for MiddleGround
Searching
intheNorthern
andOilExtraction
Native
Communities
andCentral
Ecuadorian
Amazon,
1967-1993
PaulSabin
In September1993,two high-level United Statesgovernmentofficialsappearedin
a New YorkTimesphotographbearingthe featheredcrownsand large spearsof a
smallgroupof Ecuadoriannatives,the Huaorani.These U.S. representatives
played
new roles in the changing dramaof internationalpetroleum development. By the
early 199os, the balance of political power had shifted for the first time toward
residentsof the oil-producingregion, such as the Huaorani,and to national and
internationalnongovernmental organizations(NGOs). This was the latest in a
series of shifts:by the early1970s, powerhad moved decisivelyfrom industrialized
consuming nations like the United States to the national governmentsof oil-producing countries like Ecuador. Why had the political climate changed so strikingly since the firstmajoroil discoveryin remote easternEcuador in 1967? How
should scholarsunderstandthe natureof native oppositionto oil development in
the EcuadorianAmazon?'
The local historyof oil extractionin Ecuador includes considerable exploitation and conflict. Dramaticlocal incidentssuggeststaunch resistanceto oil development among indigenous Amazonian peoples. Communities have expelled
seismic crews, harassedconstruction workers,and sequesteredgovernment officials in order to protest state and industrypolicies. A group of Huaorani even
spearedto death three surveyworkersin the late 1970s.2But the historyof Amazonian oil development is not a simple tale of capitalist penetration and pristine
native resistance.Such interpretationsmistakenlytake these determinedprotests
as an indicationthatAmazonianindigenousgroupsoppose all development,wishing to remain in a purely"traditional,"
unchanged culture. A more complex story
emerges upon closer examination.Here, as in other instances of extractivedevelopment, native groupscomplain that there has been too little of the rightkind of
development and too much of the wrong kind. Native leaders in the Amazon
particularlycriticize the alliance between the Ecuadoriangovernment,the petro-
Ecuadorian
Natives
andOilExtraction
145
lemhomane
andrtherlarge plantatonaTi pcaowrfulnombiatinhaz
y
teaiclywokdagis
teiteet
o atv omuiie
enfrig
hi
needfo securpropery titls and teir deIreAfOroal
retdeooiee
opment3~
~ ~ ~~~~~A
Rater hanexmplfyig ntie rsisanc t economIc chng thtoyo
Ecuadoria oildevlopment oints toproblemsIntewyhacopisad
146 Environmental
History
nationshavedevelopedpetroleumresources.The storyalsounderscoresthe struggle
of native communities to change how oil extractionoccurs. In Ecuador, as elsewhere, the conditions of extractionhave typicallyforced native groupsto choose
between no economic development and a form of industrialactivitythat would
undermine the foundations of native cultural and economic life. To extractoil
cheaply and fulfill national strategicand economic goals, the oil industryand the
national government ignored native concerns. Beginning in the 196os, they rode
roughshod over local land rights,failed to mitigate or compensate for pollution
damage, and allowed a sweeping processofAmazonian colonization that stripped
native groups of large swathsof territoryand endangered their cultural and economic survival.In their opposition,nativegroupsfought to change these political,
economic, and environmental conditions. Local residentsand fledgling political
organizationssought to negotiateand participatefully in discussionswith multinational oil companies and national governments.
By the late 198os, this strugglehad become roughlyanalogousto the triangular
political dynamic describedby historianRichardWhite in The Middle Ground:
Indians,Empires,and Republicsin the GreatLakesRegion, 165-1815. In White's
study, none of the major players-the native Algonquians, the English, or the
French-could get what they wanted from the othersthroughforce. Instead,they
had to seekcooperationfromeach other,and eventuallya "middleground"emerged
between the competing empires of France and England. New, hybrid forms of
cultural,economic, and political interactiontransformedthe behaviorof the participants.Forexample, unable to unilaterallyimpose French law in the colonies,
French officialsfound themselves awkwardlyadministeringa hybridform of justice that combined elements of Algonquianand French custom into a new ritual.4
Two key featuresdistinguisha middle ground:its creation by at least three political forces, and its characteristicnature of accommodation. As in the colonial
GreatLakesregion,wherethe Algonquiansand Europeanscreateda middleground
between nativepeoples and two competing Europeanempires,the middle ground
emerging in modern Ecuador reflected not a meeting of equals,but rathera relationship between groupsapparentlyunequal in power.To enhance theirpolitical
and economic position, Amazonian native groups in Ecuador made crucial alliances with sympatheticoutsiders,including environmentaland indigenous rights
organizations and international development agencies. These allies provided
money, volunteers, and advice to supportthe native groups. Through advocacy,
the internationalNGOs and aid groupscombined with nativeAmazoniansto create a political force that constrainedthe scope of action for both oil companies
and the Ecuadoriangovernment.This growingpoliticalpressurepartdy
transformed
oil industryactivity by the 1990s. Companies and governments had to pay new
attention to the social and environmental impacts of future extractionand to the
long-termdevelopment interestsof local communities. The Huaoranigarbworn
by senior U.S. officials testified to these changing developmental politics, with
local interests increasingly shaping policies and practices in the region. The
Huaorani still did not fully control their destiny, but the politics of the middle
ground gave them new influence over their fate.
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction147
Atthe sametime,the processof politicalmobilizationandthe encounterand
accommodationwith outsidersalso transformed
the nativesthemselvesas they
movedontothe middleground.They learnednew languages,traveledto Quito
andthe UnitedStates,metwithindustryandgovernment
officialsorforeignactivists, created new indigenous federationsand political practices,engaged with in-
ternationallaw and science,and modifiedlong-standingsocial and economic
activities.The accommodationof the emergingmiddlegroundthus connoted
mutualtransformation,
it fromthe raw,one-sidedexploitationof
distinguishing
the earlypetroleumboomin Ecuador.
The nativepeoplesof the northernand centralEcuadorianAmazondid not
rejectall oil extractionin the region,butratherrepudiatedthe specificmodelof
developmentimposedby multinationalcompaniesandthe Ecuadoriangovernment.Nativepeoplesoughtmanybenefitsrelatedto oil extraction,includingemployment,accessto markets,andlong-terminvestmentin healthcenters,schools,
andcommunitydevelopment.
Atthesametime,theystruggledto establishconditions for new projects, including monitoring of environmental pollution, establishment of clear land rights, and sharing of profits from oil development. In
particular,nativeAmazoniansdemanded stateprotectionagainstillegal and often
violent intrusionsby agriculturalcolonistsfromthe Ecuadorianhighlandsand by
wood, mining, and agro-industrialcompanies, all of whom followed the oil companies into the Amazon. Historically,these conditionsfordevelopmentwere rarely
fulfilled,forcingAmazoniannativesto turnto dramaticpoliticalresistanceastheir
onlyrecourse.
In sum,economicdevelopmentandnativeinterestswerenotnecessarily
mutuallyexclusive.Byanalyzingoil extractionandotherformsof economicactivityin
the Ecuadorian
Amazonastheregion'sresidentsexperiencedit-as a complexset
of costsandbenefitswhoseculturalandeconomicimpactwaspoliticallynegotiated-a morenuancedpictureemerges.Notsimplyvictimsofthe oilboom,Amazonian nativegroupssoughtto makethe most of a complicatedand difficult
situation.Nativepoliticaloppositionconcentrated
on changingexploitative
conditionsandassertinga localvisionof economicdevelopment.Bythe early1990s,
afternearlythirtyyearsof development,a modernmiddlegroundhaltinglybegan
to emergein the Ecuadorian
Amazon.Whetherthe politicsof the middleground
will fundamentally reworkfuture Amazonian development, or simply remain a
tantalizing illusion, remainsto be seen.
TheEcuadorian
OilBoom
Before Texaco and Gulf struck oil in Napo Province, the northern and central
EcuadorianAmazon remainedan economically slow-movingregion only weakly
tied to the rest of the nation. Although linked with the Andean highlands since
before the Spanishconquest, the region remained isolated by distance and a lack
of transportationinfrastructure;a hazardous dirt road along the Pastaza River,
constructedby RoyalDutch Shell in the 1930s and 1940s, providedthe only motor
148 Environmental
History
vehicle access from the highlands.Aside from the Puyo-Tenaroad completed in
1963,land access to Napo in 1967 had changed liffle since pre-Columbiantimes.
