled
with forensic evidence from the La Cantuta gravesite. Neither he nor General Hermoza Rios
suffered any consequences from the media or the military allegations. One informed individual—
who visited the US Embassy to confirm Robles’ charges—characterized the current situation as
“Peru’s version of Germany under the Gestapo.”88
Whether Peru had become Nazi-like or not, its citizens did—in an October 1993
referendum—approve (albeit by a relatively narrow margin of 53 percent) a new constitution
which concentrated power in the presidency. While the constitution did include a system of checks
and balances among branches of government, it notably broke with a time-honored tradition in
Latin America of single presidential terms by allowing the president to seek an unprecedented
second five-year term in office.
Fujimori Reelected
Fujimori’s first term expired in 1995. His opponent in the 1995 elections was the respected
Javier Perez de Cuellar, former secretary general of the United Nations. But voters were
apparently pleased by Fujimori’s record so far. Although half the 23 million population still lived
below the poverty line, the economy had improved significantly, especially for the middle class.
85
“Peru. The general and the army,” The Economist, December 7, 1996, p.40. Also Gorriti.
86
General Robles returned under an amnesty in 1996.
87
Gorriti.
88
State Department cable, “Army/SIN death squad existed,” May 24, 1993. For another collection of declassified US
embassy-Lima documents, see: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB64/
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Peru enjoyed growth in 1994 of 12.9 percent, the world’s highest. Inflation was down to 11.4
percent, its lowest since 1973.89 Fujimori’s government had also made impressive progress on other
measures less noticed by the populace, but important to outside financiers. His finance ministers
had lifted all capital controls, freed the exchange rate, privatized 51 state companies, and cut the
number of taxes from 200 to six while improving tax collection.
These economic results, plus the continuing improvements in the security situation,
carried the day. In April 1995, Peruvians gave Fujimori 64 percent of the vote. His Cambio90-New
Majority alliance also won a majority in the 120-seat new congress; traditional parties of the right
and left held only 9 percent of the seats.
Fujimori and Montesinos seemed impregnable. Faced with obstacles, they simply removed
them or went around them. The president’s growing sense of impunity was illustrated in June
1995, when a judge challenged as unconstitutional a law (Federal Act No. 26479) granting amnesty
to soldiers and police accused of human rights violations from 1980-1995. The law had been
neither publicly announced nor debated, coming into force instead the day after it was presented
to Congress and promulgated by Fujimori. To overcome the judge’s scruples, Fujimori simply
pushed a second law through the congress commanding the courts to obey.90 On July 15, the
Superior Court declared the amnesty law constitutional and sanctioned the judge who had
questioned it.
To such a duo with such a track record, little must have seemed impossible. Having
achieved the once-unthinkable goal of a second term, it was hardly surprising that the FujimoriMontesinos team now set its sights even higher.
New Aspiration
From 1990-1995, Montesinos and Fujimori seemed bent on accumulating power for one of
two possible reasons. To their supporters, they needed sufficient control to curb terrorism and the
drug trade, and to reanimate the economy. To their detractors, they were despots hungry for
unchallenged authority and personal wealth. But from 1996, a more tangible objective seemed to
inform their activities: to win a third presidential term. Again, a third term could be defended as
necessary to prosecute the anti-drug and anti-terrorism wars, and revive the economy; or as cover
for an essentially despotic regime. At least one observer discerned more dishonorable than
laudable aims: “There was no obvious heir apparent to Fujimori. There was no one who could
guarantee future election victories and provide cover for the expanding array of criminal activities
89
“The dark side of the boom,” The Economist, August 5, 1995, p.21.
90
Ibid.
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(extortion, money laundering, and arms trafficking) directed by Montesinos.”91 Whether Fujimori
and Montesinos ever discussed a specific plan is unknown. But from 1996 on, most of the
administration’s actions seemed to revolve around the goal of a third term.
It would not be easy. The just-completed 1993 constitution forbid a third term. There was
no public constituency for a longer presidency. International partners and observers could be
expected to be skeptical. The legal route—to amend the constitution—would have required either
a two-thirds congressional vote in two successive legislative sessions, or a national referendum
followed by congressional ratification.92 Montesinos and Fujimori knew either approach would fail:
Fujimori’s majority in congress was insufficient to pass a constitutional amendment, and a poll in
January 1996 showed the public opposed to a third term. Another route remained: to undermine
the autonomy of those organizations and institutions legally responsible for ensuring free and fair
elections. Montesinos’ hand was never visible, but the political opposition as well as much of the
public laid credit, or responsibility, for the events that followed at his door.
But before Montesinos could embark seriously on the reelection program, he had yet again
to squash charges of involvement in the drug trade. Despite muzzling the press, despite the selfcoup, despite the reconstituted and submissive congress, reports continued to surface that pointed
to Montesinos’ involvement. This time the charges drew international headlines.
El Vaticano
On August 16, 1996, Demetrio Chavez Pennaherrera, a drug dealer known as “Vaticano,”
stood before a civilian court to plead guilty. Vaticano had been captured in Colombia in January
1994 and expelled to Peru. A secret military court convicted him in 1994 of treason for
collaborating with the Shining Path in the Upper Huallaga Valley, and sentenced him to life in
prison (later reduced to 30 years). Vaticano now hoped to reduce his sentence further by pleading
guilty to drug trafficking charges, which carried a lesser penalty than treason.
Addressing the court, Vaticano made some startling statements. He said that, at least in
1991-1992, his drug ring had enjoyed the full protection of SIN and Montesinos personally. He
claimed that he had paid Montesinos cupos (scheduled bribes) of $50,000 a month through an
intermediary for unhampered use of an airstrip to ship drugs to Colombia.93 He said the
91
Catherine M. Conaghan, Making and Unmaking Authoritarian Peru, The North-South Agenda Papers #47,
University of Miami, May 2001. Jaime Yoshiyama, for a period head of the Ministry for the Presidency and a
possible successor to Fujimori, left public office on September 6, 1996.
92
Conaghan. The 1993 constitution allowed citizens to initiate referendums to change law or amend the constitution.
In April 1996, congress passed Law 26592 (reinforced by Law 26670) which required prior congressional approval
for a referendum.
93
State Department cable, “Intelligence chief Montesinos accused of protecting drug traffickers,” September 6, 1996.
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relationship had ended, and he had fled to Colombia, when Montesinos demanded double the
amount and Vaticano could not afford it.
The charges made headlines in Peru. A still independent television station, Frecuencia
Latina (Channel 2) broadcast the story. Public interest was intense. But barely 10 days later, on
August 28, 1996,Vaticano returned to court and, against the advice of his lawyer, retracted all his
statements about Montesinos. Vaticano seemed visibly dazed, possibly drugged. Lawyer Pablo
Castro Mora said that authorities had “gotten to my client” and that “the retraction is logical, that
while my client is incarcerated he cannot tell all that he knows and he is being threatened to be
silent.”94
Many waited to see how Fujimori would react to this incident. Montesinos’ usefulness was
indisputable. As the US Embassy noted, “[s]hould someone prove a nuisance to the president,
Montesinos may well have the information necessary to quiet the problem.” But this was a highprofile embarrassment; it was possible Montesinos had just become a liability. The embassy
dispatch continued:
For the president, Montesinos has been a trusted, and in return, a loyal
advisor, the operative in the shadows who knows the secrets and makes
things happen. Likewise, he has always had the potential for becoming a
problem, the opportunistic manipulator who maybe knows too much
about everything and generates negative press for the administration.95
Other recent drug episodes had also embarrassed the Fujimori administration. Some 380
pounds of coca paste had been found on board a former presidential plane.96 Then 200 more
pounds were discovered on board Peruvian navy ships, one anchored in Vancouver harbor.
