Deterrence Strategy and the Preservation and
Change of the International Order
Amir Lupovici
Department of International Relations
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905
[email protected]
Tel. 972-2-6523825
Paper prepared for presentation at NISA Conference 2007 - Power, Vision and Order
in World Politics. University of Southern Denmark, May 23-25, 2007
Draft: Please do not cite without author’s permission
Introduction
Since 9/11, terrorism has been acknowledged as a grave threat to the preservation of
the international order. But while most practitioners and scholars have emphasized the
threat terrorism itself poses, I argue that attempts to deter terrorism may increase this
threat to the international order. In International Relations literature, it is accepted that
security strategies take part in shaping the international order. However, not enough
scholarly attention has been paid to the constitutive effects security strategies have in
shaping and preserving this order. The importance of emphasizing these effects lies in
the fact that they clearly demonstrate that the international order is not a deterministic
outcome, but rather a dynamic process. Thus, scholars must ask: How do security
strategies and their implementation help to preserve the international order, and how
and when do they produce a change of it?
In order to answer these questions, I will first focus on the deterrence strategy
of states, identifying the different ways in which it affects the international order. I
argue that the emerging deterrence strategy in the post-World War II period helped to
constitute, and thus significantly shaped the international order. Basing my arguments
on a constructivist approach, I assert that the distribution and the internalization of
deterrence ideas have helped to preserve the international order: by preserving the
units of this order (the physical preservation of states), by developing and preserving
the norms promoted by these units (international law), and by legitimizing this order
(sovereignty). I further argue that studying the mechanisms that have helped to
preserve this order also illuminates possible sources of weakness that may lead to a
change of it. In this manner, I posit that not only is the terrorism threat difficult to
deter, it challenges the very dimensions upon which the states order is based and
which deterrence practices helped to preserve in the past.
1
This study has three main parts. In the first, I develop a constructivist
approach to explore the strategy of deterrence. I use the findings of this exploration in
the second part to show how this strategy influenced the international order in the past
— how deterrence strategy constituted and regulated this order and how the
legitimization of this order strengthened deterrence strategy. In the third part, I present
the difficulties in implementing a deterrence strategy vis-à-vis the threat of terrorism,
and discuss how this threat can undermine — and lead to a change of — the
international order.
1. Deterrence Practices and the Preservation of International Order1
A number of theories exist to explain the preservation and changes of the international
order.2 It has been suggested that security strategies and their implementation
determine and then shape the main actors of the international order. However,
although an enormous amount has been written on the questions of how these
strategies preserve the international order and how changes within that order are
derived from changes in the balance of power (Waltz, 1979), the question of how they
constitutively affect the international order has gained less attention. An exception is
Klein’s (1994) argument on how strategies — and particularly that of extended
deterrence — have helped to constitute the international order. This paper aims to
extend Klein’s argument.3 I suggest that because deterrence is a very common
1
Regarding the question what is international order, see (Bull, 1979: 8; Ikenberry, 1991: 22-30).
Some of these emphasize the importance of agents and social networks (Adler and Haas, 1992: 388-9;
Slaughter, 2004: 133) as well as the importance of technological changes (Wendt, 2003).
3
Such an extension is needed for several reasons. First, Klein does not demonstrate clearly the
processes through which strategic studies shaped the international order (Dessler, 1995: 806) and were
distributed to other actors. Second, Klein’s arguments stem from a critical approach. From this point of
view, he is focused on the influences of the extended deterrence of the US on the culture and behavior
of the Western European states (see Klein, 1994: 41, 102, 113, 127) as part of the “Western project” of
common historical identity. In contrast to Klein’s critical approach, I contend that a constructivist
approach allows exploration of the influences of the constitutive and causal mechanisms that shape the
international order, which provides an understanding not only of how strategic practices preserved this
order (as Klein does), but also of how these practices may lead to its change. In addition, beyond
American extended deterrence, I focus on deterrence as a strategic idea that has been learnt and
2
2
strategy and because of its unique development, studying it — and specifically
studying it within a constructivist theoretical framework — demonstrates the possible
influences of security strategies on the international order.
1.1 A Constructivist View of Deterrence: Deterrence as a Norm
I argue that deterrence strategy should be studied as an idea that developed in the
international system during the Cold War. Studying deterrence4 as an idea, and
specifically as a norm,5 may contribute to an understanding of the emergence and
distribution of deterrence strategy as well as of the possible influences these practices
have on the avoidance of violence. Furthermore, it may provide an integrative
solution to the enduring problems — logical, empirical and methodological — of
deterrence theory.6
The flaws in deterrence literature then emphasize the need to explore the
ideational and constructional dimensions of its basic postulations, mainly with regard
to explanations of the success of deterrence strategy. Ideational factors can help to
explain why, in contrast to the assertion of some realist scholars, deterrence strategy
was not a pre-determined outcome: rather, it was advanced through social agents
(Morgan, 2003: 165; Lupovici, 2006: 16-7).7 According to this view, deterrence is a
social practice, and as such is dependent on learning processes that may lead to the
implemented by different states following the experience of the superpowers’ strategic relations. From
this point of view, deterrence practices were much less an intended strategy for preserving the
economical order than Klein concludes (see Klein, 1994: 104).