From the capital of Quito, a new road extended to a few kilometers beyond
Papallacta,fromwhich point only a muddyhorse trailwound itswaypastBaeza to
Archidonaand Tena. Over thirtyother roadsbegan in highland sefflementswith
the aim of reaching into the EcuadorianAmazon, but all peteredout in the rough
terrainof the easternAndes. The rewardsof reaching the lowlandsjust could not
entice greatercapital investment in infrastructure.From the Andean foothills,
agriculturalproductssuch asnaranjillas(a fruitused to make drinks),aguardiente,
and unrefinedsugarwere carriedby mule; beef cattle were walkedup the pathsto
highland marketsor flown out from Tena. Furthereast, where oil townslike Lago
Agrioand Shushufindiwould soon emerge within the dense rain forest,the weak
links with the Andeanfoothills meant thatthe small nativecommunitiesand haciendas historicallytradedwith more accessible Peruvianmarketsdownstream(see
map).5
Most native communities in the northeast-primarily the estimatedsixtythousand Quijos and Canelos Quichua spreadfrom Pastazato the Columbian border,
the twelve hundred Huaoraniliving south of the Napo River,and the seven hundred and fifty Siona-Secoyaand six hundred Cofan located around the Aguarico
River-actively engaged in tradefor staples such as rice or for steel tools like machetes, fish hooks, and firearmsduring this period. At the same time, they subsisted not on tradegoods, but on shifting agricultureand hunting and fishing. At
one end of a continuum, some Quichua had been employed by Royal Dutch
Shell during its exploratoryworkand now made seasonalmigrationsto the Pacific
coast to find wage workon banana plantationsand road building projects;at the
other end, the Huaoranimaintained almosttotal isolationfrom marketsand wage
work until the late 1960s. Foralmost all of these native people, however, links to
the marketwere secondaryto their reliance on subsistenceagricultureor hunting
and gathering.6
Nevertheless,interchangewith outsidershelped shape their history.Takingthe
primaryelement of their economy for granted,many native peoples alteredtheir
settlement patternsand economic behaviorin responseto secondaryfactors.After
the Ecuadorianmilitarycut off tradewith Peru following a 1941war, many of the
more isolated eastern indigenous groups turned increasinglyto missionariesfor
key manufacturedgoods. Catholic and evangelical Protestantmissionariesdrew
native groups into nucleated settlements with promisesof schools, health care,
and access to trade.When the oil boom ignited in 1967,the complicated worldof
the EcuadorianAmazonwasthus alreadyin motion, though impedimentsto transportation,small populations,and the absence of valuable tradeproductsleft the
region with little political or economic power in Ecuador. Military personnel,
missionaries,traders,and hacendadosdominatedthe region and its people, while
native subsistenceproductionprovideda substantialrefuge from dependence on
outsidersand foreigngoods.7
Texacoand Gulf's jointdiscoveryof a largeoil field in the northeasternAmazon
rain forest in 1967 quickly transformedthis relativelysleepy region into a whirl-
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction149
wind of development activities. Petroleum from the Amazon became Ecuador's
single most valuablecommodity,providingalmosthalf of the nation'sexportearnings for much of the 1970S. The Texaco-Gulfconsortium, with the help of the
Ecuadorian govemment, built a 315-mileoil pipeline over the Andes from the
LagoAgriooil field to the Pacificcoast.Nationalcrudeoil productionsoon jumped
from five thousand to over two hundred thousandbarrelsa day.The militarygovemment established in 1972quickly increased national control over the industry
and made Ecuadora small but active member of OPEC. With oil reservesalready
identified and a substantialforeign investment made, the governmentpossessed
the leverage to force foreigncompanies to renegotiateconcessions. Ecuador'soil
boom thus coincided with the internationalshift of power from oil companies
accustomed to paying low royaltiesfor rich concessions to national govemments
determinedto reapmore profitableharvestsfrom extractivebooms. Many companies withdrewsoon afterward,due to disappointingfinds, dissatisfactionwith the
new contracts,or cancellation of agreementsby the state.The newly formedstate
oil company purchased 25 percent of the Texaco-Gulf consortium in 1973,and
then purchased Gulfs share in 1977, giving the state 62.5 percent ownership.As
the principal operatingcompany, however,Texaco remained responsiblefor the
execution of most Ecuadorianoil development until the mid-198os.While profitsharingshiftedand the nationalityof the companyemployees changed somewhat,
the state generally allowed Texaco free range in its operations.In addition to its
participationin the Texaco consortium, the state oil company founded an independent agency, PetroOriente(laterPetroAmazonas),to develop new wells in the
late 1970S and early 198os.City InvestingCompany also developed a number of
wells in the 1970s. Then, in the mid-198os,a second round of contractsbrought
new companies into the countryto explore south of the originalnortheasternpetroleum zone.8
Severalwaves of oil development have occurred throughoutthe northernand
central EcuadorianAmazon, with differentgeographic areasand cultures being
affectedat differenttimes. Explorationin the Amazon began in the Puyo region in
the 1920S and ended there with Shell's withdrawalin 1948 after it failed to find
sufficientreservesof commercially exploitablepetroleum.Texacodominatedthe
first period of sustained extraction, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, but
PetroOrienteand City Investingalso engaged in production;this took place in the
northernpart of Napo province (now the new province of Sucumbios), an area
known as the northeasternpetroleum zone. The Siona-Secoyaand Cofanes bore
the brunt of the development in the 1970s, although the Quichua and Huaorani
also felt the impact of largerprocessesof change. In the late 1980s, development
shifted to the south, with a more directimpact on the Huaoraniand the Quichua
who lived in Napo and Pastaza.Since the late-196os,however,renewed national
interestand activityin the northernand centralEcuadorianAmazon,largelystimulated by the oil boom, has led to region-wideeconomic, political, and environmental change.
The oil industrysparkedthe rapid transformationof the old Napo province
after1967. Oil companies directlyaffected native communities through oil pollu-
150 Environmental
History
tion and land seizures. During the 1970S and most of the 1980s, industrialpollution remained largely unregulatedand consequently unmnitigated.
The national
government established a small environmental agency only in 1984, while the
state petroleum company did not create an environmental unit until 1986. Pits of
drilling muds overflowedas a result of the rains, spilling contaminants into the
Amazon'swaterways.Texaco and other companies did not dismantle many old
wells and did not rehabilitateareassurroundingproductionsites. Extractionproduced a largequantityof highly toxic wateralong with the oil, and the companies
either dischargedit directlyinto wetlandareasand waterways,or storedit in poorly
maintained pools thatfrequentlyoverflowed.A 1992 studyof the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve,home to an extraordinary
varietyof faunaand floraas well as oil wells,
of
the
waste
found 70 percent
industry
pools in poorcondition. Overhalf the wells
showed oil spills into the surroundingarea.9
Industrialpollution also went unchecked in an economic sense. In an ideal
situation where industrypaid all the costs of doing business, the oil companies
would have compensatedresidentsof the petroleumregionfor pollution damages
to their health, their water sources, and their crops and animals. The desire to
avoidsuch costsmight have led then to cleaner practices.But because the statedid
not recognize indigenousland ownershipin the Amazon, and because of the inaccessibility of the courts to these indigenous groups, the petroleum companies
paid virtuallyno fines or compensation for decades. When the national environmental agency finally did fine Texaco and the state oil company in 1991 (a mere
the maximum allowed by law), the fine was overturned,and the environ$2,000,
mental subsecretary,CarlosLuzuriaga,wasforcedto resign.Justas they could not
gain compensation for pollution damages,local residentscould not intervene in
the planning for explorationand development, despite the location of the oil reservesunder their traditionallands. This exclusion resultedpartlyfrom a law that
claimed subsurfacemineralresourcesas nationalproperty.Often the firstwarning
of new activitywould come with the arrivalof surveyingcrews or the establishment of a company camp. The Ecuadoriangovernmentcaptureda high percentage of profitsthroughproductionroyaltiesand income taxes,but the affectednative
communities received practicallynothing.10
The direct impacts of oil extractionare not fully measurable historically,although the anecdotal evidence of pollution is quite extensive.The indirectconsequences of new infrastructurehave proved more profound and more easily
ascertained.Forreasonsof "landreform,"national security,and economic development, the Ecuadorian government encouraged the agriculturalcolonization
and deforestationof the Amazon, declaring it a "nationaltask."Oil roadsenabled
hundredsof thousandsof highlandand coastalEcuadoriansto flood into the newly
accessible Napo province. Alternatepolicies, such as the acknowledgmentof indigenous land reservesor the promotionof sustainableagro-forestry,
clashed with
the territorialand economic objectivesof the Ecuadoriangovernment."1
In the 196os and 1970s, Ecuadorianpolicymakershad little intention of entrusting the valuable petroleum region to the Siona-Secoya, Cofanes, or Huaorani,
native peoples whose national allegiance they did not trust. Only a few decades
Ecuadorian
Natives
andOilExtraction
151
before, in 194i, Ecuadorhad lost almost half of its claimed Amazonianterritoryto
Peru. The military feared furtherlosses in this resource-richregion that still remained outside effective nationalcontrol.The nativeresidentsdid not participate
activelyin nationalpolitical life and remainedlargelyunknownto highland Ecuadorians.Most of these indigenous people did not speakSpanish,and many lacked
national identification. Some, like the Siona-Secoya,crossedfreely over the border between Peru and Ecuador, with relativesliving on both sides. Others practiced shiftingcultivationand thus rotatedtheirvillagesitesthroughouttheirterritory.
The governmentdid not know their number and did not recognize the extensive
territorialclaims made by these villagers.2
In the yearsimmediatelyfollowing Texaco'soil strike,the governmentencouraged colonization by soldiersand formerconstructionworkers.Fora shortwhile,
the militarywas so determined to increase the Ecuadorianpresence around the
Texaco-Gulfdevelopment that they flew in vagrantsand delinquentsfrom the cities and left them there to colonize with little equipment or advice. Beforelong, of
course, colonists followed the new roadsof their own accord. Many firstworked
for the oil companies and then found sites along the roads;others established
homesteads directly,growing coffee or raising cattle to sell in regional markets.
Metaphorically,colonists hitched a ride on the backsof the oil companies. They
also quite literallyrelied on company vehicles for transportto and from their isolated farms.As a resultof this migration,Napo provinceexperiencedextraordinarily high population growth,approximately14to 15percent annuallybetween 1974
and 1982.13
The government'seconomic vision and its securityconcerns undermined native economies by ignoringnativeclaims to traditionallands.Agrarianreformlaws
declared that inefficiently utilized land could be expropriated.The national government increasinglycame to view the easternAmazon as an outlet for highland
and coastal population pressures;in 1977, the agricultureand livestock minister
announced optimisticallythat there were vast tractsof fertile, empty land in the
Amazon, "sufficientto fit more than double the currentpopulation of Ecuador."
