Political and Social Conflicts
in Lithuania: Searching for the Left/Right
Dimension and Cleavages
“The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe”
Working Papers edited by Prof. Dr. Bernd Henningsen
financed by the Fifth Framework Programme for Research
and Technological Development of the European Union
Volume 10
Mindaugas Jurkynas
Political and Social Conflicts in Lithuania:
Searching for the Left/Right Dimension and Cleavages
The content of this working paper is the sole responsibility of the author and
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ISSN: 1642-865X
Mindaugas Jurkynas
Political and Social Conflicts
in Lithuania: Searching for the Left/Right
Dimension and Cleavages
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
Nordeuropa-Institut der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Gdańsk–Berlin 2003
Contents
Abbreviations
Abstract
Introduction
Conceptualising Political Conflict
Political Conflict in Change
National Revolution and the First Issue Dimension
Value-laden Conflict Takes Root
Nil Novi Sub Sole: Ghosts of the Past Prevail
Farewell to Value-laden Conflict?
Issue Dimensions at the Presidential and Municipal Levels
Issue Divides and their Politicisation
Mapping the Emergence of Issue Divides
Transitional Issue Divides
Representation of the Religious
Urban/Rural Discrepancies
A Rift in the Left
Translation of the Ethnic Issue
Postmaterialism is not on the Agenda
Personalities and Issue Divides
Cleavages in the Pipeline?
Conclusions
References
6
7
8
12
13
14
16
19
22
23
29
31
31
32
33
35
35
36
38
39
41
43
5
Abbreviations
CPSU
LKDS
LCS
LiCS
LDP
LDDP
LKDP
LKD
LLRA
LLS
LMP
LRS
LSDP
LVP
MKDS
ND
NSSL
TSLK
– Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Sovietų Sąjungos
Komunistų Partija]
– Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union [Krikščionių
demokratų sąjunga]
– Lithuanian Centre Union [Lietuvos centro sąjunga]
– Liberal and Centre Union [Liberalų ir centro sąjunga]
– Liberal Democrat Party [Liberalų demokratų partija]
– Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party [Lietuvos
demokratinė darbo partija]
– Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party [Lietuvos
krikščionių demokratų partija]
– Lithuanian Christian Democrats [Lietuvos krikščionys
demokratai]
– Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles [Lietuvos lenkų
rinkimų akcija]
– Lithuanian Liberal Union [Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga]
– Lithuanian Women’s Party [Lietuvos moterų partija]
– Union of Lithuanian Russians [Lietuvos rusų sąjunga]
– Lithuanian Social Democratic Party [Lietuvos
socialdemokratų partija]
– Lithuanian Peasants’ Party [Lietuvos valstiečių partija]
– Modern Christian Democrat Union [Moderniųjų
krikščionių demokratų sąjunga]
– New Democracy [Naujoji demokratija]
– New Union/Socialliberals [Naujoji sąjunga/
Socialliberalai]
– Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) [Tėvynės
Sąjunga (Lietuvos konservatoriai)]
Abstract
Political parties and electoral behaviour in post-communist countries
have received substantial attention among scholars since the fall of the
Berlin wall. In this regard, Lithuania is no exception. The pattern of
party system development in ‘New Europe’ still poses questions about
the content of the Left/Right dimension, the relevance of societal conflicts and their politicisation. This study will discuss the changing
political conflict and the politicisation of emerging social cleavages.
The investigation conceptualizes definitions of political and social conflicts and proves the decline of value-laden politics and emergence of the
pragmatic socio-economic dimension in Lithuania. The study identifies
transitional, religious and urban/rural issue divides in electoral behaviour and discusses perspectives of less visible cleavages. The formation of
cleavages has not yet stabilized, as in the last decade societal factors have
not significantly influenced politics.
Introduction
The reestablishment of independence and the demise of the Soviet
Union opened a gateway for the transition to democracy, market
economies and nation-state re-building across Central and Eastern
Europe.1 Oscillating economies, controversial privatisation issues, social
stratification and transatlantic integration have had repercussions on politics in the new democracies. Against this backdrop, the Lithuanian party
system has retained a rather stable setup throughout the politically and
economically tumultuous 1990s. The period 1990–2000 has revealed
moderate party system fragmentation and a shift from centrifugal to centripetal competition. A change accompanied the 2000 elections, when
new parties entered the political arena squeesing out some old-timers.
According to Gordon Smith’s criteria, (1989), three elections in row
can clarify the significance of party system change that will rather serve
as a context of analysis. There have been a number of elections in
Lithuania, which enables us to draw inferences about the development
of political conflict and electoral behaviour there. General elections
have been organized in 1992, 1996 and 2000, not to mention the constitutive election in 1990 and a row of municipal ones in 1990, 1995,
1997, 2000 and 2002. The Lithuanian party system has changed from
two-party domination, high polarisation and centrifugal competition to
centripetal tendencies in 1990–2000, and a moderate pluralism with
1 The author would like to thank the project “The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern
Dimension of Europe” at the Humboldt University in Berlin for the financial assistance. My special thanks go to Kjetil Duvold and Dr. Paul Holtom for their useful
comments on a draft. I have also appreciated insights provided by participants of
Virtual Colloquium of the Euro Summer School Baltic Sea Region 2010: Methods,
Theories, Practicalities. All inaccuracies or errors are mine. The draft of the study has
been outlined in the conference presentation “Decline or Loss of Old Ideological
Conflict? The Case of Lithuania” at the conference “Loss, Decline and Doom in the
Baltic Sea Area”, Greifswald, Germany, February 2003. Conference proceedings will
be published in 2004. A part of the arguments developed in this study is employed in
the Duvold, Kjetil and Mindaugas Jurkynas (2004), ‘Lithuania’ in Berglund, Sten,
Frank Aarebrot and Joakim Ekman, eds., The Handbook of Political Change in
Eastern Europe, second edition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. Forthcoming.
8
INTRODUCTION
five parties now at the core.2 Hence, it is significant to discuss the relationship between the party system on the one hand and political conflict and emerging cleavages on the other. Studies of political conflict
in general have basically inferred the establishment of value-laden conflict (Žeruolis 1998, Degutis 2001). Changes in the Left/Right dimension still need to be explored, although several works have considered
this (Mikkel 1998, Degutis, 2001, Jurkynas 2001, Ramonaitė 2003), as
the party system and political conflict is far from stabilized. Issue
divides in Lithuania have been discussed more widely, but empirical
data from the last elections brings new developments to light.
This investigation is based upon following assumptions:
1. The Left/Right dimension is a dynamic concept that acquires
a meaning of dominant conflict in politics, that is, the contents of
the political conflict are not given but filled in by the relevant country’s political problematique.
2. Post-communist society in Lithuania can be described as pre-cleavage.
Market relations were not on the agenda during Soviet times and social
conflict and stratification had been frozen for fifty years with a pseudoegalitarian profile.3 The fifty years of the Soviet era broke state and nation
building and closed all patterns of democratisation. The Communist
regime eradicated most pre-World War II political traditions. Society
changed via repression, deportations, emigration and finally generational change. The beginning of the 1990s was a Tabula Rasa4 as the
core economic, societal and political processes took place during the
transition period. Linkages with the inter-war period were weak, based
more on memories than real people and institutions, or non-existent.5
2
The average share of new parties in the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas) was
37% in the period 1989–2000. In neighboring Estonia and Latvia, it has been
53% and 61% respectively (Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003). Speaking of
factions as an index for party relevance in policy making, only factions with
coalition potential might be considered as important ones.
3 The elite of the Communist party and administration, lawyers, doctors and other
professionals belonged to a higher stratum of the society and were better-off. Also
see (Žeruolis, 1996).
4 See Shabad and Slomczynski 1999.
5 For example, proto-parties, such as the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats,
Nationalist Union and several more, were established in 1989–90.
9
INTRODUCTION
3. Political parties in the new democracies appeared prior to, or simultaneously with, social stratification. The role of political entrepreneurship in the post-communist context is relevant, as party competition in Central and Eastern Europe is largely driven and shaped
by the parties themselves (Sitter 2001). The post-communist transition to democracy presupposed the re-surfacing of political parties
as a cornerstone of democratic regime. Politics in democracies
inevitably means a contest between parties for resources, power,
influence and so forth. Thus, political conflict reflects an axis of
competition, i.e., the Left/Right dimension where voters and political rivals can identify party positions.
4. Arend Lijphart claims seven different issue dimensions cut across the
thirty-six democracies he examined: socio-economic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post
materialist issues (Lijphart 1984, 79). In a way, they correspond with
the Lipset and Rokkan model of cleavages as bases for party origins
and separation. Both the Left/Right axis and societal conflicts can be
interrelated with each other, if a social cleavage usurps the main
focus of political attention. However, issue dimensions not only lead
to the Left/Right dimension, they can just separate parties (Lijphart
1984, 127–129) from a different problematique point of view.
