John
Playford
CIVILIAN
MILITARISTS
T h e author discusses the expansion of strategic studies in
Australian universities, the cold war concepts on which the
studies are based and the dangers inherent in these develop­
ments.
O u r problem lias been th at wc expect the voice ot ten o i
to be fren /ied . and that ol m adness irratio n al. It is q uite
the contrary in a world w here genial, m iddleaged C»eneral>
consult w ith precise social scientists about the param eters
of the death eq u atio n , and the problem ol its m axim ization.1
IX AM ERICA, the 11011 -military advisers to the Delense D epart­
ment, such as Herm an Kahn, Thom as C. Schelling. Henry A.
Kissinger and A lbert W ohlstetter,. have been aptly term ed crack­
pot realists" by C. W right Mills and ‘T he New Civilian M ilitar­
ists-' by Irving Louis Horowitz. Although not officially connected
to any branch of the armed services, they have assumed the pre­
dom inant influence in many areas ol strategic policy. 1 hey have
completely overwhelmed the m ilitary profession, in both quali­
tative and quantitative terms, in their contribution to the litera­
ture of strategic studies. They increasingly dom inate the field
of education and instruction in the subject. Indeed, w ith the
exception of restricted fields ot professional knowledge, the aca­
demic and quasi-academic centres of strategic studies have displaced
the staff colleges and war colleges. Despite the grum bles of the
generals, the civilian m ilitarists have created a more flexible and
m ore potent war m achine than anything that could have been
im agined by the old service-club approach of the career m en in
the armed services.
T h e new civilian m ilitarists like to see themselves as presiding
over the birth of a new academic science. In recent years, however,
the validity of their methods, their utility to society and their
integrity of purpose have all been called into question.
1 heir
m orality needs scrutinising according to some critics, while others
argue that it is the scientific adequacy of their claims. In The War
Game (1963), Horowitz indicted those men
train ed in the strategy a n d tactics of m ilitary terrorism w ho, un d er th e protection
of university and governm ent agencies claim and proclaim th eir neu trality
1
C. W right Mills, cited in D avid H orow itz, h o r n Yalta In I'ietnam : A m eru.an
Foreign Policy in the Cold W ar (H arm ondsw orth: Penguin Books, 1967)
p.349.
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w ith respect to social a n d political values. . . T h ey replace problem s of
principles w ith m atters of strategy. T h ey p re fe r th in k in g a bout th e u n th in k a b le
at th e costs of any exam ination of w hat is possible a n d preferable. T h ey in h ab it
a w orld of n ig h tm a rish intellectual ‘play ’ w hile rid ic u lin g th e ‘ossification’ of
A m erican m ilita ry posture. T hey seem to p re fe r ‘advisory’ positions a n d leave
to politicians th e actu al tasks of acting o u t th e ir recom m endations (how else
can they claim to be ‘value n e u tra l’ w ith respect to scientific canons). In brief,
they are ‘m ilita ry ' m inds w ith ‘civilian’ status.
Others extend the terms of the indictm ent beyond either the com­
plete absence of m orality or m oral obscurantism. Philip Green,
whose writings constitute the most form idable critique of “the new
intellectual im perialism ” of the civilian m ilitarists, argues that they
are to be condem ned for being pseudo-scientific in their methods.
T hey rely on a m ethod of “scientific” analysis and a logic of
“ra tio n al” action th at obscures discussion of basic issues, rather than
confronting the prim arily political and m oral questions of the
nuclear age. T h e specialist techniques they employ, such as game
theory and systems analysis, are bogus when used to arrive at
strategic decisions and merely give an air of expertise to positions
arrived at in an arbitrary and subjective m anner. These partisan
strategic analysts confuse propagandist-salesm anship with science
and their pseudo-science is a disservice to the scholarly community.
In Deadly Logic <1966), Green argued th at their work has
n o th in g to d o w ith ‘science’. T o use in a p p ro p ria te techniques th a t p e rm it
analysis to consist w’holly of th e m an ip u la tio n of o n e ’s own prejudices; to rest
one's theorizing on an assum ption th a t alreadv contains in it th e conclusions
th a t one wishes to reach —this is exactly th e opposite of w hat genuine scientists
in any field actually do.
