November 7, 2012
CANADA-ASIA AGENDA
www.asiapacific.ca
Series Editor Brian Job Associate Editor Trang Nguyen
Issue 32
China’s Leaders - the Next Generation:
Prospects and Challenges of the 18th Party Congress
Jeremy Paltiel
The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is set to start in Beijing on November 8, 2012. All
eyes are focused on China’s next generation of leaders, particularly Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who are expected to
take over top posts currently led by Hu Jintao. Despite every effort to project an image of stability, events of the
past year have been anything but routine. In analyzing the congress agenda and leadership contenders, author
Jeremy Paltiel argues that given the negative spotlight from recent scandals, the next generation of leaders will
have to earn support the hard way by learning to engage the public in the painful choices that lie ahead. For
Canadians, how China manages its transition will be important as Canada continues to deepen ties with the
world’s second biggest economic power.
On November 8, 2012, over two thousand delegates
will assemble in the Great Hall of the People to begin
the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). This Congress will inaugurate the transfer of
power to a new generation of Chinese leadership. This is
only the second time in China’s history that power has
been transferred peacefully according to pre-determined
schedule. After a decade in power, the fourth generation
of communist leaders will hand over to the fifth. Despite
every effort to project an image of stability, events of
the past year have been anything but routine. The late
night crash of a black Ferrari, a would-be defection of a
crusading police chief and the dramatic murder trial of
the wife of a Politbureau member (and his subsequent
dismissal from office) have shattered the Party’s calm
demeanour. Lurid headlines prove the Party can no
longer hide its secrets, highlighting its need to shore up
popular support.
About The Author
Jeremy Paltiel, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, specializes in politics,
government and foreign policies of Asia (China and Japan) and development politics.
For more information please visit www.asiapacific.ca.
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Behind the headlines lies a deeper anxiety: the capacity
to tranquilize the public by engineering double-digit
economic growth is coming to an end. A nationalist
upsurge unsettling China’s neighbours is not just a sign
of China’s growing power, but a symptom of a frustrated
public whose aspirations for greater political participation
has been put off too long. Stability comes with a price, and
the fourth generation leadership under Hu Jintao is passing
the bill onto Xi Jinping. To move China to a middle class,
high consumption society requires addressing inequality,
building a social safety net, and raising wages without
risking the newfound wealth and growing assertiveness of
the urban middle class. China must find a way to bask in its
achievement without antagonizing neighbours and risking
relationships with its major trading powers, including an
American superpower that grudgingly yields room at the
table. The Party can neither survive as a privileged stratum
aloof from the people, nor can its leaders wishfully delude
themselves that satisfying their own needs has no impact
or bearing on the surrounding world.
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping
©istockphoto.com/EdStock
How China manages its transition will affect Canadians
both directly and indirectly. Moving China to a high
consumption middle class society will both boost our
exports, and moderate the threat of competition from lowpriced imports. A stable China at peace with its neighbours
can continue to underpin global economic growth and
expand international trade. A more open and participatory
China will assuage Canadian anxieties about increased
Chinese investment and boost confidence that changes
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to the global distribution of power won’t bring an open
multilateral order and a global framework of cooperative
security to a crashing end. China alone will not determine
the fate of the world, but should China’s leaders falter, the
tremors are sure to be felt around the globe.
The Congress Agenda: The Script, Roles, Speeches
To understand what the 18th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party means, we need to look at what the
congress does and how the leadership selection process
in China affects policymaking. (See Figure 1)
On the agenda there will be three main items: the delivery
and approval of the General Secretary’s political report;
the presentation, discussion and approval of changes
to the Party Charter; and the election of a new Central
Committee alongside the Central Discipline Inspection
Commission. The new leadership will emerge at the
first plenary session of the 18th Central Committee held
immediately after the Party Congress. The Central
Committee will elect the members of the Politbureau, its
Standing Committee (PBSC), the chair and members of the
(Party) Central Military Commission and the Secretaries of
the Central Committee Secretariat. (See Figure 2)
One should not expect dramatic departures in the political
report by outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao, albeit
it will set the policy tone over the next five years. Quite
likely, the incoming General Secretary, who is certain to
be the current Vice-President of the People’s Republic of
China, Xi Jinping, will deliver the speech on the changes
to the Party Charter. This is likely to feature enshrining
Hu Jintao’s guiding slogan, the “scientific development
theory” alongside Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong
Thought1, Deng Xiaoping Theory and (Jiang Zemin’s) ‘Three
Represents’.
