Are Palestinians Allowed to
Resist? (Part II)
By Dina Jadallah-Taschler
There is an abundance of discourse over the means and methods
that are pursued and/or justified by the Palestinians in their
quest for independence and liberation. In the first part of
this essay, I presented the legal, historical, and current
context that forms the root of their current predicament. In
this segment, I want to address the pros and cons of pursuing
an exclusively non-armed struggle both by looking at the
uniqueness of Palestinian circumstances and also by comparing
it with the Indian National Liberation Movement, which is
usually presented in Western narratives as almost exclusively
non-violent, and successful, for having (ostensibly) been so.
A Brief History of Palestinian Non-Violent Resistance
Palestinians are continuously asked to not resist. The truth
is that whether they resist violently or non-violently,
Israeli violence continues unabated. Perhaps the scale,
ugliness and the immediacy of the trauma are exaggerated in a
massacre like we recently saw in Gaza, but the reality of
purposeful eradication persists.
Examples of Palestinian non-violent resistance have existed
since the very start of Jewish immigration into Palestine, but
were never enough to attain freedom. Ultimately it is an
imperative but frequently unstated precondition, that
Palestinians accept a permanent subjugated and defeated
status, preferably outside of their historic lands. It is
otherwise known as the Yigal Allon Plan (1967), a policy
actively pursued by even the “Dove” Shimon Peres and entailing
the expulsion of Palestinians. The Allon plan formed the basis
of
Israel’s
settlements/colonization.
Frequently
unacknowledged in mainstream Western coverage is that only
after acceptance of defeat and eradication can Israel’s
violence (aka “retaliation”) against Palestinians stop.
Unwilling to accept that, and choosing a policy of
“sumoud”/steadfastness on the land, Palestinians pursue(d)
non-violent resistance as a complimentary and grassroots
approach against the occupation. Here are just a few examples
of Palestinian non-violent resistance to Israeli aggression:
in 1902, villages of al-Shajara, Misha, and Melhamiyya
peacefully protested against the takeover of 7000 hectares of
agricultural land by the first Zionist settlers; in 1936,
Palestinians held a six-month industrial strike protesting the
British Mandate’s refusal to grant them self-determination; in
1986, Hannah Siniora and Mubarak ‘Awad (who advocates the
power of non-violence and is a self-described disciple of
Gandhi; recently deported by Israel) drew a list of civic
disobedience activities heavily reliant on boycotting Israeli
products and economic self-sufficiency, helping launch the
1987-93 First Intifada; in 1993, the signing of the Oslo
Accords and the pursuit of the “settlement” path; and
currently, the holding of protests in the villages of Jayyous,
Budrus, Bil’in, Ni’lin and Umm Salamonah against the apartheid
wall (1: See here). Today, the tradition of non-violence is
still practiced and promoted by some secular and independent
Palestinian political leaders, like the Palestinian National
Initiative led by Mustafa Barghouti. And even Hamas, often
presented as the ultimate terrorist organization, upheld a six
month ceasefire with Israel but was still subjected to a nonlifting of the suffocating siege of Gaza. (The ceasefire ended
on November 4, 2008 when Israel conducted a targeted
assassination that killed six Hamas members.)
Needless to say, these facts are rarely, if ever covered in
mainstream accounts.
Instead the focus is consistently on
“terror” and “Israel’s right to defend itself,” ignoring the
cumulative suffering of the occupation. As for Israel’s
response, it consistently uses overwhelming force, including
tear gas, rubber bullets, live ammunition, etc.
against
protesters and justifies this as “self-defense,” even when
protecting illegal settlement colonies.
Which raises the question of the efficacy of non-violent
resistance as the sole or primary means of achieving national
liberation. While each national liberation struggle is unique,
there are certain conditions and methods that may translate
across people. One thing that many have in common is that nonviolent resistance was not pursued exclusively. This was true
of the African National Congress’ anti-apartheid Boycott and
Divestment Movement in South Africa, which accompanied armed
struggle. It was also true of the struggle for national
liberation from British rule in India, a fact usually
unmentioned in Western press, which tends to focus on Mahatma
Gandhi’s satyagraha / non-violent path to resistance. In doing
so, there is a grave disservice done to explaining how Indian
independence came to be. There is also a convenient
decontextualization of the struggle. And I use “convenient”
intentionally, because Gandhi’s model is often held up (by
Israel and the West) as the best and “most civilized” one that
ought to be emulated by the oppressed Palestinians.
Gandhi in Context: Was the Indian National Liberation Struggle
Entirely Non-Violent? The name Gandhi and non-violent
resistance (satyagraha) are almost synonymous in most people’s
minds. Satyagraha’s aim is not just to defeat the opponent,
but aims to convert the adversary as well. And yet there are
important nuances and definite progression in Gandhi’s
approach to war and colonialism. On the subject of whether it
is better to be a coward or to resist violently, he said: “I
do believe that, where there is only a choice between
cowardice and violence, I would advise violence… I would
rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour
than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a
helpless witness to her own dishonour…” (2: Eds. R. K. Rabhu
& U. R. Rao, “Between Cowardice and Violence,” The Mind of
Mahatma Gandhi, Ahemadabad, India, 1967, p. 3) He also said:
“Though violence is not lawful, when it is offered in selfdefence or for the defence of the defenseless, it is an act of
bravery far better than cowardly submission. The latter befits
neither man nor woman. Under violence, there are many stages
and varieties of bravery.
