ANTROPOLOGICA
96. 2001·2002: 31-51
Conservation and Native
Amazonians: Why Some Do and
Some Don't
Stepben Beckerman
Paul Valentine l
Elise Eller
Introduction
With respect to the conservation of the bíodíverstty of Amazonia. there
has been a lively dtscusston as to the extent to which Euroarnerican
conservationists and the native peoples of the regíon are engaged in a
cornrnon enterprise (Redford & Robinson 1985; Vickers 1991; Redford &
Stearrnan 1993a; Alcorn 1993; Redford & Stearrnan 1993b; Peres 1994;
Conklin & Graharn 1995.) Although sorne participants in this discussion have
rnade a poínt of noting the manífest variability in conservation practices
arnong natíve Amazonians (Kaplan & Kopischke 1992). there rernains both a
tendency to generalize about native peoples and a lack of attention to the
factors producing the dívergent conservation views and practices of
Amazonían natíves. Thís tendency is rnanifested (Orlove & Brush 1996) in
positions taken about the existence of what Redford (1991) has called "the
ecologícally noble savage." Positions supportíng and opposing this general
view of Amazonían natíves are exernplified in CalCA (1989) and Peres (1994.)
Headland (1997) cites wíth approval argurnents that reject the idea that
traditional peoples are naturally conservationists, intrinsically in harrnony
with their environrnent.
Thus, a recent study by Alvard (1995). dernonstratíng that the Piro ofthe
Peruvian Amazon regíon are not conservationists, was taken by a nurnber of
cornrnentators as reflective of all Amazonian natives. In his article, Alvard
contested the assertion that tribal peoples are all natural conservationists,
and showed that the Piro in fact do not "1irnit their harvest of the rnost
vulnerable and easily overhunted species... Rather they rnake interspecific
1 Acknowledgements: We are indebted to Darna Dufour for her generosity in calculatíng the
estimate of the protetn cost of foraging among río Negrtrios: and to her and to Stephen and
Chrísttne Hugh-Jones for provídíng the food sharíng ínforrnatíon credíted to thern in thts arttcle.
Our thanks go to Peter Giles for hís care checking and coding Currtpaco huntíng and físhing data.
We are also most grateful to Jim Boster, who spent an otherwise perfectly good Saturday
afternoon tolling over the matrices that became Tabs. 1-3.
31
prey-choice decisions that maximize return rates-choices consistent with the
prediction of optimal foragíng theory" (Alvard 1995:800).
These observations make good sense in a society such as that of the Piro.
where fish and game are an open access resource while consumption is by
household. In this situation, anyone who conserves is practicing a self
defeating strategy-passing up food that will just end up in someone else's poto
In a game theoretic sense, the conservationist subsídtzes others at the
expense of hís own household's nutritional welfare. It ís not surprísíng that
Alvard found no conservation ethic among the Piro.
Ethnographic Background
Yet there ís another Arnazonian regíon, the blackwater area of the rio
Negro basin where Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil meet, in whích the native
peoples were recorded decades ago (well before bíodíversíty conservation
reached its present prominence) as having a conservatíontst ideology (Reichel­
Dolmatoff 1976.) This ideology remains prominent today. For example, in the
Venezuelan part of the río Negro Basín.
Three informants from three different linguistic groups of the
regíon volunteered to Valentine that an overabundant take of
fish or game was dangerous and could make one sick. Twice
Valentine observed a Curripaco man get a plentiful fish catch
and then take to his hammock for the next couple of days, worried
about the supematural consequences of irnmoderation... Another
instance of restraint follows frorn the Curripaco belief that in
certaín areas (the region around Cerro Duida is one such) it ís
fruitless to hunt because any garne killed there will turn to
maníoc when it falls to the ground. These unhunted areas serve
as de facto garne reserves. (Beckerrnan & Valentine 1996:660).
Chemela (1989; 1994) has also published evidence that other groups of
these peoples observe restraints on subsistence activities that lead to long
term preservation of their natural resources. For instance, for Tukanoans of
the Brazilian Uaupés regíon, she (Chemela 1994:447) records: "Forests along
rivers are never cultivated because lndians view thern as part of the aquatic
system. They are reserved as feeding ground belonging to the físh."
She also indicates (Chernela 1994:453) that in a particular village of
Arapaco (comprised of Tukanoan language speakers) on the Uaupés river
itself: "the Arapaco believe that guardian spirits restrict or control fishing in
17 of 29 tributary streams Ii.e., tributary to the víllage's stretch of Uaupés
frontage]. The combined length of all streams is calculated to be 156 km. Of
thís no less that 96 km, or 62%, ís restricted." She adds that many of the
restricted areas are explicitly identified by the lndians as spawníng sites for
one or another edtble fish species.
32
These observations also make game theoretic sense, because th is
blackwater regíon is characterized by village-wide communal meals.