Xi Jinping will not reveal the blueprint of his own policy
until his speech to the First Plenum of the 18th Central
Committee, a speech that may not be published in entirety
for months, if ever. Outside observers will pay particular
attention at the Congress and the subsequent CC Plenum
to what may be said about political reform, which has
been widely acknowledged within the Party to have stalled
over the past decade despite Premier Wen Jiabao’s vow
to pursue it ‘with his dying breath.’
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Figure 1. The Communist Party Electoral System
9 (7)
member
Standing
Committee
selection
Polit-bureau
25 members
election
Central
Committee
204 members
167 alternates
Party Congress
2270 delegates
The Central Committee is the
Communist Party’s College of
Cardinals. Some 200 members
have full voting rights and an
additional 150 or so ‘alternate
members’ fill positions of
members who pass away or
are removed for malfeasance.
Alternates are placed in the
order of votes received and
succeed full members in that
order.
Figure 2. Organization Chart of Central Leadership
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Looking down from the stage, the Presidium of senior
leaders will gaze into an audience of loyal minions and
an idealized representation of the best in Chinese society.
Some 2270 delegates to the Congress have been ‘elected’
from 40 constituencies of the 82 million members of the
CCP. This includes 31 Provincial Party delegations, the
People’s Liberation Army, and a number of constituencies
whose exact nomenclature is not revealed but which
includes delegates from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau,
State Owned Enterprises and the Central Organs of
the Party and government. Some 70% of the delegates
comprise top line executives (cadres) throughout the
Party and State apparatus. About 30% represent model
workers ranging from the youngest member, 22-yearold Jiao Liuyang, female gold medallist at the London
Olympics in the 200-meter butterfly, to various workers,
scientists and student village cadres deemed worthy as
models. The Central Organization Department of the Party
laid down strict guidelines for the selection of delegates
from each constituency.2 There are no ‘insurgents’ or
‘dark horses’ in Communist Party elections.
The Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China
©istockphoto.com/xingmin07
The main drama at the Congress comes in the elections
to the Central Committee. The blanket rule that all
executives below the Politbureau must retire at 65 and
may not serve more than two full terms (10 years) in
any one post guarantees relatively high turnover in
Central Committee elections. In the months prior to
the Congress there has been a thorough turnover of
leaders at the provincial level, which will be reflected in
the CC. There are some 200 full members of the Central
Committee (CC) with a further hundred and fifty elected
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as ‘alternates’. The members of the Central Committee
include the top executives of the party and state at
the central and regional level. State Council ministers,
provincial governors and Party Secretaries, heads of major
enterprises, Army generals, have their political status
validated here. (See box and Figure 1)
The pre-ordained outcome of the elections to the
Politbureau and its Standing Committee (See Figure 3)
has been the object of intense bargaining at the highest
level among the incumbents and retired leaders like
Jiang Zemin, who retains considerable patronage power.
The PBSC is the top deliberative and executive decisionmaking body in China. While the General Secretary gets
to set the agenda, he cannot proceed with any policy
initiative without the explicit consent of his colleagues.
Zhongnanhai3 watchers look at the make-up of the PBSC
for what its client networks reveal about policy preference
and how free a hand the General Secretary may have to
launch new initiatives.
The number of members of the PBSC is expected to be
reduced back to seven (where it was prior to the 16th
CC) from the current nine. To ensure regular turnover,
members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau
must be younger than 68 and be members of the current
(i.e. the immediately previous) Politbureau. The General
Secretary must be able to serve a full ten years before
reaching the age of 70, but other members can serve
a single term (i.e. five years) Only Xi Jinping and VicePremier Li Keqiang are eligible to remain on the PBSC.
Of the 25 current member of the Politbureau, excluding
Bo Xilai, whose removal is subject to confirmation at the
final plenum of the 17th Central Committee at the end of
October, only eight members are eligible to fill the 5 or
7 slots available on the PBSC. (See appendix) With the
exception of Wang Yang, Party Secretary of Guangdong
and the youngest member of the Politbureau, all will
have to retire before the next (19th) Congress in 2017.