Following those revelations, Fujimori had announced the suspension of all international navy trips
and Air Force commercial flights. Now, he remained conspicuously silent on the Vaticano charges,
except to say in a September 1 television interview that Montesinos should clarify the situation
with his own TV appearance.97
94
State Department cable, “Peru Monthly Narcotics Report,” October 10, 1996. On October 11, 1996, the Lima civil
court convicted Vaticano of drug trafficking and forgery and sentenced him to 25 years in prison. A number of
military officers, including General Jaime Rios Araico, also received sentences for drug activity. Years later,
Vaticano confirmed to a prosecutor as well as to a congressional commission that he had indeed had links to
Montesinos.
95
State Department cable, “Intelligence chief Montesinos accused of protecting drug traffickers,” September 6, 1996.
96
“Coca curiosities,” The Economist.
97
State Department cable, “Intelligence chief Montesinos accused of protecting drug traffickers,” September 6, 1996.
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But if there was a moment of chilliness between the two men who ran Peru, it soon passed.
Montesinos remained as trusted, as indispensable, as ever. Even the US government seemed eager
to sing his praises.98
US Support Welcome
On October 21, 1996—two months after Vaticano leveled his accusations and 10 days after
his sentencing—US “drug czar” General Barry McCaffrey visited Peru, where he met with
Montesinos and praised him as an “outstanding and knowledgeable strategist.”99 Speaking directly
to the issue of drug trafficking, McCaffrey said that “[i]t’s my personal opinion, but I don’t believe
President Fujimori will tolerate drug corruption among his top officials.”100
Interestingly, McCaffrey’s visit marked the first time in the six years Fujimori had been
president that Montesinos had been seen in public, and photographs were released to the press.101
Clearly there was good reason that Montesinos had acquired a number of public nicknames
connoting shadowy, behind-the-scenes power: “Rasputin,” “Darth Vader,” or “The Doctor”
(Peruvians’ title of respect for lawyers).102
The US support for Montesinos was all the more valuable because Fujimori was feeling
embattled on other fronts. Several of his close associates had gone. Hernando de Soto had
resigned. Fujimori’s wife, Susana Higachi, had moved out of the palace in a highly publicized
departure in 1994, citing fears for her own safety. The two were now divorced. His brother,
Santiago, had been forced from his position of close advisor by political infighting in April 1996.
Finally, Peru’s economic miracle—the achievement which in many eyes excused Fujimori’s
autocratic regime—was starting to crumble. After the April 1995 election, the attendant inflated
public spending had come to a halt and the money supply shrank. On the commodity markets,
exported copper prices fell, while those for imported oil and wheat rose. Instead of an anticipated
1996 growth rate of 5-6 percent, Peru looked likely to achieve 2 percent. Fujimori’s approval rating
had fallen from 75 percent to 42.5 percent.
But on one front, Fujimori could take heart. The reelection program which he had
entrusted to Montesinos looked to be on track and on target.
98
The support was not universal. In October 1996, Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Christopher Dodd (D-CT)
wrote CIA Director John Deutch to remind him that the new intelligence guidelines prohibited any intelligence
relations with Montesinos. Source: Washington Post, 9/22/00.
99
Terry Allen, “CIA and drugs, our man in Peru,” Covert Action Quarterly #59, December 3, 1996.
100
Vogel and Moffett, Wall Street Journal..
101
Caretas magazine, apparently still un-intimidated, made good use of the photo, converting it to a Halloween mask
which its readers could cut out and wear. Source: Vogel and Moffett, Wall Street Journal.
102
State Department cable, “Intelligence chief Montesinos accused of protecting drug traffickers,” September 6, 1996.
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Third Term Legal?
Fujimori and Montesinos had turned to the congress for the first step in seeking a third
term. While opposition parties were active, they were not united, and with his majority the
congress was reliably pro-Fujimori. Sure enough, on August 23, 1996, the congress approved an
interpretation of the constitution which would allow Fujimori to seek a third term in 2000. Known
as Law 26657 (Law of the Authentic Interpretation of the Constitution), it basically stated that the
1993 constitution, which allowed a second term, had not been in force when Fujimori was first
elected in 1990. Thus, the 1990 election did not count toward the limit of two, and Fujimori was
eligible to stand for a “second” election in 2000.103
Constitutional Tribunal. The Peruvian Bar Association immediately challenged the Act
before the Constitutional Tribunal, a court charged with reviewing the constitutionality of federal
law. But Montesinos had been there already. The Tribunal required six out of seven votes to
declare a law unconstitutional. Montesinos knew the six votes could not be mobilized: he had
secured the appointment of two allies to the Tribunal earlier in 1996.104 Three of the remaining
judges, however, felt strongly that the law was invalid. While they could not rule it
unconstitutional, they could and did vote that it was “inapplicable” to Fujimori (the tribunal
president abstained; the remaining three judges upheld the law).105
A Fujimori supporter took the case to the Supreme Court (despite the fact that the
Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the Tribunal), asking for invalidation of the
“inapplicable” ruling. The Supreme Court rejected the case in March 1997, but ruled that the
National Elections Board must be the final arbiter of Fujimori’s right to run. The ruling ensured
that the Elections Board would enjoy attention from Montesinos. But that lay well in the future.
More urgent at the moment was for Montesinos, operating as usual from behind the
scenes, to demonstrate to the legal community the consequences of opposition to government
plans. Retribution was becoming Montesinos’ strong suit. As it had been for inconvenient
prosecutors or critical journalists, so it now was for the judges. Over the next year, the three
dissenting Constitutional Tribunal justices suffered from physical threats, and watched as family
businesses closed and their assets were frozen. Justice Delia Revoredo was obliged to seek asylum
in Costa Rica after she and her husband were falsely accused of smuggling cars. On May 29, 1997,
the government-controlled congress removed the three dissenters from the Tribunal on the pretext
103
Act No. 26,657 had only one article, which included the following conclusion: “It is interpreted that the
computation shall not include the presidential periods started before the current constitution entered into force.”
From the Act, published August 23, 1996.
104
The two were Jose Garcia Marcelo, an army officer related to Montesinos, and Francisco Acosta Sanchez, former
vice-minister of labor.
105
Conaghan.
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that they had engaged in inappropriate conduct.106 Thus reduced in numbers and unable to meet
the legal requirement of six votes, the Tribunal could no longer rule on the constitutionality of
laws.
The judges’ dismissal did cause problems for Fujimori. In June 1997, university students
rallied for the first time against the government, leading widespread street demonstrations.107 The
judges also received a sympathetic hearing from the wider international community. Among
others, they appealed to the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which sent the
case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
But Montesinos’ remaking of the judiciary was also bearing fruit. In June 1996, whatever
powers had remained to the Public Prosecutor (attorney general) had been transferred to a newlycreated three-person Executive Committee for the Public Ministry—which took charge of all
judicial reform. In 1997, the committee assumed responsibility for assigning prosecutors to cases.108
Out of the 37 justices on the Supreme Court, only 14 were permanent appointments. Systemwide,
74 percent of judges were now provisional or substitutes, making them beholden to the
administration.109 Suspected terrorist cases were still tried by “faceless” judges who wore hoods
and allowed no cross examination, allowing for the aggressive prosecution of troublemakers.
Although opposition to the Fujimori/Montesinos methods of governing was starting to build, it
was disjointed and manageable. In summer 1997, moreover, Fujimori was still relishing his April
victory against terrorism. It had come after four months of a tense stand-off with armed guerrillas.
Tupac Amaru Hostages
On December 17, 1996, 20 guerrillas from the Tupac Amaru organization—seeking the
release from prison of fellow rebels—had taken hostage some 700 guests attending a reception at
the Japanese ambassador’s residence. Those seized included ambassadors from Japan, Brazil,
Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba, South Korea, Austria, Venezuela and six officials from the US Embassy.