4
For a thorough discussion of definitions of deterrence, see Morgan (2003: 1-2).
5
For a more detailed discussion of the deterrence norm, see Lupovici (2006). For another view of
deterrence norm, see Freedman (2004). For further discussion of Freedman’s book, see Lupovici
(forthcoming).
6
The methodological problems in classical deterrence literature stem from the difficulties in studying
deterrence success, because it is bound by the tautology according to which deterrence fails when there
is a war. See for example Lebow and Stein (1987:36, 64) and Huth and Russett (1990: 468-73).
7
For example, it can be argued that deterrence strategy serves as a self-fulfilling prophecy or even a
myth (Luke, 1989: 214). Furthermore, deterrence strategy and its development depend upon further
social constructions, such as rationality, threats, and “security”; see for example Luke (1989: 212) and
Nicholson (1992: 4).
3
construction of reality in a way that increases the chances of the success of this
strategy.
Deterrence norm can be defined “as the avoidance of violence based upon
(rational) collective expectations that the practice of violence will lead to a bigger loss
than any achievable benefit. In this sense, deterrence strategy is a norm according to
which actors implement rational choice calculations in order to avoid war. At the
same time, the implementation of rational choice calculations may itself strengthen
the norm” (Lupovici, 2006: 14). Actors may thus define deterrence as rational, and
therefore appropriate, practice.
I argue that the deterrence norm can be traced empirically to the relations of
the superpowers during the Cold War. Since the 1950s, agents (such as academic
scholars) worked to influence the strategic thinking of both superpowers to shift their
emphasis from war-fighting to deterrence by punishment. These ideas were adopted
first by American officials, who then influenced their Soviets counterparts. The
institutionalization of deterrence ideas in the early 1970s is demonstrated in the
convergence of both superpowers toward the strategy of MAD (Mutual Assured
Destruction) and in the SALT I agreements (1972) (Lupovici, 2006: 17-28; see also
Adler, 1992: 104-9; Savelyev and Detinov, 1995: 21-2). I further argue that the
deterrence norm has diffused to other actors in conflict (e.g. India and Pakistan),
which have learned from the practices of Cold War deterrence (see Krepon, 2001: 834).
Norms can influence actors’ behavior in two ways: through their regulative
and through their constitutive effects (Searle, 1998: 28). Analyzing these effects with
regard to the deterrence norm may help to explain how deterrence strategy works.
First, the regulative effects of the deterrence norm, which stem from the mutual
4
expectations the norm creates through processes of teaching and socialization, may
lead to a convergence of ideas and expectations regarding the best strategy for
handling conflict. Over time, mutual expectations that deterrence strategy will work
may reproduce the practices of the norm by supporting the continuous efforts to
maintain a specific structure of force, doctrines, and strategies compatible with the
norm. Second, the constitutive effect of the process of norm internalization is
establishment of actors’ role identities.8 Deterrence practices thus are dependent not
only on the way actors understand each other, but on the way they understand each
other’s roles and, more specifically, on the existence of counter identities (deterrent/
deterred). Over time, the internalization of role identities might also increase the
actor’s ontological security (Wendt, 1999: 131; Mitzen, 2006: 356, 359).
It should be noted that I don’t aim to argue that deterrence strategy must
become a norm to work. Nevertheless, the deterrence norm, through its regulative and
constitutive effects, creates a context within which deterrence strategy and practices
are better understood by the actors, and which may more easily influence the
continuous avoidance of violence. Within such a context of deterrence practices,
rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and
this in turn reproduces this context.
1.2 The Influences of Deterrence Practices on the Preservation of International
Order
Although many actors are not directly involved in conflicts, all are involved — albeit
to varying degrees — in practices of deterrence.9 Following from this, and because
war is an uncommon phenomenon in international politics, disobeying “deterrence
rules” is the exception. In this section, I argue that deterrence practices of the post8
On role identity, see Wendt (1999: 227-8).
Actors are involved in practices of deterrence by implementing this strategy vis-à-vis their opponents,
by implementing extended deterrence to defend an ally, by acknowledging the legitimacy of other
actors to implement this strategy, and/or by being the target of deterrence strategy.
9
5
World War II period helped to constitute and preserve the international order by
influencing three of its foundational dimensions: i) the preservation of this order’s
units (physical preservation of states); ii) the development and the preservation of
rules these units promote (the rules of international law); and iii) the legitimization of
this order (sovereignty) internationally and domestically .