Every man must judge this for
himself. No other person can or has the right. (3: Ibid, pp.
369-70) Applied to the Palestinian context, this would
indicate that Palestinians have the duty to fight back against
their own annihilation. However, he would have probably
qualified that by saying that non-violence could cause the
same changes with lower loss in life.
Historically, too Gandhi’s attitudes to war evolved.
While
still in South Africa, and in reaction to the Bambatha (Zulu)
Rebellion of 1906 against a new British poll-tax, to which
Britain responded by declaring a war, Gandhi encouraged the
British to recruit Indians. He wanted to advance Indian claims
as full citizens of the Empire. He also encouraged Indians to
join the war through his columns in Indian Opinion.
Gandhi’s statecraft and thought did not happen in a vacuum.
Likewise, India’s independence was not the work of only one
man or one concept or one strategy.
In fact, India’s
nationalist feelings pre-existed Gandhi and the Congress
Party, and evidence of it can be found as early as 1857. The
first group to call for complete independence was the
uncompromisingly secular Ghadar Party, organized in 1913 by
Indian immigrants in California. (3: See here) The party
actively pursued violent resistance and revolution (rejecting
caste as well) and predictably, their actions were labeled as
“terrorism” by Britain. Operating mainly in the first two
decades of the 20th Century, the Ghadarites were successful in
recruiting Indian soldiers in the British Army (in Hong Kong,
Singapore, Rangoon, and Basra) and urging them to revolt.
As for Gandhi, once in India, he progressed to advocating nonviolent resistance as a “weapon.” His political views on
Indian independence evolved as well. Consider that at the age
of 45, Gandhi still held some esteem for the British empire,
calling it a “spiritual foundation,” in contrast to the views
of most Indian revolutionaries. (4: See here) It wasn’t until
after the Amritsar Massacre of civilians by British troops in
the Punjab, that Gandhi advocated complete self-government
maturing into independence (swaraj). In the intervening years
there was a constant push and pull between Gandhi’s satyagraha
policy and other political personalities and groups pursuing
independence — not always non-violently.
A massive wave of revolutionary unrest swept India in 1919.
British violent retaliation was unable to quell it. For
example, there were more than 200 strikes in the first six
months of 1920 alone. And yet in 1921, when Muslim leader
Hasrat Mohani wrote a resolution asking for complete
independence, Gandhi led the opposition against it and secured
its rejection. Likewise, he supported Britain in WWI by trying
to recruit Indians for the war effort. He himself volunteered
twice for it, in present-day Iraq and in France, reasoning
that he “owed” this to the empire in return for military
protection. (5: Ibid) This led to deep divisions within the
Congress party and also caused a dramatic drop in the
popularity of Congress. Young revolutionaries like Rash Behari
Bose, Shaheed Bhagat Singh, and revolutionary groups like the
Workers and Peasant Party (Kirti Kisan Party) and militant
unions like the Bombay textile workers were frequently at odds
with Congress. Armed revolutionary groups that emerged in this
period included the Hindustan Republican Army and the
Hindustan Socialist Republican Army in northern India, as well
as the “Revolt Groups” in Bengal (e.g. Chittagong group led by
Surya Sen).
Working class and union resistance continued
throughout the 1930s. Eventually, it was in response to this
revolutionary tide, that the Congress Party became less
conservative and more supportive of the more militant
attitude. As for Gandhi, he returned to advocating non-violent
struggle and launched the salt satyagraha (1930-31) and the
boycott campaigns. He has been criticized by some for not
taking advantage of this revolutionary tide, thereby delaying
independence.
Even at the time of World War II, Gandhi prevaricated on nonviolence: first offering “non-violent moral support” to the
British effort, and only later rescinding that decision when
members of the Congress Party objected to the inclusion of
India in the war effort without her consultation. In 1939-40,
strikes and uprisings in the countryside swelled dramatically.
Afterwards, the Congress party was compelled by grassroots
pressure to launch the Quit India movement in August of 1942.
It is important to note that this period in the struggle was
one of extreme violence, mass arrests, and so forth. And yet,
Quit India’s success in contributing to independence is
controversial.
Those arguing that it failed say that it
fizzled out after five months (largely due to the army’s
loyalty) and didn’t topple the Raj or bring it to the
negotiating table for independence. In contrast, those who see
it as a success, focus on how it sapped colonial energy and
resources and on its success at mobilizing masses of
people.(5: See here) Importantly, it inspired the final phase
of the fight for independence, which witnessed increasingly
militant peasant uprisings, sometimes joined by some of the
landlords.