Also inside were Peru’s foreign and agricultural ministers, six members of Congress, the Supreme
Court president, Fujimori’s brother, mother and sister, and dozens of Japanese business people.
Some 170 hostages, including Fujimori’s mother and sister, were released almost
immediately. Others were let go over the next days and weeks until a core group of 72 hostages
remained. For months, Fujimori remained adamant in his refusal to negotiate with the rebels.
Finally, on April 22, 1997, Peruvian forces stormed the residence and rescued the hostages. The
106
The three were Manuel Aguirre Roca, Delia Revoredo and Guillermo Rey Terry. The inappropriate conduct was to
publish a document explaining their ruling on Law 26657. Source: Conaghan.
107
State Department cable, “INR intelligence briefs and assessments,” August 1, 1997.
108
The National Council of Magistrates had held the authority to appoint judges and prosecutors. This body declined
steadily in influence until in 1998 its members resigned in protest.
109
Roger Atwood, “Creeping coup,” New Republic, Oct. 6, 1997, p.15.
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initial euphoria which greeted the rescue was dimmed somewhat in international eyes when it
emerged that at least one of the guerrillas was shot after surrendering. But Fujimori was still
applauded for having stood up to terrorism and blackmail.
Having dealt so successfully with MRTA, it may have surprised Fujimori and his eminence
grise, Montesinos, that a run-in with the press did not turn out as well.
Baruch Ivcher Affair
Channel 2 or Frecuencia Latina, under the ownership of naturalized Peruvian Baruch
Ivcher, had remained an independent media voice. It had supported Fujimori’s government in the
early days but grew steadily more critical. The station seemed unafraid of Fujimori and
Montesinos. In April 1997, it broadcast a report about two female Army intelligence officers
tortured for leaking information to the media. According to Frecuencia Latina, Leonor La Rosa
claimed she had been ordered to seduce an officer to obtain compromising videos Montesinos was
collecting. When she went public, she was tortured and left crippled.110 Her colleague, Mariella
Barreto, fared worse. Barreto was found decapitated and dismembered in March 1997 after she
disclosed that she had information about the unit responsible for the La Cantuta massacre. The
report incensed the military, which in late May 1997 accused Channel 2 owner Ivcher of leading a
smear campaign and filed a suit in military court alleging slander.
Unintimidated, the station in late spring publicized Montesinos’ tax documents. These
showed that, while the unofficial intelligence chief had a modest salary, he declared income for
1996 of $600,000. Adding to the government’s discomfort, another report in an opposition
magazine alleged that Fujimori’s birth documents had been altered and contained inconsistencies,
fueling rumors that Fujimori had been born in Japan—which would make him ineligible to serve
as Peru’s president.111 Finally, on July 12, 1997, Frecuencia Latina broadcast illegal telephone
intercepts, presumably conducted by intelligence agencies, of 197 journalists, politicians and
business leaders.112
Ivcher said later he had been aware since 1995 that SIN had infiltrated his station’s news
team, so he made some personnel changes. That, he recalled, started his troubles with the
government: “Our news team became the dictatorship’s worst enemy.”113 Even with that history,
he was taken aback by the intensity of the government’s retaliation. On July 13, 1997, Ivcher’s
Peruvian nationality was revoked. The government claimed that Ivcher’s naturalization of 1984
was invalid because he had failed to renounce his former Israeli citizenship. Under Peruvian law,
110
Hilton.
111
State Department cable, “INR intelligence briefs and assessments,” August 1, 1997.
112
Ibid.
113
“In Peru, the end of the road?” Newsweek, October 9, 2000, p.60.
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non-nationals could not own shares in television firms. Ivcher fled the country for asylum in the
US. With Ivcher gone, pro-government minority shareholders (brothers Samuel and Mendel
Winters) took control of the station.114 The tone of the station’s reporting changed overnight.
But while Montesinos and Fujimori had won this battle, it was not so clear they were still
winning the war. While they had shrugged off the Vaticano charges, and eluded responsibility for
Barrios Altos or La Cantuta, the action against Ivcher proved costly. That it came at the same time
as the public demonstrations against the dismissal of the Constitutional Tribunal judges only made
it worse.
Fallout
The Ivcher affair precipitated a spate of resignations. Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela, a
national hero during the Tupac Amaru hostage crisis, resigned immediately after Ivcher’s
departure “for reasons of conscience.” Although the government denied any telephone
surveillance, the Channel 2 television report had said Tudela’s was among those phones being
tapped.115 The defense minister was next to go, followed by three more cabinet ministers by the end
of the year—some of whom jumped while others were pushed. Even members of Fujimori’s
coalition became alarmed. Carlos Ferrero, a leader of Cambio90, urged the president to retire head
of the Army General Hermoza Rios and name Montesinos to an official post where he could be
held accountable, but Fujimori refused.116
Instead, Montesinos responded with a power grab. In July 1997, SIN added to its empire,
taking on additional responsibilities for tax, customs and treasury fraud investigation. SIN
assigned 200 officers to new criminal coordination offices.117 Henceforth, fraud investigations could
be proposed and initiated only by a SIN criminal coordination office, not the police. The
government also signaled that it would tolerate no more press criticism when unidentified agents
kidnapped opposition newspaper La Republica general editor Blanca Rosales, interrogated her for
news sources and threatened to kill her.118
The heavy-handed tactics came at a price, this time in public opinion. Although the
economy was doing well with 7.4 percent growth, a budget surplus and inflation of only 6.5
percent, Fujimori’s approval rating—which had stood at 67 percent after the April hostage
114
Conaghan.
115
“Fujimori under fire,” The Economist, July 26, 1997
116
Linda Robinson, “A precipitous decline for Peru’s strongman,” US News & World Report, December 15, 1997,
p.46.
117
Fifty went to the Peruvian National Tax Administration Superintendency (SUNAT), 50 to Customs and 100 to
Treasury to help direct the Peruvian national police investigative units.
118
Atwood.
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rescue—had fallen to the low 20s by mid-1997.119 Polls showed Peruvians had lost confidence that
their president was in charge. Only 33.5 percent thought Fujimori was in control, versus 30 percent
who believed Montesinos ran the country, while another 22.8 percent said it was the military. Fully
82 percent said Montesinos and General Hermoza Rios should resign. Fujimori’s response to
criticism, noted the US Embassy in a dispatch, had become more aggressive as he blamed both
vested interests and a corrupt press for his reversals.120
The McCaffrey Affair
By early 1998, even the US was starting to regard Montesinos with a jaundiced eye. In
April 1998, US drug czar General McAffrey returned to Peru for a visit. On April 10, McCaffrey
met with a group of government counternarcotics officials. One month later, the pro-government
Channel 5 aired a selectively edited, 12-minute video of the briefing, which conveyed the
impression that Montesinos had run the meeting.121 Although, unusually for him, Montesinos had
attended two other public events recently, the TV broadcast was the first time the Peruvian public
had heard Montesinos’ voice.122
McCaffrey was outraged by the blatant doctoring of the footage and, on May 14, 1998, told
a Washington DC press conference that he was “offended by Dr. Montesinos’ manipulation and
exploitation of my visit to Peru.”123 McCaffrey added that he had heard about Montesinos’ alleged
human rights abuses and that he “shares those concerns.” He suggested Montesinos make himself
available to the Peruvian press and to human rights groups to answer the allegations. “I would not
want to characterize Mr. Montesinos nor really associate myself with his work,” McCaffrey said.124
Montesinos’ response was swift. Later that day, a SIN official contacted the US Embassy to
advise that the Peruvian government, in protest at McCaffrey’s “harsh and unfair” criticism, was
withdrawing from all government-to-government law enforcement and intelligence exchanges
with the United States. The withdrawal would remain in effect until an official US retraction and
acknowledgement of Montesinos’ contribution to the fight against narcotics.125
119
State Department cable, “INR intelligence briefs and assessments,” August 1, 1997.