T hey assume, he went on, that questions of policy are beyond
debate, thereby simply not discussing the crucial propositions that
one makes about world conflict. In other words, they engage in
“the vice of the depoliticalization of the political: the attem pt to
fit essentially political questions into the strait jacket of so-called
scientific analysis.”2
2
For critiq u es of th e new civilian m ilitarists, see A natol R ap o p o rt, Fights,
Games a n d D ebates (A nn A rbor: U niversity of M ichigan Press, 1960); R o b e rt
P aul W olff, " T h e G am e of W ar,” T h e N ew R ep u b lic, 20 Feb. 1961, pp.9-13;
P. M. S. B lackett, Studies o f War: N uclear and C onventional (L ondon: O liver &
Boyd, 1962), c h .10; Jam es R. N ew m an, T h e R u le of Folly (London: A llen &
U nw in, 1962), p p .15-30; R o b ert Paul Wolff, “ Reflection on Gam e T h eo ry and
the N a tu re of V alue”, Ethics, A pril 1962, p p .171-179; W alter G oldstein and
S. M. M iller, “ T h e P robabilities of A ccidental W ar,” N ew L e ft R eview , MayJu n e 1962, pp.21-33; Irving Louiz H orow itz, T h e W ar Game: Studies o f the
N ew C ivilian M ilitarists (N.Y.: B allantine Books, 1963); P h illip G reen,
“Academ ic G am esm anship a n d the R ealities of W a r”, D issent, A u tu m n 1963,
pp.392-395; W a lte r G oldstein and S. M. M iller, “ H erm an K ahn: Ideologist of
M ilitary Strategy”, D issent, W in te r 1963, pp.75-85; W alter G oldstein, “T ow ard
a Strategy for Peace” N ew U niversity T h o u g h t, Dec. 1963-Jan. 1964, pp.30-45;
R ich ard M erbaum , “ R A N D : T echnocrats a n d Pow er”, N ew U niversity T h o u g h t,
Dec. 1963-Jan. 1964, pp.45-57; W alter G oldstein, "T h eo ries of T h erm o-N uclear
D eterrence” , in R a lp h M iliband and Jo h n Saville (eds.), T h e Socialist R egister
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T h e institutionalized study of strategic problem s in academic and
quasi-academic centres outside the defence establishm ent is of course
most developed in the U nited States.3 In Britain, the best-known
research centre is T h e Institute for Strategic Studies, bu t the scale
of its work cannot be com pared w ith the semi-official American
research organisations such as the RAND C orporation or the Insti­
tute of Defense Analyses.4 Academic interest in strategic problem s
is underdeveloped in A ustralia where u ntil recently the A ustralian
Institute of In tern atio n al Affairs (AIIA) stood virtually alone.
Academics have always played a crucial role in the activities of
the AIIA, although the organisation is not officially attached to
any university. T h e present Federal President is Professor N orm an
H arper, an historian at M elbourne University and a form er C hair­
m an of the Research Com mittee, who was succeeded in the latter
post by Professor B. D. Beddie, a political scientist at the A ustralian
N ational University. T h e former Federal President was Professor
G ordon Greenwood, an historian at the University of Queensland.
Sir Alan W att, the full-time Director of the AIIA, and a former
Secretary of the D epartm ent of External Affairs, works from an
office in the D epartm ent of International Relations at the ANU,
whose head is Professor J. D. B. Miller, editor of A ustralian Outlook
which is published quarterly by the AIIA.
1964 (London: M erlin Press, 1964), pp.211-226; A natol R ap o p o rt, Strategy
and Conscience, (N.Y.: H a rp e r 8c Row, 1964); A natol R a p o p o rt, “ C ritiq u e of
Strategic T h in k in g ”, in R oger Fisher (ed.), International C onflict and Behavioral
Science (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964), pp.2 1 1-237; P hillip G reen, “ Social Scientists
a n d N uclear D eterrence", D issent, W in te r 1964, pp.80-91; P h illip G reen, “ M ethod
a n d Substance in th e Arm s D eb ate” , W orld Politics, Ju ly 1964, pp.642-667;
A natol R apoport, "C hicken a la K ahn", T h e Virginia Q uarterly R eview , Sum m er
1965, pp.370-389; Irving L ouis H orow itz, “ T h e Conflict Society: W ar as a Social
P ro b lem ”, in H ow ard S. Becker (ed.), Social Problems: A Social A pproach
(N.Y.: Jo h n W iley a n d Sons, 1966), pp.695-749; Solly Z uckerm an, Scientists
and W ar (London: H am ish H a m ilto n , 1966), ch.5; P h illip G reen, D eadly Logic:
T h e T heory of N uclear D eterrence (Colum bus, O hio: O hio State U niversity
Press, 1966); Sol Stern, “T h e Defense Intellectuals”, R am parts, Feb. 1967,
pp.31-37; Joseph E. Schwarz, “ Strategic T h o u g h t: M ethodology a n d R eality ”,
in C harles A. McCoy a n d J o h n P layford (eds.), A politica l Politics: A C ritique
of Behavioralism (N.Y.: T h o m as Y. Crowell, 1967), pp.55-74; P h illip G reen,
“ Science, G overnm ent a n d th e Case of R A N D ”, W orld P olitics, Ja n . 1968,
pp.301-326.
T h e new civilian m ilita rists have been defended locally by H edley Bull,
Professor of In te rn a tio n a l R elations a t the ANU since 1966 a n d form er D irector
of th e Arms C ontrol a n d D isarm am ent Research U n it in th e B ritish Foreign
Office, in “ Strategic Studies a n d Its C ritics”, W orld P olitics Ju ly 1968. For
a c ritiq u e of B ull’s position, see M ax T eich m an n , “Strategy, Science a n d M orals”,
Pacific, Nov.-Dee. 1967.
3 Gene M. Lyons a n d L ouis M orton, Schools for Strategy: E ducation and
Research in N ational Security A ffairs (N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.)
4 T h e work of T h e In s titu te for Strategic Studies is described in L aurence
W . M artin, “T h e M arket for Strategic Ideas in B rita in ”, T h e A m erican Political
Science R eview , M arch 1962, pp.23-41. See also Lyons a n d M orton, op.cit.,
pp.9, 281-285.