Among the Arawakan and eastem Tukanoan peoples of the northwestem
Amazon (the blackwater regio n draíned by the Río Negro), the major meal of
the day is traditionally a communal feast. Among the Curripaco, for instance,
men, who may have been hunting or fishing either índívídually or collectively,
bring their prey severally to theír wives, who cook it individually. A bit of
cooked food rnay or may not then be consumed prívately, but the bulk of the
food is brought to the comrnon space in the front of the longhouse (these
days, to the headman's house) and aggregated to a common fund (though it
rernaíns in separate vessels.) Men eat in one group and wornen and srnall
children in another. In each group, anyone may eat frorn any vessel, and there
ís no dífference in access between those who contributed much to the meal
and those who contributed little or nothing (Beckerman and Valentine
1996:660).
In thís culture area, the conservatíoníst ís not símply subsidizing others,
because he and his family get a share of the game and físh brought home by
everyone else in the settlement.
Model
In this note, we develop a formal model that relates the payoff for
conservation to the degree of food sharing practiced by foragers. Then we
insert into the rnodel the prelímínary data now available to show that under
sorne ethnographically recorded ranges of the relevant variables, the model
does predict no penalty -and indeed sorne benefit- for conservationist
behavior.
For the flrst task, we start with a simple equatíon for the amount of garne
a forager (hunter-flsherman) takes horneo
An individual forager takes garne at
hNt
(1)
where h ís the effectiveness of capture, per forager, per prey individual
(h is basically a measure of foraging skill -the forager's efficiency in finding
and killing hís prey); N is the size of the prey population; and t is the arnount
of time spent hunting and fishing.
With complete sharing, the hunter-fisherman effectively gets game at the
same rate that he would get it if there were no sharing at all (assuming that
all foragers are equal in hunting-fishing efficiency, exploit the same size prey
population (s), and dedícate equal time to foraging), because complete sharmg
rneans that every hunter-fisherman gets an equal share of the total ftsh and
garne acquisition.
33
If P is the size of the popuIation of human hunter-flshermen. then the
total take for the whole settlement ís just PhNt; íf we divide through that total
by P to get the individual retum, the P's cancel and we are left with hNt.
Now we look more closely at incentives for individual foragers, and
introduce three complications. The first is that hunting and fishing not only
províde energy and protein, but are also activities that consume them. We call
the cost of hunting and fishing C; we define it as the proportion of the fish and
game that has to be discounted frorn the forager's take because he has used
up that amount of nutrients in the chase. We assume e varies between o and
1: íf it reached lit never does) hunting and flshíng would be accomplished
with no expenditure of effort; íf C reached or passed 1 (it could) hunting and
fishing would not be worthwhile because the hunter would be using up more
of his own energy and protein in the process than he recovered in the f1esh of
his game. As a practical matter, for these South American tropical forest
people, we can take it that the important costs and benefits of hunting and
fishing are issues of pratein supply and expense; Calorie demands are met by
the cultivated fraction of the dieto
The second complication is the issue of the voracious forager. Suppose an
individual increased his average hunting and fishing time fram t to (t-x].
working longer, taking more meat, but also endangering the size of N, the prey
population -what gains and losses would accrue to such an individual?
The third complication is the question of incomplete sharing. Complete
sharing is very simple, as noted aboye, but it prabably never occurs. We need
to explore the issue of partial sharing. We call the praportlon of his catch that
a hunter-fisherman keeps, q; and therefore the praportion that he shares is
(l-q).
Now what we have for everyone hunting and fishing at the same efficiency
(uniform h), and for the same time (uniform t). and sharing at the same
proportíon, (l-q). is that under these conditions, the individual forager gets an
amount of fish and game gíven by
o
qhNt + (l-qlhNtP - ChNt
(2)
P
The first term aboye ts the share of the fish and game the forager keeps
for hímself: the second term is the share of the fish and game the forager gets
fram the common pot as shared out by all the hunter-fishermen including
himself; and the third term ís the praportion of that game acquísítton that has
to be subtracted fram the forager's take for the metabolic cost of his exertions
in hunting and fishing.
Now, the P's in the second term cancel out, and sínce, by definition,
q + (l-q) = 1, the expression reduces to
hNt - ChNt = hNt( 1 - C)
34
. t
. l'
(3)
Agaín, everyone is in the same sítuatíon: and this expression is simply
the expression hNt modified to account for the metabolic cost of hunting.
But what happens íf we have a forager who hunts extra. for a time of
(t + x)? In such a case, still assuming equal sharing [everyone donates to the
common pot at a proportion of (l - q)J. this man gets an amount of fish and
game gíven by
qhN(t + x) + (l - q)hNtrP - 1)+(1 - qlhNft + xl - ChN(t + x)
P
(4)
As before, the first term is the amount of fish and game the hunter­
fisherman gets by his own efforts, the second term is the amount he acquires
from the common pot (note that he makes a larger contrtbu tíon to the
common pot than anyone elsel, and the th ír d term is hís (the forager 's)
metabolic expenses.
