Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind
Author(s): Richard J. Bernstein
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Jun., 1980), pp. 745-775
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20127425
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PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
I
Rorty
JXichard
one
has written
of the most
and
important
chal
lenging books to be published by an American philosopher in the past
few decades.1 Some will find it a deeply disturbing book while others
will And it liberating and exhilirating?both,
as we shall see, may be
and wrong.
right
Not
since
James
and Dewey
critique of professional
devastating
and Dewey
(two
of Rorty's
ity and artificiality of professional?and
since Descartes?had
losophy
job for philosophers
and
unsettled
to do; Rorty
I will
state.
perspectives,
been
beginning
had
with
that
thought
once
the
steril
indeed much of modern phi
there
exposed,
was
an important
leaves us in a much more ambiguous
book from a variety
Rorty's
a general
overview
and then moving
of Rorty's
issues
that
a
such
examine
more finely meshed descriptions.
and subtlety
power
but to locate basic
we
But unlike James
philosophy.
who
heroes),
have
of
to
My aim is not only to illuminate the
and to show
analysis
are left unresolved.
its
inner
unity,
In a book that is filled with all sorts of "jolts" and apparently out
rageous
claims,
most
important
stein,
one
of the first
philosophers
and Dewey.
Heidegger,
to be something
appear
the common wisdom,
are
as
What
far
they
in his
early
tional'?a
But
apart
share
is Rorty's
declaration
of the twentieth
century
these
Grouping
of a "category
mistake"
three
because
the
three
are Wittgen
together
according
may
to
itwould be hard to imagine three thinkers who
in philosophical
temperament,
in common,
to Rorty,
according
years,
new way
that
to find a new
of formulating
of making
way
an ultimate
and concern.
style,
is that "each tried,
'founda
philosophy
context
for thought."
eventually,
of the three came to see his earlier effort as self-deceptive,
as an
a
to
retain
certain
of
after
the
notions
attempt
conception
philosophy
to flesh out that conception
needed
notions
(the seventeenth-century
of knowledge
and mind) had been discarded.
Each of the three, in his
later work, broke free of the Kantian
as foun
of philosophy
conception
Each
1
Richard
Rorty, Philosophy
Princeton
1979).
Press,
University
and
the Mirror
of Nature
(Princeton:
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
746
us against
and spent his time warning
those very tempta
dational,
tions to which he himself had once succumbed.
Thus their later work
is therapeutic
rather than constructive,
rather than system
edifying
to make the reader question
his own motives
for philo
atic, designed
a
new
to
him
rather
than
with
program
sophizing
supply
philosophical
(p. 5).
This passage
wants
indicates Rorty's
to stress
in these
"three
intellectual
most
important
But he is not primarily
century."
and what
affinities
of our
philosophers
concerned with
he
the thought of
in the sense
and Dewey,
that he
except
Heidegger,
as doing,
in a far more modest
and concentrated
the
way,
of "philosophical
and "overcoming
of
"deconstruction,"
therapy,"
Wittgenstein,
sees himself
type
tradition"
Rorty's
the essential
that typifies
is contemporary
focus
primary
thrust
of their
analytic
later work.
philosophy?espe
historical origins,
cially the philosophy ofmind and epistemology?its
the ways inwhich it emerged out of the womb of seventeenth-century
notions of mind and knowledge, the ways inwhich analytic philosophy
has
become
mankind,"
sterile
increasingly
or self-conception
image
and
remote
and its (possible) demise.
that many
we have finally discovered
from
the
"conversation
of
He seeks to show that the self
analytic
share?that
philosophers
and the correct way of
the right methods
so that they can be solved?is
a self
problems
philosophical
a grand
illusion.
On the contrary,
deception,
sophisticated
analytic
are
in metaphors
themselves
such as "our glassy
caught
philosophers
or reality
nature
stale.
that have
essence"
and "mirroring"
gone
stating
The
issues
very
of mind-body
that
identity,
seem
so vital
whether
in analytic
knowledge
philosophy?problems
can or cannot
be charac
terized as justified true belief, the theory of reference
?are
bound
themselves
and questioned.
exposed
and meaning
historical
that can be
up with
assumptions
are "problems"
not to be solved but
These
to be dissolved or deconstructed.
The way to perform this type of
therapy is to dig deep into the language games inwhich they are em
bedded
and to see how
of a series
speaking,
tique.
dresses
and
language
games
of historical
accidents,
options,
uses
a two-stage
strategy
Rorty
is a "softening
first stage
The
up"
the problems and positions
shows
various
these
that
as we
controversies
sharpen
fall apart
the
are themselves
and
the result
confusions.
in carrying
technique
out
Roughly
his cri
where
he
ad
that are currently being debated
issues
and points
(and do not lead
of difference,
to significant
the
new
foundational philosophical truths). These are the sections that will
They will
probably capture the imagination of analytic philosophers.
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
upon?as
pounce
sound,
with
of arguments
types
recognize
they
rightfully
and unconvincing
convincing
which
they
should?what
in Rorty's
747
are
familiar
and will
is sound
un
and
But
arguments.
al
though the book is filled with arguments, many of which are brilliant
the
against
points warns
one
in philosophy
strand
about Rorty's
and disturbing
at several
Rorty
ingenious,
ment
characterized
that has
and
Plato.
is unsettling
What
love of argu
ever
since
argumenta
tive style is that he refuses to play the game that can be recognized as
"normal"
seem to be primarily
i.e., he doesn't
so that one
in such a manner
issues
philosophy,
with
stating
carefully
to develop
the strongest
he wants
Rather
tion."
arguments
to show that
concerned
can proceed
in support
of a correct
"posi
is something
there
with
wrong
the whole approach to philosophy as a discipline that deals with basic
and
by clarifying
of his arguments,
and advances
problems
one follows
the nuances
solvingthese
it begins
As
problems.
to dawn on the
reader that just when he thinks he is getting down to the hard core of
these
disputes,
he discovers
that
But assuming for the moment
ve
construct
ever
ophers
there
is no core.
that Rorty
the question
naturally
technique,
into a situation
get themselves
is successful in this de
how did philos
arises,
that some
of thinking
a theory
in advancing
of
is at issue
important
extremely
thing
or stating
or meaning,
and sufficient
condi
the necessary
reference
or solving
the mind-body
is to count as knowledge,
tions for what
strat
of Rorty's
This highlights
the second
stage or aspect
problem.
He exposes
egy.
standard
philosophic
the historical
problems
are not only wrong,
roots
they
are
self-deceived
about what
they
are
least insofar as they think of "their discipline as one which
doing?at
discusses
to be
"intuitions" that play such a primary role in
If Rorty is right, then most analytic philoso
of those philosophical
philosophical debate.
phers
of what we now take
origins
for the historical
and he searches
perennial,
eternal
problems?problems
which
arise
as soon
Indeed, it should be clear that ifRorty is right
as one reflects" (p. 3).
misun
and present?have
philosophers?past
systematic
see
can
that
al
We
been
what
have
doing.
already
they
on recent
there are much
focuses
analytic
philosophy,
Rorty
then most
derstood
though
broader ramifications to his critique?a
critique that finally turns into
a meditation on the philosophical enterprise itself.
In order
to carry
out this
critique,
Rorty
develops
a historical
re
philosophy which is the context from which
analytic philosophy emerges. Rorty is sufficiently impressed by Hei
construction
of modern
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
748
to be aware
degger
of how we
founders
of modern
trace
might
back to Plato, but for his purposes
Descartes,
philosophy,
wants
to undermine
and
of the
trouble
debunk
and Kant.
Locke,
"ideal type" of what philosophy as a discipline
Rorty
source
the
he begins his "history" with
may
the
The
is supposed to be that
be
stated
as follows:
can be foundational
in respect
to the rest of culture be
Philosophy
cause culture is the assemblage
of claims to knowledge,
and philoso
can
so
It
such
claims.
do
it
because
understands
the
phy adjudicates
of knowledge
and it finds these foundations
in the study of
foundations
or the "activity of represen
of the "mental processes"
man-as-knower,
ac
To know is to represent
tation" which make knowledge
possible.
and
the possibility
curately what is outside the mind; so to understand
is to understand
nature of knowledge
the way in which the mind is able
to construct
such representations.
central concern is to
Philosophy's
a theory which will divide cul
be a general
theory of representation,
ture up into areas which represent
reality well, those which represent
and those which do not represent
it less well,
it at all (despite their
to
do
so) (p. 3).
pretense
This conception of philosophy which may appear to be intuitive and
is one
obvious
that
has
a long,
and
complicated,
devious
history.
We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge"
based on an understand
to
seventeenth
the
to
of
"mental
century, and especially
ing
processes"
Locke.
We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which
occur to the same period,
and especially
to Descartes.
"processes"
as the tribunal of pure reason, up
We owe the notion of philosophy
the claims of the rest of culture to the eighteenth
holding or denying
and especially
to Kant, but this Kantian
notion presupposed
century,
assent to Lockean
notions of mental
and Cartesian
processes
general
notions of mental
substance
(p. 3-4).
These
notions
eighteenth
eries which
which
we
have
set philosophy
invention
ventions"?the
from
the
seventeenth
and
or discov
represent
great breakthroughs
on a secure
were
Rather
"in
path.
they
and problems
of distinctions
that were
do not
centuries
inherited
blended with potent metaphors which captured the imagination of phi
losophers
One
and
set
the direction
of the many
spinoffs
for "normal"
of Rorty's
philosophizing.
reflections
is a distinctive
un
derstanding of how the history of philosophy has developed. He re
jects the view that there are perennial problems of philosophy which
arise
as
soon
as we
begin
to reflect.
criticism of a variant of this which
that
the
Rorty
our philosophic
is that
trouble
displaces
of philosophy
this
ancestors
they
did
He
is equally
relentless
in his
takes the more "charitable" view
were
so
basic problems,
but
dealing with
manner.
in an obscure
and confused
self-congratulatory
(as the dialectical
understanding
unfolding
of the history
of problems) which
he
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
claims has had a distortive
influence on the writing
a mystifying
and
philosophy
phy as a discipline.
