Small Arms: Dominating Conflict in the Early Twenty-First Century
Small Arms: Dominating
Conflict in the Early
Twenty-First Century
VIRGINIA HART EZELL
President
Institute for Research on Small Arms
F
rom the American Civil War to the Falklands War of 1982, armed conflicts
throughout history have shared one particular similarity: the dominance
of infantry. In the American Civil War, massed lines of soldiers exchanged
coordinated volleys of fire; in the Falklands War, small groups of soldiers from
the professional armies of two modern nation-states met in battle. Yet the modern
example serves to prove that conflict continues to be won by infantrymen armed
with assault rifles, machine guns, and bayonets.1 Clearly there remains a role for
the individual infantry weapon in standard warfare as well as the less conventional,
asymmetrical, low intensity conflicts expected to dominate warfare in the twentyfirst century.
An infantryman’s weapons appear simple compared to the tanks, artillery,
and aircraft that make up the mix of military systems available to combat
commanders. Technological advancements in small arms, command, control,
and communications—as well as the logistics systems that support them—have
converged in the information age, increasing the lethality of individual soldiers
operating in small groups.
Constants in the Way of Warfare
Throughout much of modern history, war fighters—especially the foot soldier—
ruled the battlefield. While heavy equipment has a major role to play, it has not
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replaced the importance of infantry when seizing and holding territory is the
definition of victory.2
Overwhelming firepower has been the holy grail of the infantry
commander for centuries. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
automatic weapon (in particular, the machine gun) was a technological
advancement designed to meet the challenge that had faced field commanders
for several centuries—getting more firepower to the target. Machine gun fire
reduced the number of men needed to bring a large amount of firepower against
large numbers of enemy forces.
In most historical experiences, wars tended to be traditional face-offs
between nation-states, with large armies massed along well-defined battle lines.
While the current international system continues to support the nation-state as
the primary actor, trends in conflict have moved away from “nation-state versus
nation-state,” gravitating instead toward conflict between the nation-state and
non-state actors.
The consequences of the collapse of Communism have included not
just the perceived ascendancy of free-market democracy as the dominant
political-economic system. It has also led to a more diverse list of mission
requirements for the military, as well as the broadening of potential military
missions. Some have concluded that conflict is now a perpetual part of politics
of the modern age—a world in constant conflict.3
Although the bi-polar structure of the international system in the postWorld War II era was dominated by fears of a nuclear exchange between the
primary powers, most wars in the past 50 years have been local. The threats are
out there: from terrorism (foreign and domestic) to civil wars, the low-intensity
range of the conflict spectrum threatens regional stability and U.S. national
interests. In order for these actors to achieve their objectives, weapons of war
are required. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, these weapons range
from strategically placed explosive devices to small arms, depending on both
the given goal and availability of weapons.
In fact, low-intensity conflict fought with infantry weapons has dominated
world politics since 1945. Civil wars have accounted for as much as 90 percent
of all warfare since the end of World War II. Those wars have been fought with
conventional weapons such as small arms, and there is no reason to believe that
this pattern will change in the twenty-first century. If anything, current trends
indicate a clear need for infantry weapons in these local and regional conflicts.4
This kind of conflict, and the use of special forces to execute them in
the twenty-first century, could make the more traditional distinction in levels of
conflict obsolete. Low-intensity guerrilla warfare and terrorism are projected to
be the norm in violent actions.5
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Small Arms: Dominating Conflict in the Early Twenty-First Century
Technology: Old Wine in New Bottles
Most people involved in the design of small arms emphasize that it is a mature
technology. That it happens to continue to be the weapon of choice in conflicts
today is a testament to small arms’ effectiveness—and suggests how little has
changed in the way of war.
News reports on CNN show opposing forces using weapons that
descended (but are not far removed technologically) from small arms developed
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the case of the .50 caliber Browning
heavy machine gun, very little has changed in its design since it was first
introduced early in the twentieth century. It remains a staple in the inventories
of military forces around the world. The standard assault rifles used by every
military force today use small caliber ammunition based on a design concept
introduced in the final months of World War II.
Light and medium machine guns, submachine guns, combat shotguns,
and bolt-action, high-precision sniper rifles all represent the evolutionary nature
of the world of small arms technology. To varying degrees, they all do the same
thing: when the trigger is pulled, the firing mechanism is released to ignite the
primer in the base of the cartridge sitting in the chamber of the weapon, which
ignites the propellant inside the cartridge case. The expanding gases created as
the propellant burns launch the bullet from the cartridge. The bullet travels
down the barrel, exits the muzzle of the weapon, and flies a given distance,
depending on several variables. These variables include the amount of propellant,
the length of the barrel, the weight of the bullet, the properties of the barrel,
and external factors involving the environment and the shooter.
Throughout the history of small arms development, industry dedicated
its energies to meet the demands of its military customers by introducing
incremental technological improvements in design as well as in production
capabilities. New materials, improved manufacturing processes, improved
weapons, improved ammunition, and changes in weapons design have served
to increase production and lengthen the life cycle of small arms. It is possible to
see weapons manufactured during World War II in the hands of insurgents in
Africa, Soviet-made light machine guns designed in the 1940’s piled high in the
caves of Afghanistan, and thousands of U.S.-made M-16 assault rifles—probably
from stocks abandoned in Vietnam—in the hands of drug lords in the Golden
Triangle.
