Human agency, historical inevitability and moral - ANU Press

Human agency, historical inevitability and moral
culpability: Rewriting black-wbite history in the
wake of Native Title
Shayne Breen
Whatever may be the evils of society in a state of civilization they are assuredly
less in character and degree than those of savage life; and I can never regret
that the fair and beautiful country of Tasmania has been entirely reclaimed
from the dominion of the debased and treacherous Aborigines; though l cannot
but comment that it has been done in part in sad violation of those laws
established by Him who hath made of one blood all men to dwell upon the face
of the earth. 12
In the 1993 N ative Title debate, Geoffrey Blainey sketched a version of the history of
black-w hite contact in A ustralia in w hich he sought to cast d oubt on the need for native
title legislation. In a series of new spapers articles and the occasional reported speech,
Blainey articulated a position on native title which argues that in the course of
dispossession m ost A borigines died from disease and that Aboriginal society w ould
inevitably decline in the face of the natural planetary spread of superior w estern
civilisation. Blainey delivered these view s in su pport of his position that the then federal
Labour governm ent w as being too generous to the country's Aborigines in w hat he sees
as a guilt-ridden and politically-correct attem pt to make reparation for perceived past
WTongs.' In his criticism of the High C ourt M abo decision, Blainey argued that the
judges w ere told the w rong story of the past; Blainey's story, presum ably, is the right
one. H ere w e have the self-proclaim ed historiographical objectivist accusing supporters
of native title of p ropagating a fashionable political-correctness, ignoring the political
m otivation w hich inform s his ow n view s— aptly described by H um p h rey M cQueen as
3
the defence of the A ustralian m ining industry.
M any A ustralians have little aw areness that historians’ interpretations of evidence
are, in larger or sm aller degree, influenced by personal values and interests. For m any
A ustralians, history is fact, not interpretation. So w hen an historian w ith the profile of
Blainey asserts publicly th at m ost A borigines died from disease, and that it was
inevitable they w ould be overrun in any case, m any A ustralians will believe th at he is
stating historical fact. But as H enry R eynolds and Gillian C ow lishaw have argued,
1Weston 1843, pp 93-4.
2 Blainey, July and November, 1993.
' McQueen 1994, p. 55.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
109
Blainey's position is open to debate, not only in term s of its substantive claims b u t also
in term s of w h at Blainey neglects to m ention. In particular, Blainey's em phasis on
disease as the m ajor cause of A boriginal deaths, w hile it m ay be statistically correct,
deflects attention from the extent of m u rd er as a major cause of deaths. This debate
betw een R eynolds and C ow lishaw on the one h and and Blainey on the other is b ut one
further episode in the now long-running debate betw een colonial and post-colonial
4
versions of race relations in A ustralia's past.
The historical debate at the national level has been replicated by historians, both
am ateur and professional, at the local level. The story of A boriginal dispossession in the
Deloraine district of n orthern Tasm ania illustrates this process of selective rem em bering.
In the 1890s Daniel Griffen, the journalist son of an Irish im m igrant, recorded in passing
the dispossession and w h at he saw as the sad fate of the Pallittorre. In 1964, J. R. Skemp,
formerly a science teacher, recognised the reality of dispossession and gave it a place in
his short history of the district. More recently, Simon Cubit, a leading advocate of the
claims of cattle ow ners and horse riders w ishing to practise their 'traditional' pursuits
on the plateau w hich overlooks the D eloraine district, described the process of early
British occupation of the M eander district w ith o u t acknow ledging either the prior
occupation by the Pallittorre or their resistance to the British invasion. C ubit portrays
the stock-keepers and their m asters as 'b o ld ' and 'am bitious', as heroic pioneers
involved in a sequential process of occupying the w ilderness and m iraculously
transform ing it into productive grazing land. C ubit's approach, w hich typifies the
historiography of racial contact in A ustralia from the 1880s until the early 1970s,
am ounts to a denial of the existence of the Pallittorre, and hence a distortion of historical
truth. This kind of selective am nesia needs to be challenged by a m ore rigorous analysis
of the process of colonisation.45
My purpose in this pap er is to challenge the historical props on w hich Blainey and
others argue against the need for som e form of reparation. I seek to show that blackw hite relations in Van D iem en's Land, and especially in Pallittorre country, w ere more
complex and problem atic than Blainey's over-generalised explanations recognise. I
argue that A borigines sought to resolve disputes in w ays in w hich violent contact w as
limited, and that they used the threat of force as a major w eapon. In contrast, the British
regularly practised prom iscuous m assacre, a practice fuelled by the belief that in
relations w ith A borigines force w as necessary. These argum ents involve not only the
question of how A borigines died b u t also the thinking, both black and w hite, w hich
informed the various uses of force. I argue also that notions of the British invasion and
subsequent A boriginal deaths as inevitable outcom es of broad historical forces are little
more than figm ents of conservative historical im aginations, m ost notably those of John
West and Geoffrey Blainey. More to the point, Blainey's argum ents, and W est's, are
contrived to deny the proposition that historical actors choose and execute courses of
action for w hich they m ust bear responsibility.
4Reynolds 1993, p. 19; Cowlishaw 1993, pp. 15 and 24.
5Griffen 1893-4, p39. Griffen's pieces were first published in 1893-94 in the Launceston D aily
Telegraph; Skemp 1964, pp. 10-11, Cubit, 1987, p. 11; Hartwig, 1971, pp. 9-24.
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
110
Resisting the invader
In the fo llo w in g analysis o f P a llitto rre re la tio n s w ith the B ritis h colonists I have used
Rhys Isaac's e th n o g ra p h ic approach o f d isce rn in g h is to ric a l actors' in te n tio n s and
m o tiv a tio n s fro m th e ir re p o rte d actions. E th n o g ra p h ic analysis a llo w s the h is to ria n to
im a g in a tiv e ly enter in to the circum stances and perhaps m e n ta lity o f h is to ric a l actors
w h o have le ft no w ritte n records. The m e th o d requires th a t re p o rte d b e h a vio u rs, w h ic h
are regarded as action-statem ents, be u n d erstood
in
the co n te xt o f the c u ltu ra l
assum ptions and values the h is to ric a l actors in question w ere lik e ly to have a p p lie d in
the reported situ a tio n . F u rth e r, situ a tio n s or in cid e n ts u n d e rsto o d in th is w a y sh o u ld be
recu rre n t inciden ts w h ic h can be seen as ty p ic a l or even s y m b o lic o f re la tio n s betw een
com p e tin g c u ltu ra l groups, in this case in d ig e n o u s people in Tasm ania and th e ir B ritish
colonisers.6
W illia m K n ig h t and John H u r lin g liv e d and w o rk e d as stock-keepers on the land
occupied b y Thom as C ookson S im pson (F igure 2).
7
John H u r lin g w as an assigned
co n vict and K n ig h t w as his overseer. A b a n d o n e d in th is place b y th e ir m aster, th e irs
w as a lo n e ly and som etim es fe a rfu l existence. Roads and hence c o m m u n ic a tio n s w ere
poor, and housing v e ry basic, little m ore than m u d h u ts w ith b a rk rooves. A t the tim e
o n ly a sm all n u m b e r o f B ritis h men liv e d in the d is tric t: three free colonists, a ll o f w h o m
w ere w o rk in g as overseers fo r absentee cattle graziers; a fe w assigned co n victs; and a
sm all n u m b e r o f soldiers and police w hose job it w as to he lp p ro te ct the co lo n ists and
th e ir cattle and sheep fro m bushrangers and A b o rig in e s. N o w h ite w o m e n liv e d in this
colo n ia l outpost.
On the n ig h t o f 22 June 1827, K n ig h t and H u rlin g w e re s ittin g in th e ir stock-hut.
The hut's fireplace sm oked a great deal th a t n ig h t, a fact w h ic h irrita te d K n ig h t. D enied
the sm all c o m fo rt o f a b la z in g fire on a cold w in te r's n ig h t, K n ig h t rem arked to H u rlin g ,
perhaps sarcastically, th a t he w ish e d 'th e natives w o u ld come and b u rn d o w n the
b lo o d y h u t to m o rro w m o rn in g '. A b o u t noon the fo llo w in g day, S aturday 23 June 1827,
K n ig h t and H u rlin g w ere w o rk in g some th ir ty yards fro m th e ir hu t. They had felled a
tree fo r fire w o o d and w ere engaged in lo p p in g its branches. D espite b e in g o n ly th irty
yards fro m th e ir h u t, K n ig h t and H u r lin g had taken th e ir m uskets w ith them , a lth o u g h
w hen ra in began to fa ll they re tu rn e d the m uskets to the h u t. D is re g a rd in g the ra in , the
tw o men re tu rn e d to th e ir w o rk . A creek, its banks protected b y a clu ste r o f tea tree
brush, flo w e d past the fro n t o f th e ir hu t. U n k n o w n to them , a g ro u p o f P a llitto rre were
h id in g in the brush. In due tim e, a cco rd in g to H u rlin g , 'a n u m b e r o f b lack n a tiv e people
rushed in to the h u t and to o k possession o f it'. A rm e d w ith hatchets and p ro te c tin g th e ir
heads w ith th e ir arm s, K n ig h t and H u r lin g m oved to w a rd s the h u t b u t w e re m e t b y a
h a il o f spears. One o f the spears, th ro w n b y a ta ll black m an, stru ck K n ig h t in the le ft
shoulder. K n ig h t p u lle d the spear fro m his sh o u ld e r and as he d id so w a v e d his hands
f’ Isaac 1982, pp. 323-29.