According to a classical dictum of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein
Rokkan (1967), national and industrial revolutions have generated
state/church, centre/periphery, agriculture/industry and capital/labour
conflict lines6 in West European societies. These splits were absorbed
and politicized by parties and gave foundations for party systems
throughout Western Europe (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). It would be
methodologically misleading to automatically apply this theorising to
post-communist Europe’s homogenized “flattened societies”.7 They
They claimed to have roots in the interwar period but apart from party names
the institutional or human linkages with that period were meager. The participation of émigrés in Lithuanian politics was also reserved and limited.
6 The others also distinguish a Bolshevik revolution followed by Social democratic-Communist divide (Arter 1999).
7 Flattened societies are characterized by voting patterns affected by cultural policies/values rather than interest crystallisation (Wessels and Klingemann 1994).
10
INTRODUCTION
were rather first and foremost affected by the fall of Communism and
the triple transition: nation/state re-building, de-Communisation and
marketisation. The post-communist transition in Lithuania has witnessed three main political conflicts: centre/periphery (or USSR/ Lithuania) (1988–90), value-laden8 (1990–1998) and socio-economic (1998–
–2003). They represent shifts in political conflict due to the interplay of
political and sociological factors. The objects of analysis are the
Left/Right dimension (political conflict) and the representation of cleavages. The investigation of empirical evidence will test the argument:
The changing political conflict in post-communist societies depends on
an interplay of political and societal factors
Initially, the analysis will focus upon three aspects mirroring the
development of the political conflict: prevailing political discourses,
cooperation/coalition patterns and an emergence of new parties or
issue dimensions/cleavages. Political discourses unveil the most
important political problematique at the time. The supremacy of
political over sociological factors in pre-cleavage societies enables us
to examine discourses as expressions of the independent political
actors affecting the political conflict. A common denominator of this
problematique prevailing in certain periods will constitute a core of
discourse evaluation without the detailed inspection of texts, speeches, and other documents. Patterns of conflict and cooperation indicate
the nature of issue dimensions. Finally, new parties or cleavages with
old ones adds additional flavour or challenges to political conflicts.
The main questions are ‘why and how the political conflict tends to
change?’ Emerging societal conflicts are reflected in the voting behaviour and affect political conflict. Voting patterns in Lithuania still
possess a retrospective character, i.e., voting against the ruling party
rather than along social and economic preferences (Degutis 2001).
Against this backdrop, cleavages are still open. However, this study
will attempt to ascertain which cleavages tend to be politicized and to
what extent, including:
8
The term ‘value-laden’ refers to the opposition of two different standpoints to
the reestablishment of justice after the fall of Communism. The leftist approach
advocated lenient judgment of the Soviet past, in contrast to the rightist camp.
11
INTRODUCTION
• an analysis of the development of political conflict, its context in
terms of the Left/Right dimension and the establishment of its features and preconditions for change;
• a discussion of cleavage formation on empirical and behavioural
levels, naming politically relevant social divisions and establishing
their relation to the party system and political conflict.
The first part of this study introduces the conceptual aspects of ‘Left’
and ‘Right’ and transformations of political conflict. The second part
presents the notion of cleavage and explores the emergence of societal
conflicts with their political representation.
Conceptualising Political Confilct
Analyses of party systems inevitably deal with competition and cooperation between political parties, which constitute dynamic aspects of
party interaction (Sartori 1976). Competition among parties occurs in
a space of political conflict where parties differ and contest according
to certain criteria. Political conflict is simply called the Left/Right
dimension. Applications of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ are embedded in notions
of socio-economic conflict9 between state and market relations vis-àvis the economy, where the ‘Left’ advocates for an active state role and
the ‘Right’ believes in market forces. This notion of the Left/Right axis
has been entrenched in the Western academic discourse for a long
time. The employment of these concepts in the post-communist setting is different, due to the long-term absence of ownership institutions, which have been evolving during the transition period. Political
actors in transitional societies define which issue dimensions become
salient. (Zielinski 2002, 185). Concepts of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ are therefore either historical derivatives or speculative concepts. Historically
they mean an evolution of political conflict among ideologies, political
movements, parties, etc., since the end of the eighteenth century
(Bobbio 1996, 1), whereas speculative concepts deal with the “empty
9
12
The Left/Right dimension is also treated as an equivalent of workers/owners ›
labor/capital cleavage following the Proletarian revolution (Hellèn, Berglund
and Aarebrot 1998, 371).
POLITICAL CONFLICT IN CHANGE
boxes” concept (Sartori 1976, 337). In the latter case, country-specific
and critical problematique are the contents of the Left/Right divide.
Giovanni Sartori (1976, 336) identifies several axes, e.g. authoritarian
vs. democratic, integration vs. ethnicity, etc., however, that are country-specific and politically relevant. The Left/Right dimension in
Lithuania is conceptualized on the prevailing political discrepancies.
Political Conflict in Change
The embryo of a multiparty system in Lithuania emerged within the
one-party system during the liberalisation of the Soviet regime at the
end of the 1980s.10 The core parties emerged in two periods. Firstly,
informal affinity groups adopted an organisational setup in 1989–90.
Apart from the Lithuanian Communist Party (LKP), the first political organisation to appear was the National Front (Sąjūdis), established in June 1988. Sąjūdis was registered as a social movement in
support of perestroika, as the Soviet Constitution did not allow any
political organisations but Communist ones.11 Nonetheless, there
was a political nature to the National Front, as it clearly strove for
political objectives.12 The first proto-parties to appear between
1988–89 were the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Nationalists’ Union, Greens, Humanitarians and the Union of Political
Prisoners and Exiles. Some of these parties claimed that they had
10 Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalisation of the Soviet regime under the slogans of
“glasnost” and “perestroika” in the mid 1980s provided the ground for the emergence of National Fronts across Central and Eastern Europe. Due to the conservative nature of the Lithuanian Communist Party, perestroika only really
began to take shape in Lithuania in 1988 (Žeruolis 1998, 20).
11 The amendments of the Soviet Lithuanian Constitution scrapped the ban on
political organisations in 1989.
12 The National Front (for the Support of Perestroika) was a social organisation
consisting of varied interests ranging from modest claims for Lithuanian
autonomy within the USSR to radical calls for independence. There were academic claims that Sąjūdis was ‘leftist’, due to its strive for social justice. On the
other hand Sąjūdis identified itself with the ‘rightist’ opposition to the ‘leftist
Communists’ from Moscow. Sąjūdis also had a propensity to strong leadership, characteristic of ‘rightist’ political organisations on a democracy-authoritarism scale.
13
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
roots in the interwar period or even earlier. However, apart from
party names there were no linkages from organisational or human
resources’ points of view. With the Law on Political Parties and
Political Organisations of 1990, the legal grounds for party development were laid. The second wave of political parties surfaced with
the dissolution of Sąjûdis and the fragmentation of the Constitutive
parliament in 1990–92. The Liberal Union (LLS) and the Centre
Movement (the Centre Union (LCS) from 1993) entered politics at
this time. The majority of political organisations acquired Westernlike names. However, the contents of political conflicts had still not
taken shape.
National Revolution and the First Issue Dimension
The national revolution gave birth to the National Movement
(Atgimimas) and the first political parties. Discourses of politics manifested themselves through anti-Moscow stances. Cooperation among
the political forces was broad and primarily based on the idea of independence. Sąjûdis as an organized ‘catch-all’ movement was initially
the main opposition to the Soviet regime, although there were small
radical groups such as the Lithuanian Freedom League. A conventional agreement about independence among the main political forces,
including the reformed nomenklatura based LKP (LDDP since
December 1990),13 did not polarize the emerging party system in
1988–90. Lithuanian society expressed its clear-cut pro-independence
stance in the national plebiscite of February 1991, which had 84.4%
turnout. The first free and Constitutive election organized under
majority rule vested political power in the reformist Sąjûdis who won
an absolute majority in the Supreme Council/Constitutive Assembly,
declared independence on March 11, 1990 and formed the first postSoviet government.
13 The LKP split in 1989 and its successor reformed LKP, later called the LDDP
(Lithuanian Labor Democratic Party) supported independence in 1990. The
residual LKP on the Platform of the Communist Party of the USSR remained
a reactionary political force and ceased to exist in Lithuania by 1991, following
the failure of the August putsch.
14
NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST ISSUE DIMENSION
Constitutive election of 1990
Seats
of which endorsed
by „Sąjūdis”
% Seats
No party affiliation
64
58
47.41
Lithuanian Communist Party
[reformed Communists]
46
17
34.07
Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party
9
9
6.67
Lithuanian Communist Party on the
CPSU Platform
7
0
5.19
Political Organisation
Lithuanian Green Party
4
4
2.96
Lithuanian Democratic Party
3
1
2.22
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party
2
2
1.48
135*
91
100
TOTAL
* Parliamentarians were not elected in 6 constituencies
Source: Results of the Elections to the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on
24 February 1990. Tiesa, 1 March 1990, Results of the Elections to the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Lithuania on 7, 8 and 10 March 1990. Tiesa, No. 60 (14279), 13 March
1990.
All of the parties, with the exception of the hard-line Communists,
supported the reestablishment of statehood and were therefore broadly endorsed by Sąjūdis (including the Social democrats, the Christian
democrats, the Democrats Greens and part of the reformed LKP).