1.2.1 Physical preservation of international order
The physical preservation of states is an important aim from the point of view of
international order, and deterrence strategy is a main force in enabling this
preservation. As the history of the state system demonstrates, deterrence strategies
were used as an inexpensive means of providing security (Bull, 1977: 119-24; Payne,
1996: 77-8; Press-Barnathan, 2004: 200).10 Furthermore, deterrence strategies helped
to maintain the order through the practices of extended deterrence and collective
security (Huth, 1994; Morgan, 2003: 172-202). The significance of these mechanisms
lies in the fact that they helped to “prevent any single power from transforming the
anarchic states system” into a hegemony (Klein, 1994: 25). They also helped to secure
the weaker actors and deal with their vulnerability. It may be argued that the practices
of extended deterrence are limited in their scope, that the weaker actors do not always
receive sufficient help, and that deterrence practices of third parties and collective
actors are not always credible (Lipson, 1994: 107-8; e.g. Huth, 1994; Morgan, 2003:
198-9). However, the existence of these mechanisms and their institutionalization
demonstrates the legitimacy of the international order (Kupchan, 1994).
To further elaborate these arguments, it is useful to view deterrence strategy as
a norm. The ideas of deterrence by punishment were distributed and adopted by
10
For example, these kinds of arguments were raised with regard to the Truman administration and to
Malenkov’s policy in the early 1950s. The reasoning was that deterrence strategy was a way to
preserve security and simultaneously balance the budget (Kratochwil, 1978: 157; Gaddis, 1987: 8;
Hogan, 1998: 265, passim).
6
different states.11 Thus, the dissemination and institutionalization of deterrence ideas,
(which made these practices more common) made the preservation of the state system
an easier task. The norm of deterrence has made deterrence strategy clearer and, by
suggesting the appropriate doctrine and force structure for states in conflict to base
their relations upon, provided a comprehensible (and inexpensive) mechanism
(Buzan, 1987: 150-1, 256-7; Adler, 1992: 110, 116-7)12 for preserving the
international order. The emergence of the norm of deterrence thus demonstrates the
process through which states became more likely to adopt practices of deterrence by
punishment. An example of this process is the strategic change in Soviet thinking and
the institutionalization of deterrence ideas in the SALT I agreements (Adler, 1992:
133-9; Savelyev and Detinov, 1995: 21-2; see also Lupovici, 2006: 21-8).
1.2.2 Strengthening international norms in (and of) the international order
Deterrence practices also worked to strengthen international norms. These practices
promoted two types of norm: i) those directly concerned with sovereignty (such as the
norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention), which I will further elaborate on
in the next section; and ii) other norms that states promoted not directly involved with
sovereignty. Here the logic of the influences of deterrence practices is quite similar to
that of any (state) legal system that aims to punish violators for their deviant behavior
(see Freedman, 2004: 60-8, 136-7 ftn. 1-7). Likewise, in the international arena,
deterring inappropriate behavior with the threat of punishment and with enforcement
mechanisms may strengthen adherence to these norms (Axelrod, 1997: 47; Freedman,
2004: 69, 72-4; see also Bull 1977:ch. 6; Press, 2004: 197). In this way, international
11
See for example Krepon (2001: 83-4), for the argument that states in Asia, such as India and
Pakistan, have adopted the Cold War’s deterrence practices and ideas.
12
The deterrence norm and the evolving deterrence ideas clarified the differences between deterrence
by punishment and other strategies such as deterrence by denial and war-fighting This distinction is
important, because while deterrence by denial is based upon classical views that emphasize the
importance of defense and war-fighting capabilities (Buzan, 1987: 200-1; Snyder, 1961), deterrence by
punishment is based upon a credible threat of retaliation (Schelling, 1966: 69-70).
7
regimes, among others, were used as a deterrent force that could provide “collective
enforcement mechanisms [that] both decrease the likelihood of autonomous defection
and permit selective punishment of violators of norms” (Oye, 1992: 47).
Furthermore, maintaining norms and integrating their ideas into common
practice may lead in the long run to the internalization of the norm (Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998).13 In this manner, regimes not only help to keep the norms they are
based upon (Hurrell, 1993: 64), but they also may over time constitute actors’
identities and change their interests (Wendt, 1995: 72). But the important point for
this paper is that strengthening international regimes reflected an evolving
constitutionalization of the international order (Elazar, 1998: 4, 18-9): the
preservation of various norms (and regimes) reproduced the order and helped to deter
deviant behavior, and so helped to constitute this order. Not only did these processes
make the order’s units (the states) better suited to take part within this order, but over
time they helped to institutionalize these normative ideas, turning them into
fundamental interests of the international order’s units.
The deterrence norm (and deterrence practices) were strengthened by specific
norms that evolved in the international arena — such as the non-use of nuclear
weapons — and at the same time they codified these norms. Nuclear weapons, for
example, came to be defined in terms of deterrence (Price and Tannenwald, 1996:
117-118, 122-5, 135; Farrell and Lambert, 2001; Freedman, 2004: 70-1).
The protection and preservation of international norms, which deterrence
practices enabled, was vital with regard to the international order. On the one hand,
these practices helped to preserve the main characteristics of that order, and on the
other, they allowed for incremental changes within it, providing necessary flexibility.
13
As Johnstone (2003: 442) argues, “Respect for the rules of the international system is the price of
membership. It generates pressure to comply with the law out of a common sense of being part of a
community.”
