HISTORY Subject : History Paper No. : Paper

History of China & Japan
1
HISTORY
Subject
:
History
Paper No.
:
Paper - VIII
History of China & Japan Unit No. & Title
:
Unit- 2
History of Japan
Topic No. & Title
:
Topic - c
Emergence of Japan as an
Imperial Power
Lecture No. & Title
:
Lecture -2
Japan & First World War
(For under graduate student)
Script
Japan during and after the First World War:
Washington Conference & the Manchurian Crisis
By the first decade of the twentieth century a reasonably
successful form of government had been achieved in Japan.
Japan had also been able to fulfil the objective of security
from the nations of the West and acceptance by them of
Japan as an equal. The event that really won for Japan full
status as a world power and equality with the nations of the
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2
West was its victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War
(1904 – 05).
The Treaty of Portsmouth signed in September 1905
recognised Japan’s ‘paramount interest’ in Korea, and made
her free of all foreign competitors in Korea. Korea was
turned into a Japanese protectorate, ending its diplomatic
ties with other powers. In 1907, Japan imposed its control
over the Korean Government, while the Japanese secured
the right to act as Korean officials. The Korean army was
disbanded. The Koreans broke out in severe protests
against
the
Japanese
moves
and
large
scale
rioting
followed. But the protests of the Koreans had been brutally
suppressed by Japan. In August 1910, Japan quietly
annexed Korea, with the tacit support of the big powers,
who judged Japanese action in Korea as inevitable. By
1912, Japan emerged as a major imperialist power with
important colonies in Korea and Taiwan and predominant
rights in South Manchuria.
In 1914, Japan entered World War I as a British ally.
Although Japan played only a minimal military role, it was
History of China & Japan
3
able to pick up the German colonial possessions in East Asia
and the Pacific, - Kiaochow Bay and the port of Tsingtao on
the south coast of Shantung, which the Germans had
obtained in 1898. In January 1915, while World War I was
going on, Japan placed the 21point Demands on China,
which were inimical to its sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and gave it an ultimatum that unless the demands
were conceded Japan would resort to force. The demands
exposed Japan’s aggressive attitude. China finally submitted
and thus Japan enhanced her power and influence in China.
Furthermore, Japan occupied Shantung by concluding a
treaty with China..
The World War I came to an end in 1918. Japan sat at the
Versailles Peace Conference (1919) as one of the victorious
Five Great Powers – the only non-Western nation to be
accepted as an equal by the West. The peacemakers of
Versailles recognized Japan’s occupation of Shantung of
China.
By 1921, Japan was in a strategically dominating position in
East Asia. In the north, the possession of the Sakhalin
History of China & Japan
4
Island and Kurile Islands, together with Hokkaido, gave her
control of entry into the sea of Okhotsk. Possession of the
Loochoo Islands a group of thirty-six islands between
Kyushu and Taiwan) and the Pescadores enabled Japan to
shut off the Yellow Sea.
Thus she controlled all maritime access to China from
Fukien Province, and all maritime access to Siberia. From
Korea and the Kwantung leased territory Japan controlled
access to Manchuria. Her position in Shantung gave her
power to dominate Peking (Beijing) if she chose to exert it.
Since the beginning of the 20th Century, the United States
of America (USA) and Great Britain, had been encouraging
Japan in East Asia with the intention of checking Russian
advancement in the Far East. But when Japan’s attitude
became immensely aggressive they became concerned. In
fact Japan emerged as a deterrent factor in the way of US
investments
in
Manchuria.
But
it
was
the
Japanese
immigration problem that was mainly responsible for the
deteriorating relations between the two countries. Since
1905, a large number of Japanese labourers began to
History of China & Japan
5
immigrate to
particularly
to
the coastal Pacific region
California.
The
American
of the USA,
citizens
put
tremendous pressure on the US government for putting an
end to the Japanese immigration. In spite of several
discriminatory measures against the Japanese adopted by
the US government, it failed to stop immigration.
