WHY DID JAPAN ADOPT
THE POLICY OF "SEPARATING ECONOMICS FROM POLITICS"?
A Look at Post Second World War Sino-Japanese
Relations from a Korean Standpoint
by
CHUNGJA CHO PARK
B.A. , Ewha Womens University, 1950
B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1954
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
i n the Department
of
P o l i t i c a l Science
accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
January, 1973
In presenting this thesis in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for
an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that
the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.
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Department of
P o l i t i c a l Science
The University of B r i t i s h Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada
Date
February 26, 19 73
ABSTRACT
Japan's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s w i t h the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a
have been one
of the most important and c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s s i n c e Japan
r e g a i n e d h e r independence i n 1952.
ties
Geographical proximaty,
historical
t h a t Japan has w i t h C h i n a , and C h i n a b e i n g a major power w i t h n u c l e a r
c a p a b i l i t y made i t v i t a l l y important
f o r Japan to keep a p i p e l i n e open
w i t h h e r , and the p o l i c y o f s e p a r a t i n g economics from p o l i t i c s p e r m i t t e d
trade r e l a t i o n s w i t h h e r .
i n g out why
i t was
In t h i s t h e s i s I am
o f utmost importance
chiefly Interested i n find-
f o r Japan t o adopt
this
principle
of f o r e i g n p o l i c y toward Communist C h i n a .
In the f i r s t s e c t i o n , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and
circumstances which e v e n t u a l l y l e d Japan to adopt
explored.
The
second s e c t i o n w i l l
and i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s p o l i c y .
how
historical
this policy w i l l
d e a l w i t h the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
significance
In s e c t i o n t h r e e I s h o u l d l i k e
the a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n s on " t r a d e " are used by b o t h
be
to a n a l y z e
the C h i n e s e l e a d e r s
and the p r o - P e k i n g l e a d e r s i n Japan as a means o f changing Japan's p o l i c y
toward
is
China.
An important a s p e c t o f t h i s p o l i c y
the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impact
i n Japan.
Korea w i l l be a f f e c t e d by Japan's new
t r e a t e d i n the l a s t
section
F i n a l l y , I s h o u l d l i k e to see
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the P e o p l e ' s
how
Republic
of China.
The
c h i e f cause o f a d o p t i n g and p u r s u i n g the p o l i c y o f s e p a r a t i n g
economics from p o l i t i c s stemmed from i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which
Japan found h e r s e l f as a d e f e a t e d n a t i o n a f t e r the Second World War.
I t was
the n a t u r e o f the San F r a n c i s c o Peace T r e a t y , the t i m i n g o f the s i g n i n g ,
the
ii
attitude of Communist China and Japan's p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to the United
States that made Japan recognize N a t i o n a l i s t China.
Since neither Nation-
a l i s t China nor Communist China would permit diplomatic t i e s with any
country that recognized the other, i t was not possible f o r Japan to recognize
both regimes.
Therefore, Japan maintained only economic relations with
Communist China without any direct p o l i t i c a l contact.
Sino-Japanese trade relations were based on the r e a l i t y
Communist China and Japan.
of both
From Japan's point of view i t was a r e a l i s t i c
approach to maximize economic opportunities and minimize p o l i t i c a l involvement u n t i l the r i g h t opportunity came f o r normalization.
By adopting and
p r a c t i s i n g the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , Japan looked
for larger commercial opportunities i n the future and i t also served as a
pipeline between the two b i g countries i n A s i a .
From China's viewpoint, i t was an "accumulative" approach f o r the
eventual normalization of relations with Japan.
Trade was used as an
instrument of p o l i t i c a l pressure and i t r e f l e c t e d China's p o l i t i c a l aims.
The volume of trade fluctuated and the techniques China used varied according
to the p o l i t i c a l objectives.
China appealed to a "broad p o l i t i c a l spectrum"
i n Japan through private agreements and exchange of u n o f f i c i a l p r i v a t e
delegations.
China threatened Japan with suspension of trade, and manipulated
her with " f r i e n d l y trade" and "memorandum trade".
Since the agreement for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations
was signed on September 29, 1972 the controversial issue of "separating
economics from p o l i t i c s " has become a story of the past.
i
The admission of
iii
Communist C h i n a to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s i n 1971, Nixon's v i s i t
F e b r u a r y , 1972,
to C h i n a i n
and the e v e n t u a l change o f the p o l i c y o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s
gave Japan an o p p o r t u n i t y to change h e r p o l i c y
and r e c o g n i z e the P e o p l e ' s
Republic o f China.
With the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , K o r e a must
seek h e r r o l e by p u r s u i n g "independent and p o s i t i v e " a c t i o n .
The
talks
between North and South f o r the e v e n t u a l u n i f i c a t i o n o f Korea and the
constitution
o f South Korea which was
attempts t o a d j u s t h e r s e l f
to t h i s
adopted i n 1972
role.
reflect
Korea's
new
iv
CONTENTS
Chapter
Page
Introduction
1
I
H i s t o r i c a l Background
5
II
International Reasons
11
Trade Negotiations
16
Internal P o l i t i c a l Reasons
31
Conclusion
39
Bibliography
43
III
IV
INTRODUCTION
As a South Korean, i t has been one of the most important
issues for me to observe Japan's r e l a t i o n s with the People's Republic
of China.
Korea i s sandwiched between the two nations, each a giant:
Japan, an economic power belonging to the group of free, democratic
nations;
China, a growing m i l i t a r y power with her revolutionary zeal
and communist reform.
The impact of their r e l a t i o n s i s f e l t immediately
i n Korea and her national i n t e r e s t and s u r v i v a l has been greatly affected
by t h e i r moves.
For the past twenty years between 1952
to 19 72, Japan has
maintained ties with both N a t i o n a l i s t China and Communist China, one
formal as the other informal, and this kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p was
a l l based
on the p o l i c y of "Separating Economics from P o l i t i c s . "
Separating economics from p o l i t i c s has been used to mean
carrying on economic r e l a t i o n s without d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l contact.
With
respect to Communist China this has meant that Japan has carried on tirade
with China without diplomatic or other d i r e c t contact between the governments.
Japan, i n the meantime, has carried on both trade and diplomatic r e l a t i o n s
with Taiwan.
Because neither of the two Chinas w i l l permit diplomatic
ties with any country that recognizes the other, i t i s not possible to
recognize both regimes.
Now
that Japan established diplomatic r e l a t i o n s
with Peking and Taiwan had broken o f f diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Japan,
Japan may
try to carry out the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s
2
by maintaining i t s trade and other economic t i e s with Taiwan but having
no d i r e c t diplomatic r e l a t i o n s .
Since the two Korean regimes also refuse
to have relations with any country that simultaneously recognizes i t s
r i v a l regime, Japan can maintain diplomatic and trade r e l a t i o n s only with
South Korea.
I t can, however, separate economics from p o l i t i c s by trading
with the North Korean regime but have no diplomatic t i e s .
D. C. Hellmann c a l l e d this p o l i c y "schizophrenic"! -jo a South
Korean i n t e l l e c t u a l , this p o l i c y represents a t y p i c a l side of an "economic
animal" and the p o l i c y p r i n c i p l e being manipulated by " p o l i t i c a l leaders
o
who have two faces and who
c a l l f o r two d i f f e r e n t tunes at the same time."
To former Prime Minister Ikeda, however, i t was
the " r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y " i n
3
r e l a t i o n to Communist China.
Whatever the description or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this p o l i c y
may
be, Japan's foreign r e l a t i o n s with Communist China have been one of the
most important and controversial issues since Japan regained her independence
i n 1952.
The People's Republic of China, a f t e r a l l , governs a l l the main-
land of China, an area about twenty-six times greater than that of Japan,
with a population of 800 m i l l i o n .
Geographical proximity, h i s t o r i c a l t i e s
that Japan has with China, and China being a major power with nuclear
^Donald C. Hellman, "Japan's Relations with Communist China,"
Asian Survey IV (October, 1964) , p.1092.
^Suh Bong Yuen, Choongang Ilbo, September 9, p.3.
•^Chronology, Japan Quarterly, January 1964, p.
250.
3
c a p a b i l i t y made i t v i t a l l y important f o r Japan to keep a p i p e l i n e open
with her giant neighbour, and the p o l i c y of "separating economics from
p o l i t i c s " permitted informal f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with her.
not
a front door diplomacy;
i t was a back door diplomacy waiting f o r a
ripe opportunity for normalization of r e l a t i o n s .
arrived;
In a way, i t was
The ripe time has j u s t
with Prime Minister Tanaka's v i s i t to Peking and the p o l i c y of
s e i k e i bun r i (separation of economics and p o l i t i c s ) i s about to be
reversed.
The p r i n c i p l e of " p o l i t i c s " w i l l be applied to Communist China
and the Japanese leaders hope that the p r i n c i p l e of "economics" w i l l
apply to Formosa.
In this thesis I am c h i e f l y interested i n finding out why i t
was of utmost importance f o r Japan to adopt this p r i n c i p l e of foreign
p o l i c y toward Communist China.
In order to do so, I s h a l l devote the f i r s t
section to exploring the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and h i s t o r i c a l circumstances
which eventually l e d Japan to adopt this p o l i c y .
