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p
"Friends" Preferences
Hypothesis
Prob.
of
Alliance
Formation
Perceptions Hypothesis
Linear approximations
of the two hypotheses
0
Least
Similar
Dyadic Preference Similarity
7 1J '
!
*
9 7
Most
Similar
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' : 50
All Alliance Types
Defense Pacts Only
Model 1 - 1: "Old" COW Alliance Data, 2 Terms
Model 1 - 4: "Old" COW Alliance Data, 2 Terms
0.06
Pred. Prob. (Mean) of Alliance Form
Pred. Prob. (Mean) of Alliance Form
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
0.04
0.02
0.00
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
0.1
0.2
Dyadic Preference Similarity
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0.8
0.9
1
0.8
0.9
1
Model 1 - 5: "New" COW Alliance Data, 2 Terms
0.06
Pred. Prob. (Mean) of Alliance Form
0.06
Pred. Prob. (Mean) of Alliance Form
0.4
Dyadic Preference Similarity
Model 1 - 2: "New" COW Alliance Data, 2 Terms
0.04
0.02
0
0.04
0.02
0.00
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
0.1
0.2
Dyadic Preference Similarity
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Dyadic Preference Similarity
Model 1 - 3: "New" COW Alliance Data, 3 Terms
Model 1 - 6: "Old" COW Alliance Data, 3 Terms
0.06
Pred. Prob. (Mean) of Alliance Form
0.06
Pred. Prob. (Mean) of Alliance Form
0.3
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.04
0.02
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Dyadic Preference Similarity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Dyadic Preference Similarity
7 5J 9 7
5
? + D
' B
&
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D % R
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+ %
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54
"Old" Alliance Data
"New" Alliance Data
Model 2 - 3: Loess Estimate of Affinity on Alliance Formation
-0.5
-1.0
lo(Affinity of Nations)
-1.5
-1
-2.0
-2
lo(Affinity of Nations)
0
0.0
0.5
Model 2 - 1: Loess Estimate of Affinity on Alliance Formation
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
Affinity of Nations
0.8
1.0
0.8
1.0
Model 2 - 4: Loess Estimate of Affinity on Alliance Formation
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.5
-2.5
-2.0
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
lo(Affinity of Nations)
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.5
Model 2 - 2: Loess Estimate of Affinity on Alliance Formation
lo(Affinity of Nations)
0.6
Affinity of Nations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
Affinity of Nations
0.6
Affinity of Nations
Model 2 - 4: Logit Estimate of Diff. btw Affinity and Expectations
0.5
0.0
partial for Difference
-1.0
-0.5
0
-1
-2
partial for Difference
1
1.0
2
Model 2 - 2: Logit Estimate of Diff. btw Affinity and Expectations
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
-1.0
1.0
7 2J , 13
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Difference between Future Affinity and Expectations
Difference between Future Affinity and Expectations
F9? 52
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40
TABLE 1: Logit Estimates of Alliance Formation, Onset + Sample (Robust S.E., Adj. for Clustering in Dyads)
Dep. Variable
AFFINITY
Linear
coeff
S. E.
z
Square
coeff
S. E.
z
Cubed
coeff
S. E.
z
DISTANCE
(logged)
coeff
S. E.
z
POL. REL. DYAD coeff
(dummy)
S. E.
z
DEMOCRACY
Lower Dyadic
(Dem-Aut+10)/2
Higher Dyadic
(Dem-Aut+10)/2
CAPABILITIES
Lower Dyadic
(CINC/total)
Higher Dyadic
(CINC/total)
MAJ. POWER
One
(dummy)
Both
(dummy)
∆#
(dummy, 2 lags)
WAR
Dyadic
(dummy, 5 lags)
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
3rd Party Lag
(dummy)
coeff
S. E.
z
3rd Party Lead
(dummy)