The success of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the
spectre of Communism however brought the US and Japan
close to one another. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of
November 1917 attempted to reconcile conflicting interests
of the US and Japan in China. The US recognised Japan’s
right to protect its special interests in China, bordering on
its own territory. But within a few days, this treaty
appeared to be a burden to America and in 1923 it was
terminated. Great Britain also was interested in cancelling
the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. At this critical juncture
of history, the USA convened a conference on East Asia in
her capital Washington.
A second period in the history of Japanese imperialism was
from World War I to 1922.
History of China & Japan
6
With a view to contain Japanese imperialism in the Far East
the US convened the Washington Conference in 1921.
Harold Vinacke aptly remarked that, “The modern history of
Far East serves as the background of the Washington
Conference”. Delegates of nine countries, comprising the
USA,
Great
Holland,
Britain,
Japan
and
France,
China
Belgium,
attended
Italy,
the
Portugal,
Washington
Conference. The Conference began in November 1921, and
continued upto February 1922.
The Washington Conference resulted in the signature of
three treaties.
The first was known as the Four-Power Treaty, signed
between the USA, Great Britain, France and Japan. The
signatories agreed to respect each other’s rights in relation
to their insular possessions in the Pacific. It was also
decided that in the event of any controversy between them,
they would settle the issue through negotiations. This treaty
served as a pretext for putting an end to the superfluous
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7
Anglo-Japanese
Alliance
of
1902,
which
had
become
extremely unpopular in Britain and the USA.
The second treaty was the Five-Power Treaty, concluded
between the USA, Britain, Japan, France and Italy. This
treaty
provided
for
an
extensive
measure
of
naval
disarmament. The US Secretary of State, Hughes fixed the
naval ratio in the Pacific in terms of capital ships, at five for
the USA, five for Great Britain, three for Japan and 1.75
each for France and Italy. This meant the fixing of the
strength of Japan in capital ships at 60% of the British and
American figures. The French and Italian quotas were 35%.
The signatories further agreed to maintain the status quo,
in respect of fortifications and naval bases in a specified
area of the Pacific.
The last treaty, known as the Nine-Power Treaty, had
been signed by all the participants of the Conference. The
signatories
pledged
themselves
1)
to
respect
the
sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China; 2) to maintain and
advance the principle of equality of commercial opportunity
History of China & Japan
8
in China; and 3) not to take any action or support any
action designed to create spheres of interest or to provide
for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in
designated parts of China. By a separate agreement,
concluded between Japan and China, Japan undertook to
return Kiaochow and Shantung to China. The treaty,
however, failed to live up to the expectations of China,
although it welcomed getting back Shantung. Some foreign
powers were still enjoying extra-territorial rights in certain
parts of China, along with retaining the right of determining
the
tariff
structure
of
China.
Thus
the
provision
of
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of China
appeared to be meaningless.
The Washington Conference was hailed as an outstanding
success. The two important aspects of success of the
Conference were the return of Shantung to China by Japan,
and to stop unbridled competition for increasing naval
power in the Pacific. It had restored the pre-war balance in
the Pacific. Tensions in the Far East could be reduced at
least for some time. Richard Storry remarked, “Finally, at
Washington, China received the satisfaction she had failed
History of China & Japan
9
to obtain at Versailles”. But there is very little doubt that
the Washington Conference was only partly successful. The
Conference miserably failed to restore the lost dignity and
sovereignty of China. In fact, vital colonial interests of
almost all the big powers remained in China. Relentless
competition among the imperialist powers had been the
most formidable cause behind the tension in this area. The
most important precondition for establishing peace in East
Asia was to put an end to the semi-colonial status of China
and to establish Chinese sovereignty. But none of the
imperialist powers was willing to take their hands off the
vast market of China. Rather than being sincere in returning
to China her political and economic rights, the big powers
were interested in keeping China in a state of hypo-colony,
and here lay the most formidable failure of the Washington
Conference.
Japan reluctantly accepted the provisions of the Washington
Treaties. E.H. Carr aptly observes that, “The situation
created by the Washington treaties was insecure in so far as
it depended on the unwilling renunciation by Japan of her
forward policy on the Asiatic mainland”. A sense of
History of China & Japan
10
exultation had swept through London and Washington after
the Conference, as it paved the way for Anglo-American
cooperation in the international sphere and for the isolation
of Japan in the Far East. An elated British diplomat wrote in
his report, “At the Washington Conference Japan yielded
everything and gained nothing”.