To protect their claims under the agrarianreform laws, native landholdersand
colonists had to develop at least half of their land. Most turned to cattle ranching
in orderto use the land extensively,aided by generous creditprovidedby the national developmentbank.Rapiddeforestationhas been one resultof this mix of oil
industryinfrastructure,colonization, land law, and credit. Tremendous conflict
over land ownershiphas been another result,producingclashes, for instance, between native communities and colonistsand between both those groupsand economic interestslike the Africanpalm plantations,which produceda valuablepalm
oil.4
Accordingly,as the oil boom opened up the northernand central Ecuadorian
Amazon, the political, legal, and economic context workedto advance the interests of highland colonists, agro-industry,mining companies, and wood companies
over those of indigenous residentswho lacked secure title to their lands and the
political and economic powerto protecttheir claims.
152 Environmental
History
BeondNafive
Viclmizaffon
of landby inIndustrialpollutionandthe seizureand subsequentdeforestation
economicand
dustryandcolonistscreateddauntingandat timesoverwhelming
hazardsforAmazoniannatives.Theseoppressive
conditionsrepreenvironmental
sent the mostimportantregionalconsequenceof Ecuadorianoil development.
theirresponsiThe oil industryand the nationalgovernmentclearlyrepudiated
Yetthesenativeresidentswerenotmerelyvictimsof
bilitiestowardlocalresidents.
the oil industry;
theyalsousedit to theiradvantage.Inso doing,theycomplicated
the typicallypolarizeddevelopmentdebate.Mostobviously,nativeadultssought
employmentwiththe oil companies.Amongthe moreacculturated
Quichua,for
NormanWhittenreportedthat"nativeresponseto the
example,anthropologist
oil boom wasimmediate.Fromvirtuallyeveryfamilyof the PuyoRuna,young
men signedon to workwiththe explorationcompanies.Unlessrecalledbytheir
families,manyspent1to 2 yearsin a forestzone. They didthe majorpartof the
initialcampclearing,builthelicopterpads,andclearedthe io feet wide jungle
paths."'5
By1979,evenamongthe Huaorani,the mostisolatedsocialgroup,6o percent
of the menstudiedbyanthropologist
JamesYosthadworkedforanoil companyat
leastonce,clearingtrailsfortheseismicsurveys.FormanyQuichua,theoilboom
thanslave-likedebt
provideda sourceof cashincomethatseemedmorefavorable
peonageon haciendasalongthe NapoRiver.PadreJoseMiguelof the Catholic
missionin Coca recalledgoingto the haciendaswithrepresentatives
of a seismic
surveyingcompany,a concertedstrategyagainstthe hacendados.Theyarrivedat
one haciendajustbeforethe riceharvestandmanagedto luremostof theworkers
awayforseismicwork.Formostof Huaoranimen,asforthe Quichua,theventure
intoshort-term
employmentprovedasmucha culturalexperienceasaneconomic
one. The radiosandclothingmanypurchasedquicklyfell apartwhenbroughtto
theirrainforesthomes.The primarysourceof sustenanceremainedthe landcultivatedbythe familyorfoodcollectedandcaughtin the rainforest,thoughwages
didprovideforshotguns,machetes,sugar,andotherstaples.16
The intenseoil exploitationof the 1970S reshapedregionalpoliticsas well as
local economies.Duringthe 196os and early1970s, nativepoliticalorganizing
rapidlyincreased.The firstgenerationof leadersof newnativeorganizations
came
predominantly
throughtheschoolsoftheCatholicChurch,wheretheywereteachers,students,or employees.Somenativeorganizations
beganwithdirectchurch
whileothers,likethe Organizacion
sponsorship,
de PueblosIndigenasde Pastaza
(OPIP),beganoverthestaunchoppositionof the DominicanChurch,whichsaw
the movementasradicaland"communist."
Seekingto buildsupportforoil extraction,theoilcompaniesandtheflushnationalgovemmentfinancedsecularschools,
healthcenters,andeventhe headquarters
forsomenativefederations,
thusweakeningthepowerof thepatronesandtheCatholicmissionswhileenhancingnative
politicalindependence.The new tradecentersand infrastructure
alsoprovided
Amazoniannativeswitheasieraccessto marketsandcheapergoods,unmediated
by patrones, missionaries,or intermediarytraders.By the 198os, new technology,
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction153
such as solarpanels for electricalpower,enabled regionalpolitical organizing.For
example, the Siona-Secoyacould now communicate by radiowith a regionalfederationbased more than a day'sjourneyaway,in Puyo.17
Finally, complicating the situation further,native peoples in the Amazon also
joined in the colonization processand began to transgresstraditionalland boundaries. Some groups under pressurefrom mestizo colonists, like the Quichua and
the Shuar, also had growingpopulationsof their own. With the assistanceof government credit supportedby petroleum revenues, some Quichua had turned to
ranching in orderto protecttheir land claims. Others joined the migrationto the
northeast,where they conflicted with other native groups;Quichua and Shuar
colonists invaded Huaorani lands on the right bank of the Napo, for example,
while Quichua immigrantsfromthe Tenaareaseffledon landsclaimedby Quichua
groupsof the lower Napo River."S
In short, as a growing native population sought political independence, economic opportunity,health, education, and interculturalexperience,they revealed
a strikingwillingness to participatein a changing Amazonian economy. At the
same time, they also tried to change the terms of economic development to contain it within the frameworkof theirpersonallives and their communities.As they
tried to navigate a path between the Scylla of economic stagnation and the
Charybdisof industrialexploitation, they pushed the oil companies and the national govemment towarda new paradigmfor economic development, one where
both native communities and outside forces might transformeach other. There,
on the modern middle ground,nativegroupswould modifymanytraditionalpractices as they partiallyand successfully entered the marketeconomy. Oil companies and the state would rearrangedevelopment plans partlyaround local social
needs, democraticallydetermined,ratherthan pure profitand national security.
Beginning in the late 1970s, native groups in Ecuador pushed to incorporate
local concerns into the planning and execution of multinational development
projects.In part,they sought to readjustthe distributionof costs and benefits. To
preventdamage, they called for respectof theirland claims, for compensation for
industrypollution, and for guaranteesof clean production.To increasetheir benefits, they demanded investment in long-term regional development, including
education, land-use studies, health programs,and infrastructure.Costs and benefits, of course, are culturally defined, which partlyexplains why this political
struggletook on the characteristicsof a middle groundbetween differentcultures.
Increasinglyduring this period, indigenous groups sought local control over development projects in order to fit them into the long-term trajectoryof their
community life. Native leaderswanted bilingual education and health programs
that mixed Westernand traditionalmedicine. The call for environmental monitoringsimilarlyreflectedtheir distinctculture;ratherthan preservethe rainforest
as some inviolate "wilderness,"they struggledto safeguardvalued economic activitieslike farming,hunting, and fishing.'9
Politicalaction taken by the Cofanes of Dureno partiallyillustratesthis push to
change the conditionsof oil extraction.The Cofanes complained aboutthe loss of
wood, flight of animals, and contamination of water that resulted from Guanta
154 Environmental
History
No. 8, a well near their settlement. The Cofanes blocked road construction in
January1988, demanding compensation for damages. They also demanded annual appropriationsduring the years of production within Cofan territory,with
the money to be invested in training,ecological rehabilitation,and environmental research.The Cofanes also sought additional help for the community to defend its land against colonists. According to one report,Texaco's response was
brusque:"Youare not a government that we have to ask permission from."In
contrastto that attitude,leaderssuch as the Secoya native Celestino Piaguajeoffered a frankindigenous perspectiveon such situations:"These companies come
on the lands without consultation. I believe this isn't rational,rationalpeople go
firstto the ownerof the lands to askpermissionbefore using them, that'swhat the
well-mannereddo."
Highlighting nativeattemptsto teach propermannersto outsidersneithersanctifies local knowledge nor suggeststhat all native groups inherentlyformed communities with visions of a sustainable future. Sufficient examples exist of local
political divisionsoverdevelopment. Individualsdefied their communitiesby selling lands or cutting communal timber. Similarly,indigenous political organizationsexpressedconflictingnotionsof appropriateand advisabledevelopment.Some
divisionswere ideological, while othersplitswere purelypolitical,as organizations
and individualsmaneuvered to receive national and internationalfinancial supportand to carryout community-levelprojects.For example, from September 30
to October 4, 1988, fifty Huaorani from Tonfampareoccupied Zapino 1, an Esso
Company oil well in Block 8, demanding infrastructureas compensation for petroleum exploitation. The Huaorani particularlywanted their airstripto be expanded in size so thatlargerplanes could land and villagerscould more easilytake
products to market.The protestsrevealed the split between the regional indigenous federation,CONFENIAE, dominatedby the Quichua and Shuar,and this
group of Huaorani. Spurred on by Dayuma, the woman leading the Huaorani
settlement,the protestersforcedCONFENIAE leadersto leave at spearpointwhen
the stateoil company and governmentrepresentativesarrivedto discussa possible
airstrip.The Huaoraniinsisted that all aid go directly to the settlement, without
being filteredthroughthe regionalgroup.CONFENIAE criticizedthe close links
between Dayuma, the oil companies, and evangelical Protestants.2"
Despite suchlocal divisions,contendingindigenouspoliticalorganizationssought
in similarwaysto shape outside forces to serve local needs. The evangelical Protestant group of Pastaza,the Associacionde IndfgenasEvangelicos de Pastazay la
Region Amazonica (AIEPRA),brokeawayfrom the secular OPIP in 1980 to work
largelywith evangelical aid organizations.AIEPRApushed its backersto sponsor
small-scaleeconomic development in the setflements in an effortto enable communitymembersto produce commoditiesforthe market,including cattle, coffee,
and cacao. During the exploratoryphase in Moretecocha, AIEPRAnegotiated
with the Atlantic-RichfieldCompany, urgingthe corporationto invest in projects
that would endure at the local level, such as schools, a communal house, pumps
for clean water, and a landing strip.AEIPRApresident Pablo Grefa declared his
intention to stand firm and to protect the valued riversand forests against the
hazardsrevealed previouslyin the northeasternpetroleum zone. A primarycon-
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction155
cern for the evangelicals,as well as for the more prominent OPIP,was the protection of land againstthe intrusionsof colonists and industrialpollution. Such concerns were rooted in local economics, not in desiresfor ethnic or environmental
purity.'