coeff
S. E.
z
System
(dummy, 2 lags)
CONSTANT
N
Wald Chi2
Prob > Chi2
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
Model 1 - 1
All Alliances
Model 1 - 2
Model 1 - 3
Model 1 - 4
Defense Pacts
Model 1 - 5
Model 1 - 6
"Old" data
"New" data
"New" data
"Old" data
"New" data
"Old" data
45.499
( 8.977 )
5.068
-30.694
( 5.610 )
-5.471
19.162
( 5.580 )
3.434
-12.374
( 3.514 )
-3.521
65.704
( 9.920 )
6.623
-43.774
( 6.191 )
-7.071
60.753
( 8.912 )
6.817
-38.083
( 5.443 )
-6.996
-0.663
( 0.1063639 )
-6.236
-3.027
( 0.8679818 )
-3.487
-0.915
( 0.155 )
-5.911
-4.872
( 1.241 )
-3.927
-22.935
( 7.007 )
-3.273
53.986
( 11.540 )
4.678
-32.749
( 6.242 )
-5.246
-0.884
( 0.151 )
-5.866
-4.628
( 1.214 )
-3.813
-0.694
( 0.091 )
-7.625
-3.099
( 0.757 )
-4.095
-1.095
( 0.159 )
-6.885
-6.354
( 1.261 )
-5.040
-32.942
( 6.918 )
-4.761
92.429
( 13.962 )
6.620
-61.295
( 8.127 )
-7.542
-0.699
( 0.092 )
-7.621
-3.161
( 0.764 )
-4.137
0.111
( 0.018112 )
6.138
-0.156
( 0.0163954 )
-9.507
0.168
( 0.020 )
8..319
-0.156
( 0.020 )
-7.937
0.160
( 0.020 )
7.959
-0.157
( 0.020 )
-7.830
0.157
( 0.022 )
7.269
-0.163
( 0.025 )
-6.500
0.132
( 0.021 )
6.304
-0.134
( 0.021 )
-6.277
0.152
( 0.022 )
7.041
-0.165
( 0.025 )
-6.503
-40.921
( 21.23825 )
-1.951
9.357
( 2.138902 )
4.374
-73.842
( 21.594 )
-3.420
9.978
( 1.914 )
5.213
-70.556
( 21.693 )
-3.252
9.801
( 1.961 )
4.998
-21.113
( 15.933 )
-1.325
12.750
( 2.150 )
5.930
-105.436
( 30.576 )
-3.448
13.167
( 2.622 )
5.022
-22.631
( 15.295 )
-1.480
12.804
( 2.166 )
5.911
1.966
( 0.9161157 )
2.146
5.079
( 1.59359 )
3.187
1.597
( 0.1014251 )
15.748
4.087
( 1.312 )
3.115
4.930
( 1.965 )
2.509
1.860
( 0.117 )
15.946
3.843
( 1.276 )
3.011
5.040
( 1.954 )
2.579
1.929
( 0.121 )
15.951
1.496
( 0.773 )
1.935
3.733
( 1.245 )
2.998
2.928
( 0.190 )
15.406
4.361
( 1.512 )
2.884
7.295
( 2.255 )
3.235
2.030
( 0.127 )
16.004
1.544
( 0.782 )
1.976
3.617
( 1.230 )
2.940
2.979
( 0.193 )
15.457
-3.196
( 0.9191461 )
-3.477
0.025
( 0.0895124 )
0.275
-0.235
( 0.1000366 )
-2.349
-1.259
( 0.976 )
-1.291
-0.090
( 0.101 )
-0.891
0.068
( 0.094 )
0.724
-1.414
( 0.971 )
-1.457
-0.084
( 0.101 )
-0.833
0.068
( 0.094 )
0.729
-2.646
( 0.746 )
-3.547
-0.686
( 0.142 )
-4.826
-0.066
( 0.138 )
-0.476
-1.705
( 1.160 )
-1.469
-0.392
( 0.117 )
-3.349
0.071
( 0.107 )
0.660
-2.502
( 0.736 )
-3.398
-0.683
( 0.143 )
-4.767
-0.082
( 0.139 )
-0.592
1.359
( 0.6152831 )
2.209
-15.618
( 3.451557 )
-4.525
-0.056
( 0.491 )
-0.115
-3.369
( 2.146 )
-1.570
-0.086
( 0.495 )
-0.174
4.545
( 2.042 )
2.226
0.941
( 1.036 )
0.908
-24.124
( 3.944 )
-6.117
-0.349
( 0.509 )
-0.685
-18.228
( 3.520 )
-5.178
0.944
( 1.036 )
0.911
-0.840
( 1.710 )
-0.492
14176
701.21
0.0000
0.2678
-1650.2461
14176
728.41
0.0000
0.2723
-1640.1568
20407
594.47
0.0000
0.3583
-1051.6917
14176
638.83
0.0000
0.3067
-1410.6991
20407
604.51
0.0000
0.3631
-1040.8278
20407
565.45
0.0000
0.2108
-2120.7396
TABLE 2: GAM Estimates of Alliance Formation, Onset + Sample
Dep. Variable:
AFFINITY
Similarity of
Preferences
Model 2 - 1
All Alliances
Model 2 - 2
Model 2 - 3
Model 2 - 4
"Old" data
"Old" data
"New" data
"New" data
-40.890
( 16.094 )
-2.541
12.633
( 8.872 )
1.424
-0.869
( 0.054 )
-15.953
21.528
( 9.445 )
2.279
0.949
( 0.349 )
2.722
-0.871
( 0.054 )