Striving for the reestablishment of independence drove a wedge
between Moscow and the National Front. The LKP held moderate
attitudes and moderating positions.
In sum, the first political conflict was directed at the Soviet Union
rather than among proto-parties within the country. However, the moderate positions of the LKP were the first sign of political difference that
gained momentum later. The period of 1988–90, in a way, draws upon
the national revolution (Lipset and Rokkan, 1990) and the centre
(Moscow)/periphery (Lithuania) split, where all parties but orthodox
Communists could be regarded as anti-systemic ones. Prevailing political discourses, cooperation-friendly patterns and the first parties filled
the ‘empty boxes’ of the Left/Right axis with the salient problem of
15
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
independence and statehood. This vanished after they had been achieved
in 1990 and consolidated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 1991.
The political conflict was conducive to cooperation, as it was based on
psycho-emotional affinities rather than pragmatic rationale.
Value-laden Conflict Takes Root
Independence had been achieved, though it remained a sensitive area
in politics. Political issues in the early 1990s inherited a lot from the
first political conflict. This, in turn, differentiated between the different political forces. Anti-communist and de-Communisation ideas
stemmed from Sąjūdis after 1990.14 They were based on different values of justice to and from the past and contradicted those of the political elite. Many people connected with the CPSU in one way or another did not consider themselves ‘enemies of Lithuania’, the label
Sąjūdis frequently ascribed to their political opponents. Politicians
disagreeing with de-Communisation ideas stemming from the ‘Right’,
set up factions in the Supreme Council/Constitutive Assembly. The
first faction to have appeared in June 1990 was the Sąjūdis Centre faction. By May 1991, there were 7 factions in the parliament, which
turned became the nuclei for new parties.15 A different assessment of
Soviet legacies, geopolitical orientation, the pace of economic reforms
(Mikkel 1998) and the political system16 drove a wedge between the
‘leftist’ LDDP and LSDP on the one hand, and the ‘rightist’ Sąjūdis
(the Conservatives from 1993) and Christian democrats on the other.
The leader of the National Front, Vytautas Landsbergis, led the radicalisation of politics, since he called for a ‘witch hunt’ of opponents on
the Left. The emotional load of this conflict penetrated society, which
tended to support the leading representatives of the political conflict,
14 Politicians of Sąjūdis extensively applied the term ‘Communist’ to denigrate
political opponents. All of Sąjūdis’ opponents therefore formed a ‘Communist’
camp, which consisted of: the LDDP and LSDP, but also included the liberals
and the Center Union.
15 “On the eve of the elections of 1992, there were already nine parliamentary factions. Seven of them were by-products of Sąjūdis <…>” (Krupavičius and
Žvaliauskas 2003).
16 Leftist parties advocated for parliamentarism, whereas Sąjūdis stood for a strong
political leader, namely the president.
16
VALUE-LADEN CONFLICT TAKES ROOT
namely Sąjūdis/TSLK and LDDP for a number of years. Few parties had
institutional networking and coherent ideological standpoints. Moreover,
they had emerged not as political representations of cleavages, but rather
as society-detached organisations. This posed difficulties when lining
them up for anything but value-laden criteria generated by political actors
(Jurkynas 2001). The four largest political parties17 resembled catchall or
‘people’s’ parties18 appealing to broad electoral segments.
The radicalisation of Sąjūdis and the factionalisation and fragmentation of the Supreme Council/Constitutive Assembly in 1990–1992
increased the polarisation and centrifugal competition of the nascent
party system. The Communist/anti-Communist division usurped the
political conflict.19 The positions of the LDDP on the left and Sąjûdis
on the right were unable to compromise. In addition, there was bickering between leftist groups.20 For example, LSDP officially blocked
LDDP membership in the Socialist International in the early 1990s.
The polarized confrontation between ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ with Communist/anti-Communist discourses, low coalition potential21 and new
emerging parties in opposition to the radicalisation of Sąjûdis disclosed the entrenchment of the value-laden conflict. The electoral
pendulum22 shifted over several elections in a row between the main
17 The LDDP, LSDP, Sąjūdis and the Christian democrats.
18 The ‘Catch-all’ image was also visible in 1996 as the four largest parties, the
LDDP, TSLK, LKDP and LSDP including smaller the Center Union and the
Liberal Union, indicated that their electorate was ‘everyone’ or ‘all layers of
society’ (Piliečių pasirinkimas, Lietuvos rytas, 1996 October 12).
19 This division was also accompanied by the geopolitical orientation of the political actors (East/West) or confrontation between ‘radical/moderate reforms’.
The Left advocated Lithuanian relations with the post-Soviet countries (‘East’)
and moderate economic reforms.
20 For Social democrats the ‘left’ was a classical concept, whereas for the LDDP
it meant ‘nomenklatura and the Communist past’.
21 Cooperation between Sąjūdis/TSLK and the Christian democrats was driven
by close value-laden criteria rather than political necessities or socio-economic
affinities.
22 On the micro electoral level there was no pendulum effect whatsoever as voters
did not shift their preferences drastically, but rather abstained from voting
(Degutis, 2001)
17
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
carriers of political conflict – the LDDP and Sąjūdis.23 It is hardly surprising that this value-laden cleavage dominated post-communist
Lithuania’s politics, as the crystallisation of social and economic interests was far from complete (Hellèn, Berglund and Aarebrot 1998, 368).
On the other hand, Sąjûdis saw a strong and well-organized ex-Communist party as the key political rival and deliberately developed
anti-nomenklatura sentiments.
Political tensions mellowed in 1992, when political parties reached
agreements about the drafts of the Constitution, the electoral system
and a pre-term parliamentary election. Parties for the first time
became the real electoral choice, as in the Constitutive election of 1990
nearly all of the parties called for the same objectives: independence,
democracy and a market economy. Electoral coalitions in the general
election of 1992 were scarce. Only two rightist coalitions led by Sąjūdis
and the Christian democrats overcame the four percent threshold.24
The electoral outcome of the 1992 parliamentary elections was
favourable to the Algirdas Brazauskas-led LDDP, which won an
absolute majority of parliamentary seats25 and formed the government.
Sąjūdis lost the leading positions due to its fragmentation, controversial economic reforms and a hypertrophied political odium towards its
opponents, as Landsbergis and his political entourage resorted to the
rather Bolshevik principle of ‘who is not with us is against us’. The
electoral campaign of 1992, and the ensuing political quarrels at the
parliament, focused upon the same political conflict between the
Communists and anti-Communists. No new political organisations,
apart from the main quadruplet of LDDP, LSDP, Christian
Democrats and Sąjūdis, entered the political arena. There was no
space for new parties as a “black and white” worldview provided a too
simplistic political conflict (Vogt 2003) generated by Sąjūdis. The
LDDP and Sąjūdis possessed a rather strong organisational set up,
23 Conservatives (TSLK) since 1993.
24 Coalitions in 1992 won 17.5%, in 1996 – 2.1% (Žeruolis 1998, 124) and in 2000
– 72%.
25 The LDDP attracted over 800.000 of votes, totaling in 73 parliamentary seats
out of 141.
18
VALUE-LADEN CONFLICT TAKES ROOT
a ‘mass party’ character and absorbed the political conflict on dualist
value-laden criteria by preventing the emergence of new parties. The
period 1992–96 was marked by fierce quarrels between the LDDP on
the one hand and the LKDP, Sąjūdis and the Social democrats on the
other. Both rightist and leftist opposition to the LDDP stressed faulty
privatisation schemes favouring nomenklatura, corruption and lenient
attitudes towards former USSR countries, again along the same lines
of Communist/anti-Communist political conflict. Yet, the rightist
politicians did not stress the opposition in socio-economic terms since
the LDDP and all other governments, despite their ideological colouring, have been implementing reforms for the sake of marketisation
anyway.26 Instead, the rightist opposition retained moral, value-laden
criteria opposing the ‘Communists’ representing nomenklatura.
Coalition practices after the election were scarce as only the LKDP
and Sąjūdis cooperated, but only on the basis of opposing the
“Communists”, which included the Social democrats, although they
also opposed the LDDP.
Nil Novi Sub Sole: Ghosts of the Past Prevail
The electoral pendulum returned the Right to power in the Seimas
election of 1996. The Conservatives, led by Landsbergis, won an
absolute majority and formed a government.27 The election results signalled the persistence of value-laden conflict – although to a lesser
scale. Opinion polls from 1996 indicated that 56,7% of respondents
identified the LDDP with “representation of nomenklatura” and
46,9% with “orientation to the East”; whereas 46,8% of respondents
considered “orientation Westwards” as the main political feature of
the TSLK (Degutis, 2001). Polls of the political elite from 1994–1996
revealed that the ideological cleavage was tenacious (Žeruolis 1998,
96–99). Retrospective voting patterns, that is, voting ‘against’ parties in
26 Both the EU and the US recognized Lithuania as a market economy in 2001–
–2002.