While their long-termvisions for the Amazon remained distinct,colonists and
indigenous groups demonstrateda common interest in a greaterreturnof petroleum revenues to the region, the speedy conclusion of land titling, and the improvementof environmentalpracticesby the oil companies.Colonistsalsoendured
contaminated waterways,challenged company behavior,and sought compensation for damages;like Amazonian natives,they sufferedfrom the poor infrastructure typical of boom towns, which lacked safe water, sewage systems, reliable
electricity,health care, and other services.Leadersof a broad-based,month-long
strikeby indigenouspeople and coloniststhroughoutthe petroleumregion in 1984
demanded bridges, paved roads, electricity, regional health services, and a law
allocating a portion of petroleum revenues to the Amazonian political districts.
The govemment refusedto earmarkpetroleumrevenuesto the area,but responded
to the pressureto invest in regional infrastructureand community development
projects.23
Native groupschallenging oil extractionquestioned the terms of industrialactivity more than industryitself. Like their colonist counterparts,native residents
sought to refocusdevelopment prioritiesaroundthe concerns of the people living
in resource-producingareas.But not all communities made the same calculation
of economic and cultural costs and benefits. The Siona-Secoya who live in
Ecuador'sCuyabeno National Parkopposed any extension of oil industryactivity
because of past experiences with colonization and pollution, and because they
enjoy a fairlysecure, and growing,alternativesource of income - employment in
ecotourism. Ecotourism provides cash employment while allowing continued
engagementin traditionalsubsistenceactivities.The Cofanof Siabalomadea similar
calculation.As they establishedhuts in theirvillageforthe ecotouristsof the 199os,
the Cofan saw nearby oil development as a dangerousthreatto the settlement's
new business and to highly valued traditionalsubsistence activities. Of course,
opportunitiesin ecotourism are not available to all communities, and the clash
with the oil sector is something of an irony since the oil companies and the military facilitated ecotourism through the construction and maintenance of basic
transportationinfrastructure.24
OilandSustainable
Development:
Charting
a MiddleGround
The Ecuadoriangovernmentand the oil industrymight have extractedoil as part
of a sustainable regional development plan. While oil itself is a nonrenewable
resource,and thus not "sustainable,"properlyinvestedoil revenuesmay have contributed to long-term social and economic development. Attention to environmental justice-to the interplaybetween industrialactivityand local economnies
and environments-could havetransformedthe conditionsof extractionand made
the oil industrymore compatible with the well-being of the region'sresidents.25
156 Environmental
History
Integratingnew industrialactivityinto long-termregionaldevelopment means,
among other things, increasinglocal participationin projectplanning and execution, expandingthe local investment of resource rents, and recognizing and accommodating local lifeways.Such modificationseither make oil extractionmore
expensive or involve a transferof money and political or cultural power to local
entities.26Such changes can be achieved only through a negotiated political approachto oil development,with many featuressimilarto the searchfor accommodation that occurs in White's Middle Ground. The Algonquians achieved their
goals in partbecause of competition between two richerEuropeanpowers.In the
recent internationalpolitics of development, the ongoing strugglebetween determined industriesand national governments on the one hand, and Ecuadorian
and internationalNGOs and developmentagencieson the other,helped to create
a fresh terrainfor independent, native political action. As in the imperial contest
for the Great Lakes region of colonial North America, local struggles became
potent issues in the politics of distantcountries.The force of local political organizing and alliances between local groupsand sympatheticoutsiderscreatedthis
modern middle ground. In turn, the politics and practicesof the middle ground
partiallytransformedthe actions of governmentand industry,as well as the traditional waysof native communities.
Some tentativesteps onto a modern middle ground have been taken in Ecuador since the late 1980s. The government has recognized native land claims in
communal territorialportionsfarlargerthan the 5o-hectareportionsallocated to
mestizo colonists. Similarly,town-meeting-stylelocal councils in Amazon native
communitiesoperatein a consensus manner,unlike political entitieselsewherein
Ecuador, yet are largely recognized as legitimate political institutionsby the national government.These hybridformsof land ownershipand governmentexemplify the shifting terms of cultural and political power in Ecuador. Similarly,the
Conoco Oil Company's environmental management plan revealed a tentative
attempt to institutionalize a middle ground in corporatepolicy. In its consideration of the Huaorani,the plan recognized a Huaoranipolitical organization,but
also acknowledgedthat the president and vice-presidentof the organizationdid
not command decision-makingpowers comparableto an elected American official. "Waorani[sic] society remains highly egalitarian"the plan noted. "Company-sanctionedcommunications must recognize that there are no leaders and
thatall Waoranihamletsmustparticipatein decisions."Businesswith the Huaorani
could not simply proceed on a strictlyWesternbasis, with quick, direct negotiations.27
Conoco's "Guiding Principles"illustrateda new moralityprecariouslyestablishing itself in the rain forest region, leading to the recognition of new cultural
practices:
The Waoranihavethe rightsdue anyhumanpopulationandamongthoserights
isthe rightto decideforthemselveswhattheywantfromlifeandhowto pursueit.
The Waoranihavethe capabilityto makesuch decisionswithintheirownculturalframework.
Theirwayof livingwithintheirenvironment
in theterritory
that
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction157
hasbeen theirhomelandforcenturiesdeservesthe utmostrespect.Theyshould
not be forcedto act accordingto the rulesof outsideinterests?.2
As the enunciationof "guidingprinciples"
suggests,the modernmiddleground
betweenthecompaniesandthenativepeoplesinvolvesanovert,legalisticstruggle
overthe termsof engagement.This legalismdiffersfromthe ambiguityandcultural"misunderstanding"
thatWhitedescribesforcolonialNorthAmerica.Where
colonialpoliticsconsistedof impromptumeetingsthatfolloweduncertaincodes
of conduct,the nativeaccommodation
withoil companiesandgovernments
usuallytakesthe formof writtenlegalcontractsbetweennativefederationsand oil
companiesortheEcuadorian
govemment.Yetin Ecuador,asin thecolonialGreat
Lakesregion,the culturalandpoliticalconcessionsresultingfromthisprocessof
negotiationalteredall partiesinvolved,transforming
thepracticesof industry,
the
state,and nativepeoples.Withthis mutualtransformation,
the modernmiddle
groundplayeditselfoutnotonlyin twoU.S.officialsdressingin Huaoraniaccoutrements,butalsoin the actualformof development.29
Ecuador'semergingmiddlegrounddevelopedoverthe courseof severaldecades.FirstcamecarelessdevelopmentbyTexaco,otheroil companies,andthe
Ecuadorianstatein the 1970s.Thisroughlycoincidedwiththe organizingof nativecommunitiesintolocalandregionalassociations,
aswellasthe emergenceof
a strongenvironmentaland humanrightsmovementinternationally.
Struggles
overlandclaims,pollution,andculturalfragmentation
characterized
the 1980s.
Nativeorganizations
grewstronger,andthe firstEcuadorianenvironmental
organizationsemerged,sponsoredbyinternational
aidfromgovernments
andNGOs.
Ecotourismgrewasan industry,
increasinginternational
familiarity
withtheAmazon anditspeopleandcreatinga neweconomicinterestin the rainforests.In the
early199os, the changingpoliticalclimateyieldedthe firstsubstantivearrangementsbetweennativecommunities,environmental
groups,andthe stateandoil
companies.Thoughfarfromstandard
practice,theaccommodation
ofthe middle
groundbecamerealanddemonstrated
atleastsomepotentialforreconcilingtensions between economic development and regional cultural, political, and envi-
ronmentalchange.
Inthelate1980s andearly199os, thecontroversy
overtheConocoOilCompany's
planto developpetroleumconcessionBlock16in easternEcuadorrepresented
a
criticalturningpoint.The failedConocoeffortrevealedhowa middlegroundis
morethanan economiccompromiseforceduponnativepeoples.The practical
aspectsof the Conocoplanattemptedto addressmanyconcernsaboutthe environmentalandsocialimpactsof newextraction.
A largeregionaltrustfundpromisedto investunprecedented
sumsof moneyin socialandeconomicdevelopment
projects.Yetthesesubstantivechangescould not alterthe generalsenseamong
manynativepoliticalleadersthatthe Conocoprojecthadbeendrivenforward
by
externaldemands.Manyfeltthatit wouldnotaddresskeylocalcultural,political,
andeconomicconsiderations.
The Conocoplanultimatelycollapsedundernative suspicionand dissatisfaction
aboutthe proposedarrangement
and pressure
fromEcuadorian
andinternational
environmental
groups.The advancesandlimi-
158 Environmental
History
tations inherent in the Conoco plan revealedhow dramaticallythe political landscape of Ecuadorianoil development had changed since the 196os. The plan'sfate
also hinted at the new trendsof the 1990s.