8
1.2.3 Legitimizing the international order
Deterrence practices also helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the units of the
international order. Legitimization of the international order, which helped to
constitute the idea of sovereignty, was exhibited at two different levels: international
and domestic. At the international level, deterrence practices were the appropriate
means of maintaining and reinforcing the international order (Klein, 1994: 26, 41,
102). In this manner, the acquisition of power not only helped the physical
preservation of the international order, it became a legitimate practice (see in Farrell
and Lambert, 2001: 310).14 In addition, to some extent, and particularly with regard to
the issue of collective security, deterrence may seem a legitimate strategy since “the
aggressor must not go unpunished” (Nicholson, 1992: 79). Domestically, states
practicing deterrence were able to increase their internal legitimization. By
implementing successful deterrence practices, states not only could supply security
for their citizens, they could increase their perceived effectiveness and through this
justify and legitimize these practices.15 In this way, the states that became the (only)
legitimate security provider continuously helped to strengthen both the idea of the
sovereign states order (see also Bull, 1977: 16-9; Weber, 1998: 78) and the practices
associated with deterrence strategy (such as armament and the use of threats).
Although this kind of argumentation is also valid for other strategies, deterrence
strategy is unique in its dual legitimacy: both domestic and international.
Viewing deterrence as a norm therefore helps to further sharpen the
connection between deterrence practices and the international order. The emergence
of the deterrence norm was highly influenced by the view, developed at RAND, that
deterrence is the only rational and legitimate way to think about strategy in the
14
15
Regarding the morality of nuclear deterrence, see (Walzer, 2000[1977]: 260-74; Nye, 1986: 42-80).
Lipset (1981: 77-83) discusses some possible relations between state’s effectiveness and legitimacy.
9
nuclear age (Cohn, 1987: 716-7). In the same way, the institutionalization of MAD
ideas in the SALT agreements established the practice of deterrence as the legitimate
way to handle the superpowers’ relations (Price and Tannenwald, 1996: 142-3; ftn. 64
p. 142). The norm and practices of deterrence (and especially the successful practices
of deterrence) created a context within which actors could easily interpret whether
their opponents were rational actors and whether their aims were to appease or to
escalate to war. This knowledge helped actors enhance the practices of deterrence,
and thus further strengthened the international order These understandings provided
by the norm of deterrence could also constitute the opponent as a legitimate actor with
reasonable aims and interests (see for example Buzan, 2004: 145; Nye, 1987).
Nevertheless, “the cost” of the acceptance (even the tacit acceptance) of this
practice is that the opponent may act in the same way and arm himself. The
legitimacy of mutual armament of opponents may preserve their security dilemma. In
these circumstances, deterrence practices, strengthened by the deterrence norm, help
preserve the international anarchy that states, as Wendt (1992) argues, make. The
security dilemma, preserved by deterrence practices, helps to further reproduce the
anarchical characteristics (and constructions) of international politics. Since in this
view anarchy is fundamental to the international (constructed) order of states (Wendt,
1999: 246-7, 307; Mitzen, 2006: 26, 29), it can be concluded that deterrence practices
help to preserve this order by reproducing deterrence practices and thus “making
anarchy.” In this respect, there are two main complex (and mutual) relations between
deterrence ideas (and the deterrence norm) and the existence of international order:
First, the enhancement of the international order was based upon the
10
assumption of unitary-rational (states) actors (Wendt, 1999: 291-7),16 an assumption
that also defined and constituted the actors in a “deterrence game.” In other words, the
basic view of the units within the international order — which was based upon the
assumption of unitary-rational state actors — made the implementation of deterrence
strategy by those supposedly rational actors highly relevant.
Second, as Klein suggests, the arguments regarding deterrence strategy were
possible because these concepts and ideas “stood in an intimate relationship with so
many modernist conceits — the wall between public and private, the boundaries
between inside and outside, the bifurcation of politics into the domestic and the
foreign.” According to Klein, mutual influences between strategic studies and the
international order helped to constitute this bifurcation (Klein, 1994: 140; passim; see
also Walker, 1993: 151). Hence, I suggest that without this bifurcation, “strategic
actions” would have become meaningless. For strategic action, and therefore strategy,
actors need to have other (strategic) actors confronting them. These boundaries
between the inside and outside (Walker, 1993: 13, 60-2) not only encouraged but
allowed for state’s strategies through the creation of “international rivals” (see also
Hogan, 1998: 1-4). In other words, the anarchic characteristics of the international
order, distinct from the hierarchal domestic environment, generated the unitaryrational-strategic actor who aimed to provide security (Buzan, 1987: 232; Klein,
1994: 21), and at the same time constructed his possible opponents. In this way,
deterrence practices and the deterrence norm were enhanced by the international
order, but they also clarified and stabilized the boundaries between the inside and the
16
As Slaughter (2004: 32) suggests “the conception of unitary state is a fiction, but has been a useful
fiction.” Thus, according to Klein, although the unitary conceptualization is flawed in describing the
international political order today, not only was it a good theoretical tool in the past, but it also
influenced the way that order has developed (see Klein, 1994).