27 The TSLK received 70 mandates in the 141-seat parliament. However, 4 constituencies did not elect any candidates as the turnout was lower than 40% and
the elections were not qualified as valid. The elections in these constituencies
were organized in 1997–99 but three parliamentary seats remained free.
19
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
charge and favouring opposition, confirmed the prevalence of valueladen conflict. Political behaviour, discourses and market reforms of
the Conservatives were very much oriented against the East.
Suspicious privatisation deals favouring homeboys or Western
investors at the expense of economic logic28 marked the Conservative
rule and coloured the political conflict. Scarce pre-electoral coalitions among marginal parties disclosed low coalition potential, due
to irreconcilable values of justice and morality towards the Soviet
past. By the same token, the Conservatives controlling the Seimas
did not need a coalition partner. However, the Christian democrats
entered the government based on their value-laden affinity as
before.29 The Centre Union was the only new party to squeeze in
among the four established parties in the parliament. Its success was
the very first signal that there were voters dissatisfied with political
discourses driven by the Left and the Right. The gradual increase of
electoral ranks supporting the Centre Union was a sign of the openness of the electoral market, not to mention a symptom of the low
voter turnout.
80
70
60
50
40
30
75,3
58,6
71,1
52,9
54,2
44,8
53,9
39,9
nic
ipa
l
2002
Mu
rlia
me
nt
2000
Pa
nic
ipa
l
l
ipa
nic
2000
Mu
Pa
rlia
me
l
1997
Mu
1996
nt
1995
ipa
nt
me
rlia
Pa
Co
n
stit
uti
ve
1992
nic
1990
Mu
Percentage
Voter turnout in elections, 1990–2002
Source: Central Electorial Commitee of Lithuania.
28 The most notorious privatisation case was that of the oil refinery “Mažeikių
nafta”. It involved the US company Williams International. The deal imposed
hundreds of millions US dollar costs for the operation and business risks upon
the government and gave no guarantees from the US company in return.
29 The Center Union became a coalition partner too, because of the Conservatives’
whim of having a center-right pseudo oversized coalition vis-à-vis the Left.
20
“NIL NOVI SUB SOLE”: GHOST OF THE PAST PREVAIL
Apart from rural votes elevating the Lithuanian Peasants’ Party (LVP)
in local elections, no other issue dimensions can be associated to the
main parties. Comparing parliamentary voting patterns with those for
the municipal election of 1995, we can see that the votes received by
the LDDP, LSDP, LKDP and TSLK shrank from 67.1 to 55.8%,
indicating less electoral backing for party system polarisation and its
value-laden conflict. The main carriers of the political conflict – the
LDDP and Sąjūdis/TSLK – lost their electoral support and seats in
the parliament after each general election.
ūdis/TSLK combined, 1992–2000, %
Seats and votes of LDDP* and Sąjū
100
72,5
80
59,9
60
Seats in the parliament
62,2
40
42,6
Votes received
20
39,7
39,3
0
1992
1996
2000
* The LDDP and LSDP formed a Social democratic coalition in the 2000 election
and the parties merged into LSDP in January 2001.
Source: author’s calculations.
The distribution of the relevant political parties along the value-laden/ideological
dimension, 1990–199830
“Communist”
“Anti-communist”
LSDP
LDDP
Sąjūdis/TSLK
LCJ/LCS
LVP
LKDP
Source: author’s calculations.
30 The placement of parties is based on their ideological self-understanding, behavior towards other parties and identification among voters (Research on political
culture, 1996; Žeruolis 1998, 12–9–131). Black boxes portray parties with low
parliamentary representation.
21
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
Farewell to Value-laden Conflict?
The parliamentary election of 2000 followed the changing political
conflict, manifested in the local election of 2000. Four parties passed
five percent multi-member constituency threshold. The winner of the
election was the block of New Politics (Naujosios politikos blokas)
consisting of the LLS, NS, LCS and a marginal Modern Christian
Democrat Union. In his annual address to the Seimas in 2000, president Adamkus criticized the style and performance of the Conservative-dominated parliament and raised the idea of a ‘new politics’ that
could break the old patterns of conflict. (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004).
The pre-electoral coalition answered the call of the president for ‘new
politics’ and enjoyed his political blessing by forming the government.31 Social democrats regained their popularity with the comeback
of Brazauskas from political retirement and the Conservatives lost
severely with a drop in support from 29.8% to a meagre 8.6%. Electoral
support ebbed away from the key carriers of the old political conflict,
leaving them with their lowest combined result. Political discourses
during the election did not evoke old conflict patterns and concentrated on social and economic reforms instead (Partijų programos 2000).
Increased voter volatility and the emergence of new political actors,
without ties to the value-laden approach32, pinpointed the emerging
changes of the Left/Right issue dimension.
Electoral volatility in parliamentary elections, 1996–2000, %
1996
2000
25.6
41.2
Source: Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003.
Coalition potential has strongly increased as shown by the fact that
72% of the votes cast went to cooperation minded parties: the block of
31 The ‘New politics’ block crumbled in June 2001 after the New Union withdrew
from government and formed a coalition with the Social democrats. Their
leader Brazauskas is the current premier.
32 Comparing the general elections of 1992 and 2000 the electoral loss of the rightist parties was 21%, of leftist ones – 51% (Degutis, 2001).
22
FAREWELL TO VALUE-LADEN CONFLICT?
’New Politics’ and the Social democratic camp. The NSSL and LLS
pushed out two “established” parties – the Christian democrats and
the Centre Union.
Effective number of legislative parties, 1990–2000
5
4
3
2
2,99
3,52
4,04
1,98
1
0
1990
1992
1996
2000
Source: Herron 2002, 14; Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003.
Issue Dimensions at the Presidential and Municipal Levels
Semi-presidentialism33 and an electoral system that has single-mandate constituencies elevated the political salience of personalities, who
have also affected political conflicts. In the early 1990s, personalities
rather than parties captured the attention of the electorate. Parties
were organisationally and ideologically underdeveloped, electoral
experience was low and politicians became the primary targets of selfidentification. Presidential competition is expected to influence the
character of divisions not just by the effect of the winner-take-all outcome and institutional or informal incentives to two-person races, but
also by personalising political disputes (Evans and Whitefield 2000).
In such a case, a presidential contest could influence the political conflict since politicians could choose salient discourses. In the presidential
election of 1993, Brazauskas and the Lithuanian diplomat Stasys
Lozoraitis ran for t office. Campaigning rhetoric indicated adherence
to the old issue divide. Value-laden conflict, with the different positions
towards the country’s relations with the East or West, was strengthened
by the fact that according to the Constitution, the president’s main
33 Lithuania is considered to be a semi-presidential regime, although the parliament possesses more authority than the president.
23
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
activity domain is foreign policy. The majority of centre-right parties cast their support for Lozoraitis in order to prevent namely “the
Communists” from winning the presidency. The political support
for candidates did not require any specific form of cooperation and
joint positions occurred on an ad hoc basis rather than after longterm collaboration practices. The presidential election in 1997
became a signal of the changing political conflict. The main targets
and engines of the value-laden conflict, Brazauskas and Landsbergis, ceded the top political office, as Brazauskas did not participate34 and Landsbergis lost in the election. The loss of the TSLK
leader, following low electoral support for the party, reduced the leeway of the Conservatives to exploit the value-laden. Two political
outsiders35 Valdas Adamkus and Artūras Paulauskas attracted 72.3%
of the votes in the first round. The political tensions were far from
political strain in the first round, though there were plenty of allegations about Paulauskas as a representative of the new nomenklatura.
The new Lithuanian president, the expatriate from the US Adamkus,
retained a liberal creed and kept aloof from the Communist/antiCommunist divide during his term in the office, contributing to the
reduction in value-laden conflict. The last presidential elections of
2002 confirmed that the old political conflict has ebbed. No parties
appealed to the ‘Communist’ past and a socio-economic problematique flavoured with populism prevailed in the pre-electoral discourses. The election also elevated the conventional issue ‘go
West’36, regional discrepancies and anti-Establishment voting tendencies, indicating the weakening ability of political actors to shape
political conflicts.
34 Brazauskas refused to run for president and urged voters to choose new and
young politicians, favoring Artūras Paulauskas.
35 Adamkus was supported mostly by the Center Union whereas Paulauskas was
supported by the LDDP, LVP, LLRA and LMP. Paulauskas and his followers
established the New Union/Social liberals (NSSL) after the presidential election.
36 Lithuania was been invited to NATO in November 2002 and to EU in
December 2002. All major political parties in Lithuania support Lithuanian
membership in NATO and EU. It is interesting to note that despite the level of
polarisation, a majority of political parties approved of “macro” consensus
issues, 1988–1990: “independence” → 1990-onwards: “democratisation” and
“market economy” → 1994 – onwards: “Euro-Atlantic integration”.
24
ISSUE DIMENSIONNS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS
The municipal elections37 are a moot question in the evaluation
of the Left/Right dimension. Campaigning rhetoric in local elections
is usually less politicized and deals primarily with bread-and-butter
issues. The proportional electoral system and ‘local visibility’ of politicians is conducive to a higher number of parties countrywide than
after general elections. The voter turnout in local elections is as a rule
low (48.2% an average) as voters, apart from a general distrust in politics,
see municipalities as politically supervised by the government.