Followingan opening by the Ecuadoriangovernmentto foreignoil companies,
Conoco led a consortium of investorsin a risk service contract signed in 1986.
Conoco agreed to invest $44 million in explorationexpenses over four years in
order to drill six exploratorywells. Following exploration, the company would
have the option of developing the discoveredreservesthrough a profit-sharingarrangement with the Ecuadorian government. By 1989, five of the six wells had
struckoil, provingtwo hundredmillion barrelsof heavycrude oil reserves.Conoco
and the-Ecuadoriangovernmentopened negotiationsover the termsfor development of concession Block 16.30
In responseto growingpressureto minimize the social and environmentalconsequences of rain forest oil development, Conoco sought to win the supportof
internationaland Ecuadorianenvironmentaland indigenousrightsgroupsfor an
innovativeenvironmentalmanagementplan. In fact, Conoco and its parentcompany, Du Pont, with reputationsto protect, had no choice but to workwith the
internationalgroupsbecause of theirgrowingpolitical power,particularlybecause
Block 16 lay within YasuniNational Parkand also extended into territorybelonging to the Huaorani.
Conoco's environmental management plan contained seven main provisions
intended to minimize deforestation,watercontamination, and health effects:(1)
centralized productionfacilities;(2) clusterwell sites (eight to twelve wells each);
(3) reinjectionof all producedwaterinto the same reservoir;(4) safety,health, and
environmentalprotectionprograms;(5) management of soil erosion and replanting; (6) air emission control;and (7) waste minimizationand disposal.Deforestation forthe constructionof roadand pipeline right-of-waysand well sites would be
minimized by making the right-of-waysnarrower,using plastic ratherthan local
treesto build the roadbed, and reducingthe numberof roadsand well sitesthrough
cluster drilling. Other major problems, such as the water contamination associated with the dumping of formation water in Amazonian waterways,would be
avoidedby reinjectingthe waterinto the geologic formation.3'
In additionto new environmentalpractices,Conoco claimed that it would take
innovative steps to minimize impacts on local native peoples. The company argued thata rigorousplan to controlspontaneouscolonization,enforcedby Conoco
and the Ecuadoriangovernment,would breakthe link between petroleumextraction and native land loss. "It will be impossible [for settlers]to come in on our
road,"declared EdwardJ. Davies, the presidentof Conoco Ecuador.In addition
to protectingagainstsettlerinvasion, the company also planned measuresto protect the Huaorani from the influence of company activity.Company policies to
prevent disease transmission,alcohol use, and hunting and fishing by company
employees would reduce the impact of extractionon local peoples.32
Finally, Conoco showed a willingness to finance a regional foundation that
would provide independent oversightof company compliance with the environmental managementplan and would channel economic benefitsback into native
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction159
communities of the region. The proposedfoundation emerged from discussions
between Conoco and twoAmericanNGOs, the NaturalResourcesDefense Council (NRDC) and Cultural Survival.Believing that the Block 16 oil development
was inevitable given Ecuador'sprecariousfinancial situation, the NRDC, led by
senior attorneysJacob Scherrand RobertKennedyJr.,and Cultural Survival,led
by projectsdirectorTed MacDonald, decided to explorethe possibilityof making
the Conoco development a model of social and environmental responsibility.In
the winter of 1991,Conoco and the two organizationsdiscussedthe idea of establishing a foundationfinanced by somewhere between $5 million and $25 million
from Conoco. In addition to overseeing Conoco's compliance with its environmental management plan, the foundation would use its resourcesto supportthe
developmentprojectsof the region'snativecommunities, includingthe Huaorani,
as well as the regional native federation,CONFENIAE.33
Conoco never createdthe foundationor executed its developmentplans.Negotiationsbetween the NRDC, CulturalSurvival,and Conoco collapsedfollowinga
witheringattackby American and Ecuadorianenvironmentalgroups.Denouncing the two NGOs forhaving"soldout"to the enemy,groupssuch as the Rainforest
ActionNetwork,the SierraClub, andthe Ecuadorianlegal organizationCORDAVI
insisted on absolute opposition to any development of Block i6. Simultaneously,
the supportthatthe NRDC and CulturalSurvivalhad receivedfromCONFENIAE
and from the Huaoranievaporatedamidst internal dissent and suspicion. Faced
with continuing opposition from the environmental groups that it had hoped to
assuage, Conoco's enthusiasm for the Block i6 project dwindled. The company
decided in the summer of i992 that its production development funds would be
better invested in new areas such as the former Soviet Union or the North Sea.
Conoco withdrew,selling its operatinginterestin Block 16 to an American-based
company, Maxus EnergyCorporation.
Conoco's departurein 1992has been interpretedboth as a tentativevictoryfor
opponents of Amazonian oil development and as a lost opportunityto create a
model for the clean development of oil resourcesin tropical rain forests.Robert
KennedyJr.,who arguedthe latterperspectivein a WashingtonPosteditorialfollowing Conoco's withdrawal,criticized the campaign for "ideological purity"in
Ecuador.He arguedthat oil is "potentiallyless damagingto rainforeststhan other
economic activitiessuch as mining, forestry,or cattle ranching."He declared the
need forenvironmentalgroupsto adopta more sophisticatedapproachthatwould
"allowus to negotiatewith those corporationswilling to commit themselvesto the
highest environmentalstandards."34
While Kennedyrecognized some of the complexities of the Amazon situation,
including the tensions between regional poverty,economic stagnation, and desires to protect the Amazonian environment, the failure of the Conoco plan surprisedhim. The negotiationswith Conoco had dissolvedin partbecause of absolute
opposition to oil development in the Amazon, led principallyby the environmental groups. But the deal also died because indigenous leaders deemed it insufficient. The plan negotiatedby Conoco, the NRDC, and Cultural Survivaloffered
money and mitigation,two goals of the region'sindigenous groups, but the deal
160 Environmental
History
did not guaranteethat the company would fulfill its promises.Nor did it yield any
control so that native residentscould shape the project accordingto their needs.
The Conoco plan also did not satisfactorilyaddressland ownership,an issue that
only negotiations between the indigenous groups and the national government
could resolve.35
Conoco's proposalsfor modifyingthe Block i6 development can be seen as a
tentative movement towarda modern middle ground, but the failed negotiations
revealed some of the limitations of dealmaking solely between companies and
native groups.Without concessions by the Ecuadorian central government,key
political and economic decisions about the pace and geographic spread of oil
extractioncould not be effectivelyaddressed.Similarly,the companies and communities alone could not resolve the core question of land control that underlay
some hazardsof oil development, such as the problem of sefflers,the inabilityto
monitor and preventpollution, and the filing of claims for compensation arising
from damage.A middle ground also had to be reachedbetween the native groups
and the state.
Accommodation with the state occurred to some extent in PastazaProvince,
where in 1992the national government gave 2.1 million hectares of land over to
the managementof the province'sprincipalnativeorganizations.The largestland
area fell to one of the more radicaland best-organizedof the provincialorganizations, OPIP,a Quichua organizationbased in Puyo. The government'sconcession
resultedfromyearsof political struggleby indigenouspeople in Pastaza,culminating in a large 1992march from Puyo to Quito, the national capital. Pastazahad
been the firstareain theAmazon affectedby the searchforpetroleum in Ecuador,
beginning in 1921with the arrivalof the Leonard ExplorationCompany. Royal
Dutch Shell followedLeonardin 1928,and Shell built the firstmotorroadinto the
Amazon, fromAmbatoto Mera, near Puyo.As with the Texaco-Gulfdevelopment
in the 196osand 1970s, up throughShell'swithdrawalin 1948the company'sactivities broughtmestizo and foreigncolonistsand land speculatorsto the newly accessible area. Shell'sexplorationworkcombined with other historicaltrendsto make
the Puyo area,with the largestpopulationand most developed infrastructure,the
center forbusiness,government,military,and Protestantmissionaryactivityin the
EcuadorianAmazon. The influx of outsidersand the new roadaccess resulted in
new land conflicts.36
During the 1970S and 198os, while what is now the province of Sucumbios
teemed with oil wells, roads,and colonists, the native leaders in Pastazamosily
watched the havoc from afar, though Pastazacommunities also struggledwith
problemsof territorialand civil rightsand culturalchange. In the late 1980S, as the
oil companies turned once more to the south, OPIP and its community leaders
became determined to shape and control any development that might occur in
their region. One of OPIP'slargestand leading settlements, Sarayacu,drew national attentionto the problemsof Amazonianoil development when it held hostage representativesof the state oil company, the land reform agency, and the
office of the presidentfor ten days. Leadersdemanded the completion of discussions over land rights and petroleum development. The resulting SarayacuAc-
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction161
cords,signedbygovernmentofficialsandindigenousleadersin May1989,called
fora cessationof seismicworkuntilthe region'snativepeoplesobtainedsecure
titleto theirlands.The agreementalsodemandedimmediatecompensationfor
the ecologicaldamagecausedby openingtrails,cuttingwood,and detonating
explosivesforseismicwork.37
Governmentofficialsquicklyrepudiatedthe promisesmadein Sarayacu,but
Quichualeadersin Pastazacontinuedto workon theirownlistof conditionsand
goalsforregionaldevelopment,andforpetroleumextractionin particular.