Depositions concerning the death of W illia m K night, 1827,1/316, C hief Secretary's Office,
Hobart. Unless otherwise indicated the in fo rm a tio n in the fo llo w in g section is d ra w n from
these depositions. Four statements were given to P.A. M ulgrave, police m agistrate at
Launceston, between 26-30 June 1827. The statements were given by a police constable, a
soldier, an overseer of convicts and an assigned convict.
111
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
• Whitefoord Hills
% Dunorlan
GOG RANGE
City of Ochre
PLUTO'S FOREST
MAGOG
500rir
'400m
Deloraine
M id dle P lain
Mersey River
Ritchie's
stockhut.
Needles Ridge
Chudleigh
Long R id g e
Simpson's stockhut
(Knight & Hurling)
J400m
C u b it's S u g a rlo a f
300m.
R itc h ie 's P lain
± T \ 300m
D a iry P la in s
Stocker's stockhut
(Cubit)
S to c k e r's P lain
W e s te rn
M a rs h e s
QUAMBY'S BLUFF
GREAT WESTERN TIERS
,600 m
1100m
C heshunt
GREAT WESTERN TIERS
600m
GREAT WESTERN TIERS
1. 5 miles
CENTRAL PLATEAU
1100m
Map 2: The Westward's Killing Fields: Pallittorre country and the scene of
William Knight's death. Based on the Land Commissioners' maps, 1826-28.
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
112
to H u rlin g . H u rlin g , s u p p o sin g th a t K n ig h t m eant h im to ru n fro m the attackers, ran
onto the adjacent p la in , w h ic h was ankle deep in w ater, and to w a rd s G ibson's h u t, some
three m iles to the south-east, in search o f help. K n ig h t s lo w ly fo llo w e d H u rlin g , b u t
about 200 yards fro m the h u t, tw o o r three blacks knocked K n ig h t d o w n . In lin e w ith the
practice fo llo w e d b y o th e r Tasm anian A b o rig in e s, the P a llitto rre k ille d K n ig h t b y
beating h im a ro u n d the head w ith w addies. They also used a ga rd e n hoe. The blacks
then re tu rn e d K n ig h t's b o d y to w ith in fifte e n yards o f his hut. A rope m ade o f n a tiv e
grasses w as used to d ra g the b o d y, w h ic h had a black m a rk a ro u n d its neck, fro m the
p la in to the hut. The rope w as la te r fo u n d b y w h ite s at the blacks' camp. W h e n K n ig h t's
b o d y w as fo u n d b y H u r lin g and some others, it was on its back, the legs w e re crossed,
one arm w as u n d e r the head and the o th e r u n d e r a side, and a d a rk c o lo u re d co tto n
h a n d ke rch ie f covered the face. K n ig h t u s u a lly ke p t this h a n d k e rc h ie f in h is ka n g a ro o
skin cap, w h ic h w as ly in g on the g ro u n d near his head w ith some b lo o d in it.
3 9 5 8 2 *lW h ile K n ig h t w as m e e tin g his fate, ab o u t tw e n ty b lacks p u rsu e d H u r lin g
across the p la in to the edge o f the forest. Just p rio r to e n te rin g the forest, H u r lin g tu rn e d
and faced a black, w h o w as arm ed w ith a spear in each hand, s ta n d in g some ten to
fifteen yards aw ay. H u r lin g th re w his hatchet th ro u g h the air. The w ea p on h it it's m a rk,
k n o c k in g the black to the g ro u n d . In te n t on fleeing his attackers, H u rlin g decided his
chances w ere better w ith o u t his boots, w h ic h w ere too b ig fo r his feet. H e unlaced them
and th re w them off, re c a llin g later he fe lt he co u ld no lo n g e r ru n w ith th e m on. A n k le
deep w a te r w o u ld n o t have helped. By n o w there w e re ab o u t tw e n ty blacks w ith in
th irty yards o f H u rlin g , a ll arm ed w ith spears. As he ran, several spears w ere th ro w n at
h im , a lth o u g h none h it. Some three o r fo u r h u n d re d ya rd s in to the forest, H u rlin g
became tire d and w as u nable to ru n an y fu rth e r. H e noticed am o n g some ta ll grass a
huge fallen tree w ith a large lim b co m in g o ff it's side. H e clam bered u n d e r the tree,
w h ic h w as h o llo w , and la id d o w n w ith his face to the g ro u n d and his hands u n d e r his
body.
The P a llitto rre s u rro u n d e d the tree w h e re H u rlin g w as 'h id in g '. T h e y passed
backw ards and fo rw a rd s at b o th ends o f the tree, as th e y d id c a llin g 'R ugga, R ugga’,
p ossibly a w o rd fo r 'go a w a y 1.8 They k e p t th is u p fo r a sh o rt tim e. Some th ir ty m in u te s
later, H u r lin g s d og came to h im . A s s u m in g th a t the blacks w ere unable to fin d h im and
fearing they m ay have fo llo w e d his dog, H u rlin g im m e d ia te ly abandoned his h id in g
place. So th a t he m ig h t ru n m ore fre e ly, he p u lle d o ff his trousers, w h ic h w e re sodden,
and proceeded to ru n alo n g a v e ry ro u g h forest road to w a rd s G ibson's h u t. A t some
stage eith e r d u rin g o r a fte r the k illin g o f K n ig h t and the p u rs u it o f H u rlin g , the
P a llitto rre 'p lu n d e re d ' S im pson's sto ck-h u t. They to o k w ith them fo u r w h ip s , a stra w
hat, a handkerchie f, tw o forks, fo u r spoons, one w o o d e n bucke t, a fry in g pan, fiv e shirts,
tw o pairs o f trousers, a p a ir o f boots, a w a istco a t and a b lu e jacket; they also to o k a
q u a n tity o f flo u r, th ir ty p o u n d s o f sugar, tw e lv e p o u n d s o f tea and three p o u n d s of
soap. They le ft a b ucket, a fry in g pan, tw o iro n pots, a g ru b b in g hoe and a m o rtis in g
tool. O u tsid e the h u t they le ft fo rty p o u n d s o f salt. T hey b u rs t open several bags
c o n ta in in g eighteen bushels o f w h e a t, a nd scattered the g ra in a b o u t the h u t a nd outside
the door. These actions b y the P a llitto rre severely d is ru p te d H u rlin g 's capacity to
rem ain at the h u t and p e rfo rm the c o lo n is in g tasks his m aster had assigned to h im .
s I was unable to fin d any reference to this w ord.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
113
Hurling arrived at Gibson's stock-hut about 3 o'clock. Waiting there to greet this
unexpected visitor were Henry Smith, William White, Thomas Baker, field police
constable Thomas Williams and two soldiers, corporal James Lingan and corporal John
Shiners. Smith and White were both convicts, assigned to David Gibson, their absentee
landlord, himself a former convict. Baker was their overseer. Hurling, wearing only a
shirt and with his trousers in one hand, ran straight into the hut and sat down on a stool.
He was out of breath, on the point of exhaustion, and, according to the occupants of
Gibson's hut, pale and frightened. It was some time before he could speak. When he
could, Hurling told Smith 'Oh! My mate is killed, the natives have been and killed my
mate along side of me.1 Almost immediately a party comprising police constable
Williams, corporal Shiners, Baker, Hurling and Smith left for Simpson's hut. They found
Knight's body where the Pallittorre had left it, some fifteen yards from his hut. The
Pallittorre were nowhere to be seen. Williams observed both large and small barefoot
foot prints, indicating both adults and children were in the Pallittorre party. Smith
estimated 30 people; their footmarks 'were all over the Garden like the footmarks of so
many Cattle'. The whites returned to Gibson's hut. The following day, Sunday 24 June,
Shiners, Williams and Lingan, accompanied by Baker and White, set off in pursuit of the
Pallittorre. About two in the afternoon Shiners noticed the smoke of a fire which he
judged to be near Laycock's Falls, some five miles west of Gibson's hut. Arriving at the
falls about an hour before sundown, the pursuers hid in a hollow tree some 400 yards
from the blacks' camp. Two blacks, armed with spears, stood guard, suggesting an
expectation of revenge.
The British response to Knight's death suggests they adapted their military practice
to a form of guerrilla warfare. Between seven and eight o'clock the whites crept to
within 40 yards of the blacks' camp. Six fires were burning. Three were close together,
and the other three 14 to 15 yards away. About 30 blacks and a num ber of dogs were at
the first clustering of three fires. Without calling out and under the cover of darkness,
the whites, with pistols blazing, rushed the Pallittorre camp. A 'great num ber of black
native people’ ran from their camp and 'immediately disappeared amongst some scrub
and ferns'. No blacks cried out. Like other Tasmanian Aborigines, the Pallittorre were
quick to incorporate British hunting dogs into their hunting practices. As the Pallittorre
fled in to the night at Laycock's Falls, their dogs attacked their assailants. Throughout
the course of the night the whites shot upwards of 25 of these dogs. The evidence makes
no mention of any intention to take prisoners. Williams, Shiners and their accomplices
9
were intent on reprisal, not on implementing the rule of law. Both Williams and Shiners
were at pains to point out they had not called out prior to their attack. This was
significant because in British military tradition, surprise ambushes were considered to
be dishonourable. This, however, was a silent war, unannounced in the immediacy of its
execution, requiring great patience and cunning in the quest for advantage.