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In recent years there has been a substantial expansion of the
activities of the AIIA. A grant of US S75,000 from the Ford F ounda­
tion in 1962, conditional on the appointm ent of a full-time Director,
enabled a three-year research project on A ustralia’s relations with
South-east Asia to be undertaken. T o cover additional costs and
make provision for the expansion of work after the Ford grant
was exhausted, the AIIA launched a public appeal in 1964 for
S200,000. T h e appeal was launched by the M inister for External
Affairs and the Federal Governm ent also helped by m aking contri­
butions tax-deductible. A useful sum was collected, but the target
figure was not achieved. As it turned out, the Ford Foundation
again came to the rescue in March 1968 with a further grant of US
SI00,000 lor a second third-year project on A ustralia’s relations with
South-east Asia.5
A nother g rant from the Ford Foundation, the size of which was
undisclosed, enabled the ANU to establish in 1963 the Defence
Studies Project w ithin the D epartm ent of Political Science. T he
grant came through the AIIA, and from 1963 to 1966 the Project
was led by Professor A. L. Burns. In September 1964 it conducted
a sem inar of m ilitary personnel, public servants and academics who
considered the conditions of dispersal of nuclear weapons about
the In d ian and Pacific Oceans and the conditions under which
Australia m ight become an owner or a host. T h e authors of the
three papers presented at the Conference openly declared their
assumption that no m atter what m ilitary or economic inadequacies
were revealed in China at the time of writing, sooner or later she
must become strong and therefore a threat to surrounding nations
and to A ustralia.6
T h e gradual awakening ol academic interest in strategic studies
in Australia led one of its leading proponents, Dr. T . B. M illar ol
the D epartm ent of International Relations at the ANU, to look
optimistically into the future when he addressed the annual con­
ference of the A ustralian Regional G roups of the Royal Institute
of Public A dm inistration in November 1965 on the need for
developing institutionalized study of strategic problems:
W e have lived for so long in o u r political backw ater th at we cam e to believe
th a t strategy was som ething th at concerned o u r allies b u t not us. A nd out
(■overnm ent, w hich app eared to have discovered th e secret of p erp etu al rule,
aided bv a bureaucracy which did not especially w ant its com fortable seclusion
invaded, convinced us for a long tim e th a t defence was a subject w hich could
safely be left to the experts inside the high stone walls along St. Kilda Road.
Perhaps Russell H ill lias caught the w inds of change. P erhaps such few
5 T h e H erald, -1 Sept. 1964; T h e Age, 16 Oct. 1964; T h e H erald, 3 Oct.
1966: T h e A ustralian, 9 A pril, 1968.
6 A. I.. B urns. N ina H eathcote and
P. King. X uclear Dispersal in Asia
anil the Indo-P ucifie R egion (C anberra: A ustralian In stitu te of In tern a tio n a l
Affairs a n d T h e A ustralian N ational U niversity, 1965.)
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academ ics as arc seriously interested in defence are believed to be a ra th e r m ore
p o te n tia lh respectable bunch these days. Perhaps the Yict Cong and I)r.
Sukarno have aroused us all to an awareness of the dangers aro u n d us and the
need of an inform ed p ublic o p inion to help produce or accept th e necessary
m easures to m eet them . W hatever th e reason, it does seem th at a better
relatio n sh ip is developing betw een all those in the com m unity who are concerned
about defence m atters.7
T h e gap between Russell H ill and Acton rapidly closed in the
second half of 1966 with the establishm ent of the Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre at the AXU ,8 which incorporated the
facilities of the Defence Studies Project. Its gestation period, how­
ever, did not proceed quite as smoothly as its initiators had an ti­
cipated. Ill the Australian Financial Review (3 Aug. 1966), M ax­
imilian W alsh reported that there was a strong division of opinion
at the AXU on the proposal to set up the Centre. A m eeting of the
heads of departm ents attached to the Research School ol Pacific
Studies discussed the scheme, but the opposition was so strong
that its proponents avoided p utting any recom m endation to the
vote. T h e chief objection recorded was the high content of classi­
fied inform ation likely to be contained in papers em anating trom
projects sponsored by the Centre. T he dependence ol Centre
personnel on access to classified m aterial would result, it was leii,
in an im pingement on the academic independence oi the Centre,
since its start would have to be cleared with both the D epartm ent
ol Defence and the A ustralian Security Intelligence Organisation.
The critics also argued that the source of the C entre’s iunds could
link its work too closely to the general aims ol US loreign policy.
Nevertheless, one of the leading proponents ol the Centre, Sir John
Crawford, the then D irector of the Research School ot Pacific Studies
and subsequently Vice-Chancellor of the AXU, told W alsh that he
intended to press ahead w ith the proposal. He also strongly denied
the allegation that the Ford Foundation had offered to finance the
Centre. Subsequently, T ribune (24 Aug. 1966) reported that two
representatives from the Ford Foundation had arrived at the AXU
just before the m eeting of departm ental heads in the Research
School of Pacific Studies. A subsequent item in the Australian
Financial Review (19 Aug. 1966) stated that some opposition to
the Centre had been elim inated by the decision that its research
projects would not be classified, but other critics feared th at classi­
fication would probably be introduced at a later stage.
These fears were far from groundless. In the previous year,
M illar had drawn attention to the use that the US A dm inistration
made of non-government defence and strategic experts from the
universities and organizations such as the RAX’D Corporation,
7 T . B. M illar, " T h e C o n trib u tio n of A cadcm it Personnel a n d Research
In stitu tio n s to Defence", P ublic A d m in istra tio n (Sydney) , M arch 1900, pp.27-2H.