120
Ibid.
121
State Department cable, “ONDCP director speaks out and Montesinos reacts,” May 15, 1998.
122
The other two events were a book-signing ceremony for General Hermoza Rios in late 1997, and an April 22 event
commemorating the one-year anniversary of the hostage rescue. Source: SD “ONDCP director speaks out and
Montesinos reacts,” May 15, 1998.
123
Ibid.
124
Karen DeYoung, “’The Doctor’ Divided US officials; CIA defended Peruvian against human-rights accusations,”
Washington Post, September 22, 2000, p.A1.
125
State Department cable, “ONDCP director speaks out and Montesinos reacts,” May 15, 1998.
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Valle Riestra. As if facing down the US government were not enough, Montesinos over
the summer was forced to take on opposition from another, rather unexpected quarter—the prime
minister’s office. On June 4, 1998, Fujimori appointed Javier Valle Riestra, a former opposition
senator known for his defense of human rights, as prime minister. It was an unusual appointment
that observers speculated was intended to bolster Fujimori’s image.
Valle Riestra quickly made it clear that he was opposed to the idea of Fujimori running for
a third term as president, and he voiced his opposition frequently. Specifically, he called on
Fujimori to strike down the 1996 law which interpreted the 1993 constitution as allowing him to
run again.126 He also advocated a pardon for American Lori Berenson, sentenced in 1996 as a Tupac
Amaru terrorist. In August, the prime minister took on another hot topic—he criticized the prison
conditions of Shining Path leader Guzman as too lenient (reportedly Guzman enjoyed access to
music and conjugal visits). The military responded that Guzman was held under rigorous
conditions, though it conceded Guzman had come to a 1994 agreement with the government. On
August 7, 1998, Valle Riestra resigned after repeated threats to do so. He explained that "I cannot
live among these constant disputes. I am a democrat, and here there is a totalitarian spirit."127
Valle Riestra’s one-man campaign made little difference to Montesinos’ plans, though it
must have been unexpected to face internal opposition.
Corruption on Video
But Montesinos had other fish to fry. By early 1998, it was becoming clear that to reelect
Fujimori to a third term would require unprecedented coordination and coercion. Fujimori still
had not declared his intention to run, and Montesinos apparently wanted all the pieces in place
before such an announcement. To his advantage, Montesinos enjoyed Fujimori’s complete
confidence, especially after Fujimori dismissed the unpopular General Hermoza Rios in August
1998. The president, reported the US Embassy, “has publicly praised [Montesinos] for his work
against narcotics traffickers, common criminals and terrorists.”128 It continued:
Nothing that the government does on intelligence, enforcement, and
security issues occurs without his [Montesinos’] blessing. Like it or not, he
is the go-to guy, short of the president himself, on any key issues,
particularly any major counternarcotics issue.
Videotapes. So throughout 1998 and 1999, Montesinos stepped up his efforts to ensure that
the administration controlled all key institutions associated with elections. Just how he did so is
uniquely on public view. Montesinos had, of course, been consolidating the administration’s hold
126
“Peru. A very strange prime minister,” The Economist, August 15, 1998, p.28.
127
Associated Press, “Peruvian prime minister quits after two months,” New York Times, August 8, 1998, p.A5.
128
State Department cable, “D/ONDCP visit—the Montesinos factor,” July 22, 1999.
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on the congress, the Supreme Court, the military and other organizations since 1990. His methods,
however, must be largely surmised from the results. For 1997-2000, however, an audiovisual
record exists of Montesinos in action—videotapes he made of meetings in his office. There is only
conjecture as to why Montesinos started in 1997 to videotape transactions (Montesinos claims
Fujimori instructed him to).129 The majority of the available tapes (thousands more may have been
hidden or destroyed) chronicle meetings in 1998 and 1999. They provide a detailed view of how
Montesinos conducted business during those years.130
Montesinos had his work cut out for him. For one thing, the political opposition had been
working since mid-1996 to collect the required 1.25 million voter signatures required to force a
popular referendum on a third term for Fujimori.131 By July 16, 1998, despite considerable legal
obstacles thrown in its way, the campaign had collected 1.44 million signatures.132 So Montesinos
arranged for the rules and the personnel to change—most urgently at the National Elections Board.
Building a Pliable Board
Under the 1993 constitution, the National Elections Board held responsibility for all final
rulings on electoral matters. It was an autonomous body of five members, appointed respectively
by the Supreme Court, the Public Ministry, the Lima Bar Association, public law schools, and
private law schools (the law school candidiates must be former deans). To deny a candidacy
required four votes. The Board had proved remarkably independent in allowing the referendum
signature campaign to go forward, despite efforts by congress and the National Office of Electoral
Procedures to impede it.133 In October 1996, all five Board members had voted in favor of letting
the referendum proceed, arguing that the referendum in question pre-dated the legislation passed
to prevent it and therefore was exempt.134 From Montesinos’ perspective, this would have to
change.
His long-term goal was simple enough: to control the country’s electoral and judicial
processes so that Fujimori’s government could stay in power for the foreseeable future. He made
129
“Yes, he’s back,” The Economist, June 30, 2001.
130
The Special Prosecution Office handling Montesinos’ case classified the 720 tapes in its possession into three
categories: private matters (affairs, indiscretions); criminal (bribes of private sector firms and individuals); and
public interest (politics and the judiciary). The great majority of the public sector tapes concern the reelection
effort.
131
Technically, the referendum sought repeal of the Authentic Interpretation Law of August 1996, which allowed
Fujimori a third term.
132
Conaghan.
133
Specifically, the congress in early October 1996 passed a law eliminating the possibility of referendums to repeal
laws, and required morever that any referendum have prior legislative approval.
134
The members were Alvaro Chocano Marina (Supreme Court), Ramiro de Valdivia Cano (Private Universities),
Manuel Catacora Gonzalez (Public Ministry), Romulo Munoz Arce (Lima Bar Association) and Walter Hernandez
Canel (Public Universities). Source: Conaghan.
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no secret of it in an April 1998 conversation with members of Fujimori’s party. Obtaining the right
to appoint provisional magistrates had been key. “We are working to ensure that this reform of the
judiciary lasts forever,” he said in a videotaped discussion, “because this is the only way we can
maintain control over the Supreme Court, with these provisional magistrates.”135 If he failed, he
knew the price: jail for all. As he put it:
Our horizon is a stable government until 2005… It’s an unknown whether
we will have a majority in congress [after the 2000 elections]. If we do not
have a majority, but we control the judiciary and the Public Ministry, we
can manage the situation. If we cannot control them, all public officials
from ministers to the bottom tier will be sent to court [on corruption
charges].
Montesinos had already started his campaign to reconfigure the National Elections Board
with a 1997 law passed by the congress that allowed provisional court magistrates and
prosecutors—most of them beholden to Montesinos—to vote on Board nominees.136 Opposition
legislators had protested loudly, but to no avail. Now Montesinos took a more direct hand. At a
meeting on May 3, 1998, Montesinos worked to persuade Supreme Court Justice Alipio Montes de
Oca—a government supporter—to take the position of president of the Board. Montesinos offered
Montes de Oca a generous package to accept this career move: the standard monthly salary of
15,000 soles (ca. $940, the same as the president), plus $10,000 a month in cash. Unbeknownst to
Montes de Oca, the conversation was videotaped.