11
outside. In addition, they helped actors to practice “strategy,” to distribute
“strategies,” and to preserve the states and the state system.
The fact that strategy exists vis-à-vis another actor(s) is related to a further
important characteristic of the deterrence norm — the constitution of actors’
identities.17 In this manner, the creation of role identities of the deterrer and the
deterred actors not only helps to preserve the practices of deterrence themselves
(Lupovici, 2006: 15-6), it enhances the various mechanisms suggested for maintaining
and preserving the international order. Deterrence role identities could have these
effects because they are about the creation of order, working as a mechanism against
the “unknown.” As such, deterrence identities are concerned with a willingness that
actions be predictable (Jeonniemi, 1989: 45).18
2. Confronting the Threat of Terrorism: The Difficulties of Deterrence
In order to show how the difficulties in deterring terrorism challenge the international
order, I need first to consider the problems in implementing a deterrence strategy. It is
widely accepted that a successful deterrence strategy is dependent upon three things:
i) the defender’s capabilities, ii) willingness to act, and iii) ability to communicate
these two factors (Morgan, 2003: 15-20). The threat of terrorism poses major
challenges to the establishment of successful deterrence strategy in all of these
criteria.
2.1 The Defender’s Capabilities
The problem with regard to capabilities in implementing deterrence strategy against
terrorism lies in the “paradox of unrealized power” (see Baldwin, 1979), which
concerns the difficulties strong states have in transforming their power in
17
On the importance of the “other” to the constitution of the self-identity, see Wendt (1999: 224-9).
According to Jeonniemi (1989: 45), “On the surface deterrence is about fear, danger, hostility,
duality and bipolarity, but deep down it is a sign of order, a framework for a predictable world and a
joint set of rules for fighting disorder” (my emphasis). See also Falk (1989: 59).
18
12
asymmetrical confrontations (e.g. Paul, 1994). Specifically with regard to terrorism,
the capability problem is the outcome of three interconnected problems: the lack of a
clear target for the use of power; the political interests of these actors, and the
capabilities of the challengers.
The process of identifying targets through which to threaten terrorists in order
to implement deterrence strategy against them emphasizes the basic difficulty
suggested in the paradox. The classical approach of deterrence by punishment
suggests threatening the “value targets” (counter-value) of an opponent, such as
industrial targets or the civil populations (Freedman, 2003: 232-42). However, this
becomes problematic in the context of terrorism because of the different value system
of the terrorist “decision makers” (Davis and Jenkins, 2002: 5).
The second problem stems from the fact that even a successful implementation
of deterrence strategy is limited: not only because of the balance power and the
balance of interests (see Mearsheimer, 1983, Shimshoni, 1988), but because these
actors may want to become the target of an attack in order to justify their cause and
increase their legitimacy and base of support (Paul, 2005: 55; Löwenheim, 2007: 17980). For this reason deterrence strategy may become irrelevant and even
counterproductive, since former deterrence successes may become the precise reason
for terrorists to challenge it, knowing the defender would surely retaliate (Frey, 2004:
33-4; Ganor, 2005: 67).
The third kind of capability problem stems from the terrorists’ abilities. First,
they can transform conflicts into indirect confrontations that allow them to maximize
their relative advantages (Paul, 2005: 55-8). Similarly, even trying to implement
strategies of deterrence by denial — a strategy that involves convincing a potential
attacker (through either counter-force or active and passive defense measures
13
[Freedman, 2004: 37]) that he will not be able to succeed in his attack (Snyder, 1961:
14-5) — rather than deterrence by punishment is also a very limited option when
confronting terrorists. The inadequacy of this strategy stems simply from the fact that
there is no absolute protection for any defender from terror attacks (Frey, 2004: 33).
These problems are further aggravated when confronting suicide terrorism.19
2.2 The Defender’s Willingness to Act
The problem with establishing credibility in implementing deterrence strategy vis-àvis terrorists stems from the difficulty of making an effective threat when confronting
an actor with maximal aims (religious, ideological) (Ganor, 2005: 65; Davis and
Jenkins, 2002: 4-5). This difficulty is evident in particular with regard to deterrence of
suicide attacks (Pedahzur, 2005: 11-2). Furthermore, terrorists may gain a deterrent
posture, limiting the defending state’s ability to make credible threats. The red lines
between Israel and the Hezbollah20 established in 1996 after the “Grapes of Wrath”
operation (Sobelman, 2004: 72, 81) is a good example of this point.
2.3 The Defender’s Ability to Communicate
Another fundamental problem in deterring terrorists stems from the difficulties in
identifying to whom the messages regarding capabilities and credibility should be
directed. Not only is the identity of these challengers often obscure, but, as it has been
suggested, different measures are required for different types of actor: individuals
who commit terrorist attacks,21 leaders of terrorist organizations ordering the attacks22
19
What, for example, would the targets be to neutralize a suicide terrorist? Or what targets should be
defended (and how) to prevent such an attack? (See Pedahzur, 2005: 12; Ganor, 2005: 76). Pedahzur
argues that by using suicide attacks the terrorist organizations are upgrading their violence and
‘”signaling that there are practically no means of dissuading them with traditional approaches”
(Pedahzur, 2005: 12; See also Pape, 2003: 346-7).