8 T . B. M illar, "D efence in the U niversities” , T h e B u lletin , 1 Oct. 1900, p.29.
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before suggesting th at the aid of academics should be enlisted in
A ustralia.9 Reviewing the book, M alcolm Fraser, M H R , who be­
came M inister for the Army shortly afterwards, pointed out that
M illar had not m entioned that the academics who participated
in the Am erican research projects underw ent a security classification
which involved certain restraints and vows of silence on those
involved.
Fraser then posed the question: “W ould A ustralian academics
and defence publicists be prepared to undergo sim ilar restraints?”.
10 Indeed, M illar himself had raised the problem during his
address to the Royal Institute of Public A dm inistration in Novem­
ber 1965:
T h ere are certainly security problem s in associating academ ics a n d research
in stitu tio n s in activities involving classified in fo rm atio n , b u t they are not
insoluble. E ach in d iv id u a l m ust be security cleared, a n d p ro p e r precautions
taken over docum ents or m aterials or processes. O nly those in itiates w ho do
n o t wish to share th e sanctum believe th a t it is im possible to do so w ith o u t
re nding th e veil.l 1
Despite the opposition of a num ber of senior ANU academics,
the C entre was speedily established. N ot unexpectedly, M illar was
appointed to the position of Executive Officer, the “clim ax” — to
quote the Australian Financial Review — of “a m eteoric rise in
the academic sphere” since he joined the ANU as a Research
Fellow in In tern atio n al Relations in June 1962. In August 1964
he was appointed Fellow and prom oted to the position of Senior
Fellow in Ju ly 1966. In 1968 he moved up another rung in the
academic ladder to the position of Professional Fellow. G raduating
from the Royal M ilitary College at D untroon in 1944, M illar
served as an infantry officer in the A IF at M orotai and later with
BCOF in Jap an . After the war he resigned from the Army and took
his B.A. degree from the University of W estern Australia. Moving
to M elbourne as a teacher at H untingtow er School, conducted by
the C hristian Science Church, to which he belongs, M illar worked
part tim e towards his M.A. at M elbourne University which he
com pleted in 1958. T h e thesis topic was the “History of the Defence
Forces of the Port P hillip District and Colony of Victoria 18361900”. H e then proceeded to the University of London, where he
gained his Ph.D. in 1960. Before transferring to the ANU in 1962,
he lectured in m ilitary history at D untroon.
M illar holds strong public political views, going well beyond
those civilian m ilitarists who merely call for increased defence
5 T . B. M illar, A ustralia's D efence (M elbourne: M elbourne U niversity Press,
1965), p.4.
10 A ustralian Journal of Politics and H istory, Dec. 1965, p.403.
' I M illar, “ T h e C o n trib u tio n of Academ ic Personnel and Research In stitu tio n s
to D efence,” p.30.
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expenditure and the im portance of m aintaining the American
alliance. At the first university “teach-in” on Vietnam at the ANU
in 1965, he supported A ustralian intervention, along w ith Peter
Samuel and Tom Hughes, Liberal M H R . A report of his speech
in T h e Australian (24 July 1965) indicated that he believed the
situation in South V ietnam was like the two A ustralian Com m unist
Parties am algam ating under the leadership of the “Chinese” group
and, w ith encouragement and assistance from the Com m unist gov­
ernm ents of New Zealand and Indonesia, beginning in Queensland
“a campaign of terror, or m urder, coercion and persuasion aim ed at
taking over the nation by force.” Moreover, he pointed out, the
insurrection broke out while “Sir James Cairns” was Prim e M in­
ister. M illar’s principal argum ent in favour of A ustralian in ter­
vention was th at “we are com m itted to the defence of South Viet­
nam by the Seato treaty.” Unless we assist the U nited States in
Vietnam, we cannot expect them to help us when we are in trouble.
In any event, he concluded in a vain attem pt to silence the critics,
“T h e Governm ent has access to far more inform ation than we have.”
It is interesting to note th at M illar has not spoken at any subsequent
“teach-ins” on Vietnam, and has refused an invitation to participate
in one at Monash, b u t he still strongly supports A ustralian inter­
vention.
M illar is especially critical of those Australians who are opposed
to A ustralia’s intervention in South Vietnam. In Australian N eig h­
bours (July-Aug. 1965), published by the AIIA, he made the follow­
ing comment on A ustralian defence and foreign policy:
I feel m any of th e criticism s to be m isguided, and feel th a t a large p ro p o rtio n
of th e critics w ould change th e ir a ttitu d e s if they were obliged to forsake
the lu x u ry of opposition for th e responsibilities of fo rm u la tin g a n d im plem enting
governm ent policy. M uch of th e criticism appears to b e based on th e theory
th a t we should tru st a n d cultiv ate (or bribe?) p o ten tial enem ies w hile d istru stin g
a n d refusing to assist o r su p p o rt acknow ledged friends.
Non-Communist critics, he continued, “tend to equate communism
w ith all that is natural, inevitable, progressive, wholesome and
democratic.” T h e U nited States “stands in the way of the Chinese
expansion.” T h e Indians “have become m uch more appreciative
of the value of friends in the West since their experience of a
Chinese invasion.”
O n this last point, it w ould be interesting to hear M illar’s views
on the writings of Dr. A lastair Lamb, not to m ention a statem ent
by General Maxwell T aylor in testimony before the US Congress
in which he adm itted that India started the Sino-Indian border
war of 1962 by m ilitarily “edging forward in the disputed area.”
(UPI, 18 April 1963).