Of these, Vice-Premier Wang Qishan, who is the leading
economist in the top leadership and who is popular both
inside the Party and outside China, is considered to be a
shoo-in.4 Most observers expect Yu Zhengsheng, Party
Secretary of Shanghai, to take up a position outside
the PBSC, but should Wang Yang, known for his liberal
outlook both on market and political reform make it in,
his youth might make him a serious rival to Li Keqiang,
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Figure 3: Flow of Power
election
selection
the Premier designate. By contrast, should Xi Jinping be
surrounded by elder colleagues, he will find it hard to
establish his authority in a culture where seniority and
precedence matter. For that reason, he will prefer a PBSC
reduced in size.
is speculation that the Premier or Premier designate Li
Keqiang might join Xi on this body, thus strengthening
civil-military coordination as well as civilian authority over
the military.
The wider Politbureau should see the rise of one or two
faces born in the 1960’s. Hu Jintao’s CYL protégé, the Party
Secretary of Inner Mongolia Hu Chunhua is widely touted
to carry the torch for the ‘Sixth Generation’ of Party
leaders and as the insider for the next succession. It is
too early to tell who might join him. The elections to
the Central Committee should also include faces from
the ‘Seventh generation’ -- those born after 1970. These
junior stars will broadcast criteria for the next generation
of leaders. The military does not have a seat on the PBSC.
While Xi Jinping is certain to emerge as General Secretary
at the First Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, it is
not certain when he will inherit the post of Chair of the
Central Military Commission (CMC). Rumours suggests
he might do so soon, allowing him to inherit the job of
Commander-in \-Chief two years earlier than Hu Jintao did
in his leadership transition. Uniformed officers dominate
the CMC with only the Chair as a civilian member. There
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Xi Jinping, Photo Credit: U.S. Department of Defense
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The next stage in succession will come at the first
session of the Twelfth National People’s Congress,
China’s national legislature, which will be ‘elected’ over
the coming months and will convene its first plenary
session in early March. Right before the NPC meets, the
Second Plenum of the 18th Central Committee will ratify
the choices for President, Premier and Chair of the NPC
as well as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) alongside the slate of Vice-Premiers,
State Councillors and Ministers. There should not be big
surprises here, but the list of ministers will include new
faces including some who are not Party members.
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The ‘Shanghai’ faction is associated with former General
Secretary Jiang Zemin, comprising his associates from his
days as Party Secretary of Shanghai before he was elevated
to become General Secretary in Beijing.
These days, attention is given to the so-called “princelings,”
children of veteran communist leaders who have risen high
in Party ranks. Jiang was the son of a minor revolutionary
martyred in the Sino-Japanese War. Xi Jinping and the
disgraced Bo Xilai are the most prominent members of
this princeling group.
Both Xi and Bo are children of high ranking revolutionary
leaders persecuted during the Cultural Revolution of the
late 1960’s who returned to senior positions under Deng
Xiaoping.6 The difference Xi Jinping might bring to the
leadership of China is shaped by a unique combination
of experiences. He began his political career by earning
the trust of poor peasants at the grass roots in China’s
northwest while still under a political cloud. Alone among
the current generation of leaders, he has worked inside
the military apparatus. For two decades, he oversaw
economic development in China’s most advanced coastal
areas before assuming his role as heir apparent.7
Factions and Factionalism
Unlike observers like Cheng Li at Brookings, I do not
subscribe to the theory that princelings are more élitist
in contrast with more ‘social-democratic’ CYL associates.
The “self-made” are just as ready to flaunt their newfound
status as their colleagues born with a silver spoon. Where
the Youth League faction is made up of deferential
strivers who made their way up through the ranks, the
“princelings” are self-confident individualists who, like
Bo Xilai, display their ambition on their sleeve. Loosely
associated with this group is Vice-Premier Wang Qishan.
Wang graduated in history, but his career as an economist
was kick-started because he is the son-in-law of former
financial supremo Vice-Premier Yao Yilin.
The appointive selection process we described earlier
favours patron-client ties. Elite competition is channelled
into the formation of factional networks. The leadership
contenders are divided among the ‘Youth League’ and
‘Shanghai’ factions. The former is closely associated
with current General Secretary Hu Jintao, who himself
was elevated to head the Communist Youth League (CYL)
under Hu Yaobang in the mid 1980’s.5
Party leaders surround themselves with loyal clients given
the low level of trust in Chinese society and the secrecy
shrouding a closed political system. Nonetheless, the
pattern of orderly succession put in place by Deng Xiaoping
ensures that no leader can accumulate absolute power, as
did Mao Zedong. Under this system, the incumbent cannot
designate his own heir. Hu Jintao was selected to succeed
Jiang Zemin by Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Jintao, whose own
Li Keqiang, Photo Credit: Friends of Europe
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favourite was Li Keqiang, had to defer to Jiang Zemin in
selecting Xi Jinping. Likewise, Hu Jintao will surround Xi
by his own clients and allies to deny him absolute power
and ensure “collective leadership” or government by
consensus.
