Democratic Renewal Submission Anna Keenan ­ [email protected] , 902 621 0341 16 November 2015, New Glasgow, PEI Introduction and background I am a recent arrival in Prince Edward Island. I arrived here in late April 2015, just days before the last provincial election, to live with my island‐born husband and his family. Following both the provincial and federal elections with great interest, I have been heartened to see the very active public discussion surrounding the Island’s ‐ and Canada’s ‐ electoral model. I believe that 2015 is the ideal time for PEI’s government and community to lead change on this issue. With the new Federal government committed to taking up the challenge of federal election reform within 18 months, PEI’s deliberations and decisions on this matter could have not only a very positive impact here, but also nationally. My perspective in this submission is informed by my own international citizenship and residence. I was born and raised in Australia and have been a voting citizen there, experiencing both the “First‐Past‐The‐Post with Alternative Vote” system for the Australian House of Representatives, and the “Proportional with Single‐Transferable‐Vote OR Group‐Voting‐Ticket” model of the Australian Senate. I spent 5 years living in The Netherlands and observed elections there occurring under an “Open List Proportional” system. I believe all these systems are superior to Canada’s basic FPTP system, but all have weaknesses that could be improved upon, as discussed later. I am now a permanent resident of Canada, working towards Canadian citizenship. I look forward to voting in the next provincial and federal elections, under a fairer, more representative electoral process. In addition, I have built my opinions on electoral models through my professional experience. My academic background is in Mathematics and Economics. I have been working in the areas of climate change policy and democratic participation, both in Australia and internationally, for 8 years, with a variety of civil society organisations, large and small. That experience has included both participation and assessment of non‐partisan, issue‐based campaigning in a number of elections in various countries. I have read all the other submissions to the Committee that were received before October 28, and have taken them into account as I developed this submission. I thank the Committee for having the opportunity to present a summarised version of this paper at the public consultation on November 16 ‐ this signals a strong commitment to democratic process. 1/14 Areas of my comments: 1. Decision­making Process (p2) 1.1 Decision­making timeline 1.2 Plebiscite by Preferential Ballot method 1.3 Specific plebiscite questions and format 2. Objections to Plurality and Majority models (p4) 2.1 Problems with Plurality (FPTP) or Majority (50%+1) systems 2.2 Problems with the Preferential Ballot (if either a Plurality or Majority voting system is retained) 3. Proportional Voting ­ Strengths overall, Weaknesses in models (p7) 3.1 The strengths of proportional voting Addressing the myth of ‘coalition risk’. 3.2 Weaknesses of common proportional models Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) Single­Transferrable­Vote (STV) Proportional 4. An ideal proportional model ­ Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP ) (p10) 4.1 A summary of DMP 4.2 Advantages of DMP Conclusion (p11) 5. (Annex) ­ Results of last PEI election, with DMP (p12) 1. Decision­making Process 1.1 Decision­making timeline I was pleased to see in White Paper on Democratic Renewal (p21) that this Committee will be working on defining a plebiscite question. I’m concerned that you only have until November 30, two short weeks away, to come up with it, and would urge you to take the winter to continue to think it over and ensure it is properly formulated. 1.2 Plebiscite by Preferential Ballot method I was also pleased to see the proposal in the White Paper (p21) that the plebiscite question be guided by a preferential ballot. It is a little ironic that the 2005 referendum itself used a ‘first past the post’ voting model to choose between three options. This directly led to vote­splitting ­ effectively silencing the voices of those who wanted change, but not the particular model proposed, as noted on page 9 of the White Paper. This is known as the “separability problem” and is easily avoided by separating the ballot into two sequential questions, and using a Preferential Ballot if more than two options are presented for any individual question. 2/14 1.3 Specific plebiscite questions and format I disagree strongly with the White Paper’s suggestion (p21) that the advisory plebiscite will include the option of a “preferential ballot” as an alternative to a FPTP or Proportional Representation. This is highly misleading. As I will elaborate upon later in this presentation, a ‘preferential ballot within a FPTP system’ is still a FPTP system, complete with all the weaknesses of a non­proportional system. As noted on page 13 of the White Paper, the issue of “the basic voting system” ­ plurality, majority or proportional ­ is a separate issue to “the structure of the ballot” ­ single choice, dual choice, or ranked choice. To propose a plebiscite that asks people to choose between three options ­ two of which are “basic voting systems” (FPTP; Proportional Representation) and one of which is a “ballot structure” (A preferential ballot), would be a very serious conflation of two separate issues, and I would argue would be intentionally misleading , causing great confusion