His alternative,
can be seen
which
of all sorts
such
of culture
part
of themes
blending
and Feyerabend,
Foucault,
Kuhn,
are moments
in history
be
when,
place of what
talk of some
being
or religion?a
is invented
and
of a new
a particular
philosophical
language
the direction
for "normal"
philosophiz
of some other historical
accidents?like
when
entrenched,
a while,
because
ing.
the appearance
another
cluster
is going on in some
new set of metaphors,
the imagination
captures
what
accidents?like
it sets
gets
After
or just
genius
boredom
plain
or "serious"
But
philosophy.
that we
are
always
dealing
with
history
sors as "really"
what
image?where
we now take
we
see our predeces
fundamental
prob
to be
a former
one because
it can
displace
a
of
because
Rather,
prior paradigm.
problems
it "nudges"
the former
contingencies,
paradigm
not
does
happened
in the
seventeenth
century
when
better
was
seemed
occurs,
the point
to have
much
philosophers
of the elaborate
After
point.
a difficult
have
aside.
language
the
is what
This
a relatively
within
time
that
short
collapsed and no
a revolution
such
game
paradigm
formulate
of a set of historical
period of time the entire tradition of scholasticism
longer
heaval
of
problems
temptation to rewrite the
in our own
treating
basic
The crucial point is to realize that a philosophical
lems.
abnor
It is an illusion to
same
the
We must resist the Whiggish
of philosophy
this
sometimes
mal talk will set philosophy off in new directions.
philosophy.
and
sterility?
of metaphors,
and problems
the
usurp
distinctions,
is now seen as a dying
tradition.
At first the abnormal
as kookiness
or as not
new genius
be dismissed
may
"genuine"
believe
of philoso
as a novel
as science
and problems
For a time,
distinctions,
of followers.
game
of historical
of the history of
on our understanding
effect
Derrida,
suggested
by Heidegger,
as
be
stated
There
follows:
may
cause
749
or up
out what
figuring
had evolved.
If
they don't dismiss it out of hand, they are ineluctably tempted to rein
terpret it as an anticipation of their present concerns. While Rorty
refuses to make any predictions about what will happen next in phi
losophy, he certainly suggests that this is likely to happen again with
the problematic of modern philosophy and its offspring, analytic phi
losophy.
To understand
losophy or even the whole
uncover
that
are
a historical
such
as analytic
tradition of modern philosophy,
set of metaphors,
of the
characteristic
the
movement
and problems
confusions,
or
the
forms of life that
games
distinctions,
language
phi
one must
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
750
established the patterns for normal philosophizing.
Briefly stated,
the history of modern philosophy is the history of the rise and fall of
the "mind" and the prized philosophical discipline?"epistemology."
II
book is divided
Rorty's
chapters:
Invention
is the
which
roring,
"The
of
Idea
tions,"
central
a Theory
"Epistemology
two
chapters,
part
of Knowledge',"
"Privileged
Representa
and
Psychology,"
"Epistemol
of Language"; and part 3, Philosophy,
"From
of eight
two
"The
comprises
chapters,
Without
Minds";
part 2, Mir
of the book,
contains
four chapters,
and Empirical
ogy and Philosophy
with
into three parts and consists
Essence,
part 1, Our Glassy
of the Mind,"
and "Persons
Epistemology
concludes
to Hermeneutics,"
and
"Phi
In the next three sections I will treat
losophy Without Mirrors."
some of the highlights of each of these parts and show how Rorty
seeks to get back to (and behind) those "intuitions" and pre-analytic
seem
that
distinctions
to arise
as soon
as we
begin
to reflect.
Thus,
for example, the mind-body problem is taken to be a basic problem for
philosophy because it appears to be intuitively evident that there is
some
distinction
important
even
"physical,"
though
between
we
may
what
is "mental"
be perplexed
about
and what
how
is
to charac
terize this distinction and what to make of it. But, Rorty tells us, "In
my Wittgensteinian
than familiarity
our
intuitions
ourselves
with
an intuition
view,
a language-game,
is to relive
(p. 34).
playing"
is never
anything
so to discover
more
the
or less
source
of
we
find
of the language-game
history
to
wants
Now
who
every philosopher
get
the
clear about the mind-body problem is obliged to ask what are the cri
teria for distinguishing the "mental" and the "physical." In what I
called the "softening up" stage of Rorty's strategy he quickly runs
through several of the major criteria that philosophers have invoked
to characterize
the
"mental":
intentionality,
nonspatiality,
immate
riality, temporality, the presumed "phenomenal quality" of pains and
other "raw feels." He concludes his survey with the claim that
is to iden
the intentional with the immaterial
the only way to associate
and that the only way to identify the phe
tify it with the phenomenal,
is to hypostatize
universals
and think of
nomenal with the immaterial
from particulars?thus
rather than abstractions
them as particulars
habitation
(p. 31).
giving them a non-spatial-temporal
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
751
if we
to make
refuse
this hypostatization,
and see
Consequently
a
the
of
then
trap
through
invoking
specious metaphysical
distinction,
we would
an easy dissolution
have
of the mind-body
As
problem.
a
too
himself
it
is
bit
and
easy.
Rorty
points out,
Furthermore,
quick
analogy, he tells us "What the patient
carrying out his therapeutic
a list of his mistakes
is not
needs
of how
standing
he came
in these confusions"
to make
but
confusions
these mistakes
rather
an under
and become
involved
If we are ever finally to get rid of the
(p. 33).
we
problem
mind-body
to such a question
and
to be able
need
a satisfactory
to give
answer
as:
How did these rather dusty little questions
about the possible
identity
of pains and neurons ever get mixed up with the question
of whether
man
in kind" from the brutes?whether
"differed
he had dignity
rather than merely
value?
33)
(p.
a question
Posing
mind-body"
like this
us realize
that "the
already make
At best
it is a label for a cluster
should
is a misnomer.
problem
of quite distinct and different problems that have become fused and
confused together. We can see this by considering the partial list
that
Rorty
gives
or another,
time
"of the
features
as marks
taken
which
philosophers
of the mental":
have,
at one
1. ability to know itself incorrigibly ("privileged access")
2. ability to exist separately from the body
3.
4.
a nonspatial
(having
nonspatiality
to grasp universals
ability
part
or "element")
5. ability to sustain relations to the inexistent
6.
ability
to use
7.
ability
to act
8.
ability
to form
("intentionality")
language
freely
part
of our
social
group,
to be
"one
of us"
9. inability to be identified with any object "in the world"
is compounded,
a given
feature
has
response
Confusion
that
argued
"mental"?the
the
really
the problem
of Rorty's
concentrates
in his
list.
when
it is
frequently
serve
to mark
off the
feature.
For
in question
is not
heuristic
purposes,
three clusters of issues: the problem of conscious
of reason,
fying the differences
one
all too
simply will not
been
that the feature
or essential
important
Rorty distinguishes
ness,
because
(p. 35).
and
the problem
and the interrelations
In part 1, Our
aims.
primary
on the problem
of consciousness,
One reason
for this is that many
of personhood.
Clari
among these problems
is
Essence,
Rorty
on 1, 2, and 3
focusing
Glassy
contemporary
analytic
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
752
have
philosophers
as
written
heart of the mind-body
opening
problem
that
article
is the
of consciousness
One need only think of Smart's
problem.
in his
statement
if the
set
off
so much
contem
of the
debate:
prary
in the
does seem to be, as far as science is concerned,
nothing
but increasingly
of physical
constitu
arrangements
complex
All except for one place; in consciousness.
That is, for a full
not
of what is going on in man you would have to mention
description
so
nervous
in
his
and
processes
tissues,
system,
glands,
only physical
his visual, auditory and tac
forth, but also his states of consciousness;
...
states of
his aches and pains.
So sensations,
tual sensations,
the
do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside
consciousness,
I just cannot believe
that
and for various reasons
physicalist
picture,
in terms of phys
this can be so. That everything
should be explicable
. except
seems
to me
to be
ics ..
the occurrence
of sensations
unbelievable.2
frankly
There
world
ents.
show
In unraveling
the
how this problem
of consciousness,
problem
arose and how we became
"rather dusty little questions about the possible
neurons."
The
he
story
unfolds
back
goes
task
Rorty's
is to
with
preoccupied
identity of pains and
to Plato
and Aristotle.
But the point of his historical excursion into classical and scholastic
philosophy is to make us keenly aware of how different the so-called
mind-body
problem
was
and after
before
what we now (after Descartes)
tinctions
did
Descartes
not
exist
invented
cartes
prior
the mind
Descartes?to
show
take to be obvious and intuitive dis
to Descartes'
in the
that
"invention"
sense
of the mind.
that
it is only after Des
a central
became
problem
was the essential
or
feature
the problem
of consciousness
for philosophy.
What
then for Descartes
to Rorty's
criterion
of the "mental"?
According
reconstruction,
an
cartes'
is
effective
criterion
to "indubitability."
appeal
Descartes'
own
conviction
us that
that
he had
hit upon
a rock
bottom
Des
Despite
meta
physical distinction between the mind and the body, Descartes, by
appealing to indubitability, sowed the seeds for transforming (or cre
ating) the mind-body problem into an epistemological issue about the
nature and consequences of indubitability?which
is itself the origin
of the contemporary obsession with incorrigibility and privileged ac
cess.
Now one can imagine a critic of Rorty objecting at this point (at
the end of his first chapter) as follows: Despite the historical learning
2
Mind,
in The Philosophy
and Brain Processes,"
"Sensations
reprinted
ed. V. C. Chapell
Cliffs, N.J.:
1962), p. 161.