The second section w i l l deal with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e
and implications of this p o l i c y .
I t was the p o l i c y which gave the means f o r
Japan to maintain informal f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with Communist China without
the
formality of recognizing her and yet get around the objections and demands
of Japan's f r i e n d s , the United States and Formosa.
In section three I should l i k e to analyze how
the actual negotia-
tions on "trade" are used by both the Chinese leaders and the pro-Peking
leaders i n Japan as a means of changing Japan's p o l i c y toward China.
The
process of negotiations was a constant pressure and reminder f o r the Japanese
4
p o l i t i c a l leaders to be aware of the "China problem".
An important
of this p o l i c y treated i n the l a s t section i s i t s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l
n i f i c a n c e i n Japan.
The
aspect
sig-
"China problem" s p l i t the p o l i t i c a l leaders, even
within the government party of the L i b e r a l Democratic Party.
The p o l i c y
offered the means to m o l l i f y the opposition forces, and circumvent the
dominant group i n the government party.
I t was
one of the b i g issues which
the candidates f o r the e l e c t i o n of Prime M i n i s t e r debated during the
e l e c t i o n i n July of
1972.
In section four, I should l i k e to see how
by Japan's new
recent
Korea w i l l be affected
r e l a t i o n s with the People's Republic of China.
5
I
The p o l i c y of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " i s not enunciated by one i n d i v i d u a l , nor does i t spring from any s i n g l e source.
The
p o l i c y has evolved and grown out of Japan's p a r t i c u l a r g e o - p o l i t i c a l s i t uation, and i s heavily circumscribed by the l o g i c of events that have taken
place i n the world.
After the Second World War, i n the s t r i c t sense of the word, f u l l
sovereignty i n foreign r e l a t i o n s started when the San Francisco Peace Treaty
went into e f f e c t on A p r i l 28, 1952.
Even with the freedom to pursue her i n -
dependent course of action i n foreign p o l i c y , Japan had to accept and follow
an already-established course.
I t seems, therefore, very important to ex-
amine and analyze just what the i n t e r n a t i o n a l conditions were that eventually
led
Japan to adopt the p o l i c y p r i n c i p l e of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s . "
In
the f i r s t place, Japanese foreign p o l i c i e s cannot be considered
without taking into account her r e l a t i o n s with the United States.
U n t i l the
San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed and went into e f f e c t , Japan was under
the
occupation of the A l l i e d Forces and the core of the A l l i e d Forces
was the United States Army.
the
The Supreme Commander of the A l l i e d Forces was
American general, Douglas McArthur, who actually ruled Japan and h i s
rule was d i r e c t l y influenced by the United States foreign p o l i c y towards Asia
and toward the entire world.
When Japan regained her independence i n 1952, the world was
into two b l o c s
divided
each dominated by the two superpowers, the United States
6
and the Soviet Union.
Japan, under the occupation and influence of the
United States, had to choose her side i n the Cold War,
and i t was
almost
the natural course of action that Japan stood on the side of the Western
powers.
Prime Minister Yoshida had this to say, that,
"since the United States and the Soviet Union, the two
major powers, are i n opposition to each other, one
supported by a group of free countries, the other by
the s a t e l l i t e Communist nations, the only l o g i c a l p o l i c y
for (both West Germany and) Japan to adopt i n foreign
a f f a i r s i s co-operation with the United States as members of the group of free nations.
The San Francisco Peace Conference i t s e l f was
the product of the Cold
War,
i
and the Treaty was
drafted and signed under the assumption that "Japan
would do her best to contribute towards the strengthening of a close and
s o l i d relationship with the United States."^
The timing and signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty i n September 1951,
States was
and not before, was
very important because at that time the United
f i g h t i n g i n Korea as a member of the United Nations Forces against
North Korean communists and the "volunteer" forces of Communist China.
Had
the Treaty been signed and r a t i f i e d as the United States f i r s t intended to do
i n 1947^
the Japanese course of action would have been quite d i f f e r e n t .
Japan,
as a defeated nation under the severe terms of punishment and reparations,
might have chosen a " n e u t r a l " p o l i c y and her c o l l a b o r a t i o n with the United
Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1961),
p. 111.
'ibid., p.
250.
Richard N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951 (London and
New York: Cambridge University Press f o r Melbourne University Press, 1962),
p. 148.
7
States would not have been so close.
I t was
the Korean War which had
the
decisive impact on the negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
sixteen months before the Korean War
s t a r t e d i n June 1950,
Only
the United States
Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, said i n Tokyo that Japan and the Far
East were of secondary importance i n the world s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n and
the
United States forces might be withdrawn i n the event of war with the Communists.
7
When John Foster Dulles was
undertaking h i s mission i n preparatory
negotiations for the Treaty, he had two choices i n the formulation of United
States' p o l i c y .
One was
to b u i l d up Japanese strength and do everything pos-
s i b l e to keep Japan on the United States' side, and the other was
to try to
detach Communist China from the Soviet Orbit and l e t China take her former
8
p o s i t i o n on the Anglo-American side of the balance.
l a t t e r course impossible and Mainland
China was
she sent "volunteer" forces to Korea.
The Korean War made the
l a b e l l e d "aggressor" a f t e r
Throughout the war,
Japan was
the rear
base f o r the United Nations forces i n Korea, and Japan had to be counted upon
as a free world member state when the Treaty was
signed i n 1951.
From the outset Communist China adopted a h o s t i l e p o l i c y toward
Japan.
The People's Republic of China was proclaimed i n October 1949
China concluded
and
the Treaty of Friendship, A l l i a n c e , and Mutual Assistance
with the Soviet Union i n February 1950.
This agreement provided f o r a j o i n t
defensive stance against Japan, and A r t i c l e I stated that the signatories
undertook j o i n t l y to "adopt a l l necessary measures at t h e i r disposal for the
New York Times, February 17, 1949,
p.
10.
^Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 127.
8
purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and v i o l a t i o n of peace
on the part of Japan o r any other state that may collaborate with Japan
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y i n acts of aggression."
I t i s notable that the wording of the Treaty was focussed on Japan
and i t i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to understand why both the U.S.S.R. and Communist
China overestimated Japan's strength.
Japan, i n 1950, i n f a c t , was s t i l l
a defeated nation, completely disarmed and i t s war-making capacity e n t i r e l y
eliminated by i t s new c o n s t i t u t i o n .
Harold C. Hinton suggests that,
" i t was probably S t a l i n , rather than Mao, who preferred to
name Japan instead of the United States as the power whose
alleged aggressive tendencies the a l l i a n c e was e x p l i c i t y
directed,
but i t must be taken into account that China was the d i r e c t v i c t i m o f Japanese imperialism and was f e a r f u l of the r e v i v a l of Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and .
imperialism.
Compared with Japan, Communist China p r a c t i c a l l y had no ex-
perience i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , and i t i s not very s u r p r i s i n g that Communist China i n the wake of her success i n defeating N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese considered Japan a threatening power.
Japan had yet to formulate her p o l i c y to-
ward Communist China, but China had already adopted a h o s t i l e p o l i c y toward
Jap an.
When the question of which o f the two Chinas should be represented
at
the peace conference came up, according to the r e c o l l e c t i o n of Yoshida,
the United States had i n s i s t e d that she would not on any account sign a
Harold Hinton, Communist China i n World P o l i t i c s (Boston:
f l i n Company, 1966), p. 123.
Houghton, Mif-
9
treaty i n company with Communist China, while the United Kingdom maintained
that of the two Chinese governments, the one that should be seated and sign
at the conference was Communist China.
In the end i t was agreed that China
should not be represented at the conference, and that Japan could sign a
separate peace treaty l a t e r with whichever of the two Chinese governments
she chose to recognize."*"^
Indeed, on the surface, Japan was l e f t with the freedom to pick
either N a t i o n a l i s t China or Communist China to be the other party i n concluding peace with J a p a n a n d A r t i c l e 26 o f the Peace Treaty gave the l e g a l base
for i t , but i n a c t u a l i t y Japan didn't have much choice.
a l i s t Chinese with whom Japan had conducted
I t was the Nation-
the war, and her p o s i t i o n i n the
Security Council i n the United Nations was a very important factor f o r Japan.
U n t i l the end of 1951,
Japan adopted the cautious p o l i c y of welcoming f r i e n d l y
and intimate economic r e l a t i o n s with Taiwan, but at the same time, avoiding
any form of t i e s with Taiwan which would probably win the strong disapproval
12
of
the newly established Communist China.
When John Foster Dulles made h i s fourth v i s i t to Japan i n December
1951, he answered to a newspaperman i n Japan that he had no intention of i n posing
upon Japan which of the two governments of China she should choose
to make a peacy treaty.
However when the question of what the United States'
Senate would do i f Japan didn't make i t clear that she intended to make a
^ Y o s h i d a , op_. c i t . , p. 253.
"^Morinosuke Kajima, A B r i e f Diplomatic History of Modern Japan (Rutland
and Tokyo: Charles F. Tuttle & Co., 1965), p. 151.
12
Ibid., p. 151.
