Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 17, No. 6, t993
The Effects of Stealing Thunder in Criminal
and Civil Trials*
Kipling D. Williams,# Martin J. Bourgeois,t and
Robert T. Croyler
The effectiveness of a persuasion technique referred to as stealing thunder was assessed in two
simulated jury trials. Stealing thunder is defined as revealing negative information about oneself (or, in
a legal setting, one's client) before it is revealed or elicited by another person. In Study 1,257 college
students read or heard one of three versions of a criminal assault trial in which a damaging piece of
evidence about the defendant was absent (no thunder), brought up by the prosecutor (thunder), or
brought up by the defense attorney and repeated by the prosecutor (stolen thunder). In Study 2, 148
college students heard a civil negligence trial in which damaging evidence about the key plaintiff's
witness was absent (no thunder), brought up by the defendant's attorney (thunder), or brought up by
the witness himself (stolen thunder). In both studies, stealing thunder significantly reduced the impact
of the negative information. A path analysis of the processes underlying the effect suggested that
verdicts were affected because of enhanced credibility.
Often a difficult decision in opening statements is whether, and if so how, to volunteer weaknesses. This involves determining your weaknesses and predicting whether
your opl~nent intends to use them at trial. There is obviously no point in volunteering
a weakue.~s that would never be raised at trial. Where, however, that weakness is apparent ~md known to the opponent, you should volunteer it. If you don't, your opponent
will, with twice the impact. (Mallet, 1992, pp. 47-48)
We refer to the strategy mentioned above as stealing thunder. Mallet's opinion
that negative information about one's client should be disclosed before the opposition reveals it is advocated in many other trial technique books (see, for example, Bergman, 1979; Keeton, 1973). In over 40 interviews with attorneys across
the country, the In'st author has been told without exception (and usually in a
manner suggesting that the answer to the question is ludicrously obvious) that
there are no circumstances in which an attorney should not steal thunder.
* We would like to thank Michelle Cox, Gim Koay, Dana Koay, and Ralph Mueller for their helpful
input. Thanks also to Irv Horowitz and Steve Karau for their comments on earlier drafts. Requests
for re~ts~sl~:_~d be made to Kipling Williams, Department of Psychology, University of Toledo,
ToledoLOhio-~3606 or through e-mall: [email protected].
t U n i v e ~ o f Toledo.
Univer~'ty of Utah.
597
0147-7307/93/1200-0597507.00/0 9 1993 Plenum Publishing Corporation
598
WILLIAMS ET AL.
The only published exception to this apparent truism is in Klonoff and Colby's (1990) recent trial strategy book, Sponsorship Strategy. In it, they claim that
criminal defense attorneys facing a decision whether or not to reveal negative
information about their client should almost never do so. Sponsorship strategy
assumes that if the damaging evidence is brought up by the defense, the jury will
accept the credibility of this evidence without questioning it. If, however, the
damaging evidence is brought up by the prosecution, the jury may question its
validity because the prosecution is attempting to persuade the jury to return a
guilty verdict.
Although most attorneys appear to be in favor of using a stealing thunder
strategy, there are many reasons to expect that stealing thunder may be ineffective
or even counterproductive. No empirical research exists testing directly the effectiveness of stealing thunder. Social psychological theories and research findings in the areas of persuasion and impression formation offer conflicting predictions.
Why Stealing Thunder May Be Effective
Framing. Stealing thunder may work because the attorney can frame the
evidence in his or her own terms and downplay its significance. Just as politicians
are eager to put their "spin" on potentially damaging information, stealing thunder may be effective only when the attorneys frame the negative information in the
most positive light. Kassin, Reddy, and Tulloch (1990) showed the beneficial
effects of framing a videotape of a defendant's implausible denial during interrogation in a simulated trial. For mock jurors who were high in need for cognition,
whichever side framed the evidence first was at an advantage. Kassin et al. argued
that high need for cognition jurors are active processors who are eager to come to
a correct decision. They were, therefore, more likely to use the early, positively
framed information to guide their subsequent analysis of the trial information. It
is possible that stealing thunder may depend upon how the thunder is framed,
rather than who reveals it first or how soon it is revealed.