Another them e frequently stressed by M illar is that the “Viet
Cong” are simply “terrorists". In an ABC broadcast several years
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ago which was later included in a booklet entitled Ferment in Asia
(edited by Professor N orm an H a rp e r), M illar summed u p the
"Viet C ong” as a ‘‘powerful internal terrorist arm y” :
N o rth V iet N am seeks to extend its C om m unist system over th e south and
in to Laos a n d p erh ap s Cam bodia. O nly the U nited States, massive a n d alien,
stands in the way. T h e A m ericans seek to c ontain C hinese hegem ony; to lim it
H anoi's control to N o rth Viet N am ; to prove th a t th e C om m unist m odel of
subversion and revolutionary w arfare is n o t inevitable and invariably successful,
even w ith an ad jo in in g C om m unist state; to m ain tain the rig h t of small
n ations to exist.
U nited States’ measures to assist economic, social and political
developments in South Vietnam, M illar wrote in The Bulletin (6
M arch 1965), “have largely failed for a single basic reason: the
systematic campaign of m urder and sabotage by the Vietcong
designed to deny the aid to the South Vietnamese people.” Were
the U.S. to withdraw from South Vietnam, he continued, “the
whole of its carefully-fostered and genuinely deserved reputation in
Asia as a bulwark against Com m unism and a support against
poverty would be irreparably dam aged.”
“Chinese expansionism ” was the basic assum ption of M illar’s
paper on “A ustralia’s Defence Needs” which appeared in Australia’s
Defence and Foreign Policy (1964), edited by Jo h n Wilkes:
1 h a t th e Chinese P eople’s R epublic, w ith its stan d in g arm y of some three
m illion m en, has su p p o rted and will su p p o rt subversion, revolution, a n d even
overt invasion th ro u g h o u t South-East Asia in an a tte m p t to ensure th a t the
region is controlled by com m unist governm ents sym pathetic or preferably
su b o rd in a te to C hina; a n d th a t if C hina were to gain control of th e m ainland,
A ustralia w ould be in a very difficult position. T h u s in h elp in g to defend
South V ietnam , T h a ila n d and Malaysia, A ustralia con trib u tes directly to its
own defencc.
Australia, he continued, was helping to defend South Vietnam
from “externally-backed communist subversion, infiltration, terro r­
ism and aggression.” Moreover, “We need to ensure that our ser­
vicemen are ideologically armed — not ‘indoctrinated’, but aware
of the great benefits of the democratic way of life, and the Christian
values which are the basis of our society.” In this paper, and in his
other writings, he argued both that “we m ust prepare now to meet
the future th rea t”, and that C hina is at present both unable and
unw illing to invade Australia.
In fact, in his m ajor work to date — Australia’s Defence (1965)
— M illar is even more contradictory, as one of his persistent critics,
M ax T eichm ann, pointed out in Arena, Summer 1966, and also in
■a paper on “Non-Alignm ent — A Policy for A ustralia” in Aspects
of Australia’s Defence (1966). On the one hand, M illar referred
to the “expanding im perialism of the Chinese People’s R epublic”
(p.31); on the other hand, we were told that not only does China
not have the means to launch an invasion of Australia but that
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“it would seem unlikely, at this stage, that the Chinese Governm ent
has any desire to do such a thing.’’ (p.59)
These quotations should be sufficient to make clear the intensity
w ith which M illar holds Cold W ar assumptions, and also his tenden­
cy to denigrate opponents on the grounds of naivete or worse. N ot
surprisingly, then, we note an item in News-Weekly (12 Oct. 1966)
announcing that forthcom ing speakers before the C anberra Branch
of the Defend A ustralia Committee, the leading pro-Vietnam
lobby group in the country, would be Senator F. P. M cManus of
the DLP, Mr. M alcolm Fraser, the M inister for the Army, and Dr.
T . B. M illar.
M illar’s Cold W ar assumptions are not shared by all non-Comm unist specialists. T h u s we find two young A ustralian social sci­
entists writing as follows:
T h e fact th a t C hina has given aid a n d com fort to her allies in neig h b o u rin g
countries, th a t she has taken strong m easures to su b ju g ate an area jurid ically
regarded as p a rt of C hina, a n d th a t she has m ade a brief foray in to In d ia
(over a bo rd er dispute as genuine as such disputes can ever be, a n d p ro bably
u n d e r provocation) should not deceive us in to th in k in g th a t C om m unist
C hina has perform ed any acts com parable to the in te rn a tio n a l aggressions of th e
1930's and 1940’s. 12
Even more interesting are two evaluations of C hina in 1966 by
Alastair Buchan, D irector of the Institute for Strategic Studies in
London, and by Roderick M acFarquhar, editor of T h e China
Quarterly, published by the Congress for C ultural Freedom.
B uchan described C h in a’s objectives as follows:
It is very easy to p u t to g eth er th e stream of abusive editorials in the P eking
Daily w ith th e facts of C h in a ’s p o p u latio n , her nuclear w eapons p rogram m e—
a n d h e r ag ricu ltu ral poverty, to create a n ig h tm are prospect of an o v er-populated
a n d vindictive g reat n a tio n ex p an d in g in every direcion, a n d provoking the
first nuclear w ar in th e process. I t seems to m e th ere is little justification,
certainly in M ao's statem ents, for this view . . . C ertainly C hina w ould like to
re^pver her influence over areas like V ietnam a n d Laos, as to some e x ten t
she has done over C am bodia, and this leads her to be an active su p p o rter
of indigenous re v o lu tio n ary m ovem ents. B ut she has never p ro m o te d any
in te rn a l ‘wars of lib e ratio n ', only encouraged them w here they develop
natu rally . I can see no evidence th a t she wishes for a satellite em p ire in Asia,
w hile th ere are clear signs th a she is becom ing increasingly absorbed in h e r
ow n dom estic a n d political problem s.