20
Although the Hezbollah is not a regular terrorist actor, some of its actions can easily fit the common
definitions of terror attacks; see in Sobelman (2004).
21
For example, Almog suggests the contested idea that demolishing the houses of terrorists (and thus
threatening their families’ possessions) may have a deterrent effect upon them (Almog, 2004-5: 13).
22
These kinds of messages were directed through the assassinations of senior figures in terrorist
organizations (Almog, 2004-5: 14). But although some scholars argue that learning processes may
14
(Almog, 2004-5: 13-4), and states that support and sponsor these attacks (PressBarnathan 2004: 201; Ganor, 2005: 81-2). Different methods of communicating
threats to terrorists have also been suggested (Ganor, 2005: 67): through the legal
system (law, international law, court) as well as the armed forces (Hayes and Weatley,
1996: 13, 19-20). But the fact that these kinds of actors are not always identifiable
further complicates the problem (Paul, 2005: 55). And even if the adversary can be
identified, this may garner media attention and emphasize the terrorist’s existence and
cause, which is one of their premier aims (Frey, 2004: 33).
2.4 Analysis: The Problem in Light of the Deterrence Norm
Elaborating the difficulties of establishing successful deterrence vis-à-vis terrorists in
light of the deterrence norm may help to better understand their sources, and may help
to better explain why states continue to use deterrence practices in spite of their
doubtful efficiency in facing the terrorist threat. Three characteristics of the deterrence
norm may help to explain these difficulties: i) deterrence norm as a learning process,
ii) deterrence norm as a construction of rationality, and iii) the constitutive effects of
this norm.
2.4.1 Deterrence as a learning process
Deterrence, as indicated by the concept of the deterrence norm, is about learning: that
is, actors can learn the ideas of deterrence. Effecting these ideas, however, is not a
predetermined course. It follows then that terrorists can learn deterrence ideas, but not
implement such a strategy with their opponents. The aim of terrorists is to change the
status-quo, while the aim of the practice of deterrence is mainly to preserve the statusquo. Hence, these actors may practice deterrence only in very specific situations,
while in others they merely use their understanding of it to serve their strategic and
increase the ability to deter terrorists (see Almog, 2004-5; Ganor, 2005: 66-7, 74-6), they cannot solve
most of the problems suggested in this section mainly because of the prior maximal aims of these
actors.
15
political interests without attempting to establish such relations. In these
circumstances, the deterrence norm eases the work of these challenging actors,
providing them with a clearer articulation of deterrence ideas and helping them
identify the actors that adopted this norm in relations with other opponents.
2.4.2 The deterrence norm as a social construction of rationality
The norm of deterrence is based upon the process of defining and redefining
rationality. In this manner, the deterrence norm suggests that rationality be used to
avoid wars and at the same time defines the appropriate behavior for rational actors in
a conflict (see Lupovici, 2006: 29).
This process of a creating a common definition of “rational” action (as well as
“rational” actors) has not taken place with terrorists because of their maximal aims
and their distinct notions of “rationality” (Ganor, 2005: 74). For example, preferring
the collective over the individual is a crucial factor in the common definition of
“rational” action. Also, one must acknowledge the value of human life for deterrence
by punishment to work, an acknowledgment that is difficult for fundamentalist actors
(Ganor, 2005: 81). Although this does not necessarily imply that these actors are not
rational (Davis and Jenkins, 2002: 5), it makes it clear that their definition of
rationality is different from the Western definition (see also Payne, 2001: 7-11).
2.4.3 The Constitutive Effects of the Deterrence Norm
While the previous two characteristics of the deterrence norm help to explain why
deterrence ideas were only marginally adopted by terrorists, the constitutive effects of
the deterrence norm help to explain why some states do use it, and why deterrence
practices used by these states become inconsistent. I argue that the internalization of
deterrence norm led to the constitution of deterrence identities (such as the role
identity of deterrer) and therefore helped shape American political rhetoric. The
16
influences of the deterrence norm thus went beyond the strategies of the Cold War.
For example, as Frey argues, “[The American] government often sees deterrence as
the only way of signaling to its own people that it is determined to fight terrorism at
‘all costs’” (Frey, 2004: 41). Furthermore, as Jervis (2003: 318) suggests with regard
to the American war in Iraq, “[P]eople often feel that uncertainty can be best
eliminated by taking the initiative.”
