Does al-Qaeda hold European governments
to ransom?
European citizens and the risk of kidnap by al-Qaeda
Date: 05/08/2014
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
Facts and figures ........................................................................................................................... 1
Victims ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Locations ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Duration and treatment ................................................................................................................ 4
Ransom payments ....................................................................................................................... 4
Outcomes..................................................................................................................................... 5
Challenging assumptions ............................................................................................................. 5
Targeting European citizens ........................................................................................................ 5
Ransoms payments increase the risk of kidnapping ................................................................... 5
Risk mitigation.............................................................................................................................. 6
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction
Al-Qaeda has conducted kidnappings for both financial and political ends for many years, and has
kidnapped both local and foreign nationals. Recent media publications have asserted that al-Qaeda
specifically targets European nationals. This is largely due to previous experience indicating that the
governments of these individuals will pay ransoms in order to ensure the safe return of their citizens.
This report aims to discuss these assertions and outline the threat of kidnapping to European citizens
from al-Qaeda.
One assertion which must be made clear before assessing this threat involves the basis of the
evidence which is used by the various media sources, primarily the New York Times, and red24. It is
not declared whether the media reports on this topic include kidnappings conducted by al-Qaeda
affiliate groups, such as al-Shabaab, the al-Nusra Front, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
and so forth, or the core al-Qaeda groups only. This report will focus primarily on the kidnappings
claimed by the core al-Qaeda groups (i.e. al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula) and, where relevant, will distinguish incidents carried out by core al-Qaeda groups and
those conducted by affiliated groups.
Facts and figures
Victims
The publication by the New York Times, dated 30 July 2014, provides a range of figures indicating the
risk of kidnapping to European citizens. As in the majority of kidnap for ransom cases, the media
outlet fails to take into account the number of kidnappings which may go unreported. Although the
proposed figure of 53 incidents in the past five years tallies comparably with evidence gathered by
red24 in terms of reported incidents, it is likely that the actual number of kidnappings is higher, most
likely around 90 incidents in which European nationals have been kidnapped in the past five years. It
is expected that many incidents involving European citizens are not publicised as media attention can
greatly complicate negotiations and substantially raise ransom demands.
In addition, further statistics are offered regarding the proportion of victims attributed to each nation,
with French nationals appearing to be most frequently kidnapped. This assertion is largely supported
by red24 evidence, with an estimated 40 percent of European victims being French. However, this is
based solely on published reports, while unreported incidents may involve a variety of nationalities
which could affect this assertion. In addition to French citizens, victims have been recorded from
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Britain, Spain, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Philippines, Poland
and Sweden.
Number of incidents involving European nationals (20092014)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
French
Other*
British
Dutch
German
Swiss
Fig.1 *Other – includes nationals from Canada, Denmark, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Spain and Sweden.
In addition to kidnapping foreign nationals, al-Qaeda has also targeted local nationals. Ninety percent
of victims worldwide are local nationals to the country in which they are kidnapped. Although alQaeda has placed considerable emphasis on the kidnapping of Westerners, the group has carried out
a number of kidnappings targeting local nationals. This is most apparent with al-Qaeda-affiliated
groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa, which have perpetrated a number of
kidnappings against fellow citizens for political and financial purposes.
Locations
Al-Qaeda groups have carried out kidnappings of European citizens in a variety of locations, as seen
in the map below.
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Fig. 2 - Map of kidnapping incidents involving European citizens perpetrated by al Qaeda and al-Shabaab.
This map highlights kidnappings officially carried out by al-Qaeda groups and al-Shabaab only. AlQaeda-affiliated groups have conducted kidnappings in other countries including Syria, Iraq and the
Philippines, but these have not been officially claimed by the organisations.
The al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda-associated group, has been particularly active in Syria and
kidnapped more than 30 European citizens since July 2012. This report has not included the al-Nusra
Front in the assessment of al-Qaeda’s threat to European nationals for two core reasons; that the
group confines its operations almost exclusively to Syria, and that the changing nature of the group
makes it more difficult to align its activities exactly with those of al-Qaeda at large. However, it should
be noted that this group presents a significant threat to European citizens travelling to Syria, as
demonstrated through the high number of European citizens kidnapped in the past two years.
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Location of kidnappings by al-Qaeda (2009-2014)
Somalia
8%
Syria
3%
Mali
30%
Kenya
21%
Mauritania
3%
Cameroon
3%
Niger
13%
Yemen
19%
Fig.3 - Chart indication the percentage of kidnappings involving European citizens carried out in each country.
Duration and treatment
Available evidence suggests that European citizens kidnapped by al-Qaeda are frequently held for a
number of months, although recorded durations range from a few days to several years. However, the
average duration for these incidents is approximately two months, during which the hostages appear
to be comparatively well looked after. In a number of cases, victims have fallen ill and their captors
have actively sought medical assistance in order to maintain a reasonable level of health. This is
primarily to ensure that the hostages survive in order that the group can collect a ransom payment.
However, there have been a number of incidents in which victims have been beaten, maltreated and
violently abused by their captors. Such treatment is often more likely when a ransom is not expected,
for example, when the victim is kidnapped solely for political purposes or when a ransom payment is
not forthcoming and the group use physical harm to provoke fear within both the victim and their
families.
Ransom payments
Ransom payments made by both governmental and private organisations to ensure the return of
European hostages have varied but available evidence suggests these routinely exceed US$1million.
In an incident cited in the New York Times involving the kidnap of one British, one German and two
Swiss nationals in Mali in 2009, the British national, Edwin Dyer, was killed after a ransom was
demanded, while the other three nationals were released following an alleged payment of
approximately $10.7million.