Next morning, no black bodies could be found, although Williams saw tracks of
blood near the fires. He was quite sure at least one black had been shot. He traced the
track of blood over two logs; between the logs he saw 'the prints of naked hum an feet,
close to the track of blood’. In contrast, Shiners did 'not think that any of them had been
MSee Neal 1991, pp. 17-18, 58, 78-80, for a discussion of the non-application of the rule of law
to Aborigines in New South Wales prior to 1860.
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
114
w o u n d e d ' o r k ille d . N o t s u rp ris in g ly , the blacks d id n o t re tu rn to th e ir cam p. The w h ite s
rem ained at the cam p u n til a b o u t ten o'clock the fo llo w in g m o rn in g , b u t to no a va il.
They re tu rn e d to G ibson's h u t; soon after, they set o u t fo r Launceston to te ll th e ir stories
to the police m agistrate. K n ig h t's death p ro m p te d a h o rrib le revenge. Soon a fte rw a rd s ,
the H o b a rt Colonial Times re p o rte d th a t T h e people o ve r the second W estern T ie r have
k ille d an im m ense q u a n tity o f the blacks th is last w eek, in consequence o f th e ir h a v in g
m u rd e re d M r Sim pson's stock-keeper. They w ere s u rro u n d e d w h ils t s ittin g ro u n d th e ir
fires, w hen the soldiers and others fire d at them w h e n a b o u t th irty ya rd s d ista n t. They
re p o rt th a t there m u s t be a b o u t s ix ty o f them k ille d and w o u n d e d '.'0
*
W h y was W illia m K n ig h t kille d ? There is one v e ry specific reason fo r the k illin g .
A n in fo rm a n t called P unch to ld R obinson th a t K n ig h t deserved to be k ille d because he
'used to k ill the natives fo r s p o rt1." U s in g the d e p o sitio n s taken b y M u lg ra v e , w e can
discern at least tw o o th e r specific reasons fo r the P a llitto rre attack on K n ig h t's h u t: to
'p lu n d e r' the h u t, ta k in g some o f the contents and d e s tro y in g others; and to scare
H u rlin g aw ay. So the P a llitto rre had v e ry specific reasons fo r the ritu a l k illin g o f K n ig h t.
B ut the location o f K n ig h t's death in a p p ro p ria te w id e r contexts a llo w s a deeper
u n d e rsta n d in g o f the P a llitto rre m o tiv a tio n fo r k illin g h im . In p a rtic u la r, the b ro a d e r
context o f the Black W a r in V an D ie m e n ’s L and, and p rio r re la tio n s w ith E uropeans
liv in g in P a llitto rre c o u n try are a p p ro p ria te contexts; and K n ig h t's k illin g also needs to
be understood w ith in the contexts o f A b o rig in a l expectations concerning re ciprocal
exchange and c o n flic t re so lu tio n .
In early 1803, the A b o rig in a l la n d then k n o w n b y the E uropean w o rld as V an
D iem en's Land w as in v a d e d b y B rita in . F o llo w in g a decade o f liv in g in s u rv iv a l m ode in
b o th the n o rth and the south o f the island, the colonisers g ra d u a lly occupied the
A b o rig in a l h u n tin g g ro u n d s betw een Launceston and H o b a rt, as w e ll as on the east
coast o f the island. T h ro u g h the 1820s, co lo n isa tio n in te n s ifie d in to riv e r v a lle ys adjacent
to the central c o rrid o r betw een Launceston and H o b a rt, and in to w h a t was re fe rre d to
by the colonists as the W e stw a rd , a series o f A b o rig in a l h u n tin g g ro u n d s s tre tch in g
w e stw a rd some th ir ty m iles fro m Launceston to w h a t became k n o w n as D eloraine. A t
the
end
o f th is
n o rth e rn
c o rrid o r
w as
P a llitto rre
c o u n try ,
(see
M ap
12
3) ~ The
in te n sifica tio n o f co lo n isa tio n in the 1820s occasioned a v ig o ro u s and e xtre m e ly effective
resistance b y the island's A b o rig in a l ow ners. The Black W a r w as w e ll u n d e rw a y b y the
m id-1820s b u t w as at its fiercest in the late 1 8 2 0 s . T h e e xtent o f land in P a llitto rre
c o u n try suitable fo r g ra zin g , some 31,000 acres,
14
ensured it w as a ta rg e t fo r the
invaders. F rom a b o u t 1823 o n w a rd s, B ritish squatters began m o v in g cattle a nd stockkeepers onto P a llitto rre land. C h ie f am o n g these w as W illia m F ield, fo rm e rly a co n vict,
H obart Colonial Times, 6 July 1827.
11 Plom ley 1966, p. 219; In 1830, in fo rm a tio n about b la c k -w h ite relations in the Deloraine
district was given to the d ia rist G .A. Robinson by a stock-keeper called Punch. Punch
w orked on a stock-run at Avenue Plains, near Parkham, some 10 kilom etres west o f
Deloraine tow nship. Born in London, he was a form er convict w h o had also been a
constable. Robinson described h im as very civil, and was impressed by the fact that Punch
gave T ruganini, w h o was tra ve llin g w ith Robinson, a new pair o f shoes.
12 Ryan 1981, p. 83.
13 Ryan 1981, p. 139.
14 C ubit 1987, p. 10.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
115
who by the mid-1820s had acquired ownership of large numbers of cattle and sheep.
Field sold most of his produce to the government store in Launceston, a commercial
relationship suggestive of government acceptance of this 'unofficial' occupation. No
record of hostility in the period from 1823 until late 1826 exists. The effective
dispossession of the Pallittorre occurred in the late 1820s, during the second phase of
pastoral expansion in Van Diemen's Land.
A concerted resistance occurred across the Central North during late Spring and
early Summer of 1827. At least 19 separate incidents occurred in this period, including
nine incidents between 10-24 November. At least eight whites were killed, in addition to
spearings, other woundings and general harrassments. Huts were plundered and burnt,
and at least 100 sheep were killed at the Lake River."1 Between 2-7 December,
Map 3: Occupation of Aboriginal Land to the late 1820s,
Van Diemen's Land.
15Correspondence file, William Field, 71/227, Archives Office of Tasmania.
Plomley 1992, pp 44-51.
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
116
several travellers w ere harrassed on the Launceston to H o b a rt Road. B ut w h e n w e
exam ine relations betw een the P a llitto rre and the stock-keepers liv in g in th e ir c o u n try
p rio r to K n ig h t's death, w e gain a m ore substantial in s ig h t in to the local c o n te x t fo r
K n ig h t's k illin g and the n a tu re o f the vio le n ce w h ic h characterised the c o n flic t. A series
o f incidents, in v o lv in g P a llitto rre a tte m p ts at n e g o tia tio n , ra id s on stock-huts, the th e ft
o f w o m e n and c h ild re n , and k illin g s o f blacks preceded K n ig h t's death.
A b o u t six m o n th s p rio r to the attack, in the p re v io u s su m m e r, 'a b o u t tw e n ty o f the
n a tive people came to the h u t and re m ained in the n e ig h b o u rh o o d o f the h u t the w h o le
o f the day'. A lm o s t c e rta in ly the P a llitto rre on this occasion so u g h t to in d u ce K n ig h t to
fu lfil his reciprocal o b lig a tio n to them .
K n ig h t, w h o h ad been an 'associate' o f the
blacks in Sydney, spoke to them in th e ir o w n language and th e y w e n t aw ay. N o spears
w ere th ro w n , no shots w ere fire d . R elative h a rm o n y p re v a ile d , a lth o u g h the appearance
o f h a rm o n y p ro b a b ly m asked d e v e lo p in g tensions. A b o u t three m o n th s p r io r to his
death K n ig h t to ld H u rlin g th a t he had 'fa lle n in w ith some natives and fire d a t th e m ,
and th a t three spears w h ic h he had b ro u g h t hom e w ith h im , had been th ro w n at h im '.
H u rlin g 's account o f the in fo rm a tio n related to h im b y K n ig h t suggests th a t K n ig h t w as
the aggressor in th is in cid e n t. N o o th e r in fo rm a tio n co n ce rn in g th is in c id e n t is a va ila b le .
It is ve ry lik e ly K n ig h t's death w as related to these e a rlie r incidents. M o re g e n e ra lly , the
th e ft o f w o m e n and c h ild re n m ay have persuaded the P a llitto rre to take revenge on
K n ig h t. Punch to ld R obinson th a t he asked a black w h o c o u ld speak E n g lish w h y th e y
k ille d Europeans. H e w as to ld 'if b lack m an came and to o k a w a y his lubras and k ille d
his piccaninnies, w o u ld he n o t k ill b lack m an fo r it?'