10
peace treaty with N a t i o n l i s t China, the answer was, "In case Japan recognized Communist China unexpectedly,
the Senate might not r a t i f y the
13
Peace Treaty."
The r e s u l t of the Dulles v i s i t ended with a l e t t e r
from Yoshida to Dulles on December 24, 1951, affirming that "Japan has
no i n t e n t i o n of concluding a b i l a t e r a l treaty with Communist China" and
assured him that "Japan i s ready to formalize r e l a t i o n s with the Nationa l i s t government i n accordance with the p r i n c i p l e s l a i d down i n the San
»14
Francisco Peace Treaty.
As the incident of this l e t t e r i n d i c a t e s ,
Japan was already oriented toward the "Washington l i n e , " and the pressure
was on her to recognize and have diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with N a t i o n a l i s t
China.
Accordingly, on A p r i l 28, 1952, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was
concluded with N a t i o n a l i s t
China.
So f a r , I have examined the simple question why Japan chose Nationa l i s t China instead of Communist China to conclude the Peace Treaty and
to e s t a b l i s h diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with.
The f a c t that Japan was a member
of the Western b l o c does not n e c e s s a r i l y answer the whole question.
The
United Kingdom, for instance, recognized Communist China i n 1949. I t was
the process and nature o f the San Francisco Treaty, the timing of the s i g n ing, the a t t i t u d e of Communist China, Japan's p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to the
United States, and a c e r t a i n pressure as w e l l as an expectation from the
United States, that were a l l woven together f o r Japan to adopt the p o l i c y
of recognizing N a t i o n a l i s t China.
The root of the p o l i c y of separating
economics from p o l i t i c s s t a r t e d at this point.
Asahi Shinbun, December 11, 1951, p. 1.
Asahi Nenkan, 1952, p. 105.
11
II
Because o f the reasons stated above, Japan's r e l a t i o n s with Communist China cannot be considered without taking into account her r e l a t i o n s
with the United States and N a t i o n a l i s t China.
Japan's external p o l i c y had
to comply w i t h i n the framework of the United States' o v e r a l l foreign p o l i c y .
I t i s e s s e n t i a l to c o r r e l a t e Japan's r e l a t i o n s with f i r s t the United States
and secondly with N a t i o n a l i s t China.
The p o l i c y of separating economics from
p o l i t i c s emerged and evolved out of the t r i a n g l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between Japan,
the United States and N a t i o n a l i s t
China.
When Japan regained her independence i n 1952,
the o v e r a l l foreign
p o l i c y o f the United States was the p o l i c y of "containment."
containment, before the Korean War
expansion
The p o l i c y o f
started, was mainly aimed to stop the
of communist influence i n Europe exercised by the Soviet Union.
According to George F. Kennan who f i r s t proposed this p o l i c y i n h i s a r t i c l e ,
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct," there were three postulates regarding Soviet
b e l i e f s and expectations.
of
was
The f i r s t of these was the Kremlin's
acceptance
the fundamental antagonism between c a p i t a l i s m and communism. The second
that the Soviets believed that capitalism i n this competition was doomed
and therefore there was no need to engage i n a l l - o u t war.
The t h i r d was
the Soviet assumption of Kremlin i n f a l l i b i l i t y made i t useless to negotiate
with Russian diplomats since a l l important
He,
decisions were made at top l e v e l .
therefore, came up with the p o l i c y which he summarized:
12
"In these circumstances i t i s c l e a r that the main element of
any United States p o l i c y toward the Soviet Union must be that
of a long-term, patient but firm and v i g i l a n t containment of
Russian expansive tendencies."-^
A f t e r this a r t i c l e was
published the term "containment" was
up and elevated to the status of a "doctrine" which was
picked
then i d e n t i f i e d with
16
the foreign p o l i c y of the United States.
With the outbreak of the Korean War,
to be applied to the Far East.
the p o l i c y of containment came
President Truman stated on June 27,
1950:
"The attack upon Korea makes i t p l a i n beyond a l l doubt that
Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and w i l l now use armed invasion
and war.""
Accordingly he ordered United States a i r and sea forces to give the
Korean government troops cover and
support.
Regarding N a t i o n a l i s t China, i n the same statement, President Truman
reversed the p o s i t i o n he had enunciated on January 5 that same year.
In
that statement he said that Taiwan had already become Chinese t e r r i t o r y i n
keeping with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and that the f i g h t i n g between
the Chinese Communists and N a t i o n a l i s t s was
a c i v i l war
i n which the
U.S.
•^Goerge F. Kennan, under the pseudonym of "Mr. X", "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct," Foreign A f f a i r s , Vol 25, No. 4 (July 1947), p. 375.
16
George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston:
p. 356.
17
New York Times, June 28, 1950,
p.
1.
Brown and Company 1967),
13
Forces would not be used.
But h i s new p o l i c y statement was
that,
"In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by
Communist forces would be a d i r e c t threat to the security
of the P a c i f i c area and to United States forces performing t h e i r lawful and necessary function i n that area.
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent
any attack on Formosa . . .
The Seventh Fleet w i l l see
that this i s done."
19
Within s i x months the p o l i c y of the United States toward Asia
had changed r a d i c a l l y , and i t indicated that the United States viewed the
Korean War as an extension of Soviet communist power i n Asia.
From the
viewpoint of the United States, South Korea and N a t i o n a l i s t China were not
considered to be p a r t i e s to a mere c i v i l war, but f r o n t l i n e s i n a struggle
between communism and the western world.
Japan also became very important
i n t h i s struggle, f o r without Japan, the United States would lose a v i t a l
communication, supply and s t r a t e g i c base i n the Far East.
Thus, South Korea, N a t i o n a l i s t China and Japan became embroiled i n
the
defence of the
"free world" and the United States established a series
of a l l i a n c e s aimed at the containment of communism.
The Mutual Defence
Treaty was concluded with the Republic of Korea i n October 1953, and with
the
Republic of China a m i l i t a r y assistance agreement i n February 1951 and
a Mutual Defence Treaty i n December 1954.
With Japan, the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security was signed i n 1951.
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United
New York Times, January 6, 1950, p. 1.
New York Times, June 28, 1950, p. 1.
14
States of America
and Japan t i e d Japan d i r e c t l y to the United States, f o r
Japan depended e n t i r e l y on the United States for n a t i o n a l defence.
Article
V provided:
"Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
party i n the t e r r i t o r i e s under the administration of Japan
would be dangerous to i t s own peace and safety and declares
that i t would act to meet the common danger i n accordance
with i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions and processes."
The treaty went on to say i n A r t i c l e VI that,
"For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and
maintenance of peace and security i n the Far East, the United
States of America i s granted the use by i t s land, a i r and
naval forces of f a c i l i t i e s and areas i n Japan."
In these circumstances
i t was
the n a t u r a l course of development
that Japan had to cooperate and be party to the accomplishment of the p o l i c y
of containment i n Asia.
Japan and the United States became indispensable
partners to each other.
As a r e s u l t of Treaty commitments, Japan followed the United States
p o l i c y of non-recognition of Communist China and established formal diplomatic
t i e s s o l e l y with the N a t i o n a l i s t government i n Formosa.
As f a r as Japan's r e l a t i o n s with N a t i o n a l i s t China are concerned,
Japan recognized the N a t i o n a l i s t government as the de jure government of China
by concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty i n A p r i l 1952,
war between Japan and China was
terminated.
and the state of
At f i r s t Japan might have appeared
to recognize N a t i o n a l i s t China wholely under pressure from the United States,
but Japan on her part, i s "indebted" to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who
nounced a l l right to claim any
reparations
from Japan.
re-
He had e a r l i e r issued
15
proclamation to "repay enmity with, v i r t u e " and safely r e p a t r i a t e more than
20
two m i l l i o n Japanese s o l d i e r s from the Chinese
Mainland.
Thus Japan's r e l a t i o n s with Communist China emerged as the result
of Japan's o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s with the United States and N a t i o n a l i s t China.
Non-recognition of Communist China suited Japan's three fundamental objectives of foreign p o l i c y since her independence, which are the "Cooperation
with the free world community," "Support of the United Nations," and "being
21
a staunch member state of the Asian community."
Japan also was
able to
insure her security by being a member of the "free world," f o r American containment of Communist China meant at the same time protection f o r Japan under
the nuclear umbrella of the United States.
In order to "contain" Communist
China, the United States had i t s nuclear base i n Okinawa, i t s Seventh Fleet
i n Taiwan S t r a i t , m i l i t a r y bases i n South Korea, and l a t e r i n Vietnam.
was
Japan
able to become the t h i r d economic power i n the world by completely r e l y -
ing upon the United States f o r her n a t i o n a l defence.
The p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s stemmed from the
b a s i c assumption
that Japan wanted to maximize b e n e f i t s with f r i e n d l y nations
and at the same time minimize h o s t i l i t y with Communist China.
In this aspect,
Japan did not follow unswervingly the l i n e of the United States p o l i c y toward
Communist China.
By adopting the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s ,
Japan carried on non-strategic trade with China but did not i n v i t e the f e e l i n g
of b e t r a y a l from the United States, N a t i o n a l i s t China and South Korea.
she was
able to maintain a p i p e l i n e with Communist China.