They
calledfor environmentalmanagementplansthatincludedthe participation
of
indigenoustechnicians.Theywantedto participate
economicallythrough"serious negotiation"
as ownersof naturalresourcesto betterensurethe autonomous
developmentof indigenouscommunities.They calledforthe controland planningof monitoring,includingestablishednormsandsanctions,withtheparticipation of indigenousgroupsin the levyingof sanctions.Quichualeadersgenerally
didnotplanforthe expansionof the petroleumfrontier,butrathersoughtto improvethe developmentof areasalreadyleased.In otherterritories,
theycalledfor
a moratorium
on theleasingof newblocksforfifteenyears.The delaywouldallow
nativegroupsto consolidatecontrolovertheirterritory
andwoulddeclarecertain
areasoff-limitsto oil development.Finally,theydemandedthatthe companies
stayoutof localpoliticsto preventthe playingof one localgroupagainstanother.
Alloftheseconditionsconstituted
OPIP'sattemptto interjectlocalsocioeconomic
andpoliticalconcernsintothedevelopment
process.According
to Quichualeader
LeonardoViteri,OPIP'seffortsdrewon the examplesof othernativepeoples,
includingthe Navajos,Samis,andCanadiangroups,whohavehadsomesuccess
in theirpushforautonomyandin negotiatingguarantees
of environmental
monitoring,participation
in planning,and royalties.This strategicborrowingunderscoresthe international
natureof the recentpoliticsof the Amazon.38
Conclusion
Asthe storiesof Blocki6 andPastazasuggest,newalliancesbetweennativeorganizationsand international
nativerightsand environmental
groupspartiallyreshapedthe struggleoveroil developmentsuch thatthe mid-197osexploitative
ofTexacobecameuntenablefifteenyearslater.Otherindications
strategies
ofsubstantive change include the alliance between indigenouspeoples and the
ecotourismindustrythatsuccessfullypressured
thegovernmentin 1993to temporarilyhaltexploratory
workin the fragileCuyabenoWildlifeReserve.The "Oil
IndustryOperatingGuidelinesforTropicalRainforests,"
publishedbyan internationaloil industryworkinggroupin 1991,alsoillustrates
howinternational
politicalpressurehelpedforceinternational
petroleumcompaniesto addressquestions
of industrialpollution,colonization,andindigenouslandrights.The guidelines
includerecommendations
forthe expandeduseof helicoptersinsteadof roadaccess,clusterdrillingandwastewater
spillcontingencyplans,complete
reinjection,
plansforthe abandonmentof wells,andcolonistcontrolpolicies.None of these
162 Environmental
History
guidelinesnecessarilyindicatethatan adequatedevelopmentstrategy
willgovem
futureoil extractionin Ecuador,buttheydo revealhownativeactivismandpressurefrominternationalenvironmentaland humanrightsorganizations
created
alternative
politicsof developmentin the Ecuadorian
Amazon.39
The ouflinesof the modemmiddlegroundemergingin Ecuadorcan alsobe
foundin recentnegotiationsoveroil and gasdevelopmentin the UnitedStates
andCanada.MarianeAmbler's
BreakingtheIronBonds:IndianControlofEnergy
DevelopmentrevealshowNativeAmerican"energytribes"in the UnitedStates
struggledto linkthedevelopmentof reservation
energyresourcesto thesocialand
economicdevelopmentof the reservation
asa whole.Tribessuchasthe Northern
similarto
Apachefolloweda trajectory
Cheyenne,Navajo,Blackfeet,andJacarilla
thatoccurringin Ecuador,on a slighilyearliertimetable.As nativegroupsand
theirleadersassertedthemselvesoverthecourseofthe 196os and1970s, theysought
to imposetheirown orderon energyprojects.As with OPIP,the energytribes
oftenpushedformoratoriums
to allowthemselvestimeto prepareforthe onsetof
development.The NorthAmericantribesalso demandedstrictenvironmental
andplanningandthelocaldistribution
monitoring
of jobsandinvestmentcapital.
A similarprocesstookplacein Canada'sNorthwestTerritories
fromthe 1960S to
the 1990S.40
Justaselementsof the fragilemiddlegroundin contemporary
naturalresource
politicscan be foundin nativeNorthAmerica,so too can the Amazonianstory
speakto the historyof resourcedevelopmentoutsideof nativecommunities.Recognizingthe complicatednatureof localoppositionto industrialdevelopmentin
easternEcuadorpointsto a reformulation
of otherhistoricalconflictsovereconomicdevelopment.Ratherthaninterpreting
them as absolutebafflesbetween
romanticized
subsistenceculturesanddemonizedmarketcultures,the focuscan
shiftto people'sstruggleto bettertheirpoliticalandeconomicsituation.Thisap
proachsuggestsa fundamentalquestion:underwhatconditionsdo localitiesenter
themarketeconomyandwithwhatsuccessdotheywrestbenefitsfromit?Suchan
inquirywouldmoreaccuratelyreflectthe complicatedbalancesoughtby many
individuals
andlocalitiesbetweenthe continuitiesof traditionandthe opportunitiesof historicalchange.
PaulSabinis a doctoralcandidatein historyatthe University
of Califomia,Berkeley, wherehe is completinga dissertation
on the role of lawandpoliticsin the
Californiaoil economyfrom1900 to 194o. His article,"HomeandAbroad:The
TwoWests'of Twentieth-Century
UnitedStatesHistory'(PacificHistoricalReview,August1997),receivedthe W Turrentine
JacksonPrizefromthe Pacific
CoastBranchoftheAmericanHistoricalAssociation
forthebestgraduate
student
essayof 1997.
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction163
Notes
Specialthanksto PaulArellano,Margaret
Chowning,DavidEngerman,DavidIgler,GregoryKnapp,DouglasSouthgate,and RichardWhite.A CharlesP. HowlandFellowvship
fromYaleUniversity
supportedresearchin Ecuadorin 1992-93.
1. The twoofficialswereKatherineMcGinty,the WhiteHousedirectorforenvironmental policy,andJamesMack,theAmericancharged'affaires
in Ecuador.JamesBrooke,
"OilandTourismDon'tMix,IncitingAmazonBattle,"New YorkTimes,26 September
1993,3. In Ecuador,the Amazonianprovincesare collectivelyreferredto as the "El
Oriente"or "theEast."To minimizeconfusionforthe English-speaking
reader,I have
used"Ecuadorian
Amazon"or "Amazonian
Ecuador."
2. Since 1983,Abya-Yala
Presshas publishedKipu:El MundoIndigenaen la Prensa
Ecuatoriana,collectedarticlesfromthe EcuadorianpressaboutEcuadorianindigenouspeoples[hereafter
Kipu].FortheCofanesof Durenoblockingroadconstruction
10(1988):159.For
bythe CEPE-Texaco
consortium,see Hoy,27January
1988,in KGpu
the sequestering
of governmentofficialsin the townof Sarayacuin 1989,see Hoy,ii
May1989,in Kipu12 (1989):274-76.Forthe Huaoranispearing,see El Comercio,5
November1977, in Kipu9 (1987):224.
3. Unionde Nativosde la AmazoniaEcuatoriana,Problematica
Socialy Agrariaen el
OrienteEcuatoriano:
Reflexionesnacidasal interiorde la UNAE(Quito:Unionde
Nativosde la AmazonfaEcuatoriana,
June1985),9. See also AnthonyBebbington,
"Modemization
FromBelow:An AlternativeIndigenousDevelopment?"
Economic
Geography
69 (1993):274-92,andAnthonyBebbingtonet al., "FragileLands,Fragile
IndianOrganizations
Organizations:
and the Politicsof Sustainability
in Ecuador,"
Transactions
of the Instituteof BritishGeographers
18(1993):179-96.
4. RichardWite, The MiddleGround:Indians,Empires,and Republicsin the Great
LakesRegion,165-1815 (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).I discussed
somedimensionsof this"modernmiddleground"in a previousarticle.See PaulSabin,
"Voicesfromthe Hydrocarbon
Frontier:
Canada'sMackenzieValleyPipelineInquiry
Environmental
HistoryReview19(1995):17-48.Fortworecenteffortsto
(1974-1977),"
developWhite'sconceptof the middleground,see BethA. Conklinand LauraR.
Graham,"TheShiftingMiddleGround:AmazonianIndiansandEco-Politics,"
American Anthropologist
97 (1995):695-710,and DarceeMcLaren,"Livingthe Middle
Ground:TwoDakotaMissionaries,
1887-19127
Ethnohistoiy43
(1996):277-305.Conklin
and Grahamnicely analyzethe symbolicpoliticsof the modem middlegroundin
Brazil,lookingparticularly
at the waysthatthe intemationalenvironmental
communityhas misrepresented
nativeambitionswhileadoptingthe nativecauseas its own.
Thisessaydetailsanothersideof the triangular
politicsof the middleground,i.e-.,the
relationship
betweennativepeoplesandthestateandoil companiesin the Ecuadorian
Amazon.
de un grupoindigenaen el
5. Udo Oberem,LosQuijos:Historiade la transculturation
OrienteEcuatoriano,
trans.fromthe 1962Germanedition(Otavalo,Ecuador:Instituto
Otavalefiode Antropologia,
1980),29; R.J.Bromley,"Agricultural
Colonizationin the
UpperAmazonBasin:The Impactof Oil Discoveries,"
Tijdschrift
voorEconomische
en SocialeGeografie63(1972):281.The eastemregionexperiencedsubstantial
change
duringthe centuryprecedingthe 1967discovery
of oil.Anearlierrubberboombrought
"'rubber
barons"up the riversfromPeru;they enslavedand employedlocal people
164 Environmental
History
whenpossible,drivingothernativegroupsto seekrefuge.Followingthe declineof the
in the 1930S and1940Sbroughtroadconstruction,
rubbertrade,oil exploration
employment,andcoloniststo areasaroundPuyo.Then, in 1941,PeruinvadedEcuadorfrom
the east,seizinghalfof Ecuador'sAmazonterritory,
includingmostnavigablerivers.