12 A nthony C lunies Ross a n d P eter King, Australia and N uclear W eapons
(Sydney: Sydney U niversity Press, 1966), pp.56-57. M illar’s m ost recent work,
A ustralia's Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & R obertson 1968), continues to
argue th a t C hina is a m ilita ry th re a t to A ustralia a lth o u g h not a n im m ediate
one, and th a t th e th re a t m u st be m et m ainly by m ilita ry m easures. ‘‘In fifty
years tim e (A ustralia) could be a G reat Pow er — or a g ran ary trib u ta ry of an
Asian em pire.'' F or a critical review of th e book by a fellow firm believer in
th e desirability of c o n tin u in g A ustralian-A m erican alliance, see M ilton O sborne
in T h e A ge, 14 Sept. 1968.
A U ST R A L IA N
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D ecem ber, 1968
T h ere were “no signs that she is losing her innate caution, or that
she wishes to rule Asia by force.'’ Consequently:
If this view of Chinese policy is correct, th ere is no case for creating an
in te g rate d m ilita ry coalition of h e r pow erful neighbours and th e external
powers to ‘c o n ta in ’ her physically as th e Soviet U nion h a d to be ‘c o n ta in ed ’
in W estern a n d South-eastern E urope in th e 1950’s.
Successive US Secretaries of State from Dean Acheson to Dean Rusk,
he concluded, have wrongly described C hina as an aggressive power
which m ust be physically confined by direct m ilitary confronta­
tio n .13
M acFarquhar noted that “there is little evidence to suggest that
the Chinese are interested in actively trying to initiate or m aster­
m ind subversion abroad.” Moreover, “Mao does not think in terms
of the aggressive use of force, even in the absence of countervailing
American poiver, except in the case of the ‘restoration area’, and
not necessarily even there.” Fear of Chinese expansionism, Mac­
F arq u h ar concluded, is “m istaken.” 14
Let us now examine some of the activities of the Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre, whose Advisory Com mittee comprises P ro­
fessors Sir Jo h n Crawford, H. W. A rndt, B. D. Beddie, Hedley
Bull, A. L. Burns J. D. B. Miller, P. H. Partridge and W. E. H.
Stanner of the ANU, the ubiquitous Sir Alan W att and of course
Dr. T . B. M illar. In September 1967, the C entre held its first m ajor
conference, a seminar on B ritain’s w ithdraw al from Asia, whose
proceedings were edited by M illar and published under the title
Britain’s Withdrawal from Asia■ Its Implications fdr Australia.
T h e Conference was private and attended by academics, public
servants, parliam entarians, diplomats, and a selected group from
the Press. Papers were presented by M illar himself, Professors J. D.
B. M iller, A. L. Burns and W. E. H. Stanner, Mr. Geoffrey Fairb airn of the ANU, Dr. D. E. Kennedy of the University of M el­
bourne, Dr. H. G. Gelber of M onash University, and three jo u rn al­
ists, M r. Denis W arner (T he Herald), Mr. Creighton Burns (T he
A g e ) , and Mr. Peter R obinson (T he Australian Financial R e v ie w ).
T h e published proceedings of the conference came out just before
B ritain definitely announced that it would be withdraw ing east of
Suez in the near future. Peter Sam uel’s review in T he Bulletin
(13 Jan . 1968) was headed “Non-Policies from a Room ful of
T ories”. T h e book, he began, was “an account of how our foreign
affairs establishm ent protects itself against ideas.” Some of the
papers were “outstandingly frivolous”, and he specifically cited
H. G. G e lb er’s suggesting th a t th e B ritish are n o t really disengaging, J. D. B.
M iller's g en tilities on the need to consider foreign policies o th er th a n All-the13 A lastair B uchan, "A n Asian Balance of Power?” A ustralian Journal of
Politics a n d H istory, Aug. 1966, pp.274-275.
14 R oderick M acF arquhar, Chinese A m b itio n s and B ritish Policy (L ondon:
F abian T ra c t 367, 1966), pp.8, 11.
42
AU STRALIAN
I.F.FT
REV IEW
D ecem ber, 1968
way-with-LBJ (concluding w ith ‘T h ey m ay not com fort us, b u t they do m ake
us th in k ’) and D. E. K ennedy’s p a rad e of well-worn poin ts ab o u t SEA TO w hich
evoked, in discussion, th e priceless conclusion th a t an alliance ‘less specifically
opposed to C om m unism m ig h t a p p ea r desirable, b u t against w hom w ould
it be directed?'
M illar’s mistake, Samuel concluded, was in not inviting along to
his seminar people “who m ight have shaken his conservatives a
little in their rut. A Santam aria, a Knopfelmacher, a Cooksey, a
Colin Clark, or a T eichm ann or two were desperately needed.”
For the record, it should be made public th at Max Teichm ann
was not invited, despite the fact that he had argued th at B ritain’s
withdrawal from Southeast Asia was inevitable in a paper at the
1965 conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association
and in an article entitled “Protecting Ourselves” in the Spring 1966
issue of Dissent.