Credibility. Research on impression formation suggests that if a person reveals information that appears to be against his or her own best interest, then he
or she is perceived to be more credible, and hence, more persuasive (Eagly,
Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Walster, Aronson, & Abrahams, 1966). Additionally,
people were perceived as being more likable when they revealed negative informarion about themselves early as opposed to late in an interaction (Archer &
Burleson, 1980; Jones & Gordon, 1972), presumably because they were seen as
more "up front" and "honest" if they revealed the information earlier. Research
in persuasion (e.g., Kelman & Hovland, 1953) has consistently shown that audiences are more persuaded by higher credibility speakers. In a trial setting, if a
defense attorney brings up evidence that is damaging to the defendant's case,
jurors may view the attorney as a more credible speaker and may be more likely
to render a not guilty verdict.
Counterargument Formation. Stealing thunder may also provide an opportunity for an attorney to warn the jury about the upcoming damaging testimony the
STEALING THUNDER
599
prosecution is about to present, or to inoculate them with a weak attack on their
own position. Research on forewarning (e.g., Cialdini & Petty, 1981) suggests that
when an audience is previously warned of an upcoming topic and/or position of a
persuasive message, they may become more resistant to the persuasive attempt.
This resistance is especially likely when the persuasive message is important or
involving (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), as a trial is likely to be for a jury. In
McGuire's (1964) inoculation theory, he argues that when a person holds an attitude that is not buttressed by a strong cognitive arsenal, the attitude can be
attacked relatively easily. If, however, there is a weak initial attack against the
attitude, people will generate counterarguments to strengthen their position and
will be more resistant to a subsequent strong attack. We view stealing thunder as
different from inoculation in that the effectiveness of stealing thunder may not
require that jurors hold an initial attitude at all. It is possible, however, that
stealing thunder may be more effective by weakly attacking the relevance of
damaging information that will come forth later.
Old News is No News. Brock's (1976; Brock & Brannon, 1992) commodity
theory also posits several reasons why stealing thunder might be effective at
decreasing the perceived weight of the negative information. According to this
theory, the value placed on a persuasive message is much like the value placed on
any commodity; the more scarce the commodity, the more valuable it is. A persuasive message will likewise increase in value and effectiveness to the extent that
it is seen as scarce. In the courtroom, if a piece of evidence is brought out by both
the prosecution and the defense, as it is when thunder is stolen, it should be seen
as less scarce (or as "old news") and should carry less weight than if ouly one side
mentions the evidence (as when the thunder is not stolen). Furthermore, commodity theory also predicts that if a communicator is perceived as trying to
conceal a message, the message will also be more effective in persuading others
because it is seen as a secret, and hence, more valuable.
Change of Meaning. Still another possibility is that when people reveal negative information about themselves (or about their clients), the audience of such
messages (the jury in this case) is forced to somehow make sense of the apparent
inconsistency by changing the meaning of the disclosure so that it becomes consistent with the expectations they have of the speaker. A juror could do this by
discounting the importance or impact that the negative revelation seems to carry
with it, or by actually misunderstanding its meaning and making it more consistent
(a form of self-framing). This idea is similar to one proposed by Asch (1948) in his
reanalysis of Lorge's (1936) data, which suggested that people ascribed more
importance to messages authored by credible sources. Asch suggested that even
though the stimulus message was identical, people may have changed its meaning
to fit (or to be more consistent with) the supposed author. Jurors, too, may change
the meaning or importance of potentially damaging information when lawyers or
clients reveal it about themselves first.
Why Stealing Thunder May Be Ineffective
In the notorious Klaus von Bulow trial (von Bulow was a wealthy socialite
accused of trying to murder his wife), yon Bulow's defense attorney disclosed an
600
WILLIAMS ET AL.
affair his client was having before the murder. The defense attorney asked prospective jurors whether this knowledge would affect their ability to judge yon
Bulow fairly. A reporter present at voir dire reported that although the prospective
jurors claimed indifference to the news, many of them were noticeably outraged
(Wright, cited in Wrightsman, 1991). As suggested by the events in this trial, there
are several reasons to expect that stealing thunder may be ineffective or e v e n
counterproductive.