Bo Xilai Affair
It is impossible to discuss the coming transition without
mention of the Bo Xilai affair that upstaged much of the
attention on the transition in 2012. Because Bo was born
in 1949, the informal rules made him ineligible for the
Party’s top post, but his publicity juggernaut was building
momentum to propel him onto the PBSC.8
Issue 32
The Limits of Consensus Politics
With the retirement of Deng Xiaoping, the last leader
of the revolutionary generation, collective leadership
has become the norm in practice as well as in ideal. The
innate conservatism of a consensus regime precludes
bold initiative. Xi Jinping has to defer to Hu, just as Hu
deferred to Jiang, until he grasped the full reins of power.
Even then, he will be surrounded by clients of Hu Jintao
at least until his second term begins in 2017. This partly
explains the slow pace of political reform. Moreover,
because Xi will be careful to groom his own clients in
order to consolidate his authority, he is unlikely to risk his
appointment powers on rash experiments in democracy.
Nonetheless, the main message of the Bo Xilai scandal is
that neither Xi nor the Party can put off political reform
indefinitely. The built-in cronyism of an appointive
process breeds corruption. Corruption corrodes the
legitimacy of the Party and undermines the authority
of the centre by abdicating power to the highest bidder
instead of carefully planned policies devised by the
central authority. Moreover, an increasingly educated
and plugged-in population chafes under the blatant
paternalism of the Party and is prone to mock its
pretentions whenever it can.
Bo Xilai, Photo Credit: Voice of America
The Bo Xilai affair tore away the veil over corruption and
intrigue at the Party’s highest echelon, at the same time
that it revealed the hesitancy of the senior leadership
when faced with a recalcitrant member of the Party
oligarchy with a genuine popular following. As long as it
could, the Party propaganda machine had borrowed Bo’s
charisma to buttress its own image. When that image
collapsed, the Party confronted the dilemma of how to
blacken his name without tarnishing its own. As if to
hammer home the reality that Bo was not an isolated
‘rotten apple,’ the demotion in late August of Hu Jintao’s
closest associate, his former chief of staff Ling Jihua, gave
credence to the raging rumour that the black Ferrari that
had crashed on a Beijing Ring-road killing the male driver
and injuring two semi-clad young women in March, was
indeed driven by Ling’s son.
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By the end of Xi’s term, China’s educated urban middle
class will comprise the majority of China’s population.
They will be too sophisticated to show deference, and
too aware of their interests to sacrifice them for the
whims of officials. Xi Jinping will not only have to meet
the needs of urbanized Chinese, he will have to engage
them. Fortunately, Xi and his generation have had an
active history of engagement at the grassroots and
developed a comfortable relationship in dealing with the
public, more like Premier Wen Jiabao than the diffident
and stiff Hu Jintao. These political skills will be tested in
the coming years as the Chinese leadership is forced to
deal with a slowing economy and an aging population
that is increasingly demanding over quality of life issues.
The Fifth Generation
The past two generations of Party leaders were
dominated by trained engineers like Jiang Zemin, Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao. By contrast, Li Keqiang received
his first degree in law, while Wang Qishan graduated in
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history. Xi Jinping received undergraduate education in
chemical engineering. However, his incomplete middle
school education before he was sent down deep into
the boondocks, and the foreshortened curriculum of the
Cultural Revolution when he attended university as a
“worker-peasant-soldier” student, never truly qualified
him as a professional engineer. The engineering mindset
of Hu Jintao’s “scientific development theory” is likely to
be softened to a more flexible and pragmatic outlook more
appropriate in the humanities and social sciences. The fact
that both Xi and Li received their college educations after
time spent among grassroots peasants has relevance. Also
important is that they spent most of their careers as part of
the Open policy9, and have had extensive interaction with
abroad, and in the case of Li Keqiang, speak fluent English.
This generation is more at ease with the public than was
Hu Jintao, and certainly at home with foreign audiences.