The P a llitto rre p u n is h m e n t o f W illia m K n ig h t w as also a lm o st c e rta in ly in response
to an in c id e n t ju st eleven days p rio r to th e ir attack on Sim pson's hut. O n 12 June, some
tw o h u n d re d blacks s u rro u n d e d G ib so n ’s hu t. They isolated Thom as Baker fro m the h u t,
hence he w as unable to get his gun. One o f the blacks th re w a spear at h im , w h ic h
missed. The black then approached Baker, a p p a re n tly w ith o u t a w eapon. A c c o rd in g to
Punch, Baker p ro d u ce d 'a lo n g k n ife he had in a case b y his side and rip p e d u p h is [the
b la ck’s] b e lly and ran aw ay'. The black d ie d fro m th is w o u n d . Despite this in c id e n t, the
P a llitto rre rem ained in the d is tric t o v e rn ig h t, a decision, as events tra n s p ire d , w h ic h
p ro ve d fatal. Baker's re trib u tio n w as b o th s w ift and b ru ta l. H e w e n t im m e d ia te ly to
Stocker's sto ck-h u t (M a p 2), w h e re James C u b it and his 'half-caste' A b o rig in a l m istress
live d . T hat n ig h t, g u id e d b y the P a llitto rre s ' fires, Baker, C u b it and C u b it's m istress w e n t
to the blacks' cam p and k ille d nin e o f them . C u b it w as re p u te d to have k ille d m ore
blacks than any o th e r m an in the co lo n y .18
A fte r Baker 'escaped' on the day o f 12 June, the P a llitto rre ra id e d his h u t. Baker d id
n o t become aw are o f this 'p lu n d e r' u n til the fo llo w in g day; his actions the n ig h t before
w ere therefore in response to several o th e r factors: the approach by the b la ck he had
k ille d ; being su rro u n d e d by tw o h u n d re d blacks (an estim ate m ade in the fe a r o f the
m om ent?); an a cc u m u la tio n o f hatred and fear o f the blacks; and, as I w ill discuss b e lo w ,
a b e lie f th a t violence w as a necessary p a rt o f b la c k -w h ite contact. The P a llitto rre
strip p e d Baker's h u t o f a ll its b e d d in g m a te ria l and clothes. They to o k seven bushels o f
1 See Reynolds 1982, pp. 68-70 and 72-3 for a discussion o f the role o f A b o rig in a l reciprocity
in A ustralian race relations.
'* Plom ley 1966, p. 219; G riffen 1893-4, p. 39.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
117
flour, w hich they used to m ake dam per, all the knives, an axe, tw o pairs of sheep shears,
a pair of scissors, a tom ahaw k, som e g u n p o w d er and all the tin pots. They also took
aw ay 30 or 40 kangaroo skins. Clearly, the Pallittorre w anted Baker to leave. They had
not com e to kill him , b u t to collect paym ents ow ing, to frighten him into leaving and to
reduce his capacity to continue colonising their land.
Two m arkedly different strategies w ere pu rsu ed by the protagonists. The
Pallittorre sought to threaten transgressors of expected reciprocal arrangem ents, either
to procure paym ents due or to induce the colonists to leave, rather than engage in direct
conflict; the colonists ignored reciprocal expectations and practised the m assacre in
response to A boriginal threats. Baker's version of the story has him self escaping from
the blacks. I contend that the Pallittorre allow ed Baker to escape. Their business w as not
to kill him, nor did they respond im pulsively to Baker's action. W hatever their feeling
about Baker, the Pallittorre felt no im m ediate need to leave the district, nor to conceal
them selves, suggesting they felt no further threat from Baker, at least not in the
im m ediate future. This interpretation is su p p o rted by evidence prom inent colonist
Roderick O 'C onnor gave to the 1830 A borigines' Com m ittee. O 'Connor told the
19
com m ittee 'the N atives are m ore anxious to p lu n d er than to m urder'.
*
The various incidents w hich culm inated in the killing of W illiam Knight and the
subsequent m assacre of up to sixty A borigines consolidated a pattern of relations
betw een the Pallittorre and the colonists w hich persisted until the mid-1830s. Following
Knight's death, the Pallittorre continued to raid and som etim es bu rn stock-huts, spear
cattle and sheep, and drive aw ay the colonisers. W hitefoord Hills, to the w est of
Deloraine tow nship, w as one popular site of resistance during 1830. At least five
20
separate incidents occurred th e re / including one near the A venue in w hich 300 sheep
w ere clubbed to death. The A venue plain had been 'for countless generations the
favorite hunting ground of large tribes of natives, ow ing to the plentifulness of game,
kangaroo and w allaby ab o u n d in g from the Blackamoor to the R u b ico n '/ These tactics
w ere m et w ith w h at only can be described as a series of m ass m urders. In July 1830, for
exam ple, the Pallittorre attacked som e stock-keepers and successfully drove them away.
Soon afterw ards, the Pallittorre leader Q uam by, along w ith several others, w as killed.“
At M iddle Plains (Map 2), also in July 1830, 'Lyons and som e others fell in w ith a tribe of
natives and drove them into a small lagoon and shot several, and from there they drove
them to the foot of Ritchie's Sugarloaf and shot all the others except an old m an and a
w om an w ho begged for m ercy and w ere suffered to go aw ay ’. H enry H ellyer, the Van
Diem en's Land C om pany chief surveyor, told Robinson that in 1830 a stock-keeper
called Paddy H eagon living at the Retreat, som e tw o miles east of the future Deloraine
24
tow nship, shot nineteen blacks w ith a sw ivel gun charged w ith nails.* O 'C onnor told
the A borigines C om m ittee that 'C aptain Ritchie's [stock-]men, to the w estw ard of
” Shaw (edj 1971, p. 54.
Plomley 1992, pp 44-51.
21 Griffen 1893-4, p26.
22 Ryan 1981, p. 139.
23 Plomley 1966, p. 218.
24 Ryan 1981, p. 139.
118
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
25
N orfolk Plains, used to h u n t them on horseback, and shoot them from their horses.'
Punch told Robinson that several natives w ere shot by either M urphy or M urray and
tw o others at the Long Swam p. Punch felt that these m en w ere excessively cruel and
that 'in this case they o ught to be p u n ish e d ’.“6
The Pallittorre continued to respond to these assaults w ith retribution spearings,
which w ere not intended to kill, and w ith raids on stock-huts. One such attack w as
m ade on a sto ck -h u t at Dairy Plains (M ap 2) occupied by Thom as Johnson and Dolly
Dalrym ple. This incident has been w ritten about several times. Dolly is usually
presented as heroically resisting a vicious and cow ardly assault by a large nu m b er of
blacks.“ A six hour siege is reported to have occurred, and Dolly's heroism is frequently
m arvelled at because she w as a w om an and because she w as a 'half-caste', the dau g h ter
of an English sailor and an Aboriginal w om an w hom the sailor had abducted. These
racist and sexist interpretations alw ays fail to locate the blacks' attack on Dolly's hut
w ithin the w ider black-w hite relations in the district. On this occasion the blacks speared
Dolly's d au g h ter in the thigh, and they set fire to the hut. W hile there can be little d oubt
that the attackers w ere in a m ean m ood and that in all probability Dolly acted w ith great
bravery, the interpretations of this incident alw ays seek to 'heroineise' Dolly and
'cow ardise' the blacks.
The Pallittorre also regularly harrassed Cubit. In Septem ber 1831 C ubit w alked
from his h u t at Stocker's Plain (Map 2) to collect w ater from a nearby spring. Local
legend has it that 'som e score or m ore of spears' w ere throw n at him. C ubit 'b eat a hasty
retreat' to his h u t b u t received eight w ounds, none fatal, along the way. The blacks
m ade a 'long and determ ined attack' on the h ut b u t a stockm an there 'sh o t several of
them, and the rem ainder fled to the m ountains'. O ther A borigines w ho frequented the
district ap parently w earied of the struggle. Sometime in 1830, in response to A rthur's
offer of a free pard o n to any convict w ho could 'conciliate' Aborigines, John Benfield
approached three blacks. H e offered them bread and, pu ttin g aside his gun as requested
by the blacks, w as led to a place beyond D unorlan (Map 2). From here Benfield took a
larger group to the local m ilitary party; Benfield subsequently received his pardon. This
report suggests that these blacks sent out three of their num ber to m eet Benfield for the
purpose of m aking arangem ents to 'com e in ’. Lack of food and w eariness of the struggle,
or perhaps an unw illingness to engage in the struggle, w ere reasons w hy m any
A boriginal groups subm itted to the invader. Perhaps the brutality and extent of the
killings in Pallittorre country also induced these particular blacks to 'com e in ’.“s
Attitudes to the use of force
In the second half of the 1820s, both A borigines and colonists in Van D iem en's Land
adopted practices designed to induce fear and terror in the hearts and m inds of their
respective enemies. But, as I suggested above, the m ethods used by the tw o groups to
induce fear and terror differed considerably. The A borigines w ere far m ore im aginative
in their use of force than w ere the British, using different m ethods to achieve different
25 Shaw (ed) 1971, p. 54.
2<’ Plomley 1966, p. 218.
: Skemp 1964, pp. 10-11; Veale n.d., pp 83-90.
2SGriffen 1893-4, pp. 38-9.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
119
ends; for the British, force usually m eant m ass killings of Aborigines. Indeed the record
show s that for the British the m ere fact of being black w as sufficient cause to w arrant the
use of extrem e and unlaw ful force against Aborigines.