In thís scheme, each other hunter-fisherman gets fish and game in the
amount of
qhNt + (l - q)hNtfP - 11 + f1 - q)hNft + xl - ChNt
P
(5)
We solve for the point at which it pays an individual to begín to hunt and
físh more than everyone else, the poínt at whích a non-conservíng, Piro style
strategy ís rewarded. That poínt ís just the value at which expression (4), the
voracíous forager's retum, is greater than expression (5), the individual retum
of each of hís more restraíned neíghbors. The result of reducing the inequality
ís that ít pays to be voracíous when
q>C
(6)
That is, ít pays a forager to work longer hours only when the proportion
of hís take that is kept for hís own prtvate consumption is greater than the
proportíon of hís foragíng retums that ís used in the effort of foragíng,
What thís final Inequalíty suggests ís that as the cost of hunting and
fishing ríses. that ís, as a forager uses up a hígher fraction of the food value of
hís prey in acquíríng that prey, the proportion of h is prey that a hunter­
fisherman has to keep for hímself in order to make voracity pay also goes up.
Thís result implies that in regíons where retums on hunting and fishing are
low because fish and game are scarce and requíre considerable effort to
obtaín, then only a moderate amount of sharing is neceasary to make ti
uneconomical to act rapacíously. On the other hand, in a rich regíon, one
where the forager gets meat at arate far outstrtpping his metabolic expenses,
ti ís individualIy advantageous to take as much as he can get unless a very
large proportion of the game is shared.
35
Another írnplícatíon is that, under conditions where the level of sharing
makes excess effort disadvantageous to the voracious forager (someone who
hunts or fishes for extra time benefits others more than he benefits himself) ít
is to everyone's individual advantage to have N, the size of the animal
population, be as hígh as possible. This effect occurs because the amount of
game the forager gets ts a function of hNt, and since there is no advantage in
increasing t, the only way to improve one's take is to increase h (by becoming
a more skilful hunter or fisherrnan), or to increase N, the síze of the fish and
game population(s.)
Probably everyone tries to be as good a hunter and fisherrnan as possíble:
prestíge (and probably sexual favors) awaits Nimrods. More important, in the
present context, is that there is also individual incentive for deliberate
conservation to keep N hígh. The larger the prey populations, the hígher the
collective and individual benefits.
Do actual values for the model parameters, taken fram the native peoples
of the río Negro. fall within the range of values where these arguments predict
conservation?
Three kinds of figures are required:
1: Returns rates for foraging (hN):
II: Metabolic costs of hunting (C):
III: Proportion of físh and game not shared (q).
None of these parameters has yet been measured to our entire
satisfaction among the río Negro basin peoples. Nevertheless, sorne
prelirní nary measurements and reasonable estimates are available. For
foragíng return, we have records of fishing and hunting acttvttíes and catches
from a Curripaco (Wakuénaí] víllage in far southern Venezuela, collected by
Valentine in the second half of 1982 as part of a project that preceded the
development of the model we present aboye.
The Region
The oligatrophic (exceptionally low in nutrients) blackwater ecosystem
pivotally affects subsistence actívítíes in this area (Sponsel 1992). The low
above-ground biomass and extremely acid and nutríent-poor soils translate
into very low biomass productivity of game and fish (Moran 1995). The
inkiness of the rivers, caused by undecomposed organic matter and dissolved
phenols, makes fishing with tradítíonal arrows and lances less effective than
it ís in clear rivers (Moran 1995). The underlying soils are frequently
extremely acid, whích limits horticulture to a few plants such as maníoc that
are adapted to such low pH and to otherwise toxic levels of aluminium
saturation (Moran 1995). Secondary succession is much slower than in other
areas of Amazonia, necessitating much longer fallow periods before swidden
cultivation can be practiced again (Uhl et al. 1982). The area is characterized
36
by low fauna! biomass (Janzen 1974), stunted fish (Clark 1980), and crops
with comparatively low mineral content, especíally calcium (Holmes 1981).
The marked seasonal variations also sígnífícantly shape subsistence
strategíes (Sponsel 1993). The Río Negro ríses and falls on average seven
meters per year in the regíon. The Curripaco divide the annual cycle into two
seasons (low waters metaka oni from November to March and high waters
eepada oni from April to September) reflecting this seasonal process. When
the ríver begíns to rise the fish abandon the principal channels and streams
and feed on detritus -the insects, leaves, and fruits that drop from the flooded
forest (rebalse) (Goulding 1988). When the water starts to leave the forest,
they are forced into the main channels where there i s less food available
(Welcomme 1979). Físh dispersed in the flooded forest are much more díffícult
to harvest and catch rates are lower than when they are concentrated in the
shallow rivers and streams (Clark 1983). The Curripaco are acutely aware
that fish and humans experience alternating seasons of relative plenty and
scarcity.
Like fish, game fol1ows a seasonal mígratory pattern of concentration and
dispersa\. During the wet season, game heads for tierra firme and keeps well
clear of village settlements. While foragíng in tierra firme, game ís sometimes
attracted to gardens and abandoned swiddens because the secondary grO\\lth
provídes ground level food and cover. Sorne game animals come to the rebalse
towards the end of the wet season. Pacas feed on the dry fruits strewn on the
ground when the water recedes from the flooded forest in September and
October, and peccaries and agoutís make seasonal vísíts to the rebalse when
moriche fruít (Mauritiaflexuosa L.) ripens in May, and also when the ríver
begíns to fal\.