Immediately
after
the
conclusion
of
the
Washington
Conference of 1921-22, anti-American agitations broke out
in Japan and the agitators burned the national flag of the
USA. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Shidehara sought an
unconditional apology from the USA government. Ian Nish
remarked “It was deeply ironic – not to say tragic – that
Shidehara whose main policy objective was to improve
relations with the Americans, had to face hostile legislation
from Washington”. So long as Shidehara remained as
Japan’s Foreign Minister, he followed a soft policy towards
China in compliance with the provisions of the Washington
Conference.
The militant nationalists of Japan not only showed severe
hostility to the Washington Conference, they also accused
History of China & Japan
11
Shidehara of adopting “a weak-kneed China policy.” The
moment the militant nationalists of Japan started gaining
political power, they took steps to violate the clauses of the
Washington treaties. The Manchurian Crisis of 1931 again
saw the eruption of Japanese aggression with renewed
vigour.
The attachment of Japan as a whole to Manchuria was of
long standing. In popular sentiment Manchuria was viewed
as a recompense for the 100,000 Japanese lives lost in the
Russo-Japanese War. Army planners saw Manchuria as a
buffer against Russian power in the north, and military
leaders started demanding a share of political power in
Japan in the 1920s. But there were moderate military
leaders too who opposed the idea of defying the civil
government in Japan. Until the end of the 1920s Japan
could maintain a balance between the army and civil
administration. In the early 1920s, the Japanese army took
an initiative to launch an expedition in Siberia. But by the
beginning of the early 1930s, the militant military leaders of
Japan gained more power. In March 1931, some military
leaders of Japan planned a violent coup against the
History of China & Japan
12
Wakatsuki ministry. But at the final moment, General
Ugaki, the minister for war, refused to take part in this
‘direct action’. Thus the planned coup d’état did not take
place.
There had been important reasons behind Japan’s attack on
Manchuria. In the 1920s Japanese investments constituted
75% of the entire capital investments in Manchuria. The
Japanese investment was huge particularly in the South
Manchurian Railway Company. At least 10lakh Japanese
subjects had been residing in Manchuria. Moreover about
40% of Japan’s China trade centered round Manchuria.
Thus Japan’s economic interests in Manchuria induced its
military leaders to adopt an expansionist policy. The Great
Depression of the early 1930s provided the army leaders of
Japan with the justification for attacking Manchuria.
The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), concluded after the
Russo-Japanese War, had allowed Japan to station an army
of 15000 soldiers in Manchuria, for the protection of the
South Manchurian Railways. Their headquarters were at
Mukden. The economic crisis, which between 1929 and
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13
1931 cut the value of Japan’s foreign trade almost in half,
threatened serious internal unrest.
In the summer of 1931, the murder of a Japanese officer in
Manchuria by Chinese bandits was used to incite the
Japanese army. On 18 September 1931, a Japanese patrol
near Mukden alleged that a detachment of Chinese soldiers
attempted to blow up the main line of the Japanese
controlled Manchurian railways. The Japanese army used it
as the pretext for attacking Manchuria and Japan undertook
a full-scale attack. The Japanese troops seized Mukden.
According to Richard Storry, the seizure of Mukden was the
“curtain raiser of the occupation of all Manchuria.”
Within four days of capturing Mukden, all the Chinese towns
within a radius 200 miles north of Mukden, some of them
far outside the railway zone, had been occupied by the
Japanese army. The Chinese provincial government had
been driven out of Mukden, and the government maintained
a shadowy existence at Chinchow. By the middle of
November 1931, a vast territory of Northern Manchuria
came under the direct control of the Japanese army. The
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14
Japanese forces then moved southwards and resorted to air
bombing over the southern part of Manchuria. The 28th
December saw the fall of Chinchow to Japanese troops.
Then the Japanese reached Shanhaikawan on the Great
Wall, the frontier station between Manchuria and China
proper. By 4 January,1932, the Japanese conquest of
Manchuria was complete.