Morinosuke Kajima, op. c i t . , p.
Ibid., p.
191.
139.
Yet,
16
III
The t h i r d important aspect of the p o l i c y of separating economics
from p o l i t i c s i s the f a c t that this p o l i c y , despite the o f f i c i a l protest
and the counter-claim by China of the p r i n c i p l e of " i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s and economics," was
accepted by i t , and Sino-Japanese trade was
r i e d on from the establishment of the People's Republic.
The attitude of
Communist China towards Japan i n this aspect, was quite d i f f e r e n t from
attitude towards the United States.
car-
its
I t seems appropriate to examine what
i t i s which made this p o l i c y work with Communist China.
The p o l i c y of sep-
arating economics from p o l i t i c s would not have worked unless Communist China
was w i l l i n g to trade with Japan.
From the p o s i t i o n of Communist China, what
advantage could i t gain?
Communist China's attitude to trade with Japan has been quite d i f ferent from that of the United States toward China trade.
Roger Hilsman,
Assistant Secretary of State, i n a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San
Francisco, underlines this difference.
"Much speculation has
commercial relations
and Communist China.
c r y s t a l clear on this
of i t , "
He s a i d :
turned around the question of p o s s i b l e
. . . between p r i v a t e American firms
Peking's own p o l i c y , however, seems
point. Peking apparently wants none
and Hilsman quoted one Chinese o f f i c i a l as saying that,
"we won't trade with the United States because the United
States Government i s h o s t i l e to us,"
17
and he emphasized Mao's maxim that " p o l i t i c s and economics are inseparable."
The oft-repeated Chinese o f f i c i a l emphasis
that " p o l i t i c s and ec-
onomics are inseparable" c o l l i d e d d i r e c t l y with the p r i n c i p l e of separating
economics from p o l i t i c s .
The United States refused to trade with China, but
trade with Japan was a d i f f e r e n t story.
Marius B. Jansen brought out this
point saying that the story of Sino-Japanese trade r e l a t i o n s i s f u l l of irony.
Economics and p o l i t i c s are inseparable, according to Chairman Mao, but i n
23
fact the Chinese have been w i l l i n g to separate them f o r the Japanese.
There are two main i n t e r e s t s involved between Japan and Communist
China i n t h e i r trade r e l a t i o n s .
a p o l i t i c a l interest.
One i s an economic i n t e r e s t , and the other,
One c e r t a i n l y cannot deny the economic advantages of
trade between Japan and Communist China.
A developing China and an indust-
r i a l l y advanced Japan could benefit each other by promoting close trade r e l a tions.
Geographical proximity, f o r one, reduces shipping costs.
An example
of these savings i s shown underneath i n Japan's trade with the United States
a f t e r Japan followed the embargo on trade with Communist China.
In 1956
Japan imported coal from the United States at $26.50 per ton, while i t was
possible to import some from Communist China at $12.20, less than h a l f the
amount.
With s a l t , Japan paid $18.10 per ton from the United States while
i t cost only $9.50 from Communist China.
The items of trading goods are also complementary to each other.
Japanese items such as f e r t i l i z e r , machinery and s t e e l goods are just what
22
New York Times, December 14, 1968, p. 2.
23
Marius B. Jansen, "China and Japan," P o l i c i e s Toward China: Views from Six
Continents, edited by A.M. Halpern (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1965), p. 460.
18
Table I
China
U.S.A.
Average p r i c e of
t o t a l imports
Coal (ton)
$12.2
$25.5
$24.0
Iron Ore (ton)
$13.7
$20.3
$18.6
Salt (ton)
$ 9.4
$18.1
$12.9
Source: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Return of the Foreign
Trade of Japan (Tokyo), No. 74 (Jan.-Dec. 1956), c i t e d by
Leng Shao-Chuan, Japan and Communist China (Tokyo: Doshisha
University Press, 1958), p. 60.
r
China needs and many Japanese products are more suited to Chinese people
than s i m i l a r products manufactured i n Western countries.
And some Chinese
products such as soy beans have a ready market i n Japan but v i r t u a l l y none
i n Europe.
Besides, from the p o s i t i o n of Japan, foreign trade has always been
a major consideration i n the foreign p o l i c y of contemporary Japan and China
i s a b i g market with 800 m i l l i o n people.
Japan, l i k e B r i t a i n , i s i n a p o s i -
t i o n to "trade or fade" and has to follow the l i n e of " p o l i t i c s i s p o l i t i c s ,
2A
trade i s trade."
But as a trade partner, Japan i s v a s t l y more important
25
to China than China i s to Japan.
More important than trade i t s e l f , other p o l i t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l
considerations promoted trade between Japan and Communist China.
In this
aspect, they used trade as a means to achieve t h e i r p o l i t i c a l aims, and t h i s
24
Young Hum Kim, East Asia's Turbulent Century (New York: Appleton L. CenturyCrofts D i v i s i o n of Meredith Publishing Company, 1966), p. 174.
25
L. W. Beer, "Some Dimensions of Japan's Present and P o t e n t i a l Relations with
Communist China," Asian Survey, V o l . IX, No. 3 (March, 1969).
19
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so with Communist China.
into trade.
Peking always injected
politics
Accordingly, what Japan w i l l s e l l and buy and the terms and
conditions of trade w i l l be determined by Chinese Communist leaders to f i t
26
their own p o l i t i c a l aims rather than t h e i r own or Japan's economic
At
the core of the p o l i t i c a l nature of Sino-Japanese trade are
the major objectives of Chinese foreign p o l i c y toward Japan.
objective was
needs.
The
first
to separate Japan from the influence of the United States,
and the second was to prevent Japan from dealing with "two Chinas."
The
immediate p o l i c y which China adopted varied according to the domestic and
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , but there were no changes as f a r as t h e i r major
27
objectives i n p r i n c i p l e was concerned.
"The i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s
and economics" i s the p r i n c i p l e aimed to achieve these ends, and the Chinese
government hoped to b u i l d up pressure i n Japan, through trade, to a t t a i n
the
eventual normalization of r e l a t i o n s between the two countries.
From the very beginning of trade r e l a t i o n s the Chinese had these
objectives i n mind, and they are c l e a r l y maintained throughout the h i s t o r y
of trade r e l a t i o n s .
J . Stephen Hoadley and Sukehiro Hasegawa divide the
Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s between 1950 and 1970 i n terms of four linkage periods, and i t i s convenient to follow t h e i r d i v i s i o n , since they bring out
the
immediate aims of Communist China very c l e a r l y and the f l u c t u a t i o n s of
trade between Japan and China.
The f i r s t , an i d e o l o g i c a l linkage under the
"people's diplomacy," and second, p o l i t i c a l linkage with "peace diplomacy,"
'Wilbur Martin, "Japan and the Rise of Communist China," Japan between East
and West, edited by Hugh Borton (New York: Harper for the Council on
Foreign Relations, 1959), p. 201.
r
Tadao Ishikawa, "Communsit China's Policy toward Japan," The Future of Communist China, edited by Joon Yup Kim (Seoul: Bum Moon Sa, 1967), p. 393.
20
the t h i r d , economic linkage with "friendship trade," and the l a s t , quasi28
diplomatic linkage with "L-T Trade."
The f i r s t two linkages cover the
" u n o f f i c i a l , " "private" trade agreements between 1950 and 1957.
During
this period, the trade volume was small, but as the r e s u l t of opening a
regular trade channel, a number of private organizations were established
i n Japan to promote Sino-Japanese trade, including the Japan-China Friendship Association, the Association f o r the Promotion of International Trade,
and the Japan-China Importers' and Exporters' Association.
Through these associations, Individual Japanese leaders and p r i vate firms, Peking's main objectives during this period were to c u l t i v a t e
Japanese friendship, to encourage Japan to detach i t s e l f from the U.S.Japan a l l i a n c e and to support Japanese domestic r a d i c a l s favouring China
over the United States.
Thus, Peking worked to increase the p o l i t i c a l
pressures on the Japanese government to grant at least de facto recognition
of Communist China.
This kind of approach, however, did not bring the desired r e s u l t s ,
and the arguments over the p r i n c i p l e of separating economics from p o l i t i c s
had already started.
Shanghai i n 1956,
When the Japanese trade, f a i r s were held i n Peking and
Ta Rung Pao pointed out, i n p r a i s i n g the trade f a i r , that
trade ought not to be separated from p o l i t i c s even though the Japanese embargo on s t r a t e g i c goods had prevented many Japanese products from being on
29
display i n the trade f a i r .
On the part of the Japanese government, Prime
J . Stephen Hoadley and Sukehiro Hasegawa, "Sino-Japanese Relations 19501970," International Quarterly. Vol. 15 No. 2 (June, 1971).
T
9
' Ta Kung Pao, October 29, 1956, c i t e d by C. P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with
Communist China," Asian Survey. V o l : IX (December; 1969), p. 907.
21
Minister K i s h i stated i n June 1957
during his v i s i t to Washington that Japan
had no intention to extend p o l i t i c a l recognition to Peking, and this statement c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d Japan's p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s .
Private, u n - o f f i c i a l trade was
suspended a f t e r concluding the
fourth Sino-Japanese agreement on March 5, 1958.