Lyndall Ryan, for Van D iem en's Land specifically, and H enry Reynolds, on a w ider
national scale, have w ritten com prehensive analyses of the reasons for Aboriginal
resistance, citing such factors as the invasion of their land, the failure of the colonists to
accept reciprocity, British killings and abductions of A boriginal w om en and children,
and a desire for the British to leave. Reynolds has also offered a w ide-ranging account of
the tactics, both traditional and new , em ployed by A borigines across A ustralia in that
resistance. Tactics such as surveillance, retribution spearings and occasional retribution
killings w ere derived from traditional cultural practices. Innovations included the use of
British food, w hich increased m obility and lessened the risk of capture or reprisal; the
theft and in som e places the use of firearm s; economic w arfare, such as killing stock,
b u rn in g haystacks or ruining seed; and selective attacks w hich also lessened the risk of
reprisal.“9 The Van D iem en's Land experience, including that of the Pallittorre, largely
conform s w ith this explanation of the reasons for resistance and the explication of the
tactics used by Aborigines. But the Pallittorre experience, and that of Van Diemen's
Land A borigines generally, suggests that our u n d erstanding of the nature of black-w hite
violence can be enhanced by further exploration of tw o im portant issues: Aboriginal
attitu d es to the use of force, as distinct from the tactics used; and the characterisation of
A boriginal resistance as guerrilla w arfare.
The evidence for the Pallittorre suggests they never believed that violent killing, or
even lesser expressions of force, w ere necessary or even desirable in their relations w ith
the colonisers. As Punch told Robinson 'w h en he first cam e the natives w as very
peaceable, but they have been drove to com m it outrages on the w hites by reason of the
30
dire atrocities first com m itted upon them '.' The evidence prior to the K night killing
suggests they sought to negotiate a reciprocal arrangem ent w ith Knight. In their ten
years of relations w ith the British, durin g w hich time m any of their people w ere killed,
the Pallittorre killed only two w hites.31 O n m any occasions they could have killed
colonists, but did not. The am bush and killing of W illiam K night w as a prem editated
retribution prom pted by several factors, both local and non-local, as argued above. On
m ost occasions, P allittorre hostility involved theft or property dam age, or attem pts to
induce colonists to leave, not the killing of colonists. Given that less than 2500 colonists
w ere killed by A borigines A ustralia-w ide, the Pallittorre approach to the use of force
seem s to have been w idespread across A ustralia. A nd although colonists w ere killed,
never did A boriginal violence in Van D iem en's Land come to resem ble the often
unprovoked prom iscuous violence practised by the British. This w as not a question of
'prim itive' w eaponry (captured guns w ere not used against the colonists), or of lacking
the tactical skill— the record show s A borigines w ere skilful, creative and w itty in their
29 Ryan 1981, ch. 7; Reynolds 1982, pp. 103-110.
111Plomley 1966, p. 219.
11 Plomley 1992, p. 15.
32 Reynolds 1982, p. 121.
120
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
33
resistance to the British.' Rather, Van D iem en's Land A borigines chose not to com m it
atrocities on the scale practised by the British.
O ne prevailing tendency in the historiography of Tasm anian A borigines is to assert
that the A borigines w ere experiencing som e kind of slow strangulation of their
intelligence at the tim e of the British invasion. Rhys Jones w as the m odern populariser
of this social-D arw inist notion, and it has m anifested itself in a num ber of w ays both
34
before and after Jones presented his thesis in the film The Last Tasmanian.' A long w ith
the m yth that A borigines becam e extinct w ith the death of T ruganini in 1876, this
strangulation m yth has been and still is a m ajor factor in the oppression of T asm anian
Aborigines. In this regard it is im p o rtan t to stress the tactical innovation dem onstrated
by Van D iem en's Land A borigines in their responses to the British invaders. Failure to
do so not only encourages the contem porary survival of the strangulation m yth, it runs
the risk of depicting A borigines in early colonial Tasm ania as captives of the topography
and their cultural traditions. The issue of A boriginal adeptness at guerrilla w arfare is a
case in point. C ertainly the topography, the process of gradual occupation by the British,
and the w eapons preferred by the A borigines m eant guerrilla w arfare w as an obvious
option, b u t w e should be w ary of the proposition that guerrilla w arfare w as a 'natural'
developm ent, that A borigines took to guerrilla w arfare as a fish takes to w ater. Such an
assertion tends to im ply that the choice to use tactics w hich historians have
conceptualised as guerrilla w arfare w ere not conscious choices, b u t rather som ething
which Aborigines did 'n atu rally '.3b C ertainly they w orked to harness advantages
available to them , b u t w e need to recognise and acknow ledge that creative and
intelligent choices w ere m ade.
C haracterisations such as Jones' notion of strangulation m ay be unw ittingly
supported by interpretations about the n atu re of the A boriginal m ilitary response to the
British invasion. R eynolds suggests th at m any Aboriginal groups m oved from 'feud to
37
w arfare' in their relations w ith the British.' In general term s this m odel does describe a
broad m ovem ent that did occur. There are three problem s, how ever, associated w ith
this term. One is that it can be interpreted as m eaning that the Van D iem en's Land
A borigines w ere slow to discard responses based on traditional practices; tw o, the term
fails to explain w hy the shift occurred; and three, the term fails to recognise that some
groups w ho m et colonisers for the first tim e in the mid 1820s, such as the Pallittorre,
m oved m uch m ore quickly into the w arfare m ode than other groups. The m ost vigorous
and organised resistance in Van D iem en's Land coincided w ith the rush of occupation in
the second half of the 1820s. Until that time, m any A boriginal groups preferred to
negotiate solutions, largely on the basis of reciprocity, rather than engage in conflict.
N ot until the m assive escalation of sheep and colonisers in the mid-1820s did w arfare
develop. Also, the decline in population levels induced survivors to come together, thus
creating the im pression of a late organisation. This im pression tends to obscure the point
" see Clark 1987, p. 64.
34 The Last Tasmanian: a story of genocide, 1976, (feature documentary), Sydney, Artis Film
Productions Pty Ltd, producer Tom Haydon.
35 Discussions with Aboriginal colleagues and students over the past seven years have
convinced me of this point.
Reynolds 1982, p. 103.
Reynolds 1982, pp. 77-8.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
121
that although the conflict intensified in the late 1820s, reflecting an ap p aren t transition
from 'feud to w arfare', the tactics used und erw en t refinem ent rather than m ajor change
du rin g the 1820s. A boriginal hostility, although m ore organised in the late 1820s,
rem ained linked to the retribution process, to attem pts to drive the colonists aw ay,
collect d u e paym ents or acquire food. The Pallittorre experience suggests it took them
little tim e to realise they w ere involved in an open-ended conflict w ith their invaders.
After they confronted Baker, for exam ple, they rem ained in the im m ediate vicinity of his
hut, leaving them easy targets for the reprisal that night. At that tim e, they saw that
having enacted retribution, that particular m atter w as closed. But they learned very
quickly that this w as not the case. After they killed Knight, som e ten days later, they
travelled som e five miles from the scene of the killing and posted sentries to detect
evidence of p ursu it.38
O ne tactic w hich has not been em phasised as m uch as it m ight have been is that of
the threat of force, a tactic closely related to the production of fear in the enemy.
Reynolds cites one exam ple of this tactic and Ryan in several instances refers to the
39
A boriginal intent to intim idate the colonists/ b u t in m y view it deserves greater
em phasis. Incidence of the threat of force, a less tangible tactic than the others discussed
by Reynolds, needs to be discerned from the ethnographic record. The record for Van
D iem en's Land in the late 1820s show s the existence of considerable British fear. D uring
the m ilitary operation know n as the black line, in Septem ber 1830, for exam ple, the
governm ent's decision to begin the line below Launceston provoked both fear and
outrage in Launceston and su rro u n d in g districts. A colonist at George Town, some
thirty miles north of Launceston, reported seeing a tribe of som e 600-700 A borigines
40
preparin g to attack Launceston. At the tim e there w ere less than 300 A borigines still
living on the entire island, although the general belief w as that som e 2,000 w ere still 'at
large'. This capacity for fear reflects the colonists' sense of vulnerability, a vulnerability
born of their ow n perception of A borigines as treacherous savages as well as the
A boriginal capacity to induce fear. But w as British fear m erely an outcom e of the
conflict, and not an outcom e deliberately pursu ed by the Aborigines? We need to be
careful not to deny the possibility that A borigines deliberately decided to use the threat
of force and the attend an t generation of fear as a pow erful w eapon in their w ar against
the British, that A borigines w ere creative agents in m oulding the shape of the conflict,
not m erely ad hoc responders acting w ithin param eters set by the topography, the
British and their ow n cultural traditions.
Several incidents suggests that A borigines in Van D iem en's Land used the threat of
force as a major w eapon in their struggle against the British. Ryan relates an incident at
Eastern M arshes, near O atlands, in O ctober 1824, in w hich 150 Aborigines, accom panied
by 50 dogs, divided into groups, su rro u n d ed a stock hut, threw spears and stones, and
finally surrounded the h u t w ith fires. Despite a siege lasting in excess of five hours, the
two servants w ho occupied the h u t 'escaped'.41 This incident represents far m ore than a
desire to acquire provisions; occurring at the beginning of the Black W ar, it can be read
3h Depositions concerning the death of William Knight, 1827, Chief Secretary's Office, 1/316,
Archives Office of Tasmania, Hobart.
33 Reynolds 1982, p 105; Ryan 1981, ch 7.
411Launceston Advertiser, 6 July 1830.
41 Ryan 1981, p. 88.
122
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
as a symbolic incident, a display of a range of weapons in a configuration of
confinement but exercised primarily as intimidation, dem onstrating to the colonists at
large that the threat of force and its attendant fear were to become a fact of daily life.