(Englewood
of
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
and imagination that is evidenced
753
in Rorty's history of the origin of
about
and despite
the rhetoric
"dusty
on Rorty.
can easily
For this
be turned
dissolve
doesn't
reconstruction
On
anything.
of consciousness,
the problem
the tables
little questons,"
in historical
exercise
can be read as showing
the
narrative
just why
contrary,
Rorty's
the
is
nub
of
the
of consciousness
mind-body
problem?why
problem
to clarify
between
the relation
it is so important
pains and neurons.
the
Nothing Rorty has said thus far indicates that the problem is either
or has
unimportant
been
yet
I think that Rorty
satisfactorily
resolved.
aware that this is the "natural"
is perfectly
at this point.
The aim of his second
"Per
to make
chapter,
objection
sons Without
to
meet
the
is
show
Minds,"
squarely?to
objection
twists
and turns in contem
all the major
that when we work
through
status
of
consciousness
the
the entire
about
debates
porary
analytic
He
dissolves.
problematic
a
science fiction
invents
deans
us
does
live on the other
who
in all respects
biochemistry
with
side
one great
had been
in a most
this
tale where
the general
of the galaxy
and
For
difference.
fashion.
ingenious
characters
seem
them
neurology
in which
the first disciplines
He
are Antipo
to be just like
and
technological
us they do not make
any first
breakthroughs
or third person
"raw feels,"
about pains,
and minds.
person
reports
we use "mentalese"
the
about
stimulation
of neu
Where
they speak
some of our tough
rons and C-fibers.
In the twenty-first
century
were
achieved.
Unlike
analytic philosophers visit the Antipodeans and confront the
problem of trying to figure out whether the Antipodeans have minds,
minded
and whether
they
consciousness
experience
in the way
in which
we
do. The device is imaginative and playful but the point is deadly seri
ous.
For
that
have
uses
Rorty
been made
it to work
through
virtually
all the major moves
and meta
substantive
by philosophers?both
to Kripke.
the
debate
that has gone on from Feigl
philosophical?in
we
In what
is one of the densest
of
the
have
book,
chapters
nothing
of the attempts
to
less than a re-enactment
by analytic
philosophers
of consciousness.
state and solve the problem
all
that
argues
Rorty
attempts
to
invent
imaginative
thought-experiments
issues by an appeal to the analysis of meanings
sion gets
more
heated
and
sharper,
Rorty
focuses
or resolve
the
fail. As the discus
on the notion
of a
"phenomenal property" and smokes out what he takes to be the key
principle involved:
we make an incorrigible
P) Whenever
report on a state
with which
there must be a property we are presented
make the report (p. 84).
of ourselves,
induces us to
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
754
As
"enshrines
he phrases
it, this principle
to the mind'
is closer
than itself,
'nothing
the Cartesian
and
notion
an entire
involves
that
epis
a specifically dualistic one" (p. 84). So
temology and metaphysics,
the problem becomes what to make of and what to do with this princi
ple (P). Indeed most of the positions that have been taken on the
mind-body
(as the problem
problem
can be
of consciousness)
charac
terized in relation to the stand that they take to (P)?including
various
and
forms of materialism,
haviorism,
runs
various
the
Rorty
through
"positions"
linguistic
in order
be
dualisms.
to
So
that
show
they can be interpreted as containing important insights, none
while
of them
us any
bring
to a resolution
closer
of the
issues.
outstanding
Despite Rorty's disclaimers, it begins to look as if he himself is
he is in effect
doing what he keeps telling us we should not do?that
a "substantive"
advocating
on the mind-body
position
sition that looks like a sophisticated
in a way
is and
he
leged access.
a surprising
(P) shows is how the contemporary
on the status
of incorrigibility
depends
But at this point, Rorty makes
what might
move.
He
claims
that the proper
response
argue for or against principle
be
neither
(p. 97).
In away he
isn't.
the principle
What
of consciousness
po
problem?a
form ofmaterialism.
(P), but to drop it altogether
dualists,
behaviorists,
skeptics,
comes when
The denouement
Rorty
nor
'identity
declares:
problem
and
seem
privi
to be
is not
to
"and thus
theorists'"
The real difficulty we encounter
is, once again, that we are trying to
set aside the image of man as possessor
of a Glassy Essence,
suitable
on to it with
nature with one hand while holding
for mirroring
the
If we could ever drop the whole cluster of images which Anti
other.
podeans do not share with us, we would not be able to infer that mat
over spirit, science over privacy,
or anything
over
ter had triumphed
are
else.
These
which
not
notions
do
warring
opposites
anything
make sense outside a cluster of images inherited from the Terran sev
No one except philosophers,
enteenth
who are profession
century.
to
take
if
these
will
be scandalized
ally obligated
images seriously,
start saying "The machine
told me it didn't really hurt?it
people
are too involved with
to. Philosophers
seemed
only, very horribly,
status" to take such developments
notions
like "ontological
lightly, but
no other part of culture
is. . . . Only the notion
that philosophy
of categories
into which every pos
should provide a permanent matrix
and cultural development
sible empirical
should be fitted
discovery
strain impels us to ask unanswerable
without
like "Would
questions
this mean that there were no minds?"
"Were the Antipodeans
right in
never were any of these things you call "raw feels" '?"
saying There
(p. 123)
The
about
above
passage
the problem
sums
the
substance
of consciousness.
But
up
of what
one might
has
Rorty
still want
to say
to ob
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
is really a materialist
ject that this only shows that Rorty
passage
in a section
appears
755
entitled
"Materialism
(and the
without
Mind
Such a claim would not be wrong, but itwould cer
Body Identity").
the point.
For the triumphal
verdict
that Rorty
is a mate
tainly miss
we are infected
its rhetorical
rialist manqu?
force because
only gains
a
us to set aside.
set
of
and
that
is
by
images
categories
Rorty
urging
If we
insist on clinging to talk about materialism
(and Rorty might
the point
is to realize how innocuous
and how
ask, why bother?)
is.
to the unphilo
"materialism"
It amounts
really
unphilosophical
our
that
claim
talk and act
may
sophical
someday
great-grandchildren
then
like Antipodeans and relegate the problem of consciousness
dustbin of historical curiosities.
to the
Ill
and demise
the rise, nature,
deals with
(and
2, Mirroring,
some recent
to salvage)
The moral
of this
epistemology.
attempts
on part 1 and deepens
Just as
argument.
Rorty's
part is a variation
cen
in the seventeenth
of "mind" has its origins
notion
the modern
Part
tury, so does epistemology which is so frequently taken to be either
Just as we can
identical with philosophy or the heart of philosophy.
the
envision
already
that we
argues
of
epistemology.
collapse
Rorty
the
of
passing
have
already
obsession
with
the grounds
in which
the way
gins
has plagued
the
tween
thrived
of knowledge
century,
claims.
He
epistemology
also
became
of knowledge
that by
argues
so well
the
by probing its ori
upon a central
ever since?the
of knowledge
theory
conditions
of the genesis
the causal
fication
nineteenth
it has
so
"mind,"
for envisioning
Rorty begins his examination of epistemology
and
the
fixed
confusion
that
confusion
be
and the justi
of the
the end
that
it became
virtually identical with philosophy as a discipline. For the past hun
dred years, it has seemed that the first task of philosophers is to re
solve
epistemological
issues
before
any
progress
can
be made
with
The historical probing of
other problems and areas of philosophy.
the origins of epistemology is followed by what Rorty himself consid
ers to be the central chapter of the book, "Privileged Representa
tions" which deals with the work of Sellars and Quine. Once we fully
appreciate
the
force
and
consequences
of Sellars's
"Myth of the Given" and Quine's skeptical arguments
critique
of
the
about the Ian
756
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
guage-fact
the major
then we
distinction,
distinctions
that
phy but also questioning
ished.
The
final
two misguided
for not only abandoning
grounds
set the context
for modern
philoso
have
have
analytical philosophy.
But Rorty
isn't fin
two
of this part examine
what
he considers
chapters
successor
to
"save"
attempts
epistemology
by finding
psychology and the philosophy of language?
disciplines?empirical
which might replace traditional epistemology and presumably answer
the
that
"real"
problems
answer.
to
ing
our
were
predecessors
epistemological
try
of Sellars and Quine as the
Since Rorty considers his discussion
Iwant
to concentrate
of his book,
centerpiece
tion that he offers of their work.
According
it is basically
of epistemology,
construction
on the novel
interpreta
re
to Rorty's
historical
the "Kantian
of
picture
to produce
and intuitions
together
concepts
getting
knowledge"
(p.
sense of the idea of a "theory
as a spe
of knowledge"
168) that makes
cifically philosophical discipline distinct from psychology.
to saying that if we do not have the distinction
This is equivalent
be
tween what
is "given" and what
is "added by the mind" or that be
tween the contingent
influenced by what
is given) and the
(because
"within" the mind and under
its con
(because entirely
"necessary"
count as a "rational recon
trol), then we will not know what would
struction"
of our knowledge
(p. 169).
Although
the history
these
two
related
of the analytic
were
distinctions
attacked
throughout
the arguments
of
it is only with
movement,
Sellars and Quine that they have been fully discredited.
invoke
the
same
argument
the
against
given-versus-nongiven
equally
distinctions.
The crucial
contingent
Quine
we
understand
tion
of belief,
Sellars and
in their
"one which
bears
critiques,
and the necessary-versus
of this argument
is that
premise
we
when
knowledge
and thus have no need
understand
to view
the
social
it as accuracy
justifica
of repre
sentation" (p. 170). Unlike many critics of Sellars and Quine who
think they have gone too far with their holistic tendencies, Rorty
claims
that
arguments
even to see
they have not gone far enough.
a better way
is not to advocate
that
epistemology
can now
The consequence
of their
or
of doing epistemology,
be replaced
by a "legitimate"
scientific inquiry, but simply to put an end to epistemology
tout court.