-16.097
coeff
S. E.
z
-0.692
( 0.050 )
-13.913
20.794
( 11.536 )
1.803
1.653
( 0.317 )
5.219
-0.676
( 0.041 )
-16.473
coeff
S. E.
z
0.150
( 0.023 )
6.516
-0.161
( 0.026 )
-6.172
0.095
( 0.018 )
5.444
-0.138
( 0.016 )
-8.388
0.158
( 0.020 )
7.929
-0.155
( 0.019 )
-8.075
0.155
( 0.020 )
7.773
-0.151
( 0.019 )
-7.839
-26.531
( 15.717 )
-1.688
12.816
( 1.738 )
7.376
-41.261
( 13.490 )
-3.059
9.650
( 1.535 )
6.288
-70.155
( 14.270 )
-4.916
9.967
( 1.541 )
6.469
-69.969
( 14.295 )
-4.895
10.151
( 1.546 )
6.568
1.572
( 0.444 )
3.540
3.573
( 1.472 )
2.427
2.995
( 0.154 )
19.395
-3.165
( 0.445 )
-7.111
2.077
( 0.387 )
5.367
4.230
( 0.981 )
4.310
1.732
( 0.103 )
16.755
-3.167
( 0.362 )
-8.739
3.700
( 0.479 )
7.717
4.621
( 1.238 )
3.732
1.963
( 0.109 )
18.058
-4.535
( 0.454 )
-9.997
3.730
( 0.478 )
7.804
4.571
( 1.274 )
3.588
1.967
( 0.109 )
18.005
-4.564
( 0.451 )
-10.110
-2.432
( 1.422 )
-1.711
-0.673
( 0.139 )
-4.851
-0.121
( 0.128 )
-0.946
-2.872
( 1.196 )
-2.402
0.039
( 0.084 )
0.470
-0.291
( 0.091 )
-3.192
-1.244
( 1.911 )
-0.651
-0.092
( 0.093 )
-0.990
0.056
( 0.092 )
0.609
-1.300
( 1.962 )
-0.663
-0.088
( 0.093 )
-0.940
0.054
( 0.092 )
0.587
1.048
( 1.004 )
1.044
-0.142
( 1.070 )
-0.133
1.306
( 0.584 )
2.238
0.867
( 0.667 )
1.300
-0.062
( 0.402 )
-0.154
3.449
( 0.588 )
5.869
-0.045
( 0.404 )
-0.111
3.410
( 0.587 )
5.810
coeff
S. E.
z
Difference btw coeff
Affinity & Exp. S. E.
z
DISTANCE
(logged)
DEMOCRACY
Lower Dyadic
(Dem-Aut+10)/2
Higher Dyadic
(Dem-Aut+10)/2
CAPABILITIES
Lower Dyadic
(CINC/total)
Higher Dyadic
(CINC/total)
MAJOR POWER
One
(dummy)
Both
(dummy)
∆#
(dummy, 2 lags)
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
POL. REL. DYAD coeff
(dummy)
S. E.
z
WAR
Dyadic
(dummy, 5 lags)
coeff
S. E.
z
3rd Party Lag
(dummy)
coeff
S. E.
z
3rd Party Lead
(dummy)
coeff
S. E.
z
System
(dummy, 2 lags)
CONSTANT
N
Chi2
Prob > Chi2
coeff
S. E.
z
coeff
S. E.
z
20407
144.3702
0.0000
20234
326.757
0.0000
14176
83.26506
0.0000
14040
79.10271
0.0000