The warsparkedincreasedactivityby the Ecuadorianmilitary,whichshutdownthe
exchangeof rainforestandhaciendaproductswithPeruviantraders.See NormanE.
WhittenJr.,"Amazonia
TodayattheBaseof theAndes:AnEthnicInterfacein Ecologiin CulturalTransformations
andEthnicityin
cal, Social,andIdeologicalPerspectives;"
ModernEcuador,ed. NormanE. WhittenJr.(Urbana:Universityof IllinoisPress,
1981), 121-61.
6. Populationestimatesfromthe early1990S shouldbe takenas roughguides,since no
one knowswithcertaintywhatthepopulations
aretoday,muchlessin 1960.Forpopulationstatistics,see Chapter2 of NelsonGomez et al., Tempestaden la Amazonia
Ecuatoriana
andLucyRuiz,"Pueb(Quito:CIESA,1992);Whitten,"Amazonia
Today";
los Indigenasy Etnicidaden la Amazonia,"in Indios: Una reflexion sobre el
levantamiento
indigenade 1990 (Quito:InstitutoLatinoamericano
de Investigaciones
Sociales, 1991), 451. For far higher population estimates of the Quichua, see
CONFENIAE,Estructurade la CONFENIAE(Quito:CONFENIAE,1980).The
Huaoranididnotengagein tradeuntilthe late1960s,andone subgroupof thatpeople,
the Tagaeri,does not engagein tradeeven today.Still, foreignproductsplayedan
important
role,andtheHuaorani
oftenstolemanufactured
goodsfromcompanycamps.
The Huaoraniare atypicalin theirisolation,althoughtheirculturehas undergone
dramaticchangesince evangelicalmissionariesencouragedmanyof them to settle
morepermanently
in a smallpartof theirformerterritory.
DavidStoll,Fishersof Men
orFoundersof Empire?.:
The VVycliffe
BibleTranslators
in LatinAmerica(Cambridge,
Mass:CulturalSurvival,1982);JamesA. Yost,"Twenty
Yearsof Contact:The Mechanismsof Changein Wao('Auca')Culture,"in CulturalTransformations
andEthnicity
in ModernEcuador,ed. NormanE. WhittenJr.(Urbana:Universityof IllinoisPress,
1981),677-704;JoeKane,Savages(NewYork:Knopf,1995);LauraRival,"SocialTransformationandthe Impactof FormalSchoolingon the Huaoraniof AmazonianEcuador"(Ph.D.diss.,LondonSchoolof Economics,1992).
7. See NormanE. WhittenJr.,SachaRuna:Ethnicityand Adaptationof Ecuadorian
JungleQuichua(Urbana:
University
of IllinoisPress,1976);SicuangaRuna:TheOther
SideofDevelopmentinAmazonian
Ecuador(Urbana:
University
of IllinoisPress,1985);
andthe scholarlyworkof the authorswhocontributed
articlesto CulturalTransformationsandEthiicityin ModernEcuador,ed. NormanWhittenJr.(Urbana:University
of IllinoisPress,1981).Forthe QuijosQuichua,see Oberem,LosQuijos;Theodore
MacDonaldJr.,"Processes
of Changein AmazonianEcuador:QuijosQuichuaIndiansBecomeCafflemen"
(Ph.D.diss.,University
of Illinois,1979);andBlancaMuratorio,
Rucu-yaya
Alonsoy la historiasocialy economicadel AltoNapo (Quito:Abya-Yala,
1987).An interestingSecoyaperspectivecan be foundin AngelCelestinoPiaguaje's
commentaryon missionaries,
trade,local politics,and development,in ECORASA:
Autobiografia
de unSecoya(Shushufindi,
Ecuador:
EdicionesCICAME,i19o).Aworthwhile collectionof narrative
accountsexaminingkeypointsin the twentieth-century
historyoftheOrientecanbe foundin LeonirDall'AlbaBallardin,
ed.,Pioneros,Nativos
y Colonos:El Doradoen el sigloXX(Quito:EdicionesAbya-Yala,
Petroecuador,
and
MisionJosefinade Napo, 1992).Foran accountof the Cofan,see ScottRobinson,
'Towardan Understanding
of KofanShamanism"
(Ph. D diss.,CornellUniversity,
1979).
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction165
8. GeorgePhilip,Oil andPoliticsin LatinAmerica(Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1982), 276-78; Jose V. Zevallos7 El Estado Ecuatorianoy las Transnacionales
Petroleras:Ochoafnos dealianzayconflicto, 1972-1979 (Quito:La UniversidadCatolica,
1981).
9. Carlos Quevedo and Jorge Medina, "La Contaminacion en las Actividades
Hidrocarburiferasen el Ecuador,"paper presentedat Primero Congreso Ecuatoriano
del Medio Ambiente, Quito, Ecuador,7-14 February1987, 12, 14, i6; Hoffinan,Jurado,
Sandoval, Consultores Cia, Ltda., "Contaminaci6nambiental hidrocarburiferaen la
Reservade Produccion Faunisticade Cuyabeno" (Quito: Hoffinan, Jurado,Sandoval,
Consultores Cia, Ltda., April 1992), 89; JudithKimmerling, "DisregardingEnvironmental Law:PetroleumDevelopment in ProtectedNaturalAreasand IndigenousHomelandsin the EcuadorianAmazon,"HastingsIntemationaland ComparativeLawReview
'4(1991): 849-903; Chris afJochnick, RogerNormand, and SarahZaidi, Righb Violations in the Ecuadorian Amazon: The Human Consequences of Oil Development
(New York:Center for Economic and Social Rights, March 1994), 16-20. See also
JudithKimmerling,Amazon Crude (Washington,D.C.: National Resources Defense
10.
Council, 1991).
Hoy, 3 June iggi, in Kipu i6 (1991): 139; Douglas Southgate and Morris Whitaker,
Economic Progressand the Environment: One Developing Country'sPolicy Crisis
(New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1994); Carlos Luzuriaga,interviewby the author,
Quito, Ecuador, 15November 1992.Since this incident, the environmentalagency has
successfully fined the oil companies, though the fines have tended to be more symbolic than punitive.
i. Oliverio Vasconez Salvador,La Colonizacion de la Region Amazonica Ecuatoriana:
Obra Nacional (Quito: Ministerio de Agriculturay Ganadarfa,1977).
u. El Comercio, 17 December 1986, in Kipu 4 (1986): 18;William T. Vickers, "Indian
Policy in Amazonian Ecuador,"in Frontier Expansion in Amazonia, ed. Marianne
Schmink and Charles H. Wood (Gainesville:Universityof Florida Press,1984),27; D.
A. Eastwood and H. J. Pollard, "AmazonianColonization in Eastern Ecuador: Land
Use Conflicts in a Planning Vacuum,"SingaporeJournal of Tropical Geography13
(1992): 103-17.
13. Bromley, "AgriculturalColonization;' 287; Fundacion Natura, Development Policy
Issues for Ecuador's Amazonia (Quito: Fundaci6n Natura, 1988), lo; Instituto
Ecuatorianode ReformaAgrariay Colonizacion, ProyectoPiloto de Colonizacion NorOriente (Quito: IERAC, Secci6n Colonizacion Empresorial, 1971);Henri Barral,
Informesobrela colonizaci6n en la Provinciadel Napo (Quito: ORSTOM, 1978), 5S.
14. Legislation passed in the 1960s to reformland tenure (primarilyin the highlands and
along the coast) effectivelydeclared much of the Amazon empty and open for colonization. Agrarianreformlawspassed in 1973furtherpressuredtraditionalland use practices by declaring that inefficiently utilized land could be expropriated.Salvador,La
Colonizacion, 33. Colonization of these lands substitutedfor the agrarianreformthat
the government had shied away from elsewhere in the country. See Theodore
MacDonald Jr.,"IndigenousResponseto an ExpandingFrontier:JungleQuichua Economic Conversion to Cattle Ranching,"in Cultural Transformationsand Ethnicityin
Modem Ecuador, ed. Norman E. Whitten Jr. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1981),356-83; JorgeE. Uquillas, "SocialImpactsof Modernizationand Public Policy,
and Prospects for Indigenous Development in Ecuador'sAmazon,' in The Human
Ecology of TropicalLand Settlement in Latin America, ed. Debra Schumann and
William Partridge(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), 407-31, and "Colonization and
166 Environmental
History
Spontaneous
' in Frontier
Settlementin Ecuador;
ed.Marianne
Expansion
inArnazo4ia,
SchminkandCharlesH. Wod (Gainesville:
of FloridaPress,1984), 261-84.
University
Forconflictsoverlandownership,see El Comercio,6 October1985,in Kpu i8 (195):
27, and 26 October1985,in Kpu21 (1985):23; Hoy,23 December1985,in Kpu 23
17(1986):29; KiitheMeentzen,"Resisfing
Lnd
1986,in KGpu
(1985):21, and29August
Grabbingin Ecuador:QuichuaIndiansThreatenedby Development"CulturalSurvivalQuarterly
lo (1985):30-32; "CONFENIAE
in Ecuador:
DenouncesAgribusiness
An OpenLetter,"CulturalSurvivalQuarterly
io (1985):33-37.See alsoEl Comercio,
z6 May1986.in Kpu 8 (1986):24.