In 2011, it was estimated that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb attained an average ransom of
US$5.4million for Western hostages; similar demands have been made in recent years. In 2010, it
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was reported that US$17million was paid for three French nationals alone, who had been kidnapped
in Mali. It is estimated that running al-Qaeda’s considerable operations costs approximately
US$2million per month, and therefore the payment of ransoms is a necessary element of the group’s
operational capability.
What is clear, though not defined in recent commentaries, is that the involvement of third party
intermediary raises the ransom demand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the recruitment of a
mutually amenable negotiator from a neighbouring or neutral country allows the perpetrators to
demand a higher ransom as there is the acknowledgement that a settlement is desired.
With regards to the total revenue which al-Qaeda has produced from kidnappings, estimates vary,
although senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials estimated that between 2008 and 2013,
more than US$60million was paid in ransoms to terrorist organisations, while other senior diplomats
have claimed US$20million was paid to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula between 2011 and 2013.
The figures quoted in the media, that a total of US$125million has been paid to al-Qaeda since 2008
and US$66million of this was paid in the past year alone, would most likely include payments made to
affiliated groups including al-Nusra Front, al-Shabaab and, potentially, the ISIL (now the Islamic State
and no longer aligned to al-Qaeda).
Outcomes
Available evidence regarding the outcome of incidents perpetrated by al-Qaeda in which European
citizens are kidnapped suggests that the majority of cases are resolved through the payment of a
ransom. A minority of incidents have reportedly ended with the death of a hostage, largely at the
hands of their captors and rarely during rescue attempts. The payment of a ransom, regardless of the
nationality of the hostage, is the surest way of securing their release. Comparatively, a higher
proportion of British nationals were killed by their captors than any other nationalities. However, this is
largely due to fewer British nationals being kidnapped in total (see Fig. 1); the actual number of
hostages killed is similar. It is most common for hostages to be killed in order to instil fear into other
hostages and, most importantly, those negotiating the release of the victims. In the case of Edwin
Dyer, it is possible that he was killed not only due to a failure to pay a ransom but to demonstrate to
the interested parties of the remaining hostages that a similar fate may befall them should a
settlement not be reached. In addition, the killing of hostages reinforces the reputation of the group as
ruthless and vehemently anti-Western, and supports their underlying, radical beliefs and rhetoric.
Challenging assumptions
Having addressed the facts above, there remain a number of assumptions and assertions within the
recent media articles regarding the targeting of European nationals by al-Qaeda. Many of these
assertions require further examination in order to accurately assess the threat to European citizens.
Targeting European citizens
Although it is clear that al-Qaeda benefit most financially, and arguably politically, when European
citizens are kidnapped, it is not definite that these individuals are deliberately targeted by al-Qaeda in
each instance. There is some evidence to suggest that in many of the incidents in Yemen, the
perpetrators had carried out at least some surveillance and investigation to ensure that they
kidnapped Western nationals. This is clear as many of the targeted individuals are employees of
foreign governments or work for international organisations based in the capital, Sanaa. However, in
other incidents, it is more likely that the groups have kidnapped European citizens opportunistically.
This is particularly the case in the examples cited in recent media articles, in which a range of
nationals are travelling in remote areas of Mali.
Ransoms payments increase the risk of kidnapping
Speculation as to whether the payment of ransoms acts as an encouragement to al-Qaeda to
continue targeting European citizens fails to acknowledge other factors which would determine this
preference. It is undeniable that higher ransoms are obtained from kidnapping European citizens than
local nationals. However, in addition to the financial benefits of kidnapping European citizens, they are
also attractive targets as they represent the West, to which al-Qaeda is vehemently opposed.
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Therefore, the symbolism of targeting Europeans is also important to the group. Further to this, a
communication broadcast by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, in April 2014 called for
militants to kidnap Westerners, specifically Americans, in order to facilitate the release of prisoners.
Although this is not a great departure from al-Qaeda’s activities in recent times, it reinforces the idea
that the financial rewards of kidnapping European and American citizens is only one part of the
appeal.
Finally, the article focuses on the payment of ransoms by governments and the alleged correlation of
citizens being kidnapped. However, the article barely discusses the role of insurance companies in
encouraging kidnappings through the payment of ransoms. British and American nationals are as
likely to have kidnap insurance as European citizens, and therefore the payment of a ransom may be
as likely in these cases, depending on the legal restrictions on the payment of ransoms.
Risk mitigation
Perhaps the most significant omission from the recent media articles regarding the abduction of
European citizens by al-Qaeda is the clear failure by these individuals to mitigate the risk of
kidnapping. In the pieces cited by the New York Times and other media sources which have
commented on the article, examples are used in which European citizens have been kidnapped from
areas known to be high risk for kidnapping, and the victims clearly have not attempted to address this
risk prior to or during their visit. The incidents of individuals travelling alone in remote areas of Mali
and Southern Algeria demonstrate a naivety on the part of the travellers with regards to protecting
themselves against such incidents. Had appropriate security precautions been taken by these
individuals, it is possible that their abduction could have been avoided. Basic precautions such as an
appropriate travel itineraries, training, situational awareness and established security protocols
significantly reduce the risk of kidnapping for travellers to these areas.
Conclusions
There is a credible threat of kidnapping perpetrated by al-Qaeda to European citizens. However, this
risk can be significantly reduced through the employment of basic security measures and pre-travel
training and education. The recent media furore over the payment of ransoms encouraging the
kidnapping of European citizens holds some truth but the correlation has been exaggerated. The
failure of the articles to address the clear lack of planning and situational awareness on the part of
victims in the incidents they cite only serve to misrepresent the threat to Europeans, and specifically
those who prepare for their visits adequately. European citizens, and indeed all travellers to areas
considered high risk for kidnapping, should be cognisant of the threat and take appropriate steps to
mitigate the risk.
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