Creating a Negative Schema. Bringing up damaging evidence early in a trial
may increase its salience due to a primacy effect (Asch, 1946). Pyszczynski and
Wrightsman (1981) had subjects listento a reenactment of a criminal trial with
either the defense opening statement first or the prosecution opening statement
first. Those who heard the defense opening first, which emphasized positive aspects of the defendant's case, were more likely to acquit, whereas those who
heard the prosecution opening first were more likely to convict. This suggests that
information heard at the beginning of the trial sets up a schema that jurors use to
interpret the subsequent evidence they hear. When damaging evidence is revealed
early in a trial, the primacy effect may act in conjunction with a confirmation bias
(Wason, 1960) to harm the defense's case. Research suggests that once a certain
schema is set in place during a judgment task, people tend to seek, elicit, and
recall evidence that confirms rather than disconfn'ms the schema (e.g., Lingle &
Ostrom, 1979; Wyer, Srull, & Gordon, 1984). Similarly, decision makers often
"freeze" (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) their information processing once they feel
they have enough information to make a decision. It seems that if a defense
attorney were to present the negative evidence about her client at the beginning of
the trial, this may bias the jurors' perception of the remaining evidence in a way
that would be more damaging to the defendant.
Increased Availability of Negative Information. If the defense in a criminal
trial presents the damaging evidence early and the prosecution repeats it, this may
make it more salient to the jurors as they make their decisions. Cacioppo and
Petty (1979) showed that repeating a persuasive message increased subjects' central processing of the message (see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Similarly, research in cognitive psychology has suggested that multiple exposure of a message
can lead to increased comprehension and recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Nelson,
1977; Rundus, 1971). If the damaging evidence is mentioned by both sides, this
may make it more likely that jurors will remember it when making their decisions.
Overview of Experiments
The primary purpose of our two studies was to provide empirical tests of the
effectiveness of the stealing thunder strategy. These studies were not intended to
tease apart the various reasons just discussed for why the strategy may or may not
work. To the extent that we could assess impressions formed after securing the
verdicts, we hoped to provide some clue as to why the effect may occur. In
Experiment 1, the defense attorney in a criminal trial steals the thunder regarding
his client's prior convictions. In Experiment 2, the plaintiff's expert witness in a
civil negligence trial steals thunder regarding his history of testifying on either side
of the issue. We hypothesized that stealing thunder would influence verdicts in the
STEALING THUNDER
601
direction advocated by the speaker in both studies. A postexperimental questionnaire was used to assess impressions. It was predicted that stealing thunder would
increase the credibility of the speaker who revealed the information, which, in
turn, would cause the change in verdict.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 257 students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at
two large midwestern universities. They received extra course credit for their
participation in the study and were randomly assigned to either read or hear a
reenactment of one of three versions of an 18-page trial transcript.
Procedure
Participants arrived in groups of up to 6 and read or heard a reenacted fictitious criminal trial. 1 The transcript was 18 single-spaced pages and, when acted
out, lasted 35 min. The three conditions were no thunder, the control condition for
the experiment, involving an assault and battery case in which a man was accused
of beating another man after a verbal altercation; thunder, identical to the no
thunder version except that near the end of the defendant's testimony, the prosecuting attorney brought up the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted of the same crime twice before; and stolen thunder, identical to the thunder
version described above except that the defense attorney brought up the evidence
regarding the prior convictions and downplayed the importance of it by noting that
it is not to be considered evidence of culpability (this argument was reiterated by
the judge during jury instructions). The stolen thunder manipulation took up only
four lines of the transcript. All versions of the trial included several eyewitnesses
who placed the defendant at the crime scene, but the evidence for guilt in the no
thunder condition was pretested to be ambiguous. After subjects heard or read the
trial, the experimenter administered a questionnaire asking subjects to render a
verdict on the case (on an 11-point, Likert-type scale, from 0.0 = definitely not
guilty to 1.0 = definitely guilty), as well as answering questions regarding credibility of the defense attorney, the defendant, and the prosecutor (on 9-point,
Liken-type scales).