and making it difficult for civil society to educate the public on the choice they face before participating in the plebiscite. I fear that the result of the plebiscite would then fails to accurately capture the views of the public. I am interested in seeing a new voting system introduced on the island in time for the next Provincial election. I therefore believe an advisory plebiscite ­ or, if it is required for electoral reform, a binding referendum ­ should be held in the fall of 2017. In order that the reforms could be passed in a single step, I would propose a two­part referendum with the following form for questions. This is modeled on the New Zealand experience, with the addition of a Preferential Ballot structure for the second question: Question 1: Should Prince Edward Island keep the First­Past­The­Post, single­option (FPTP) voting system? Choose one: [ ] Yes [ ] No Question 2: If Prince Edward Island were to change to another voting system, which voting system would you choose? Rank all options from 1­5. Use “1” for your most­preferred option Use “5” for your least­preferred option [ ] Multi­Member Proportional (MMP) [ ] Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP) [ ] Single Transferable Vote (STV) Proportional [ ] Supplementary Member (SM) [ ] Alternative Vote (AV) 3/14 As a further effort in making the plebiscite as democratic as possible, multiple versions of the ballots could be printed, with the options presented randomly, to remove the effect of a donkey­vote, in which some voters would simply order the given options 1­5 from top to bottom. For the purposes of the example, I have included five options above. However, I would support the idea that the Committee could simplify the ballot by removing some of these options, if there was a unanimous consensus amongst Committee members that some of these options are not viable or desirable for the island. If only two options were included on the plebiscite ballot, I would recommend adding a “None of the Above” option. Personally, I do not feel that the Single Transferable Vote (STV), Supplementary Member (SM), Alternative Vote (AV) or Mixed­Member Proportional (MMP) systems are adequate for the Island, and I would remove them from the second ballot question, leaving only one option remaining, Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP). In the event that the Committee agrees (by consensus) that only one alternative (non­FPTP) option is feasible for the Island (for example, Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP)) then I would phrase Question Two of the plebiscite/referendum as follows: Question 2: If Prince Edward Island were to change to another voting system, would you support the Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP) System, as proposed by the Committee on Democratic Renewal? Choose one: [ ] Yes [ ] No 2. Objections to Plurality and Majority models 2.1 Problems with Plurality (FPTP) or Majority (50%+1) systems Briefly, I greatly support the work of this Committee on Democratic Renewal, to reform the Island’s outdated Plurality (FPTP) system. I believe both FPTP and Majority systems is highly inadequate, for the following reasons: ● Many Islander’s views remain unrepresented in parliament ○ For example, in a three­party FPTP system, up to 66% of voters could be unrepresented. ○ In a majority system, up to 49% of voters could be unrepresented. ● Many Islanders, particularly youth, are frustrated with and disenfranchised by a 4/14 ●
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voting system that does not result in fair representation. This risks depressing voter turnout. Majority governments can be elected with only a minority of public support Minority governments and coalitions are rare, which in turn greatly decreases the incentive for constructive and cooperative dialogue and negotiation between parties. ○ This in turn leads to greater polarisation, and a lower quality of respectful, civil discourse and political debate in government, which I fear further legitimises disrespectful and uncivil debate amongst the broader public. I was dismayed when reading the White Paper to see that the proposed alternative (Dual Member) system remains based on a Majority (50%+1) basic voting system . While a Preferential Ballot is proposed in the White Paper, the basic voting system is not a Proportional one ­ it only shifts from a ‘Plurality’ to a ‘Majority’ system ­ which still risks disenfranchisement of up to 49% of the voters on this Island. None of the representational weaknesses of the FPTP system would be removed by the proposal in the current White Paper ­ the current weaknesses would only be ‘reduced’. If we are, as an Island community, to engage so much of our collective energy in this process of Democratic Renewal, we should ensure that we get a good, democratic return on our investment of energy. A shift from Plurality (FPTP) to majority a majority (50%+1) system ­ albeit with a more complex ballot and dual districts ­ is not good enough. The White Paper mentions, on page 14, that some proportional systems, such as Mixed­Member Proportional (MMP), create fears of a two­tier legislature and the use of party lists. I agree wholeheartedly. However, this weakness of the MMP system ­ which is only one variant of Proportional voting ­ should not be used as an excuse to dismiss proportional representation and instead default to a weak, Majority­based voting system. Proportionality should still be on the cards as an option for the island to strive for. There are other systems, and I advocate for Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP) as proposed by Sean Graham, which do not rely on party lists or create a two­tiered legislature.