China was visibly shocked and considered the Manchurian
incident to be an arbitrary act of aggression on the part of
Japan. The Chinese government appealed to the League of
Nations for justice. But the League delayed unnecessarily in
adopting any concrete step against Japan. The Japanese
delegate in the League of Nations, however, denied Japan’s
intention of annexing Chinese territory, and claimed that
Japan was compelled to resort to military action in
Manchuria for protecting Japanese lives and property from
Chinese bandits. The League set up a Commission, under
the presidency of Lord Lytton (British representative), to
investigate on the spot “any circumstances which, affecting
international relations, threatens to disturb peace between
China
and
Japan.”
Meanwhile
Japan
consolidated
her
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15
conquest of Manchuria by setting up a puppet Republic of
Manchuria and appointing as its president the last survivor
of the Manchu dynasty, Pu Yi. The republic began to be
administered
by
Japanese
advisers,
although
Japan
recognized it as an independent state.
The Lytton Commission report was submitted to the League
of Nations in September 1932. It was an exhaustive
document, which had gone beyond the Manchurian episode
and dealt with almost all the aspects of Sino-Japanese
relations.
The
report
disclaimed
totally
the
Japanese
pretexts of invading Manchuria and asserted that Japan’s
justifications of the attack were absolutely unfounded. The
report declared the independent Manchukuo state to be a
complete fiction and observed that neither the restoration
of
status
quo
nor
the
maintenance
of
the
fictitious
Manchukuo state would be a satisfactory solution of the
dispute. It recommended that an autonomous regime
should be set up in Manchuria after a thorough negotiation
between China and Japan.
History of China & Japan
16
On 24 February 1933, the Lytton Commission report was
voted on by the General Assembly of the League. Of the 44
delegations present, 42 accepted it. Siam abstained and
Japan cast a negative vote.
But the negative vote of one of the parties to the dispute
did not stand in the way of the unanimous adoption of the
report. With the announcement of the result, the Japanese
delegation left the hall in a body. Next month, i.e. in March
1933, Japan made an official announcement that it was
quitting the League of Nations.
The League failed miserably to take any punitive measures
against the aggressive designs of Japan. Japan’s conquest
of Manchuria put a big question mark on the ability of the
League. A.J.P. Taylor, in his ‘The Origins of the Second
World War’, observed, “It was treated as a milestone on the
road to war, and the first decisive ‘betrayal’ of the League’.
E.H. Carr, in his ‘International Relations Between the Two
World Wars’, wrote, “The Japanese conquest of Manchuria
was one of the most important landmarks since the First
World War.” In the Pacific, it marked the resumption of the
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17
struggle for power which had been suspended by the
Washington Conference. As far as international relations
were concerned, it heralded a return to “power politics”,
which had been in abeyance, at least in this naked form,
since the end of the war. The Manchurian incident exposed
the weakness of the League of Nations.
It became clear that the members of the League “were not
prepared to resist an act of aggression committed by a
powerful and well-armed state.” The members of the
League, however, consoled themselves by thinking that the
failure of the League in East Asia would not mean the
League’s ineffectiveness in other parts of the world. But the
Chinese delegate, present at the League meeting, lamented
that China “cannot be expected to admit that the operation
of treaties, covenants and the accepted principles of
international law stops at the border of Manchuria.”
The Great Depression of the 1930s affected the economy of
Japan
very
badly.
A
section
of
Japanese
politicians,
Japanese industrialists, as well as the military leaders of
Japan started believing sincerely that the world trading
History of China & Japan
18
system was breaking down and open competition in the
global
market
was
no
more
possible.
Only
a
more
aggressive foreign policy would allow Japan to find markets
so that it could raise productivity, reduce unemployment,
and avoid social tension. The takeover of Manchuria marked
a watershed in the history of Japan’s foreign and domestic
policy. A new era of Japanese expansionism began. At
home there was an outburst of violence. On 15 May 1932, a
group of young naval officers assassinated Inukai Tsuyoshi,
the 76 year old Prime Minister and Seiyukai party president.
This incident marked the end of parliamentary rule in
imperial Japan.