Results
Probability of Guilt Ratings. First, a planned comparison showed that participants listening to the thunder version of the trial (M = 6.61) were more likely
' A preliminary ANOVA including location of university and mode of transcript (written or audiotape)
showed no main effects or interactions involving these factors on any of the dependent measures.
Therefore subsequent analyses did not include these factors.
602
W I L L I A M S ET AL.
to think the defendant was guilty than those listening to the no thunder version (M
= 5.04), t(168) = - 3.98, p < .001. Next, stolen thunder probability of guilt scores
(M = 5.83) were significantly lower than those in the thunder condition, t(166) =
1.96, p < .05. Finally, stolen thunder probability of guilt scores were significantly
higher than no thunder scores, t(168) = - 1.85, p < .05.
Convincingness and Credibility Ratings. A similar pattern emerged with regard to participants' ratings of defendant convincingness (M = 5.06 for no thunder; M = 4.24 for thunder; M = 4.61 for stolen thunder) and ratings of defense
attorney honesty, (M = 6.09; M = 5.10; M = 5.84, respectively). Paired comparisons indicated increased defendant convincingness in the no thunder condition compared to the thunder condition t(173) = 2.77, p < .001, with stolen
thunder marginally higher than thunder, t(167) = - 1.4, p < .08. Stolen thunder
subjects did not differ from no thunder subjects on this measure, t < 1.
Similarly, ratings of defense attorney honesty were higher in the no thunder
than thunder condition, t(173) = 3.84, p < .001; higher in the stolen thunder
condition than thunder, t(167) = -2.62, p < .01; and not significantly different
when comparing the stolen thunder condition to thunder, t < I.
Path Analysis. The theoretical model by which stealing thunder was thought
to be effective is shown in Figure 1. A path analysis was performed using LISREL
7 (J6reskog & Sfrbom, 1989) to isolate the direct and indirect effects of stealing
thunder. Only subjects in the stolen thunder and thunder conditions were included
in this analysis. The exogenous variable in this analysis was the trial version
(thunder vs. stolen thunder). Endogenous variables included ratings of defense
attorney honesty, convincingness of the defendant, and probability of guilt scores.
The decomposition of total effects of the trial version into direct and indirect
components indicates that the indirect effects of trial version (that is, through
defense attorney honesty and defendant credibility ratings) on probability of guilt
scores are significant (p < .05). That is, after the effects of stolen thunder versus
thunder on credibility ratings were partialed out, the thunder condition had no
residual effect on probability of guilt scores. These results support the hypothesis
..05
Stolen Thunder |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
.17" ..._ [ Deffense Attorney
Credibility Index N
--...
.o,..
..1
of Guilt
.
I
/
/
/
Convincing? [
Fig. 1. Path model o f the effects of trial version on probability of guilt scores in Study 1. Standardized
path coefficients sjmlific~nt at p < .05 are marked with an asterisk.
STEALING THUNDER
603
that stealing thunder affects judgments of guilt by increasing the credibility of the
defense attorney and the defendant.
Discussion
The results of this study support the idea that stealing thunder can be an
effective persuasive strategy in the context of a simulated criminal trial, partially
because of the enhancement of the credibility of both the defense attorney who
used the strategy and the defendant.
In Study 2, we test the effectiveness of stealing thunder about the credibility
of a key witness in a civil trial. Presumably, if this technique is as powerful as is
claimed by some, it should also be effective in a civil trial. Additionally, we
manipulate the disclosure on the part of the plaintiff in this experiment, rather
than for the defense as was done in the first experiment. The negative information
(that is, the thunder) in this case was evidence that the expert witness had recently
(last week) given testimony in another case that contradicts the witness's testimony in the present trial. We hypothesize that stealing thunder will increase
credibility ratings and verdicts for the witness's side (that is, the plaintiffs).