2.2 Problems with the Preferential Ballot (if either a Plurality or Majority voting system is retained) As FairVote PEI mentioned in their submission: “I urge the committee for the sake of clarity to consider renaming the ‘preferential ballot’ system to what it should more correctly be called – and that is Alternative Vote or AV. AV refers to single­winner ridings or districts, where a ranked or preferential ballot is used to ensure that one candidate has 50% of the vote.“ 5/14 This Alternative Vote (AV) is exactly the structure that is proposed in the White Paper (page 15), and it should be referred to as such, to avoid confusion with a Preferential Ballot within a proportional voting system. I would like to speak to my experience voting in Australia, where the Alternative Vote (that is, a Preferential Ballot with a Majority voting system) is used for the House of Representatives, and contrast it to what I observed during last month’s federal election here in Canada, where we saw significant numbers of people ‘voting strategically’, rather than voting for their ideal first­preference party (the one most closely aligned with their values) in order to avoid the risk of their least­preferred option being elected. People whose values would have them vote for third or fourth parties are incentivised by a FPTP system to instead vote for whichever major party they are least opposed to. Polling publication in advance of election day therefore has an undue influence on election results, and large numbers of voters are left disenfranchised or dissatisfied with the results. I would like to point out that the Alternative Vote (AV) majority system in the last Canadian federal election would result in nearly exactly the same outcomes as the FPTP system with widespread strategic voting. In Australia, voters for third and fourth are marginalised as their votes (at second and third preference) flow towards the least­opposed major parties. It reinforces a false two­party system. The only difference between an the AV system and what PEI and Canada has now, is that under the Alternative Vote, people’s ‘ideal first preferences’ are publicly recorded, before their vote defaults to what would have been their ‘strategic vote’. As such, under the Alternative Vote, supporters of third and fourth parties still have their first­preference votes disregarded, and are left without representation in parliament. I would like to note that the Alternative Vote is, indeed, a great system in single­candidate, or single­question contests ­ for example, leadership ballots within a party, or in a single­question plebiscite/referendum. However, in multi­member parliaments with elections happening in multiple seats, if the AV is employed, it will always lead to a non­proportional outcome. As noted in the White Paper on page 16, the AV system proposed “does not directly translate vote share into seat share, and hence may not succeed in making election outcomes results more proportional. This does reduce the possibility … of frequent minority or coalition governments. ... some voters may still be under­represented or unrepresented in the Legislature, and smaller or newer parties may still experience greater challenges in winning seats.” These are extremely serious concerns and as an Island community, we can do much better. As noted in Theresa Doyle’s submission “ FPTP is blatantly anti­democratic. Preferential ballot only pretends to address this crisis in democracy. ” As noted in Sean Graham’s submission, “The type of preferential ballot system being proposed would create a new type of inequality between voters. It would allow some voters to elect their first choice, while others would only be able to elect their second, third, etc. 6/14 choice. Worse still, this system would result in some voters electing no one at all. Therefore, there would still be ample potential for the proposed system to waste a large number of votes. Finally, the suggested preferential ballot system would result in election outcomes that don’t match parties’ popular support, and, since this type of system usually results in nearly identical results to those obtained by SMP [the current system], it would only give an illusion of improving democracy in PEI.“ 3. Proportional Voting ­ Strengths overall, Weaknesses in models 3.1 The strengths of proportional voting I believe that Proportional Voting systems bring the following benefits: ● The composition of the House more closely reflecting the popular vote ● No one’s votes are “wasted”. This minimises disenfranchisement of voters, maximises electoral participation. ● It would maximise political engagement in between elections, as each citizen would feel that they have as much of a voice as any other, and a true representative of their views in parliament. ● Results in stronger oppositions and more diverse Legislatures. ○ This would greatly increase the incentive for civil, respectful political discourse, debate and negotiation across party lines, and would make Governments more responsible to the people rather than parties. ● Reduces the risk of majority governments, which can enable a party to unilaterally push through undemocratic legislation, without adequate public debate, especially early in their terms. ● Proportional Representation has is now the norm rather than the exception around the world. PEI risks starting to look outdated if we continue to stubbornly hold