In this respect, the American argument that the war in Iraq is part of the “war
on terror” (2002) further demonstrates the rhetoric of deterrence. According to the
Bush administration, Iraq must be attacked because Saddam Hussein is not a rational
actor and hence is not deterrable (Fleischer, 10.15.2002). Without discussing here
whether or not this postulation is correct (see for example Jervis, 2003: 323-4), this
kind of argumentation exemplifies the use of deterrence to justify actions. For
example, President Bush argued that
[f]or much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War
doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still
apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence — the promise of
massive retaliation against nations — means nothing against shadowy terrorist
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible
when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. (Bush,
1.6.2002)
However, the American strategic arguments regarding the war in Iraq have
not been entirely coherent. In contrast to the above protestation that these kinds of
threats cannot be deterred, for example, spokesman of the White House Ari Fleischer
has explained American strategy: “The President also believes that the use of force
against Iraq will similarly send a powerful deterrent message to terrorists around the
world…” (Fleischer, 19.3.2003). The inconsistency over the feasibility of deterring
these actors can be explained by the compelling rhetoric developed and enabled by
the deterrence norm, which became a discursive tool for the policy’s justification.
17
Another important point can be suggested with regard to Fleischer’s
arguments that using force against (rogue) states may increase the American deterrent
posture vis-à-vis terrorists. Although such a shift can be understood as an attempt to
preserve the international order, as Press-Barnathan (2004: 201) argues, it also
demonstrates the American acknowledgement of the difficulties of deterring these
actors. But more importantly, and in addition to Press-Barnathan’s view of this war
against states as a mechanism of enhancing deterrence,23 I suggest that these actions
can be understood as attempts to return to the well-known practice of deterrence
(against states) simply because states are familiar with it. Therefore, these attempts
cannot be interpreted as a conventional means of establishing future deterrence (and
thus security), but rather as an attempt to provide ontological security and to enhance
the feeling of security. It is thus not surprising, as Press-Barnathan (2004: 205)
argues, that the U.S approach has failed to “win or even come significantly close to
winning the war against terrorism.” My position is that the U.S. has not failed,
because, at least in part, winning the war was not its main aim.
3. Possible Influences of Terrorism on the International Order.
In this section, I show how the difficulties in deterring terrorism challenge three
aspects of the international order: i) the physical preservation of the international
order’s units (states), ii) the norms promoted the international order’s units, and iii)
the legitimacy of sovereign states order.
3.1 Challenges to Physical Preservation
At the very basic level, the inability of states to deter these threats is a challenge to
their preservation, and demonstrating that they cannot efficiently provide security and
23
Press-Barnathan argues that the U.S. tried in the war in Iraq to “devise a new deterrence mechanism
… by shifting the game back from the nonstate actors to the state actors in the system.” In addition she
argues that “[t]he interstate game is the one game it knows how to play. In practical terms that has
meant shifting the focus from an initial emphasis on the terrorist organizations themselves to a focus on
the states that support or may support them ... United States policymakers view this as more familiar
and feel more comfortable playing this game” (Press-Barnathan, 2004: 200-1).
18
protect their own citizens. Furthermore, deterring these actors may become a
dangerous strategy because they can take advantage of those implementing deterrence
strategy, provoking them to retaliate.
It has been argued that a major problem stems from the fact that states are not
suited to deal with threats of non-state actors. As Ganor for example argues, “it is
difficult to deter a terrorist organization. It is much easier to deter a sovereign state, if
only because a state has sensitive targets and numerous interests that can be attacked
… In contrast, a terrorist organization, is, by its nature, clandestine. In most cases its
activists are out of sights and organized in such a way that harming one part of the
organization will not strike a severe blow to other parts of the organization” (Ganor,
2005: 64).24
The above suggestion of threatening states instead of the terrorists themselves
in order to establish deterrence strategy may partially solve the deterrence problems
and even strengthen the international order. It is possible to implement such a strategy
with regard to rogue states that support terrorism, or even to encourage the
establishment of new states instead of terror organizations — as, for example, BarJoseph suggests in advocating a Palestinian state that Israel could deter more easily
(Bar-Joseph, 1998). However, solving deterrence difficulties by transforming the
strategic problem into one of state vs. state is a limited option, because terrorist
organizations can use terror to undermine the international order itself (e.g. al Qaeda,
see Löwenheim, 2007: 175-91, esp. 190-91). In these situations, challenges of
deterrence and challenges to the international order overlap.
24
Similarly, Dagan argues that “a great error is to relate to a terrorist organization as if it were a
terrorist state, which weighs its actions according to the rationale of decisions making process.”
According to Dagan, although it possible to deter terrorist organizations from attacking a certain type
of target or a particular place, he warns against implementing a strategic deterrence against these
organizations (Dagan as referred by Ganor, 2005: 75).
19
As Wendt argues, the dysfunction of states in providing security is one of the
main reasons for the inevitable creation of a “world state” order (Wendt, 2003: 508-9;
see also Wendt, 2005: 589). Although the idea that the creation of a world state is an
inevitable process can be disputed (e.g. Shannon, 2005), the increasing inability of
states to deter these new threats and provide security not only jeopardizes the
threatened states but challenges their legitimacy as security providers.