The Pallittorre adopted similar tactics. In addition to the Baker incident, twenty or thirtv
Pallittorre chased John Hurling from the site of Knight's killing, throwing spears at him,
all of which missed. In both cases, the Pallittorre threatened the two colonists with force;
in neither case was the colonist actually assaulted. These threats of force, read as
statements of intent, suggest the Pallittorre wished to convey to the colonists not merelv
a desire to have them leave, but to frighten them and other potential invaders, to create
42
in the minds of colonists a perm anent state of fear.
Other tactics also were designed to induce fear. In the summer of 1827-28 the
sudden appearance, after long periods of absence, and open hostility shown by the
Luggermairrernerpairrer and Lairmairremener bands of the Big River tribe, the
southern neighbours of the Pallittorre, caused panic among the colonists. The decision of
the Lairmairremener to split up and work in two adjacent areas along the Ouse and
upper Derwent Rivers gave 'the impression of combined strategy’. At other times,
constant movement and sudden attacks in unexpected places made capture difficult,
thereby keeping fear levels high. There are num erous reports of Aborigines telling
raided colonists they would be back to get them. In December 1829, for example, the
Lairmairremener robbed huts near New Norfolk. They speared a settler and took his
two pistols; they did not kill him, but told him 'we will give it to you'.44 The taking in
raids of guns and knives, although there are no reports of those weapons being used in
Van Diemen's Land, would almost certainly have enhanced British fear. These tactics
produced fear amongst the colonists; such tactics were shaped by the traditional
movements of those bands and the local topography, but were also the results of
decisions, consciously taken, to induce terror amongst the colonists. Fear was not simply
the outcome of tangible tactics; it was also the outcome of an Aboriginal policy of terror.
The threat of force, and the fear such threats engendered, rather than tangible violence
itself, was a major, if not the major weapon used.
The savagery of the British reaction to Aboriginal hostility has several
explanations. Fear, racial hatred and the Aboriginal resistance certainly contributed to
that over-reaction; but given the 'peaceable' disposition of the Pallittorre and many other
Aboriginal bands in Van Diemen's Land, can such factors account for the ferocious
nature of British violence? At least two writers have suggested that colonial powers
have seen racial others as inherently criminal and necessarily productive of social chaos.
Winthrop Jordan suggests that free African Negroes in America were seen to be
potentially if not actually in a state of insurrection. Barry Morris recently argued that
force was seen by colonists as a necessary part of black-white contact in colonial New
South Wales; this perception was prom pted and legitimated by constructions of
Aborigines, based on real and imagined fears, as treacherous savages always likely to
undermine the colonising effort. The perception that force was necessary pointed to an
inherent instability of British power in colonial situations, giving rise to a culture of
12See Ryan 1981, p. 97, for a further example.
1 See Ryan, 1981 p. 118; Shaw (ed) 1971, pp. 48, 54.
44Ryan 1981, p. 119.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
123
terror w hich governed colonists’ relations w ith A borigines in colonial N ew South
W ales.45
Follow ing Jordan and Morris, free or uncontained A borigines can be characterised
as potential or actual insurrectionists w ho had to be controlled by force. The record for
Van D iem en's Land, including both A boriginal and British actions, su pports such a
characterisation. C ertainly the record show s that A borigines in Van D iem en's Land
refused to accept the theft of their lands. O n the British side, perhaps the m ost telling
evidence is the decision in the early 1830s by A rth u r and Robinson to 'round up' W est
46
C oast A borigines w ho posed no threat to British occupation. The record of British
violence in Pallittorre country, certainly after W illiam K night's death, suggests
em phatically that m ost colonists there felt it necessary to use force against the local
Aborigines; and there can be little d o u b t that A boriginal violence, relatively lim ited
though it w as, consolidated such perceptions.
Several prom inent colonists w ho assessed the conflict betw een black and w hite
argued th at force w as necessary in dealing w ith Aborigines. A rgum ents for force often
drew links w ith perceived Aboriginal savagery and the need for force. In an analysis of
the potential value of the black line, the Launceston Advertiser ow ner and editorialist
John Pascoe Faw kner argued that the capture of the blacks 'cannot be achieved w ithout
bloodshed'— the ability of the blacks to d isappear into the bush and avoid apprehension
m eant that force w as necessary if they w ere to be contained. The only w ay to prevent
47
'their deadly incursions' w as 'by shooting a few of them '. Colonists giving evidence to
the Aborigines' C om m ittee believed th at force w as necessary. Roderick O 'C onnor, for
exam ple, th o u g h t it 'im possible to su ppress them by open force'; the A borigines should
be fought not openly b u t in a silent w ar m arked by the genocidal am bush. O 'C onnor
advocated 'som e of the w orst characters w ould be the best to send after them ', citing a
colonist called D ouglas Ibbens w ho had killed half the eastern tribe 'by creeping upon
them and firing am ongst them w ith his double-barrelled gun'.48 John W est also felt that
force w as necessary to subjugate the Van D iem en's Land 'savages'. In 1852, W est w rote
that the consequences of the occupation for indigenous people are of little concern
because the 'original occupation of this country necessarily involved m ost of the
consequences w hich follow ed'. Like the 1830 A borigines' Com m ittee, W est blam ed the
convicts for inflicting death and destruction on the Aborigines. But in W est's view the
A borigines them selves w ere chiefly to blam e, since as savages they w ere unable to
com prehend the law s of civilisation: 'the barbarian that cannot com prehend laws or
49
treaties, m ust be governed by bribes, or force'.
A lthough historians such as A.G.L. Shaw have argued that G overnor A rth u r w as
genuinely concerned to protect the A borigines in Van D iem en's L an d / the record of
events does not lend substance to the proposition. O n the contrary, the evidence
suggests that both the British governm ent and A rthur, along w ith m ost colonists,
believed that force w as necessary, certainly if the A borigines refused to accept British
49Jordan 1974, pp 221-2; Morris 1992, pp 72-87.
46 Ryan 1981, chlO; Robson 1983, pp 249-50; Pybus 1991, pp 127-29.
4' Launceston Advertiser, 27 September 1830.
4*Shaw (ed) 1971, p. 55.
49 West 1852, p. 96; Shaw (ed) 1971, pp. 35-41.
511Shaw 1980, pp. 123-34.
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
124
authority. David Neal has recently shown that in New South Wales the rule of law was
not applied in order to protect A borigines/’ the same is the case for Van Diemen's Land.
Arthur's governorship is marked by a failure to prosecute the many recorded massacres
perpetrated against Aborigines by parties of colonists including police and soldiers, the
revenge massacre for William Knight's death being but one example. This failure
suggests Arthur believed force was necessary. Bronwyn Desailly has convincingly
shown that the British government was prepared to condone the use of force to suppress
Aborigines who challenged the British occupation, although it sought to conceal such
condonem ent/“ It is not surprising then, that from the time Aborigines began to
seriously threaten the British invasion of their hunting grounds, Arthur's policy reads as
53
a sequence of measures involving the forceful repression of Aboriginal resistance.' In
the late 1820s Arthur actually adopted a formal policy of terrorising the Aborigines out
of the 'settled districts', a policy which sought to move between the threat and the use of
force. It makes no difference, as Shaw has argued, that Arthur may have been
powerless to stop atrocities against Aborigines—the point is that his policy both
facilitated and encouraged atrocities such as those committed against the Pallittorre.
Reynold's most recent work suggests that Arthur himself was aware of th is/5
*
One outcome of seeking to generalise about the causes of Aboriginal deaths on an
Australia-wide basis, or even a colony-by-colony basis, is that experience at the local
level can be obscured. What use is a generalised view if it does not accord with the
record of evidence in specific places? History is as much, if not more so, about the
particular as the general. A generalised view, if it is to aspire to validity, m ust follow
detailed investigation of local places; it must reflect regional variations and similarities,
not subvert them to a general view. The dangers for the integrity of historical
scholarship inherent in generalised versions of early colonial conflict are exacerbated
when high-profile historians seek to popularise comfortable and sanitised general
versions. Death by disease is no doubt a less culpable notion than death by violence for
a clientele enamoured of a celebratory version of Australia's past.
The discussion above shows that Blainey's assertion that disease was responsible
for most Aboriginal deaths simplifies and distorts the wider story of Aboriginal deaths
in the wake of colonisation. While agreeing that disease and other factors, all linked to
colonisation, were responsible for most Aboriginal deaths, Reynolds asserts” that
between 1788 and the 1930s at least 20,000 Aborigines in Australia were killed by whites
or their agents, some of whom were native police. Plomley argues that in Van Diemen's
Land, starvation caused by the British occupation of hunting grounds was one
significant cause of Aboriginal deaths. The importance of local studies lies in
recognising that different factors contributed to most deaths in different places. In many
places, certainly in Tasmania, it is not possible to tell how many Aborigines were killed,
51 Neal 1991, pp. 17-8, 58, 78-80.
52Desailly 1977, ch. 3.
53Robson 1983, pp. 210-20.
54Desailly 1977, ch. 3.
55Reynolds 1995, p. 108.
56Reynolds 1982, p. 122.