Turning to the human inhabitants of this resource-limited regíon, one of
the key features of the social organísatíon of the N.W. Amazon ís that local
groups were wídely scattered and organised into hierarchical structures to
control access to límíted areas of fish concentration in flooded forest and
cataracts (Chernela 1982; Goldman 1963; Hill and Moran 1983; Jackson
1983; Moran 1991, Uhl 1980; Valentine 1991).
The Research Site
The study village (whích no longer exists) had a population of 42 in 1982,
and had been founded sorne 20 years before the time of the fieldwork. It was
located on an island in the Guaínía River, the northern extensíon of the Río
Negro. Thís island was neariy a day's paddling from Maroa, the closest large
Currípcaco village, and two day's paddlíng from San Carlos, the local
administrative centre.
There was dense vegetation on three sides of the island and granite rocks
gently slopíng down to the river on the north end. The port was located there,
37
with the víllage overlookíng ít. In the study víllage the hauses were in
twa
raws, ane hause behind the other, in much the same way that the individual
cubicles of the traditionallonghouse were placed (Wallace 1889: 190). These
two lines ran back from the plaza. The headman's house, whích was bigger
than the rest, ran at ríght angles to the lines of houses, and served many of
the functions of the entrance and central body of a long house.
No víllagers eamed wages and almast the entire food supply carne fram
theír awn subsistence activities of swiddening, gathering, fishing and hunting.
Carbahydrates were obtaíned mainly from garden produce, and pratein fram
físhíng and hunting.
Manioc is the staple garden crop in this
regíon.
Swidden
productíon is rnuch lower here than elsewhere in the Amazon. Crops such as
plantains, beans and bananas fare badly. Nevertheless, Clark and Uhl (1987)
calculate that the potential carryíng capacity of maniac ís seven times greater
than the present population.
In general, the regíon's fishermen did have access to autbaard mators,
gasoline, shotguns. harpoon guns. head lamps, and 12 volt batteries.
However, in the study village. beca use of lack of cash and persistent
mechanical failures, there was less access to labour saving equipment than in
the larger settlements. Villagers shared seven shotguns and two outboard
motors (donated by a govemment agency), and a broad range of metal hooks
and nylon fishing lineo
Life in the study village was paced by the two daily communal meals.
During the study period the villagers nearly always attended the community
meals. Every morníng and evening, they gathered at the headman's house.
Each housewife brought her contribution from her own hearth. The usual
practice was to have an early communal breakfast, which consisted of hot
manioc drink (pachiakal or palm fruit liquid and sometímes a meat or fish
soup. A second communal meal was held at sundown. The meal consisted of
meat or fish soup, and manioc bread followed by a manioc drink. During the
dry season when food was plentiful sometimes an additional communal meal
was slotted ínto the day. At the heíght of the wet season, community meals
tapered off because there was inadequate food. For instance, Holmes and
Valentine partícípated in a meal of a half a dozen pounded sparrow-sized
birds in a thin gruel shared by a community of about twenty.
At the rear of each house was an open-síded kitchen and bench. It was
here, on hís return, that a hunter or fisherman sometimes had a small meal
before the community meal. This public consumption of a modest amount of
food was acceptable. Secret consumption of food, hidden away in the comer of
the house, was noto Free riding was also unacceptable. Initiates were taught
that hunger hurts, that they must be self-sufficient and share. Prospective
bridegrooms were closely monitored for their contributions to the community
meal, and young men who consistently failed to bríng home food for the pot
were unfavourably compared to their more productive peers. Nor were older
men beyond public scrutiny. For instance, on one occasíon. Valentine had
38
,,1
i
,.I-,I-H."'-~"l·~'-··~"'''''
.·,-++_'__ "¡'_·I·,_·.,~
l
been monopolizing the headman with questions for too long. A fellow víllager
of low social status jokingly told the headman to contribute more to the village
lardero
Field Methods
Starting at the begínníng of July, 1982, Valentine recorded the time of
departure and time of return for each man as he left and re-entered the
village, íf these events occurred during daylight. As a back-up, for comings
and goings that took place in darkness, he also made a trip raund the village
once a day with his assistant, Felix Lopez, the headman's son, during which
visits the two workers asked about foraging episodes they míght have missed.
The same questions were also posed duríng the communal meals at which
everyone gathered every morning and evening. Men were interviewed on
their return frorn hunting and fishing excursions. Sometimes Valentine
accompanied fishing trips.
Scales were set up in a house on the way to the port. which everyone had
to pass by. Two scales were used: one for light items and a bigger one for
larger game animals. Men were very cooperative, and carne to get their game
weíghed as they entered the village. They obviously enjoyed finding out the
weíght of their day's take.
These data were recordad daily on a printed form which stipulated: date
of observatíon: the name of the man (or the men íf they engaged in graup
foragíng): time of departure; time of return; the foragíng sites vístted: the
species of prey; the number of individuals of each species; the weíght of the
prey; the tools and equipment employed; and the dístríbutíon of the prey to
other village members. As will be apparent , foraging time defined as
everything between departure and return for a foragíng expedition includes
the hours spent travelling, building traps, and collecting baít, as well as time
spent in actual fishing and hunting in the narrow sense.