3.2 Challenges to Rules and Norms of the International Order
Under the threat of terrorism, rules and norms that states have developed to preserve
the international order are challenged. The norm of sovereignty is undermined, as well
as other norms constituting the world states order such as territorial integrity and
monopoly on use of force. Thus, states are not merely limited in dealing efficiently
with these threats, but some of the possible reactions that aim to preserve and restore
the deterrent posture may even erode the international order. For example, even if
attacking states that shelter terrorist groups (such as occurred in the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in 2006) could be justified by the rules of international law, such actions
challenge states’ territorial integrity. The accumulation of these kinds of challenges
may undermine the basic characteristics of the system of sovereign states.
3.3 Challenges to the Legitimacy of the Sovereign States System
Successfully implementing the deterrence norm and deterrence practices enhances the
international order, while difficulties in this respect challenge it. The point is that not
only the cases of actual failure of deterrence could undermine international order, but
even mere attempts to employ such a strategy vis-à-vis terrorists may burden that
order. As will be shown in this section, the inability of states to provide security (and
thus to preserve the norms they developed which constituted the international order)
may eventually invalidate the international order’s legitimacy.
20
At the very basic level, since a state’s legitimacy is, at least in part, derived
from its ability to protect its citizens (Ayoob, 2005: 20), the dysfunction of this ability
with regard to terrorism may erode its effectiveness and legitimacy. If these
challenges become a common phenomenon, the legitimacy of the international order
itself can become threatened.
A second challenge lies in the fact that practicing deterrence with terrorists
gives them domestic and international legitimacy. This is because the practice of
deterrence strategy, and especially mutual deterrence strategy, demonstrates and is
based upon acknowledging the opponent not as an actor that should be eliminated, but
as one with whom at least tacit cooperation is feasible and necessary for successful
implementation of this strategy (Schelling, 1966: 259; Morgan, 2003: 60).25 Because
terrorists challenge both the states they threaten and the states from which they
operate, using deterrence strategy against them increases their legitimacy and may
decrease the legitimacy of the states involved.26 For example, Hezbollah, challenges
the international order not only because it threatens Israel, but because it challenges
the Lebanese government’s role as the actor with legitimate monopoly on the use of
force.
When deterrence failures were few and sporadic, such as occurred during the
Cold War,27 states could better deal with terrorism, and the influence of this threat on
the international order was limited. The view of deterrence as a norm is helpful in
25
Here again the establishment of the red lines with the Hezbollah are a good example. Not only did it
help the Hezbollah to enhance its position within Lebanon (Sobelman, 2004: 21-24), but this agreement
also helped the Hezbollah to increase its international legitimacy. Deterrence practices with the
Hezbollah became legitimate and were even institutionalized in a formal agreement. However, the
process of legitimizing deterrence practices with such an actor aggravates the problems of the states
involved (i.e., Israel and Lebanon).
26
A similar argument was made regarding negotiating with terrorists. Paul (2005: 57) argues that
“when states negotiate with terrorists, they may lend them legitimacy . . . [however terrorists] often
lack legitimacy, both in the societies they come from and in the eyes of the state they target.”
27
For example, according to the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), since 1968
there was a dramatic rise in the number of terrorist attacks and injuries.
21
encompassing the point that deterrence successes28 and failures are cumulative. The
accumulation of deterrence failures effects more failures, because it demonstrates to
other actors that deterrence strategy doesn’t work. This understanding may also lead
other actors to challenge other opponents.
The situation becomes even more complicated if we acknowledge that
terrorism itself can become the norm (Davis and Jenkins, 2002: 4), in which case not
only would it be difficult to deter these threats, but the difficulties in deterring them
would be learned by other actors. Here, Löwenheim makes a significant related point
in his comparison of the political and international arenas. If only a few people break
the law, not only does it not pose a major problem to the state, it strengthens the law
because laws are determined vis-à-vis violators. The same is true with regard to
international rules and norms (see Löwenheim, 2007: 65-6). The problem begins
when the deviant behavior becomes the (new) norm. When such a behavior crosses a
tipping-point, the order can no longer be preserved because of two problems: at the
basic level, if too many people break the law, it may indicate that the norm itself has
been challenged; but since norms should be enforceable by deterrent measures, it also
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms. The same is true in
the international arena. When terrorists are few in number, they do not pose a critical
problem; but when many emerge in the same period at once, the problems they cause
accumulate. In such cases, the inability to resolve the problems leads to problems both
of effectiveness and of legitimacy. In this manner, the state as a security provider may
become obsolete and hence less legitimate. As long as states and their strategies of
deterrence provided security, the distinction of inside/outside was legitimate and even
effective. But such distinction may become less relevant in light of the threat of terror.
28
See for example on deterrence as a myth and a self-fulfilling prophecy, Luke (1989: 214).
22
The inability of states to preserve rules and norms also affects the legitimacy
of the international order. In this respect, the inability to enforce specific international
norms (or rules) challenges not only these specific norms, but also the legitimate
enforcement measures and the bodies responsible for preserving them. Since rules and
norms are mechanisms that generate “order,” and deterrence practices as well as the
deterrence norm are complementary mechanisms in achieving this aim, the inability to
enforce these norms demonstrates to some extent the absence of order.
23
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