By the end of the war, Britain was indicating that power would
be transferred to Indians. Aware that they couldn’t hold on
any longer, they instead focused on partitioning India –
bringing to mind Israel’s recent attempts to divide Gaza from
the West Bank. In the meantime, Congress’ adherence to a
policy of non-violence was entirely dependent on the British
soldiers – as opposed to the armed Muslim League – and were
unable to prevent partition. Thus, Congress’ inherent
conservatism with regards to armed struggle hindered its goal
of keeping India intact. They failed to build on numerous past
instances of Hindu-Muslim cooperation against British
colonialism. (Not all members of the Muslim league supported
Muslim self-determination: Communist leader Ghaffar Ali
opposed it vociferously.)
As is evident from the history recounted above, the agreeable
and reasonable- sounding frame of the superiority of peaceful
resistance sets up a false dichotomy. Presenting satyagraha as
the exemplary approach to liberation is deceptive mainly
because India’s independence was not achieved through nonviolence alone. Moreover, its historical context and enemy are
do not translate well across time and location.
Finally,
while inspirational and useful on many levels, it is not
sufficient as sole guide or solution to achieving Palestinian
liberation.
Options for Palestinian Resistance
Fundamentally, all theories of national liberation emanate
from the ethical and legal principle that a people have the
right to be free from alien occupation and exploitation.
Resistance is their inalienable right. Insistence on nonviolent resistance can sometimes be counterproductive – as
happened with Gandhi’s insistence on it when confronting
partition. Relying solely on non-violence subordinates the
fundamental moral and ethical goal of independence to all
sorts of conditionalities in order to achieve it in the
“right” way.
All events so far indicate that non-violent resistance has
been of modest benefit to Palestinians, with the important
exceptions of tarnishing Israel’s image and moral claims. One
could argue that Israel pursued the (sham) Oslo peace process
precisely because the First Intifada rendered the population
ungovernable. Unfortunately for the Palestinians, the Fateh
leadership of the PLO squandered those achievements and
marginalized popular input.
Since then, pursuit of
“settlement” and “negotiation” in the absence of a concomitant
armed struggle has produced regressive and contradictory
effects. Why is that?
One reason is the nature of the adversary. Zionist and Israeli
ideology and statecraft are fundamentally violent, involving
ethnic cleansing and relying first and foremost on war as an
instrument in achieving Greater (Eretz) Israel. Unlike Great
Britain, which had developed a liberal democratic tradition
when Indians were struggling for their independence, Israel is
essentially a highly militarized, ethnically-based and legally
privileged society. It made no difference whatsoever how the
Palestinians resisted, whether violently or not. As happened
in other Western colonial historical experiences, like the US,
Australia, or apartheid South Africa, the settlers use
overwhelming force to convince the native populations of their
ultimate defeat.
A second important difference is that after World War II,
England could no longer hold onto its colonies. This is in
sharp contrast to the US-superpower-backed-Israel, which
maintains a pronounced military superiority over all its
neighbors.
A third difference is that ever since the Jewish Land Agency
started buying Palestinian lands from absentee landowners, and
continuing after its war-time conquest of land, Israel
stipulated that Palestinians cannot lease or be employed on
purchased land. As a result, Palestinians are less important
to the Israeli economy than India was to Britain.
Their
marginalization and de-development are intentional and serve
to facilitate Israeli expropriation of valuable water, land,
and other resources. Moreover, Israel receives significant
financial and military “aid” from the United States which also
reduces its need to integrate economically with its neighbors.
The lack of economic dependency makes non-violent resistance
much less effective as a weapon in fighting the occupation.
Any economic levers the Palestinians may have had were further
diminished (intentionally) via their PA leadership’s
dependency on and distribution of foreign “aid.” This had the
double effects of corrupting and ensuring the cooptation and
cooperation of the leadership, as well as minimizing the size
and role of an educated middle class that could lead the
struggle – as was the case in India.
A fourth difference is the lack of a charismatic leader like
Gandhi. Which brings us right back to the first reason, the
nature of the opponent. Israel has a long history of
assassinating and / or deporting any potential leader who is
incorruptible or charismatic or effective. (6: For a partial
list of Palestinian leaders assassinated by Mossad, see
here.)
In the final analysis, non-violence is still a worthy means of
resistance. Significantly, it enhances growing international
perceptions of the brutality of the occupation and builds on
the legal consensus and framework of the legitimacy of
Palestinian rights, as recurrently affirmed through UN General
Assembly annual resolutions and the most recent ruling against
the apartheid wall at the International Court of Justice. Nonviolent resistance, by being more accessible to ordinary
people, additionally creates more sustainable and widespread
networks of resistance. At a minimum, it establishes a network
of interdependence for the newly liberated society to build
on.
But it is not enough. And arguably, it has never been enough,
especially in the absence of a more just as opposed to
legalistic international relations.
– Dina Jadallah-Taschler is an Arab-American of Palestinian
and Egyptian descent, a political science graduate, an artist
and a writer. She contributed this article to
PalestineChronicle.com.
Contact
her
at:
[email protected].