From a purely technological perspective, scientists and engineers in the
small arms field have constantly worked to design weapons that would make
the individual soldier more lethal. In order to lengthen the life cycle of small
arms, scientists and engineers have experimented with different materials. When
the 5.56 x 45 mm M-16 assault rifle was first introduced in the 1960s, its plastic
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buttstock and handguard led some to suggest the new weapon was made by
Mattel, a major American toy maker, rather than the venerable gun maker Colt’s
Manufacturing Company. Today, composites and robust plastics are the norm
rather than the exception. They last longer, withstand harsh climates, and help
reduce the weight of the weapon, allowing for easier carry and use.
Improved night vision equipment combined with high-powered scopes
help a shooter acquire targets and hit them—day or night, in good weather or
bad. Using thermal imagers (which detect the target through its radiated heat)
and image intensifiers (which operate in extremely low light to see targets in
darkness), soldiers can fight in the dark. Adding a laser designator or red dot
scope to the standard assault rifle completes the equation to improve hit
probability. With today’s technology, a regular soldier is capable of precision
shooting.
Small Arms Production
As technological advances over the last two centuries have increased the
firepower of small arms, military establishments have increased their number
of weapons and men. The result was an increasingly strong demand on industry
for more materiel.
The American Civil War is one illustration of the under-utilization of
production. Due to the Confederacy’s lack of skilled labor, their forces were
constantly short of firearms. The Russian experience is a similar case, especially
in the early history of mass production. To meet perceived demands, Czars
imported technology by hiring European and American engineers to increase
production at their factories.6
Technology transfer in the twentieth century has helped to disburse the
knowledge of small arms manufacturing, making it possible for less-developed
countries to jump-start their industrial base. This has helped to increase
international production capacity and, consequently, increased the availability
of small arms around the world.
Indigenous small arms production has been used in various recent lowintensity conflicts. In Nicaragua, there was evidence of homemade 40 mm grenade
launchers, which require less accuracy because they deliver a high explosive
projectile to cover a large area.
Guerrillas in Sri Lanka have been known to produce their own weapons.
Over the past decade, however, the Tamil Tigers’ international infrastructure
has provided that organization with alternative methods of meeting their needs.
Criminal activities—including drug smuggling and extortion—have helped the
LTTE raise the money needed to buy weapons in the marketplace (legitimate or
otherwise), precluding the need to produce their own weapons in large quantities.
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In Darra, in Pakistan’s Northwest Territory, power as well as survival is
projected from the muzzle of a gun. Small arms production at Darra has not
been based on a requirement for large-scale conflicts. But this region has been
known for its handmade guns for over 150 years. Some of Darra’s production
may have found its way into conflict in the area, but the types of conflicts near
Darra—such as the one in Afghanistan—
suggest a requirement for numbers of
weapons greater than that which could be Power as well as survival
made by local gunsmiths. Large numbers is projected from the
of Kalashnikov weapons and
muzzle of a gun.
ammunition were shipped to Afghan
rebels during their war with the Russians
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Soviet government supplied revolutionary
forces in Africa throughout the Cold War period. As a result, proxy wars of the
Cold War created large conventional arms transfers—of weapons with long
shelf lives—throughout the third world.7
The expanded production capacity and extended shelf life of small arms
contribute to the availability of small arms around the world. Clearly, the weapons
are already in place through indigenous production, or they are readily available
through various levels of the international arms marketplace, whether black,
white, or gray.
Getting It There
No less important than small arms technology itself is getting the weapons into
the hands of the user, when and where he needs them. The fact that the intensity
of the conflict may be considered “low” does not diminish the need for large
quantities of weapons and ammunition. As suggested, the trend in conflict has
been toward the low end of the conflict spectrum. Those wars are fought with
small arms and other infantry weapons. Although small units appear to dominate
the scene, the agility of these units will lead to a high operational tempo. At the
same time, overwhelming firepower will continue to drive the battle. That equals
a high dependence on relatively large quantities of infantry weapons and
ammunition.8
As precision munitions are introduced in the small arms arena, fewer
munitions will be needed to achieve the same results. Clearly, precision munitions
cannot be used universally. Less precise, area munitions are better suited for
attacking large clusters of enemy forces. A precision mortar or 40 mm grenade
will increase first hit probability. It is equally clear that no amount of precision
will replace the requirement for the overwhelming firepower achieved with
standard heavy machine guns and automatic assault rifles.
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Conclusion
Just as the economies and industrial bases of developed countries have
transitioned from heavy manufacturing to an information-based paradigm, so
military establishments are transforming to information-based operations. At
the same time, the threat has shifted from conflicts between nation-states to
asymmetric threats from non-state actors. Yet armies have retained their primary
mission to fight and win their nations’ wars with conventional weapons and
munitions. Rather than a diminished role, the current trend in the application of
force has shown an increased reliance on small units of infantry soldiers executing
national policy with small arms and conventional munitions. When a full
accounting is done, the individual foot soldier armed with man-portable infantry
weapons will be at the center stage in conflicts in the twenty-first century. WA
Notes
1. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc.,
1990): 193-194.
2. Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995): 365.
3. Ralph Peter, Fighting for the Future, (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999): 133-135.
4. Parker, op. cit.: 368 –369.
5. Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century,
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s (USA), Inc., 1990): 158.
6. Stevens, R Blake, ed. Kalashnikov: The Arms and the Man, a Revised and Expanded Edition of “The
AK47 Story” by Edward Clinton Ezell, (Cobourg, Ontario: Collector Grade Publications, 2001): 1923.
7. Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1990): 237.
8. Lawrence Freedman, “A British Soldier Fighting the Mahdists in the Sudan, 1885,” War,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994: 355-357.
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