“You will not sign anything,” Montesinos directed Montes de Oca. “You will come here
every month and I will give you an envelope and that’s it.”137 He also offered him a security detail
for his family. Furthermore, he guaranteed that Montes de Oca could later become president of the
Supreme Court. He assured Montes de Oca, whom he frequently called “my brother,” that the
delegate to the Elections Board from the Public Ministry would also be “one of us, so you will not
be alone there.”
Two days later, on May 5, 1998, as if moving pieces on a chessboard, Montesinos met with
an unnamed judge to tell him Montes de Oca was leaving the Supreme Court. He offered his
interlocutor the chance to work in the criminal branch of the court.138 “You know I have lots of
relationships,” Montesinos began the conversation. “And you know that to integrate the Supreme
Court, we sometimes need people we trust.”139 He explained how he had opened doors for former
classmates, then offered the anonymous judge the opportunity to likewise name a friend to his
135
Transcription of Video 806, Montesinos meets 17 congressmen of Cambio90, Fujimori’s party, April 16, 1998.
136
Conaghan.
137
Transcript of Video 888, May 3, 1998. Montesinos and Supreme Court member Alipio Montes de Oca.
138
The Supreme Court had seven “specialized chambers”: three in criminal law, two in civil law and one in social
matters. Each chamber had five members.
139
Transcript of Video 892, May 5, 1998, Montesinos and unknown judge.
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current post. Montesinos wanted the new recruit to help him fight a constitutional challenge from
the Peruvian Bar Association to Decree 900, which restricted jurisdiction over habeus corpus and
other legal proceedings to “specialized public law judges,” a category created by Montesinos. The
judge agreed to help.
Many Irons. Not all Montesinos’ time went to the reelection effort. From one example, one
can discern the wide range of his activities, and how he earned his sobriquet “Mr. Fix-it.” On May
5, 1998, the same day he met with the anonymous judge, Montesinos also called in his old friend
Jose Dellepiane Massa, a navy official appointed by Montesinos as executive secretary of the
Executive Commission of the Judiciary. In 1995, Fujimori had created the Executive Commission to
replace the constitutionally-established Judicial Council in charge of appointing judges. Although
Dellepiane did oversee some legitimate reforms, criticism of his appointment—a naval officer
instead of a lawyer in charge of judicial reform—had by 1998 reached an international body, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Montesinos realized he would have to
reassign his friend.
In their friendly meeting, Montesinos explained to Dellepiane that “I have called you to
tell you something that is not heartwarming to say, because of our friendship, but duties are duties
over these things. I have the ungrateful charge to ask you to leave your position.”140 In
compensation, Montesinos urged Dellepiane to choose a new post abroad, and guaranteed him his
former income. “The boss has given me authority for you to decide where you want to go, how
much you want to earn,” Montesinos told his friend. “You tell me. And if you do not know [right
now], you tell me tomorrow.”
Montesinos’ Finest Hour
By July 1998, Montesinos had the Elections Board more or less where he wanted it in terms
of personnel. The next step was to ensure it scuttled the referendum effort. The congress had laid
the groundwork with its vote in October 1996 to require prior legislative approval for any
referendum. The board had ruled that provision invalid in October 1996. Now Montesinos was
going to put forward another resolution, through the compliant National Office of Electoral
Procedures (ONPE), which would give the Elections Board another chance to require
congressional approval for a referendum. Such a requirement would move the entire issue into the
hands of the congress—which Fujimori and Montesinos controlled.
Montesinos wrote the resolution himself and, in a meeting on July 20, 1998, gave a draft
copy to National Elections Board member Walter Hernandez Canel (delegate from the Public
Universities) and Constitutional Tribunal member Jose Garcia Marcelo. “I would like to have your
140
Transcript of Video 884, May 5, 1998, Montesinos and Jose Dellepiane Massa, Executive Secretary of the
Executive Commission of the Public Ministry.
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comments because the idea is to have a unity, a doctrinal consensus,” he told the two men.141 The
next day, he was closeted with Congressman Medelius Rodriguez and National Elections Board
member Romulo Munoz Arce (delegate from the Lima Bar). He told them, clearly confident of the
outcome in advance, that ONPE would enact the resolution he showed them, and that the
referendum sponsors would immediately appeal the resolution to the Elections Board. Montesinos
wanted them to make sure that this time, the resolution passed.
One Board member who should have been a dependable ally apparently posed a problem.
Luis Serpa Segura was a recent appointee to the Board with a history on the Supreme Court of
supporting rulings that favored the governments. On August 11, 1998, again meeting with
Elections Board member Munoz Arce and Congressman Medelius Rodriguez, Montesinos
discussed the need for Munoz Arce to speak “because Lucho [Serpa] cannot do it properly.” The
trio also discussed the possible recalcitrance of another member of the Board, Ramiro de Valdivia
Cano, but Montesinos reassured them that he was “already softened.”142 Much of the rest of the
conversation concerned Munoz Arce’s daughter and her studies in Connecticut. Montesinos was
buying her ticket, arranging for her visa, and providing her with $5,000 a month toward expenses.
He also agreed to arrange a job for Munoz Arce’s son in the internal revenue agency, as well as to
resolve an issue for his wife.
On August 14, Montesinos addressed the Serpa problem. In a meeting that included
President of Congress Victor Joy Way. Montesinos suggested to Serpa that if he had any qualms
about activities at the Board, he should resign and take over as president of the Supreme Court.
“Who is the only man we trust with the merit to do it? The only one is you,” he flattered Serpa.143
Apparently Serpa calculated that after all he could do the job at hand, and the drama played out
according to Montesinos’ script.
On August 9, 1998, right on schedule, ONPE had issued Resolution 092-98-J/ONPE
suspending the referendum on Fujimori’s candidacy until its promoters complied with the
requirement for prior congressional approval. The Foro Democratico leading the referendum effort
appealed the resolution before the National Elections Board and, on August 20, the Board upheld
the ONPE resolution—reversing its stance of October 1996. While 1.25 million signatures were still
required to accept a petition for a referendum, the National Elections Board now agreed that for a
referendum to be held, proponents had additionally to acquire congressional approval. The vote
was four to one, with only Valdivia de Cano voting to uphold the original ruling. Those voting in
141
Transcript of Video 933, July 20, 1998. Montesinos with National Elections Board member Walter Hernandez
Canel, and Jose Garcia Marcelo, member of the Constitutional Tribunal.
142
Transcipt of Video 1318, November 11, 1998. Montesinos, National Elections Board member Romulo Munoz
Arce and Congressman Medelius Rodriguez. The transcript is officially dated November, but the conversation
clearly took place in August.
143
Transcript of Video 1196, August 14, 1998. Montesinos, President of Congress Victor Jon Way, National Elections
Board member Carlos Bringas (previously a provisional prosecutor, voted as delegate from the Public Ministry),
and National Elections Board President Luis Serpa Segura.
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favor included Serpa Segura and Jose Carlos Bringas. The Board’s ruling dealt a death blow to the
referendum. On August 27, 1998, the congress voted 67 to 45 to block the referendum (the law
required a minimum of 48 supporting votes for the referendum to proceed). Montesinos had won.
On December 27, 1999, Fujimori at long last announced his candidacy for a third term as
president. Civil society groups and political associations immediately filed eighteen separate legal
challenges with the National Elections Board, but the Board rejected them all.
Enlisting the Media
Other thorny issues Montesinos resolved with less apparent difficulty. Faced with the
prospect that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based in Costa Rica, might launch
inconvenient investigations, Montesinos simply arranged for congress in July 1999 to rubberstamp a resolution that Peru was withdrawing from the court’s jurisdiction. The court had
proposed that Peru re-try in civilian court four Chilean members of Tupac Amaru sentenced to life
in prison by a military court.144 It had also indicated interest in hearing the Ivcher case, as well as
one on behalf of the three Constitutional Tribunal judges fired in 1997.