It is as if Quine, having renounced
the conceptual-empirical,
analytic
were
and language-fact
still not quite able to
distinctions,
synthetic,
renounce
that between
the given and the postulated.
Sel
Conversely
over
cannot
the
later
lars having
distinction,
triumphed
quite re
nounce
courteous
the former cluster.
of
Despite
acknowledgement
is still permeated
Sellars's writing
Quine's
triumph over analyticity,
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
757
with the notion of "giving the analysis" of various terms or sentences,
and with a tacit use of the distinction
the necessary
and the
between
and the empirical,
the structural
the philosophical
and the
contingent,
scientific.
Each of these two men tends to make continual, unofficial,
use of the distinction
which
the other has tran
tacit, heuristic
It is as if analytic philosophy
scended.
at
could not be written without
least one of the two great Kantian distinctions,
and as if neither Quine
nor Sellars were willing
to cut the last links which bind them to Rus
and "logic as the essence
of philosophy"
sell, Carnap,
(pp. 171-72).
I cannot go into the details of Rorty's
of Sellars
and Quine.
Rorty
a strong
of their work,
critique
tive analysis
many of the objections
interpretation, defense, and
develops
defense
an extremely
of their claims
against
that have been raised by others, and at the
a penetrating
For example,
many
critique.
that
later
his
reflections
argued
work,
Quine's
especially
a blatant
of translation,
reveals
contradiction?or
terminacy
a deep
his own pragmatic
tension?with
and holistic
same
percep
time
critics
have
on the
inde
at
least
arguments.
Rorty locates and specifies this tension better than anyone else (see
p. 202). I am primarily interested in how Rorty "uses" Sellars and
role that they play in the dramatic narrative he is unfold
Quine?the
Sellars
and Quine complete the critique of the Kantian legacy of
ing.
epistemology and lead us to a "holistic" view of knowledge, to what
(The choice of these
Rorty labels "epistemological behaviorism."
are unfortunate
behaviorism"
"epistemological
we
are
a
new
that
with
and better
dealing
they suggest
epis
we
are
to
time
make
this move,
temological
Every
position.
tempted
now seems
one position
to be a better
i.e., to replace
by what
philo
our feet.)
the
from
under
How
rug
sophical
position,
Rorty
pulls
terms
"holism"
and
because
then
are we
haviorism"
to understand
and
what
means
Rorty
be
by "epistemological
"holism"?
and epistemic
to what
Explaining
rationality
by reference
authority
society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence
an attitude common
of what I shall call "epistemological
behaviorism,"
to Dewey
and Wittgenstein.
This sort of behaviorism
can best be
seen as a species of holism?but
one which requires no idealist meta
It claims that if we understand
the rules of a
physical underpinnings.
we
understand
all
that
there
is
to
understand
about
language-game,
...
are made.
in that language-game
If we are be
why the moves
in this sense, then it will not occur to us to invoke either of
haviorist
the traditional Kantian
distinctions
(p. 174).
In short,
to advocate
only makes
sense
if we
behaviorism"
"epistemological
a new subtle epistemological
through and to abandon epistemology,
vocate
accept
some
is not
to ad
position; rather it is to see
to see that the whole project
form
of the Kantian
distinctions
758
which
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
now
have
"A holistic
been
approach
As
rejected.
to knowledge
us that
for "holism,"
Rorty warns
is not a matter
of antifoundation
alist polemic, but a distrust of the whole epistemological
(p. 181).
"to be a behaviorist
Consequently
enterprise"
...
in epistemology
is
to look at the normal scientific discourse of our day bifocally, both as
patterns
adopted
ment
of objective
less than the best
for various
truth,
idea we
historical
reasons,
where
truth"
"objective
have
about
how
currently
going on" (p. 385).
Anticipating the charge that epistemological
lism require
edge, Rorty
abandoning
and
objectivity,
truth,
and
as
the
achieve
is no more
and
to explain
what
no
is
behaviorism and ho
the growth
of knowl
insists:
For
the Quine-Sellars
to epistemology,
to say that truth and
approach
can only be judged by the standards
of the inquirers of our
knowledge
own day is not to say that human knowledge
is less noble or important,
or more "cut off from the world" than we had thought.
It is merely
to
unless by reference
to what we
say that nothing counts as justification
already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and
our language so as to find some test other than coherence.
To say that the True and the Right are matters
of social practice
may seem to condemn us to a relativism which all by itself, is a reduc
. . .
tio of a behaviorist
or morals.
to either knowledge
approach
Here I shall simply remark that only the image of a discipline?philos
will pick out a given set of scientific or moral views as
ophy?which
more
"rational" than the alternatives
which
by appeal to something
forms a permanent
neutral matrix
for all inquiry and all history,
it possible
to think that such relativism must automatically
makes
rule
out coherence
theories of intellectual
and practical
One
justification.
reason why professional
recoil from the claim that knowl
philosophers
or rights and duties an ontological
edge may not have foundations,
which dispenses
with founda
is that the kind of behaviorism
ground,
with philosophy
tions is in a fair way toward dispensing
(pp. 178-79).
There
are many
analytic
philosophers
who
share
Rorty's
skepti
cism about traditional epistemology.
But for them the basic trouble
is that genuine philosophic issues have been obscured by epistemolog
ical formulations.
We
need
to reformulate
the
relevant
issues
in a
"purified" philosophy of language or a scientific empirical psychol
ogy. But Rorty is relentless in his critique of those who think episte
In the last two chapters ofMir
mology can be salvaged in this way.
two
he
to
found successor disciplines to
exposes
attempts
roring,
nor the "new philoso
Neither
epistemology.
"empirical
psychology"
of
to
solve
Once again
help
phy
language"
epistemological
problems.
are
use of this technique,
there
inversions.
where
striking
(Rorty's
he shows how things turn out to be the very opposite of what
they
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
to be,
purport
From
egy.)
is variant
Rorty's
own
of Hegel's
use
the new
perspective,
759
of this
concern
strat
dialectical
with
the
issue
of
"realism" and the belief that the way to deal with the foundations of
do not
is through
"formal
semantics"
philosophy
in philosophy.
On the contrary,
Putnam
advances
represent
as
insofar
he temporarily
misled us into thinking that the issue of metaphysical realism is an
important one for philosophy, and Dummett insofar as he thinks that
Frege has shown us the way to get at the foundations of philosophy
turn
out to be arch
antithetical
that philosophers
knowledging
have
discovered
convinced
covered
It would
the
that
"real"
are
there
have mistakenly
this
is a despairing
can't
quite
real
of philosophy,
is nevertheless
foundations
and that we have now dis
finding
to
attempt
them.3
From
save
analytic
on to the "problem
up holding
give
Rorty's
of view
point
that
philosophy?one
of representation"
the belief that there is something to be preserved
of mirroring
claimed that they
foundations
to go about
how
be hard
of modern
understanding
that presented
than
phy
a more
to imagine
and
philosophy
analytic
philoso
ac
and Rorty.
by Dummett
Dummett,
reactionaries.
and
from the metaphor
reality.
IV
There
some
be
will
readers
who
when
reach
they
this
point
in
Rorty's book (after 311 densely argued pages) will breathe a sigh of
relief. They may not be acquainted with the latest subtleties in the
controversies
analytic
cons of a causal theory
excited
by
the work
their colleagues.
took
a wrong
about
the mind-body
or why
of reference,
of Davidson,
Putnam,
or the pros
and
problem,
so many
professionals
are
Kripke,
Dummett,
and
But they may have felt that somehow philosophy
turn with
the analytic
satisfaction that Rorty has written
movement.
They
may
feel
some
the type of critique that could only
3 In
his essay,
It To Be?" Dummett
ophy finally
and Ought
"Can Analytical
be Systematic,
Philosophy
says, "Only with Frege was the proper object of philos
established;
namely, first that thought, secondly that the study
of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological
and finally, that the only proper method
for analyzing
process of thinking;
...
in the analysis of language
it has taken nearly a half
thought consists
century since his death for us to apprehend
clearly what the real task of phi
Truth and Other Enigmas
(London:
losophy, as conceived by him involves."
Duckworth,
1978), p. 458.
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
760
by an "insider,"
no clothes?or
at least
be written
and
has
is scantily
that
he has
shown
that the emperor
If only Anglo-American
clad.
philosophers had taken a different turn; if only, for example, they had
followed the lead of Husserl who opened up the field of phenomenol
ogy, then we might have avoided the tangled mess which has con
sumed so much technical competence.
But if this is the way they
have
read
Rorty,
him
have misread
they
and
they
have
missed
the
real sting of his critique. Rorty is not denigrating the contribution of
analytic philosophers, despite the severity of his critique. The first
two parts of the book employ (with novel twists) the insights and ar
guments of analytic philosophers to show how they lead to surprising
and
But
conclusions.
unexpected
even
more
important,
has
Rorty
dropped enough hints along the way to show how his critique can be
"Professional philosophy" is not to be identified with
generalized.
any
most
in philosophy
criticisms
school
incisive
who
losophers
tal turn."
sell and Husserl
the
reinforcing
schools.
are insignificant when
of Rorty's
Many
continental
phi
compared with what
a crucial
way played
as a foundational
discipline.
in his distinctive
Each
of philosophy
image
to those
as having
taken the "transcenden
the
differences
between
Rus
perspective,
Rorty's
in common.
share
across
as relevant
just
of themselves
think
From
cuts
but
are
they
in
role
Fur
it should now be clear that Rorty's primary object of attack
thermore,
is any form of systematic
there are real foundations
which
shares
the conviction
that
philosophy
must
that philosophy
discover
and that phi
can transcend
a perma
and adumbrate
history
losophy as a discipline
nent neutral matrix
for assessing
all forms
of inquiry
and all types
of
knowledge.
for
Nevertheless,
philosophy
those
and Continental
in terms
think
who
of Anglo-American
it will be noticeable
philosophy,
that in
a new set of characters
and a new set of
part, Philosophy,
enter
the
Gadamer,
Sartre,
stage.