It is hard to trace the coalition potential on the municipal level as
the majority of local council governments had been led by coalitions
that differ from coalitions on a national level. Pre-electoral coalitions,
too, differ from constituency to constituency. On the other hand, local
elections can in a way disclose tendencies of electoral preferences,
especially before an upcoming general election. New parties have so
far had to first appear in the municipal elections prior to the vote hunt
on the grander scale. The municipal election of 1995 confirmed the
tendencies of value-laden political conflict as the Conservatives and
the Christian democrats received a lion’s share of votes. On the other
hand, since 1992 votes cast for the four main parties representing the
value-laden political conflict has been gradually plummeting.
Percentage
Votes received by the LDDP, LSDP, LKDP and TSLK, 1992–2002
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
83,9
69,4
67,1
36,7
55,8
1992
1995
1996
Source: author’s calculations.
1997
2000
43,2
34,7
2000
2002
The Peasants’ Party and the Centre Union are new parties in Lithuanian politics. They scored 7% and 5% respectively in the local election
37 Data on the first local election of 1990 is not available as, according to an e-letter from
the head of the central electoral commission, Zenonas Vaigauskas to Mindaugas
Jurkynas on 11 December 2002, “archives remained at municipalities <…> whereabouts of some documents is unknown and might be lost beyond retrieval.”
25
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
of 1995. The LVP represented rural interests, although many rural voters tend to flock to leftist parties. The number of votes collected by the
four major parties increased to nearly 70% in this election, thereby still
showing the supremacy of elite-driven problem-engineering over sociological factors. Pre-electoral cooperation or party alliances were also
not popular. Quite a few parties in different constituencies led to fragile and unstable coalitions, driven rather by the necessity to form local
government than cooperation practices. The number of parties with at
least 4% of votes cast increased from 6 to 8 between the local elections
of 1995 and 2000, and remained the same in 2002.
Electoral support for major parties 1992–2002, % of valid votes cast
1992
Parliamentary
LDDP
LSDP
44
1995
Municipal
1996
Parliamentary
1997
Municipal
2000
Municipal
2000
Parliamentary
2002
Municipal
16.9
9.5
14.9
11.1
31.1 5
See 6
5
17.1 6
6.1
4.8
6.6
9.2
6.6
See
Sąjūdis/
TSLK1
21.2
28.8
29.8
33.2
12.7
8.6
LKDP
12.6 2
16.6
9.9
12.1
6.3
3.1
LKDS
3.6 3
N/A
3.2
0.34*
See 4
3.8
See 7
LVP
-
7.0
1.7
5.6
13.4 4
4.1
8.0 8
LCS
2.5
5.0
8.2
9.1
11.1
2.9 10
8.7 9
10
12.6 9
LLS
11.2
6.35 7
1.5
2.7
1.8
3.6
10.6
17.3
NSSL
-
-
-
-
17.3
19.6 10
7.5
LDP
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.9
* the percentage of seats at local municipalities
1 – TSLK has institutionalized Sąjūdis into a political party in 1993, 2 – LKDP led coalition, 3 – LKDS led coalition, 4 – Coalition of LKDS and LVP, 5 – Coalition of LDDP
and LSDP, ND and LRS, 6 – Merger of LDDP and LSDP, 7 – Merger of LKDP and
LKDS into LKD, 8 – Merger of LVP and ND, 9 – These parties and MKDS have merged
into Liberal and Centre Union in May 2003, 10 – The block of ‘New Politics’ with LCS,
NSSL and LLS continued cooperation after the election and formed the government.
Source: author’s calculations.
26
ISSUE DIMENSIONNS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS
The local election of 2000 brought new parties into the limelight. It
represented not only changes in the party system but also in the political conflict. The New Union (NSSL) and Liberal Unions, led by the
young and charismatic leaders Paulauskas and Rolandas Paksas
respectively, smashed into politics with the LCS and LVP scoring
52.4% aggregated voter support. Only the LKDS and LVP cooperated
before the election, partly on affinities in social spending and targeted
electorate and partly on ad hoc agreements of political leadership.
However, the cooperation potential in the local election of 2002
peaked, as three major mergers between ideologically akin parties took
place.38 One new party, the Liberal Democrats (LDP), received electoral attention after withdrawing from the Liberal Union. The LDP
consisted of a handful of political opportunists whose connections
with shady economic and ostensibly eastern capital posed more questions than answers during the campaigns of 2002.
Current distribution of relevant political parties in the two-dimensional model39
‘Anti-Communist’
LKD
LSDP NS
TSLK
LDP
Left
LiCS
Right
LVP
‘Communist’
Source: author’s calculations.
38 The LSDP and LDDP merged into the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
(LSDP), the LKDS and LKDP into the Lithuanian Christian Democrats (LKD).
The LVP and the New Democracy also concluded an alliance with the Seimas.
39 The spatial model of the parties is based on their stand vis-à-vis each other.
Black blocks indicate parties with low parliamentary representation. The dotted line represents the vanishing value-laden political conflict. Also see
Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003;
27
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CONFLICT
The period of 1990–1997 disclosed the viability of the value-laden
political conflict on the Left/Right dimension.40 Ideologically driven
political disputes and behaviour mainly referred to the ‘Communist/
anti-Communist’ discourse. Cooperative practices both before elections
and at the parliament were meagre. Only the rightist TSLK and LKDP
were inclined to collaborate and then only on an anti-Communist basis.
Party mergers were absent. No new parties, apart from the Centre
Union and the LVP (in local elections), were sandwiched into the policy-making. The four main parties – the LDDP, LSDP, LKDP and
TSLK – received, on average, 69% of the vote in 1992–1997. An intransigence of opposing political poles coincided with polarisation, though
diminishing, as compromises were hard to achieve in the ideologically
heated atmosphere. One piece of survey-based research concludes, “it is
obvious that issues outside socio-economic conflict dominate the Left/
Right divide in Lithuanian politics.” (Žeruolis 1998, 130). However, the
picture has started changing since 1997 with new political agendas
appearing. The value-laden conflict polarized society quite clearly and
the decline of the old conflict played havoc in electoral self-identification, as the number of identification-less voters increased substantially
between 1996 and 2001. Difficulties with self-identification correlate
with rather low ‘class’ or cleavage-based voting (Degutis 2001).
Self-identification of electorate on the Left/Right axis, 1996–2001
Year
Identification
Difference
(2001-1996)
1996
1999
2001
Leftist
20,5
13,6
20
- 0,5
Centre
19,6
27,6
15,6
-4
Rightist
35,6
15,5
14,8
- 20,8
31
42
49,2
+ 18,2
No identification
Source: Degutis, 2001, Table 14.
40 Forty-two percent of respondents could not identify themselves on the
Left/Right divide in 1999. Twenty-eight percent considered themselves as of
‘Center’ ideology, 14.8% – ‘Left’ and 15.5% – ‘Right’. (Novagrockienė 2001).
28
ISSUE DIMENSIONNS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS
Although Jakub Zielinski notes the Left/Right conflict in new democracies is about to surface after the consolidation of the party system
(Zielinski, 185), the analysis herein discloses the opposite, since the
Lithuanian party system, with ‘earthquake election’ of 2000 acquired
open perspectives.
Issue Divides and their Politicitisation
‘Cleavage’ is a political division among citizens rooted in the social
system’s structure that affects electoral preferences. Cleavages can
trigger political disagreement and have historically become bases for
party divisions. New parties do not necessarily reflect emerging cleavages, but cleavages need an agent, that is, a party in order to acquire
political salience. The social conflict or issue divide is politicized
when it is translated into politics. In the pre-cleavage post-communist societies there is a difference between ‘cleavage’ and ‘division’, as
the cleavage must be a permanent and non-contingent societal conflict translated by political agents. If the politicisation of social conflicts is rather short-lived, it is an issue divide. On the other hand, the
cleavage dwindles away when parties escalating or representing the
divide are no longer key decision-makers and electoral preferences are
restructured around other political agents. One party can institutionalize more than one social division; moreover, divides are not necessarily bipolar. A party representing an issue divide does not necessarily have to have an adversary (Hellèn, Berglund and Aarebrot 1998,
372). An issue dimension can be politicized even if there is a party
representing just one side of the issue divide. If a majority of parties
and voters support one side of a cleavage it loses its mobilising effect
due to consensus on the issue.
The pioneering dictum of the political sociologists Seymour
Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) established the preconditions for the emergence of party systems in Western Europe. National and industrial revolutions produced structural divisions: national
(centre-periphery), religious (state-church), industrial (rural-industry), proletarian (owners-workers). Only the parties reflecting these
structural divisions were able to reproduce themselves electorally and
29
ISSUE DIVIDES AND THEIR POLITICITISATION
institutionally and gave rise to the modern party systems. The
authors also noted the political ability of parties to engineer cleavages
that do not translate themselves into party oppositions, as they partly depend on the organisational and electoral strategies of parties
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 26–27). Sartori (1969) developed the idea
further by turning the causal logic of the Lipset and Rokkan model
upside-down. For him, parties give visibility and identity for social
divisions rather than social divisions inducing the development of
parties. Politics in such events can be conducted independently
from social structures. Parties are able to politically vivify a cleavage
that can be dying socially (Lipset 1970). In sum, Evans and Whitefield (2000) conceptualized cleavages between social stratification
and its impact on institutions and the political behaviour of political institutions, and their impact on social structures. The first part
of these explanations is ‘bottom-up’, and stresses the relevance of
sociological factors in explaining the nature of political divisions.