The reasons f o r suspen-
sion given by the Communist Chinese trade corporations were the r e f u s a l
to f u l l y honour the fourth Japan-China p r i v a t e trade agreement by the K i s h i
administration and an i n s u l t to the Chinese national f l a g i n Nagasaki, which
30
had been torn down by a student who
had not been punished.
However, the
r e a l motivations of Peking could be interpreted as one of trying to i n f l u ence the outcome of the Japanese general e l e c t i o n of that month by holding
K i s h i responsible f o r the suspension of trade.
Peking also might have hoped
to influence Japanese p o l i t i c a l groups to pressure the K i s h i government i n 31
to concessions to Peking.
A f t e r two years of trade suspension, i t was
Communist China which
again i n i t i a t e d the opening of "friendship trade" i n 1960.
I t was begun
by Premier Chou and Chinese p o l i t i c a l objectives during the t h i r d linkage
period are seen c l e a r l y i n t h e i r demands.
This trade was
so named because
the Chinese wanted to trade with only a few " f r i e n d l y " Japanese companies
which pledged to respect Chou's three p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and oppose the
U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.
Chou's three p o l i t i c k , p r i n c i p l e s were:
1) not to adopt p o l i c y i n i m i c a l to China, 2) not to j o i n a p l o t to recognize two Chinas, and 3) not to hamper attempts to normalize Sino-Japanese
30
Uemura Sachisei, "Around the Nagasaki National Flag Incident," Asahi
Janaru, Vol. 14, No. 35 (September 1, 1972), p. 12.
31
C P . Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China," Asian Survey, Vol. IX
(December, 1969), p. 910.
22
relations.
32
Under these conditions, the Chinese held the ultimate r i g h t to
decide which companies are " f r i e n d l y " and which were not, and whether to
recognize or r e j e c t Japanese companies.
The firms were also e a s i l y able
to obtain favorable commercial terms i n such s p e c i f i c arrangements as
33
p r i c i n g , inspection, a r b i t r a t i o n and shipping.
The " f r i e n d l y " firms which China chose, however, were small and
weak, and the p o l i t i c a l objectives of e s t a b l i s h i n g channels of communication and influence upon the r u l i n g L i b e r a l Democratic Party and major i n dustries were only p a r t i a l l y affected.
In order to supplement and
the channels opened by "Friendship" trade, an L-T Trade was
enlarge
signed on Nov-
ember 9, 1962, and China entered a quasi-diplomatic, linkage period.
trade was
c a l l e d "L-T Trade" because i t was
The
signed by Liao Cheng-Chih and
Takasaki Tatsunosuke and i t covered an " o v e r - a l l trade" f o r f i v e years
be-
tween 1963 and 1967. .
The L-T Trade had a s e m i - o f f i c i a l nature since Takasaki was
of the L i b e r a l Democratic Party leaders i n the Diet and he had
the
one
support
of a s u b s t a n t i a l portion of the L.D.P. Diet members as w e l l as the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry.
the agreement was
From the L.D.P. leaders' viewpoint,
s a t i s f a c t o r y since the Chinese leaders genuinely
34
nized the necessity of dealing with the Japanese conservatives
recog-
and i t
showed that the Chinese f i n a l l y accepted the r e a l i t i e s by t a c i t l y consenting
32
Asahi Nenkan, 1963, p. 305.
33
Chae-Jin Lee, "The P o l i t i c s of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations, 1963-68,"
P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , XLII CSummer, 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 129.
34
A.M. Halpern, "China and Japan," China i n C r i s i s , edited by Tang Tsou
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 6 8 ) , p. 447.
23
to tolerate the Japanese government's established p r i n c i p l e of "separating economics
from p o l i t i c s . "
From the p o s i t i o n of Communist China, the agreement gave them the
opportunity to maintain two trade channels of "friendship trade" and "L-T
Trade."
Their c a l c u l a t i o n on maintaining separate trade channels were again
political.
Friendship trade serves China's short-range goals such as stim-
u l a t i o n of Japanese l e f t wing p o l i t i c a l support for China and Mao
and opposi-
tion to the Sato government p o l i c y toward Taiwan and the United States, while
L-T Trade serves long-range goals such as an encouragement of top conservat i v e L.D.P. leaders recognition of China as a legitimate and respected n e i 35
ghbor.
They aimed at small pay-offs i n the short run while deferring to
I
prospect of large pay-offs such as the normalization of r e l a t i o n s between
the
two countries.
The conclusion of L-T Trade also gave Communist China a good ex-
cuse to engage i n quasi-diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s .
Trade L i a i s o n Council" was
its first
ments.
The "Japan-China Over-All
founded i n Tokyo with Takasaki Tatsunosuke as
chairman to f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of the L-T Trade agree-
Also, on August 13, 1964, Communist China was
authorized to open
a trade l i a i s o n o f f i c e i n Tokyo, headed by Sun Ping-hua.
Since the open-
ing of this o f f i c e , i t continued to function more as a p o l i t i c a l agency
than as normal trade mission, and the Chinese gradually engaged i n a wide
36
range of open p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s against the Japanese government.
kind of a c t i v i t y i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by the statement of Liao
during a v i s i t to the Tokyo L i a i s o n O f f i c e who
This
Cheng-chih\
s a i d , on September 9,
1967,
that Sato's v i s i t to Taiwan, "constituted a criminal interference i n China's
35
Hoadley and Hasegawa, op. c i t . , p. 151.
~^Lee, op. c i t . , p. 135.
24
domestic a f f a i r s and the act of p o l i t i c a l provocation against the Chinese
people."
To this statement the Japanese o f f i c i a l of the Ministry of For-
eign A f f a i r s showed his displeasure "that the l i a i s o n o f f i c e which should
be concerned for the promotion of Japan-China trade should not utter such
37
p o l i t i c a l statements."
Communist China was also able to manipulate the competitive r e l a tionship between friendship and L-T Trade agreements.
As Table 2 shows,
the Sino-Japanese trade volumes were almost equally divided between the
two u n t i l 1965. In 1966, however, the " f r i e n d l y " firms trade accounted
for 67 per cent and the L-T Trade only 33 per cent.
By 1967, the propor-
tion of L-T Trade i n t o t a l volume further declined to 27.7 per cent.
This
decline was a d i r e c t r e s u l t of Communist China's increasingly h o s t i l e a t t i tude toward Sato's government.
This h o s t i l i t y was heightened by the "private
l e t t e r " o f Yoshida which gave the assurance to the N a t i o n a l i s t government i n
Taiwan that the Japanese Import and Export bank would no longer be used to
38
finance Japanese i n d u s t r i a l exports to Peking.
This "private l e t t e r " was
produced as a r e s u l t of protest from N a t i o n a l i s t China when the Kuroshiki
Rayon Company of Japan agreed to export a $22 m i l l i o n nylon plant to Communist China, and i n August 1963 the Japanese government approved the export under a five-year deferred payment plan.
"Yoshida's l e t t e r " gave a series of set-backs to Peking's p r e s t i g e i
and i n t e r e s t s , and i n r e t a l i a t i o n i n 1965 the Chinese delayed renewal of
the L-T Trade arrangement, but permitted the f r i e n d l y trade to increase.
Asahi Shinbun, September 9, 1967, p. 3.
!
Asahi Shinbun, March 6, 1968, p. 7.
25
Table 2
The Evaluation of the "Friendly Firms" Trade and the L-T Trade i n
Sino -Japanese Trade
(unit : 1,000
Year
dollars)
Composition
(%)
Compared to Previous
Year (%)
Volume of Trade
Friendly
Firm Trade
L-T
Trade
53.7
46.3
202.6
58.6
41.4
156.7
143.6
60.7
39.3
205,058
146.0
111.1
67.0
33.0
154,408
96.8
75.3
72.3
27.7
Friendly
Firm Trade
L-T
Trade
Friendly
Firm Trade
L-T
Trade
1963
73,577
63,439
1964
181,947
128,542
247.3
1965
285,133
184,608
1966
416,329
1967
403,022
Source:
Chugoku Kenkyusho (China Research I n s t i t u t e ) ed. , Shin Chugoku Nenkan (New China Yearbook), Tokyo: Toho Shoten, 1968, p. 179.
—
—
They also i n t e n s i f i e d their propaganda campaign against Sato's "Anti-China"
policy.
Another reason that Communist China put the p r i o r i t y on " f r i e n d l y "
trade i n 1966 and 1967 was
that the large firms and industries which joined
the L-T Trade were p o l i t i c a l l y uncontrollable, compared with " f r i e n d l y firms"
which engaged i n pro-Chinese a c t i v i t i e s on behalf of Peking.
The L-T firms
were large and carried on trade on the basis of long-term arrangements with
China.
They were, therefore, less dependent on China and l e s s susceptible
39
to Chinese p o l i t i c a l pressure.
Since detailed arrangements under the L-T Trade agreement had to
be negotiated on a yearly basis, Peking was able to drive a hard bargain
Lee, op. c i t . , p. 132.
26
before i t signed the annual trade agreement.
f i v e year L-T Trade agreement i n 1967,
other long term agreement.