Habermas,
Heidegger,
problems
are
and
Kuhn
discussed
with
and
Derrida
Foucault,
Apel,
along
the final
Rorty
Feyerabend.
now
tions as that between
two
But
on philosophy
of the book.
parts
Rorty
siveness
is that
that
he
cuts
up such
familiar
Spirit and Nature,
Naturwissenschaften.
orchestrated
carefully
flection
takes
there
is no
"continental"
distinc
and
Geisteswissenschaften
of
In
this
change
work
all this material
is integrated
into a re
itself?a
reflection
that emerges
from the first
What
across
characterize
the
much
theme.
is provocative
and refreshing
and the irritable
stale polemic
of the nondialogue
between
about
defen
Anglo
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
and Continental
American
is equally
He
philosophy.
761
and
devastating
equally illuminating about both sides of this great divide.
In order to get this last part into clear focus, itmay be helpful to
a number
raise
curred
critique
looks as
to many
or does
if he
nihilism.
At
and
of doubts
Is Rorty
readers.
he
have
is leading
times,
that
suspicions
engaging
simply
to say?
constructive
It certainly
and
relativism,
anything
us to historicism,
even
Rorty
we all know
Presumably
project.
and can be refuted by carefully
oc
have
surely
a
in
destructive
will
uses
these
skepticism,
labels to characterize
that these are philosophic
self-referential
constructed
jection
critique
must
take
a stand
arguments.
on what
someplace
ends
dead
How then does Rorty get out of this bind? How does he meet
that any
his
the ob
is True
this stance itself demands some sort of philosophic
and Right?and
justification? One of the main purposes of the final part of his book is
to answer
doubts
these
to adumbrate
and
an alternative
as a voice
in the conversation
ing of philosophy
own
to
fore turning
self-understanding
Rorty's
sense
in which
to
I
want
the
clarify
enterprise,
understand
of mankind.
of the
the above
But
be
philosophical
"labels" do
and do not apply to Rorty.
If by historicism we mean that history itself is a foundational dis
that
cipline,
the
explanations
that
seek
philosophers
can
only
be
found in the study of history, or even ifwe understand by historicism
the
to be
where
that Popper
attacked
someone
who
believes
that there
enable
us
curious
a historicist
variant
is sup
are laws of history
then Rorty
is certainly
not a
to predict
the future,
some of the strongest
he has presented
historicist.
On the contrary,
a
he
has
such
For
been
and try
position.
arguments
against
arguing
no
us
is
his
that there
foundational
discipline?neither
ing to show
posed
which
tory,
ture
that
nor science,
nor poetry.
nor philosophy,
is more
than
any other
privileged
is one
be such a discipline
there must
that
cised.
Further,
and
tingencies,
insistence
Rorty's
it doesn't
make
options,
given
is no part of cul
the illusion
part?and
to be exor
that needs
There
on historical
any
sense
con
accidents,
to think that his
But if by
tory could ever aspire to be a predictive discipline.
historicism we mean that a healthy historical sense of how philosophic
language
games
arise,
get
entrenched,
and pass
away may
cure
us of
the belief that there are perennial philosophical problems, then Rorty
is certainly a historicist and tells us that this is the moral of his book.
If by skepticism we mean the type of epistemological doctrine
that insists that we can never really know what is beyond the "veil of
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
762
and
ideas"
our
that
can never
to knowledge
claims
be justi
"really"
fied, then it is difficult to imagine amore forceful attack on such skep
an epistemological
Such
ticism.
its force
gains
skepticism
ac
from
us to abandon.
that Rorty
If
urges
metaphors
we
were
if
could
rid
ourselves
of
the
de
successful,
therapy
Rorty's
we dis
and the fear that unless
and compulsion
sire for constraint
the
cepting
very
cover the (nonexistent) foundations of knowledge we are faced with
intellectual and moral chaos, then epistemological skepticism would
no longer be a position to be "refuted"?it
would simply wither
we mean
If by skepticism
away.
of knowledge,
or philosophy,
language,
neutral framework
that we
to escape history,
picious of all attempts
have
and
for being
grounds
to discover
sus
the foundations
a permanent
to delineate
for evaluating all claims to knowledge,
then this is
has been advocating.
Rorty
we mean
If by relativism
that there
is no truth,
and
objectivity,
or
worse
better
and
moral
for judging
standards
arguments
positions,
not a relativist,
and suggests
is certainly
that such a rela
then Rorty
what
tivism
has
tack.
Rorty's
become
aim
of a straw man
something
is not to deny or denigrate
ity" but to demystify
mean
these "honorific" labels.
behaviorism,
epistemological
that
there
to at
for philosophers
"truth" and "objectiv
If by relativism we
is no other
way
to jus
tify knowledge
claims or claims to truth than by appealing to those
social
which
practices
have
been
hammered
in the
out
course
of
human history and are the forms of inquiry within which we distin
guish
Rorty
what
is true
"anything
and idiosyncratic,
is objective
false, what
a relativism.
not mean
But
this does
and
such
advocates
then
that
goes."
If by nihilism we mean that whether we are dealing with knowl
edge
or morals,
anything
is just
as good
or as true
as anything
else,
then again Rorty is not a nihilist. On the contrary, such a position is
frequently adopted by those who think this is the only alternative to
the claim that knowledge and morals have foundations. But if nihil
ism means being liberated from the illusion that there is something to
which
we
sent,
that
can
appeal which
is no way
there
or ought
to command
universal
from human
freedom
and
of escaping
will
as
re
sponsibility in making moral decisions, and no ultimate support to
which we can appeal in making such decisions, then Rorty happily
thinks of himself as a nihilist.
The point I am emphasizing can be stated in a slightly different
way.
"Historicism,"
"Skepticism,"
"Relativism,"
and
"Nihilism,"
are
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
typically
positions
are "real"
thought
to which
they are taken to be
give up the claim that there
and morals.
knowledge,
objectivity,
to be so objectionable
are driven when
we
foundations
763
for truth,
because
we
They are all shaped in the image of what might be called the "Carte
moral
chaos.
Rorty
damental
dichotomy
tradition.
Rorty's
to help
Either/Or,
But
advocating
that has shaped
main
therapeutic
us
still we want
and what
perform
we give
up
these
to see
to know
with
that we
is not
is some
there
Either/Or?either
Anxiety"?the
grand
or we
are confronted
constraint
foundational
sian
take
basic
intellectual
and
on this
sides
fun
the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian
us
is to liberate
point
it, and to set it aside.
through
what
this
can
if any, philosophers
if
of philosophy
emerges
function,
type of self-understanding
various
"self-deceptions"
from
that
Rorty
In
exposes.
the final part of the book where Rorty seeks to answer this question,
he "works
through"
what
initially
distinctions:
Spirit
and
Nature,
turwissenschaften,
mal and abnormal
seems
to be a bewildering
Geisteswissenschaften
and incommensurability,
commensurability
array of
and Na
nor
and unfamiliarity,
discourse,
familiarity
epistemol
and
and
and phi
ogy
hermeneutics,
systematic
edifying
philosophy,
as
as
conversation.
"asides"
losophy
inquiry and philosophy
Rorty's
are
as his main points.
and incisive
illuminating
on the significance
some
of
of these distinctions
as they enable us to grasp Rorty's
own understanding
frequently
want
to touch
insofar
as
I
But
only
of phi
losophy.
a
"able to be brought
under
Rorty means
By "commensurable"
can
set of rules which will tell us how rational
be
reached
agreement
seem
on what would
statements
settle the issue on every point where
to conflict.
These
rules
tell us how
will
all residual
which
merely
verbal,
disagreements
or else merely
an ideal
to construct
be
seen
to be
temporary?capable
or
'noncognitive'
of being resolved
by doing something further" (p. 316). Modern philosophy
tradition
the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian
tinental
tion.
forms
has
been
obsessed
with
in
situation,
shaped by
and con
its analytic
search
for commensura
in both
the
This is the quest that is characteristic
of epistemology.
Her
as Rorty
understands
it, is not the name of a new method
meneutics,
or discipline,
an alternative
to achieve
but
way
commensuration,
rather largely a struggle against the assumption that all contributions
to culture
are
commensurable.
Hermeneutics
"is an expression
of
hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will
not
be
filled?that
our
culture
should
become
one
in which
the
de
764
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
is no longer felt" (p. 315).
mand for constraint
tween
the
"commensurable"
The distinction
the
and
be
which
"incommensurable,"
takes over from recent
in the philosophy
debates
of science,
is
Rorty
one that he generalizes.
It is applicable
to all domains
of discourse,
or literary
whether
criticism.
they be science,
poetry,
philosophy,
when
of the his
Earlier,
characterizing
Rorty's
understanding
I indicated that he sees it as consisting of periods
tory of philosophy,
of "normal
discourse"
where
and the "correct"
cedures,
ods of abnormal
discourse
way
when
and writing
He
appear.
and "abnormal"
discourse
because
discourse
and
during
periods
cause these are
as
pear
if all
always
manent
radicalizes
the
times
discourse
able
morals
envisions
or poetry
sometimes
possibility
be taken
might
was
science,
just
this role.)
discourse
played
By
and the "abnormal"
the "normal"
Throughout
Lockean-Kantian"
his
wants
to the
book
It is
suggests).
be
thrives,
epistemology
is
there
when
it does ap
agreement,
be
commensurable
and
might
philosophy
the rules
of commensuration.