The second is called ‘top-down’ because it underlines the role of
elites or institutional factors in shaping divisions (Evans and
Whitefield 2000). In the flattened societies of the new democracies,
parties have been particularly active in engineering political problems independent of societal divisions. Early democratisation will
not necessarily generate clear-cut divisions on functional lines
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 12).
Bartolini and Mair (1990) proposed a definition of ‘cleavage’ that
has been refined by scholarly debates. The cleavage consists of three
aspects: 1. Empirically, it has to be definable in terms of social structure; 2. Normatively, a cleavage is a system of values giving a sense of
common identity to a social group; 3. Behaviourally, a cleavage manifests itself as an interaction between political actors. This study will
mainly take into consideration the empirical and behavioural aspects.
This paper posits that societal divisions based upon socio-economic
interests are inclined to last longer than those supported by public
opinions and without entrenchment in social groups. Electoral support serves as a useful tool for ascertaining the level of politicisation of
societal conflicts and changes in political conflict. Only parties with
4–5% of electoral support in the long run are considered as representing issue divides.
30
MAPPING THE EMERGENCE OF ISSUE DIVIDES
Mapping the Emergence of Issue Divides
Societal cleavages need time to develop into homogenized and socially amorphous post-communist societies. The primacy of politics over
interest crystallisation prompts parties to keep the focus of analysis on
cleavages manifested through representation of, and electoral support
for, parties (Hellèn, Berglund and Aarebrot 1998, 368). A theoretical
landscape of emerging cleavages in post-communist countries (Hellèn,
Berglund and Aarebrot 1998, 371) suits the Lithuanian framework
well. Cleavages from inter-war Lithuania hardly exist, due to the
transformation of Lithuanian society during the Soviet years. In general, parties bear traditional names and attempt to be ideologically true
by appealing to their constituency. However, this has not always been
the case in Lithuania, as many parties in the beginning of the 1990s
possessed a catchall image due to organisational, networking and ideological weaknesses. Historical41, transitional and contemporary cleavages can be traced on the electoral level.
Transitional Issue Divides
The issue dimension of the Soviet apparatus vs. Sąjūdis (and between their
descendants) was depicted above as the dominating value-laden political
conflict between 1990–1997. Sąjūdis coined the basics of this political conflict. The TSLK sometimes exploits the value-laden approach in appeals to
their constituency, which supported the Conservatives with an average
20,8% of the vote between 1992–2002. Electoral defeat and low ratings
forced the party not only to get rid of its anti-Communist stances, but also
to change its flagship: Landsbergis resigned from his chairmanship of the
TSLK in 2003. The political retreat of the Conservatives contributed to the
transformation of the political conflict, because one of the main agents of
the conflict lost political relevance. The Conservatives can no longer
embrace old and out-of-date tactics. Their constituency between 1996–
–2000 consisted largely of city dwellers and the elderly. The numbers in the
constituency with a negative evaluation of the Soviet past was reduced
between 1996 and 2000 (Degutis 2001).
41 Historical herein refers to the “historical” reasoning of Seymour Martin Lipset
and Stein Rokkan (1967).
31
ISSUE DIVIDES AND THEIR POLITICITISATION
Representation of the Religious
The religious cleavage was salient in the interwar period as the political and societal influence of the Catholic Church and the Christian
Democratic party were omnipresent. This party used to play the key
role in politics, until the authoritarian coup of 1926. The Soviet regime
destroyed the political influence of the Church, as secularism and
atheism were official policies in the Communist years. The effect of
marketisation on this issue divide has a lesser importance for raising
political salience, as religious values are less linked with positions on
the market. According to the census of 2001, 79% of Lithuanian society considered themselves to be Catholic. The religious issue has been
politically manifested in two parties: the LKDP and the Lithuanian
Christian Democratic Union (LKDS).42 The opposition of the Catholic
Church to the Soviet regime and its active role in the National
Movement enabled the LKDP to appeal to voters for independence
with religious flavour. Their participation in the constitutive election
rendered the LKDP a certain degree of success. However, after the
reestablishment of independence, the party joined with the Conservatives’ in the anti-Communist conflict. The religious divide appears
to have been politically visible in anti-Communist sentiments rather
than as a representation of religious interests. The withering of the old
political conflict took the wind out of the Christian parties’ sails: the
party did not pass the five percent threshold in the multi-member constituency in the general election of 2000 and lost political relevance.
Backing for them in the local election of 2002 was 6.35% and opinion
polls reveal six percent support.43 A religious cleavage does not seem
to challenge the political conflict and remains the electoral base of
LKD. Christian democratic parties persisted throughout 13 years with
13% of valid votes cast, on average. However, this does not mean that
there is a permanent and noncontingent cleavage. The value-laden
conflict overclouded the real representation of the religious stratum.
The typical voters of the party in 1996–2000 were rural voters of ‘over-60’
42 The parties merged into the Lithuanian Christian democrats in May 2001. The
LKDS was not as influential in politics as LKDP. A splinter of LKDP – the
marginal Modern Christian Democratic Union – was set up in April 2000.
43 http://www.5ci.lt/ratings2/Lit/frameset.htm Visited 13 March, 2003.
32
REPRESENTATION OF THE RELIGIOUS
with primary education (Degutis 2001). The change of the Left/Right
dimension opens perspectives for the Christian Democrats to link
their electoral strategies with religious interests in politics that is still
open for the electoral test in the future.
Urban/Rural Discrepancies
Another social conflict lies along the urban/rural dimension. Lithuania is traditionally regarded as an agricultural society. There were
political parties such as the Farmers’ union and Peasant People’s Party
representing rural interests in Lithuania before World War II (Žeruolis 1998, 124). The conflict overlaps with a protective/free-market division (Hellèn, Berglund and Aarebrot 1998). The transition to the market economy induced the emergence of a landowners’ layer. The
number employed in the agricultural sector shrank from 19% in 2001
to a still socially sensitive 17% (240.000 people) in the middle of
2002.44 However, the GDP share of agricultural production has
dropped nearly four times since 1994. This social structure provides
a basis for a rural cleavage to be exploited by political parties.
25
20
15
10
5
16,6
23,1 20,1
11,9
14,3
01
9,4
20
00
20
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
19
19
95
10
5,9
Ja 20
n. 02
–J
un
e
21,1
94
Percentage
GDP share of the agricultural sector in Lithuania 1994–2001, %
Source: Statistical office.45
The first party to have distinctly manifested itself for the rural dimension was the Lithuanian Peasants’ Party. It emerged in the mid-1990s
and recorded 70.500-voter or 6.6% of votes cast on average between
44 http://www.std.lt/Apzvalga/L00-4-016.pdf Visited March 17, 2003.
45 http://www.std.lt/STATISTIKA/Rodikliai/pagr_rod_met.htm Visited 15 March,
2003.
33
ISSUE DIVIDES AND THEIR POLITICITISATION
1995–2002. The party claims to represent farmers’ interests and stands
for protectionism. Farmers have always been the most sceptical about
the EU and its market-driven logic. The last municipal election again
confirmed that the LVP’s electoral support is mainly in rural areas,
while its support in the cities remained insignificant.46 The party has
not adopted a Scandinavian-style ‘Centre’ party approach. In 2002, it
merged with New Democracy (formerly the Women’s party), which
at that juncture had little to do with ideological affinities. The party
has politicized the rural conflict since 1995. However, it has been more
successful in local rather than national elections, and has never managed to pass the five percent threshold. The LVP’s performance in the
general elections is still a flop, as it has received on average 2.9% of the
votes. Explanations for this state of affairs lie with other leftist parties
like the LSDP, NS, even the LKDP and TSLK who also attract rural
support. Therefore, the representation of rural interests is expressed by
the LVP mainly at the local level, where politics deals less with ideology than on the national level, where rural issues either find political
representation in other parties or are overshadowed by other problematique.
The rural/urban cleavage is gathering a duplex character with the
Liberal Union. The party emerged from political “neverland” in 2000,
driven by its new leader Paksas. The LLS has attracted on average
7.2% of voter support between 1992–2002.47 The party’s constituency
seems to lie in major cities (Degutis 2001). The LLS advocates liberally minded reforms and policies. Even a breakaway of the LDP faction led by Paksas in 2001, did not weaken its popularity. The party’s
support rose from 10.6% to 12.6% between 2000–2002. Whether the
LLS will entrench the issue division remains to be seen, as the relative
success of the Liberals has lasted only since 2000. Furthermore, part of
the Conservative constituency also lies within urban areas. The urbanrural cleavage has not yet, at least according to the available data,
become institutionalized in the party system (Johannsen 2000).