The second study also tests whether the timing of the disclosure is an important variable. If credibility is the essential reason for the success of stealing
thunder, then it should be a more effective strategy when used early, before the
testimony of the witness, than if used later, after the testimony has already been
presented. The reason for this is that if thunder is stolen early, jurors should be
more likely to view the attorney as being "up front" and straightforward. If the
attorney waits until a favorable impression is already created, then the negative
disclosure may be perceived to be manipulative and less credible. On the other
hand, if schema rather than credibility is the important factor, then it would be
more effective to first create a positive schema before stealing the thunder.
A third purpose of Study 2 is to rule out an alternative explanation for the
results of Study 1. It is possible that any form of response will diffuse the impact
of the negative information, regardless of when it is provided. In order to rule out
this alternative explanation in Study 2, the thunder includes a response by the
plaintiffs to the attack by the defense attorney. This response is identical to the
disclosure offered by the plaintiffs in the stealing thunder condition. Consistent
with the credibility explanation, we hypothesize that it is necessary to steal thunder (to appear straightforward and honest) rather than simply to respond to it (and
to appear to have waited to see if the negative information was going to be
revealed before having to defend it).
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Jurors in this experiment were 148 college undergraduates who received extra
course credit for their participation.
604
WILLIAMS ET AL.
Design
Study 2 employed a 3 (no thunder vs. thunder vs. stolen thunder) x 2 (before
vs. after relevant testimony) between-subjects factorial design.
The Trial
The trial used in this study was based on testimony from an actual civil case
in which a man's estate was suing a shipyard, claiming that his exposure to
asbestos on the job caused lung cancer, which subsequently led to the man's
death. The defendants, the shipyard, were claiming that the man also smoked
9cigarettes for 40 years, and that this alone could have caused his lung cancer. The
central evidence in the case consisted of an expert medical witness who testified
in a deposition for the plaintiffs. The testimony consisted of a great deal of technical evidence that used the deceased man's medical records to establish a causal
link between asbestos exposure and lung cancer. The doctor testified that, even
among smokers, people exposed to asbestos are much more likely to contract
cancer.
In the no thunder version, the doctor's credentials established that he was an
expert in the field and that he had written extensively on the topic and testified in
trials many times. In the thunder version, the defendant's attorney also brought up
the fact that the witness had just testified the previous week that using past
medical records to determine causation was not scientifically valid. The expert
witness countered that, as an expert in the field, he could testify for both sides of
such a controversial issue. In the stolen thunder version, the witness himself
brought up the fact that he had testified the opposite last week but that, as an
expert, he could testify for both sides.
Half of the participants heard the witness's credentials (and, hence, the thunder manipulation) before the main body of the expert's testimony, and the other
half heard them afterwards. All versions of the case contained the same expert
testimony except for the manipulation of thunder (i.e., credentials). The thunder
manipulation took up less than a minute of the 25-rain audio presentation.
Procedure
Jurors participated in groups of up to 6, although they completed all dependent measures independently. Each group was randomly assigned to one of the six
experimental conditions. In all conditions participants were told that we were
interested in the reactions of jurors to depositional testimony. After the concept of
depositions was explained to the subjects, they were asked to imagine that they
were actual jurors deciding the case. Legal instructions explained civil concepts
such as causation and preponderance of evidence and how they were to use these
concepts to determine their judgments.
After hearing the evidence, all participants f'dled out a questionnaire that
asked for a verdict (as a dichotomous response for plaintiff or defendant), the
likelihood that asbestos exposure caused the decedent's lung cancer, and credibility ratings of the various trial participants (on 9-point, Likertotype scales).
STEALING THUNDER
605
Various aspects of the expert witness's credibility were assessed by having participants fdl out separate rating scales on the preparedness, convincingness, and
trustworthiness of the expert witness. After filling out the questionnaire, all participants were debriefed and allowed to leave.