on to a FPTP system. I believe that PEI can and should grasp this current opportunity to be a leader and set an example for Canada and other nations to follow, by making real reforms, and moving to a proportional system. Addressing the myth of ‘coalition risk’. A common argument in favour of FPTP is that it provides stable, majority governments. I would argue that this is, instead, a great argument against FPTP systems ­ a majority government risks authoritarian behaviour ­ especially early on during its term when electoral consequences for its actions are many years away. As noted in Mike Redmond’s presentation to Democratic Renewal Committee, there is nothing to fear from coalition governments. In fact, having observed coalition governments frequently during my time living and working in Europe, I can confidently say that coalition 7/14 governments, rather than absolute majorities, lead to enhanced civility in political discourse, better negotiation between parties and greater democratic engagement. There are currently 84 countries in the world functioning as coalition governments, 36 of which are in Europe. In my opinion, they function well. I want to echo the sentiments expressed by Lynne Lund in her written submission to this Committee: “People what collaboration in government. We want politicians to work across party lines and we know that no one party has a monopoly on good ideas. We know that we are not well represented when one party has the gift of a majority government, and all other ideas are disregarded.” It is disingenuous to say that minority governments and coalitions can’t be effective. However, this is only the truth if the parties and politicians elected are unskilled at compromise and negotiation. I frequently hear that “you can’t trust politicians, they don’t listen, they are only in it for themselves.“ However, believe that Island politicians can do better ­ I believe that they have the capacity to negotiate skillfully, to hear diverse perspectives, and to be civil and collaborative with each other on an issue­by­issue basis, across party lines. Under a Proportional Representation system, the incentive for politicians to be better listeners, and better negotiators, would only increase. This is good for democracy. 3.2 Weaknesses of common proportional models I am a proponent of Proportional Voting, however I strongly favour the Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP) model proposed by Sean Graham in his submission to the Committee. The following models for Proportional representation ­ while substantially better than a FPTP or Majority­based voting system ­ all have substantial weaknesses that can be greatly improved upon. Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) MMP is a strongly proportional system and the ballot form required is not overly complex or confusing. For this reason, it is a common form of Proportional voting. However, as noted on page 9 of the White Paper, opponents of the MMP system are concerned about the way that the system necessitates the use of ‘party lists’ rather than locally­known and accountable candidates, for half of the seats in parliament. There are real risks that “party insiders” would be picked on these lists, and that those lists would be highly biased towards urban areas or certain demographic groups. I understand that it is largely this concern ­ in addition to the ‘supermajority’ threshold, which led to the failure of PEI’s 2005 referendum. I think we can do better. Another, less significant weakness of MMP is that the ‘party list’ seats are permanently off­limits to independent candidates, so it does reinforce the role of parties. 8/14 Single‐Transferrable‐Vote (STV) Proportional There are two main weaknesses of the STV system: First, STV reduces local representation, because it is based on larger, multi­member districts, within which proportional representations take place. There is a direct trade­off between proportionality and local representation ­ the larger the districts, the more proportional results would be, however with less local representation. It also does not remove the concern about the use of party lists, which is also a problem with MMP. For example, if PEI were to maintain a parliament of approximately 27 seats, and use STV, there would need to be a decision ­ would it be best to: a) Use 4 electoral districts (presumably matching the federal boundaries), each with 7 representatives? (Risk that up to 14% of voters would not have the party they voted for represented in the legislature.) b) Use a single electoral district, with 27 representatives? (Only a maximum 3.7% of voters would be disenfranchised under this system, however there is no local representation.) Second, STV necessitates a complex and confusing ballot. This is how the Australian Senate is elected ­ I can attest to the fact that it is a very confusing ballot paper to be presented with. It also requires voters to much more about a much longer list of individual candidates, rather than focusing on party policies and knowing local candidates, in order to make an educated vote. In Australia, senate ballots will often consisting of over 80 names, competing for only 12 seats in a district. Australia gets around this requirement by allowing individuals at the Senate Ballot Box to choose between a full STV ballot ­ or to ‘just vote 1’ by using a ‘Group Voting Ticket’ (GVT) ballot so that their votes can assigned automatically, according to form pre­submitted by a political party. It is a very messy and confusing system ­ so confusing, in fact, that about 95% of Australian voters choose the simplified GVT option, effectively handing personal democratic power into the hands of political parties. 