But
there
is
the
iar," Rorty
deliberately
are
these distinctions
of all
when
as there
than
of "normal"
as a feature
this
that
discourse
is historically
stable with
that the domain
in which
bility has been achieved is the measure
even
distinction
sees
Rorty
himself
(as Kuhn
of "normal"
Kuhn's
to clarify
a danger
of confusing
what
or in thinking
and eternal,
be
might
culture
is agreement
about problems,
pro
of finding
solutions
followed
by peri
and new ways
of speaking
strange
there
that
the per
sta
such
for all other domains.
other
parts
of
culture
(Rorty
as
such
as our paradigms
of normality
rather
in the West
when
theological
as
such bland distinctions
introducing
a time
or the
to make
changing
has
Rorty
tradition
of modern
"familiar"
and
us
of how
scene
been
aware
the
"unfamil
"relative"
of culture.
the
attacking
philosophy,
but
"Cartesian
implicitly
and
explicitly he has been contrasting this tradition with another attitude
toward philosophy. He speaks of
a "tradition,"
in
resemble
each other
figures who, without
forming
their distrust
of the notion that man's essence
is to be a knower of es
sences.
William
Goethe,
Kierkegaard,
James,
Santayana,
Dewey,
are figures
the later Wittgenstein,
the later Heidegger
of this
sort . . . These writers
have kept alive the suggestion
that, even
we want to know,
when we have justified true belief about everything
we may have no more than conformity
to the norms of the day. They
sense that this century's
have kept alive the historicist
"superstition"
as well as the relativist
was
last century's
sense
triumph of reason,
that the latest vocabulary,
borrowed
from the latest scientific achieve
of essences,
but be
ment, may not express privileged
representations
in which the world
infinity of vocabularies
just another of the potential
can be described
(p. 367).
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
The
mainstream
and
phers,"
of philosophers
Rorty
calls
765
"systematic
the
philoso
calls
peripheral
ones?following
Kierkegaard?he
to edifying
What
is common
is
"edifying
philosophers."
philosophers
that they use every means
their skepticism
about
they can to voice
the "whole project
of commensuration."
In our time, Dewey, Wittgenstein,
are the great edify
and Heidegger
All three make
it as difficult as possible
thinkers.
to
ing, peripheral
take their thought as expressing
views on traditional
philosophical
or as making
as a co
constructive
for philosophy
problems,
proposals
and progressive
fun of the classic
operative
discipline.
They make
the
picture of man, the picture which contains systematic
philosophy,
search for universal
in a final vocabulary.
commensuration
ham
They
mer away at the holistic point that words
take their meaning
from
other words
rather than by virtue of their representative
character,
and the corollary
that vocabularies
from the
acquire their privileges
men who
use them rather
than from their transparency
to the
.
real.
.
.
want
to keep space open for the sense of
Edifying
philosophers
wonder which poets sometimes
cause?wonder
that there is some
is not an accurate
thing new under the sun, something which
repre
sentation of what was already there, something which
(at least for the
cannot be explained
and can barely be described
moment)
(pp. 368
70).
itmight seem as if Rorty is casting his lotwith edifying philoso
phy (although he realizes that there is something paradoxical about
the very notion of an edifying philosopher).
Edifying philosophy is
Now
always
reactive
losophy.
he himself
and parasitic
Edifying
admires
the pr?tentions
upon
is alluding
of Poetry
is best
like poetry
losophy
of mankind.
conversation
ing,
intelligent,
but
versation,
revealing,
so can many
To view
and
the
rather
role
than
that
it can
philosophy
of conversa
conception
in the Conversation
of Mankind."
Phi
to Oakeshott's
as one of the many
in the
voices
can be civilized,
conversation
illuminat
understood
A
Truth may be relevant
exciting.
other things,
and a conversation
be thought of as a disguised
foundations.
phi
and
Rorty's
heroes,
frequently
their use of satire,
and
ridicule,
us.
a
leaves
where
He
suggests
Rorty
philosophers
and emulates
But this is not quite
paradox.
new metaphor
for understanding
philosophy
as
in
conversation
play
culture?philosophy
as inquiry.
Rorty
tion in "The Voice
of systematic
are
to a con
is not
to
inquiry into truth or the discovery
of
philosophy
as a form
of conversation
itself part of the larger conversation of mankind
which
is
is to begin "to get the
in particular
out of speech
the mirroring,
alto
metaphors
means
as
It
also
that
culture
(p. 371).
gether"
recognizing
changes
one or another
voice may play a more
role in the conversa
significant
visual,
tion.
and
From
this
perspective
we
can
view
edifying
philosophers
as
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
766
on
rather
than "seeing
them as holding
views
partners
common
of
of
wis
concern"
"One
of
way
thinking
(p. 372).
subjects
the love is not the same as that of argu
of which
dom as something
conversational
ment, and of which the achievement does not consist in finding the
correct vocabulary for representing essence, is to think of it as the
wisdom
practical
in a conversation"
to participate
necessary
(p. 372).
Rorty concludes his book with an eloquent plea for dropping the no
no
as knowing
about knowing
which
of "philosophers
something
so
and dropping
the notion
that their voice "al
well"
body else knows
on
an
of the
claim
the
attention
other
has
ways
overriding
tion
participants
frank about
vide.
in the
"useful
the
entire
Rorty's
we
Instead
(p. 392).
that philosophers
conversation"
kibbutzing"
book can be read
as an
ironic
should
sometimes
be
pro
on the
variation
Peircian theme of not blocking the road to inquiry. For it is not open
inquiry that needs defense today, but open civilized conversation.
Rorty thinks it is idle to speculate about what will happen next in phi
losophy, but in his final sentence he tells us "The only point on which I
would insist is that philosophers' moral concern should be with contin
uing
the
rather
of the West,
conversation
insisting
upon
philosophy within
of modern
place for the traditional problems
conversation"
than with
a
that
(p. 394).
V
never
Rorty
sional philosophy,"
the possible
With
philosopher
"modern
or strident
a moral
illusions,
tions,
our historical
in his
there
"analytic
hasn't been
has written
and seductive
eloquence.
and
that
seriousness
passion
seeks
that seeks
self-deceptions,
to use a classical
limitations?or
and
of "profes
critique
and
philosophy,"
of Quine,
exception
James who
since William
humor, playfulness,
with
shrill
becomes
philosophy."
an American
as much
with
wit,
All this is combined
to unmask
pr?ten
us aware
of
to make
turn
of phrase?to
make us aware of our human finitude. Although I am sympathetic
with his powerful and challenging critique, there is something funda
mentally wrong with where Rorty leaves us. In this final section I
want to argue that the moral of the tale he tells is not quite the one
that he suggests.
In a manner
similar
to the way
in which
Rorty
uses
Sellars and Quine (against themselves) I want to show that Rorty
himself does not quite see where his best insights and arguments are
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
leading him.
Much of this book is about the obsessions
and the pictures
himself
Rorty
phers
which
that hold
them
But
captive.
It is almost
is obsessed.
as
go" and accept the force of his own critique.
has
more
been
izes.
767
Rorty
touched
deeply
keeps
pointing
he
by what
to and hinting
of philoso
is a sense
there
if he can't
in
"let
quite
It is as if Rorty himself
is attacking
than
at an alternative
he
real
to the
foundationalism that has preoccupied modern philosophy without
ever fully exploring this alternative.
Earlier I suggested that one
way of reading Rorty is to interpret him as trying to help us to set
aside
the Cartesian
Cartesian
anxiety?the
Either/Or?that
under
lies so much of modern philosophy.
But there is a variation of this
we are ineluctably tempted
Either/Or that haunts this book?Either
by foundational
and
metaphors
the desperate
to escape
attempt
history or we must frankly recognize that philosophy
form
of "kibbutzing."
however,
Suppose,
were
no
we
suppose
from
itself is at best a
that Rorty's
therapy were
held
captive
by meta
longer
successful;
really
and "mirroring,"
essence"
phors of "our glassy
suppose we accepted
that knowledge
in any other way than by
claims can never be justified
an appeal
we were
to social practices,
of the desire
suppose
purged
for constraint
and compulsion,
then what?
The scene of culture
and
the voice of philosophy in the conversation of mankind look very dif
ferent from the one that Rorty proposes. To flesh out what Imean, I
will begin with what might seem to be external and peripheral mat
ters
then move
and
closer
to the heart
of Rorty's
vision.
I can isolate Rorty's obsession by comparing him with one of his
John Dewey.
heroes,
Rorty
most
important
philosophers
thinks
that Dewey
is one of the three
in his early
because
while
of our century
work he tried to provide a new foundation for philosophy,
to see
and Wittgenstein?came
in his
later
Dewey
Heidegger
deceptive.
these
against
what Rorty
very
says
work
to which
temptations
here and in other
places,
this
earlier
he?like
effort
as self
us
his time warning
"spent
he had succumbed."
From
the story
is a bit more
com
plicated, for according to Rorty, Dewey himself was briefly tempted
?or
bullied?into
thinking he had to supply a new metaphysical
foundation
suspected,
4
for
his
own
naturalistic
this is the "bad" Dewey,
See Richard Rorty,
Philosophy
of John Dewey,
Press,
sity of New England
vision.4
But
as
might
and his lasting contribution
inNew
"Dewey's Metaphysics,"
ed. Steven M. Cahn (Hanover,
1977).
be
is
in the
Studies
N.H.: Univer
768
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
rather
"therapeutic
atic,
than
rather
than system
constructive,
edifying
own
the reader question
his
motives
for philos
to make
designed
ophizing rather than supply him with a philosophical program."
this
is a gross
of Dewey
interpretation
one
distortion,
was
but Dewey
not
as obsessed
nearly
is more
that
It is true as far as it
revealing about Rorty than it is about Dewey.
goes,
But
with
episte
attacking
mology and the "spectator theory of knowledge" as is Rorty. What
fails to give its just due?is
that Dewey was
Rorty leaves out?or
with
the
role
that
concerned
primarily
philosophy might play after
one had been liberated from the obsessions and tyrannies of the
would
of philosophy."