Results
The hypotheses of Study 2 were tested by performing chi-square analysis on
subjects' verdicts. In addition, planned comparisons were done on credibility ratings.
Verdicts. There was a marginally significant effect of type of trial on the
dichotomous verdict measure, whereas timing did not have an effect. As shown in
Figure 2, verdicts were more likely to be for the plaintiff under the conditions of
stolen thunder (65%) and no thunder (58%) than in the thunder version (43%), X2
(N = 148) = 5.22, p < .07. Separate 2 x 2 chi-square analyses suggested that the
difference between no thunder and thunder was not significant, X2 (N = 99) =
2.28, p < . 13, but the difference between stolen thunder and thunder was significant, • (N = 100) = 4.94, p < .05. Neither independent variable (thunder or
timing) significantly affected subjects" ratings of the causal role of asbestos in
leading to the decedent's lung cancer. Because timing of disclosure had no main
effects or interactions, subsequent analyses were done collapsing across this variable.
70
60
50
Percent of
jurors
finding for
plaintiff
40
I L~ early
[] late
30
20
10
no thunder
thunder
stolen
thunder
Fig. 2. Percent of jurors findingfor plaintiffas a function of timing and thunder condition.
606
WILLIAMS ET AL.
Credibility Ratings. Trial version also had significant effects on participants'
ratings of the credibility of the plaintiff's witness. Specifically, the no thunder
conditions led to significantly greater ratings of the witness's perceived preparedness (M = 7.4, M = 5.8, respectively), t(97) = 4.25, p < .001; convincingness (M
= 6.3, M = 4.9, respectively), t (97) = 3.25, p < .001; and trustworthiness (M =
6.8, M = 4.7, respectively), t(97) = 4.78, p < .001, than did the thunder conditions. Similarly, the stolen thunder conditions led to significantly greater ratings of
the witness's perceived preparedness (M = 7.4, M = 5.8, respectively), t(98) =
- 4 . 5 1 , p < .001; convincingness (M = 6.5, M = 4.6, respectively), t(98) =
- 4 . 1 3 , p < .001; and trustworthiness (M = 6.4, M = 4.7, respectively), t(98) =
-3.80, p < .001, than did the thunder conditions. Stolen thunder and no thunder
conditions did not differ on any of the credibility ratings, all t's < 1. These findings
paralleled the effects of trial version on verdicts. Again, this was true whether
credentials were presented before or after the testimony. Analysis of credibility
ratings of the two attorneys in the trial did not yield any significant differences
across conditions.
Path Analysis. Results of a path analysis (including only thunder and stolen
thunder conditions) again showed that the indirect effects o f thunder (i.e., through
credibility ratings of the witness) were significant. Because the credibility ratings
of the witness's trustworthiness, convincingness, and preparedness were highly
intercorrelated (all r's > .7), these ratings were summed to form an overall credibility index. After partialing out the effects of thunder version on credibility
judgments, the residual effect of stealing thunder on verdicts was not significant.
Figure 3 shows results of the path analysis.
Discussion
Results of Study 2 replicated the effects of stealing thunder and extended the
findings to a simulated civil trial. Specifically, stealing thunder significantly affected ratings of witness credibility and verdicts such that people were perceived
to be more credible when they revealed negative information about themselves,
Thundervs.
~'~2~
Stolen Thundcx
-.09
X
\
~
Wrd~ct I
%,
caused injm7
I
Fig. 3. Path model of the effects of trial version on verdicts in Study 2. Standardizedpath coefficients
significantat p < .05 are marked with an asterisk.
STEALING THUNDER
607
and this in turn led to more favorable judgments. As in Study 1, the path analysis
suggested that stealing thunder changed verdicts mainly through increasing witness credibility. Additionally, Study 2 found that stealing thunder was an equally
effective persuasive technique whether it was utilized before or after the relevant
testimony was presented.