Data
The data obtained by these methods concern 16 men, their foraging
hours and fish and game harvests fram July through November, 1982. Hourly
return rates per man (hN), for time spent hunting and fishing, varied
depending on man and month. Returns ranged fram O kg/hr to 2.63 kg/hr,
fresh, unbutchered weíght-; the mean was 327 g/hr2 •
2The aboye data are consistent wíth that obtalned by other researchers. Hill (1984) provides
data on hourly fishlng returns per man obtained from the study víllage or one nearby. Returns
were approxlmately 300 g/hr for May, 200 g/hr for June, and 120 g/hr for .Iuly, 1981. Clark
(1983. 1987) collected ñshmg data for the períod Aprll 1979-Aprll 1981 from a local town, San
Carlos de Rio Negro, The monthly catch rates were between 0.15-1.10 kg/hrwith an overall mean
rate of 0.62 kg/hr. The bi-monthly rates for the wet season were 150g/hr. 300g/hr and 450g/
39
This figure is for total fresh weíght: to obtain the. edible fraction, the
number needs to be reduced by 30-40% (depending on the species.) Moreover,
many of these records were for hunting with shotguns or fishing wlth steel
fishhooks and headlamps; traditional foraging produces yíelds of at least
40-50% less (Beckerman 1994; Hames 1979). That consideration takes the
estimate of the mean return down to the nelghborhood of 100 g/hr of meat. At
a protein content of about 20%, the foraged fish and game provided about 20g
proteíri/hr of foragíng, on average. Finally, to evaluate the currency value of
this ingested animal protein in replacing a gram of protein in human tissue
we need to discount sorne additional amount for the entropic loss in dígestíon
and synthesis. We leave the caIculation of this final discount for a subsequent
paper, noting here only that 20 g/hr may be rather generous as the figure
assígned to hN.
The estimation of e, the metabolic cost of fishing and hunting, is difficult.
Protein, the factor implicated in our model, is not much consumed in
muscular exertion while the body has stores of fat and carbohydrates and the
size of these stores among the human population of this reglen is not entirely
clear. Based on a 32-day dietary survey carried out at the end of the wet
season in an isolated village that had access to a white water ecosystem,
Holmes and Clark (1992) calculated the population had an adequate proteín
intake. They concluded that the region's indigenous population does not
suffer protein deficiency and enjoys good nutrition. However, during the wet
season, there was sorne nutritional stress that may lower resistance to
disease resulting in hígher mortality. An earlier study had shown that adults
were at or aboye the WHO international standard weíght-for-heíght (Holmes
1981).
However, Holmes (1985), using a nutritional survey of the regíon that
included clínícal. dietary and anthropometric measures, found sígns of sparse
and/or dyspígmentated hair in 25 to 50% ofyoung children and "rnoon-face"
in 12%. These sígns are suggestive of undernutrition (Jelliffee 1966). There
was also a hígh parasite load (Holmes 1981). In terms of weíght-for-age, 80%
of the chiIdren and adolescents were below the tenth percentile of the
Venezuelan standard and aduIts were small.
These findings have to be considered along with other circumstantial
evidence. Blackwater rivers have been known as "rívers of hunger" since the
reports of Humbolt, Wallace and Bates in the 19th century, and their
inhabitants have habitually been noted as famine prone (Wallace 1889: 162:
Wríght 1981). Curripaco culture is permeated with references to the stresses
of fasting and hunger. For ínstance. the Curripaco language is divided into
five dialects. Each dialect is known by the term sígntfyíng, 'Yes, there ís' or
'No, there is not (food)' -the greetings a visitor may receive on arrívíng at a
hr. Sponsel (1993) reports that at the study village over a twelve month period the mean fishing
and hunting return rates were 290 g/hr and 440 g/hr respectively. The monthly fish catch
weíghts ranged frorn 440 g/hr to 90 g/hr and the monthly game weíght.s ranged frorn 950 g/hr
to 60 g/hr.
40
settlement. In short, in the historicaI past, these people may have been
nutritionally close enough to the bone to bUITl appreciable amounts of protein
in exertion, even though that situation does not correspond to the general
current condítíon.
Darna Dufour, a physícal anthropologist who has worked in the
blackwater regíon, was generous enough to offer us her conjecture that a 60
kg man between 18 and 30 years old, natíve to this regíon, would use up no
more that 5 grams per hour of hís own protein in the actívíty of hunting. The
actual amount of protein now used up in foraging exertion is a question for
field determination in future work.
The proportion of hunted and fished food that is privately consumed (q)
and shared (1 - q) in this regíon ís highly variable and seems to respond
mainly, these days, to the degree of Westernization and the level of internal
conflict of the particular blackwater village in questíon. Traditionally,
communal meals were part of the lúe of all setilements in the Upper Río Negro
(Matos Arvelo 1912). The Tatuyo Tukanoan village where Dufour (personal
communícatíon) worked now eats communally only once a week, so at rnost
l/7th of their food is shared. Stephen and Christine Hugh-Jones (personal
communication) estímate that in the Barasana village where they worked,
something around 1/4 or 1/3 of fish and game is shared out. Valentine
estima tes that, in the study village, 3/4 or more of fish and game was
consumed. As mentíoned aboye, there was strong social pressure to share
food at the community meals. Those who did not share were thought either to
be stingy or to be expressing in a very visible and tangible way their
discontent with the village leadership or with the community as a whole (Hill
1983).