47 Plomley 1992, p. 15.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
125
how m any died from disease, or how m any died from starvation. A ccording to the
historical record, the chief cause of A boriginal deaths in Pallittorre country w as the
prom iscuous massacre. Evidence th at disease had lesser im pact than killing in Pallittorre
country w as the ability of those not killed to rem ain healthy. As late as 1834 Robinson
w as told by an unnam ed Aboriginal w om an w ho only very recently had been living
w ith the Pallittorre th at there w ere p len ty ’ of blackfellas still in the district. Reports of
raids for food on colonists' properties at C hudleigh, in the w est of Pallittorre country,
corroborate the w om an's evidence. 8 In any case, as Reynolds has pointed out, the
im portan t point from the perspective of national debate about w hite A ustralia's
obligations to A borigines in the w ake of native title is not how m any died from w hat
cause, b u t asserting that disease accounted for m ost and neglecting to em phsise the
extent of killing— the course Blainey chose durin g the native title debate—distorts the
reality of contact violence.38 As I am arguing, this distortion is further exaggerated by
national versions of the past w hich do not allow for local variations.
Irresistible inevitability and human agency
In his The Invasion of America, Francis Jennings60 used the term 'the conquest m yth' to
characterise colonial justifications of indigenous dispossession w hich em phasise the
inevitability of the process. A ccording to this m yth, savagery and civilisation w ere
opposites, the natives incapable of civilisation and hence full hum anity, the colonists
ennobled in their contest w ith the dark pow ers of the w ilderness’. Savages w ere
creatures of the w ilderness and w ould alw ays rem ain so, w hereas the civilised w ere
'required by divine sanction or the im perative of progress to conquer the w ilderness and
m ake it a garden'. F undam entally, all prescriptions contained w ithin the m yth w ere in
som e w ay fated - as Jennings puts it, 'it w as all inevitable'. As a m eans of rationalising
the gruesom e reality of A boriginal dispossession, various elem ents of the conquest m yth
w ere re-inforced d u rin g the early decades of the British occupation of Tasm ania.
A borigines w ere routinely perceived as objects of savagery, if not the m ost uncivilised
savages on earth. In the early 1850s, the conquest m yth w as popularly articulated in
Tasm ania by the Launceston-based preacher, editor and historian John W est.61
W est's view s on the inevitability of conquest are im portant in this story. W est w as
an im m ensely influential journalist and preacher in northern Tasm ania during the 1840s
and 1850s.6' His view s provide verification that the conquest m yth w as afoot in Van
D iem en's Land, and his contribution to racist ideology, at least in Tasm ania, has been
considerable. W est found th at the occupation of A boriginal land in Van Diem en's Land
w as just in the follow ing terms:
The right of w an d erin g hordes to engross vast regions forever to retain exclusive
property in the soil, and w hich w ould feed m illions w here h u n d red s are
scattered—can never be m aintained. The laws of increase seem to suggest the right
of m igration: neither nations nor individuals are bo u n d to tarry on one spot, and
die. The assum ption of sovereignty over a savage people is justified by necessity—
SKPlomley 1966, p. 903.
wJennings 1975, pp. 29-31
Morgan 1992, pp. 143-50; West 1852, pp. 92-96.
62Australian Dictionary of Biography 1966, pp 590-92.
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
126
th a t law , w h ic h gives to strength the c o n tro l o f weakness. It p re v a ils e ve ryw h e re : it
m ay be eith e r m a lig n a n t or benevolent, b u t it is irre sistib le .'13
Three closely related id e o lo g ica l p o sitio ns in fo rm W est's ju s tific a tio n o f occupation.
W est argues firs tly in Lockean term s64 th a t the Taws o f increase seem to suggest the rig h t
o f m ig ra tio n '. M ig ra tio n fo r W est is in fact necessary, fo r w ith o u t it b o th in d iv id u a ls and
nations w ill perish. Secondy, the o ccu p a tio n is ju s tifie d b y the s o c ia l-D a rw in is t la w
w h ic h 'gives to s tre n g th the co n tro l o f weakness'. T his la w p re v a ils e ve ryw h e re , its
m oral im p lic a tio n s b e in g co in cid e n ta l to its u b iq u ity . T h ird ly , W est w ro te th a t it 'is not
in the nature o f c iv ilis a tio n to exalt the savage'; the re la tio n o f the savage to the w h ite
(West's w o rd ) 'can o n ly be th a t o f an alien, a slave'.63 Three n a tu ra l la w s then, those of
increase, the do m in a n ce o f the stro n g o ve r the w eak, and the in c o rrig ib ility o f the racial
savage, render in e v ita b le a ju s t and necessary occu p a tio n o f A b o rig in a l land. These are
law s w h ic h im p e l and dicta te b ro a d h is to ric a l forces w h ic h h u m a n society is o b lig e d to
accept, indeed m u s t accept because th e y are irre sistib le . In p a rt, W est w as re s p o n d in g to
a w id e ly fe lt am bivalence in the 1830s and 1840s a b o u t B ritis h presence in the co lo n y
and the im p lic a tio n s o f th a t presence fo r the isla n d 's A b o rig in a l p o p u la tio n . W.P.
W eston, fo r exam ple, spoke fo r m a n y colonists w h e n he w ro te
W hatever m a y be the evils o f society in a state o f c iv iliz a tio n th e y are assuredly
less in character and degree than those o f savage life ; and I can never re g re t that
the fa ir and b e a u tifu l c o u n try o f Tasm ania has been e n tire ly reclaim ed fro m the
d o m in io n o f the debased and treacherous A b o rig in e s ; th o u g h I ca n n o t b u t
com m ent th a t it has been done in p a rt in sad v io la tio n o f those la w s established by
H im w h o h a th m ade o f one b lo o d a ll m en to d w e ll u p o n the face o f the earth
W est's ju s tific a tio n fo r E n g la n d 's 'a s s u m p tio n o f s o v e re ig n ty ' w as thus one ea rly
expression o f a process o f d e nial o f re s p o n s ib ility w h ic h is s till e v id e n t at the present
tim e.
G eoffrey B lainey in fo rm e d his analysis o f the im p lic a tio n s o f the N a tiv e T itle A c t
w ith an ideolog ica l p o s itio n in g s im ila r to th a t advanced b y West. A ttr ib u tin g a m ajor
p o p u la tio n increase to the p re -C h ris tia n in v e n tio n o f a g ric u ltu re , B lainey argues th a t fo r
5,000 years the stro n g have in va d e d the w eak; and th a t the A b o rig in a l ’w a y o f life was
b ound to be o v e rth ro w n e v e n tu a lly because it su p p o rte d so fe w people on so m uch
la n d ’. Blainey also offers a m o d e rn version o f W est's la w co n ce rn in g the in c o rrig ib ility o f
the savage. The N a tiv e T itle b ill 'is in tro d u c in g a fo rm o f o w n e rs h ip and an a ttitu d e to
the land that served the w o rld w e ll in the Stone A ge b u t w ill be se lf-d e fe a tin g in the 21st
century'. A n d despite an h is to rio g ra p h y th a t c o m p e llin g ly d ocum ents the deliberate
process o f m a rg in a lis a tio n , B lainey argues th a t the 'm a in reason' w h y A b o rig in e s are
'less fo rtu n a te ' in the fie ld s o f
health, e du ca tio n and w o rk o p p o rtu n itie s ...is because th e ir tra d itio n a l c u ltu re , fo r
all its m erits, does n o t fu lly e q u ip th e m fo r the m o d e rn w o rld . The n e w em phasis
“ West 1852, pp. 92-96.
MYarw ood and K n o w lin g 1982, p. 95.
65 West 1852, pp. 92-96.
"" Weston Reminiscences, pp 93-4; see also Dove 1842, pp 247-8; Plom ley 1966, pp 202-3:
Reynolds 1995, pp. 83-85.
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
127
on A boriginal ow nership of land is reinforcing culture. In th at sense, it is a
backw ard step.57
The inevitability argum ent operates on tw o levels, the inevitability of the
occupation itself, and the inevitability of A boriginal deaths once the occupation had
occurred. The arg u m en t that historical processes inducing the inevitability of invasion
m ight be at w ork is su pported by som e superficial evidence. Five thousand years of
invasions and alm ost continuous w ar suggest an entrenched desire to dom inate others.
But the issue is m ore com plex and problem atic th an either W est or Blainey allow. Robert
King has argued, for exam ple that im portant strategic, trade and social factors figured
prom inently in a long-running debate w hich culm inated in the occupation of A boriginal
A ustralia. A nd recently Allan Frost has argued that the British occupation of A ustralia
w as p art of a British Board of Trade plan to establish a global free trade netw ork.68 Such
choices challenge the notion of hu m an society im pelled to act by instincts beyond its
control. Once again Blarney's historical m ethod reduces a set of complex processes to
sim plified generalisation.
W est asserts that occupation 'necessarily involved m ost of the consequences w hich
follow';69 not only w as the invasion necessary and just, so too w ere the consequences
w hich followed! Is such a view beyond dispute? If w e accept the view that the bulk of
colonists th o u g h t force w as a necessary, it w as m ore or less inevitable that m any
Aborigines w ould die violent deaths, although there are m any exam ples of colonists
w ho w ere able to enjoy relatively harm onious relations w ith Aborigines, prim arily
w hen control of land w as not an issue. Ryan show s, for exam ple, that relations betw een
A borigines and sealers along the north coast of Van D iem en's Land in the early years of
the nineteenth century w ere in som e respects m utually beneficial and certainly more
70
harm onious than those w ith agriculturalists an d graziers from about 1810 onw ards.