Television. As for the press, Montesinos apparently decided to buy the coverage he
needed. The state-run Channel 7 already supported the government, so he concentrated his efforts
elsewhere.145 On October 14, 1998, for example, Montesinos met with Jose Francisco Crousillat,
majority shareholder of America Television (Channel 4). The two men arranged that Channel 4
would support the reelection project, for which Montesinos paid 1.9 million soles ($619,000).146 On
February 26, 1999, he paid Crousillat another $1 million.147 A contract signed November 7, 1999,
between Crousillat and Montesinos allowed the intelligence chief to direct the content of news and
political advertisements. In exchange, Montesinos paid Crousillat $1.5 million a month until April
2000. Over time, Crousillat received $10 million for his station’s reelection support.
In the summer of 1999, Montesinos brought a bank into his relationship with Channel 4.
On July 19, 1999, he invited Eugenio Bertini Vinci, general manager of Wiese Sudameris Bank, to a
meeting with Channel 4 shareholder Crousillat as well as the station’s director general, Luis
Alberto Wo. Cesar Chavez Jones, then-president of the military-police pension agency which was
also a major stockholder of Banco di Comercio, was also present. Montesinos offered to solve some
judicial problems confronting both Wiese Sudameris bank and Banco de Comercio if, in exchange,
the banks would refinance the debts of two television stations, Channel 4 and Channel 2.148 At this
144
“Outlaw,” The Economist, July 10, 1999
145
Conaghan.
146
Transcript of Video 1200, October 14, 1998. Montesinos and Jose Francisco Crousillat.
147
Transcript of Video 1347, February 26, 1999. Montesinos and Crousillat.
148
Specifically, Montesinos asked Wiese Sudameris to refinance the TV channels’ debt, and Banco di Comercio to
provide the necessary collateral.
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meeting, Montesinos assured his audience that “Channel 4 is playing for the government, for the
president, and for his reelection”149 He continued: “We were thinking, brother, as a way of lending
us a hand, we would look for a mechanism for Banco de Comercio to make the payment.” Bertini
Vinci assured Montesinos that “I can do it directly.” Four months later, on November 11, 1999,
Bertini was back in Montesinos’ office—apparently to reap his reward. The two discussed a delay
Montesinos could engineer to a Tax Court resolution which negatively affected the bank.150 Bertini
accepted Montesinos’ offer to delay the measure until after year’s end.
Montesinos likewise pursued Genaro Delgado Parker, owner of Channel 13 (Red Global).
On April 7, 1999, Delgado Parker promised Montesionos to cancel his station’s contract with
political commentator Cesar Hildebrandt, who had criticized Fujimori’s reelection campaign.151
This was disingenuous on Delgado Parker’s part—he had already canceled Hildebrandt’s contract.
A few months later, Delgado Parker lost ownership of the station; Montesinos was apparently
dissatisfied with him. On August 25, 1999, Montesinos met with another TV mogul, Ernesto Shultz
of Channel 5 (Panamericana), as well as with Manuel Delgado Parker (Genaro’s brother)—
controlling owner of the Radioprogramas radio station. Both wanted Montesinos’ help with a
judicial problem.152 Montesinos did help, and eventually paid Shultz millions for his cooperation
on a number of matters. The result of such media deals was that in October 1999, reporting on
Fujimori accounted for 73 percent of all news programs; in November 1999 the figure was 81
percent.153 On the government-aligned stations the percentages were even higher. Opposition
parties and candidates could get virtually no airtime.
Print Media. Montesinos did not leave newspapers and magazines out of his plan. On
September 14, 1999, for example, Montesinos approached Eduardo Calmell del Solar, owner of the
sympathetic newspaper El Expreso.154 Together, Montesinos and del Solar planned activities
targeted at the political opposition parties. Montesinos even suggested that intelligence agents
could form an investigative unit to provide the newspaper with news items damaging to the
opposition. The two men met at least five times between September 1999 and May 2000. On April
13, 2000, they renewed their contract.155 For his services, Montesinos paid del Solar a total of $3.85
million.
149
Transcript of Video 1607, July 19, 1999. Montesinos, Eugenio Bertini Vinci, general manager of Wiese Sudameris
Bank, plus Jose Francisco Crousillat and Luis Alberto Wo, the owners of Channel 4.
150
Transcript of Video 1788, November 11, 1999. Montesinos and Bertini Vinci.
151
Transcript of Video 1459, April 7, 1999. Montesinos and Genaro Delgado Parker.
152
Transcript of Video 1677, August 25, 1999. Montesinos, Manuel Delgado Parker (Genaro’s brother) and Ernesto
Schultz of Panamericana TV.
153
Conaghan.
154
Transcript of Video 1736, September 14, 1999. Montesinos and Eduardo Calmell del Solar.
155
Transcript of Video 1475, April 13, 2000. Montesinos and Calmell del Solar.
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Montesinos also bought off the tabloid press. Beginning in late 1997, tabloid articles began
to appear criticizing journalists who opposed the reelection project, or who took exception to either
Montesinos, the armed services or SIN. From July 1999, the tabloids attacked leading opposition
presidential candidates almost daily. Although the tabloid editors denied any undue influence
from the government, in both 1998 and 1999 employees of the newspapers revealed that the critical
articles were faxed into the newspaper offices from individuals associated with SIN.156
Investigators later confirmed that Montesinos channeled $100,000 a week to intermediaries who
paid off tabloid press executives in return for feeding them news items.157
Military in Loop. Montesinos never forgot to keep his friends in the military informed of
his plans and achievements. On November 26, 1999, Montesinos discussed reelection prospects
with the commanders of the three branches of the military.158 “We have a political objective, which
is the reelection,” he told the group.
To get the reelection, we need to deal with the devil if necessary. We need
to play a strong role, because the reelection means the continuity of all of
us and the stability of the army and the police.159
The reelection, he continued, was only the latest stage in a plan dating back to 1990. “This
is a project of 15-20 years,” he said. “It’s a long-term plan, because to make the country take off is
something you cannot accomplish in 5, 10 or 15 years.” He boasted of his control over the media.
Opposition candidate Alberto Andrade (Somos Peru party), for example, had just held a press
conference. “No channel broadcast the press conference, it never existed,” Montesinos bragged to
the three officers. For the next few months, all television stations had agreed to emphasize a single
theme that favored the government: security, because “we are making everybody remember” what
it was like when terrorism ran rampant. Overall, he reassured them, the administration had the
broadcast media in its pocket.
Everybody is already lined up… we made them sign contracts. We are
playing seriously here… Every day I have a meeting here at half past
noon, where we plan what will be broadcast on the evening news.
Where’s He Getting that Money?
Astonishingly, given the extent of Montesinos’ dominance, negative reporting still
managed to make its way into the press. In mid-December 1999, less than two weeks before
156
Conaghan.
157
Conaghan.
158
They were Admiral Ibarcena Amico, commander-in-chief of the marines; Lieutenant Bello Vasquez, commanderin-chief of the air force; and General Villanueva Ruesta, commander of the army.
159
Transcript of Video 1792, November 26, 1999. Montesinos and the Army, Navy and Air Force commandants.
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Fujimori officially declared his candidacy, the old question of Montesinos’ finances again reared its
head. On December 15, the small opposition newspaper Liberacion published a copy of Montesinos’
transactions at Sudameris Wiese Bank from January-November 1999.160 The account showed
deposits of $2.16 million, including monthly payment of $100,000 from abroad and regular
deposits of $17,000—amounts of money stratospherically higher than what Montesinos was
earning.