46 http://www.vrk.lt/2002/savivaldybes/rezultatai/rapgsarl_15.htm Visited 17 March,
2003.
47 38% of LLS electorate came from rightist parties and 19% – from the Left (Degutis,
2001).
34
A RIFT IN THE LEFT
A Rift in the Left
The contraposition of the ex-Communist LDDP and the Social democratic parties has been inherent in Lithuanian politics from the very
beginning of the 1990s. The LSDP regarded the LDDP as representing
nomenklatura interests, especially in privatisation, not to mention the
unending squabble over who the ‘real’ Social democrats are. Having
been boosted by the success of cooperation in the local and general elections of 2000, the LDDP and LSDP merged in 2001. Social democrat/Communist bickering now seems to have vanished. The electoral
results indicate two Leftist parties have been the most popular in the
period 1999–2002, receiving, on average 25,4% of the vote. The Social
democrat story bears resemblances to that of the Christian democrats,
as the representation of labour by the leftist parties was again obscured
by the value-laden conflict. Voters more favourable towards the Soviet
past comprised a part of the LDDP and LSDP electorate in 1996. In
general, qualified workers, the unemployed and non-Lithuanians
favour the LSDP (Degutis, 2001). The voting patterns over the past
decade have followed the value-laden conflict and only votes cast for
the LSDP before 2000 could have a different meaning.
Electoral backing for LDDP and LSDP, 1992–2002
45
%
35
50,1
LDDP
LSDP
25
15
TOTAL
44
16,9
6,1
5
1992
21,7 16,1
9,5
4,8 6,6
1995
1996
31,1
24,1
14,9
9,2
1997
17,7
11,1
6,6
2000
17,1
2000
2002
Source: author’s calculations.
Translation of the Ethnic Issue
The ethnic cleavage is mostly significant in divided societies, or where
national minorities are politically active via their respective parties.
However, political issues concerning ethnic minorities in Lithuania
have never stirred as major a concern as in Estonia and Latvia. The
35
ISSUE DIVIDES AND THEIR POLITICITISATION
ethnic composition of Lithuanian society, broad citizenship opportunities and a favourable legal framework preconditioned the absence of
the politicisation of the ethnic issue (Jurkynas, 1997).
%
Change of ethnic composition in Lithuania, 1989–200148
100
80
60
40
20
0
83,5
79,6
7
9,4
1,7 1,2
1989
Source: Statistical Office.
6,7 6,3 1,2
0,7
Lithuanians
Poles
Russians
Belarussians
Ukrainians
2001
The leftist parties are still favoured in general elections among a constituency of the national minorities (Žeruolis 1998, Degutis 2001) and
support for ethnic parties is low. Not one of the ethnic parties has
received more than three percent of the votes cast in general elections.
In local elections the ethnic parties are more successful. The LLRA has
controlled municipal councils in Vilnius and Šalčininkai districts
between 1997–2002. It is worth mentioning that the party landscape of
national minorities is quite fragmented.49
Postmaterialism is not on the Agenda
With the pioneering research of Ronald Ingelhart (1977), postmaterial issues entered the academic discourse. A decent level of socio-economic development in western societies opened the way for concerns
48 The number of Poles in Lithuania shrank from 258.000 to 235.000 and Russians
– from 344.500 to 220.000 in the period.
49 The Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles (LLRA) and the Party of Lithuanian Poles
represent the Polish minority. In a similar vein, the Union of Lithuanian Russians
and the Political Party ‘Russian alliance’ stand for the local Russians. Only the
LLRA remains influential on a local level with roughly three percent of all mandates
in the local council between 1997–2002. The other ethnic parties participate in the
election fragmentarily and their results hover below one percent of mandates.
36
POSTMATERIALISM IS NOT ON THE AGENDA
about “quality of life”. Again, western experiences are not always easily
transferable to Eastern and Central Europe, due to still rather low living
standards. Interestingly though, the first organisations to challenge the
Soviet regime had a superficial postmaterial flavour. Ecology movements were among the first to openly criticize the Soviet regime. The
Greens were the very first to have started questioning the legitimacy of
the regime via ecological rhetoric, especially after the Chernobyl catastrophe in the mid-1980s (Arter 1999). A postmaterialism issue in the
Lithuanian context can be seen in two parties: The Greens and the
Women’s party. The emergence of the Greens in Lithuania in the late
1980s was linked with opposition to the Soviet industrial-energy sector.
Ecological demonstrations expressed political discontent with Soviet
politics rendering political points: the Greens had acquired several seats
after the constitutive election of 1990. In the parliamentary election of
1992, the Greens failed to attract any electoral support and vanished
from the political arena. The early post-communist ecology movement
was emotional and anti-Soviet rather than post-materialistic and support for independence and opposition gave them seats in the Supreme
Council/Constitutive Assembly. The transformation of the economy
and society focused upon material issues as low living standards did not
enable them to search for postmaterial values. On the other hand, ecological ideas during the Soviet period existed, but their political institutionalisation did not go far as the independence issue vanished. Actually, postmaterialism has never been on the political agenda, as it was
first obscured by the reestablishment of statehood and then by the valueladen conflict. High electoral volatility, the relative success of the new
parties and low voter turnout demonstrated the openness of the electoral
market, where the Greens might reconsider their political careers. The
other party that might have theoretically represented postmaterialism
was the Women’s party (LMP),50 established in 1995. The electoral
results of the LMP were far from satisfactory. The party has never managed to gain any seats via party lists in general elections. The key credits
for party support lie rather with the popularity of its leader and the first
50 The party changed its name in 1998 to New Democracy/the Women’s party. In
2000, New Democracy finally merged with the Peasants’ Party and in 2002
became the New Democracy and Peasants’ Party.
51 She received nearly five percent of valid votes cast in the presidential election 2002.
37
ISSUE DIVIDES AND THEIR POLITICITISATION
Lithuanian premier Kazimiera Prunskienė51 than postmaterial values.
Inadequate living standards are not conducive to postmaterial thinking,
as witnessed by low electoral support for the Green and Women’s parties. Finally, it is still remains to be seen whether the hybrid of “rural
postmaterialism” after the merger of LMP with the Peasants’ Party,
whose profile is far from a “centre” image, will be like that of parties in
the Nordic countries.
Personalities and Issue Divides
Personalities became the first objects of political identification among the
electorate after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Society was socially homogenized and amorphous and parties still lacked organisational networking.
The leaders of Sąjūdis and the reformed LKP, namely Landsbergis and
Brazauskas, were the first to have been accredited with personal charisma. The underdevelopment of post-communist parties preconditioned
personal ambitions and a large number of party splinters, factions in the
Seimas and a migration of politicians from party to party. The largest
parties produced a number of splinter parties: the LDDP lost the
Socialists, the LSDP – Social democracy-2000, the Conservatives – the
Homeland People’s Party and the Moderate Conservative Union and
LKDP – the Modern Christian Democrats. Even the Liberals had
a splinter group of Liberal Democrats in their faction in the parliament.
New parties in politics also appeared with the help of politicians. The
NSSL should be grateful to Paulauskas, as his personal charisma after
losing the presidential election of 1997 led to the creation of the party and
its successful results in 2000. The arrival of Paksas to the Liberals was
marked with rising ratings and they became the second largest parliamentary party in 2000. In a similar vein, the comeback of Brazauskas
from political retirement saved the LSDP and LDDP in 2000, and rendered the largest parliamentary group and control of the government
after the general election. Again, the extreme unpopularity of the exchairperson of the Seimas, Landsbergis contributed to the heavy loss of
the TSLK in the same election. With the Constitution and electoral laws
adopted in 1990 and 1992 respectively, two institutional factors reinforced the importance of personalities: the electoral system and the presidency (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004). Single-member constituencies render awards to politicians with larger room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis their
38
PERSONALITIES AND ISSUE DIVIDES
parties. A politician elected in such a constituency holds a stronger position in the party’s organisation. S/he has a direct contact to voters that
increases opportunities for improving personal political performance
despite party politics. Parties, according to opinion polls, have been
regarded as the most distrusted institutions over the last ten years. There
is a legion of examples in Lithuanian politics, when certain personalities
have been constantly elected at the parliament in single-member constituencies in spite of party records. Party loyalty and party membership
rates are also low.52 The ‘presidential factor’ is another feature that reinforces the role of personalities in politics. The president is elected directly by popular mandate and has certain powers in domestic politics. Many
parties view the presidential election as an opportunity for advertising
their respective parties and keeping them in the focus of the electorate,
who tend to cast their votes without considering social and economic
interests, even if they do not expect to win. The presidential election of
2002 revealed that a large section of the electorate did not follow the bidding of the LSDP, LKD, LLS, TSLK and NS and vote for Adamkus in
the run-off, potentially indicating an anti-elite mood. It appears that the
role of the presidency will diminish somewhat as the political game
becomes increasingly routinized and institutionalized (Duvold and
Jurkynas 2004), and voters acquire more electoral experience and cleavages come to play a more important role in politics in the future. The
electoral attachment to personalities again tends to shade the societal
interest crystallisation of social and economic interests.