Seminars are also held regularly at the Centre and speakers from
outside the ANU have included Douglas Pike, author of Viet Cong,
G. Jockel of the D epartm ent of External Affairs, Air M arshal E.
Reyno of the Royal C anadian A ir Force, G roup C aptain D. B.
Nichols, Director of Legal Services in the RAAF, and Professor
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, a form er senior State D epartm ent official
now at the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, which was financed u ntil recently by the
C.I.A.
One revealing aspect of the Centre's work is their current interest
in the techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. They have already
held one sem inar on the subject and there will be another in the
near future. T h ere are no indications to date that they intend to
em ulate such large-scale exercises in “counter-insurgent prophy­
laxis” as Project Camelot, sponsored a few years ago by the US
Army under the aegis of the American University and eventually
cancelled by form er Defence Secretary R obert M cNam ara follow­
ing widespread criticism in L atin America.15 T h e old form ula
for counterinsurgency used to be ten soldiers for every guerrilla.
Now the form ula appears to be ten social scientists for every guer­
rilla. Counterinsurgency projects im plicitly identify revolution and
radical social change w ith social pathology, and order and stability
w ith social health. T h e ir general purpose is to reduce the likeli­
15 See Irving L ouis H orow itz (ed.), T h e Rise and Fall of P roject Camelot
(Cam bridge, Mass.: M IT Press, 1967); M arshall W indm iller, “T h e New A m erican
M a n d arin s” a n d K athleen G ough, “ W orld R evolution a n d th e Science of M an",
in T heodore Roszak (ed.), T h e D issenting A cadem y (N.Y.: P an th eo n Books
1967).
For a plea by a m em ber of th e Defense D epartm ent in W ashington for m ore
social science research to back u p US m ilitary involvem ent in the T h ir d W orld,
see T hom as H. T ackaberry, "Social Science Research, Aid to C o unterinsurgency”,
T h e Am erican Journal o f Econom ics and Sociology, Ja n . 1968, p p .1-8.
43
A U ST R A L IA N
LEFT
REVIEW
D ecem ber, 1968
hood of social disturbances or revolutions in the T h ird W orld.
T h e possibility th at all or some revolutions may be justified or
desirable is not considered, nor is any interest shown in how to
assist Left insurgency movements in dealing with dictatorial govern­
ments of the Right. Im plicit in the concept of “counter-insurgency”
is an assum ption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to
the interests of “the free w orld” and th at the US and its close allies
m ust be prepared to assist counterrevolutionary measures to repress
these movements. Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Director of the
M ershon Social Science Program in N ational Security at Ohio State
University, has warned that counterinsurgency theorizing, like
deterrence theorizing, is “equally poisonous for social science study
and research.” 16 And Conor Cruise O ’Brien has argued convincingly
th at many social and political scientists accept, although they do not
proclaim, the principle of “counterrevolutionary subordination.”
One can assume the continued prom otion by the U nited States and
its satellites of counterrevolution in the underdeveloped countries,
and in this kind of situation the real danger to academic integrity
comes from “counterrevolutionary subordination.” ’7
It is undeniable th at some scholarly research is being undertaken
at the Centre, b u t the w orld’s problem s are defined in terms
extremely close to w hat the Left feels to be the perception of world
problem s held by the A ustralian Governm ent.
Relations between the Centre and the defence departm ents are
cordial. A lthough no formal links exist, the Centre has effective
access to governm ent and they certainly hope to influence govern­
m ent policy. A peace institution on the other hand, not only would
be denied these inform al links but it would be neither as influential
nor as well-financed. Some of the projects already undertaken at
the C entre are sober and serious pieces of research, bu t they are
wholly w ithin the framework of the Cold W ar perspective. T he
Am erican counterparts of the Centre and the quasi-academic insti­
tutes like the RAND C orporation are unquestionably oriented
towards the general perspectives, if not always the concrete policies,
of the Am erican foreign policy elite. T hey hold the same im portant
assumptions as the official U nited States position, and these basic
assumptions are not pu t to any kind of test. In the case of RAND,
although its research workers have been intellectually independent
to the extent of strenuously questioning their em ployer’s policies,
they have not been “independent” to the extent of questioning
1* In tro d u c tio n to G reen, Deadly Logic, p.ix.
17 C onor C ruise O 'B rien, “ Politics and th e M orality of Scholarship”, in Max
Black (ed.), T h e M orality of Scholarship (Ithaca: C ornell U niversity Press,
1967), p .71. It is believed th a t the Strategic and Defence Studies C entre at
the A N U has recently begun a substantive study of nuclear w eapons for
A ustralia.
44
A U STRA LIA N
LEFT
REVIEW
D ecem ber, 1968
either the nature of the jobs they are perform ing or their basic
values. As M ax T eichm ann wrote in the Spring 1967 issue of
Dissent when discussing social science institutes or projects in
receipt of CIA or US m ilitary finance:
Such an in stitu te need n o t produce loaded or co n tam in ated research—but
it w ill be influenced by a d isto rted ord er of research p riorities. Some avenues
of research and some hypotheses w ould alm ost certainly be excluded, for fear
of producing u n p a la tab le conclusions or unacceptable prescriptions. T h u s
how m any US foundations w ould go on financing a M ilitary In stitu te which
started producing studies show ing th e desirabiliy of u n ila te ra l nu clear d isarm a­
m ent. or arm ed n e u tra lity , o r th e dangers of stationing US bases on its soils,
or historical analysis show ing th a t A m erica was m ainly responsible for m a in ­
tain in g the Cold W ar, or d em onstrations th a t the US was conducting subversion
of o th er countries by the use of the CIA and its in n u m e rab le fronts? Yet
research bodies in these fields w hich dodge such enquiries . . . are, intellectually
speaking not w orth a cracker.