Dewey
certainly
"problems
to existing
reference
that all justification
involves
is not a discipline
that philosophy
or access
knowing
this is where
to more
the real
that has any special knowledge
fundamental
foundations.
What
begin.
problems
agree with Rorty
social practices
and
are
But
the
the worse?
structed?
to
ones
Which
practices
the better from
criticized
and
sought to deal with these problems without
Dewey
"our
to be discarded,
need
for Dewey
social
to which we should appeal? How do we discriminate
or
of
recon
any ap
meta
essence,"
"mirroring,"
own
are
to
these
analysis,
phors.
According
Rorty's
genuine
never
to
but
around
these
and re
problems,
Rorty
asking
quite gets
lated questions.
He tells us, of course,
that there
is no special philo
for dealing with
such issues and no ahistorical
matrix
sophical method
peal
can
we
to which
these
glassy
issues
But
appeal.
accepting
our
Whatever
disappear.
success or failure in dealing with what
men,"
quite faces?although
that points
to the
alism
and
shown
Following
successor
of Dewey's
judgment
he called the "problems of
the worse,
the
us
search
that
the
from
rational
relative) must
for an ahistorical
is nothing
there
the
irrational
(even
is one
them.
discipline
to
assum
lead us back to foundation
But Rorty
has
perspective.
inevitable
about
such a move.
Rorty, we do not have to see this enterprise
foundational
never
as if any philosophic attempt to sort out the
ing that this is historically
also
final
not make
does
with questions
which
struggled
Rorty
his whole
of
modern
reading
philosophy
need for reflective
to examine
intellectuals
Sometimes Rorty writes
from
claim
constantly
Dewey
better
this
foundational
as finding a
but
epistemology,
as
rather
a dif
changing the direction of philosophy, of giving the conversation
ferent turn. Ironically, for all his critique of the desire of philoso
phers
to escape
from history
tatis, there is a curious way
and
to see
the world
sub
in which Rorty himself
species
aeterni
slides into this
769
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
stance.
He keeps telling us that the history of philosophy,
of all culture,
history
and demise
of various
is a series
of contingencies,
and forms
games
of the rise
accidents,
of life. But suppose
situation.
Then a primary
language
back into our historical
place ourselves
to deal with
task is one of trying
conflicts
and
present
to
of
sort
out
from
the
the
better
worse,
trying
focusing
we
cial practices
what
types
like the
to endure
ought
are
of justification
and which
demand
acceptable
and which
of
confusions,
on which
so
of
reconstruction,
are not.
Rorty
might reply that there is no reason to think that the professional phi
losopher
is more
aspects
ertheless
of culture.
suited
But
recognize
how
"understanding
even
a task
than
this need
and
the
possible
of other
representatives
not be disputed.
the legitimacy
importance
in the broadest
things
in the broadest
together
hang
for such
We
of the
can nev
of
task
sense of the
possible
sense of the term."5
term
In saying this, I do not think that I am saying anything that
Rorty himself doesn't suggest, but he does not grapple with these
In part,
issues.
I think
this
is due
to his
own
unwarranted
anxiety
that philosophers can't quite help getting caught in the snares of the
criticized.
type of foundationalism which he has so devastatingly
This is why Rorty himself is still not liberated from the types of ob
sessions
which
he
claims
have
plagued
The point that can be approached
a central
example
by examining
of
historicism.
type
In his discussion
of Kuhn's work
tive
most
modern
philosophers.
from a slightly different perspec
that Rorty
gives
to support
his
out what he takes
and in sorting
in the controversies
and wrong
between
Kuhn and his crit
con
be considered
takes up what might
the hard case?the
ics, Rorty
and Bellarmine.
between
Galileo
troversy
to be right
can we then find a way of saying that the considerations
advanced
against the Copernican
theory by Cardinal Bellarmine?the
scriptural
of the fabric of the heavens?were
descriptions
"illogical or unscien
tific"? This, perhaps,
is the point at which
the battle
lines between
Kuhn and his critics can be drawn most sharply.
Much of the seven
it was to be a "philosopher"
teenth century's notion of what
and much
of the Enlightenment's
notion of what it was to be "rational" turns on
Galileo's being absolutely
To
right and the church absolutely wrong.
here?not
suggest that there is room for rational disagreement
simply
for a black-and-white
to en
struggle with reason and superstition?is
the
notion
of
328).
very
danger
"philosophy"
(p.
But
5
Wilfrid
ence, Perception,
and the Scientific
Sellars,
"Philosophy
and Reality
(New York: Humanities
Image of Man," Sci
Press,
1963), p. 1.
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
770
Rorty
out
points
that Kuhn
does
Kuhn's
However,
question.
ment
for a negative
not
an explicit
answer
to the
an
"arsenal
of
argu
provide
answer
is im
case, a negative
give
writings
"In any
answer."
plied by the argument of the present book" (p. 328). It is important
to clarify just what Rorty is and is not claiming. He is certainly not
suggesting that the issues raised in the dispute between Galileo and
Bellarmine
culture
was
are unimportant.
affected
by the
But
argues
Rorty
decision
procedures
that
there
to which
On
the
resolution
contrary,
of issues
Galileo's
distinguish
fate
of European
in this debate.
are no permanent
or
standards,
criteria,
one could univocally
which
would
appeal
declare Galileo on the side of truth, objectivity,
sharply
the
raised
from
arguments
and rationality,
Bellarmine's
and
"irratio
nality."
I wish
to draw is that the "grid" [to use Foucault's
conclusion
and eigh
in the later seventeenth
century
term] which
emerged
to in the early seven
teenth century was not there to be appealed
teenth century, at the time that Galileo was on the trial. No conceiv
no study of the nature of human knowledge,
able epistemology,
could
out. The notion of what
have "discovered"
it before it was hammered
in the process
If one
it was to be "scientific" was
of being formed.
the ranking
values
endorses
the values?or
of competing
perhaps
?common
was being "un
to Galileo and Kant, then indeed Bellarmine
We are heirs of three hundred years of rhetoric about the
scientific."
of distinguishing
science and religion,
sci
importance
sharply between
ence and politics,
science and art, science and philosophy,
and so on.
This rhetoric has formed the culture of Europe.
It made us what we
are today. We are fortunate
that no little perplexity within epistemol
to defeat
it.
the historiography
of science,
is enough
ogy, or within
is not to say that there
But to proclaim our loyalty to these distinctions
are "objective"
and "rational" standards
for adopting
them (pp. 330
31).
The
Rorty insists that it is an illusion to think that philosophers stand as
neutral third parties to this significant debate, and that they are able
to score
for one
points
side
or the
other
by
to ahistorical
appealing
But it is instructive to see
standards of rationality and objectivity.
over
all too rapidly. Suppose we try the thought
what Rorty passes
experiment of imagining ourselves back into the context of this de
bate, and suppose too that we are liberated from thinking that the
issues
can
standards.
task
be
resolved
What
is precisely
them and
clarify
This
guments.
values
over
by
an
then? Certainly
to "hammer
to try
is not
competing
to permanent
appeal
out"
the
relevant
are
to sort
out what
a matter
of arbitrarily
but rather
trying
values,
epistemological
the issues don't disappear.
issues
the better
involved,
and worse
Our
to
ar
one set of
endorsing
to give the strongest
771
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
"historical
cannot
one
support
by
simply
of the controversy
How
social practices.
competing
relevant
"historical
reasons"?
What
the
are we
even
reasons"?or
we
the above
about
is revealing
social
mean
passage
issues
practices,
conflict
of
serious
to understand
what
The
other.
are
what
he places
"objective"
and
"rational"
the
"historical
by
is the way
language itself reflects what he is presumably
which Rorty's
When
or
side
to existing
appealing
and
is the genuine
resolved
be
for the heart
ing.
to
reasons"
in scare
in
oppos
quotes
and
contrasts this with "three hundred years of rhetoric" he is implicitly
think
aping those who
standards
of objectivity
ric.
that
either
there
are
But Rorty himself has deconstructed
and rationality.
He
distinguishes
rock
or there
and rationality
two
bottom
is only
permanent
"mere" rheto
this sense of objectivity
senses
and "sub
of "objective"
jective."
of theories,
in the first sense was a property
which,
"Objectivity"
are chosen by a consensus
of ratio
been
discussed,
thoroughly
having
a "subjective"
consideration
is one
nal discussants.
By contrast,
which has been, or would be, or should be, set aside by rational discus
to
is seen to be, or should be seen to be, irrelevant
sants?one
which
. . . For a consideration
to be sub
of the theory.
the subject matter
in this sense, is simply for it to be unfamiliar.
So judging sub
jective,
as
as
relevance.
is
hazardous
judging
jectivity
on the other hand,
sense of "subjective,"
In a more
traditional
to
is out there" and
what
contrasts
with
"corresponding
"subjective"
is in here" (in the
like "a product only of what
thus means
something
heart, or in the "confused" portion of the mind which does not contain
reflect what is
and thus does not accurately
representations
privileged
with "emotional"
is associated
In this sense "subjective"
out there).
are idiosyncratic,
or "fantastical,"
for our hearts and our imaginations
of the self-same
while our intellects are, at their best, identical mirrors
external
(pp. 338-39).
objects
Throughout
the history of philosophy
these two different
senses of
to
and tangled
have
been
confused
and "subjective"
run
the
has
Plato
since
the
tradition
"In
this
together
way,
gether.
no algorithm'
the 'reason versus
with
versus
distinction
'algorithm
"objective"
passion' distinction" (p. 339). While there is an innocuous sense in
which we employ the second distinction, Rorty has argued that we
are on the very brink of misunderstanding when philosophers try to
blow this up into something like the issue of realism versus idealism.
It is the first distinction that is the effective distinction for sorting out
what
is "objective"
and
"subjective."