The ap p aren t ability of individuals such as Punch to co-exist w ith the Pallittorre also
71
show s th at conflict and death w ere not inevitable. In any case, neither the arg u m en t for
the inevitability of invasion, nor the belief that force w as a necessity, should obscure the
fact th at in m any cases of m assacre, actions followed prem editated decisions. If w e held
that the belief that force w as a necessity m eant that m ass killings of Aborigines was
inevitable and hence som ehow an inevitable fate, w e dispense w ith the notion that
individuals and states oug h t to be held accountable for their actions, irrespective of
w hen those actions w ere com m itted. In Van D iem en's Land prevailing ideas and
circum stances helped shape decisions, b u t individuals m ade decisions and com m itted
actions. Beliefs, ideas and circum stances m ay pro m p t decisions and help explain
subsequent actions, b u t they cannot exonerate individuals from responsibility for those
actions, especially in the absence of substantive evidence of self-defence. Just as the
Pallittorre w ere not the passive victim s of their invaders, nor w ere the invaders the
passive victim s of their ow n beliefs, prejudices and prevailing circum stances. That the
Van D iem en's Land A borigines w ere system atically m assacred w as never inevitable;
m ass killing by m assacre w as the outcom e of consciously taken decisions.
67 Blainey, 24 July 1993.
“ King 1990, pp. 13-20; Frost 1992, pp. 4-11.
69 West 1852, p. 92.
Ryan 1981, chs. 3 & 4.
71 Plomley 1966, pp. 218.
128
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
When combined with representations of Aborigines as anachronistic cultural
objects, the inevitability argument on both levels—invasion and deaths—is calculated to
exonerate past historical actors for responsibility for the mass murder of Aborigines; it
serves also to excuse contemporary Australians from the responsibility to provide
72
Aborigines with necessary and just human rights, ‘ usually conceived as some form of
land rights, and the provision of basic services such as health care and educational
opportunity. The effect of the inevitability argument is to render the decision to invade
and the deaths which followed of lesser significance in the destruction of Aboriginal
society than the broad historical forces which impelled those lesser, contingent
decisions. As did West, Blainey is seeking to swing the pendulum of public opinion
away from an acceptance of pre-meditated killing as a major cause of Aboriginal deaths
and towards a more comfortable view of the past—that Aborigines lacked both the
biological capacity and the cultural sophistication to adapt to the inevitable arrival of a
superior western civilisation. Blainey and his predecessor West give us essentially
colonial versions of the past; their histories document Australian history as the story of
western progress, as the story of broad historical forces to which individual agency is
always susceptible; they present historical pasts in which the indigenes are required to
assimilate into western culture and society, or perish. Both use their versions of the past
to argue, each for his own generation, that neither compensation nor reparation to
Aborigines is necessary.
C on clu sion
The historical debate which accompanied the High Court's Mabo decision and the
subsequent Native Title Act 1993 is one expression of a contest to control the memories
that nourish national consciousness and so shape our future’.73 Given such lofty stakes, it
is crucial that positions put by protagonists such as Blainey be challenged, certainly on
historical grounds, and on moral grounds too. Both grounds involve questions
pertaining to the relevance and methodology of historical scholarship in the field of race
relations. In 1990 Peter Read wrote that historians have seldom addressed ’the question
of whether we, the present, have any responsibility towards rectifying the deeds of
earlier generations'.74 The High Court ruling that ’"Australia" is morally illegitimate to
the extent that it is founded on European denial of the continent's prior ownership by
indigenous people'/3 however, has prompted debate on the issue. While Tim Rowse has
expressed the view that such matters are 'endlessly ponderable'76 positions put by
Blainey and the moral philosopher Raimond Gaita suggest a polarisation exists. In many
ways this debate and the 1996-97 Wik debate, in which the High Court ruled that Native
Title and pastoral leases could co-exist 7 suggest the ambivalence which characterised
the views of men such as Weston is still evident in Australian society. As might be
expected, the focus of these debates is whether or not land should be returned to
'2Rowse 1993, p. 229.
73McQueen 1994, p. 54.
74Read 1990, p. 298.
75Rowse 1993, p. 229.
" Rowse, 1993, p. 229.
For comment on the High Court's Wik decision, see, for example, The Australian, 21 March
and 15 April 1997
REWRITING HISTORY IN THE WAKE OF NATIVE TITLE
129
Aborigines. Blainey does not ad dress the issue of an inherited responsibility, b u t rather
points out perceived negative outcom es (in his view) if the responsibility is accepted.
Blainey argues th at no further land should be given to A borigines for a num ber of
reasons: the average Aborigine has 12 tim es m ore land than the average nonA borigine—an over-sim plification, in m y view , w hich distorts the reality of Aboriginal
dispossession; a potential w eakening of the 'sovereignty and unity of the A ustralian
people', a claim w hich assum es that such sovereignty and unity actually exists; the
threat to econom ic prosperity derived from m ining, a claim for w hich the evidence is
contradictory; th at ow nership of land is not vital for the survival of any A ustralian
family, an arg u m en t w hich ignores the im portance of land in form ulations of Aboriginal
identity; and the H igh C ourt's ap p ro p riatio n of the Parliam ent's right to em body
contem porary m oral values in law, a claim w hich forgets that the parliam ent drafted
and passed the N ative Title A c t/8
Gaita, on the other hand, argues th at reparation in the form of N ative Title is
necessary because nothing less than reparation will redress 'the crim es of our political
ancestors' and restore to A borigines their 'full hu m an status', the depth of their 'moral
79
and spiritual being', w hich w as denied by the application of terra nullius and by the
ubiquity of the conquest m yth. If the obligation to restore full hum an status to
A borigines provides one basis for an arg u m en t for present responsibilty, this paper
suggests at least one other. Its illegality aside, one of the m ost m orally culpable aspects
of the occupation in Van D iem en's Land, and in fact all of A boriginal A ustralia, w as the
persistent choice, w hen taking the land, to em ploy the prom iscuous massacre. M any
A borigines w ith w hom I have w orked speak of the en during cultural and personal
80
traum a b equeathed by know ledge of those m assacres. This traum a and the atten d an t
moral culpability is intensified by the fact th at in alm ost every other aspect of social life
the British invaders rigorously applied the rule of law. As m ost historians w ould know,
reparation for w ar crim es is not a novel notion. W hen taken together, the illegal claim to
the country, the m orally culpable m eans used to acquire and retain it, and the disastrous
consequences for A borigines, w hich persist to this day, provide a very solid basis for the
argum en t th at we do have an obligation to rectify past w rongs. In the long run, no
am ount of over-sim plified and politically m otivated 'history' will deny that obligation.
And herein lies the im portance of local studies.
Local studies enable us to engage w ith the particular, the actual, and the complex,
to explore w id er issues at close range, and p erh aps u n d erstand m ore intim ately the
living actuality of the time. The arg u m en t th at colonisation in A ustralia w as an abstract
force to w hich h u m an s w ere b o u n d to defer, or 'a structure im posed on local practice,81
tends to deny the diversity and com plexity of relations betw een indigenes and
colonisers in local places at different 'historical m om ents'.82 This argum ent tends also to
deny the level of agency open to the participants in those relations. Similarly, explaining
Aboriginal d eaths in term s of the abstraction 'disease' obscures the com plex of w ays and
circum stances in w hich indigenous people died. To claim validity, a generalised view
MBlainey, 10 November 1993.
Gaita, 19 November 1993.
80See Cameron and M atson-Green 1994, p65.
w Stoler 1989, pl35-6., in Thomas 1994, pl3.
82Thomas 1994, p!4.
130
ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1996 20
m ust reflect detailed investigation of local places; it m ust reflect regional variations and
sim ilarities, not subvert them to convenient generalisation. Historical opinion, especially
on an issue w hich m any observers believe has deep im plications for the moral character
of contem porary A ustralian society83 should alw ays proceed from a rigorous historical
analysis of available evidence and from generalisations w hich take account of the
diversity and com plexity of local experience.
A ck n o w led g m en ts
T hanks to Richard Barwick for his help w ith preparing the m aps for publication.
Shayne Breen lectures in Aboriginal Studies in Riaivunna, Centre for Aboriginal Education, at
the University of Tasmania. Dr Breen holds a PhD in history from the University of Tasmania,
and he is descended from the Aboriginal peoples of Central Victoria.
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U niversity Press, pp 590-92.
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Blainey, Geoffrey 1993, 'M abo decision looked back through m odern blinkers', The Age,
31 July.
Blainey, Geoffrey 1993, 'M abo: w hat A boriginals lost', The Age, 10 Novem ber.
Blainey, Geoffrey 1993, 'L and rights for all', The Australian, 10 Novem ber.
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su rv iv al’, in Tasm anian H istorical Research Association, Papers & Proceedings,
H obart, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 65-70.
Clark, Julia 1987, ’Devils and horses: religious and creative life in Tasm anian Aboriginal
society’, in Michael Roe (ed.), The Flow of Culture: Tasmanian Studies, Canberra:
A ustralian A cadem y of the H um anities, pp. 50-72.
C ow lishaw , Gillian 1993, ’M abo breeds a sinister new form of racism, The Age, 31 July.
Cubit, Simon 1987, ’Squatters and opportunists; occupation of lands to the w estw ard to
1830’, in Tasm anian Historical Research Association, Papers & Proceedings, H obart,
vol. 34 no. 1, pp. 7-13
D epositions concerning the d eath of W illiam K night 1827, Chief Secretary's Office,
1/316, A rchives Office of Tasm ania, H obart.
Desailly, Bronwyn 1977, The M echanics of Genocide, MA thesis, U niversity of
Tasm ania, H obart.
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