15. Whitten,SachaRuna,252.
i6. Yost"Twenty
yearsof Contact)'699;PadreJosCMiguel,interviewbytheauthor,Franciscode Orellana,9 March1993.ForQuichuadebt-servitude
in the lowerNapo,see
FranciscoJavierBeghin,"Condicionesde Servidumbre
Vigentesen Haciendasdel
OrienteEcuatorianoPlanificacidn
1 (i963):81-96;TheodoreMacDonaldJr.,"Joining the Navyto See the World CulturalSurvivalQuarterlY
7 (i983):42-43.
theireffortson civil justicefor
17. The Quichuaof the Tenaareainitiallyconcentrated
indigenouspeople,landlegalization,struggleswithwhitecolonists,andeffortsto convincefamiliesto sendtheirchildrento the nissionschool.See Fundaci6nFriedrichNaumann,LaCulturaTradicional
delNapo(Quito:Abya-Yala,
Indgenaen la Provincia
June1991). The Quichualeadersin PastazawentthroughtheCatholicschools,though
the actualorganization
wasopposedby the Dominicans.The ShuarFederationreceivedconsiderable
TitoMarino,interview
helpfrommissionaries.
bytheauthor,Puyo,
3 December1ggz; JuanSanh,interviewby the author,Puyo,3 December1992. For
schoolinfrastructure,
see El Comercio,21 July1985, in Kpu 14 (1985):29;Amanecer
Indio,3o December1985, in Kipu8 (1986):27. In 1984, the Ministeriode Bienestar
SocialprovidedFOINwithfundsforthe secondstageof construction
of itsheadquartersin Tena.Kpu 5 (1984):z4. Nativefederationsalsoincreasinglyreceivedaid from
foreignenvironmental,
developmentand indigenousrightsorganizations,
furtherliberatingthemfromthe missionswhileplacingthemin relationto newideologicalpressures.
i8. MacDonald,"Processes
of Changein AmazonianEcuador";El Comercio,15 April
1985,in KIpu7 (1985):29; JoeKane,"LetterFromthe Amazon:WithSpearsfromAll
Sides)'New Yorker,
27 September
1993,634. The Cof4nandSiona-Secoya
alsofound
themselvesconstrained
by new Quichuasefflements,as well as by mesfizocolonists.
19. See, forexample,Crist6bal
Tapuy,presidentof CONFENIAE,quotedin Hoy,1i September1985,in Kpu 17(1985):28. Nationally,
the pushforbilingualeducationamong
Ecuadorianindigenousgroupsexemplifiesthe attemptto increasecontroloverthe
termsof integrationintothe nationalsociety.
2o.AAmanecer
Indio,January1988, in Kipu10 (1988):164;Hoy,5 January
1989, in Gpu 12
(989): 247-48; Dereclos del Pueblo,March1986,in Kpu 9 (1986):22; Piaguaie,
behaviorin the late198oswas
ECORASA79. It is importantto recognizethatCofAin
influencedby outsiders,includingProtestant
missionaries
andtheirchildren,anthroand indigenousrightsgroups.
pologists,andenvironmental
21. WilliamVickers,"Informe
preliminar
sobrelas culturasSiona,Secoya,y Cof6ny su
situacionde la tierra7in Infonneparala delimitaci6nde territorios
nativosSionaSecoya,Coan, y HuaoranhINCRAEpublicacionNo. 39, ed. JorgeUquillas(Quito:
INCRAE,1982), i2; Hoy, 5 October1988,in Kipuil (1988):213-4; Hoy,4 November
1988,in Kpu ii (1988):219; Kane,Savages.
22. PabloGrefa,presidentof AIEPRA,interviewby the author,Puyo,3 December1992.
Ecuadorian
NativesandOilExtraction167
23. El Comercio, 20 July 1986, in
Kipu14 (1986):27; JonMcLin,Social and Economic
Effects of Petroleum Development in Non-OPEC Developing Countries: Synthesis
Report (Geneva: InternationalLabour Organisation,1986), 23-24. See, for example,
Asociaci6n de Pre-Cooperativas"Pacayacu"to Tribunalde GarantiasContitutionales,
14 July 19o (unpublished letter in possession of the author). See also the coverage of
the strikein Hoy throughoutthe month of March.
24. Kane, Savages,191-96;Mike Tidwell, Amazon Stranger:A RainforestChiefBattles Big
Oil (New York:Lyons and Burford,1996).
25. I describe the pursuit of environmental justice as a political and socioecononmicissue
since there is liffle difference between environmentaland socioeconomic justice. The
problemsof environmentalhazardsin poor and politicallyweak communities are simply differentversions of underfunded infrastructure,inferiorhousing, and the inequitable provision of government services. In this sense, the environment serves as the
medium for social and economic injustice. In the particularcase of communitiesliving
in the extractiveregion, I am combining the issue of the distributionof environmental
hazardswith questionsof access to and control over resourcesand the course of development. Susanna Hecht and AlexanderCockburn make environmental justice a major theme in their book on the political ecology of the Amazon, The Fate of the Forest:
Developers, Destroyersand Defenders of the Amazon (London: Verso,1989).
26. Economists Douglas Southgate and MorrisWhitakercalculated that improvedpollution controls would add $6o million to preproductionspending, thus raisingthe cost
per barrelby 45 cents. Economic Progressand the Environment,86-87. Texacoboasted
in 1987 that it had maintained a cost of production in Ecuador near the lowest in the
world,around$3.50 per barrel."Los23afiosde TexacoPetroleumCompany-Operadora
del ConsorcioCEPE-Texacohan sido positivosparael desarrollodel pais,"El Universo,
4 July1987, Special Supplement, 6.
27. Conoco Ecuador Ltd., Environmental Management Plan, Block i6 (Quito: Conoco
Ecuador Ltd., 22 January1991),4.
28. Conoco Ecuador Ltd., The RelationshipBetween the Waoraniand Conoco: Guiding
Principles (Quito: Conoco Ecuador Ltd., 2 November 1989), 1.
29. White, Middle Ground, x. But see also Conklin and Graham, "Shifting Middle
Ground."
30. Susan E. A. Hall, "Conoco's'Green' Oil Strategy,"HarvardBusiness School, Case No.
N9-392-133,
1992-
Conoco Ecuador Ltd., EnvironmentalManagement Plan, 2, 10-11.
3. EdwardDavies, quoted in JamesBrooke,"New EffortWould TestPossibleCoexistence
of Oil and Rain Forest,"New YorkTimes, 26 Februaryiggi, C4.
33. Recent writing on the Block 16 case includes Hall, "Conoco's"Green"Oil Strategy";
Kane,Savages;and MarcelaEnriquezVasquezand ByronReal Lo6pez,VidaporPetroleo:
El caso delparque nacional Yasunfante los Tribunales(Quito: Fundaci6n Ecuatoriana
de Estudios Sociales, 1992). Kane reportsthat CONFENIAE sought $211million from
the oil company. Savages,73.
3. Robert F. Kennedy Jr.,"AmazonSabotage,"WashingtonPost,8 August1992, A17.
35. Hall, "Conoco's'Green' Oil Strategy,"17.
36. JamesBrooke,"EcuadorGives IndiansTitle to Big Amazon Area,"New YorkTimes,6
September 1992, 10; Viteri, interview;Whitten, Sacha Runa, 207-67. The Leonard
ExplorationCompany was affiliatedwith StandardOil of New Jersey.Shell began to
withdrawin 1948, although its agreement with the government was not scheduled to
31.
168 Environmental
History
expire until 1953. Jaime Galarza, El Festin del Petroleo (Quito: Ediciones Solitierra,
1972),
79-83,
102-5-
37. "SarayacuAccords,"7 May 1989and 9 May 1989 (copy in the possessionof the author).
The agreementswere signed by Luis Luna Gaibor,executivedirectorof IERAC;Alfonso
Calderon, advisorto the presidenton indigenousaffairs;Manuel Navarro,CEPE; Jorge
Aldaz, CEPE; Medardo Santi, presidentof Comuna Alama Sarayacu;Antonio Vargas,
presidentof OPIP;Luis Vargas,presidentof CONFENIAE; Crist6balTapuy,president
of CONAIE. The community of Sarayacuitself did not actually have exploitable oil
reserveswithin its territory.
38.Viteri interview;Ruiz, "PueblosIndigenasy Etnicidad en la Amazonia."
39. Southgate and Whitaker;Economic Progressand the Environment, 83; Brooke, "Oil
and TourismDon't Mix"; Oil IndustryOperatingGuidelines for TropicalRainforests,
ReportNo. 2.49/170 (London: E & P Forum,April 1991).Forrecent accounts of developments in the EcuadorianAmazon that fit within the context of the emerging middle
ground, see JackEpstein, "EcuadoriansWage Legal BattleAgainstUS Oil Company,"
Christian Science Monitor, 12 September 1995, 10; Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Greens
Force Texaco To Clean Up," The Observer,7 May 1995, Business Section, 2; Julie
Triedman, "Putting Scientific Know-HowTo Work For Clients," American Lwyer,
March 1995,45; MatthewYeomans, "Fool'sGold: In Ecuador'sRain Forest,The Case
AgainstTexaco is Clear-Cut,"Village Voice,4 February1997,46; "EcuadorSeeks U.S.
Justice Dept. Interventionin Texaco Oil Spill Case,"Business Wire, 22 January1997;
Dudley Althaus,"Amazon'sEmpty Legacy;Big Oil Respondsto Environment;Toll on
Rain Forest,Culture Still Unacceptable to Critics,"Houston Chronicle, 15 December
1996,27; Mario Gonzalez, "Ecuador-Oil:Maxus Suspension a RiskyMove by the New
President?"InternationalPress Service, 23 August1996.
40. MarjaneAmbler, Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian Control of Energy Development
(Lawrence:UniversityPress of Kansas,1990); Sabin, "Voicesfrom the Hydrocarbon
Frontier,"40-41.