Results
We can insert the values for hN, C, and q discussed aboye -rough but
servíceable for current purposes -ínto a spreadsheet matrix and look at the
advantage or disadvantage to a hunter-ftsherman who works harder than
everyone else, violating the taboos on rapacity for which the peoples of this
regíon are noted. To make the relative advantage clear, we assume a single
voracíous forager and compare the amount offood he acquires [expression (4)]
to the amount of food acquíred by each of the conservationists [expression
(5).] Whenever (4) is greater than (5), it pays the voracious forager to hunt and
fish as much as he can, and conservation be damned; whenever (5) is greater
than (4). the voracious forager. by his extra efforts, actually provídes more
food for others than he keeps for hímself, and he thus has an incentive to
keep his actívítíes in check.
We evaluate the expressions (4) and (5) with the following values:
P = 16 (the number of hunters in the Curripaco study village where
Valentine has worked)
41
hN = 20 (our current estimate of the protein retum per hour of hunting­
fishing for thís village)
t = 1 (we choose this number in order to work with an hourly rate: total
monthly hunting times val}' from O to over 250 hrs: mean around 75)
In the spreadsheet matrix. we let q. the proportion of his take that a
forager keeps for his own hearth, val}' from O to 1 by increments of .05; and
we let C. the proportional cost of hunting. val}' from O to .5 by increments
of .05. The rows in Table 1 show the changíng values of q and the columns
the changíng values of C.
42
"
I
Table 1
C
~---
f-­
~-
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
-
0.00
25.7813
28.3672
26.9531
27.5391
28.1250
28.7109
29.2969
29.8828
30.4688
31.0547
31.6406
32.2266
32.8125
33.3984
33.9844
34.5703
35.1563
35.7422
36.3281
36.9141
37.5000
0.05
23.9063
24.4922
25.0781
25.6641
26.2500
26.8359
27.4219
28.0078
28.5938
29. 1797
29.7656
30.3516
30.9375
31.5234
32.1094
32.6953
33.2813
33.8672
34.4531
35.0391
35.6254
0.10
22.0313
22.6172
23.2031
23.7891
24.3750
24.9609
25.5469
26.1328
26.7188
27.3047
27.8906
28.4766
29.0625
29.6484
30.2344
30.8203
31.4063
31.9922
32.5781
33.1641
33.7500
I
0.15
20.1563
20.7422
21.3281
21.9141
22.5000
23.0859
23.6719
24.2578
24.8438
25.4297
26.0156
26.6016
27.1875
27.7734
28.3594
28.9453
29.5313
30.1172
30.7031
31.2891
31.8750
0.20
18.2813
18.8672
19.4531
20.0391
20.6250
21.2109
21.7969
22.3828
22.9688
23.5547
24.1406
24.7266
25.3125
25.8984
26.4844
27.0703
27.6563
28.2422
28.8281
29.4141
30.0000
0.25
16.4063
18.9922
17.5781
18.1641
18.7500
19.3359
19.9219
20.5078
21.0938
21.6797
22.2656
22.8516
23.4375
24.0234
24.6094
25.1953
25.7813
26.3672
26.9531
27.5391
28.1250
0.30
14.5313
15.1172
15.7031
16.2891
16.8750
17.4609
18.0469
18.6328
19.2188
19.8047
20.3906
20.9766
21.5625
22.1484
22.7344
23.3203
23.9063
24.4922
25.0781
25.6641
26.2500
0.35
12.6563
13.2422
13.8281
14.4141
15.0000
15.5859
16.1719
16.7578
17.3438
17.9297
18.5156
19.1016
19.6875
20.2734
20.8594
21.4453
22.0313
22.6172
23.2031
23.7891
24.3750
0.40
10.7813
11.3672
11.9531
12.5391
13.1250
13.7109
14.2969
14.8828
15.4688
16.0547
16.6406
17.2266
17.8125
18.3984
18.9844
19.5703
20.1563
20.7422
21.3281
21.9141
22.5000
0.45
0.50
8.9063
7.0313
9.4922
7.6172
10.0781
8.2031
10.6641
8.7891
11.2500
9.3750
11.8359
9.9609
---­
12.4219 10.5469
13.0078
11.1328
13.5938
11.7188
14.1797
12.3047
14.7656
12.8906
15.3516
13.4766
14.0625
15.9375
16.5234
14.6484
17.1094
15.2344
17.6953
15.8203
16.4063
18.2813
16.9922
18.8672
17.5781
19.4531
18.1641
20.0391
18.7500
20.6250
Tab. 1: The matrix shows t he returns to t he "voracíous forager" for various proportions of metabolic cosis of foragíng (C) and amounts of foraged
food kept for own consumption (q). according to the expression
qhN(i + xl + (1 - qlhNUP - 1l+(1 - qlhN(t + xl - ChN(t + x)
P
.¡:,.