W here does the C entre obtain its funds? W hen it was being
established Sir Jo h n Craw ford had adam antly denied rum ours of
financial assistance from the Ford Foundation, bu t today the ANU
publicly acknowledges that the funds are coming from this source.
T h e Ford Foundation in fact has been the most active foundation
in the broad field of international relations, including grants to
establish and m aintain the Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
Professor Hans J. M orgenthau of the University of Chicago has
commented on
the enorm ous positive and negative influence w hich foundations exert upon
the « K:“Cts, results, and m ethods of research. T hey rew ard certain types of
research by su p p o rtin g them and stim ulate m ore research of th e same type
by prom ising to su p p o rt it. O n th e o th er h and, they th w a rt or m ake im possible
o th er types of research by not su p p o rtin g them . T h e p o litical scientist
who w ants to share in these rew ards and, by doing so, gain prestige a n d power
w ithin the profession cannot help being influenced by these positive and
negative expectations in his concept of the social tr u th of th e m ethods by
w hich to seek it, a n d of th e relevant results to be expected from it.) 8
T h e assumptions of the Cold W ar are accepted by the Ford Found­
ation. Thus it favours projects in which all questions are sub­
merged to the national interest. W riting in T h e Village Voice (6
July 1967), two young New Left social scientists, T o d d G itlin and
Bob Ross, noted that the consequences of a grant from the CIA, the
State D epartm ent or the Ford Foundation, were identical — “ to
expedite America’s foreign penetrations, and to render them legiti­
mate; to decorate the gendarm erie of the world with ribbons of
rationality and liberalism .” Looking at the claim that the Congress
for C ultural Freedom ’s newly-found ties with the Ford F oundation
i s H ans J. M orgenthau, " T h e P urpose of Political Science”, in Jam es C.
C harlesw orth (ed.), A Design for Political Science: Scope, O bjectives, and
M ethods (P hiladelphia: A m erican Academ y of Political a n d Social Science,
1966), pp.70-71.
A U ST R A L IA N
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REV IEW
Decem ber, 1968
indicated th at it was no longer a Cold W ar instrum ent, 1. F. Stone’s
Weekly (3 A pril 1967) commented:
Frankly, we d o n ’t th in k th e shift from C IA to F o rd m akes m u ch difference.
T h e F o rd F o u n d a tio n , w ith M cGeorge B undy a t its head, like th e R ockefeller
F o undation, w hich D ean R usk long ra n , are p a rt of th e sam e pom pous
A m erican establishm ent. . . T hese stuffed sh irt in stitu tio n s are n o m ore likely
to finance in d ep e n d en t a n d critical w ritin g o n A m erican policy in V ietnam
or L atin A m erica th a n w ould the CIA.
And C onor Cruise O ’Brien has m aintained th at the way in which
international political studies are today supported and organized
in America involves m anipulation:
M any of these studies, b o th respectable a n d o th er, are financed either by some
bran ch of the U n ited States governm ent o r by som e fo u n d a tio n whose policies
are the sam e as those of th e U n ited States governm ent, from w hich it m ay
even acquire its hig h est personnel. W h en we find th a t m any of these studies
also d isto rt reality, in a sense favorable to US policy a n d reassuring to US
o pinion, it is a p p a re n t th a t h e re the m o rality of scholarship has been
exposed to te m p ta tio n and in some cases has succum bed w ith en th u siasm .19
T h e role of civilian m ilitarists in A ustralia will certainly become
m ore im p o rtan t in the next few years. Already T h e Australian (8
May 1968) has editorialised on the urgent need for a “think tan k ”,
along the lines of the RAND C orporation, to m odernise A ustralian
m ilitary organisation and strategic thinking. It was immediately
joined by Professor Hedley Bull who told a defence forum at the
University of M elbourne th at the rigid division between public
servants and arm ed forces personnel on the one hand and academics,
parliam entarians and journalists on the other, im poverished think­
ing about defence m atters on both sides. H e added th at the Aus­
tralian defence m achine needed to be subjected to the sort of
“intellectually rigorous political, strategic and economic analysis”
that transform ed the American war m achine under form er Secretary
of Defence R obert M cNam ara — a transform ation in which the
key role was perform ed by the RAND C orporation, (T he Austra­
lian, 8 May 1968).
T h ere has been a clear connection between the “disinterested”
scientist an d Am erica’s arsenal of exotic weaponry, between the
“dispassionate” anthropologist and the dom ination of prim itive
peoples, between the “objective” sociologist and the m anipulation
of power elites in under-developed countries, and between the
academic centre of strategic studies and counterinsurgency warfare.
As Irving Louis Horowitz noted when he entered a plea for moving
beyond the findings of the civilian m ilitarists, such a step would
he to move in to “a clearer and cleaner use of social and political
science.”20
19 O 'B rien, op.cit., p.70.
20 H orow itz, T h e W ar G am e, p.28.
46