9/14 4. An ideal proportional model ­ Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP) I most fervently recommend the Dual­Member Mixed Proportional (DMP) system suggested in Sean Graham’s written submissions to the Committee , using 14 dual­member districts across the island. 4.1 A summary of DMP 1. Basic Voting System : dual­member districts, with local candidates only (no province­wide party lists are used): ○ First elected candidate: elected by local plurality ○ Second elected candidate: selected from local candidates (not a party list), to fulfill requirements for province­wide proportionality 2. Size of electoral districts: ○ If we are to keep the current approximate size of the legislature (27 or, under this system, 28 representatives), then districts would need to be doubled in size ­ so 14 districts, each with two members. ○ The overall size of the legislature could, optionally, be increased, however I don’t think this is necessary. 3. Ballot Structure: ○ Either a ‘Single Choice’ ballot ­ which looks and feels very similar to the current ballot form, requiring voters to mark a single ‘X’ against their party of choice ­ or a ‘Fractional ballot’ system, could be used under DMP. However, there would only be only a slight theoretical advantage to using the Fractional Ballot structure, with substantial added complexity and civic education required. I would recommend retaining a single­choice ballot with a DMP model. (See pages 30, 55 and 56 of Sean Graham’s written submission) 4.2 Advantages of DMP After assessing Sean Graham’s submission, I feel that DMP has all the advantages of the MMP system (True proportionality, Ballot simplicity) , without the weaknesses (No serious loss of local representation, all candidates remain local, and there is no reliance on party lists). In addition, to these benefits ­ and to the general benefits of a proportional system ­ there are a number of new advantages brought by the proposed DMP system: ● Allows for the same nomination process currently in use by parties ● From the voters’ perspective, the ballot paper looks nearly identical to the current voting system ­ it requires no special civic education to have people’s voices be heard. 10/14 ●
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Decreases the incentive for Strategic Voting ­ voters can always, confidently, vote for the party that best represents their values No exclusion of independent candidates if that is the option most preferred by local voters, while still embracing the role that political parties play in a representative democracy. PEI could return to its tradition of using dual member districts The majority of districts would be represented by two parties, not only one, which would encourage greater inter­partisan dialogue at the local, district level, as well as at the provincial one. An accurate balance between rural and urban representation would be maintained Linguistic and religious minorities would be protected Reduces the chances of ‘coin toss’ tie­break situations. As a mathematics graduate I can say that his proposal is sound, and as a passionate supporter of participatory democracy, I can find no hidden disenfranchised groups or perverse, anti­democratic incentives resulting from his proposed model. In fact, I was about to sit down to draft a similar albeit ‘back of the envelope’ proposal, when I read his submission and was pleased to see that the work had already been done for me, and to a much higher standard than I would have been capable of, without dedicating the years of academic study & research that Mr Graham has undertaken. Mr Graham states in his submission: “Two years ago, I received funding from the University of Alberta’s Undergraduate Research Initiative to develop a new electoral formula that would address the shortcomings of SMP while satisfying Canada’s unique needs.“ His research on the history of electoral reform in Canada led him to understand the reasons why many past reform referendums have failed, and to develop his new DMP model. His submitted papers include sound explanations and references and I can only recommend that he be invited to travel to the Island to present his work to this committee in person, and to have his travel costs from Alberta covered . I feel that I cannot do his work justice by simply reiterating it here ­ it should be represented by the researcher himself. (Disclaimer: I don’t know Sean Graham, I have only read his work.) Conclusion DMP is a system that is not yet in use anywhere else in the world, however it has been designed by a Canadian, for the Canadian context, in the last two years. It has never been considered in a referendum anywhere, and it is a strong proposal, so should be given the chance of public consideration. I believe that introducing DMP could be an exciting opportunity for PEI to do something new, and good, to lead Canada and the world forward. Perhaps the ‘Birthplace of Canada’ could also be the ‘Birthplace of Democratic Renewal’ in this country. 11/14 5. (Annex) ­ Results of last PEI election with DMP From pages 5­9 of Sean Graham’s submission to the Democratic Renewal Committee: 12/14 Under the current electoral system (actual results): 13/14 If the 2015 Provincial Election had used by DMP (with the existing 27 districts)*: *Note that I would propose to reduce the number of districts to 14, instead of 27, to keep the overall size of the legislature at 28. 14/14