VJ
where P = 16; hN =20: and t = l. In ihe ceIl in ihe upper left hand comer. the metabolic cost of foragíng is taken as O. and ihe proportion of
his iake that the voracious forager keeps for hts own prívate consumption is also O -that ís, the forager shares everything. As one moves to the right
in the matrix, C, the metabolic cost ofhunting, increases. As one moves down, q, the proportion ofthe foragers take he consumes prtvately, increases
-thai s , he shares less.
í
"'"'""
Table 2
C
r-­
·
;¡
+
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
025
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
~0.95
1.00
0.00
25.7813
25.7422
25.7031
25.6641
25.6250
25.5859
25.5469
25.5078
25.4688
25.4297
25.3906
25.3516
25.3125
25.2734
25.2344
25.1953
25.1563
25.1172
25.0781
23.7891
25.0000
I
0.05
24.5313
24.4922
24.4531
24.4141
24.3750
24.3359
24.2969
24.2578
24.2188
24.1797
24.1406
24.1016
24.0625
24.0234
23.9844
23.9453
23.9063
23.8672
23.8281
22.5391
23.7500
0.10
23.2813
23.2422
23.2031
23.1641
23.1250
23.0859
23.0469
23.0078
22.9688
22.9297
22.8906
22.8516
22.8125
22.7734
22.7304
22.6953
22.6563
n.6i?2T
22.5781
21.2891
22.5000
0.15
22.0313
21.9922
21.9531
21.9141
21.8750
21.8359
21.7969
21.7578
21.7188
21.6797
21.6406
21.6016
21.5625
21.5234
21.4844
21.4453
21.4063
21.3672
21.3281
20.0391
21.2500
0.20
20.7813
20.7422
20.1031
20.6641
20.6250
20.5859
20.5469
20.5078
20.4888
20.4297
20.3906
20.3516
20.3125
20.2734
20.2344
20.1953
20.1563
20.1172
20.0781
18.7891
20.0000
0.25
19.5313
19.4922
19.4531
19.4141
19.3750
19.3359
19.2969
19.2578
19.2188
19.1797
19.1406
19.1016
19.0625
19.0234
18.9844
18.9453
18.9063
18.8672
18.8281
17.5391
18.7500
0.30
18.2813
18.2422
18.2031
18.1641
18.1250
18.0859
18.0469
18.0078
17.9688
17.9297
17.8906
17.8516
17.8125
17.7734
17.7344
17.6953
17.6563
17.6172
17.5781
16.2891
17.5000
0.35
17.0313
16.9922
18.9531
16.9141
16.8750
16.8359
16.7969
16.7578
18.7188
16.6797
16.6406
16.6016
16.5625
16.5234
16.4844
16.4453
16.4063
16.3672
18.3281
15.0391
16.2500
0.40
15.7813
15.7422
15.7031
15.6641
15.6250
15.5859
15.5469
15.5078
15.4688
15.4297
15.3906
15.3516
15.3125
15.2734
15.2344
15.1953
15.1563
15.1172
15.0781
13.7891
15.0000
O!]
0.45
14.5313
14.4922
14.4531
14.4141
14.3750
14.3359
142969
142578
14.2188
~4.1797
13.2813·
13.2422
13.2031
13.1641
13.1250
13.0859
13.0469
13.0078
12.9688
t .
12.~
14.140~906
14.1016
12.85113­
14.0625
14.0234
13.9844
13.9453
13.9063
13.8672
13.8281
12.5391
13.7500
12.8125
12.7734
12.7344
12.6953
12.6563
12.6172
1
12~
25.0391
~.5000
Tab. 2: The matrix shows the returns t o lhe "conserving forager" forvarious proportions ofmetabolic cosis of foraging (e) and amounls offoraged
food kepl for own consumption (q), according (o the expression
qh Nt + (] - q)hNtfP - 11 + fl - qlhN(t +.xl - ChNt
P
where P = 16: hN =20: and t = 1. In the cel1 in t he upper left hand comer. lhe metabolic co s t of foraging is taken as O. and the proportion of
his take lhallhe conserving forager keeps for his own private consumption is also O -that ís. the forager shares everything. As one rnoves to the right
in (he matríx. C. th e metabolic eosl of hunting íncrcases. As orie moves down. q. (he proportion of the forager's take t h at he consumes privalely.
íncreases- that ís. he shares less.