Cleavages in the Pipeline?
Post-communist societies are marked by the interplay of top-down and
bottom-up approaches.53 In the beginning of the 1990s, political actors
were quite successful at elevating political problems, as the electorate did
not have political experience and did not vote along rational social and
economic interests.54 In the course of marketisation and growing political
52 By 1999, membership ratios in Lithuanian parties were about five percent (Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003). It is far from the west European standards.
53 The theoretical frame of political and societal factors for party systems: see
Evans and Whitefield, 2000.
54 On retrospective voting ‘against’ in Lithuania see Degutis 2001.
39
ISSUE DIVIDES AND THEIR POLITICITISATION
experience, societal factors turned to manifest their role in politics.
Arguably, some issue divides have surfaced and some still can be latent or
overshadowed by other emerging cleavages. Low trust in parties and the
parliament and disillusionment with a democracy that has not brought
a decent living standard has led to low voter turnouts since 1992. The
electoral market is open as voter volatility is high, turnout low and new
parties have been entering politics since 2000. It should not come as surprise then that there is much leeway for political exploitation of the
emerging issue divisions in society. A divide of winners/losers of the transition or, say, a centre/periphery cleavage that in a way overlaps with the
urban/rural divide may politically manifest itself to some extent. Vilnius,
Klaipėda and Kaunas attract over 80% of foreign direct investment and
produce over 60% of Lithuania’s GDP. Unemployment rates in those
cities are far below the national average. It is therefore no wonder that the
LLS rallies its constituency in urban areas. The course of modernisation
has produced a stratum of young, educated, and well-off people who are
barely attached to the nomenklatura privatisation. Their voting preferences tend to favour liberal-minded parties of the Right. Voting results in
the presidential election of 2002 also follow this pattern. President
Adamkus drew his, though insufficient, support in large urban areas and
from the well-off. On the other hand, the ‘losers’ of the market reforms –
the unemployed, low-salary employees, and the rural population – to
some extent, if they participate in elections, express their political attitudes.
Some of them vote for leftist parties and some do not go to elections at all.
Yet, support for Paksas in the provinces was clearly convincing (Prezidento rinkimai 2003). The relative success of the Liberal Democrats and
the fact that a TV comedian came third in the presidential election 2002
reveal an underrepresented societal dissatisfaction – an anti-Establishment mode inherent to the Nordic countries in the 1970s and 1980s.
Issues of integration have not yet stirred political conflicts. Euro-Atlantic
integration is a consensus issue among the political elite and the population at large, confirmed by the 91% ‘yes’ vote in the 2003 referendum on
Lithuanian membership of the EU. Two factors caused this favourable
attitude towards the EU: a geopolitical rationale for participating in joint
European decision-making and hence a distancing from Russian influence; and economic calculations aimed at reaching a higher level of affluence. On the other hand, the nature of EU membership will undoubtedly affect domestic politics and thence fall into political conflict. Due to
40
CLEAVAGES IN THE PIPELINE
the open electoral market and socio-economic grievances of EU-adjustment ‘life’, especially in the countryside, EU-generated conflict could be
absorbed by political parties and represented in politics. EU membership
may also give birth to a certain nationalist backlash in a country that has
so recently surfaced from Soviet domination. Issues of self-determination
in a supra-national EU context might still be politically sensitive, as
according to the New Europe Barometers from 2001, forty-four per cent
of Lithuanians identify primarily with the nation-state (Duvold and
Jurkynas 2004).
Conclusions
Lithuanian politics has preserved a significant degree of stability and
continuity due to one-two party dominated parliaments and majority
governments in the last thirteen years. The fragmentation of the party
system has remained moderate. In this context, political developments
have acquired another dimension with the presidential election of
1997, when the anti-Communist discourse lost political salience. Two
“earthquake” elections in 2000 confirmed the changing political conflict. The electoral strategies of the political elite predetermined which
societal conflicts were relevant for the election as politicians entered
into conflicts that did not always mirror societal conflicts until 2000.
The loss of electoral appeal by political actors representing the old conflict revealed their weakening role in generating and shaping politics
independently from societal processes. The reasoning of Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) on the one hand, and Sartori (1969) on the other, have
interacted as the Lithuanian case has witnessed the interplay of political and sociological factors. The emerging preferences along socio-economic lines resulted in different voting, sweeping away bipolarity and
value-laden conflict. Centre-right parties have surfaced, bringing socioeconomic agendas and neglecting ‘ghosts of the past’. The emerging
coalition-based and merger-oriented practices have weakened the old
value-laden political conflict and brought down-to-earth issues to the
main political discourses. The meaning of the Left/Right dimension
seems to have acquired a classical Labour/Capital shape and is more
cooperation-conducive than the value-laden divide. Entrenching the
socio-economic agenda helps parties to better draft their electoral
41
CONCLUSIONS
strategies towards voters and rivals on pragmatic bases and manifest
societal interests rather than emotional value-laden outbursts. The
socio-economic dimension is also favourable to the crystallisation of
interests in a pre- or semi-cleavage society, as old political conflict has
rather obstructed cleavage politics or ‘class’ voting. The end of the transitional value-laden cleavage manifests itself in a new era of pragmatic
orientation towards interests in politics. However, electoral volatility
has also reached relatively high levels, signalling erratic voting preferences. Against this backdrop of a flattened society and the personalisation of politics, this should not come as a major surprise. From empirical and behavioural points of view, a linkage between emerging
socio-economic interests and voting behaviour has not yet stabilized.
This analysis has identified transitional, historical (religious) and contemporary (urban/rural) issue divides with the highest political profile
whereas the ethnic one has played a minor role. Postmaterial issues are
not on the political agenda. On the other hand, the societal behaviour
of the post-communist transformation, i.e., winners vs. losers of the
marketisation, regional discrepancies or EU adjustment issues might
find their place in politics in the future. On the other hand, the politicisation of issue divides apart, the transitional and partly religious
divide has only existed since 2000. Therefore, it is too early to draw
inferences about lasting cleavages in Lithuanian politics. Volatile voting preferences, the changing party landscape and the structure of
competition, show the inability of societal processes to remarkably
influence political behaviour. Mindaugas Degutis rightly suggests that
societal structure is not changing as fast and as radically as certain party
preferences, and further says that a regression analysis of socio-demographic characteristics explains just 11% of the distribution in electoral
behaviour (Degutis 2001). Arguably, post-value-laden issue divisions
do not seem to challenge the socio-economic character of the political
conflict. They are too new, contain a lesser political salience and are
again submerged into the Left/Right problematique. Instead they
rather serve as normative bases for developing electoral identification.
The open electoral market, weak party organisation and loyalty, combined with high voter volatility, leave open perspectives for structuring
societal conflicts. They are reminiscent of issue divides rather than
cleavages, whose formation is still far from permanent and noncontingent political divisions in Lithuanian society.
42
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The BaltSeaNet is an EU-Research Training Network financed by the Fifth
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. The program encourages research teams from Member States and Associated Countries to
work together on trans-national and interdisciplinary projects. BaltSeaNet investigates the interrelationship of the concepts “Baltic Sea Region” and “Northern
Dimension of Europe” and examines the preconditions and prospects for a further
expansion of regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea area.
BaltSeaNet analyses the influence which the European Union can exert in the
political, economic, and cultural realms over aspirations of regional integration and
how nations with different historical experience, economic and social realities as well
as different patterns of national identity can contribute to the specific development of
the Baltic Sea region. In its search for answers the project combines three disciplines
– economics, political science and cultural science.
BaltSeaNet consists of eight partners: the Humboldt-University in Berlin
(Germany), the University of Copenhagen (Denmark), the University of Gdańsk
(Poland), the University of Helsinki (Finland), the University of Latvia in Riga
(Latvia), Södertörns Högskola (Sweden), the University of Tartu (Estonia), and
the University of Vilnius (Lithuania).
Further information: http://www2.hu-berlin.de/BaltSeaNet
Previous BaltSeaNet Working Papers
2001
1. Carl-Einar Stålvant: The Northern Dimension: A Policy in Need of an
Institution?
2. Leena-Kaarina Williams: The Baltic Sea Region: Forms and Functions of
Regional Co-operation.
3. Peter Stadius: Southern Perspectives on the North: Legends, Stereotypes,
Images and Models.
2002
4. Kazimierz Musiał (ed.): Approaching Knowledge Society in the Baltic Sea
Region.
5. Paul Holtom, Fabrizio Tassinari (eds.): Russian Participation in Baltic Sea
Region-Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad.
6. Magdalena Żółkoś: New Members in the ‘European Community of Values’?
The European Union’s Human Rights Policy Towards the Accession
Countries – a Case Study of Poland.
46
2003
7. Andres Juhkam: Interest Rate Risk Management In Non-Financial Corporations: Estonian Evidence.
8. Fabrizio Tassinari (ed.): The Baltic Sea Region in the European Union:
Reflections on Identity, Soft-Security and Marginality.
9. Indira Dupuis, Journalism in Latvia: A Profession in Transition.