This
is a variable
and
change
able distinction both with respect to different historical epochs and
with respect to different fields of inquiry. But the key reference here
is to a consensus
chosen
by rational
discussants.
How
are we
to de
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
772
are
cide who
the rational
sense
in what
and
discussants
are
they
"ra
tional"? This is not "merely" a rhetorical question, but frequently
the most vital question to be confronted. What we learn from Rorty
is that philosophers do not have any special knowledge or any special
access
to permanent
rational
discussants
to answer
standards
from
those
are judged
who
the type of issue that needs
cisely
that Rorty
nothing
deed everything
lessens
says
this
the
out
Sorting
question.
to be irrational
is pre
to be "hammered
out."
that philosophers
to
be
ought
addressing.
is something
There
if one prefers,
or,
"reflective
in Rorty's
askew
emphasis.
intellectuals"
in matters
or
practices
to
illusory
he
Throughout
argues as ifwe are confronted with two alternatives: Either
whether
In
of the question.
importance
he says and shows indicates that this is the sort of
question
cation,
But
all justifi
or morals,
to social
appeals
con
He has been
primarily
of knowledge
foundations.
cerned with criticizing the second alternative because he rightly
thinks that this is the one to which most modern philosophers have
been
drawn?disputing
But
to be known.
are
references
to the "best"
would
very
social
indicates
second
accept
little to say about
is a vital
it.
For
of this
to deny
that
this distinction
to be made.
distinction
to what
and
practices
his awareness
lute or definitive way of making
there
foundations
this
and how
they
and
alternative
reject
that Rorty
As Rorty well
advocates.
knows
is open to the criticism
view
of a consensus
of how are we
a rational from
an irrational
consensus.
His
constant
any defense
to distinguish
has
the
on the one
concentrate
sants
are
only what
we
suppose
"rational"
discus
problem.
there
is some
But
he
abso
is not to deny that
it seems
Sometimes
as
Rorty himself is guilty of a version of the "Myth of the Given"?as
social
are
practices
the
sort
of thing
need to do is to look and see what
illusion.
To
as Rorty
tell us,
does
that
are
given,
they are.
over
and
and
that
if
if
all we
But surely this is an
over
again,
that
"to say
the True and Right are matters of social practice" (p. 179) or that
"justification is amatter of social practice" (p. 186) or that "objectivity
should be seen as conformity to norms of justification we find about
to know how we are to understand
(p. 361), will not do. We want
are
how
and pass
"social
sustained,
generated,
they
practices,"
we want
to know how they are to be
But even more
away.
important
we
are confronted
in any historical
not only
For
criticized.
period
us"
with
a tangle
ing and
of social
conflicting
but with practices
that make
practices,
us.
demands
There
is
here
upon
danger
compet
of reify
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
773
and failing to appreciate
idea of a social practice
ing the very
is rational
criticisms
and arguments
about what
and
very
are constitutive
and social practices.
of traditions
that
our
irrational
Rorty seems to be deeply ambivalent about the prospects for phi
of his work
is to suggest
and to advocate
in the conversation
that philosophy
plays
The moral
losophy.
a
turn in the role
for
a need
of man
Even his "historicism" points to a way inwhich philosophy can
kind.
vital and
play a much more
limitations
but nevertheless
confusions
that
same
he draws
time
area
the very
central
sense
to make
try
us and to gain
back from taking
that
accept our historical
of the conflicts
and
a critical
confront
of problems
we
role when
this
he has
opened
At
perspective.
from
seriously,
up
the
entering
for us.
There is the same lack of balance in the moral decisionism that
runs through the book. For all his criticism of Kant, Rorty praises
Kant for helping us to see that the
new objec
to answer questions
of justification
attempt
by discovering
tive truths, to answer the moral agent's request
for justifications
by
is the philosopher's
of a privileged
form of bad
domain,
descriptions
of substituting
for moral
faith?his
special way
pseudo-cognition
was to have seen through the "metaphysi
Kant's greatness
choice.
con
and to have destroyed
cal" form of this attempt,
the traditional
ception of reason to make room for moral faith. Kant gave us a way of
seeing scientific truth as something which can never supply an answer
a way of claiming our moral
to our demand for a point, a justification,
decision about what to do is based on knowledge
of the nature of the
world
383).
(p.
according to Rorty, Kant misled us into thinking that
Unfortunately,
a decision
But here
for moral
choice.
procedure
to be presupposing
what
he has so effectively
criti
that
moral
social
and
is
(and
choices)
viz.,
"justifying"
political
a matter
ourselves
into thinking
of deceiving
there is some ulti
is nevertheless
there
seems
too Rorty
cized,
either
mate
can
appeal
or a matter
of personal
(arbi
One would have thought that this is just the type of
trary?) decision.
either/or
misleading
we
to which
ground
to expose.
that he wants
For
we
sometimes
can
and do try to justify or warrant our moral decisions by giving the best
reasons
there
And
count
rithm
vant
we
can
we
can give
to support
them even when
constitutes
be disagreements
about what
sometimes
we
are
forced
even
as good reasons
or eternal
standards
issues.
of knowledge
If we
when
to reflect
does
we
to which
accept Rorty's
or moral
choices,
on what
that
recognize
reasons.
good
and
that there
recognize
we can appeal
to settle
claim that all justification,
cannot
hope
to escape
to
ought
is no algo
from
the rele
whether
history
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN
774
and
sense
only makes
to prevail,
ought
out" is not a matter
this
but
decision,
type of practical
make
doesn't
to recover
social practices are
to ultimate
appeal
the notion
that Aristotle
reasoning
any
still
the moral of Rorty's book is
for understanding
as an attempt
to see his work
are
argumentation.
requires
One perspective
we
practices,
or abandoned.
be modified,
or "arbi
of "mere"
rhetoric
ones
which
"Hammering
trary"
to social
reference
the critical task of determining which
faced with
relevant,
with
of phronesis?the
for us which
sketched
eternal
foundations,
standards,
or algorithms.
But Aristotle also sowed the seeds for the distrust
that philosophers have of phronesis by contrasting it in the strongest
the
with
way
possible
contemplative
Rorty
not only questions
shows
us
and
the more
that
scientific
we
understand
the more
reasoning,
we
of
understanding
but more
this contrast,
what
realize
noesis.
he
significantly,
on
goes
how closely
in theoretical
it resembles
the forms of reasoning and decision making exemplified by the person
who
For
exhibits
is a major
reversal
have
taken
theoria?or
philosophers
typically
or an
This
phronesis.
more
inversion.
accurately
their images of what theoria is supposed to be like?to be the stan
dard by which practical wisdom is to be judged. Once we make the
turn Rorty
once we
advocates,
that we
realize
are dealing
with
forms
of discourse which differ from each other in degree and not in kind,
once we
realize
that
persuasion
a form of rational
is always
rationality
a definitive
attain
ahistorical
closure,
effective
can
which
never
then the reflective task would seem to be to clarify the different forms
and rational
of phronesis
One might
deny
social
ing.
that
persuasion.
that it is not his intention to
imagine Rorty replying
there
practices,
are
These
are genuine
conflicts,
problems
and uncertainties
that demand
all
in the
involved
image
created
by competing
understand
reflective
as conversa
of philosophy
tion that he wants to substitute for philosophy as the inquiry into
foundations. Rather his main point is to challenge the presumption
that philosophers have some special knowledge or method which en
ables them to do this better than anyone else. He also claims that a
healthy historical sense reveals that there have been times when the
ologians,
poets,
and
scientists,
function better than professional
dispute
these
claims
nor
even
literary
critics
philosophers.
Rorty's
skepticism
have
performed
this
But I do not want to
about
in
the way
which professional philosophy has become amarginal voice in the con
versation
of mankind.
I do want
to urge
that we
can give
a very
dif
PHILOSOPHY INTHE CONVERSATIONOF MANKIND
We can see it as a type
ferent twist to Rorty's critique of philosophy.
of therapy
can
that
misconceptions
stale metaphors
can achieve.
philosophy
what
and
actions
rearguard
us from
liberate
about
misguided
or to reformulate
them
problems
can see that
between
detect
attempts
in new and
there are many
signs of playing
from the seventeenth
century.
advocates
of "objectivism"
various
inherited
that
are
themselves
philosophers
775
to
and fundamental
many
Despite
traditional
salvage
Underneath
and
of notions
the
"relativism,"
increasingly
we
ways,
sophisticated
out the legacy
polemic
one can
to real
coming
ize that there is something wrong with the entire framework and the
categorial distinctions that keep these debates alive.
The
choice
that
dational disciplines.
But
jectivity,
out to be new
turn
which
philosophers.
and
sessions
and warns
about
to think that they must
of philosophers
tions.
is not one of opting
a few more
variations
or playing
out
worries
Rorty
"kibbutzing"
tired themes.
programs"
us
confronts
He himself
But
need
that we
"constructive
apologies
can
for foun
the obsessions
he has
shown
not
to answer
unanswerable
tempted
of questions
concerning
justification,
be
are plenty
there
against
is obsessed with
us
set aside
the proper way
the scope of disciplines,
old
the temptation
come up with
self-deceptive
as
for philosophy
on the same
these
of
ob
ques
ob
of distinguishing
and praxis
that are answerable
discussants,
we
our attention?even
and demand
when
concede
that any answers
are themselves
to
historical
limitations.
book can be
subject
Rorty's
rational
from
irrational
read as helping to bring about a turning in philosophy and in seeing
how
But
jackets.
the metaphors
aside
were
ideas which
and
the anxieties
powerful
once
once we make
have become
liberating
once we
this turning,
that
pictures
about constraint
in philosophy,
then
the
far more
alive
strait
liberated
from
once we
set
held us captive,
and compulsion
that have been so
scene
and the potential
of culture
have
contribution of the voice of philosophy
becomes
intellectual
are
in the conversation of mankind
and dramatic.
Haverford
College.