After the expiration of the
Mainland China refused to sign an-
Their immediate fury was
due
to the Sato v i s i t
to Taipeh i n September and to Washington i n November 1967.
During those
v i s i t s , Sato referred to the threat posed by Communist China to her
neigh-
40
bors,
and Peking attacked this saying that, "Sato's t r i p to Taiwan was
a component part of a fcig anti-China, anti-Communist, a n t i - p e o p l e . " ^
cerning Sato's v i s i t to Washington, J i n Min J i h Pao
declared that
Con-
"the-out-
cry against the threats of China's nuclear weapons i s a b i g conspiracy
by
42
the U.S.
and Japanese r e a c t i o n a r i e s . "
On March 7, 1968,
To secure the new
a memorandum f o r one year's
trade was
signed.
agreement, the Chinese made the Japanese L.D.P. Diet
members sign a statement where they recognized
Chou's three p o l i t i c a l p r i n -
c i p l e s and they reaffirmed the p r i n c i p l e of i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of economics and
43
p o l i t i c a l matters.
This reference was
s p e c i f i c a l l y intended
Japanese government for i t s p o l i c y which continued
to rebuke the
to permit economic r e l a -
tions with Communist China without granting diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . Deputy
Vice Minister of'Foreign Trade, L i u Hsi-Wen warned at a reception for the
returning Japanese delgates that "the escalation of Sato's reactionary f o r eign
p o l i c y would generally endanger the future of memorandum trade.
40
Asahi Shinbun, September 9, 1967, p. 3.
41
Peking Review, September 1967, p. 32.
42
Quoted i n Peking Review, Decemher 1, 1967, p. 31.
43
Asahi Shinbun, March 7, 1968, p. 2.
44
Asahi Shinbun, March 7, 1968, evening e d i t i o n , p. 1,
27
Hereafter anti-Japanese government statements appears i n connection with a l l the trade agreements
China.
signed between Japan and Communist
When the Friendship trade agreement for 1967-1968 was signed, the
p o l i t i c a l statement contained phrases which praised the C u l t u r a l Revolution and Mao's thoughts.
I t also included a statement on a struggle against
four common enemies o f the Chinese and Japanese people:
U.S. imperialism,
Soviet revisionism, Japanese reaction, and the Japanese Communist Party.
The Chinese negotiator even stated that " p o l i t i c s i s the b a s i s ,
l i f e and s p i r i t of economics" and suggested that Mao's doctrine should be
45
the foundation of Sino-Japanese trade.
Communist China f u l l y c a p i t a l i z e d on the opportunity to conclude
a new trade agreement every year to l e t the Japanese delegates recognize
the Chinese p r i n c i p l e of " i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s and economics" and
attack the p o l i c y of the Japanese government toward China.
In the new
agreement signed on A p r i l 20, 1970, Communist China showed her fury on the
Sato-Nixon Communique signed i n November 1969 by adding Chou's fourth p r i n c i p l e as a new condition i n trading with Japan.
Sato acknowledged
Japan's
commitment to the defence of Taiwan which China feared would lead to a
r e v i v a l of Japanese m i l i t a r i s m against China.
The essence of Chou's fourth
p r i n c i p l e was that Communist China would not trade with Japanese firms and
46
companies trading with and a s s i s t i n g Taiwan or South Korea.
At the end
of the new agreement both Communist Chinese and Japanese negotiators agreed
that the deterioration of r e l a t i o n s between the two countries was created
Lee, op. c i t . , p. 136.
Sei I c h i Tagawa, "Chou's Four P r i n c i p l e s , " Bungei
Shunju
CAugust 1970).
28
by Sato's government and that the Japanese delegates would make an e f f o r t
to dispel this obstruction.
The study of the patterns and techniques used throughout the h i s t ory of Sino-Japanese trade relations shows that Communist China took the
i n i t i a t i v e and Japan responded.
to p o l i t i c a l events such as:
The volume of trade fluctuated according
the Nagasaki f l a g incident, "Yoshida's p r i -
vate l e t t e r , " Sato's v i s i t s to Taiwan and the United States, and the SatoNixon Communiques.
The techniques Communist China used varied according to the shortterm objectives of Communist China.
spectrum" i n Japan^
7
China appealed to a "broad p o l i t i c a l
through private agreements and exchange of u n o f f i c -
i a l private delegations.
China threatened by way of suspending trade.
China demanded and this demand appeared i n the form of Chou's four p o l i t i c a l principles.
F i n a l l y , China manipulated Japan e s p e c i a l l y with " f r i e n d l y
trade" and "memorandum trade."
In short, trade was used as an instrument
of p o l i t i c a l pressure and i t r e f l e c t e d China's p o l i t i c a l aims.
Sino-Japanese trade went on, despite the fundamental differences
i n t h e i r concepts of the p r i n c i p l e of " i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s and economics" and the p r i n c i p l e of "separating economics
from p o l i t i c s . " I t
was because they both agreed at one point that p r i n c i p l e i s p r i n c i p l e and
reality i s reality.
They both claimed t h e i r own p r i n c i p l e , but accepted
the r e a l i t y and compromised. From China's viewpoint, i t was an "accumulat i v e " approach f o r the eventual normalization of relations between the
two countries.
From Japan's point of view i t also was a r e a l i s t i c approach
A.M. Halpern, New York Times, March 4, 1966, p. 6.
29
to maximize economic opportunities and minimize p o l i t i c a l involvement
u n t i l the r i g h t opportunity
came f o r normalization.
By adopting and
p r a c t i s i n g the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , Japan
looked f o r a bigger commercial opportunity
i n the future and also i t
served as a p i p e l i n e between the two b i g countries i n Asia.
Furui Yosh-
imi, who headed the Japanese negotiations f o r trade negotiations as a
member of the L.D.P. had these words to say:
"Trade i s the only p o l i t i c a l p i p e l i n e which connects Mainland
China and Japan. In the case o f Sino-U.S. r e l a t i o n s , there i s
ambassadorial talk at Warsaw. Between Washington, D.C. and
Moscow, there i s a 'hot-line' connected. Imagine the r e l a tions between Japan and Mainland China without t h i s pipeline?
This l i n e may be small and narrow, but i t has a tremendous
p o l i t i c a l significance for the future.
Yoshimi Furui, "Is 'Sino-Japanese Negotiation' an Humiliating Diplomacy?"
Burigei Shunju,
July 1970, p. 96.
30.
Table 3
JAPAN'S TRADE WITH CHINA, 1950-1971
(U.S. $1,000*3)
Year
Exports to China
A
$ Value % Prev. Yr.
Imports from China
B
$ Value % Prev. Yr.
T o t a l s
A + B
$ Value % Prev. Yr.
1950
$ 19,633
0
$ 39,328
0
$ 58,961
0
1951
5,828
29.7
21,606
54.9
27,434
46.5
1952
599
10.3
14,903
69.0
15,502
56.5
1953
4,539
757.8
29,700
199.3
34,239
220.9
1954
19,097
420.7
40,770
137.3
59,869
174.9
1955
28,547
149.5
80,778
198.1
109,325
182.6
1956
67,339
235.9
83,647
103.6
150,968
138.1
1957
60,485
89.8
80,483
96.2
140,968
93.4
1958
50,600
83.7
54,427
67.6
105,027
74.5
1959
3,648
7.2
18,917
34.8
22,565
21.5
1960
2,726
74.7
20,729
109.6
23,455
103.9
1961
16,639
610.4
30,895
149.0
47,534
142.1
1962
38,460
231.1
46,020
149.0
84,480
177.7
1963
62,417
162.3
74,599
162.1
137,016
162.2
1964
152,739
244.7
157,750
211.5
310,489
226.2
1965
245,036
160.4
224,705
142.4
469,741
151.3
1966
315,150
128.6
306,237
136.3
621,387
132.3
1967
288,294
91.5
269,439
88.0
557,733
89.8
1968
325,439
122.9
224,185
83.2
549,624
98.5
1969
390,803
120.1
234,540
104.6
625,343
113.8
1970
568,878
145.6
253,818
108.2
822,696
131.6
1971
587,188
101.6
323,172
127.3
901,360
109.5
SOURCE: Asahi Janaru (Customs D i v i s i o n , Ministry of Finance, Japan),
September 15, 1972, p. 19.
31
IV
So f a r , the p o l i c y of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " has
been examined within the frame of i n t e r n a t i o n a l circumstances and how
ex-
ternal factors outside Japan, including the attitude of Communist China,
affected the Japanese government i n pursuing this p o l i c y .
No less import-
ant than external factors are the i n t e r n a l factors which influenced the
formation and p r a c t i c e of t h i s p o l i c y .
I t seems of utmost importance to
analyze the i n t e r n a l aspect of Japanese p o l i t i c s i n this l a s t s e c t i o n .
Apart from trade interests which we observed i n section three,
the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s served mainly two purposes.
One was
that, to a certain extent, i t met the popular demand f o r improved
r e l a t i o n s with Communist China, and the other was
that i t served the need
of appeasing the opposition p a r t i e s i n Japan as well as the anti-^mainstream
factions within the governing L i b e r a l Democratic Party.
The former was r e -
lated to the Japanese people i n general and the l a t t e r was
connected with
Japanese i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s .