Montesinos responded that he had nothing to hide, and invited the Public Ministry
(attorney general’s office) to investigate. At the same time, he filed a complaint that the newspaper
had violated bank privacy rights. The whole affair made it on the front pages only on January 18,
2000, when the pro-government daily Expreso published the results of the Sudameris Wiese Bank’s
own internal investigation into the Liberacion report.161 The bank investigation implicated APRA
(opposition) Congressman Jorge del Castillo and his sister-in-law, who worked at the bank.
Castillo had fled to the US, and the sister-in-law allegedly confessed. Public Prosecutor General
Miguel Aljovin Swayne asked the congress to investigate whether Castillo’s parliamentary
immunity should be lifted.
Montesinos, treating the bank’s investigation as conclusive, reversed his earlier request for
an investigation by the Public Ministry and asked instead that the whole affair be archived.162 The
Public Ministry had long been obedient to the administration. Accordingly, on his last day in
office, January 24, 2000, Public Prosecutor (attorney general) Aljovin did as Montesinos asked and
halted the inquiry. He argued that the documents implicating Montesinos had been obtained
illegally and were therefore inadmissible in court.
The dismissal, commented the US Embassy, “failed to address the fundamental question
of the source of the large quantities of money allegedly found in a public servant’s account.”
Nonetheless this case, as so many before it involving Montesinos, died away. The only surprise
was that Aljovin, considered decent but weak, had bothered to dismiss the case when his successor
was guaranteed to do so. Nelida Colan, the long-time Montesinos loyalist, took over from Aljovin
for her third term as attorney general. Little remained to do but wait for the election.
Election Too Close
The election was scheduled for April 9, 2000. But even with all the arrangements
Montesinos had made, the voting did not go as hoped. Peru Posible candidate Alejandro Toledo
had experienced a sudden surge in voter support. It took days to determine the actual outcome of
160
State Department cable, “Opposition tries to make campaign issue of controversial presidential advisor
Montesinos’ finances,” January 20, 2000.
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
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the vote, as Fujimori toyed with the idea of claiming outright victory. (Montesinos, an
international observer later confirmed, had hired technicians to tamper with the ONPE computer
programming.) Finally, as a result of domestic and international pressure, the official result was
announced on April 12: Fujimori had barely failed to win the required 50 percent; Toledo had
taken 40 percent of the vote. There would have to be a run-off election. Toledo agreed to a second
round only if campaign conditions improved, including an end to discriminatory media coverage.
The run-off election was set for May 28, 2000.
In the first round, Fujimori’s newly re-christened party Peru 2000 had won 52 of the 102
seats in Congress. That denied Fujimori the decisive majority he had enjoyed from 1995-2000 and
weakened his position significantly. To strengthen the administration’s hand, a number of
opposition congressmen had to be persuaded to switch sides. This was where Montesinos could be
highly effective. So he began what he termed his “recruitment operation.”163 His goal: to persuade
both current congressmen and candidates either to join Peru 2000 or to work secretly for Fujimori’s
reelection as “moles” from within their original parties.
An early effort was successful. On May 5, 2000, Montesinos met with Alberto Kouri, a
member of Toledo’s party, Peru Posible. TV Channel 4 executive Crousillat introduced Kouri to
Montesinos before leaving the room.164 With the video camera running, Montesinos said to Kouri:
“I don’t want a bare majority. I want a majority of 70, 75.” He pulled out a form for Kouri to sign.
But Kouri stalled, asking “How much? How much?” Montesinos, pulling out a wad of US dollars,
said, “Here is 10 [thousand].” But Kouri objected “No, we spoke of 15, 20.” Montesinos complied:
“Ten plus five—15,” and Kouri signed the form.165
Eventually, 11 individuals agreed to switch parties. Each of them signed three documents:
a formal petition asking Fujimori if he/she could join the party; a receipt for money received; and
an “honorable pledge” to follow the instructions of a coordinator—who was Montesinos. Each
deal was a little different: some were strictly monetary; others included gaining coveted positions
or eliminating troublesome legal problems.166 All were illegal. All were videotaped. Five other
legislators consented to collaborate with Montesinos and advance Fujimori’s interests from within
their existing party. These individuals received lump sum payments from $7,000 to $35,000.167
No Postponement. Both the opposition candidates and international observers had
condemned both the campaign and the first-round election as fraudulent, and pleaded with the
government to postpone the run-off election until free and fair conditions could be established. But
163
Montesinos’ declaration before the Subcommittee of Investigation of the Peruvian Congress, December 20, 2001.
Available at www.agenciaperu.com/actualidad/2002/ene/vladi_com_estrada.htm
164
Matt Moffett, “Peru’s press is now less cowed by state,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2000, p.A19.
165
Joseph Contreras and Russell Watson, “Not climbing down,” Newsweek, October 2, 2000, p.38.
166
See Appendix 1, chart of congressmen and candidates who switched to Fujimori’s Peru 2000 party.
167
See Appendix 2, chart of congressmen who operated as “moles” for Fujimori inside their existing political parties.
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the government denied any wrongdoing and refused any delay. On May 18, 10 days before the
second round vote, opposition candidate Toledo withdrew from the race, charging fraud.168
International observers waited another week, until the National Elections Board also rejected
postponement. At that, the OAS, a delegation from the Carter Center-NDI, European observers,
and the domestic poll-watching organization Transparencia all in protest suspended their election
observation.
Second Round. The vote went ahead on May 28, and Fujimori claimed victory with 74.3
percent of the vote. But the accumulated charges of fraud, the experience of the international
observers and the protests of the opposition resulted in unprecedented scrutiny of Peru and its
newly thrice-elected president. In late June 2000, the OAS sent a high-level mission led by OAS
Secretary-General Cesar Gaviria and Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to Lima to
sponsor a “democratic dialogue” between the opposition and the government. The mission
concluded with 29 recommendations for democratic reform. At the top of the list was the
restructuring of SIN and the removal of Montesinos. The “dialogue” was scheduled to start in
August.
On July 28, 2000, Fujimori was inaugurated for his third term. Only Ecuador and Bolivia’s
presidents attended from among the Latin American countries; the US and Canada sent no highlevel representatives. Because the opposition threatened a massive, three-day nationwide protest,
the affair was tense. Violence broke out on the streets; tear gas filled the cathedral during mass the
morning of the ceremony. Later, a police official confirmed that SIN had infiltrated the protest and
was responsible for the violence.169 The government used the violence to discredit the opposition
and try to cancel the OAS-sponsored “democratic dialogue”—but in vain.
On August 21, 2002, the day the talks with the opposition were to start, Fujimori tried to
seize the moral high ground with a press conference.
The Unraveling
The press conference was unusual because the shadowy Montesinos stood at Fujimori’s
side. Quite likely the event was his idea. Fujimori announced that the Peruvian government had
successfully broken up a ring of arms dealers channeling weapons to the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels. The arms had come from Jordan, stopped in the Canary
Islands, then arrived in Peru for trans-shipment to FARC. Montesinos, said Fujimori, was the
168
Toledo said in 2003 (by then he was Peru’s president) that he had spurned offers from Montesinos’ envoys for $50
million to withdraw from the second round. The manner in which he actually withdrew was not what Montesinos
would have scripted.
169
Conaghan.
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“architect” of the bust and the operation another example of his administration’s “defense of
democracy.”170
Unfortunately for this version of events, Jordan immediately protested, saying it had sold
the arms legitimately to representatives of the Peruvian government. Jordan also claimed that the
US had known of and approved the arms sale. Quickly rumors spread that Montesinos had in fact
known all along about the operation he was now taking credit for exposing.
Video Made Public. Then on September 14, 2002, the hammer dropped on Montesinos.