Given the negative spotlight from scandals that have
shaken the political core in China, the next generation
led by Xi Jinping will have to earn support the hard way,
by learning to engage the public, and by involving it in
the painful choices that lie ahead. Xi Jinping has signalled
his readiness to undertake political reform by seeking
the counsel of Hu Deping, son of General Secretary Hu
Yaobang, whose sudden death in April 1989 sparked the
student protests that ended in the tragedy at Tiananmen.
The major challenge for the Fifth Generation leadership is
not simply to initiate political reform but to find solutions
to problems where social interests radically diverge.
The immediate challenge to the new leadership will be to
deal with a slowing economy. Sluggish growth in Europe
and America and rising wages threaten China’s export
markets even as a housing bubble at home hamstrings
government efforts to apply economic stimulus to bolster
domestic demand. The Party cannot simply order stateowned banks to open the spigot to state owned enterprises
because China has reached the limits of productive
investment in infrastructure when whole towns are sitting
unoccupied. Further on, China’s leaders must confront
the demographic challenge of a rapidly aging population
due to a combination of rising life expectancy and the
one child policy. The Party faces a growing contradiction
between addressing those left behind in China’s breakneck
modernization without antagonizing the urban middle
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class. The key challenge is to broaden the base of a
consumer society, and that requires both better income
distribution and a better social safety net to be paid for by
those who benefitted most from reform thus far. A new
class of property owners demands the protection of law,
which cannot proceed without reducing official discretion
with its pernicious side effect, corruption. The Party can
solidify legitimacy by addressing social needs and gain the
allegiance of the middle class by implementing the rule
of law. Will the new Party leader scale back the political
privilege that put him in power, or will Xi Jinping succumb
to temptation by papering over conflicting interests by
encouraging populist nationalism?
So far, the CCP has shown remarkable resilience. It has
shrugged off isolation following Tiananmen and survived
the collapse of the Soviet Union through enthusiastic
integration into the global economy. China bounced back
with renewed vigor and respect after the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997 and the Great Recession of 2008. The CCP
has successfully tied its own survival to the fulfilment of
Chinese aspirations. Its greatest challenge may be to limit
its own power in the same cause.
As Chinese expectantly await political change to catch
up to their extraordinary economic success, Canadians
should be prepared to set aside their prejudices and
embrace Party experiments with a more open political
process. Domestic efforts to overcome a legitimacy gap
will affect perceptions of China’s behavior worldwide.
China’s leaders may proceed by cautiously and tentatively
“crossing a river by groping stepping stones” as they did
with economic reform. All signs point in one direction,
but the cost of stopping halfway will leave the Party
to sink in its own corruption. As we consider China’s
leadership transition we must soberly contemplate the
cost to ourselves should the Chinese political system fail
to achieve greater legitimacy and transparency. If China’s
economy falters, so will our own.
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Appendix: The 16th and 17th Politburo and their implications for the 18th Politburo Standing Committee
16th Politburo Standing
Committee
Hu Jintao
Zeng Qinghong
Wu Bangguo
Wen Jiabao
Huang Ju
Li Changchun
Jia Qinglin
Wu Guanzheng
Luo Gan
Wider 16th
Politburo
Cao Gangquan
Chen Liangyu
He Guoqiang
Hui Liangyu
Liu Yunshan
Liu Qi
Guo Boxiong
Wu Yi
Wang Gang
Wang Zhaoguo
Wang Lequan
Yu Zhengsheng
Zeng Peiyan
Zhang Dejiang
Zhang Lichang
Zhou Yongkang
Year of Birth
1942
1939
1941
1942
1938
1944
1940
1938
1935
Year of
Birth
1935
1946
1943
1944
1947
1942
1942
1938
1942
1941
1944
1945
1938
1946
1939
1942
17th Politburo Standing
Committee
Hu Jintao
Wu Bangguo
Wen Jiabao
Jia Qinglin
Li Changchun
Xi Jinping
Li Keqiang
He Guoqiang
Zhou Yongkang
Wider 17th
Politburo
Bo Xilai
Guo Boxiong
Hui Liangyu
Li Yuanchao
Liu Yunshan
Liu Qi
Liu Yandong
Wang Gang
Wang Lequan
Wang Qishan
Wang Yang
Wang Zhaoguo
Xu Caihou
Yu Zhengsheng
Zhang Gaoli
Zhang Dejiang
Year of Birth
1942
1941
1942
1940
1944
1953*†
1955*†
1943
1942
Year of
Birth
1949**
1942
1944
1950*
1947*
1942
1945*
1942
1944
1948*
1955*†
1941
1943
1945*
1946*
1946*
*Eligible for appointment to 18th PB SC
† Eligible for 19th PBSC
** removed from post
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There have even been rumours that references to Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought will be dropped entirely—though this is unlikely, unless
the Party wishes to change its name. De-emphasizing Mao Thought can be seen as a riposte to Bo Xilai’s populist Red revivalism.