Popular demand i s a vague expression, but i t represents the f e e l ing of the Japanese people.
At the bottom of their hearts, they have a
f e e l i n g of g u i l t f o r the past acts of Japan.
During eight years of war
be-
tween 1937 and 1945 the Japanese army k i l l e d more than ten m i l l i o n Chinese
and caused f i v e b i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n war damage.
tion of war with Mainland China, twenty-seven
Without the l e g a l termina-
years have passed, and during
these years the Japanese have been somewhat frustrated by the f e e l i n g of
32
need to atone for Japan's past crimes.
This f e e l i n g i n general i s w e l l
represented by the act of Prime Minister Tanaka when he stated h i s "pro49
found self-examination f o r the great troubles Japan i n f l i c t e d on China"
at h i s f i r s t banquet i n Peking i n September l a s t year.
Besides the f e e l i n g of g u i l t , there also i s a f e e l i n g of a f f i n i t y between the Chinese and Japanese, rooted i n t h e i r common c u l t u r a l ,
l i n g u i s t i c and r a c i a l background.
For the Japanese, China has always stood
" i n s i d e " and the western nations "outside,"
"Orientals" and "fellow Asians"
are the words often used to describe this kind of a f f i n i t y .
this f e e l i n g i s the sort of moral sympathy
toward China.
Stemming from
Both Japan and
China went through the p a i n f u l process of modernization; Japan s u c c e s s f u l l y
with "Meiji Isshin""^ and China not so successfully with the "Movement to
Westernize" and a large segment of the Japanese i n t e l l e c t u a l s i s sympathetic
to the e f f o r t s of the Chinese people to modernize t h e i r society, even i f
these e f f o r t s are being made under the Communist r e g i m e . ^
It i s very d i f f i c u l t to describe this kind of f e e l i n g as a "nat i o n a l f e e l i n g , " but i t may be safe to say that the Japanese, i n general,
tend to be swayed by the " f e e l i n g " or the "mood" rather than by sound
l o g i c a l reasoning.
This common c u l t u r a l f e e l i n g cut across the p o l i t i c a l
l i n e s and culminated i n a popular demand f o r better r e l a t i o n s h i p s with
Mainland China.
The p o l i c y of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " didn^t
meet this demand a l l the way, but a trading relationship was b e t t e r than
49
Asahi Shinbun, September
29, 1972, p. 3.
"*^A movement to modernize Japan i n the era of Emperor M e i j i .
"'"'"Jun Eto, "The Views from Japan," speech f o r Japan Society i n New York,
Chuo Koron (December, 1971), p. 66.
33
no r e l a t i o n s h i p at a l l .
I t was
short of normal, diplomatic r e l a t i o n s , but
i t provided a r e l i e f or comfort that a Japan-China r e l a t i o n s h i p i s there
i f only i n the form of trade.
The p o l i c y of "separating economics from
p o l i t i c s " gave them the hope that the p o l i c y would eventually end up with
the normalization of r e l a t i o n s between the two countries.
In
defending
the p o l i c y of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s , " former Prime M i n i s t e r
Sato said that the p r i n c i p l e w i l l not continue forever, and the government
52
i s j u s t waiting for the r i g h t time f o r normalization.
The impact of the China p o l i c y upon Japanese i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s
has
always been one of the intense and c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues i n Japanese p o l i t i c s .
The opposition p a r t i e s sharply opposed the government p o l i c y of "separating
economics from p o l i t i c s , " but the p o l i c y also divided the members of the
governing L i b e r a l Democratic Party.
Before the signing of the agreement for
the normalization of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s on September 29 of l a s t year,
the
opposition p a r t i e s have been constant c r i t i c s of the p o l i c y .
The China p o l i c y of opposition p a r t i e s varied.
The p o l i c y of the
Japan S o c i a l i s t Party, the major opposition party i n Japan, appeared very
c l e a r l y i n i t s four p r i n c i p l e s for Sino-Japanese f r i e n d l y , diplomatic r e l a tions which J.S.P. announced after the f i f t h v i s i t to China by the members
of that party i n November, 1970.
The four p r i n c i p l e s
contained:
1.
The J.S.P. opposes U.S. imperialism and the r e s t o r a t i o n
of Japanese m i l i t a r i s m .
2.
The party i s against the government p o l i c y of t r e a t i n g
China as an enemy and upholds the view that there i s
only "One China." I t also urges the abrogation of Japan-
As ahi Shinbun, December 26, 1969,
p. 2.
34
N a t i o n a l i s t China Peace Treaty.
3. I t accepts the view of the i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s
economics, and,
and
4. I t has organized a united front to accommodate a l l the
forces which stand f o r an early agreement to SinoJapanese diplomatic r e l a t i o n s .
The party also urged the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact
immediately following the normalization of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s .
The Japan Democratic S o c i a l i s t Party, the second major opposition
party, i s less d r a s t i c i n opposing the government p o l i c y than the J.S.P.
upheld the idea of "One
China and One Taiwan" but ar,gued that Peking,
Taipeh, should be regarded as the legitimate government of China.
The
It
not
Na-
t i o n a l i s t government should be recqgnized as a temporary government of the
area i t now
controls, and the ultimate status of Taiwan should be determined
by the w i l l of the Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese residents on Taiwan.
The
D.S.P. also urged the government to change i t s foreign p o l i c y that b l i n d l y
followed the United States and undertake an early conclusion of diplomatic
54
r e l a t i o n s with Communist China as a basis for peace i n A s i a .
The Japanese Communist Party, the smallest segment of the opposit i o n , i n terms of representatives i n the Diet (
house )
wan
36 seats i n the lower
advocated the immediate abrogation of the peace treaty with T a i -
and immediate r e s t o r a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s with Communist China.
i n i t s apparent form, was
This p o l i c y ,
s i m i l a r to that of the J.S.P., but the J.C.P. stood
more f i r m l y against the United States' Far-Eastern p o l i c y .
Mainichi Shinbun, November 4, 1970,
Kokumin S e i j i Nenkan, 1969,
p.
789.
p. 4.
I t also urged
35
the "end" of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
The impact of these d i f f e r i n g views and p o l i c i e s toward Communi s t China held by the opposition parties upon Japanese government i s not
very s i g n i f i c a n t , as would be the case i n the United States where the major
two-party system i s practised, but the successive L.D.P. government had to
take them into consideration for p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y as w e l l as f o r the
s u r v i v a l of their own party.
As f a r as Japanese-China p o l i c y was concerned,
the government i n pursuing the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s
has been i n the defensive side i n the face of those views which came from
the opposition p a r t i e s .
Much more s i g n i f i c a n t than the views and claims of opposition
parties i s the s p l i t cf opinions and factions on the China p o l i c y among the
L.D.P. members.
On the China issue, L.D.P. has been divided into a pro-
Peking group and a pro-Taiwan
group.
The pro-Peking group was a combina-
tion of about 86 Diet members from both houses and represented by the Asian
A f r i c a Study group
(Ajiya-Afurika Mondai Kenkyu K a i ) .
by such members as
The group was l e d
Fujiyama A i i c h i r o , Matsumura Kenzo, Furui Yoshimi, and
Miki Takeo, the most outspoken c r i t i c s within the governing party.
To them
i t was u n r e a l i s t i c to recognize N a t i o n a l i s t China as the only legitimate
government of China.
I t i s Communist China, after a l l , which has controlled
the mainland with 800 m i l l i o n people since 1949, and i t was unnatural that
Japan should leave her r e l a t i o n s with China i n a state o f war and follow the
56
"policy of containment."
They, therefore, favored the recognition of Peking
Ibid., p. 798.
Fujiyama A i i c h i r o , "The Base of Negotiations with Peking," Chuo Koron
(October, 1972), p. 146.
36
instead of Taipeh, and pressed for the expansion of trade through the conclusion of an o f f i c i a l agreement and not by means of u n o f f i c i a l
agreements.
The Pro-Taiwan group, on the other hand, based i t s claim on the
basis that i t i s with Chiang Kai-shek's government
that Japan fought and
Japan must be bound by the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.
not
Japan also should
forget the generous "favours" which Chiang Kai-shek provided right
a f t e r the end of the Second World War by returning two m i l l i o n Japanese
l i v i n g i n China safely to Japan and not claiming any reparations from Japan.
The Pro-Taiwan group was represented by about 161 Diet members who belong
to the Asian Problems Study Group (Ajiya Mondai Kenkyu Kai).
The group i n -
cluded such senior members of L.D.P. as K i s h i Nobusuke, Fukuda Takeo and
I s h i i M i t s u j i r o who have been the chief f a c t i o n leaders backing Sato.
are
They
the more right-wing conservatives who have pursued an anti-communist
l i n e , and they maintained the r i g i d p o s i t i o n that Taiwan should continue to
receive recognition as the only legitimate representative of China.
They,
however, had no objection to trade with Communist China, provided that i t
did not damage r e l a t i o n s with either Taiwan or the United States.
I f the claims of pro-Taiwan group, as represented by the government p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , are c a r e f u l l y
examined,
this group d i d not deny the necessity of eventual normalization of d i p l o matic r e l a t i o n s with Communist China.