G E N E R A L DISCUSSION
The two studies reported here suggest that stealing thunder can affect verdicts and credibility ratings of participants in a simulated civil or criminal trial
context. We found the stealing thunder effect in two different trials with different
types of damaging evidence and when stolen by either side of the adversarial
process. Despite the fact that the stimulus cases were relatively long and complex,
we were able to demonstrate reliable stealing thunder effects with proportionately
brief manipulations. Taken together, these results strongly support the stealing
thunder strategy.
Before we universally advocate the use of stealing thunder, we need to rec=
ognize the limitations of these studies. Although Study 2 showed no effects of
timing (i.e., stealing thunder was equally effective whether it was done before or
after a witness's testimony), timing may prove to be important in other contexts.
In an earlier study, Jones and Gordon (1972) found that a person was perceived as
more likable when they revealed negative information early as opposed to late in
a social encounter. Future research should determine when timing of disclosure is
important and when it is not.
Another interesting question is whether flaming of the thunder is important
when stealing it. Is it enough to simply reveal the information early, or must one
also downplay the significance of the negative information for stealing thunder to
be effective? Mallet (1992) believes that framing is essential when stealing thunder: " H o w do you volunteer the weakness? The key is to mention the weakness
without emphasis and to present it in the least damaging light, when it will blend
easily into the story" (p. 48). The studies reported in this article examined stolen
thunder with minimal, yet plausible framing. Although it does not seem likely that
an attorney would bring up damaging evidence without presenting it in its best
light, future research would be needed to determine its necessity. It may be also
that the effectiveness of the technique is limited to certain domains or to certain
types of negative information. For example, as in the yon Bulow case discussed
earlier, it is possible that stealing thunder that is characterological in nature (that
reflects on a defendant's character) may backfire on an attorney. As an extreme
example, would Jeffrey Dahrner's case have been helped by admitting up front
that he was a cannibal? Intuitively, no amount of framing would reduce the impact
of such heinous acts.
At this point it is also unclear whether or not it is crucial for the stealing
thunder effect that one (or one's attorney) brings up the negative information or
whether a neutral third party's revealing it may have similar effects. For example,
in a criminal trial similar to that used in Study I, what if the judge (as opposed to
608
WILLIAMS ET AL.
the defense attorney) brought up the negative information early in a trial? As
Brock's commodity theory (1976; Brock & Brannon, 1992) would suggest, stealing thunder may be effective because it makes old news seem less valuable. If this
reason is sufficient, then it would not matter who stole the thunder. In fact, one
could conceptualize pretrial publicity as a form of stolen thunder by a third
party--the press. If so, existing research suggests that, if anything, pretrial
"thunder" biases people against the defendant about whom the thunder was
revealed (Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990) and does not seem to soften its blow.
Subsequent research should attempt to determine the differences between pretrial
publicity and stealing thunder.
The potential effects of stealing thunder are not limited to the courtroom.
Hypothetically, the process may work in virtually any situation where negative
information may turn up, from relationships to job interviews to politics (cf. Gary
Hart or Bill Clinton) to popular music. With regard to popular music, we need only
compare what happened to the career of Mini VaniUi, after somebody else revealed the information that they did not sing on their record, to that of The
Monkees, who personally revealed the fact that they did not play their instruments
on their early records. We are currently investigating the effectiveness of stealing
thunder in several social contexts, including political campaigns, job interviews,
and the disclosure of personal information in dating situations. We suspect that
the pattern that has emerged in the present studies will generalize to any situation
in which interpersonal judgments are formed.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the present studies indicate that stealing thunder can be an
effective presentation strategy and that it appears to work by enhancing the presenter's credibility. Clearly, we have not attempted to test all of the interesting and
competing possibilities outlined in the introduction. To what extent do jurors
change the meaning or importance of the information? Does the scarcity principle
enhance nonstolen thunder, and if so, under what conditions? Does stealing thunder by itself induce the formation of counterarguments, or is framing necessary?
Under what conditions will stealing thunder backt'tre? Future research aimed at
directly manipulating appropriate variables and assessing intervening cognitive
responses may enlighten us further as to the underlying mechanisms and limitations of the effectiveness of stealing thunder.
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STEALING THUNDER
609
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