Congressman Fernando Olivera of the Independent Moralizing Front, the same congressman who
in 1990 had been prepared to air tax fraud charges against candidate Fujimori, released a video
which ran on an independent cable television station. Eventually even pro-government stations
showed excerpts from the video.171 It caused a sensation. The video was of Montesinos’ May 5
meeting with Congressman Kouri when he paid him handsomely in cash to change his party
affiliation.
It took years to learn the source of the video—but the speculation about it spoke volumes
about the complex mythology surrounding Montesinos and his doings. Some hypothesized that it
came from disgruntled naval officers at SIN headquarters. Others thought the CIA, disillusioned
with Montesinos after the FARC affair, had made the video available. Yet other reports said
Fujimori’s daughter Keiko—who did not like her father’s adviser—had leaked the tape.172 The truth
was more prosaic. The source was Matilde Pinchi Pinchi, an advisor and reputed lover of
Montesinos. She had become rich under his patronage, but reportedly was jealous of his relations
with other women—of whom there were many over the years. As one former secretary told the
press: “Montesinos always told me that he received many women. Every time he wanted one, he
made a phone call and he had her.”173 Nor were the women for himself alone; Montesinos
apparently frequently used courtesans for entrapment to blackmail those whose services he
needed.174
Pinchi, through a subordinate, sold the videotape to Congressman (Independent
Moralizing Front) and former investigative journalist Luis Iberico. Iberico negotiated for the tape
from early August and paid $100,000 for it.175 Iberico then passed it on to Congressman Olivera.
Olivera and Iberico rushed to make the video public when it became apparent that SIN had
learned they had it and was preparing to stop them. On the morning of September 14, their
170
Conaghan.
171
State Department cable, “Video shows Montesinos buying off opposition legislator,” September 15, 2000.
172
Joseph Contreras, “What the spy chief knows,” Newsweek, July 9, 2001, p.17.
173
Enrique Chávez and Milagros Trujillo, “Las Chicas A1 del SIN,” Caretas, July 24, 2003. See:
http://www.caretas.com.pe/2003/1782/articulos/charo.html
174
For more on this, see the “Bustamante Exorcizado” section here:
http://www.caretas.com.pe/2003/1769/articulos/pinchipinchi.phtml
175
Contreras and Watson. Also see: http://www.caretas.com.pe/2003/1769/articulos/pinchipinchi.phtml
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cellphones went dead at the same moment; both men received threatening phone calls. They called
their press conference for that afternoon.
The video’s impact was instantaneous, and dramatic. Montesinos, the master plotter, had
become snared in a net of his own making. Fujimori held panicked meetings for two days before
announcing, on September 16, 2000, that he was halting SIN operations, that he would hold new
elections and step down himself as president in July 2001. Montesinos, however, did not go easily.
He shouted at Prime Minister Federico Salas, delegated to inform Montesinos he had to resign,
that “I have 3,000 armed men at my disposal. I can launch a coup. No little president of the
ministerial council is going to tell me what to do.”176 Only on September 24 did Montesinos head
for Panama. On September 25, the government confirmed that Montesinos had been relieved of his
duties.
By mid-October, however, all Montesinos’ handpicked appointees in the police and the
armed forces remained in place. Indeed, there were signs Fujimori was backpedaling on his
proposal to leave office. Any optimism he may have had about staying on, however, was quickly
dashed. On October 23, in a dramatic development, Montesinos resurfaced in Peru.
During a week of almost comical frantic activity, Fujimori—clad in leather jacket—staged
a very public hunt for Montesinos by jeep and helicopter. In fact, Prime Minister Salas later said,
the hunt was a diversion. Its true purpose “was to distract the journalists’ attention while his
people looked for whatever it was that he was looking for: papers, evidence, suitcases. He wasn’t
looking for Montesinos,” said Salas.177 Testimony later revealed that Army Chief General Jose
Villanueva Ruesta had been hiding Montesinos.178 On October 29, 2000, Montesinos left a second
time—this time to go into hiding. He was tracked down on June 23, 2001 in Venezuela, where he
had undergone plastic surgery to alter his appearance (to little effect). He returned to Peru a
prisoner, incarcerated in the same prison he had designed for Shining Path terrorist Abimael
Guzman. He faced 70 trials on charges from drug-trafficking to embezzlement, from directing
death squads to corruption.
Investigators found Montesinos had amassed a fortune of some $85 million, much of it in
Swiss banks (a Florida bank held $38 million of Montesinos’ money).179 In his home, they
discovered 1,200 Christian Dior shirts, 50 French suits, 16 pairs of Italian shoes, and an assortment
of silk ties, gold cufflinks, Swiss watches and jewels—all together valued at about $700,000.180
176
Catan.
177
Catan.
178
Conaghan.
179
In all, various members of Fujimori’s government had stashed $207 million in foreign bank accounts.
180
Reynaldo Munoz, “Montesinos: Peru’s public enemy number one,” Agence France Presse, June 24, 2001.
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Meanwhile, on November 16, 2000, Fujimori departed for an Asia-Pacific Summit in
Brunei. But he never returned. After the summit, he headed to Japan, where he remained. Fujimori
tried to resign via fax, but the congress—finally in the hands of the opposition—refused to accept
it. Instead, on November 22, 2000, a majority of legislators voted to remove Fujimori from office.
It was not clear whether or of what Montesinos would be found guilty. While the
prosecutor had 720 of what became known as the Vladivideos to use against him, news reports said
some 2,500 existed.181 Perhaps Montesinos had hidden some; it was also likely that Fujimori had
taken or destroyed some in the days after the crisis broke. But Montesinos claimed there were
30,000 videos. Maybe, with that claim, Montesinos hoped to reactivate his old network and,
eventually, secure his freedom. Clearly, the more individuals he could threaten to take down with
him, the better his chances of survival. Thirty thousand incriminating tapes would surely help his
cause.
181
See Appendix 3 for a chart illustrating the web of Montesinos’ contacts, both actual bribes and exchanges of
favors.
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Robust Web of Corruption ____________________________________________________ C14-04-1722.0
Appendix 1
Congressmen and candidates who switched to Fujimori’s Peru 2000 party
Name
Juan Carlos Mendoza
del Solar
Gregorio T. Gomez
Former Political Party
Solidaridad Nacional
Exchange
US $10.000 /month
Peru Posible (Toledo)
Jose Luis Elias Avalos
Eduardo Farah
Antonio Orefice
Edilberto Canales
Pillaca
Luis Caceres
Velazquez
Luis Caceres Perez
Mario Gonzalez Inga
Jorge Polack
Avancemos
Solidaridad Nacional
Peru Posible
Peru Posible
US $5.000 /month +
US $20.000 for a car
US $100.000 (for campaign)
US $20.000 /month
Judicial and administrative files against
him were closed
US $20.000
Rubi Rodriguez de
Aguilar
APRA
FREPAP
FREPAP
Peru Posible
Solidaridad Nacional
US $20.000
US $20.000 /month
Chairman of the
Commission
US $50.000
Foreign
Affairs
Source: Guillermo Jorge, Associate
Moreno Ocampo & Wortman Jofré
Buenos Aires
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Robust Web of Corruption ____________________________________________________ C14-04-1722.0
Appendix 2
Congressmen who operated as “moles” for Fujimori inside existing political parties
Name
Jorge D’Acunha Cuevas
Milagros Huaman Lu
Guido Pennano Allison
Jose Luna Galvez
Waldo Rios Salcedo
Political Party
Peru Posible
Peru Posible
FIM
Solidaridad Nacional
FIM
Exchange
US $10,000
US $30,000
US $35,000
US $7,000
US $10,000
Source: Guillermo Jorge, Associate
Moreno Ocampo & Wortman Jofré
Buenos Aires
45
Appendix 3
Robust Web of Corruption ____________________________________________________ C14-04-1722.0
46