Table 3
e
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.85
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
~
0.00
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
8.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
9.3750
10.000
10.6250
11.2500
11.8750
12.5000
0.05
-0.6250
O.ÚOOO
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
8.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
9.3750
10.0040
10.8250
11.2500
11.8750
0.10
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
6.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
9.3750
10.0000
10.6250
11.2500
0.15
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
12500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
6.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
9.3750
10.0000
10.6250
0.20
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.8250
6.2500
6.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
9.3750
10.0000
0.25
-3.1250
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
6.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
9.3750
I
0.30
-3.7500
-3.1250
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
8.8750
7.5000
8.1250
8.7500
I
0.35
-4.3750
-3.7500
-3.1250
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
6.8750
7.5000
8.1250
0.40
-5.0000
-4.3750
-3.7500
-3.1250
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
62500
6.8750
7.5000
0.45
-5.6250
-5.0000
-4.3750
-3.7500
-3.1250
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
6.8750
0.50
-6.2500
-5.6250
-­
-5.0000
-4.3750
-3.7500
-3.1250
-2.5000
-1.8750
-1.2500
-0.6250
0.0000
0.6250
1.2500
1.8750
2.5000
3.1250
3.7500
4.3750
5.0000
5.6250
6.2500
I
Tab. 3: The matrix shows the value ofeach cell in Tab. 2 subtracted from that ofthe corresponding cell in Tab. l. Where the difference ís positive.
the "voracious forager" realizes an individual profit from his extra foraging effort. Where the difference is negattve, the "conserving forager" actually
profits more from the "voracíous forager's" extra effort than the "voracious forager" does himself. Under such conditions (upper ríght corner of matrix)
there is an individual payoff to being a conservationist.
The fírst matrix (Tab. 1) shows the returns to the voracious forager for the
various combinations of q and C. The second matrix (Tab. 2) shows the
returns to one of his conserving neíghbors, for the same combinations,
presuming that the voracious forager is the only one hunting and fishing
overtime.
The third matríx (Tab. 3) shows each cell in Tab. 2 subtracted from the
corresponding cell in Tab. l. That ís, Table 3 shows the dífference between the
returns to the rapacious forager and those to the conserving forager.
Wherever the difference is negatíve (upper rtght comer), the conservationist is
actually being subsidized by the voracious forager, gíven the parameter values
indicated aboye.
What we see is that for hígh proportions of sharing (low q) and hígh costs
of foraging (high e), the estimated values do indicate an incentive for
conservation. They also indicate a motive for free riding -and in fact free riding
is a major concern of these people. The data have obvious limitations, but the
results mamtaín the possibility that conservation could be the best individual
strategy in those socíettes where communal dining ís the norm. We look
forward to refining the exercise reported here with more accurate parameter
values collected from the blackwater regíon both by ourselves and (we hope)
others.
Whatever the outcome of working through more definitive data sets, we
hope that this exercíse has demonstrated the limited utility of generalizing
about "natíve peoples" as íf the condition of being "índígenous" were sufficient
to ensure that they must all be of one mind about conservation. The
variability of economic organization among the native peoples of the Amazon
is at least as wide as the variability of economic organízatíon among the
modern nation states whose representatives constitute the greatest threat to
Amazonian wildlife. lt is narve to assume that the attitudes and practices of
índígenous Amazonians are less affected by their own economic interests than
are those of the "Fírst World" cítízens who dispute about conservation policy
in this endangered regíon.
Abstract
In the discussion oJ the extent to which contemporary cosmopolitan
conservationists and native Amazonians share common goals in the
conservation o] biodiversity, native Amazonians are ojt.eri treated as a
relatively uniform category. The Amazonian ethnographic literature, however.
records substantial variation in attitudes towards the preservation oJ natural
populations. The region around the río Negro is well knownJor what would be
called a "conservation ethic" if it were manifested among contemporary
educated people in the Americas and Western Europe. We present a model
that relates the unusualJood sharing practices oJ the peoples oJ this region to
46
their fLSh and game conservation practices. The model predicts that jor certain
levels oj jood sharing and Joraging cost.s, conserving behavior wíll be
rewarded on a short-term individual basis as well as on the long-term
collective level. A test oJ the model with recently gathered data suggests that
these río Negro peoples may Jall within parameter ranges requiredjor them to
practice conservation in a sense acceptable to many conservation biologists.
Resumen
En la discusión en torno al grado en que los conservacionistas cosmo­
politas contemporáneos y los amazonenses nativos comparten objetivos
comunes en la conservación de la biodiversidad, a éstos se los trata a menudo
como una categoría relativamente uniforme. Sin embargo, la literatura
etnográfica de Amazonia registra una variación substancial en las actitudes
que refieren a la preservación de las poblaciones animales. La región del Río
Negro es conocida por lo que podría llamarse una "ética conservacionista", si
ésta también se manifiesta entre la gente contemporánea educada en las
Américas y Europa Occidental. Presentamos un modelo que relaciona las
prácticas inusuales de compartir la comida que tienen los indígenas de aquella
región, con sus prácticas en cuanto a la conservación de los animales de caza y
los peces. El modelo predice que (para ciertos niveles del costo implícito en
compartir la comida y cazar y pescar) un comportamiento conservacionista será
premiado tanto en una base individual. a corto plazo, como al nivel colectivo, a
largo plazo. Una prueba del modelo en base a datos recién recolectados,
sugiere que estas poblaciones rtoneqrinas pueden caer dentro del rango
parametral que se requiere para muchos biólogos conservacionistas.
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E-mail: [email protected]
University of East London
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Longbridge Road, Dagenham, Essex RM8 2AS
United Kingdom
E-mail: [email protected]
University of Utah
Anthropology Department
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112-0060
USA
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