I t only hesitated to betray Japan's
f r i e n d l y a l l i e s , the United States and Taiwan.
Fukuda, as the foreign min-
i s t e r of Japan under Sato, c a l l e d Japan's p o l i c y toward China "duck d i p l o macy."
"A duck i n i t s appearance doesn't seem to be swimming, but under
the surface of water i t i s paddling c o n s t a n t l y . " ^
^ M a i n i c h i Shinbun, November 20, 1971, p. 4.
7
He also defended the
37
government p o l i c y saying that "the normalization of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s
with Communist China i s our national task.
We are working to achieve
this
58
goal, but we should keep our i n t e r n a t i o n a l f a i t h i n the process."
The
s p l i t over the China issue among L.D.P. members cut across the main f a c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s and i t s impact i s f e l t every two years when there i s the
party p r e s i d e n t i a l contest.
Actually, the chief objective of a f a c t i o n
59
i s to obtain Cabinet, Diet and party leadership posts f o r their members,
-but China p o l i c y i s often used as the f o c a l point to improve t h e i r p o s i t i o n
i n the inner party leadership contest.
Aiming at the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n
which was held i n July l a s t year, anti-main stream factions made a b i g issue
of the China p o l i c y of the mainstream.
The Dietmen's League for Normaliza-
I
tion of Japan-China Relations was formed on October 21, 1970 and this
supra-
party league included the opposition party members of the J.S.P., D.S.P.
and Komeito, as w e l l as 28 L.D.P. members and they severely c r i t i c i z e d the
China p o l i c y o f the Sato government.
admitted
E s p e c i a l l y a f t e r Communist China was
to the United Nations i n October 1971, 12 members of the L.D.P.
abstained i n the non-confidence vote against Fukuda, the foreign minister,
along with opposition party members.
I t was the f i r s t time the anti-Sato
factions acted out their discontent i n not voting for the government, and
they included such pro-Peking members as Fujiyama, Utsunomiya and Furui.
Miki Takeo was i n the forefront of c r i t i c i s i n g the government when he said
"The Prime Minister ignored the opinion of the inner party, group" for Japan's
Mainichi Shinbun, October 18, 1971, p. 2.
I
Frank C. Langdon, "Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l Discord on
China P o l i c y , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol. XLI, No. 3 ( F a l l , 1968), p. 405.
38
p o l i c y toward China.
Thus, i n Japanese p o l i t i c s , factionalism, p o l i c y issues, and
vote-getting measures for the party leadership post intermingled
and the eventual aim of r a i s i n g the China p o l i c y issue was
together,
to get the
votes for the leadership contest.
I t may
as
sound paradoxical that the governing party members such
Fujiyama, Matsumura and Furui, committed to the promotion of trade
with Communist China, openly c r i t i c i z e d so often the p o l i c y of t h e i r
party government, but the Sato government was
own
u n o f f i c i a l l y able to use
them for leading to the eventual diplomatic normalization between both
countries.
Mairiichi Shinbun, October 26, 1971,
evening e d i t i o n , p. 1.
39
V
Now
that the agreement f o r the normalization of Sino-Japan r e l a -
tions i s signed as of September 29, 1972, the controversial issue of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " has become a story of the past.
Japan
recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China and Japan f u l l y understood and respected the Chinese claim
that Taiwan i s an "inalienable p a r t " of Chinese
territory.
From the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , which was
the o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of Japan between 1952 and 1972, the following conclusions can be drawn.
The chief cause of adopting and pursuing the p o l i c y of separating
economics from p o l i t i c s stemmed, above anything else, from i n t e r n a t i o n a l
circumstances i n which Japan found h e r s e l f as a defeated nation a f t e r the
Second World War.
The opposition voices i n Japan c r i t i c i z e d the China
p o l i c y , saying that the p o l i c y was based on a f i c t i o n that the Nationali s t government i n Taiwan represented the whole of China.
But from the p o s i t i o n of the Japanese government, i t was not because the government did not r e a l i z e the existence and importance of Communist China on the mainland that she did not recognize Communist China.
There was not much room for Japan to follow an independent course of action
toward China.
The p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s was based on the
r e a l i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and i t represented a "wait and see" a t t i tude u n t i l the r i g h t time f o r the change came.
40
The admission of Communist China to the United Nations i n 1971,
Nixon's v i s i t to China i n February, 1972,
and the eventual change of
the p o l i c y of the United Nations gave Japan the opportunity to change
her p o l i c y and recognize mainland China.
In this respect, Japan even
jumped ahead of the United States i n the normalization of diplomatic r e l a tions and Japan now
i n a new
claims that she i s ready f o r "independent
diplomacy"
era f o r A s i a .
The p o l i c y of separating economics and p o l i t i c s allowed Japan to
be able to put her one foot on Taiwan and one on China, without hurting
any a l l i e d countries.
cause China also saw
Trading relationships with China were possible be-
the advantage of maintaining that r e l a t i o n s h i p .
the agreement on normalization of Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , Japan now
Since
appears
eager to maintain trading relationships with Taiwan, and hence the adoption
of the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s f o r the other China.
But, that p o l i c y toward Taiwan w i l l not cause much controversy i n Japanese i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s as i t did toward Communist China.
Korea also has
to readjust her p o l i c y toward North Korea and Communist China according
to the changes and s h i f t s of the p o l i c i e s of the United States and Japan.
In order to do so, i t i s very important
to evaluate where Korea should
stand i n the newly established relationship between Japan and Communist
China.
H i s t o r i c a l l y , Japan has pursued a Korean p o l i c y by which Japan
could check the influence of other nations i n Korea which threatened Japan.
The main cause of the Sino-Japanese war
war i n 1904
i n 1894
and the Russo-Japanese
stemmed from Japan's b e l i e f that the influence of either China
or Russia was
the immediate threat to Japan.
The Taft-Katsura agreement
41
i n 1905
gave Japan a f r e e hand i n K o r e a , and i t opened the way
f o r Japan
61
to p r o c l a i m o u t r i g h t a n n e x a t i o n i n 1910.
The T a f t - K a t s u r a agreement gave
Japan complete d o m i n a t i o n o f K o r e a and e x p r e s s e d hope f o r peace i n the F a r
E a s t , b u t i t became the main cause o f u n r e s t and war between Japan
China.
and
A f t e r the Second World.War K o r e a was d i v i d e d i n t o two s e c t i o n s
a l o n g the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l .
I n s t e a d o f a l l o w i n g one power t o dominate K o r e a ,
K o r e a came under the i n f l u e n c e o f t h r e e b i g powers, C h i n a , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n
and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and K o r e a became a f o c a l p o i n t i n the c o l d war.
S a t o - N i x o n Communique o f 1969
r e a f f i r m e d Japan's commitment t o Korean
fence i n . A r t i c l e 4 that s a i d , "the s e c u r i t y o f the R e p u b l i c of Korea
e s s e n t i a l to Japan's own
The
de-
was
security."
Thus, K o r e a i n the p a s t has e x p e r i e n c e d t h r e e d i f f e r e n t waves o f
i n f l u e n c e from t h e b i g powers around h e r , and she now has t o f i n d h e r
r o l e i n the c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s .
K o r e a has to f a c e a new
new
On-one hand,
Japan t h a t emerged as an economic b i g power and
may
s t a r t t o t a k e the p l a c e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as the g u a r a n t o r o f s e c u r i t y
i n non-Communist A s i a .
On the o t h e r hand, K o r e a a l s o has to a c c e p t the
r e a l i t y t h a t Communist C h i n a now has a new
forum i n w h i c h t o p r e s s h e r views
on Korean a f f a i r s through h e r a d m i s s i o n to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .
S i t u a t e d between t h e s e two b i g powers i n A s i a , K o r e a s h o u l d get
o v e r the " c o l d war c o n s c i o u s n e s s " and h a l t
i t y toward N o r t h K o r e a and Communist C h i n a .
the p o l i c y o f u n m i t i g a t e d h o s t i l K o r e a a l s o s h o u l d be
careful
t h a t Japanese economic power i n K o r e a s h o u l d n o t t u r n i n t o p o l i t i c a l o r m i l i t a r y power.
Communist C h i n a has a l r e a d y warned a g a i n s t s i g n s o f r i s i n g
m i l i t a r i s m i n Japan and any s i g n of such a move by Japan would i n v o k e
61
Woo-keun Han, The H i s t o r y o f K o r e a ( H o n o l u l u : East-West C e n t e r P r e s s ,
1970), p.
447.
42
immediate reaction from Communist China.
History i n Korea t e l l s the l e s -
son that Korea should not i n v i t e one power to chase the other power from
the Korean peninsula.
This has been Korea's fate since the Sino-Japanese
war of 1894-95.
With the normalization of Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , Korea also
should f i n d her r o l e i n pursuing "independent and p o s i t i v e " action i n
this new r e l a t i o n s h i p .
unification
The talks between North and South f o r the eventual
of Korea and the new c o n s t i t u t i o n of South Korea which was
adopted i n 1972 r e f l e c t Korea's attempts to adjust h e r s e l f to this r o l e .
43
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Newspapers
Asahi Shinbun
Choongang Ilbo
Jenmin Jihpao
Mainichi Shinbun
New York Times