2
This includes a minimum number of women (23%) national minorities, educational qualifications and age distribution. 93.5% are college
educated, and the average age is 52. A 15% margin of choice was allowed between the number of nominees and the slate of elected delegates.
However, each nominee had his or her CV vetted by higher levels and received a degree of support in straw polls before appearing as a
candidate.
3
Zhongnanhai is area just to the west of the Forbidden City where China’s top leaders live and work.
4
Li Yuanchao, head of the Organization Bureau of the Committee, is likewise considered unassailable. Liu Yunshan, the PB member in charge of
the Propaganda Department is also regarded as a favourite. The remaining eligible are Liu Yandong, the only female member of the Politbureau,
Yu Zhengsheng, Party Secretary of Shanghai, Zhang Gaoli, Party Secretary of Tianjin, and Zhang Dejiang, who replaced Bo as Party Secretary
of Chongqing. A full decade in age separates Liu Yandong and Wang Yang.
5
The Youth League was promoted as a reserve army for future national leaders. Many of the current members of the Politbureau, and an
increasing number of leaders at the provincial level are former protégés and colleagues of Hu Jintao from his days at the Youth League. These
include Liu Yandong and most prominently Li Keqiang, the presumptive Premier.
6
Xi Zhongxun, Jinping’s father, was among the revolutionaries who pioneered the communist base in North Shaanxi where Mao’s forces
established their headquarters following the Long March in 1935. He rose as high as Secretary-General of the State Council before the Cultural
Revolution. After the Cultural Revolution he was made Party Secretary of Guangdong where he directed the establishment of the Special
Economic Zones of Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai.
7
While his father languished in disgrace, as a teenager Xi Jinping was rusticated to the caves of North Shaanxi, where he earned the trust
of local villagers. He rose to Party Branch Secretary and earned recommendation to enter the prestigious engineering faculty at Tsinghua
University, returning to study chemical engineering in Beijing in 1975. Following Mao’s death, family connections enabled him to become
personal secretary to Defence Minister Geng Biao, a close associate of Deng Xiaoping. To polish his credentials as a professional politician, Xi
then volunteered to go out to a rural county south of Beijing, where he became County Party Secretary before being transferred to coastal
Fujian, opposite Taiwan, where he spent twenty years. He became Party Secretary in Xiamen (Amoy) only 10 km from KMT occupied Kinmen
Island right when Taiwan began to encourage cross-Strait communications and investment. From Fujian he moved up the coast to Zhejiang
Province, the hub of private enterprise in China, before landing in Shanghai, his penultimate career stop before his triumphant return to Beijing.
8
His populist campaigned had earned him star status even in the Party media—the homepage of the Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily
had a Bo Xilai-Chongqing feature on the top right corner. Top leaders, with the notable exception of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, paid homage
to his innovations. This went on until early February, when Bo Xilai abruptly sacked his police chief, Wang Lijun. A few days after, Wang drove
into the US Consulate in Chengdu capital of neighbouring Sichuan, where he remained for 36 hours. The affair only became public because
cellphone pictures of the US consulate surrounded by Chongqing police cars popped up all over Chinese cyberspace. The story that emerged
first in the media and then in a series of sensational court trials was that Wang sought asylum to reveal Bo’s alleged cover-up of the murder
of British citizen Neil Heywood in November 2011 at the hand of Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai.
9
The “open policy” is shorthand for the policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978 of market economic reform and opening up trade and
investment to the global economy.
1
The opinions expressed in Canada-Asia Agenda are those of the author and are published in the interests of promoting public awareness and
debate. They are not necessarily the views of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. While every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy of this
information, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada cannot accept responsibility or liability for reliance by any person or organization on the use of
this information. This Canada-Asia Agenda issue may be copied whole or in part and/or re-distributed with acknowledgement to “the Asia Pacific
Foundation, Canada’s leading independent resource on Asia and Canada-Asia issues”. Archive issues of Canada Asia Agenda, and its predecessor,
Asia Pacific Bulletin, may be found at <http://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda>. APF Canada is funded by the Government of Canada and
by corporate and individual donors.
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